IR 05000321/1988029

Insp Repts 50-321/88-29 & 50-366/88-29 on 880820-0923.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operational Safety Verification,Maint Observations & Surveillance Testing Observations & Physical Security

ML20205A185
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	10/12/1988
From:	Menning J, Randy Musser, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205A183	List: IR 05000321/1988029 ML20205A177
References
TASK-2.K.3.18, TASK-TM 50-321-88-29, 50-366-88-29, NUDOCS 8810250418
Download: ML20205A185 (13)

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0 UNITED STATES

[vA 880/%,' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION il

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h 101 MARlETT A STREET, N *' .

t ATL ANTA. GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos: 50-321/88-29 and 50-366/88-29 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos: 50-321 and 50-366 l License Nos: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name: Hatch Units 1 and 2

Inspection Dates: August 20 - September 23, 1988 Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia inspectors: . b. 62 10\)d 4  !

Johqj. Menning, 59nior Resident inspector Date Signed

/ $1dall[ D (441 W /O//2/9%

RandD1 A. Musser Resident Inspector Date Signed Appro.ed by: I .% e . .- w ke iL!fg Farvin V. Sinkule, Chief, Projact Section 3B Date Jigned Division of Reactor Projects

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SUMMARY i

Scope: This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observations, Plant j Modifications, Surveillance Testing Observation ESF System Walkdowns, Radiological Protection, Physical Security, Reportable ,

Occurrences, Operating Reactor Events. Three Mile Island items, Part 21 Report followup, Review of Temporary Instruction 2515/98,and Review of Licensee's Operational Upgrade Efforts.

J Results: No violations or deviations were identified, i

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e 8810250418 881013 PDR ADOCK 05000321 G PNV i

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REPORT DETAILS > Persons Contacted l

Licensee Employees C. Coggin, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager  !

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D. Davis, Manager General Support .

J. Fitzsimons, Nuclear Security Manager  !

, *P. Fornel, Maintenance Manager ,

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O. Fraser Site Quality Assurance Manager i

• M. Googe, Outages and Plann'ng Manager .

l J. Lewis, Acting Operations Manager l

• H. Nix, General Manager

• T. Powers Engineering Manager i D. Read, Plant Support Manager  ;

• H. Sumner, Plant Manager

! S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager l R. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager f Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors

• J. Menning <

R. Musser [

• Attended exit interview

] Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the l last paragrap ! Operational Safety Verihcation (71707) Units 1 and 2 l

The inspectors kept themselves infomed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant !

operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various i

members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits ;

to the control room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints l and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on ;

equipment, controls and switches, annunciator alams, adherence to !

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limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily i

! journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access l

controls. This inspection activity included numerous infomal discussions ;

with operators and their supervisor Weekly, when on site, selected ESF !

systems were confirmed operabl The confirmation was made by verifying l the following: accessible valve flew path alignment, r wer supply breaker ,

! and fuse status, instrumentation, major component leakage, lubrication, ,

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cooling, and general conditio I i

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l General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis. Portions of the control building, turbine building, reactor building, and outside areas were visited. Observations included general plant / equipment conditions, safety related tagout verifications, shift turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security, problem identification systems, missile hazards, instrumentation and alarms in the control room, and containment isolatio In the area of housekeeping the following discrepancies were observed by the inspector and brought to the attention of ccgnizant licersee personnel: On September 7,1988, a pile of erpty cardboard boxes was noted on the floor in the area of the RWCU precoat tank on elevation 185 in the Unit 2 reactor buildin On September 7,1988, apparently contaminated water was observed on the floor under a capture funnel attached to valve 2C11-F002A, This CRD hydraulic system valve is located on elevation 130 in the Unit 2 reactor buildin During this reporting period, the inspectors reviewed the licenste's controls on overtime of personnel who perform safety-related functior: Section 6.2.2.g of the technical specification establishes requirements for the control of such overtime, and Section 8.4 of licensee procedure 30AC-ops-003-05, "Plant Operations," provides implementing instructions to support the technical specification requirements. The inspector reviewed a Health Physics and Chemistry Department Overtime Deport for the month of I August and determined that technical specification and procedural

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requirements had been me Particular emphasis was placed on conformance with the requirement that overtime deviations be approved in advance by the Plant lianage As previously reported in Inspection Report No. 50-321,366/88 22, the licensee continues the effort to repair the Unit I spent fuel pool liner leak. The impressions in the fuel pool liner bottom surface mentioned in Inspection Report No. 50-321,366/88-22 were repaired on August 13-17, 1988, using undarwater welding. It appears that this attempt to stop the liner leak was unsuccessful, as there was n0 appreciable change in the liner leakage rate of 4.7 gpm. The licensee is currently using "high-tech" sonic equipment to map the various frequer,cies heard in tha fuel pool in an effort to locate the liner leak. The inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's progress in repairing the spent fuel pool liner lea _ __

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i At 1615 on September 4, 1988, Unit 1 automaticall,,y scramed from approximately 66 percent of rated power. The "B RFP controller

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malfunctioned resulting in a scram on low reactor vessel water level. The speed of the "A" RFP had unexpectedly run back to 2000 rpm approximately 15 minutes prior to the scram. Control room personnel were in the process !

of recovering from the RFP runback at the time of the scram. This scram ;

is discussed in paragraph 10. The restart of Unit 1 comenced at 0920 on

September 5, 1988, following the completion of initial corrective action Criticality was achieved at 1449 on September 5, 1988, and the Unit 1 main generator was synchronized with the grid at 0100 on September 6, 198 ,

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No violations or deviations were identifie I

3. Maintenance Observations (62703) Units 1 and 2

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During the reporting period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance

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activitie The observations included a review of the work documents for adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the sctual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and adherence to the appropriate quality control The primary maintenance observations during this month are sumarized below:

Maintenance _Activig Date t Connecting of power leads to RHRSW 08/26/88 -

pump IE11-C001D per MWO 2-88-3368

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Modification of Core Spray system pipe support 09/08/88 l 1E21-CSH-22 per MWO 1-88-4471 (Unit 1)

I' Motor actuator characterization of RCIC 09/09/88 turbine steam valve 2E51-F045 (Unit 2) i

l Repair of main steam line radiation 09/13/88 l monitor 1011-K603A per MWO 1-88-5332 I (Unit 1) 7 l

No violations or deviations were identifie !

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] 4. Plant Modifications (37700) Units 1 and 2  ;

I The inspectors reviewed documentation packages for selected DCRs that had been implemented and closed by the licensee. The review included '

verification that the design changes had been reviewed and approved in accordance with the technical specifications and 10 CFR 50.59, controlled l i;

by approved procedures, and verified by appropriate post installation

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testing and/or inspections. The review also included verification that '

plant procedures, operator training programs, as-built drawings,

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preventive-maintenance programs; and the ISI/IST programs were revised, as

appropriate, prior to the modification being declared operabl The DCRs involved in this review was identified by the licensee as a Nos. 85-74,85-110, and 87-8 No violations or deviations were identifie : Surveillance Testing Observations (61726) Units 1 and 2 The inspectors observed the perfonnance of selected surveillances. The observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, i conformance to the technical specification, verification of test I instrument calibration, observation of all or part of the actual

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surveillances, removal from service and return to service of the system or t components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria. The primary surveillance testing observations . ,

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during this month are sumarized below:

Surveillance Testing Activity Date Monthly operability testing of torus 09/06/88

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to drywell vacuum br Jers per procedure 345V-T48-002-15 (Unit 1) Post-maintenance functional testing 09/13/88 of main steam line radiation monitor 1 1D11-K603A per procedure 575V-011-016-1S ,

(Unit 1) j

! IST of RHR pumps 2E11-C002A and 09/15/88

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2E11-C002C per procedure 345V-E11-001-2S (Unit 2)

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- CRD withdrawal stall flow testing per 09/16/88 ,

i procedure 42FH-ENG-028-2N and control rod weekly exercises per 345V-C11-003-25 (Unit. 2) procedure

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Nc, violations or deviations were identifie ,

ESF System Walkdowns (71710) Unit 2

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I The inspectors routinely c"nducted partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve t

! and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room to ensure that lineups were in accordance with operability requirements and that equipment material  ;

conditions were satisfactor The Unit 2 Hydrogen Recombiner system was ,

walked down in detail on September 19, 198 !

I No violations or deviations were identifie l

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7. Radiological Protection (71709) Units 1 and 2 The resident inspectors reuiewed aspects of the licensee's radiological protection program in the course of the monthly activitie The -

performance of health physics and other personnel was observed on various l 1 shifts to include: involsement of health physics supervision, use of ;

! radiation work permits, use of personnel monitorin9 equipment, control of !

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high ra6t% areas, use of friskers and personal contamination monitors, ,

and pos* nd labelin I j No violatic,.. or deviations were noted.

l 8. Physical Security (718dl) Units 1 and 2

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! In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included i

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i a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of

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various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: availability of supervision, availability of armed response personnel, protected and vital access controls, searching of

personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting i j of visitors, patrols, and compensatory posts.

5 No violations oc' deviations were noted.

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9. Reportable Occurrences (90712 and 92700) Units 1 and 2 j A number of LERs were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect !

, trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriat I j Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred i to determine that technical specifications were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost consideration.

I Unit 1 88-06 Degraded Oil Causes Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation {

f This LER concerns an unanticipated isolation of the !

Unit 1 RWCU systen on August 9, 1988. The event was caused by a seal failure on RWCU pump 1G31-C0018. The ,

seal failure resulted in the release of steam into the !

RWCU pump roo The system subsequently isolated on ;

high room and high differential temperature signal l The licensee has determined that the probable root I l cause of the event was premature oil degradation which caused abnormal pump bearing wear and excessive pump

vibration. The degradation is thought to be due to a bad batch of oi The licensee intends te have a I sample of the suspect oil analyzed. Additionally, the I

suspect baten of oil was placed on hold until the test

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results are evaluated. The licensee plans to revise I

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this LER by approxinately December 8, 1988, after the l oil analysis results have been evaluated. This matter

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remains open pending review of the revised LER by the 4 inspector _l

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88-08 Deficient Procedure Causes Missed Technical i Specification Sut.eillance on HPCI Valves This LER concerns a failure to operability test HPC1 '

system motor-operated valves 1E41 F006 and IE41-F007 ,

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in accordance with the requirements of Technical i j Specificacion 4.5.0.1.e. The valves were being i i tested at every cold shutdown instead of monthly as required by the technical specification. The root

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cause of the problem was determined to be a procedure deficiency. Test procedure 345V-E41-001-15. "HPCI '

Valve Operability," did not specify the proper test  :

frequenc This deficiency was identified by the *

licensee's PUP personnel. Corrective actions included ,

satisfactorily testing the HPCI valves in question,

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revising procedure 345V F41-001-15 to reflect the  ;

i proper testing interval, and reviewing other valve j

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operability testing procedures to identify similar  !

deficiencies. This matter appears to be a violation i of Techt..' cal Specification 4.5.D.I.e. However, since ,

all the requirements specified in 10 CFR Part 2 ,

1 Appendix C.Section V, were satisfied, this licensee- l J identified violation is not being cite Review of ,

the LER is close I l

! Unit 2 88-20 Design Deficiency Causes Blown Fuse, Loss of

Feedwater, and Subsequent Reactor Scram .

This LER concerns the Unit 2 automatic. scram on

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August 5, 1988. This scram was previously discussed

) in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/88-24 and 50-366/  !

88-24 The licensee has determined that the root  ;

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cause of the sciam was a design deficiency which ,

ganged four minimum flow controllers with eight other

instruments in a circuit with only one in-line fuse  !

4 for protectio No fused connectors were provided in [

i case of inadvertent shorting or arcing in the circui :

A design review of the feedwater centrol circuitry has l'

been initiated to identify similar ganged circuits.

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Design change requests to <:orrect any identified '

design deficiencies will be developed based on the ,

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results of this review, Review of this LER is closed, f i

No violations or deviations were identifie . Operating Reactor Events (93702)

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The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed  !

j reactor event The review included determination of esuse, safety i

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significance, performance of personnel and systems, and corrective actio !

) The inspectors examined instru. tent recordings, computer printouts, i i  !

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l operations journal entries, scram reports and had discJssions with -

operations, maintenance, and engineering support personnel as appropriat c At 1600 on September 4, 1988, the speed of the Unit 1 "A" RFP unexp" tedly ;

decreased to 2000 rpm while the unit was operating at rated power. Both recirculation pumps began to run bsck to their No. 2 speed limiter setting t of 44 percent as reactor vessel level decreased to below plus 32 inche l The "B" recirculation pump ran back to 44 percen However, the "A" !

recirculation pump stopped at about 60 percent. The control room operator ;

took manual control of the "A" recirculation pump and began reducing its l speed. The "A" recirculation pump went to 44 percent soon af ter the

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operator took manual contro Reactor vessel level decreased to approximately plus 22 inches following the speed reduction of the "A" RF ;

Vessel level was restored to the nomal band with the operating ("B") RF At 1615, the "B" RFP controller failed downscole, resulting in an i automatic scran on low reactor vessel water level. Unit I was operating l at approximately 66 percent of rated power at the time of this scra l

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Reactor vessel water level det.reased to a minimum level of minus 58 inches l following the Unit I scram on September 4, 1988. The recirculation pumps !

tripped; and HPCI, RCIC, and the SGTS initiated automatically at the l required vessel level setpoints. Although HPCI initiated, it tubsequently [

tripped on high turbine exhaust pressure. HPC1 reset automatically and ;

tripped again. HPCI reset automatically again and then injected into the !

reactor vessel. The control room operator manually tripped HPCI and RCIC !

as vessel water level increased past plus one inch. Reactor vessel water i level was then restored to the normal range with the "B" RFP in manual !

control. Plant systems functioned properly during these events witn d . l exuptions of the RFP controllers (which initiated the events), the "A" i

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recirculation pump (which failed to run back properly), and HPCI (which tripped twice before injecting). .

Troubleshooting of the "A" RFP controllers was perfomed under WO ,

1-88-5105. A loose termination screw was found on capacitor C11 in the i signal converter. Additionally, a cold soldered joint was found on the [

signal converter board. Troubleshooting of the "B" RFP controllers w3s :

performed under WO 1-98-5103. No problems were initially identified with !

the RFP's control syt.- s. However, during inspection of controller !

amplifier unit (IC32-K674B), the connector on the controller amplifier was ,

found to be loos The repaated trips of HFCI were investigated under WO 1-88-5104 A i non-functioning HPCI steam supply drain pot level switch (IE41-N014) was l identified and replace The improper runback of the "A" recirculation ;

pump was investigated under WO 1-88-5102. No problems were found in the j scoop tube positioner. However, speed limiter (1831-K621A) was found to l be out of tolerance and was subsequently readjusted, j l

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At 1451 nn September 9, 1988, the speed of the Unit 1 "A" RFP unexpectedly f decreased to approximately 2000 rpm with the unit at rated power. Reactor vessel water level decreased to approximately plus 25 inches and the  !

recirculation pumps automatically ran back to the No. 2 speed limiter l setting as expecte Control room personnel subsequently restored reactor '

vessel water level to the normal control band with the "8" RFP and l

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decreased reactor power to approximately 55 percent with recirculation i flow. With the exception of the "A" RFP controller, plant systems  !

l functioned as expected during this transient. However, at 1804, when a l control room operater manually reset the runback on the "A" recirculation j pump, the pump speed increased rapidly. The "/" recirculation pump was t subsequently trippad by the Shift Supervisor tr terminate the resulting transient. This caused power to momentarily 7 pike to approximately ,

105 percent. Initial investigation indicates ', hat the runback may have  ;

been improperly rese The inspector's review of this matter is continuin L The inspectors noted the similarity of the "A" RFP speed reductions on September 4 and 9,1988, and discussed the licensee's corrective actions i for these and other recent feedwater control problems in Unit 1 with a department manage Investigation into the event on September 9,1983, i identified a defective control amplifier in the "A" RFP speed control The events on September 4, 1988, were found to be caused by other equipment problems as discussed above. Discussions with the manager revealed that the licensee primarily attributes the Unit 1 feed pump (

control prob". ems to the aging of control circuits which have been in service for about 14 years. The licensee plans to rebuild related control [

boards during the upcoming Unit 1 outag Unit 2 were rebuilt during the last outage.)(Similar control theboards in

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Additionally, licensee ,

has connected recorders at various points in the Unit 1 feed pump control  ;

circuitry to help identify any other problems that may arise during '

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Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Three Mile Island items (item numbers from NUREG 0737) l Item !!.K 3.18 concerns modification of the ADS initiation legic. This l item remained open pending the completion o' work and review of the data package for DCR 87-87 for Unit 2. This DCR provided two manual keylock i switches in the main control room to prevent ADS initiation during an ATWS i even Prior to the modification, the operator had to repeatedly reset  !

the 120-second tiner to prevent ADS initiatio DCR 87-87 was closed on i June 21, 1988, and was subsequently reviewed by the inspecto Item II.K.3.18 is now closed for Units 1 and Of the TMI items assigned to the resiJent inspectors for review and closure, only item II.F.1.6 remains open. This item concerns containment hydrogen monitoring and remains open for both Hatch units. Related work

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I has been perforced under DCR 81-132 for Unit 1 and under DCR 81-165 for l Unit 2. On August 26, 1988, the liccasee advised the inspector that these

! DCRs would be closed in abt.ut 6 months. This item remains open pending closure of these DCRs and subsequent review by the inspecto ;

! No violations or deviations were identifie ,

12. Part 21 Report followup (92716) l

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By letter dated May 23, 1985, Henry Pratt Company advised the NRC of an j instance in which a valve-shaft-to-actuator key fell out of place ;

resulting in inoperability of a motor operated containment purge valv (

Pratt recomended that certain grades of Locktite be applied to such keys :

to secure the valve /actu6 tor connection whenever actuators of any type or r manufacture are removed from Pratt valves and reinstalled in the fiel !

The licensee has reviewed this matter and modified seven valve maintenance t procedures. In each case, the procedure was changed to require the use of ;

Locktite 242 or equivalent for key retention. The inspectors reviewed the following four procedures which have been revised and are currently ;

ef fcctive-

CM-MME-010-Os, "Limitorque Manual Unit Models HOBC Through H7BC l Mechanical Maintenance," Rev. I CM-MME-016 05, "Limitorque Valve Operator Type SMC-03 Mechanical '

Maintenance," Rev. 2 i CM-MNT-024-05, "Rotork Actuators, Models 7A and 16A, Corrective :

Maintenance," Rev. 1  :

I CM-MNT-030-05, "Bettis Robotarm Valve Actuator, Models 520-SR and '

CB-725-SR, Corrective Maintenance," Rev. 1 i

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The following three procedures have been revised but require validation I prior to release for unrestricted use:

I CM MME-009-05. "Limitorque Valve Operator Model 58-0 Through SB-4 Mechanical Maintenance" CM-MNT-025-05, "Bettis Robotarm Yalve Actuator, Models 722C-SR and 732C-SR, Corrective Maintenance" l i  ; GM-MNT-022-05, "Maintenance of Butterfly Valves" ,

This matter, tracked by Region !! as item 321,366/P2185-02, is close !

I Kaman Instrument Corporation advised the NRC of a possible defect in

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certain ncble gas radiation eonitors by letter dated February 27, 198 The monitors in question are designated as Kanan model KMG-HRH with detector model K0GM.H The monitors are designed to measure fresh equilibrium noble gas fission product specific activity levels up to

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i 1x10+5 micro Curies /c Certain of these monitors were found to saturate ;

i at lower specific activity level The vendor subsequenti develcped a -

4 modification kit to correct this problem. The required mod fications were ,

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perfonned at Plant Hatch under DCR 85-110 (Unit 1) and DCR 85-74 (Unit 2).

The inspectors reviewed the documentation packages for these closed out i j DCRs. This matter, tracked by Region !! as item 321/P2186-01, is clote l

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J 13. Review of High Temperature Cond'.tions Within the Drywell (T! 2515/98)

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] Units 1 and 2 ,

During the reporting period, the inspector performed Tl 2515/98, [

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"Information of High Temperature Inside Containment /Drywell in PWR and  ;

BWR Plants", for Units 1 and 2. The inspector provided information and data on average drywell temperatures for the months of April-September

. 1987, drywell temperature limits for operation, drywell temperatures I assumed in the licensee's EQ program, location of drywell temperature i instrumentation, and location of the drywell coolers. Additionally, an j assessment was provided as to whether or not average drywell temperature  !

readings accurately reflect conditions within the drywell. TI 2515/98 is  !

considered close j i 14. Review of Licensee's Operational Upgrade Efforts - Units 1 and 2  !

) As discussed in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-321/88-14 and 50-366/88-14, f 4 the licensee voluntarily initiated a program in April 1988 ta upgrade ,

I certain aspects of operational perforuance. The referenced reports r j mentioned that the resident inspectors would review longer term (

) operational upgrade efforts as related activities were completed. The  !

l areas discussed below were reviewed during the current reporting period, j i t

! Post-Maintenance Testing: The licensee elected to develop an upgraded j

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post-maintenance testing procedure that comorehensively addresses l post-maintenance testing requirements. This procedure became effective on  !

August 29, 1988, as Outages and Planning Departnent Procedure 951T-0TM-  !

00105, "Maintenance Work Order Functional Test Guidelines," Rev. O. The

] procedure establishes guidelines for FT assignment on MW0s by Planning and i Control pwsonnel to ensure that equipment will perform its intended function when returned to service following maintenance activities. The

, inspectors reviewed this procedure and noted that it provides FT guidance ,

1 and does not preclude any additional testing deemed necessary. The  !

j inspectors also noted that the procedure requires that the ISI Coordinator l 1 be contacted in the case of components in the IST Program to ensure that  ;

test requirements are accurately specifie Procedure 951T-0TN 001-05 1 i provides FT guidance for the types of equipment listed bel l Valves

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Fan Coils / Filter Train Units .

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Turbines MG Sets i CRDs .

Filters /$ trainers l Instrumentation  :

Batteries  !

Static Inverters {

Heat Tracing  ;

Piping / Tubing  !

Electrical Pipe Supports  !

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Fire Protection (

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The inspector concluded that the licensee has effectively provided FT f guidance to address the most frequent types of maintenance activitiet, Review of the licensee's operational upgrade efforts in the post-maintenance testing area is considered close Drawing _ Control: The licensee's long-term action in the area of drawing control involves resolving ABN tracking discrepancies, On September 22, '

1983, the inspector reviewed the status of this work with the cognizant supervisor, The inspectors learned that the licensee is in the process of switching to a new system, Major Projects Management System, for tracking ABNs, The licensee currently expects to have the new system fully operational by October 28, 1988. This item remains open pending review by the inspector of the new ABN tracking system,  ;

Prior to s;artup from the operational upgrade outage, the licensee ensured !

that all critical drawings in ' e control room were up to date and l reflected the current status of the plant. This was done by placing up to  !

date prints of critical drawing on stick files in the control room, If ABNs were issued against a critical drawing, the control room prints were manually updated with sen and in This system has si.bsequently been change As of September 22, 1988, the critical drawings and their I associated ABNs, are now kept in the control room on aperture cards, If l an ABN is issued against a critical drawing, the blueline drawing (which j is maintained on site) i, updated with red ink by the licensee's Orafting i Services Group. Next, the Drafting Services Group photographs the updated l blueline to make an aperture card, This aperture card is then taken to ,

document control for reproduction and distribution to all controlled sets i of drawings with the control room naving first priority. The inspectors  !

discussed this process with the cognizant engineering supervisor and reYiewed the applicable Department Instruction (D!-ENG-31-04SSN, Rev. 2). j 1 Exit Interview (30703)

lhe irspection scope and findings were summarized on September 26,19S3, I with those persons incicated in paragraph 1 aoove. The licensee- ,

identified violation indicated in paragraph 9 was also discussed, This violation meets the requirements specified in 10 CFR Part 2. Appendix Section 5, and is not being cite The Itcensee did not identify as proprieta ry any of the material provided to or reviewed by the

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inspectors during this inspectio Dissenting comments were not received l

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16. Acrnnyms and Abbreviations  !

l ABN - As-Built Notice ADS - Automatic Depressurization System i ATWS - Anticipated Transient Without Scram l BWR - Boiling Water Reactor i l

CR0 - Control Rod Drive i DCR - Design Change Request j ESF - Engineered Safety Feature  !

EQ -

Environmental Qualification i FT - Functional Test GPM - 3allons per minute HPCI - High Pressure Coolant Injection 151 - Inservice Inspection IST - Inservice Testing ,

LER - Licensee Event Report  !

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MG - Motor-Generator KWO - Maintenance Work Order PUP - Procedure Upgrade Program  !

PWR - Pressurized Water Reactor RCIC - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RFP - Reactor Feedwater Pump [

RHR - Resioual Heat Renoval r RHRSW . *tsidual Heat Removal Service Water RPM - ' evolutions per ininute

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RWCU - Reactor Water Cleanup System l SGTS Standby Gas Treatment System l'

T1 - Temporary Instruction TMI - Three Mile Island

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