ML20207J275: Difference between revisions

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#REDIRECT [[IR 05000424/1986111]]
{{Adams
| number = ML20207J275
| issue date = 12/31/1986
| title = Insp Repts 50-424/86-111 & 50-425/86-50 on 861022-1215.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Containment & safety-related Structures,Piping Sys & Supports & safety-related Components
| author name = Livermore H, Rogge J, Schepens R, Sinkule M, Skinner P
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000424, 05000425
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = 50-424-86-111, 50-425-86-50, NUDOCS 8701080368
| package number = ML20207J244
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 35
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000424/1986111]]
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:. ....
                km CUg                                  UNITED STATES
                      Do                    NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
          [              o                                REGloN II
          g              j                        101 MARIETTA STREET. N.W.
          *            ^t                          ATL ANTA. GEOR GI A 30323
          .%,
              +...+
                      /
          Report Nos.:      50-424/86-111 and 50-425/86-50
          Licensee: Georgia Powe Company
                        P. O. Box 4545
                        Atlanta, GA 30302
          Docket Nos.:      50-424 and 50-425                    License Nos.: CPPR-108 and CPPR-109
          Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2
          Inspection Conducted:          October 22 --December 15, 1986
          Inspectors: I.          . [                                                  l    /!
                  -      H. H. Livermore, Senior Resident Inspector                        Date Signed
                            Construction
                        $ ALQ
                    g J. F. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector
                                                                                          r2/s/86
                                                                                            Date Signed
                            Operations                      f
                        6 6K A~I
                        R. J. Schepens, Resident Inspector
                                                                                            r#/9s
                                                                                            Date Signed
                  M        Operations & Constructipn
                        @( w)
                        P. H. Skinner, Senior Resident Inspector
                                                                                          n/n/86
                                                                                            Date Signed
                            Catawba
          Accompanying Perso nele        C Bur er and C. Paulk
          Approved by:                  _14ukd6
                          M. V.LSinkule', Section Chief
                                                                                                  J/ A6
                                                                                            Dat'e Sfgned
                          Division of Reactor Projects
                                                          SUMMARY
          Scope:    This routine, unannounced inspection entailed Resident Inspection in the
          following areas: containment and safety related structures, piping systems and
            supports, safety related components, auxiliary systems, electrical equipment
          and cables, instrumentation, preoperational test program, quality programs and
          administrative controls affecting quality, and follow-up on previous inspection
            identified items.
          Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
                  8701090368 861231
                  PDR      ADOCK 05000424
                  O                      PDR
      ._-          _          ._    __                      _          , _ . . , _ -
                                                                                _                        . _ . _ _ _
 
  _ _
                                            DETAILS
    1.  Persons Contacted
          Licensee Employees
          R. E. Conway, Senior Vice-President, Vogtle Project Director
          C. Whitney, General Manager, Project Support
          P. D. Rice, Vice-President,-Project Engineering
          R. H. Pinson, Vice-President, Project Construction
          W. W. Mintz, Project Completion Manager
          R. W. McManus, Readiness Review
        *G. Bockhold, Jr. , General Manager Nuclear Operations
        *T. V. Greene, Plant Manager
        *R. M. Bellamy, Plant Support Manager
        *C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance Manager
        *C.  E. Belflower, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Operations
        *E. D. Groover, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Construction
        *W. E. Mundy, Quality Assurance Audit Supervisor
        *D. M. Fiquett, Project Construction Manager - Unit 2
          B. C. Harbin, Manager Quality Control
        *G. A. McCarley, Project Compliance Coordinator
        *W. C. Gabbard, Regulatory Specialist
          C. F. Meyer, Operations Superintendent
          R. M. Odom, Plant Engineering Supervisor
          C. L. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent (Startup)
          M. A. Griffis, Maintenance Superintendent
j
          E. M. Dannemiller, Technical Assistant to General Manager
          G. R. Frederick, Quality Assurance Engineer / Support Supervisor
        *R. E. Spinnatu, ISEG Supervisor
'
        *J. F. D' Amico, Nuclear Safety & Compliance Manager
        *W. F. Kitchens, Manager Operations
          V. J. Agro, Superintendent Administration
        *A. L. Mosbaugh, Asst. Plant Support Manager
          M. P. Craven, Nuclear Security Manager
l        Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen,                  technicians,
          supervision, engineers, inspectors, and office personnel.
'
          Other Organizations
          F. B. Marsh, Project Engineering Manager - Bechtel
          H. M. Handfinger, Asst. Plant Support Manager - Bechtel
          D. L. Kinnsch, Project Engineering - Bechtel
;
        * Attended Exit Interview
      2.  Exit Interview (30703C)
          The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 15, 1986,
          with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described
          the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. No
                . - -    - - - _ - -.      - . - _  - .-          . _ . - - - -            . . - - ,
 
                    -                                                  .        .--    .    .      - .-                -    -      -- -
  .    .
                                                                                      2
L
              dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not
              identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the
              inspector during this inspection.
              The following items were identified during this inspection:
                    Unresolved Item 50-424/86-111-01, " Review Inspection Results of the
                    Licensee's Inspection of Burn Damage on Limitorque Operator Power
                    Leads." - Paragraph 4
                    Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-424/86-111-02, " Review PRB Procedure
                    for Proper Incorporation of Technical Specifications." - Paragraph 26
                    IF! 50-424/86-111-03, " Review Revistor. 00005-C Regarding Overtime
                    Minimizing." - Paragraph 23
              The following previous inspection items remain open due to incomplete
              licensee action:
                    IFI 50-424/86-51-02, " Review Procedure 00301-C to Verify Incorporation
                    of Unfettered Access for NRC Resident Inspectors." - Paragraph 23
              This inspection closed two violations, nineteen IFIs, two Construction
              Deficiency Report and fourteen Three Mile Island Tcsk Followup Items.
              Region based NRC exit interviews were attended during the inspection period
              by a resident inspector.                                                                                                        ,
'
          3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
                                                                                                                                              '
              (Closed) Violation, 50-424/86-09-01, " Failure to Perform an Adequate System
>
              Walkdown During the Turnover of Safety-Related Systems". This violation
,
              identified a number of discrepancies between the as-built configurations of
              the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System and the Nuclear Service Cooling Water
,
              (NSCW) System and the latest Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID)
F            drawings for those systems. These discrepancies were not identified on the
;
              system punchitsts as required by Startup Manual Procedure SUM-17 even though
!
              a walkdown inspection had been conducted on the systems during turnover as
              required by Construction Department Procedure GD-A-49. The inspector has
L            reviewed the licensee's corrective action which consisted of but was not
'            limited to:        1) Documenting the discrepancies identified on controlled
              documents such as Deviation Reports and Field Change Requests, 2) Issuing
i            FPCN 1 to Construction Procedure GD-A-49 which included provisions for
              identifying discrepancies between Isometric Drawings and P& ids during
              turnover walkdowns and documenting them on the Master Tracking System
              Punchlists, and 3) Performing and documenting a re-walkdown of all safety-
;            related systems in accordance with a special Construction Acceptance Test
.            CAT-M-99.    The licensee's results of the re-walkdowns conducted in
l            accordance with CAT-M-99 was presented to the Resident Inspectors on
'            September 24, 1986, as documented in Inspection Report No. 50-424/86-74 and
              50-425/86-35. Based on this review the inspector has determined that the
(              licensee has taken the appropriate corrective action; therefore, this item
              is considered to be closed.
r
)
' -_ _ _. __              . - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ . _ _ _ _ , _ _ . _ . _ _ .
                                                            _
                                                                                        -  _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . -
 
  . .
                                                    3
          (Closed) Violation 50-424/86-31-01, " Failure to Establish Appropriate
          Procedures to Properly Control the Filling and Venting of Safety-Related
          Systems".    This violation identified several examples where approved
          procedures were not used during filling and venting safety-related systems
          but rather verbal instructions were given by a test supervisor to operations
          personnel.    Subsequently an error was made in sequencing the opening of
          valves, which in turn, led to inadvertent overfilling of the Reactor Coolant
          System above the 188' elevation. The inspector has reviewed the licensee's
          corrective action which consisted of but was not limited to: 1) Additional
          training to emphasize the importance of effective communication, avoidance
          of operator errors, and the use of appropriate procedures to control work
          activities, 2) System Operating Procedure 13011-1 for filling and venting
j        the RHR System was revised to address the sections of piping between valves
          8701A and 8701B (Train A) and 8702A and 8702B (Train B), 3) Startup Manual
'
          Procedure SUM-37 was revised to establish policies to limit the use of
          verbal instructions on the performance of work activities involving safety-
          related equipment, and 4) A new Startup Manual Procedure (SUM 39, " Initial
          Test Program Incident Reports") was developed to establish a report to
          management for occurrences (like the RCS overfills) that were previously not
          required to be reported. The procedure includes provisions for determining
          the root cause of reported incidents and for prescribing appropriate
          corrective action. Based on the above review the inspector has determined
          that the licensee has taken the appropriate corrective action; therefore
          this item is closed.
      4. Unresolved Items
          Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
          determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or
          deviations. One new unresolved item identified during this inspection is
          discussed in Paragraph 24.
      5. Followup on Previous Inspection Items (92701)
          (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-424/85-26-02 & 50-425/85-25-02,
          " Review Licensee Action on Information Notice Nos. 85-15, 85-19 & 85-25."
          This Inspector Followup Item identified three (3) IE Information Notices
i        which required followup by this inspector pending completion of the
          licensee's evaluation process. The inspector has reviewed the licensee's
          action and has determined that the IE Information Notices were distributed
          to the appropriate departments for evaluation of applicability and that
          appropriate corrective action has been taken.          Based on this review this
          item is considered to be closed.
          (Closed) IFI 50-424/86-60-09, "QC Re-inspection Anti-Drug Program". As
          noted in the Inspector Followup Item, the inspector was concerned that the
          Vogtle Drug Program was lacking some continuity and detail to insure
          standardization in the areas of:          the formal QC notification process of
          those called in on the Drug Abuse Hot Line; those who will be addressed by
          QC for re-inspection (field engineers, QC, etc.); and detail decisien making
          guidelines as to how a supervisor decides who will be tested or not.
          The inspector reviewed the following newly issued Drug Program procedures:
                  -        _      . _ - - . _ _ __    ___                              _ . _ . _ _ _ __
 
  . .
                                            4
            a)  Management Action Procedure dated September 8, 1986.
            b)  Desk-top Procedure S-1920, Reporting Guidelines, September 27,
                  1986.
            c)  QC Re-inspection / Verification Status Sheet.
      The procedures set forth additional details that satisfy the aforementioned
      inspector concerns. Specific forms and notifications are now provided that
      notify QC of all personnel that fail the drug and alcohol testing.
      Guidelines are provided that determine exactly whose work is to be
      re-inspected. Re-verification lists record the actions taken on all those
      personnel in the re-inspection category. Guidelines are provided for
      management evaluation of the quality of information, knowledge and
      observation of the individual, and discretion and judgement to be used in
      regards to the nature of the employee's duties. The inspector is satisfied
      with the action taken and considers this item closed.
      (Closed) 50-424/86-09-05, " Review Licensee Action to Resolve HVAC Handswitch
      Nomenclature". This inspector followup item identified that handswitch
      Nos. 1-HS-12004, 1-HS-12050A, 1-HS-12051A, 1-HS-12053A & 1-HS-12054A on the
      Control Room HVAC Control Panel QHVC were labeled as " exhaust" fan whereas
      the P&ID and the applicable operations procedure states " supply" fan. The
      inspector has reviewed the licensee's action which included the replacement
      of the handswitch switch plates with ones with the correct nomenclature,
      i.e., " supply" fan. Based on this review the inspector has determined that
      the licensee has taken the appropriate corrective action; therefore, this
      item is considered to be closed.
      (Closed) IFI 50-424/86-60-04, " Review Results of Baselining the Regulatory
      Compliance Computer Database With the Readiness Review Module 7 Database".
      The inspector reviewed a marked up version of Table 3.2-1 from Module 7
      showing where the Master Operations Database contained each commitment.
      Summary Tables were reviewed showing (1) Differences and (2) Those added
      since issuance of Module 7. It was noted that several commitments listed in
      Module 7 will not be in the Master Database.        These commitments were
,
        indicated in the package as " Design State of Fact" or " State of Fact".
i
      (Closed) IFI 50-424/86-31-04, " Review Minimum Shift Crew Requirements".
      Since this item was opened the Technical Specifications have developed to a
      final status. The issue was brought to NRR attention and the decision was
      to use the Standard Technical Specification (STS) format. While the STS
      does not require personnel in a defueled state for a single unit site; it
,.
      will when both units are operating.
      (Closed) IFI 50-424/86-31-05, " Review Implementation of Technical
      Specification Overtime Conflicts with 00005-C". Since this item was opened
      the Technical Specifications have developed to a final status.      NRR has
      decided to change the wording in the Technical Specification to match the
        licensee's proposal. The inspector has noted to NRR where their
        requirements have been relaxed and will enforce the Technical Specification
      as issued.
                        --    ._    -    _    _
 
  . .
                                                          5
            (Closed) IFI 50-425/86-31-02, " Review Implementation of Negative Logic
            Testing". This Inspector Followup Item identified that based on a review of
            several Preoperational Test Procedures and discussions                                        with test
            supervisors that the AFW & CVCS System Preoperational Test Procedures did
            not contain provisions for testing all valves and pumps with transfer switch
            control to the remote shutdown panels for negative logic testing.                                    The
            inspector has reviewed the licensee's action which consisted of issuing and
            implementing preoperational test procedure 1-300-15.                            This procedure
            contained sections 6.8 through 6.12 which detailed a Generic Test Procedure
            for testing valves and pumps transfer switch control for negative logic
            testing which had not been previously identified for testing in their
            respective System Preoperational Test Procedures. Based on this review the
            inspector has determined that the licensee has taken the appropriate
            corrective action; therefore, this item is considered to be closed.
            (Closed) IFI 50-424/86-31-07, " Review Maintenance Procedure 20427-C for
            Incorporation of the ANSI Requirement to Document Closecut Inspection
            Results." This inspector has reviewed the licensee's action which consisted
            of incorporating this requirement as Step 4.3.5.b.6 into Maintenance
:          Procedure 20427-C, Revision 2. Based on this review the inspector has
            determined that the licensee has taken the appropriate corrective action;
            therefore, this item is considered to be closed.
            (Closed) IFI 50-424/86-31-06, " Review Site Procedure 00402-C, Licensing
            Document Change Request, for Resolution of Comments". The inspector
            reviewed procedure 00402-C, Rev. 3 issued 11/3/86 and noted that this item
            has been resolved.
            (Closed) IFI 50-424/86-51-01, " Review Licensee Action for TMI Item I.C.3".
,
            Procedure 00001-C, Rev. I has been revised to contain the correct delegation
            of responsibil!ty.              The applicant still needs to provide a management
            directive as delineated when this item was open.
            (Closed) IFI 50-424/86-60-03, " Review Technical Specification Surveillance
            4.8.1.1.1 Implementation Procedure for Proper Verification of AC Independent
            Power Sources." Procedure 14230-1, Rev. 1 issued 10/12/86 was reviewed for
            proper incorporation of comments. A second issue regarding the deletion of
            a technical specification surveillance was brought to NRR attention and
            resolved as not applicable.
4          (Closed) IFI 50-424/86-12-30, 50-425/86-18-30, " Completion of Installation
            of Telephone Systems." Installation of telephones required by the
            Radiological Emergency Plan and implementing procedures have been completed
            as required.
            (Closed) IFI 50-424/86-12-61, 50-425/86-18-61, " Complete Communication Links
            With South Carolina Counties of Aiken, Barnwell                        and Allendale."
            Notwithstanding the Administrative Decision Link (ADL) to the South Carolina
            Emergency Headquarters and Forward Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) as
            requested by that State, all links required by the Emergency Plan have been
            installed, tested, and declared operational.
    . - - -    -
                          - ----. - -- - - -                        -
                                                                          - - . - - - - - _ - . - _ _ - . _ _
 
. .
                    -
                                            6            -
      (Closed) IFI 50-424/86-12-62, 50-425/86-18-62, " Completion of All
      Communication Links Specified in the VEGP Radiological Emergency Plan, and
      Assurance of Their Operability." All such communication links have been
      installed, tested, and determined to be operable.
      (Closed) IFI 50-424/86-12-70, 50-425/86-18-70, " Include in the " Subsequent
      Operator Actions" Sections of All Appropriate Off-Normal Procedures, A Step
      Similar to That Provided in ADP 18036." This item was closed via Report
      Nos. 50-424/86-112, 50-425/86-51.
      (Closed) 50-424/86-12-103, 50-425/86-18-103, " Design & Installation of An
      Emergency Siren System.      The siren system has been installed, tested, and
      declared operational.
      (Closed) IFI 50-424/86-12-110 and 50-425/86-18-110, " Performance of a Study
      or Drills to Verify the Ability to Meet Minimum Staff Augmentation Criteria
      in NUREG-0654." The inspection reviewed the results on the drill performed
      on November 20, 1986, to demonstrate that adequate numbers of personnel
      could respond within 60 minutes of notification.
    6. Allegations
      a.    Allegation RII-86-A-0142, Non-Certified Personnel Performing iQ' Class
            Material Welding in the Fabrication Shop
            Concern
            Two individuals notified Region II personnel tht they had observed two
            non-certified personnel, one a Quality Control inspector assigned to
            the fabrication shop and the other individual hired as summer help,
            performing welding on iQ' Class material. In addition to notifying
            Region II, they also filed a concern in the GPC Quality Concern Program
            (QCP).
            Discussion
            The inspector reviewed the results of the QCP investigation and action
            taken as described in QCP File Number 86V0292. The QCP investigation
            substantiated that these two individuals had performed welding as
            stated in the concern. The individuals that performed the welding as
            well as the certified welders (2) that permitted the welding to occur
            were terminated. In addition, a Deviation Report (DR) identified as
            ED-14,013 was generated to disposition all suspect material that could
            have had unauthorized welding performed. In addition, the work that
            had been performed by the QC inspector was reviewed and reverified on a
            sampling basis. The results of this review and sampling process was
            that no discrepancies were found of the work performed by the QC
              inspector. Tte material that was not alredy installed in the plant
            was destroyed.    One piece of this material which visually appeared
            questionable was sectioned into 28 inspection samples and analyzed by
            the project welding supervision. All samples were found to be
            acceptable. All cable tray supports that had been installed with the
            exception of 2 (2 out of 25) were found and visually checked. These
 
. .
                                        7
      were determined to be acceptable based on the destructive examination
      that was performed. The 2 supports that were not found were considered
      acceptable even though they were not found. The reason they were not
      found was the utility saw no reason to expend additional man-hours and
      none of the inspected supports had been rejected (23 of 25). One of
      the certified welders was also sent to the lab and re-evaluated. This
      welder passed all requalification testing.
      Conclusion
      This allegation was confirmed to be correct. The utility took adequate
      and prompt corrective action to resolve this concern. Based on this
      review, the inspector considers this item closed.
    b. Allegation RII-86-A-0082, Concern That a Label Was Changed on a Pacific
      Scientific Snubber Without Required Process Documentation
      Concern
      During the last week of June 1985 a GPC inspector directed a craft
      pipefitter to remove the identification plate from a snubber and
      replace this plate with a new one. This work was accomplished without
      any process paperwork or without the approval of the Authorized Nuclear
        Inspector (ANI) as required by procedures.
      Discussion
      A Pacific Scientific snubber was received at the GPC warehouse on
      March 6, 1985. During the receipt inspection, the inspector identified
        that the tag number stamped on this component was incorrect.    As a
        result, the inspection could not be completed and a deviation report
        (DR), identified by control number MD-08105, was issued by the
        inspector detailing the problem.      An engineer contacted Pacific
        Scientific to obtain the correct documentation which was transmitted to
      GPC on or about April 16, 1985. The tag was transmitted in error to
        the GPC QC supervisor in charge of the warehouse who had the tag
        installed by a Pullman Power Products pipefitter without required
      documentation or without observance by the ANI representative.      The
        alleger discussed this with his supervisor, and they contacted GPC QC
        supervision. GPC stated that a DR should be written to document this
        but the alleger never saw this DR. The DR was written and is
        identified as MD-08367 dated July 3,1985. The action to resolve the
        DR was to have ANI verify vendor documentation and accept based on that
        review. The ANI inspector performed his review and signed off the
        documentation and DR on August 15, 1986.
        The snubber that was in question was initially identified to be
        installed in the Nuclear Service Cooling Water System, but has been
        replaced by a Anchor Darling type snubber. The original snubber is
        presently at Pacific Scientific labs for repair as it failed a stroke
        test.  (Reference DR MD-08756)
 
                            -        . _ -                                                      _.
  . .
4                                                            8
            Discussion with ANI and GPC QC indicate that this appears to have been
            an isolated case.
            Conclusion
            Based on the inspector's review, the work was performed without the
'
          . required process sheets as stated, but a DR was written to document and
            correct this problem. Since this was an isolated case and the snubber
            is no longer installed in the plant, the inspector considers this item
'
            is closed.
        c.  Allegation RII-85-A-0203, Alleged Harassment and Intimidation
            Concern
            An allegation was made to Region II that stated the alleger was
            harassed and intimidated for refusing to sign a dispositioned deviation
            report for work he did not accomplish.
            Discussion
            The inspector reviewed this item in detail.          This item concerned
            Deviation Report (DR) ED-09068 dated June 1, 1985, which concerned
            cables which had been installed and were found to be too short to reach
            the required equipment. The corrective action had been performed and
            signed off on the DR by the alleger. The alleger was told by his
            supervision to remove the hold tags (2 had been initially installed)
            and sign for the removal on the DR. The alleger did not find any tags
            and put the words "No Hold Tags Found" and dated the entry. He did not
            sign the block. Upon being requested to sign the block, the individual
            would not sign stating that it violated the procedure which provided
            administrative controls over the DR process. He was confronted by his
            supervision and the intent of the step that the alleger would not sign
            was explained to him but he refused to sign the step. The individual
            received a 5-day layoff without pay and as a result filed a complaint
            with the Department of Labor (DOL). The DOL case was concluded on
4            October 24,1986 (see D0L Case #E6-ERA-9). The ruling was in favor of
            the utility. The inspector determined that it is a common practice if
            no tags are found to write in "O, none or none found" and the block
              signed and dated. This process was discussed during training of QC
              inspectors primarily with supervisors and then disseminated to other
,
              inspectors. The alleger's supervisor signed the DR in question.
1
*
            Conclusion
            The signature in the block provided on the DR for this action appears
              to be an administrative control and has no significance to safety.
              Interpretation of a procedure is a management tool and this tool was
            used for this occurrence but a difference of opinion resulted.
            Although an argument occurred, documentation indicates the alleger was
;            never directed to sign the statement, but was requested several times
              to sign the DR entry form. The procedure' for controlling DRs was
      -      -_ .. -_. - - -          - . - . - - - - - - - -      _ _ _ - - _      . _ . . . - . . - -
 
  _ .-. _ . _ _ _ _ . _
            .          .
                                                                  9
                                  subsequently revised and this should eliminate further problems in this
                                  areas.    Based on this inspection this item is closed.
                          d.      Allegation RII-86-A-0083, Alleged Poor Welding and Construction
                                  Practices.
                                  Concerns
                                  (1) The alleger stated that the plastic liner for the chemical storage
                                        pond was not installed properly due to poor grading of the pond
                                        area which'left sharp pieces of earth and rock which could damage
                                        the liner.
                                  (2) The alleger stated that the diametric welding done on the loop
                                        side in containment was done using .35 and .40 stainless steel
                                        welding wire which was obtained from the Diametric classroom weld
                                        wire storage. The weld wire was not properly controlled by QA.
                                        (This concern was reported anonymously to the Quality Concern
                                        Program in June 1985.) The welding done using this weld wire was
                                        on the C level, Unit 1 containment, 20 or 30 inch stainless steel
                                        loop pipe on the reactor pumps sometime in January 1984.
                                                                                                                1
'
                                  (3) The alleger stated that Tungsten Inert Gas (TIG) rigs were used to
                                        cut holes in stainless steel        piping for temporary pipe
                                        installation for flushing.  This caused slag and molten metal to
4
                                        fall into the pipe. Even though flush boxes were used to trap any
                                        loose metals from the welding process, there is still the
                                        possibility that some weld metal remained in the line and this
                                        could damage valves in the permanent line.
                                  Discussion
                                  This allegation was officially transmitted to Georgia Power Company
                                  (GPC) by the NRC for review and appropriate action in a letter from
                                  Virgil L. Brownlee, dated July 14, 1986. The GPC response to the
                                  allegation is documented in a letter to the NRC Region II from
                                  D. O. Foster, dated July 29, 1986.      In their response GPC addresses
;                                  each of the alleger's concerns and finds them to be unsubstantiated.
l
                                  The inspector reviewed the GPC response and records documenting-
                                  interviews with several employees who were involved with the specific
                                  concerns. The inspector also reviewed QA audits and various other
*
                                  documents pertaining to this allegation.
                                  Conclusion
                                  The inspector can find no information to substantiate this allegation;
                                  therefore, based on this inspection this item is closed.
                          e.      Allegation RII-84-A-0168, Concern Regarding Processing an NCR and
l                                  Alleged Harassment Concern:
                                  Concern
l
                          _ . . -
                                            ___, __                    __      _    _      _ . _ _    _ _ _ _
 
. .
                                    10
    (1) A weld rod issue ticket could not be signed properly by an
          individual due to lack of information required to certify the
          correct material. The issue ticket was signed inappropriately by
          another person.
    (2) An individual was told by a supervisor to sign the weld ticket
          discussed in (1) above. The individual felt harassed by this
          supervisor.
    (3) Non-conforming items (NCR) were being re-written after being
          submitted by inspection personnel.
    (4) An arc strike was corrected and too much material was removed
          during the corrective action, however the repair was accepted by
          quality control inspectors by using techniques that were not
          acceptable.
    As part of this concern, a second individual identified additional
    concerns as follows:
    (5) A Class 3 valve was "taken apart" without a process sheet.
    (6) Some QC inspectors still hold union cards and keep in close
          contact with craft supervision.
    (7) Some QC inspectors were approving inspections based on verbal
          guidance from supervisors.
    Discussion
    The inspector reviewed the areas of concern identified above.      The
    following are the results of this review for each of the areas:
    (1&2) The weld rod ticket was signed off by a QC inspector.        This
          QC inspector has been terminated as a result of this action and
          other personal problems identified by a utility investigation of
          the individual. The weld in question was re-examined and no
          problems were identified.        The harassment issue was also
          investigated by the utility and substantiated. As a result the
          involved supervisor was transferred from the QC group.    The weld
          ticket processing problems were reviewed and Pullman Company
          initiated more stringent controls in this area as described in
          Pullman Corrective Action Report CA 9-1.
    (3) A review of NCR re-writing issue identified that an effort to
          " clarify" NCRs was undertaken by Pullman management in mid-1984.
          NCRs were re-written to add what supervision thought was "needed
          material".    This resulted in the re-write of numerous NCRs and
          caused concern to be expressed by.the QC personnel originating the
          reports.    As a result of various inspector's comments, the
          controlling procedure was revised to eliminate the re-write effort
          and only allow corrections and additions to be made with the
          originator's review and initialing of the changes.
 
    .                                                    .                            . _.
  .  ,
                                                        11
            (4) A review of this item identified that a Ultrasonic Test (UT) was .
                            performed on the weld repair and it was found to be acceptable.
                            Discussion with NRC UT personnel indicate that UT is an acceptable
                            method to determine pipe wall measurements. This particular joint
                            is located in a drain line connection on non-safety class piping.
                            The inspector did not request a UT to be performed again since the
                            pipe was logged and was in a non-safety system.
            (5)            Investigation of this item identified that the valve in question
                            was removed from the process line. It was a flanged valve and
                            removal consisted of disconnection at the flanges.                    There is no
                            evidence to support a disassembly of the valve. The valve was
                            removed for flush purposes and not to repair the valve. Records
                            indicate this valve was removed and re-installed several times and
                            proper process documentation was maintained.
i
            (6) The inspector reviewed this area and found that some QC
                            supervisors do continue to hold union cards. A discussion with
                            their management indicates no conflict of interest with this                                              .
                            action.                                                                                                  t
'
            (7)            For this item, discussion with various inspectors indicate that
                            they receive guidance from their supervision but follow procedures
                            to approve inspections.
            Conclusion
            Based on the findings stated above and the corrective actions taken by
            GPC, this item is closed,
        f.  Allegation RII 85-A-0016-015, " Employee Terminations Due to Drug Use".
            Concern
,
            The alleger was concerned that when employees are terminated for drug
            abuse activity that Georgia Power Company (GPC) does not list the
            reason for the termination in the individual's work records as drug
            abuse activity. The alleger stated that the reason for the termination
            is usually listed as misconduct or insubordination. The reason that
            this is placed in the records is because GPC is concerned that the NRC
            will make GPC go back and reinspect all of the work that was performed
            by the worker.
            Discussion
            By letter dated June 5,1986, U.S. NRC Region II assigned the subject
            allegation to Georgia Power Co. for action and disposition. A reply
            was received on July 3 and 10, 1986. The inspector reviewed the reply
            and notes that the licensee conducted an extensive and meaningful
              investigation into the subject allegation.
i
            The inspector reviewed the records of a sample of recent and older GPC
            employee terminations that were due to failing or refusal of the drug
:
'
          _  . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -            ______.-m._    _ , _ .  - _ . - - - _ _ _      _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . __.
 
.
                                  12
  and alcohol test. The subject allegation is correct in that GPC lists
  the reason for termination as misconduct, insubordination, or any other
  violation of work rules and does not state that the true termination
  was due to drug abuse activity. The inspector notes that this practice
  is standard and is applied in all cases by the Manager of GPC Personnel
  although not specifically written in policy procedures.
  The policy is applied by GPC Personnel Department in order to spare the
  individual the stigma of a termination by drug abuse being
  inadvertently provided to a future employer. In regards to outside
  inquiries, GPC does not provide any details except that the person did
  work at Vogtle. The inspector notes that Status 23 (Terminated - No
  Rehire) is entered on the Personnel Separation Notices of all
  individuals terminated for drug or alcohol abuse.        This policy is
  applied by the GPC Personnel Manager to all cases regardless of any
  testimonials provided by the employee's supervisors. The inspector
  also notes that aforementioned information in regards to entries in
  termination records applies only to Georgia Power employees.        Site
  contractors such as PPP, PKF, Cleveland, Butler, Daniel, etc. handle
  their own personnel separation records once GPC notifies them that an
  individual has failed or refused a drug or alcohol test. The inspector
  did not review contractor's separation processes since they were not in
  the scope of the allegation.
  In regards to the second part of the allegation, the inspector could
  find no evidence that GPC was purposely using misconduct or
  insubordination entries in termination records in order to avoid
  re-inspections of the individual's work. Oa the contrary, with the
  advent of the Vogtle Drug Program in 1984, each contractor addressed
  the need for re-inspection of work of those terminated for drug abuse.
  The notification system was not formalized but rather round-about with
  GPC QC visiting each contractor to obtain information to centralize and
  assure re-inspections were implemented. Specific drug terminations and
  re-inspection information was sometimes relayed to the NRC, but not
  every time as a matter of policy. In January 1986, GPC began a program
  to re-identify all contractor personnel terminated under the provisions
  of the Vogtle Anti-Drug Program whose work would require re-inspection.
  This information was centralized with GPC QC for re-inspection
  overview. A generic procedure was instituted that was used for sample
  re-inspections. GPC QC now has a Re-inspection / Verification Status
  List that records the actions taken on all previous site employees
  whose work required re-inspections.      Re-inspection is complete in all
  but three cases (nearing completion).        The inspector notes that
  specific forms and notifications are now provided (by Procedure S-1920)
  that notify QC of all personnel failing the Vogtle Anti-Drug Program.
  Guidelines are now provided in a Management Action Procedure that
  determine exactly whose work is to be re-inspected (i .e. , QC, QA,
  Engineers,etc.).
  Conclusion
  The allegation is correct in that misconduct and insubordination are
  some of the reasons used for drug / alcohol terminations.  The inspector
 
      _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
  . .
                                                                    13
t
                                has no problem with this practice. The allegation is unfounded and                '
                                                                                                                    .
                                incorrect in regards to GPC's purpose was to evade re-inspection of the
                                individual's work. GPC has an adequately documented, structured, and
                                controlled re-inspection program applicable to all terminations due to
                                the Vogtle Drug and Alcohol Program. This allegation is closed.
          7.              General Construction Inspection - Units 1 & 2
                          Periodic random surveillance inspections were made throughout this reporting
                          period in the form of general type inspections in different areas of both
                          facilities.            The areas were selected on the basis of the scheduled
                          activities and were varied to provide wide coyerage. Observations were made
                          of activities in progress to note defective items or items of noncompliance
,
                          with the required codes and regulatory requirements. On these inspections,
:                          particular note was made of the presence of quality control inspectors,
                          supervisors, and quality contrel evidence in the form of available process
'
                          sheets, drawings, material identification, material protection, performance
                          of tests, and housekeeping. Interviews were conducted with craft personnel,
                          supervisors, coordinators, quality control inspectors, and others as they
                          were available in the work areas.              The inspector reviewed numerous
                          construction deviation reports to determine if requirements were met in the
                          areas of documentation, action to resolve, justification, and approval
'
                          signatures in accordance with GPC Field Procedure No. GD-T-01.
                          No violations or deviations were identified.
          8.              Fire Prevention / Protection and Housekeeping Measures - Unit 2 (42051C)
                          The inspector observed fire prevention / protection measures throughout the
                          inspection period. Welders were using welding permits with fire watches and
                          extinguishers. Fire fighting equipment was in its designated areas
                          throughout the plant.
1
'
                          The inspector reviewed and examined portions of procedures pertaining to the
                          fire prevention / protection measures and housekeeping measures to determine
                          whether they comply with applicable codes, standards, NRC Regulatory Guides
,
                          and licensee commitments.
l                          The inspector observed fire prevention / protection measures in work areas
                          containing safety related equipment during the inspection period to verify
                          the following:
                          -
                                Combustible waste material and rubbish was removed from the work areas
                                as rapidly as practicable to avoid unnecessary accumulation of
                                combustibles,
                          -
                                  Flammable liquids were stored in appropriate containers and in
                                designated areas throughout the plant,
                          -
                                Cutting and welding operations in progress have been authorized by an
                                appropriate permit, combustibles have been moved away or safely
                                covered, and a fire watch and extinguisher was posted as required, and
                        .    --        ----_ . .        -  _.    .----.          - _ - - . - . . - - .  _- . _ -
 
                                            _. .              _          _
  . .
                                                    14
          -
              Fire protection / suppression equipment was provided and controlled in
              accordance with applicable requirements.
          No violations or deviations were identified.
      9. Structural Concrete - Unit 2 (47053C)
          a.  Procedure and Document Review
              The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following
              procedures pertaining to the placement of concrete to determine whether
'
              they comply with applicable codes, standards, NRC Regulatory Guides and
              licensee commitments.
              -
                      CD-T-02, Rev. 18          Concrete Quality Control
              -
                      CD-T-06, Rev. 10          Rebar and Cadweld Quality Control
              -
                      CD-T-07, Rev. 8            Embed Installation and Inspection
          b.  Installation Activities
              The inspector witnessed portions of the concrete placement indicated
              below to verify the following:
4
              (1)    Forms, Embedment, and Reinforcing Steel Instailation
                      -
                            Forms were properly placed, secure, leak tight and clean.
                      -
                            Rebar and other embedment installation was installed in
                            accordance with construction specifications and drawings,
,
                            secured, free of concrete and excessive rust, specified
'
                          distance from forms, proper on-site rebar bending (where
                            applicable) and clearances consistent with aggregate size.
t
              (2) Delivery, Placement and Curing
                      -
                            Preplacement inspection was completed and approved prior to
                            placement utilizing a Pour Card (Procedure Exhibit
                            CD-T-02*18).
                      -
                            Construction joints were prepared as specified.                      >
.
                      -
                            Proper mix was specified and delivered.
J
                      -
                            Temperature control of the mix, mating surfaces, and ambient
                          were monitored.
                      -
                            Consolidation was performed correctly.
!
j
                      -
                            Testing at placement location was properly performed in
                            accordance with the acceptance criteria and recorded on a
,                          Concrete Placement Pour Log (Procedure Exhibit CD-T-02*20).
i
                                                                                                  !
            _      _    ..            . - - -    _      ___ _ _ _ _ _ _      . , _ _ __ _- _-
 
. .
                                            15
                -
                      Adequate crew, equipment and techniques were utilized.
                -
                      Inspections during plact ;nts were conducted effectively by a
                      sufficient number of qualified personnel.
                -
                      Curing methods and temperature was monitored.
            (3) Rebar Splicing
                The inspector witnessed cadwelding operations to verify the
                following:
                -
                      Inspections are performed during and after splicing by
                      qualified QC inspection personnel.
                -
                      Each splice was defined by a unique number consisting of the
                      bar size, splice type, the position, the operator's symbol,
                      and a sequential number.
                -
                      Process and crews are qualified.
                -
                      The sequential number and the operator's symbol are marked on
                      all completed cadwelds.
                The inspector also conducted random inspections of completed
                cadwelds to verify the following:
                  -
                      Tap hole does not contain slag, blow out, or porous metal.
                  -
                      Filler metal was visible at both ends of the splice sleeve
                      and at the tap hole in the center of the sleeve. No voids
                      were detected at the ends of the sleeves.
                  -
                      The sequential number and the operator's symbol are marked on
                      all completed cadwelds.
            No violations or deviations were identified.
    10. Containment (Prestressing) - Unit 2 (47063C)
        a.  Procedure and Document Review
            The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following
            specification, procedure, and drawings pertaining to the installation
            of horizontal tendons, to determine whether they comply with applicable
            codes, standards, NRC Regulatory Guides and licensee commitments.
            - X2AF04              Technical Provisions for Containment
                                  Post-Tensioning System
            - AX2AF04-100-12      Field Instruction Manual for Installation
                                  of VSL E5-55 Post-Tensioning System Within
                                  Nuclear Containment Structures, Rev. 9
 
  . .
                                                16
            b. Installation Activities
              The inspector witnessed portions of the installation activities
              indicated below to verify the following:
              -
                    The latest issue (revision) of applicable drawings or procedures
                    are available to the installers and were being used.
              -
                    Tendons were free of nicks, kinks, corrosion; were installed in
                    designated locations; and that the installation sequence and
                    technique was per specified requirements.
              -
                    Installation crew was properly trained and quaiified.
              -
                    QC inspection was properly performed by qualified personnel in
                    accordance with applicable requirements.
              -
                    Adequate protective measures were being taken to ensure mechanical
                    and corrosion protection during storage, handling, installation,
                    and post installation.
              -
                    Tendons were stressed in the proper sequence.
              -
                    All strands in the tendon were moving together during the
                      stressing and the tendon is being stressed from both ends
                      simultaneously.
              -
                    Elongation measurements were being taken properly and being
                    compared to the calculated elongation.
              -
                    Anchor head lift-off force was being taken and documented
                    properly.
                -
                    The stressing operation was being monitored to identify any strand
                      slippage.
:              The inspector notes that containment prestressing is now complete for
              Unit 2.
!
          No violations or deviations were identified.
      11. Containment (Steel Structures and Supports) - Unit 2 (48053C)
          Periodic inspections were conducted to observe containment steel and support
          installation activities in progress, to verify the following:
          -
                Components were being      properly  handled  (included  bending or
                straightening).
!        -
                Specified clearances were being maintained.
          -
                Edge finishes and hole sizes were within tolerances.
 
. .
                                            17
        -
              Control, marking, protection and segregation were maintained during
              storage.
        -
              Fit-up/ alignment meets the tolerances in the specifications and
              drawings.
        No violations or deviations were identified.
    12. Safety-Related Structures (Structural Steel and Supports) - Unit 2 (48063C)
        Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities of
        safety-related structures / equipment supports for major equipment outside the
        containment to verify that:
        -
              Materials and components were being properly handled to prevent damage.
        -
              Fit-up/ alignment were within tolerances in specifications and drawing
              requirements.
        -
              Bolting was in accordance with specifications and procedures.
        -
              Specified clearances from adjacent components were being met.
        No violations or deviations were identified.
    13.  Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping - Unit 2
        (49053C) (49063C) (37301)
        Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities of
        the Reactor Coolant Boundary and other safety-related piping installations
          inside and outside Containments.      Verifications included but were not
        limited to the following:
        -
              Material and components were being properly handled and stored in order
              to prevent damage.
        -
              Fit-ups and alignments were within tolerances per specifications and
              drawings.
        -
              Specified clearances from pipe to pipe and adjacent components were
              met.
        -
              Piping was installed and inspected in accordance with applicable
              drawings, specifications, and procedures.
          -
              Those people engaged in the activity are qualified to perform the
              applicable function.
          -
              Drawing and specification changes (revisions) are being handled and
              used correctly.
          No violations or deviations were identified.
                                                                          .
 
  .
                                  <
                                            18                                        l
    14. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping Welding -
        Units 1 & 2 (55073C) (55083C)
        Periodic inspections were conducted during daily plant surveillances on
        safety-related pipe welding at various stages of weld completion. The
        purpose of the inspection was i.o determine whether the requirements of
        applicable specifications, codes, standards, work performance procedures and
        QC procedures are being met as follows:
        -
            Work was conducted in accordance with a process sheet which identifies
              the weld and its location by system, references procedures or
              instructions, and provides for production and QC signoffs.
        -
            Welding procedures, detailed drawings and instructions, were readily
              available in the immediate work area and technically adequate for the
              welds being made.
        -
              Welding precedure specification -(WPS) were in accordance with the
              applicable Code requirements and that a Procedure Qualification Record
              (PQR) is referenced and exists for the type of weld being made.        l
                                                                                      l
        -
              Base metals, welding filler materials, fluxes, gases, and insert
              materials were of the specified type and grade, have been properly
              inspected, tested and were traceable to test reports or certifications.
        -
              Purge and/or shielding gas flow and composition were as specified in
              the welding procedure specification and that protection was provided to
              shield the welding operation from adverse environmental conditions.
        -
              Weld joint geometry including pipe wall thickness was specified and
              that surfaces to be welded have been prepared, cleaned and inspected in
              accordance with applicable procedures or instructions.
!
        -    A sufficient number of adequately qualified QA and QC inspection
              personnel were present at the work site, commensurate with the work in
l            progress.
        -    The weld area cleanliness was maintained and that pipe alignment and
              fit-up tolerances were within specified limits.
!        -
              Weld filler material being used was in accordance with welding
,
              specifications, unused filler material was separated from other types
i            of material and was stored properly and that weld rod stubs were
l            properly removed from the work location.
!
l
        -
              That there were no evident signs of cracks, excessive heat input,
              sugaring, or excessive crown on welds.
l
        -
              Welders were qualified to the applicable process and thickness, and
              that necessary controls and records were in place.
        No violations or deviations were identified.
!
1
 
  . .
                                                19
      15. Reactor Vessel, Integrated Head Package, and Internals - Units 1 & 2
            (50053C) (50063C)
            Periodic Unit 1 inspections consisted of examinations of the Reactor Vessel,
            and the installed integrated head package and the upper internals in their
            designated storage area. The lower internals was installed in the Reactor
            Vessel during integrated ESFAS testing.
'
            The Unit 2 inspections consisted of examinations of the Reactor Vessel with
            the lower internals installed and the integrated head package and the upper
            internals which are stored in their designated laydown area.
            Inspections also determined that proper storage protection practices were in
            place and that entry of foreign objects and debris was prevented.
            No violations or deviations were identified.
      16. Safety Related Components - Units 1 & 2 (50073C)
            The inspection consisted of plant tours to observe storage, handling, and
            protection; installation; and preventive maintenance after installation of
            safety-related components to determine that work is being performed in
            accordance with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee
            commitments.
            During the inspection the below listed areas were inspected at various times
            during the inspection period to verify the following as applicable:
            -
                  Storage, environment, and protection of components were in accordance
                  with manufacturer's instructions and/or established procedures.
            -
                  Implementation of special storage and maintenance requirements such as:
                  rotation    of motors, pumps, lubrication, insulation testing
                  (electrical), cleanliness,etc.
            -
                  Performance of licensee / contractor surveillance        activities  and
                  documentation thereof was being accomplished.
            -
                  Installation requirements were met such as: proper location, placement,
l                orientation, alignment, mounting (torquing of bolts and expansion
                  anchors), flow direction, tolerances, and expansion clearance.
            -
                  Appropriate stamps, tags, markings, etc. were in use to prevent
                  oversight of required inspections, completion of tests, acceptance, and
                  the prevention of inadvertent operation.
            Safety-Related piping, valves, pumps, heat exchangers, and instrumentation
            were  inspected in the following Unit 1 and 2 areas on a random sampling
l          basis throughout the inspection period:
.
'
            -
                  Residual Heat Removal Pump Rooms
            -
                  Diesel Generator Building
                                                            -        - _ .  -    ._.    - _- _.
 
  .  .
                                                                                            '
                                                  20
            -
                  Auxiliary Feedwater Pumphouse
            -
                  Containment Spray Pump Rooms
            -
                  Pressurizer Rooms
            -
                  Main Coolant Pump Areas
            -
                  Steam Generator Areas
            -
                  Safety Injection Pump Rooms
            -
                  RHR and CS Containment Penetration Encapsulation Vessel Rooms
            -
                  Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchangers, Surge Tanks & Pump Rooms
            -
                  Cable Spreading Rooms
            -
                  Accumulator Tank Areas
            -
                  Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Letdown Heat Exchanger Pump
                  Room
            -
                  Battery & Charger Rooms
            -
                  Nuclear Grade Piping, Valves & Fittings Storage Areas
            -
                  Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Rooms
            -
                  Pressurizer Relief Tank Area
            -
                  CVCS Centrifugal Charging Pumps & Positive Displacement Pump Rooms
            -
                  Bottom Mounted Instrumentation (BMI) Tunnel and Seal Table Area
            -
                  BMI and Supports Under Reactor Vessel
            -
                  NSCW Tower Pump Rooms and Pipe Tunnels
            -
                  Containment, Auxiliary Building, Control Building, and Fuel Handling
                  Building auxiliary (secondary) areas
            No violations or deviations were identified.
        17. Safety Related Pipe Support and Restraint Systems - Units 1 & 2 (50090C)
              Periodic random inspections were conducted during the inspection period to
              observe construction activities during installation of safety-related pipe
              supports to determine that the following work was performed in accordance
            with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee ccmmitments:
              -
                  Spring hangers were provided with indicators to show the approximate
                  " hot" or " cold" position, as appropriate.
              -
                  No deformation or forced bending was evident.
              -
                  Where pipe clamps are used to support vertical lines, shear lugs were-
l                  welded to the pipe (if required by Installation Drawings) to prevent
i
                  slippage.
              -
                  Sliding or rolling supports were provided with material and/or
i                  lubricants suitable for the environment and compatible with sliding
                  contact surfaces.
              -
                  Supports are located and installed as specified.
              -
                  The surface of welds meet applicable code requirements and are free
i                  from unacceptable grooves, abrupt ridges, valleys, undercuts, cracks,
l                  discontinuities, or other indications which can be observed on the
!
                  welded. surface.
l
              No violations or deviations were identified.
l
    3                  .      __      _
                                                          _          --      ,_ ._.  _  _
 
                                        _      _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
    .
                                                                          21
      18. Electrical and Instrumentation Components and Systems - Units 1 & 2 (51053C)
            (52153C)
            Periodic inspections were coaducted during the inspection period to observe
            safety-related electrical equipment in order to verify that the storage,
            installation, and preventive maintenance was accomplished in accordance with
            applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee commitments.
            During the inspection period inspections were performed on various pieces of
            electrical equipment during storage, installation, and cable terminating
            phase in order to verify the following as applicable:
            -
                    Location and alignment
            -
                    Type and size of anchor bolts
            -
                    Identification
              -
                    Segregation and identification of nonconforming items
              -
                    Location, separation and redundancy requirements
              -
                    Equipment space heating
              -
                    Cable identification
              -
                    Proper lugs used
              -
                    Condition of wire (not nicked, etc.), tightness of connection
              -
                    Bending radius not exceeded
              -
                    Cable entry to terminal point
              -
                    Separation
              No violations or deviations were identified.
        19.  Electrical and Instrumentation Cables and Terminations - Units 1 & 2
              (51063C) (52063C)
              a.    Raceway / Cable Installation
                    The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following
                    procedures pertaining to raceway / cable installation to determine
                    whether they comply with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides and
                      licensee commitments.
                    -
                            ED-T-02, Rev. 10 Raceway Installation
                    -
                            ED-T-07, Rev. 11 Cable Installation
                      Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities
                      of Safety Related Raceway / Cable Installation.
                      In reference to the raceway installation, the following areas were
                      inspected to verify compliance with the applicable requirements:
                      -
                            Identification
                      -
                            Alignment
                      -
                            Bushings (Conduit)
                      -
                            Grounding
                      -
                            Supports and Anchorages
. .-  .
                  ..
                                  ____    ___.                            __              _ _ _ _}
                                                                                                __
 
                                            .
  .    .
                                                                22
                        In reference to the cable installation the following areas were
                        inspected to verify compliance with the applicable requirements:
                        -
                              Protection from adjacent construction activities (welding, etc.)
                        -
                              Coiled cable ends properly secured
                        -
                              Non-terminated cable ends taped
                        -
                              Cable trays, junction bcxes, etc., reasonably free of debris
                        -
                              Conduit capped, if no cable installed
                        -
                              Cable supported
                        -
                              Bend radius not exceeded
                        -
                              Separation
                b.    Cable Terminations
                        The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following
                        procedures pertaining to cable termination to determine whether they
                        comply with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides and licensee
                        commitments.
                        -
                              ED-T-08, Rev. 9 Cable Termination
                        In reference to cable terminations the following areas were inspected
                        to verify compliance with the applicable requirements.
                        -
                              Cable identification
                        -
                              Proper lugs used
                        -
                              Condition of wire (not nicked, etc.)
                        -
                              Tightness of connection
                        -
                              Bending radius not exceeded
                        -
                              Cable entry to terminal point
                        -
                              Separation
;                No violations or deviations were identified.
            20. Containment and Safety Related Structural Steel Welding - Units 1&2
                  (55053C) (55063C)
                  Periodic inspections were conducted during daily plant surveillances on
                  safety-related steel welding at various stages of weld completion.
                  The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether the requirements of
                  applicable specifications, codes, standards, work performance procedures and
                  QC procedures are being met as follows:
                  -
                        Work was corducted in accordance with a process sheet or drawing which
                          identifies the weld and its location by system, references, procedures
                        or instructions, and provides for production and/or QC signoffs.
                  -
                        Welding procedures, detailed drawings and instructions, were readily
                        available in the immediate work area and technically adequate for the
                        welds being made.
    .-  , - - .    ---    .  - -.-. - -. .-. .. .. - . .- , -
 
  . .
                                                    23
              -
                      Welding procedure specification (WPS) were in accordance with the
                      applicable Code requirements and that a Procedure Qualification Record
                      (PQR) is referenced and exists for the type of weld being made.
              -
                      Base metals and welding filler materials were of the specified type and
                      grade, were properly inspected, tested, and were traceable.
              -
                      Protection was provided to shield the welding operation from adverse
                      environmental conditions.
              -
                      Weld joint geometry including thickness was specified and that surfaces
                      to be welded were prepared, cleaned and inspected in accordance with
                      applicable procedures or instructions.
              -
                      A sufficient number of adequately qualified QA and QC inspection
                      personnel commensurate with the work in progress were present at the
                      work site.
              -
                      Weld area cleanliness was maintained and that alignment and fit-up
                      tolerances were within specified limits.
              -
                      Weld filler material -being used was in accordance with welding
                      specifications, unused filler material was separated from other types
                      of material and was stored and controlled properly, and stubs were
                      properly removed from the work location.
              -
                      There were no visual signs of cracks, excessive heat input, or
                      excessive crown on welds.
              -
                      Welders were qualified to the particular process and thickness; and
                      that necessary controls and records were in place.
              No violations or deviations were identified.
      21. Preoperational Test Program Implementation / Verification - Unit 1 (70302)
                (71302)
              The inspector reviewed the present implementation of the preoperational test
                program.      Test program attributes              inspected included review of
              administrative requirements, document control, documentation of major test
                events and deviations to procedures, operating practices, instrumentation
                calibrations, and correction of problems revealed by testing.
                Periodic inspections were conducted of Control Room Operations to assess
                plant condition and conduct of shift personnel. The inspector observed that
                Contr'sl Room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional
              ma n r.e r.  Shift personnel were knowledgeable of plant conditions,            i.e.,
                orgoing testing, systems / equipment in or out of service, and
                alarm / annunciator status. In addition, the inspector observed shift
                turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant testing,
                operational problems and other pertinent plant information during the
;              turnovers.    Control Room logs were reviewed and various entries were
l              discussed with operations personnel.
l
          .- -                  -            .          .-- - . - - - - .    . - . . - - - - -      -
                                                                                                        .- .-
 
                                                                                        .
    . .
  !
                                              24
        Periodic facility tours were made to assess equipment and plant conditions,
        maintenance and preoperational activities in progress.            Schedules for
        program completion and progress reports were routinely monitored.
        Discussions were held with responsible personnel, as they were available, to
        determine their knowledge of the preoperational program.          The Inspector
        reviewed numerous operation deviation reports to determine if requirements
        were met in the areas of documentation, action to resolve, justification,
        corrective action and approvals. Specific inspections conducted are listed
        below:
        a.  Preoperational Tests
            (1) Test Procedure Review (70300)
                  The inspector reviewed the following listed preoperational test
                  procedures.    Each test was reviewed for administrative format and
                  technical adequacy. The procedures were compared with licensee
                  commitments from the applicable FSAR Chapters, Regulatory Guide
                  1.68 and the Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-1137). This included
                  verifying that pertinent prerequisites were identified, initial
                  test conditions and system status were specified, acceptance
                  criteria were specified and management approval indicated:
                                          NRC
                Procedure No.      Inspection No.                  Test Title
                  1-300-01              70304                Integrated Safeguards and
                                                                Load Sequencing Test
                  1-3PK-02              70340                Battery Test IE
            (2) Test Witnessing (70312)
l
l
                  The inspector witnessed selected portions of the following
l                  preoperational test procedures as they were conducted.            The
l                  inspection included attendance at briefings held by the test
i                  supervisor to observe the coordination and general knowledge of
'
                  the procedure with the test          participants.    Overall crew
                  performance was evaluated during testing. A preliminary review of
                  the test results was compared to the inspector's own observations.
t                  Problems encountered during performance of the test were verified
i                  to be adequately documented, evaluated and dispositioned on a
j                  selected basis.
                                    NRC
                Procedure No.    Insp. No.      Test Title        Activity Observed
i                  1-300-01        70315      Integrated Safe-    Train "A" Single
!
                                    70316      guards and Load      Train Test
!                                              Sequencing Test      Consisting of        '
                                                                    Response to ESFAS
                                                                    With DG in Test Mode,
                                                                    Response to LOSP in
!
l
 
                        -                                  .        _
  . .
                                        25
                                                                Conjunction        with
                                                                ESFAS, Response to
                                                                Reset    to    ESFAS,
                                                                Stopping the Largest
                                                                Single Load, & DG
                                                                100% Load Rejection,
                                                                Per Steps 6.1-6.1.49
                                                                Train "A" Single
                                                                Train Test Consisting
                                                                of Tripping DG After
                                                                24    Hour    Test,
                                                                Response    to    LOSP,
                                                                Interrupted by ESFAS,
                                                                Response    to    LOSP,
                                                                Response to LOSP and
                                                                SI, Simulated Loss of
                                                                Onsite Power and
                                                                Response to Reset to
                                                                                  Steps
                      '
                                                                ESFAS    Per
                                                                6.1.58-6.1.116
              1-3BC-01        70436      Residual Heat        RHR System
                                          Removal System        Performance
                                          Preoperational        During Filling &
                                          Test                  Draining the
                                                                Reactor Cavity
                                                                Per Section 6.19
'
              1-3PK-02        70440      Battery Test IE      First Discharge
                                                                Test Results
I
      b. Followup of Event Occurring During Testing
          The inspector followed up on the following events which occurred during
          the inspection period:
          (1) RHR Train "B" pump failed to start on 11/17/86 when attempting to
:              start it for the performance of filling and draining the reactor
'
              cavity per Section 6.19 of Preop 1-3BC-01.
          (2) CCP Train "A" failed to start on 11/18/86 when attempting to start
              it to verify proper flow path alignment as a prerequisite to ESFAS
              Single Train "A" testing.
          (3) 480 Volt switchgear 18806 failed to close in on 12/11/86 during
              restoration from a Train "B" switchgea- outage. It was determined
!              that all of the above safety-related equipment failed to operate
              properly due to the breaker charging spring not being charged.
:              The Gould Brown Boveri ITE Switchgear requires a manual operation
l
i
!
i
                                                  .,.          .              ._      , _ . - _ _ ,
 
                    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. .
                                                                                26
                          by the operator to ensure the breaker charging spring is charged.
                          Operations Procedure 13435-C (Circuit Breaker Racking Precedure)
                            contains a step for the operator to ensure that the charging motor
                            power control switch is in the on position and that the charging
                              spring spring charged indicator is visible during the racking in
                              process. The licensee has formed a task force to evaluate this
                              problem so as to determine whether there is a hardware or operator
                              problem with properly racking in these breakers since there have
                              been several occurrences of these breakers not being properly
                                racked in. The Resident Inspectors will continue to follow this
                                  item.
          No violations or deviations were identified.
    22. . Plant Procedures - b.it 1 and 2 (42400B)
          This    inspection consists of a procedural                                          review to verify that
          administrative controls are established and implemented to control safety
          related operations. Procedures are selected at random and reviewed for
          technical adequacy and incorporation of requirements as appropriate for the
          proper operation of a nuclear facility in the startup and operational phase.
          The following requirements, guidance and licensee commitments were utilized
          as appropriate:
          - 10 CFR 50.59                                                    Change, Tests, and Experiments
          - 20 CFR 50 Appendix B                                            Instructions, Procedures and Drawings
            Criteria V
          - ANSI N18.7-1976                                                Administrative Controls and Quality
                                                                            Assurance for the Operational Phase
          - Regulatory Guide 1.33                                          Quality Assurance Requirements for the
            Rev 2, 1978                                                    Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants
          - FSAR Section 13                                                  Conduct of Operations
          - NUREG 0737, et al                                                TMI Task Action Plan
          No violations or deviations were identified.
    23. Three Mile Island Task Action Plan Followup - Unit 1 (425401B)
          This inspection consists of verification that the licensee has implemented
          the requirements of NUREG 0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan
          Requirements" as committed to in the facility FSAR or other appropriate
          documents.                                        Verification consisted of one or more of the following
          attributes, as appropriate, to determine acceptability for each listed
          action item:
          -
                Program or procedure established
          -
                Personnel training or qualification
          -
                Completion of item
          -
                Installation of equipment
          -
                Drawings reflect the as-built configuration
          -
                Component tested and in service or integrated into the preoperational
                test program
 
                      _ _ _ _ _ _      - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
          _ ..
  . .
                                                                27
      The following documents were utilized in performing the review, as
      appropriate:
      NUREG 0578                    TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report
      NUREG 0660                    NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the
                                      TMI-2 Accident
      NUREG 0694                    TMI-Related Requirements for New Operating Licenses
      NUREG 0737 and                Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements
          Supplement 1
      FSAR thru                    Final Safety Analysis Report
          Amendment 29
      NUREG 1137 and                Safety Evaluation Report
          Supplements
      (Closed) I.A.1.1 " Shift Technical Advisor." This item addresses the
        specific requirements to provide an on-shift technical advisor (STA) to the
        shift supervisor.            Section 6.2.4 of the final draft of the Technical
      Specifications incorporates this function into the operating staff. Final
      Safety Analysis Report Section 13.2.2.1.6 defines the STA training program
      which has been reviewed by NRR and found to be acceptable (See SER Section
        13.2.2.2). The inspector reviewed Operations Procedure 11955-C, Shift
        Technical Advisor Qualification Checklist, Training Procedure 60603 and
        various other training prccedures discussing STA training requirements, and
        discussed STA training with training personnel. This inspection identified
        that the requirements of the FSAR have been incorporated into the STA
        training program with one minor exception. This exception was that the FSAR
        commits the STA's will obtain 4 weeks of hot participation experience at the
        same type of plant prior to fuel load whereas the training procedures
        commits to obtaining this experience prior to exceeding 20's of full power.
        The training manager stated the training procedure will be changed to
        reflect the requirements of the FSAR. The inspector considers this item is
        closed for Units 1 and 2.
        (Closed) I.A.1.2 " Shift Supervisor Administrative Duties." This item was
        addressed in Inspection Report 50-424/86-51 and 50-425/86-23.                  The
        administrative duties of the Shift Supervisor is detailed in F rocedure
        10000-C Conduct of Operations. Revision 2 of Procedure 10000-C was reviewed
4      by the inspector. Although the attributes listed in Section 2.7 were stated
        to be specific duties and responsibilities, the functions were performed by
        other personnel with overview activities being performed by the Shift
        Supervisor.            The inspector discussed with several      operations shift
        supervisor personnel, the administrative requirements associated with this
        function. None indicated that the administrative tasks being performed were
        a problem and was above and beyond the requirements generally performed as
        shift supervisor activities. Vogtle is establishing an additional shift
        position designated as " common shift supervisor" who will be responsible to
        assist the shift supervisor in some previous functions performed by the
        shift supervisor. Based on this review Item I.A.I.2 is closed for both
        units.  In addition IFI 86-51-03 is closed since 86-51-01 addresses the
*
        management directive discussed in this IFI.
        (Closed) I.A.1.3 " Shift Manning - Limit Overtime and Establish Minimum
        Shift Crew." The requirement was previously inspected in NRC Repert
        50-424/86-31 where one IFI was identified to review the applicable procedure
                                                                                            1
 
                                  --.
. .
                                        28
    against TS. IFI 50-31-05 is closed in Paragraph 22 of this report.
    (0pened) IFI 50-424/86-111-03 is identified to track one comment regarding a
    revision to Procedure 00005-C to add general words concerning minimizing the
    use of overtime " Review Revision 00005-C Regarding Overtime Minimizing".
    (Closed) I.C.1 " Guidance for the Evaluation and Development of Procedures
    for Transients and Accidents." This item was reissued in Generic Letter
    No. 82-33 dated December 17, 1982. In a letter dated May 1, 1984, the
    licensee submitted a procedures generation package. This submittal was
    reviewed by NRR and is addressed in SER Section 13.5.2.1.2. The NRR review
    identified a confirmatory item (Item 44) which was resolved in SSER #2. NRR
    has concluded that the guidance is adequate for the development of Emergency
    Operating Procedures. Based on this review this item is closed for Units 1
    and 2.
    (Closed) 1.C.3 " Shift Supervisor Responsibilities".        This item was
    addressed in Inspection Report Nos. 50-424/86-51 and 50-425/86-23. In that
    report, this item could not be closed and Inspector Followup Item (IFI)
    86-51-01; Review Licensee Action for TMI Item I.C.3 was opened. This IFI
    was open pending a review of a corporate management directive or other
    appropriate directive, resolution of the succession of responsibility chain
    between the FSAR and Procedure 00001-C, and completion of NRC review. A
    management directive issued specifically to all Nuclear Operations personnel
    from the General Manager of Vogtle Nuclear Operations (GMVNO), dated
    December 8, 1986, emphasizing the OSOS responsibilities as dictated in
    Administrative Procedures and stating a review of these procedures were
    required. A process has been established to reissue this directive on an
    annual basis. This closes Item I.C.3 for Units 1 and 2 and closes IFI
    50-424/86-51-01.
    (Closed)    I.C.4 " Control-Room Access." This item was addressed in
    Inspection Report No. 50-424/86-51 and 50-425/86-23. In that report, this
    item could not be closed and Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 86-51-02: Review
    Licensee Action for TMI Item I.C.4 was opened pending a re/iew of procedures.
    which describe the At-The-Controls areas and a clarification in procedures
    for predesignated NRC personnel. The inspector reviewed procedures 00301-C,
    Main Control Room Access and Personnel Conduct dated 12/2/86; 10000-C,
    Conduct of Operations, dated 10/8/86; and 10003-C, Hanning the Shift, dated
    9/11/86. This review indicated that predesignated NRC personnel access to
    the control room is addressed in Procedure 00301-C and the figures contained
    in the above procedures are consistent in their description of the AT-The
    Controls area. Based on this review, Item I.C.4 is closed for Unit 1;
    however, IFI 424/86-51-02 will remain open pending the license completion of
    proposed procedure changes to address the original freedom of access
    concerns for the NRC Resident Inspectors.
    (Closed) I.C.5 " Procedures for Feedback of Operating Experience to Plant
    Staff". The NRC staff has reviewed the proposed administrative requirements
    as discussed in SER Section 13.5.1 and found them to be acceptable. The
    inspector reviewed Procedure 00414-C, Operations Assessment Program dated
    10/23/86 and 80009-C, Operations Assessment Program Coordination dated
    11/7/86. Based on this review this item is closed for Units 1 and 2.
                                                                                  -
 
                        _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _        _ _ _ _
-
  . .
                                                                  29
      (Closed) I.C.8 " Pilot Monitoring of Selected Emergency Procedures for
      NT0L' s" . This item is addressed in SER Section 13.5.2.1 and states that
      this item is no longer necessary because the staff has approved the
      Westinghouse ERGS, and the applicant has committed to develop E0Ps based on
      the Westinghouse ERGS. Based on this SER review this item is closed for
      Units 1 and 2.
      (Closed) II.D.3 " Valve Position Indication".                            This item was inspected in
      NRC    Report    50-424/86-60.                          The  inspection resulted in Violation
      50-424/86-60-01. This TMI item is considered closed pending completion of
      corrective actions associated with the violation.
      (Closed) II.B.1                      " Reactor Coolant System Vents".        This item involves the
      installation of reactor coolant system and reactor head high point vents
      remotely operated from the control room. FSAR Section 5.4.15 describes the
      conformance of the vent system and valve configuration to the requiremencs
      of NUREG 0737.                        SER Section 5.4.12 discussed conformance with the
      requirements and NRR concludes the system is acceptable. A walkdown of the
      head vent system and piping, including the valve position indication in the
      control room was conducted. Reviewed P&ID's IX4DB111, 1X4DB112 and
      1X4DB114.    Reviewed Procedures 13001-1, 19221-1, 19241-1, 19261-1, 19263-1,
      14725-1, and 1-388-01.                              The inspector had noted a problem regarding
      Technical Specification 3.4.11, Reactor Coolant System Vents where the
      applicant had only included two of the three remotely operated valves. In
      the applicant's November 14, 1986 submittal this item was corrected.
      (Closed) II.E.4.1                      " Dedicated Hydrogen Penetrations".      This item requires
      containment penetrations for plants using external                                recombiners.  An
      acceptable alternative is a combined design that is single-failure proof for
      containment isolation purposes and single-failure proof for operation of the
      recombiners or a purge system. SER Section 6.2.5 addresses " Con.bustible Gas
      Control in Containment" and NRR concludes that the hydrogen recombiners and
      purge systems are acceptable. Walkdowns of the recombiners and purge
        system, including the recombiner control panels were performed. Procedures
        13130-1, 1-3GS-01, and 1-3GS-02 were reviewed.
        (Closed) II.E.3.1 " Emerge / Power for Pressurizer Featers". This item
        addresses having the cap 2~ility to supply a predetermined number of
        pressurizer heaters from either the offsite power source or the emergency
        power source. FSAR Section 5.4.10.3.1 describes conformance to the
        requirements, and SER Section 8.4.9 has NRR acceptance of the provisions of
        the FSAR Section. A walkdown of electrical buses INB01, INB10, IAA02, and
        1BA03 to identify where operators would be required to perform transfer of
        power was performed.                      Preoperationa' test procedures 1-3BB-01 and 1-38B-05
        were reviewed.
        (0 pen) II.F.1.2A " Noble Gas Monitor"
                      .2B " Iodine / Particulate Sampling"
                      .2C " Containment High-Range Monitor"
        These items are the responsibility of another NRC section. These items
        require the installation of specific instrumentation. A walkdown of the
        Plant Vent Stack Monitor, Containment Vent Monitor, Containment Atmosphere
 
  . .
                                          30
      Monitor, Turbine Building Exhaust Monitor, and the Containment High-Range
      Monitors was performed. Procedure 14000-1 was reviewed. Preoperational
      test procedures have not been completed at this time. These items will
      remain open until closed by responsible sections.
      (0 pen) II .F.1.2.D " Accident Monitoring - Containment Pressure". This item
      addresses having continuous indication of containment pressure. SER Section
      7.5.2.2 contains NRR's acceptance of the system for conformance. A walkdown
      of the extended range containment pressure system, including the plasma
      display on the control board was performed. Reviewed procedures 14228-1 and
      1-3RP-03. This item will remain open until the preoperational test 1-3RP-03
      has been completed demonstrating proper instrument performance.
      (Open) II .F.1.2.E " Accident Monitoring - Containment Water Level Monitor".
      This item requires continuous indication of containment water level in the
      control room. A walkdown of the containment water level indicating system,
      including the level transmitters was performed.          Reviewed procedures
      14000-1, 14228-1 and 1-3RP-03.        This item will remain open until the
      preoperational test 1-3RP-03 has been completed demonstrating proper
      instrument performance.
      (0 pen) I I . F.1. 2. F " Accident Monitoring - Containment Hydrogen Monitor".
      This item discusses having a continuous indication of hydrogen concentration
      in the containment atmosphere.      The system must be capable of providing
      continuous monitoring within 30 minutes of the initiation of safety
      injection. A walkdown of system, including the hydrogen monitoring control
      panels and control room indications was performed.        Procedures 14000-1,
      1-3GS-01, 1-3GS-02 and 1-3RP-03 were reviewed. This item will remain open
      until the preoperational test procedures have been completed demonstrating
      proper system performance.
      (Closed) III . A.1.2 " Upgrade Emergency Support Facilities" This item is
i    being closed by direction of the Emergency Preparedness Section based on
l    extensive reviews during inspections as documented in the following reports
!    50-424/86-12 and 50-425/86-18; 50-424/86-29 and 50-425/86-14;            and
!
      50-424/86-112 and 50-425/86-51. This item is closed for both units.
i
      (Closed) III.D.1.1 " Integrity of Systems Outside Containment Likely to
      Contain Radioactive Material." This TMI-2 Action Plan requires that the
      licensee shall implement a program to reduce leakage from systems outside
      containment that would or could contain highly radioactive fluids during a
:    serious transient o accident to as-low-as practical levels. FSAR Sections
!    9.3.4.1.3.5 and 12.1.3 describes the licensee's commitment to have a program
      to reduce leakage from licensee's systems . outside containment. NRR has
      reviewed the FSAR submitted and subsequent licensee correspondence which
      documents the licensee's intent to implement a program to reduce leakage
      from systems outside containment. This item was found to be acceptable to
l
'
      the staff as documented in Section 11.5.3 of Supplement No. 3 to the SER
      with the exception for the leak rate test results. A license condition was
      identified in Supplement No. 3 to the SER in Section 11.5.3 stating that the
      applicant must provide the leak rate test results before 5% power is
      exceeded.
 
  . .
                                                                                                        l
                                                                                                        1
                                                              31
                                                                                                        :
                                                                                                        I
          The inspector conducted a review of the licensee's leakage assessment
          program for compliance with the FSAR, subsequent correspondence, and Section
          6.7.4 (a) of the VEGP Final Draft of Technical Specifications.                    The
          following procedures were reviewed:
                  Procedure No.                                  Title
                    50024-C                    Leakage Assessment Program
                    55010-1                    Containment Spray System Leakage Assessment
                    55011-C                    CVCS Leakage Assessment
                    55012-1                    Residual Heat Removal System Leakage Assessment
                    55013-1                    Gaseous Waste Processing System Leakage Assessment
                    55014-1                    Nuclear Sampling System Leakage Assessment
                    55015-1                    Post Accident Sampling System - Liquid
                    55016-1                    Safety Injection System Leakage Assessment
          The inspector had the following comments regarding the above procedures:
          1) The data sheets which identified areas in the system to check for leakage.
          did.not reflect the latest system configuration, and 2) The data sheets did
          not reflect a check for leakage assessment on the entire suction and return
          lines to the RWST on the Containment Spray, Safety Injection and Residual
          Heat Removal System. Discussions were held with the Engineering Department
          Mechanical Discipline Supervisor responsible for developing and implementing
          the Leakage Assessment Program. The procedures are currently undergoing a
          revision to update them as a result of a physical field walkdown to verify
          that the procedure can be used and that it reflects the latest configuration
          as shown on the piping and instrument drawing. The licensee has committed
          to review and resolve the inspector's comments as appropriate.
          The licensee intends to perform these leakage assessment procedures to
          collect system baseline leakrate data during the power ascension test phase
          prior to achieving 5% rated thermal power.
l
l
          Based on the above review the inspector has determined that the licensee has
,
          developed a sai ~. sf actory leakage assessment program and therefore when
          properly implemented the requirement of NUREG-0737, Item III.D.1.1, will be
          met. This item is closed for both units.
j,    24. Followup of Reportable Items - Units 1 & 2 (92700)
          This inspection was conducted to determine whether the items have been
          received by the licensee, evaluated and corrective action taken, where
          appropriate. The inspector utilized discussions with cognizant personnel
          and review of applicable documentation, and field verification as a basis
            for closure of each item.
[          (Closed) 50-424/50-425 CDR 85-87 " Damage to Internal Wiring By Space
          Heaters in Limitorque Valve Motor Operators." The applicant determined this
            item to be reportable in a March 20, 1986 letter. The Bechtel Power
          Corporation Final Engineering Evaluation Report dated February 28, 1986, was
            reviewed. The space heaters and their associated wiring are not required to
            perform or support the performance of a safety function, however, there was
            evidence that damage had occurred to the safety related motor power leads.
l
            .          --    . _ . . . . _ . -      - - . , _          .._.- - - .      _.    -- ,. ,
 
. .
                                            32
        Damage to these power leads could render the motors inoperable, thereby
        preventing the associated valve from performing the. intended safety
        function. The results of the evaluation indicated that had this condition
        gone uncorrected, it could have impacted the safety of the plant. In order
        to prevent potential damage to the power leads of the Class IE Limitorque
        motor operators, the applicant stated in letters to the dated November 18,
        1985 and dated March 20, 1986, that the permanent power circuits to the
        space heaters will be disconnected and as the circuits are disconnected,
        existing internal wiring will be checked for damage and will be repaired or
        replaced as necessary. Upon review of the documentation for CDR 85-87 the
        inspector was unable to verify that the internal wiring was checked as
        required. The applicant's further review of the corrective action indicated
        that the work had been done, but documentation could not be located. The
        inspector then selected seven of these valves containing the Limitorque
        Motor Operators from Unit 1 for inspection. Assistance was requested from
        Electrical Maintenance and Quality Control Personnel. During the inspection
        two of the seven Limitorque Motor Operators were found to have burn damage    ,
        to the motor operator power leads. The applicant, in response to this NRC
        finding, formed a task force to review the documentation and direct
        re-inspections as appropriate.      Re-inspections were performed on 110
        operations with no further identification of burned power leads.
        Documentation of positive QC inspections were located for an additional 47
        valves, 10 are planned for inspection. Four valves contained within the
        encapsulation vessels will not be inspected due to the lack of finding any
        burned wire and access difficulty associated with these valves.
        Until the results of inspections can be reviewed this item will remain
        unresolved and identified as Unresolved Item 50-424/86-111-01, " Review
        Inspection Results of the Licensee's Inspection of Burn Damage on Limitorque
        Operator Power Leads".
        (Closed) 50-424/50-425 CDR 86-93      " Process and Root-Vent-Drain Valves".
        This item concerns a reportable condition where valves may not have been
        installed in accordance with the design requirements defined in the Valve
        Designation list as described in the GPC letter dated October 23, 1985. The
        applicant kept the resident inspector apprised of this item thru routine
        meetings.    Bechtel evaluation DER-113 was reviewed.        Documentation
        demonstrated that work was completed.
    25.  IE Circular Program - Units 1 & 2 (92701)
        This inspection consisted of a review of the IE Circular Program as defined
        in VEGP Project Policy and Procedures Manual Section 7.7.      The inspector
        reviewed a random sample of previously issued circulars to determine if the
        circulars were reviewed, if appropriate action was taken, if the results
        were documented and maintained. All outstanding IE Circulars are considered
        closed based on this programmatic review.
        One problem was noted with Circular 77-CR-15 (Degradation of Fuel Oil to the
        Emergency Diesel Generator). Upon inspecting actions regarding this
        circular the inspector determined that zinc was used to coat the inside
        surface of the diesel fuel oil storage tanks. Circular 77-CR-15 states that
        zinc could degrade diesel engine performance by affecting the fuel. Further
                                .    _
                                                          - _ _ __.
 
          .                                                                        -                .-
  .. .
                                                          33
                investigation revealed that NRR is aware of this discrepancy as stated in a
                letter to Richard Conway of GPC from B. J. Youngblood of NRR, dated
                November 21, 1986. This item will receive followup as part of the closeout
                action associated with the license condition to be established by NRR.
                No violations or deviations were identified.
      26.      Safety Committee Activity - Units 1 & 2 (40301)
                .This inspection consisted of a review of the on-site and off-site safety
                  review committees to determine if they have been properly established and
                  functioning. The following requirements, guidance and licensee commitments
                were utilized as appropriate:
                -
                        10 CFR 50.59                      Change, Tests, and Experiments
                -
                      ANSI N18.7-1976                      Administrative Controls and Quality
                                                            Assurance for the Operational Phase
                  -
                        Regulatory Guide 1.33              Quality Assurance Requirements for the
                          Rev 2, 1978                      Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants
                  -
                        FSAR Section 13.4.1                Final Safety Analysis Report -
                          thru Amendment 27                Operational Reviews
                  -
                        NUREG 1137 and                      Safety Evaluation Report
                          Supplements
                  -
                        Draft Technical                    Section 6.4, Review and Audit
                          Specification
                  a.    Plant Review Board (PRB)
                        This review included attendance at two PRB meetings and review of the
                        meeting minutes for the last 90 days. Administrative procedure 00002-C
                        Rev. 4, " Plant Review Board - Duties and Responsibilities" and pending
                        changes were reviewed against appropriate commitments. This review was
                        to determine if the following had been established:
                        (1) Responsibilities and authorities
;
                        (2) Review group membership
                        (3) Method and responsibility for designating alternate members
                        (4) Quorum requirements
                        (5) Meeting frequency
                        (6) Requirements for minutes
                        (7) Lines of communication with other review
l                        (8) The written program requires review of Technical Specification
                                      Section 6.4 items
:
      ,.  _ , _      _    _ _ _ . , _ .      ._ _ ._. .  ._      _    . . _ _ -  . _ . ,
 
  r~ ..      %
                                                      34
                  The following items were identified during the above inspection and
                  forwarded to NRR for resolution where Technical Specifications were
                  involved:
                  (1) Group membership had exceeded the allowed six members by the
                          addition of memoers from other departments and by designating two
                          members to represent operations. This item would be allowable by
                          the Final Draft Technical Specification (DTS).
                  (2) Membership Designation has been performed by the Chairman and not
                          by the GMVNO as required by DTS.
                  (3) Procedure 00002-C, Rev. 4 did not reflect the DTS accurately. The
                          licensee stated that the Final Draft Technical Specification would
                          be reconciled and incorporated.
                  Inspector Followap Item 50-424/86-111-02, " Review PRB Procedure for
                  Proper Incorporation of Technical Specifications".      This item will be
                  reviewed post fuel load.
            b.    Safety Review Board (SRB)
                  This inspection ccnsisted of a review between the Final Draft Technical
                  Specifications and the procedures established to implement the
                  requirements. The following procedures were reviewed:
                          NOP-10-400      Safety Review Board 5/23/86
                          NOI-10-401      Conduct of the Nuclear Safety Review Board
                                          Meetings 5/23/86
                          NOI-10-402      SRB Review of Documentary Material 8/15/86
                          NOI-10-403      Processing of SRB Material 5/23/86
                          NOI-10-404      SRB Records Retention and Handling 5/23/86
                          NOI-10-405      SRB Subcommittees 5/23/86
                          NOI-10-406      SRB Conduct on Onsite Reviews and Audits 8/15/86
                  In reviewing NOP 10-400, the inspector noted a caveat which states that
                  until the Technical Specification (TS) proposals between Hatch and
                  Vogtle are resolved, that the appropriate Plant TS will be the
                  controlling requirement. The applicant intends to standardize the SRB
                  administrative requirements between sites.
l
    -
                  The activities of the SRB will be further inspected after licensing.
;            No violations or deviations were identified.
        27. Management Meetings - Unit 1 (30702)
            On December 12, 1986, the resident inspectors and members of the Region II
            staff participated with Commissioner Carr and his aide in a GPC presentation
,
            and site tour.
;
I
!
                                _
                      ._
                                      ..        _ - ,          _. . _ _
                                                                  _          _
}}

Latest revision as of 19:43, 5 December 2021

Insp Repts 50-424/86-111 & 50-425/86-50 on 861022-1215.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Containment & safety-related Structures,Piping Sys & Supports & safety-related Components
ML20207J275
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 12/31/1986
From: Livermore H, Rogge J, Schepens R, Sinkule M, Skinner P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207J244 List:
References
50-424-86-111, 50-425-86-50, NUDOCS 8701080368
Download: ML20207J275 (35)
v • d • e


See also: IR 05000424/1986111

Text

. ....

km CUg UNITED STATES

Do NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ o REGloN II

g j 101 MARIETTA STREET. N.W.

  • ^t ATL ANTA. GEOR GI A 30323

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+...+

/

Report Nos.: 50-424/86-111 and 50-425/86-50

Licensee: Georgia Powe Company

P. O. Box 4545

Atlanta, GA 30302

Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: CPPR-108 and CPPR-109

Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: October 22 --December 15, 1986

Inspectors: I. . [ l /!

- H. H. Livermore, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed

Construction

$ ALQ

g J. F. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector

r2/s/86

Date Signed

Operations f

6 6K A~I

R. J. Schepens, Resident Inspector

r#/9s

Date Signed

M Operations & Constructipn

@( w)

P. H. Skinner, Senior Resident Inspector

n/n/86

Date Signed

Catawba

Accompanying Perso nele C Bur er and C. Paulk

Approved by: _14ukd6

M. V.LSinkule', Section Chief

J/ A6

Dat'e Sfgned

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed Resident Inspection in the

following areas: containment and safety related structures, piping systems and

supports, safety related components, auxiliary systems, electrical equipment

and cables, instrumentation, preoperational test program, quality programs and

administrative controls affecting quality, and follow-up on previous inspection

identified items.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

8701090368 861231

PDR ADOCK 05000424

O PDR

._- _ ._ __ _ , _ . . , _ -

_ . _ . _ _ _

_ _

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

R. E. Conway, Senior Vice-President, Vogtle Project Director

C. Whitney, General Manager, Project Support

P. D. Rice, Vice-President,-Project Engineering

R. H. Pinson, Vice-President, Project Construction

W. W. Mintz, Project Completion Manager

R. W. McManus, Readiness Review

  • G. Bockhold, Jr. , General Manager Nuclear Operations
  • T. V. Greene, Plant Manager
  • R. M. Bellamy, Plant Support Manager
  • C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance Manager
  • C. E. Belflower, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Operations
  • E. D. Groover, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Construction
  • W. E. Mundy, Quality Assurance Audit Supervisor
  • D. M. Fiquett, Project Construction Manager - Unit 2

B. C. Harbin, Manager Quality Control

  • G. A. McCarley, Project Compliance Coordinator
  • W. C. Gabbard, Regulatory Specialist

C. F. Meyer, Operations Superintendent

R. M. Odom, Plant Engineering Supervisor

C. L. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent (Startup)

M. A. Griffis, Maintenance Superintendent

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E. M. Dannemiller, Technical Assistant to General Manager

G. R. Frederick, Quality Assurance Engineer / Support Supervisor

  • R. E. Spinnatu, ISEG Supervisor

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  • J. F. D' Amico, Nuclear Safety & Compliance Manager
  • W. F. Kitchens, Manager Operations

V. J. Agro, Superintendent Administration

  • A. L. Mosbaugh, Asst. Plant Support Manager

M. P. Craven, Nuclear Security Manager

l Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen, technicians,

supervision, engineers, inspectors, and office personnel.

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Other Organizations

F. B. Marsh, Project Engineering Manager - Bechtel

H. M. Handfinger, Asst. Plant Support Manager - Bechtel

D. L. Kinnsch, Project Engineering - Bechtel

  • Attended Exit Interview

2. Exit Interview (30703C)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 15, 1986,

with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described

the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. No

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dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not

identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the

inspector during this inspection.

The following items were identified during this inspection:

Unresolved Item 50-424/86-111-01, " Review Inspection Results of the

Licensee's Inspection of Burn Damage on Limitorque Operator Power

Leads." - Paragraph 4

Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-424/86-111-02, " Review PRB Procedure

for Proper Incorporation of Technical Specifications." - Paragraph 26

IF! 50-424/86-111-03, " Review Revistor. 00005-C Regarding Overtime

Minimizing." - Paragraph 23

The following previous inspection items remain open due to incomplete

licensee action:

IFI 50-424/86-51-02, " Review Procedure 00301-C to Verify Incorporation

of Unfettered Access for NRC Resident Inspectors." - Paragraph 23

This inspection closed two violations, nineteen IFIs, two Construction

Deficiency Report and fourteen Three Mile Island Tcsk Followup Items.

Region based NRC exit interviews were attended during the inspection period

by a resident inspector. ,

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3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

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(Closed) Violation, 50-424/86-09-01, " Failure to Perform an Adequate System

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Walkdown During the Turnover of Safety-Related Systems". This violation

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identified a number of discrepancies between the as-built configurations of

the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System and the Nuclear Service Cooling Water

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(NSCW) System and the latest Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID)

F drawings for those systems. These discrepancies were not identified on the

system punchitsts as required by Startup Manual Procedure SUM-17 even though

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a walkdown inspection had been conducted on the systems during turnover as

required by Construction Department Procedure GD-A-49. The inspector has

L reviewed the licensee's corrective action which consisted of but was not

' limited to: 1) Documenting the discrepancies identified on controlled

documents such as Deviation Reports and Field Change Requests, 2) Issuing

i FPCN 1 to Construction Procedure GD-A-49 which included provisions for

identifying discrepancies between Isometric Drawings and P& ids during

turnover walkdowns and documenting them on the Master Tracking System

Punchlists, and 3) Performing and documenting a re-walkdown of all safety-

related systems in accordance with a special Construction Acceptance Test

. CAT-M-99. The licensee's results of the re-walkdowns conducted in

l accordance with CAT-M-99 was presented to the Resident Inspectors on

' September 24, 1986, as documented in Inspection Report No. 50-424/86-74 and

50-425/86-35. Based on this review the inspector has determined that the

( licensee has taken the appropriate corrective action; therefore, this item

is considered to be closed.

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(Closed) Violation 50-424/86-31-01, " Failure to Establish Appropriate

Procedures to Properly Control the Filling and Venting of Safety-Related

Systems". This violation identified several examples where approved

procedures were not used during filling and venting safety-related systems

but rather verbal instructions were given by a test supervisor to operations

personnel. Subsequently an error was made in sequencing the opening of

valves, which in turn, led to inadvertent overfilling of the Reactor Coolant

System above the 188' elevation. The inspector has reviewed the licensee's

corrective action which consisted of but was not limited to: 1) Additional

training to emphasize the importance of effective communication, avoidance

of operator errors, and the use of appropriate procedures to control work

activities, 2) System Operating Procedure 13011-1 for filling and venting

j the RHR System was revised to address the sections of piping between valves

8701A and 8701B (Train A) and 8702A and 8702B (Train B), 3) Startup Manual

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Procedure SUM-37 was revised to establish policies to limit the use of

verbal instructions on the performance of work activities involving safety-

related equipment, and 4) A new Startup Manual Procedure (SUM 39, " Initial

Test Program Incident Reports") was developed to establish a report to

management for occurrences (like the RCS overfills) that were previously not

required to be reported. The procedure includes provisions for determining

the root cause of reported incidents and for prescribing appropriate

corrective action. Based on the above review the inspector has determined

that the licensee has taken the appropriate corrective action; therefore

this item is closed.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to

determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or

deviations. One new unresolved item identified during this inspection is

discussed in Paragraph 24.

5. Followup on Previous Inspection Items (92701)

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-424/85-26-02 & 50-425/85-25-02,

" Review Licensee Action on Information Notice Nos. 85-15, 85-19 & 85-25."

This Inspector Followup Item identified three (3) IE Information Notices

i which required followup by this inspector pending completion of the

licensee's evaluation process. The inspector has reviewed the licensee's

action and has determined that the IE Information Notices were distributed

to the appropriate departments for evaluation of applicability and that

appropriate corrective action has been taken. Based on this review this

item is considered to be closed.

(Closed) IFI 50-424/86-60-09, "QC Re-inspection Anti-Drug Program". As

noted in the Inspector Followup Item, the inspector was concerned that the

Vogtle Drug Program was lacking some continuity and detail to insure

standardization in the areas of: the formal QC notification process of

those called in on the Drug Abuse Hot Line; those who will be addressed by

QC for re-inspection (field engineers, QC, etc.); and detail decisien making

guidelines as to how a supervisor decides who will be tested or not.

The inspector reviewed the following newly issued Drug Program procedures:

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a) Management Action Procedure dated September 8, 1986.

b) Desk-top Procedure S-1920, Reporting Guidelines, September 27,

1986.

c) QC Re-inspection / Verification Status Sheet.

The procedures set forth additional details that satisfy the aforementioned

inspector concerns. Specific forms and notifications are now provided that

notify QC of all personnel that fail the drug and alcohol testing.

Guidelines are provided that determine exactly whose work is to be

re-inspected. Re-verification lists record the actions taken on all those

personnel in the re-inspection category. Guidelines are provided for

management evaluation of the quality of information, knowledge and

observation of the individual, and discretion and judgement to be used in

regards to the nature of the employee's duties. The inspector is satisfied

with the action taken and considers this item closed.

(Closed) 50-424/86-09-05, " Review Licensee Action to Resolve HVAC Handswitch

Nomenclature". This inspector followup item identified that handswitch

Nos. 1-HS-12004, 1-HS-12050A, 1-HS-12051A, 1-HS-12053A & 1-HS-12054A on the

Control Room HVAC Control Panel QHVC were labeled as " exhaust" fan whereas

the P&ID and the applicable operations procedure states " supply" fan. The

inspector has reviewed the licensee's action which included the replacement

of the handswitch switch plates with ones with the correct nomenclature,

i.e., " supply" fan. Based on this review the inspector has determined that

the licensee has taken the appropriate corrective action; therefore, this

item is considered to be closed.

(Closed) IFI 50-424/86-60-04, " Review Results of Baselining the Regulatory

Compliance Computer Database With the Readiness Review Module 7 Database".

The inspector reviewed a marked up version of Table 3.2-1 from Module 7

showing where the Master Operations Database contained each commitment.

Summary Tables were reviewed showing (1) Differences and (2) Those added

since issuance of Module 7. It was noted that several commitments listed in

Module 7 will not be in the Master Database. These commitments were

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indicated in the package as " Design State of Fact" or " State of Fact".

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(Closed) IFI 50-424/86-31-04, " Review Minimum Shift Crew Requirements".

Since this item was opened the Technical Specifications have developed to a

final status. The issue was brought to NRR attention and the decision was

to use the Standard Technical Specification (STS) format. While the STS

does not require personnel in a defueled state for a single unit site; it

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will when both units are operating.

(Closed) IFI 50-424/86-31-05, " Review Implementation of Technical

Specification Overtime Conflicts with 00005-C". Since this item was opened

the Technical Specifications have developed to a final status. NRR has

decided to change the wording in the Technical Specification to match the

licensee's proposal. The inspector has noted to NRR where their

requirements have been relaxed and will enforce the Technical Specification

as issued.

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(Closed) IFI 50-425/86-31-02, " Review Implementation of Negative Logic

Testing". This Inspector Followup Item identified that based on a review of

several Preoperational Test Procedures and discussions with test

supervisors that the AFW & CVCS System Preoperational Test Procedures did

not contain provisions for testing all valves and pumps with transfer switch

control to the remote shutdown panels for negative logic testing. The

inspector has reviewed the licensee's action which consisted of issuing and

implementing preoperational test procedure 1-300-15. This procedure

contained sections 6.8 through 6.12 which detailed a Generic Test Procedure

for testing valves and pumps transfer switch control for negative logic

testing which had not been previously identified for testing in their

respective System Preoperational Test Procedures. Based on this review the

inspector has determined that the licensee has taken the appropriate

corrective action; therefore, this item is considered to be closed.

(Closed) IFI 50-424/86-31-07, " Review Maintenance Procedure 20427-C for

Incorporation of the ANSI Requirement to Document Closecut Inspection

Results." This inspector has reviewed the licensee's action which consisted

of incorporating this requirement as Step 4.3.5.b.6 into Maintenance

Procedure 20427-C, Revision 2. Based on this review the inspector has

determined that the licensee has taken the appropriate corrective action;

therefore, this item is considered to be closed.

(Closed) IFI 50-424/86-31-06, " Review Site Procedure 00402-C, Licensing

Document Change Request, for Resolution of Comments". The inspector

reviewed procedure 00402-C, Rev. 3 issued 11/3/86 and noted that this item

has been resolved.

(Closed) IFI 50-424/86-51-01, " Review Licensee Action for TMI Item I.C.3".

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Procedure 00001-C, Rev. I has been revised to contain the correct delegation

of responsibil!ty. The applicant still needs to provide a management

directive as delineated when this item was open.

(Closed) IFI 50-424/86-60-03, " Review Technical Specification Surveillance

4.8.1.1.1 Implementation Procedure for Proper Verification of AC Independent

Power Sources." Procedure 14230-1, Rev. 1 issued 10/12/86 was reviewed for

proper incorporation of comments. A second issue regarding the deletion of

a technical specification surveillance was brought to NRR attention and

resolved as not applicable.

4 (Closed) IFI 50-424/86-12-30, 50-425/86-18-30, " Completion of Installation

of Telephone Systems." Installation of telephones required by the

Radiological Emergency Plan and implementing procedures have been completed

as required.

(Closed) IFI 50-424/86-12-61, 50-425/86-18-61, " Complete Communication Links

With South Carolina Counties of Aiken, Barnwell and Allendale."

Notwithstanding the Administrative Decision Link (ADL) to the South Carolina

Emergency Headquarters and Forward Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) as

requested by that State, all links required by the Emergency Plan have been

installed, tested, and declared operational.

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(Closed) IFI 50-424/86-12-62, 50-425/86-18-62, " Completion of All

Communication Links Specified in the VEGP Radiological Emergency Plan, and

Assurance of Their Operability." All such communication links have been

installed, tested, and determined to be operable.

(Closed) IFI 50-424/86-12-70, 50-425/86-18-70, " Include in the " Subsequent

Operator Actions" Sections of All Appropriate Off-Normal Procedures, A Step

Similar to That Provided in ADP 18036." This item was closed via Report

Nos. 50-424/86-112, 50-425/86-51.

(Closed) 50-424/86-12-103, 50-425/86-18-103, " Design & Installation of An

Emergency Siren System. The siren system has been installed, tested, and

declared operational.

(Closed) IFI 50-424/86-12-110 and 50-425/86-18-110, " Performance of a Study

or Drills to Verify the Ability to Meet Minimum Staff Augmentation Criteria

in NUREG-0654." The inspection reviewed the results on the drill performed

on November 20, 1986, to demonstrate that adequate numbers of personnel

could respond within 60 minutes of notification.

6. Allegations

a. Allegation RII-86-A-0142, Non-Certified Personnel Performing iQ' Class

Material Welding in the Fabrication Shop

Concern

Two individuals notified Region II personnel tht they had observed two

non-certified personnel, one a Quality Control inspector assigned to

the fabrication shop and the other individual hired as summer help,

performing welding on iQ' Class material. In addition to notifying

Region II, they also filed a concern in the GPC Quality Concern Program

(QCP).

Discussion

The inspector reviewed the results of the QCP investigation and action

taken as described in QCP File Number 86V0292. The QCP investigation

substantiated that these two individuals had performed welding as

stated in the concern. The individuals that performed the welding as

well as the certified welders (2) that permitted the welding to occur

were terminated. In addition, a Deviation Report (DR) identified as

ED-14,013 was generated to disposition all suspect material that could

have had unauthorized welding performed. In addition, the work that

had been performed by the QC inspector was reviewed and reverified on a

sampling basis. The results of this review and sampling process was

that no discrepancies were found of the work performed by the QC

inspector. Tte material that was not alredy installed in the plant

was destroyed. One piece of this material which visually appeared

questionable was sectioned into 28 inspection samples and analyzed by

the project welding supervision. All samples were found to be

acceptable. All cable tray supports that had been installed with the

exception of 2 (2 out of 25) were found and visually checked. These

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were determined to be acceptable based on the destructive examination

that was performed. The 2 supports that were not found were considered

acceptable even though they were not found. The reason they were not

found was the utility saw no reason to expend additional man-hours and

none of the inspected supports had been rejected (23 of 25). One of

the certified welders was also sent to the lab and re-evaluated. This

welder passed all requalification testing.

Conclusion

This allegation was confirmed to be correct. The utility took adequate

and prompt corrective action to resolve this concern. Based on this

review, the inspector considers this item closed.

b. Allegation RII-86-A-0082, Concern That a Label Was Changed on a Pacific

Scientific Snubber Without Required Process Documentation

Concern

During the last week of June 1985 a GPC inspector directed a craft

pipefitter to remove the identification plate from a snubber and

replace this plate with a new one. This work was accomplished without

any process paperwork or without the approval of the Authorized Nuclear

Inspector (ANI) as required by procedures.

Discussion

A Pacific Scientific snubber was received at the GPC warehouse on

March 6, 1985. During the receipt inspection, the inspector identified

that the tag number stamped on this component was incorrect. As a

result, the inspection could not be completed and a deviation report

(DR), identified by control number MD-08105, was issued by the

inspector detailing the problem. An engineer contacted Pacific

Scientific to obtain the correct documentation which was transmitted to

GPC on or about April 16, 1985. The tag was transmitted in error to

the GPC QC supervisor in charge of the warehouse who had the tag

installed by a Pullman Power Products pipefitter without required

documentation or without observance by the ANI representative. The

alleger discussed this with his supervisor, and they contacted GPC QC

supervision. GPC stated that a DR should be written to document this

but the alleger never saw this DR. The DR was written and is

identified as MD-08367 dated July 3,1985. The action to resolve the

DR was to have ANI verify vendor documentation and accept based on that

review. The ANI inspector performed his review and signed off the

documentation and DR on August 15, 1986.

The snubber that was in question was initially identified to be

installed in the Nuclear Service Cooling Water System, but has been

replaced by a Anchor Darling type snubber. The original snubber is

presently at Pacific Scientific labs for repair as it failed a stroke

test. (Reference DR MD-08756)

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Discussion with ANI and GPC QC indicate that this appears to have been

an isolated case.

Conclusion

Based on the inspector's review, the work was performed without the

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. required process sheets as stated, but a DR was written to document and

correct this problem. Since this was an isolated case and the snubber

is no longer installed in the plant, the inspector considers this item

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is closed.

c. Allegation RII-85-A-0203, Alleged Harassment and Intimidation

Concern

An allegation was made to Region II that stated the alleger was

harassed and intimidated for refusing to sign a dispositioned deviation

report for work he did not accomplish.

Discussion

The inspector reviewed this item in detail. This item concerned

Deviation Report (DR) ED-09068 dated June 1, 1985, which concerned

cables which had been installed and were found to be too short to reach

the required equipment. The corrective action had been performed and

signed off on the DR by the alleger. The alleger was told by his

supervision to remove the hold tags (2 had been initially installed)

and sign for the removal on the DR. The alleger did not find any tags

and put the words "No Hold Tags Found" and dated the entry. He did not

sign the block. Upon being requested to sign the block, the individual

would not sign stating that it violated the procedure which provided

administrative controls over the DR process. He was confronted by his

supervision and the intent of the step that the alleger would not sign

was explained to him but he refused to sign the step. The individual

received a 5-day layoff without pay and as a result filed a complaint

with the Department of Labor (DOL). The DOL case was concluded on

4 October 24,1986 (see D0L Case #E6-ERA-9). The ruling was in favor of

the utility. The inspector determined that it is a common practice if

no tags are found to write in "O, none or none found" and the block

signed and dated. This process was discussed during training of QC

inspectors primarily with supervisors and then disseminated to other

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inspectors. The alleger's supervisor signed the DR in question.

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Conclusion

The signature in the block provided on the DR for this action appears

to be an administrative control and has no significance to safety.

Interpretation of a procedure is a management tool and this tool was

used for this occurrence but a difference of opinion resulted.

Although an argument occurred, documentation indicates the alleger was

never directed to sign the statement, but was requested several times

to sign the DR entry form. The procedure' for controlling DRs was

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subsequently revised and this should eliminate further problems in this

areas. Based on this inspection this item is closed.

d. Allegation RII-86-A-0083, Alleged Poor Welding and Construction

Practices.

Concerns

(1) The alleger stated that the plastic liner for the chemical storage

pond was not installed properly due to poor grading of the pond

area which'left sharp pieces of earth and rock which could damage

the liner.

(2) The alleger stated that the diametric welding done on the loop

side in containment was done using .35 and .40 stainless steel

welding wire which was obtained from the Diametric classroom weld

wire storage. The weld wire was not properly controlled by QA.

(This concern was reported anonymously to the Quality Concern

Program in June 1985.) The welding done using this weld wire was

on the C level, Unit 1 containment, 20 or 30 inch stainless steel

loop pipe on the reactor pumps sometime in January 1984.

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(3) The alleger stated that Tungsten Inert Gas (TIG) rigs were used to

cut holes in stainless steel piping for temporary pipe

installation for flushing. This caused slag and molten metal to

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fall into the pipe. Even though flush boxes were used to trap any

loose metals from the welding process, there is still the

possibility that some weld metal remained in the line and this

could damage valves in the permanent line.

Discussion

This allegation was officially transmitted to Georgia Power Company

(GPC) by the NRC for review and appropriate action in a letter from

Virgil L. Brownlee, dated July 14, 1986. The GPC response to the

allegation is documented in a letter to the NRC Region II from

D. O. Foster, dated July 29, 1986. In their response GPC addresses

each of the alleger's concerns and finds them to be unsubstantiated.

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The inspector reviewed the GPC response and records documenting-

interviews with several employees who were involved with the specific

concerns. The inspector also reviewed QA audits and various other

documents pertaining to this allegation.

Conclusion

The inspector can find no information to substantiate this allegation;

therefore, based on this inspection this item is closed.

e. Allegation RII-84-A-0168, Concern Regarding Processing an NCR and

l Alleged Harassment Concern:

Concern

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(1) A weld rod issue ticket could not be signed properly by an

individual due to lack of information required to certify the

correct material. The issue ticket was signed inappropriately by

another person.

(2) An individual was told by a supervisor to sign the weld ticket

discussed in (1) above. The individual felt harassed by this

supervisor.

(3) Non-conforming items (NCR) were being re-written after being

submitted by inspection personnel.

(4) An arc strike was corrected and too much material was removed

during the corrective action, however the repair was accepted by

quality control inspectors by using techniques that were not

acceptable.

As part of this concern, a second individual identified additional

concerns as follows:

(5) A Class 3 valve was "taken apart" without a process sheet.

(6) Some QC inspectors still hold union cards and keep in close

contact with craft supervision.

(7) Some QC inspectors were approving inspections based on verbal

guidance from supervisors.

Discussion

The inspector reviewed the areas of concern identified above. The

following are the results of this review for each of the areas:

(1&2) The weld rod ticket was signed off by a QC inspector. This

QC inspector has been terminated as a result of this action and

other personal problems identified by a utility investigation of

the individual. The weld in question was re-examined and no

problems were identified. The harassment issue was also

investigated by the utility and substantiated. As a result the

involved supervisor was transferred from the QC group. The weld

ticket processing problems were reviewed and Pullman Company

initiated more stringent controls in this area as described in

Pullman Corrective Action Report CA 9-1.

(3) A review of NCR re-writing issue identified that an effort to

" clarify" NCRs was undertaken by Pullman management in mid-1984.

NCRs were re-written to add what supervision thought was "needed

material". This resulted in the re-write of numerous NCRs and

caused concern to be expressed by.the QC personnel originating the

reports. As a result of various inspector's comments, the

controlling procedure was revised to eliminate the re-write effort

and only allow corrections and additions to be made with the

originator's review and initialing of the changes.

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(4) A review of this item identified that a Ultrasonic Test (UT) was .

performed on the weld repair and it was found to be acceptable.

Discussion with NRC UT personnel indicate that UT is an acceptable

method to determine pipe wall measurements. This particular joint

is located in a drain line connection on non-safety class piping.

The inspector did not request a UT to be performed again since the

pipe was logged and was in a non-safety system.

(5) Investigation of this item identified that the valve in question

was removed from the process line. It was a flanged valve and

removal consisted of disconnection at the flanges. There is no

evidence to support a disassembly of the valve. The valve was

removed for flush purposes and not to repair the valve. Records

indicate this valve was removed and re-installed several times and

proper process documentation was maintained.

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(6) The inspector reviewed this area and found that some QC

supervisors do continue to hold union cards. A discussion with

their management indicates no conflict of interest with this .

action. t

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(7) For this item, discussion with various inspectors indicate that

they receive guidance from their supervision but follow procedures

to approve inspections.

Conclusion

Based on the findings stated above and the corrective actions taken by

GPC, this item is closed,

f. Allegation RII 85-A-0016-015, " Employee Terminations Due to Drug Use".

Concern

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The alleger was concerned that when employees are terminated for drug

abuse activity that Georgia Power Company (GPC) does not list the

reason for the termination in the individual's work records as drug

abuse activity. The alleger stated that the reason for the termination

is usually listed as misconduct or insubordination. The reason that

this is placed in the records is because GPC is concerned that the NRC

will make GPC go back and reinspect all of the work that was performed

by the worker.

Discussion

By letter dated June 5,1986, U.S. NRC Region II assigned the subject

allegation to Georgia Power Co. for action and disposition. A reply

was received on July 3 and 10, 1986. The inspector reviewed the reply

and notes that the licensee conducted an extensive and meaningful

investigation into the subject allegation.

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The inspector reviewed the records of a sample of recent and older GPC

employee terminations that were due to failing or refusal of the drug

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and alcohol test. The subject allegation is correct in that GPC lists

the reason for termination as misconduct, insubordination, or any other

violation of work rules and does not state that the true termination

was due to drug abuse activity. The inspector notes that this practice

is standard and is applied in all cases by the Manager of GPC Personnel

although not specifically written in policy procedures.

The policy is applied by GPC Personnel Department in order to spare the

individual the stigma of a termination by drug abuse being

inadvertently provided to a future employer. In regards to outside

inquiries, GPC does not provide any details except that the person did

work at Vogtle. The inspector notes that Status 23 (Terminated - No

Rehire) is entered on the Personnel Separation Notices of all

individuals terminated for drug or alcohol abuse. This policy is

applied by the GPC Personnel Manager to all cases regardless of any

testimonials provided by the employee's supervisors. The inspector

also notes that aforementioned information in regards to entries in

termination records applies only to Georgia Power employees. Site

contractors such as PPP, PKF, Cleveland, Butler, Daniel, etc. handle

their own personnel separation records once GPC notifies them that an

individual has failed or refused a drug or alcohol test. The inspector

did not review contractor's separation processes since they were not in

the scope of the allegation.

In regards to the second part of the allegation, the inspector could

find no evidence that GPC was purposely using misconduct or

insubordination entries in termination records in order to avoid

re-inspections of the individual's work. Oa the contrary, with the

advent of the Vogtle Drug Program in 1984, each contractor addressed

the need for re-inspection of work of those terminated for drug abuse.

The notification system was not formalized but rather round-about with

GPC QC visiting each contractor to obtain information to centralize and

assure re-inspections were implemented. Specific drug terminations and

re-inspection information was sometimes relayed to the NRC, but not

every time as a matter of policy. In January 1986, GPC began a program

to re-identify all contractor personnel terminated under the provisions

of the Vogtle Anti-Drug Program whose work would require re-inspection.

This information was centralized with GPC QC for re-inspection

overview. A generic procedure was instituted that was used for sample

re-inspections. GPC QC now has a Re-inspection / Verification Status

List that records the actions taken on all previous site employees

whose work required re-inspections. Re-inspection is complete in all

but three cases (nearing completion). The inspector notes that

specific forms and notifications are now provided (by Procedure S-1920)

that notify QC of all personnel failing the Vogtle Anti-Drug Program.

Guidelines are now provided in a Management Action Procedure that

determine exactly whose work is to be re-inspected (i .e. , QC, QA,

Engineers,etc.).

Conclusion

The allegation is correct in that misconduct and insubordination are

some of the reasons used for drug / alcohol terminations. The inspector

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

. .

13

t

has no problem with this practice. The allegation is unfounded and '

.

incorrect in regards to GPC's purpose was to evade re-inspection of the

individual's work. GPC has an adequately documented, structured, and

controlled re-inspection program applicable to all terminations due to

the Vogtle Drug and Alcohol Program. This allegation is closed.

7. General Construction Inspection - Units 1 & 2

Periodic random surveillance inspections were made throughout this reporting

period in the form of general type inspections in different areas of both

facilities. The areas were selected on the basis of the scheduled

activities and were varied to provide wide coyerage. Observations were made

of activities in progress to note defective items or items of noncompliance

,

with the required codes and regulatory requirements. On these inspections,

particular note was made of the presence of quality control inspectors,

supervisors, and quality contrel evidence in the form of available process

'

sheets, drawings, material identification, material protection, performance

of tests, and housekeeping. Interviews were conducted with craft personnel,

supervisors, coordinators, quality control inspectors, and others as they

were available in the work areas. The inspector reviewed numerous

construction deviation reports to determine if requirements were met in the

areas of documentation, action to resolve, justification, and approval

'

signatures in accordance with GPC Field Procedure No. GD-T-01.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Fire Prevention / Protection and Housekeeping Measures - Unit 2 (42051C)

The inspector observed fire prevention / protection measures throughout the

inspection period. Welders were using welding permits with fire watches and

extinguishers. Fire fighting equipment was in its designated areas

throughout the plant.

1

'

The inspector reviewed and examined portions of procedures pertaining to the

fire prevention / protection measures and housekeeping measures to determine

whether they comply with applicable codes, standards, NRC Regulatory Guides

,

and licensee commitments.

l The inspector observed fire prevention / protection measures in work areas

containing safety related equipment during the inspection period to verify

the following:

-

Combustible waste material and rubbish was removed from the work areas

as rapidly as practicable to avoid unnecessary accumulation of

combustibles,

-

Flammable liquids were stored in appropriate containers and in

designated areas throughout the plant,

-

Cutting and welding operations in progress have been authorized by an

appropriate permit, combustibles have been moved away or safely

covered, and a fire watch and extinguisher was posted as required, and

. -- ----_ . . - _. .----. - _ - - . - . . - - . _- . _ -

_. . _ _

. .

14

-

Fire protection / suppression equipment was provided and controlled in

accordance with applicable requirements.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Structural Concrete - Unit 2 (47053C)

a. Procedure and Document Review

The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following

procedures pertaining to the placement of concrete to determine whether

'

they comply with applicable codes, standards, NRC Regulatory Guides and

licensee commitments.

-

CD-T-02, Rev. 18 Concrete Quality Control

-

CD-T-06, Rev. 10 Rebar and Cadweld Quality Control

-

CD-T-07, Rev. 8 Embed Installation and Inspection

b. Installation Activities

The inspector witnessed portions of the concrete placement indicated

below to verify the following:

4

(1) Forms, Embedment, and Reinforcing Steel Instailation

-

Forms were properly placed, secure, leak tight and clean.

-

Rebar and other embedment installation was installed in

accordance with construction specifications and drawings,

,

secured, free of concrete and excessive rust, specified

'

distance from forms, proper on-site rebar bending (where

applicable) and clearances consistent with aggregate size.

t

(2) Delivery, Placement and Curing

-

Preplacement inspection was completed and approved prior to

placement utilizing a Pour Card (Procedure Exhibit

CD-T-02*18).

-

Construction joints were prepared as specified. >

.

-

Proper mix was specified and delivered.

J

-

Temperature control of the mix, mating surfaces, and ambient

were monitored.

-

Consolidation was performed correctly.

!

j

-

Testing at placement location was properly performed in

accordance with the acceptance criteria and recorded on a

, Concrete Placement Pour Log (Procedure Exhibit CD-T-02*20).

i

!

_ _ .. . - - - _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ . , _ _ __ _- _-

. .

15

-

Adequate crew, equipment and techniques were utilized.

-

Inspections during plact ;nts were conducted effectively by a

sufficient number of qualified personnel.

-

Curing methods and temperature was monitored.

(3) Rebar Splicing

The inspector witnessed cadwelding operations to verify the

following:

-

Inspections are performed during and after splicing by

qualified QC inspection personnel.

-

Each splice was defined by a unique number consisting of the

bar size, splice type, the position, the operator's symbol,

and a sequential number.

-

Process and crews are qualified.

-

The sequential number and the operator's symbol are marked on

all completed cadwelds.

The inspector also conducted random inspections of completed

cadwelds to verify the following:

-

Tap hole does not contain slag, blow out, or porous metal.

-

Filler metal was visible at both ends of the splice sleeve

and at the tap hole in the center of the sleeve. No voids

were detected at the ends of the sleeves.

-

The sequential number and the operator's symbol are marked on

all completed cadwelds.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Containment (Prestressing) - Unit 2 (47063C)

a. Procedure and Document Review

The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following

specification, procedure, and drawings pertaining to the installation

of horizontal tendons, to determine whether they comply with applicable

codes, standards, NRC Regulatory Guides and licensee commitments.

- X2AF04 Technical Provisions for Containment

Post-Tensioning System

- AX2AF04-100-12 Field Instruction Manual for Installation

of VSL E5-55 Post-Tensioning System Within

Nuclear Containment Structures, Rev. 9

. .

16

b. Installation Activities

The inspector witnessed portions of the installation activities

indicated below to verify the following:

-

The latest issue (revision) of applicable drawings or procedures

are available to the installers and were being used.

-

Tendons were free of nicks, kinks, corrosion; were installed in

designated locations; and that the installation sequence and

technique was per specified requirements.

-

Installation crew was properly trained and quaiified.

-

QC inspection was properly performed by qualified personnel in

accordance with applicable requirements.

-

Adequate protective measures were being taken to ensure mechanical

and corrosion protection during storage, handling, installation,

and post installation.

-

Tendons were stressed in the proper sequence.

-

All strands in the tendon were moving together during the

stressing and the tendon is being stressed from both ends

simultaneously.

-

Elongation measurements were being taken properly and being

compared to the calculated elongation.

-

Anchor head lift-off force was being taken and documented

properly.

-

The stressing operation was being monitored to identify any strand

slippage.

The inspector notes that containment prestressing is now complete for

Unit 2.

!

No violations or deviations were identified.

11. Containment (Steel Structures and Supports) - Unit 2 (48053C)

Periodic inspections were conducted to observe containment steel and support

installation activities in progress, to verify the following:

-

Components were being properly handled (included bending or

straightening).

! -

Specified clearances were being maintained.

-

Edge finishes and hole sizes were within tolerances.

. .

17

-

Control, marking, protection and segregation were maintained during

storage.

-

Fit-up/ alignment meets the tolerances in the specifications and

drawings.

No violations or deviations were identified.

12. Safety-Related Structures (Structural Steel and Supports) - Unit 2 (48063C)

Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities of

safety-related structures / equipment supports for major equipment outside the

containment to verify that:

-

Materials and components were being properly handled to prevent damage.

-

Fit-up/ alignment were within tolerances in specifications and drawing

requirements.

-

Bolting was in accordance with specifications and procedures.

-

Specified clearances from adjacent components were being met.

No violations or deviations were identified.

13. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping - Unit 2

(49053C) (49063C) (37301)

Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities of

the Reactor Coolant Boundary and other safety-related piping installations

inside and outside Containments. Verifications included but were not

limited to the following:

-

Material and components were being properly handled and stored in order

to prevent damage.

-

Fit-ups and alignments were within tolerances per specifications and

drawings.

-

Specified clearances from pipe to pipe and adjacent components were

met.

-

Piping was installed and inspected in accordance with applicable

drawings, specifications, and procedures.

-

Those people engaged in the activity are qualified to perform the

applicable function.

-

Drawing and specification changes (revisions) are being handled and

used correctly.

No violations or deviations were identified.

.

.

<

18 l

14. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping Welding -

Units 1 & 2 (55073C) (55083C)

Periodic inspections were conducted during daily plant surveillances on

safety-related pipe welding at various stages of weld completion. The

purpose of the inspection was i.o determine whether the requirements of

applicable specifications, codes, standards, work performance procedures and

QC procedures are being met as follows:

-

Work was conducted in accordance with a process sheet which identifies

the weld and its location by system, references procedures or

instructions, and provides for production and QC signoffs.

-

Welding procedures, detailed drawings and instructions, were readily

available in the immediate work area and technically adequate for the

welds being made.

-

Welding precedure specification -(WPS) were in accordance with the

applicable Code requirements and that a Procedure Qualification Record

(PQR) is referenced and exists for the type of weld being made. l

l

-

Base metals, welding filler materials, fluxes, gases, and insert

materials were of the specified type and grade, have been properly

inspected, tested and were traceable to test reports or certifications.

-

Purge and/or shielding gas flow and composition were as specified in

the welding procedure specification and that protection was provided to

shield the welding operation from adverse environmental conditions.

-

Weld joint geometry including pipe wall thickness was specified and

that surfaces to be welded have been prepared, cleaned and inspected in

accordance with applicable procedures or instructions.

!

- A sufficient number of adequately qualified QA and QC inspection

personnel were present at the work site, commensurate with the work in

l progress.

- The weld area cleanliness was maintained and that pipe alignment and

fit-up tolerances were within specified limits.

! -

Weld filler material being used was in accordance with welding

,

specifications, unused filler material was separated from other types

i of material and was stored properly and that weld rod stubs were

l properly removed from the work location.

!

l

-

That there were no evident signs of cracks, excessive heat input,

sugaring, or excessive crown on welds.

l

-

Welders were qualified to the applicable process and thickness, and

that necessary controls and records were in place.

No violations or deviations were identified.

!

1

. .

19

15. Reactor Vessel, Integrated Head Package, and Internals - Units 1 & 2

(50053C) (50063C)

Periodic Unit 1 inspections consisted of examinations of the Reactor Vessel,

and the installed integrated head package and the upper internals in their

designated storage area. The lower internals was installed in the Reactor

Vessel during integrated ESFAS testing.

'

The Unit 2 inspections consisted of examinations of the Reactor Vessel with

the lower internals installed and the integrated head package and the upper

internals which are stored in their designated laydown area.

Inspections also determined that proper storage protection practices were in

place and that entry of foreign objects and debris was prevented.

No violations or deviations were identified.

16. Safety Related Components - Units 1 & 2 (50073C)

The inspection consisted of plant tours to observe storage, handling, and

protection; installation; and preventive maintenance after installation of

safety-related components to determine that work is being performed in

accordance with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee

commitments.

During the inspection the below listed areas were inspected at various times

during the inspection period to verify the following as applicable:

-

Storage, environment, and protection of components were in accordance

with manufacturer's instructions and/or established procedures.

-

Implementation of special storage and maintenance requirements such as:

rotation of motors, pumps, lubrication, insulation testing

(electrical), cleanliness,etc.

-

Performance of licensee / contractor surveillance activities and

documentation thereof was being accomplished.

-

Installation requirements were met such as: proper location, placement,

l orientation, alignment, mounting (torquing of bolts and expansion

anchors), flow direction, tolerances, and expansion clearance.

-

Appropriate stamps, tags, markings, etc. were in use to prevent

oversight of required inspections, completion of tests, acceptance, and

the prevention of inadvertent operation.

Safety-Related piping, valves, pumps, heat exchangers, and instrumentation

were inspected in the following Unit 1 and 2 areas on a random sampling

l basis throughout the inspection period:

.

'

-

Residual Heat Removal Pump Rooms

-

Diesel Generator Building

- - _ . - ._. - _- _.

. .

'

20

-

Auxiliary Feedwater Pumphouse

-

Containment Spray Pump Rooms

-

Pressurizer Rooms

-

Main Coolant Pump Areas

-

Steam Generator Areas

-

Safety Injection Pump Rooms

-

RHR and CS Containment Penetration Encapsulation Vessel Rooms

-

Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchangers, Surge Tanks & Pump Rooms

-

Cable Spreading Rooms

-

Accumulator Tank Areas

-

Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Letdown Heat Exchanger Pump

Room

-

Battery & Charger Rooms

-

Nuclear Grade Piping, Valves & Fittings Storage Areas

-

Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Rooms

-

Pressurizer Relief Tank Area

-

CVCS Centrifugal Charging Pumps & Positive Displacement Pump Rooms

-

Bottom Mounted Instrumentation (BMI) Tunnel and Seal Table Area

-

BMI and Supports Under Reactor Vessel

-

NSCW Tower Pump Rooms and Pipe Tunnels

-

Containment, Auxiliary Building, Control Building, and Fuel Handling

Building auxiliary (secondary) areas

No violations or deviations were identified.

17. Safety Related Pipe Support and Restraint Systems - Units 1 & 2 (50090C)

Periodic random inspections were conducted during the inspection period to

observe construction activities during installation of safety-related pipe

supports to determine that the following work was performed in accordance

with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee ccmmitments:

-

Spring hangers were provided with indicators to show the approximate

" hot" or " cold" position, as appropriate.

-

No deformation or forced bending was evident.

-

Where pipe clamps are used to support vertical lines, shear lugs were-

l welded to the pipe (if required by Installation Drawings) to prevent

i

slippage.

-

Sliding or rolling supports were provided with material and/or

i lubricants suitable for the environment and compatible with sliding

contact surfaces.

-

Supports are located and installed as specified.

-

The surface of welds meet applicable code requirements and are free

i from unacceptable grooves, abrupt ridges, valleys, undercuts, cracks,

l discontinuities, or other indications which can be observed on the

!

welded. surface.

l

No violations or deviations were identified.

l

3 . __ _

_ -- ,_ ._. _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

21

18. Electrical and Instrumentation Components and Systems - Units 1 & 2 (51053C)

(52153C)

Periodic inspections were coaducted during the inspection period to observe

safety-related electrical equipment in order to verify that the storage,

installation, and preventive maintenance was accomplished in accordance with

applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee commitments.

During the inspection period inspections were performed on various pieces of

electrical equipment during storage, installation, and cable terminating

phase in order to verify the following as applicable:

-

Location and alignment

-

Type and size of anchor bolts

-

Identification

-

Segregation and identification of nonconforming items

-

Location, separation and redundancy requirements

-

Equipment space heating

-

Cable identification

-

Proper lugs used

-

Condition of wire (not nicked, etc.), tightness of connection

-

Bending radius not exceeded

-

Cable entry to terminal point

-

Separation

No violations or deviations were identified.

19. Electrical and Instrumentation Cables and Terminations - Units 1 & 2

(51063C) (52063C)

a. Raceway / Cable Installation

The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following

procedures pertaining to raceway / cable installation to determine

whether they comply with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides and

licensee commitments.

-

ED-T-02, Rev. 10 Raceway Installation

-

ED-T-07, Rev. 11 Cable Installation

Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities

of Safety Related Raceway / Cable Installation.

In reference to the raceway installation, the following areas were

inspected to verify compliance with the applicable requirements:

-

Identification

-

Alignment

-

Bushings (Conduit)

-

Grounding

-

Supports and Anchorages

. .- .

..

____ ___. __ _ _ _ _}

__

.

. .

22

In reference to the cable installation the following areas were

inspected to verify compliance with the applicable requirements:

-

Protection from adjacent construction activities (welding, etc.)

-

Coiled cable ends properly secured

-

Non-terminated cable ends taped

-

Cable trays, junction bcxes, etc., reasonably free of debris

-

Conduit capped, if no cable installed

-

Cable supported

-

Bend radius not exceeded

-

Separation

b. Cable Terminations

The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following

procedures pertaining to cable termination to determine whether they

comply with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides and licensee

commitments.

-

ED-T-08, Rev. 9 Cable Termination

In reference to cable terminations the following areas were inspected

to verify compliance with the applicable requirements.

-

Cable identification

-

Proper lugs used

-

Condition of wire (not nicked, etc.)

-

Tightness of connection

-

Bending radius not exceeded

-

Cable entry to terminal point

-

Separation

No violations or deviations were identified.

20. Containment and Safety Related Structural Steel Welding - Units 1&2

(55053C) (55063C)

Periodic inspections were conducted during daily plant surveillances on

safety-related steel welding at various stages of weld completion.

The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether the requirements of

applicable specifications, codes, standards, work performance procedures and

QC procedures are being met as follows:

-

Work was corducted in accordance with a process sheet or drawing which

identifies the weld and its location by system, references, procedures

or instructions, and provides for production and/or QC signoffs.

-

Welding procedures, detailed drawings and instructions, were readily

available in the immediate work area and technically adequate for the

welds being made.

.- , - - . --- . - -.-. - -. .-. .. .. - . .- , -

. .

23

-

Welding procedure specification (WPS) were in accordance with the

applicable Code requirements and that a Procedure Qualification Record

(PQR) is referenced and exists for the type of weld being made.

-

Base metals and welding filler materials were of the specified type and

grade, were properly inspected, tested, and were traceable.

-

Protection was provided to shield the welding operation from adverse

environmental conditions.

-

Weld joint geometry including thickness was specified and that surfaces

to be welded were prepared, cleaned and inspected in accordance with

applicable procedures or instructions.

-

A sufficient number of adequately qualified QA and QC inspection

personnel commensurate with the work in progress were present at the

work site.

-

Weld area cleanliness was maintained and that alignment and fit-up

tolerances were within specified limits.

-

Weld filler material -being used was in accordance with welding

specifications, unused filler material was separated from other types

of material and was stored and controlled properly, and stubs were

properly removed from the work location.

-

There were no visual signs of cracks, excessive heat input, or

excessive crown on welds.

-

Welders were qualified to the particular process and thickness; and

that necessary controls and records were in place.

No violations or deviations were identified.

21. Preoperational Test Program Implementation / Verification - Unit 1 (70302)

(71302)

The inspector reviewed the present implementation of the preoperational test

program. Test program attributes inspected included review of

administrative requirements, document control, documentation of major test

events and deviations to procedures, operating practices, instrumentation

calibrations, and correction of problems revealed by testing.

Periodic inspections were conducted of Control Room Operations to assess

plant condition and conduct of shift personnel. The inspector observed that

Contr'sl Room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional

ma n r.e r. Shift personnel were knowledgeable of plant conditions, i.e.,

orgoing testing, systems / equipment in or out of service, and

alarm / annunciator status. In addition, the inspector observed shift

turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant testing,

operational problems and other pertinent plant information during the

turnovers. Control Room logs were reviewed and various entries were

l discussed with operations personnel.

l

.- - - . .-- - . - - - - . . - . . - - - - - -

.- .-

.

. .

!

24

Periodic facility tours were made to assess equipment and plant conditions,

maintenance and preoperational activities in progress. Schedules for

program completion and progress reports were routinely monitored.

Discussions were held with responsible personnel, as they were available, to

determine their knowledge of the preoperational program. The Inspector

reviewed numerous operation deviation reports to determine if requirements

were met in the areas of documentation, action to resolve, justification,

corrective action and approvals. Specific inspections conducted are listed

below:

a. Preoperational Tests

(1) Test Procedure Review (70300)

The inspector reviewed the following listed preoperational test

procedures. Each test was reviewed for administrative format and

technical adequacy. The procedures were compared with licensee

commitments from the applicable FSAR Chapters, Regulatory Guide

1.68 and the Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-1137). This included

verifying that pertinent prerequisites were identified, initial

test conditions and system status were specified, acceptance

criteria were specified and management approval indicated:

NRC

Procedure No. Inspection No. Test Title

1-300-01 70304 Integrated Safeguards and

Load Sequencing Test

1-3PK-02 70340 Battery Test IE

(2) Test Witnessing (70312)

l

l

The inspector witnessed selected portions of the following

l preoperational test procedures as they were conducted. The

l inspection included attendance at briefings held by the test

i supervisor to observe the coordination and general knowledge of

'

the procedure with the test participants. Overall crew

performance was evaluated during testing. A preliminary review of

the test results was compared to the inspector's own observations.

t Problems encountered during performance of the test were verified

i to be adequately documented, evaluated and dispositioned on a

j selected basis.

NRC

Procedure No. Insp. No. Test Title Activity Observed

i 1-300-01 70315 Integrated Safe- Train "A" Single

!

70316 guards and Load Train Test

! Sequencing Test Consisting of '

Response to ESFAS

With DG in Test Mode,

Response to LOSP in

!

l

- . _

. .

25

Conjunction with

ESFAS, Response to

Reset to ESFAS,

Stopping the Largest

Single Load, & DG

100% Load Rejection,

Per Steps 6.1-6.1.49

Train "A" Single

Train Test Consisting

of Tripping DG After

24 Hour Test,

Response to LOSP,

Interrupted by ESFAS,

Response to LOSP,

Response to LOSP and

SI, Simulated Loss of

Onsite Power and

Response to Reset to

Steps

'

ESFAS Per

6.1.58-6.1.116

1-3BC-01 70436 Residual Heat RHR System

Removal System Performance

Preoperational During Filling &

Test Draining the

Reactor Cavity

Per Section 6.19

'

1-3PK-02 70440 Battery Test IE First Discharge

Test Results

I

b. Followup of Event Occurring During Testing

The inspector followed up on the following events which occurred during

the inspection period:

(1) RHR Train "B" pump failed to start on 11/17/86 when attempting to

start it for the performance of filling and draining the reactor

'

cavity per Section 6.19 of Preop 1-3BC-01.

(2) CCP Train "A" failed to start on 11/18/86 when attempting to start

it to verify proper flow path alignment as a prerequisite to ESFAS

Single Train "A" testing.

(3) 480 Volt switchgear 18806 failed to close in on 12/11/86 during

restoration from a Train "B" switchgea- outage. It was determined

! that all of the above safety-related equipment failed to operate

properly due to the breaker charging spring not being charged.

The Gould Brown Boveri ITE Switchgear requires a manual operation

l

i

!

i

.,. . ._ , _ . - _ _ ,

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

. .

26

by the operator to ensure the breaker charging spring is charged.

Operations Procedure 13435-C (Circuit Breaker Racking Precedure)

contains a step for the operator to ensure that the charging motor

power control switch is in the on position and that the charging

spring spring charged indicator is visible during the racking in

process. The licensee has formed a task force to evaluate this

problem so as to determine whether there is a hardware or operator

problem with properly racking in these breakers since there have

been several occurrences of these breakers not being properly

racked in. The Resident Inspectors will continue to follow this

item.

No violations or deviations were identified.

22. . Plant Procedures - b.it 1 and 2 (42400B)

This inspection consists of a procedural review to verify that

administrative controls are established and implemented to control safety

related operations. Procedures are selected at random and reviewed for

technical adequacy and incorporation of requirements as appropriate for the

proper operation of a nuclear facility in the startup and operational phase.

The following requirements, guidance and licensee commitments were utilized

as appropriate:

- 10 CFR 50.59 Change, Tests, and Experiments

- 20 CFR 50 Appendix B Instructions, Procedures and Drawings

Criteria V

- ANSI N18.7-1976 Administrative Controls and Quality

Assurance for the Operational Phase

- Regulatory Guide 1.33 Quality Assurance Requirements for the

Rev 2, 1978 Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants

- FSAR Section 13 Conduct of Operations

- NUREG 0737, et al TMI Task Action Plan

No violations or deviations were identified.

23. Three Mile Island Task Action Plan Followup - Unit 1 (425401B)

This inspection consists of verification that the licensee has implemented

the requirements of NUREG 0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan

Requirements" as committed to in the facility FSAR or other appropriate

documents. Verification consisted of one or more of the following

attributes, as appropriate, to determine acceptability for each listed

action item:

-

Program or procedure established

-

Personnel training or qualification

-

Completion of item

-

Installation of equipment

-

Drawings reflect the as-built configuration

-

Component tested and in service or integrated into the preoperational

test program

_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ ..

. .

27

The following documents were utilized in performing the review, as

appropriate:

NUREG 0578 TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report

NUREG 0660 NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the

TMI-2 Accident

NUREG 0694 TMI-Related Requirements for New Operating Licenses

NUREG 0737 and Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements

Supplement 1

FSAR thru Final Safety Analysis Report

Amendment 29

NUREG 1137 and Safety Evaluation Report

Supplements

(Closed) I.A.1.1 " Shift Technical Advisor." This item addresses the

specific requirements to provide an on-shift technical advisor (STA) to the

shift supervisor. Section 6.2.4 of the final draft of the Technical

Specifications incorporates this function into the operating staff. Final

Safety Analysis Report Section 13.2.2.1.6 defines the STA training program

which has been reviewed by NRR and found to be acceptable (See SER Section

13.2.2.2). The inspector reviewed Operations Procedure 11955-C, Shift

Technical Advisor Qualification Checklist, Training Procedure 60603 and

various other training prccedures discussing STA training requirements, and

discussed STA training with training personnel. This inspection identified

that the requirements of the FSAR have been incorporated into the STA

training program with one minor exception. This exception was that the FSAR

commits the STA's will obtain 4 weeks of hot participation experience at the

same type of plant prior to fuel load whereas the training procedures

commits to obtaining this experience prior to exceeding 20's of full power.

The training manager stated the training procedure will be changed to

reflect the requirements of the FSAR. The inspector considers this item is

closed for Units 1 and 2.

(Closed) I.A.1.2 " Shift Supervisor Administrative Duties." This item was

addressed in Inspection Report 50-424/86-51 and 50-425/86-23. The

administrative duties of the Shift Supervisor is detailed in F rocedure

10000-C Conduct of Operations. Revision 2 of Procedure 10000-C was reviewed

4 by the inspector. Although the attributes listed in Section 2.7 were stated

to be specific duties and responsibilities, the functions were performed by

other personnel with overview activities being performed by the Shift

Supervisor. The inspector discussed with several operations shift

supervisor personnel, the administrative requirements associated with this

function. None indicated that the administrative tasks being performed were

a problem and was above and beyond the requirements generally performed as

shift supervisor activities. Vogtle is establishing an additional shift

position designated as " common shift supervisor" who will be responsible to

assist the shift supervisor in some previous functions performed by the

shift supervisor. Based on this review Item I.A.I.2 is closed for both

units. In addition IFI 86-51-03 is closed since 86-51-01 addresses the

management directive discussed in this IFI.

(Closed) I.A.1.3 " Shift Manning - Limit Overtime and Establish Minimum

Shift Crew." The requirement was previously inspected in NRC Repert

50-424/86-31 where one IFI was identified to review the applicable procedure

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against TS. IFI 50-31-05 is closed in Paragraph 22 of this report.

(0pened) IFI 50-424/86-111-03 is identified to track one comment regarding a

revision to Procedure 00005-C to add general words concerning minimizing the

use of overtime " Review Revision 00005-C Regarding Overtime Minimizing".

(Closed) I.C.1 " Guidance for the Evaluation and Development of Procedures

for Transients and Accidents." This item was reissued in Generic Letter

No. 82-33 dated December 17, 1982. In a letter dated May 1, 1984, the

licensee submitted a procedures generation package. This submittal was

reviewed by NRR and is addressed in SER Section 13.5.2.1.2. The NRR review

identified a confirmatory item (Item 44) which was resolved in SSER #2. NRR

has concluded that the guidance is adequate for the development of Emergency

Operating Procedures. Based on this review this item is closed for Units 1

and 2.

(Closed) 1.C.3 " Shift Supervisor Responsibilities". This item was

addressed in Inspection Report Nos. 50-424/86-51 and 50-425/86-23. In that

report, this item could not be closed and Inspector Followup Item (IFI)

86-51-01; Review Licensee Action for TMI Item I.C.3 was opened. This IFI

was open pending a review of a corporate management directive or other

appropriate directive, resolution of the succession of responsibility chain

between the FSAR and Procedure 00001-C, and completion of NRC review. A

management directive issued specifically to all Nuclear Operations personnel

from the General Manager of Vogtle Nuclear Operations (GMVNO), dated

December 8, 1986, emphasizing the OSOS responsibilities as dictated in

Administrative Procedures and stating a review of these procedures were

required. A process has been established to reissue this directive on an

annual basis. This closes Item I.C.3 for Units 1 and 2 and closes IFI

50-424/86-51-01.

(Closed) I.C.4 " Control-Room Access." This item was addressed in

Inspection Report No. 50-424/86-51 and 50-425/86-23. In that report, this

item could not be closed and Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 86-51-02: Review

Licensee Action for TMI Item I.C.4 was opened pending a re/iew of procedures.

which describe the At-The-Controls areas and a clarification in procedures

for predesignated NRC personnel. The inspector reviewed procedures 00301-C,

Main Control Room Access and Personnel Conduct dated 12/2/86; 10000-C,

Conduct of Operations, dated 10/8/86; and 10003-C, Hanning the Shift, dated

9/11/86. This review indicated that predesignated NRC personnel access to

the control room is addressed in Procedure 00301-C and the figures contained

in the above procedures are consistent in their description of the AT-The

Controls area. Based on this review, Item I.C.4 is closed for Unit 1;

however, IFI 424/86-51-02 will remain open pending the license completion of

proposed procedure changes to address the original freedom of access

concerns for the NRC Resident Inspectors.

(Closed) I.C.5 " Procedures for Feedback of Operating Experience to Plant

Staff". The NRC staff has reviewed the proposed administrative requirements

as discussed in SER Section 13.5.1 and found them to be acceptable. The

inspector reviewed Procedure 00414-C, Operations Assessment Program dated

10/23/86 and 80009-C, Operations Assessment Program Coordination dated

11/7/86. Based on this review this item is closed for Units 1 and 2.

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(Closed) I.C.8 " Pilot Monitoring of Selected Emergency Procedures for

NT0L' s" . This item is addressed in SER Section 13.5.2.1 and states that

this item is no longer necessary because the staff has approved the

Westinghouse ERGS, and the applicant has committed to develop E0Ps based on

the Westinghouse ERGS. Based on this SER review this item is closed for

Units 1 and 2.

(Closed) II.D.3 " Valve Position Indication". This item was inspected in

NRC Report 50-424/86-60. The inspection resulted in Violation

50-424/86-60-01. This TMI item is considered closed pending completion of

corrective actions associated with the violation.

(Closed) II.B.1 " Reactor Coolant System Vents". This item involves the

installation of reactor coolant system and reactor head high point vents

remotely operated from the control room. FSAR Section 5.4.15 describes the

conformance of the vent system and valve configuration to the requiremencs

of NUREG 0737. SER Section 5.4.12 discussed conformance with the

requirements and NRR concludes the system is acceptable. A walkdown of the

head vent system and piping, including the valve position indication in the

control room was conducted. Reviewed P&ID's IX4DB111, 1X4DB112 and

1X4DB114. Reviewed Procedures 13001-1, 19221-1, 19241-1, 19261-1, 19263-1,

14725-1, and 1-388-01. The inspector had noted a problem regarding

Technical Specification 3.4.11, Reactor Coolant System Vents where the

applicant had only included two of the three remotely operated valves. In

the applicant's November 14, 1986 submittal this item was corrected.

(Closed) II.E.4.1 " Dedicated Hydrogen Penetrations". This item requires

containment penetrations for plants using external recombiners. An

acceptable alternative is a combined design that is single-failure proof for

containment isolation purposes and single-failure proof for operation of the

recombiners or a purge system. SER Section 6.2.5 addresses " Con.bustible Gas

Control in Containment" and NRR concludes that the hydrogen recombiners and

purge systems are acceptable. Walkdowns of the recombiners and purge

system, including the recombiner control panels were performed. Procedures

13130-1, 1-3GS-01, and 1-3GS-02 were reviewed.

(Closed) II.E.3.1 " Emerge / Power for Pressurizer Featers". This item

addresses having the cap 2~ility to supply a predetermined number of

pressurizer heaters from either the offsite power source or the emergency

power source. FSAR Section 5.4.10.3.1 describes conformance to the

requirements, and SER Section 8.4.9 has NRR acceptance of the provisions of

the FSAR Section. A walkdown of electrical buses INB01, INB10, IAA02, and

1BA03 to identify where operators would be required to perform transfer of

power was performed. Preoperationa' test procedures 1-3BB-01 and 1-38B-05

were reviewed.

(0 pen) II.F.1.2A " Noble Gas Monitor"

.2B " Iodine / Particulate Sampling"

.2C " Containment High-Range Monitor"

These items are the responsibility of another NRC section. These items

require the installation of specific instrumentation. A walkdown of the

Plant Vent Stack Monitor, Containment Vent Monitor, Containment Atmosphere

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Monitor, Turbine Building Exhaust Monitor, and the Containment High-Range

Monitors was performed. Procedure 14000-1 was reviewed. Preoperational

test procedures have not been completed at this time. These items will

remain open until closed by responsible sections.

(0 pen) II .F.1.2.D " Accident Monitoring - Containment Pressure". This item

addresses having continuous indication of containment pressure. SER Section

7.5.2.2 contains NRR's acceptance of the system for conformance. A walkdown

of the extended range containment pressure system, including the plasma

display on the control board was performed. Reviewed procedures 14228-1 and

1-3RP-03. This item will remain open until the preoperational test 1-3RP-03

has been completed demonstrating proper instrument performance.

(Open) II .F.1.2.E " Accident Monitoring - Containment Water Level Monitor".

This item requires continuous indication of containment water level in the

control room. A walkdown of the containment water level indicating system,

including the level transmitters was performed. Reviewed procedures

14000-1, 14228-1 and 1-3RP-03. This item will remain open until the

preoperational test 1-3RP-03 has been completed demonstrating proper

instrument performance.

(0 pen) I I . F.1. 2. F " Accident Monitoring - Containment Hydrogen Monitor".

This item discusses having a continuous indication of hydrogen concentration

in the containment atmosphere. The system must be capable of providing

continuous monitoring within 30 minutes of the initiation of safety

injection. A walkdown of system, including the hydrogen monitoring control

panels and control room indications was performed. Procedures 14000-1,

1-3GS-01, 1-3GS-02 and 1-3RP-03 were reviewed. This item will remain open

until the preoperational test procedures have been completed demonstrating

proper system performance.

(Closed) III . A.1.2 " Upgrade Emergency Support Facilities" This item is

i being closed by direction of the Emergency Preparedness Section based on

l extensive reviews during inspections as documented in the following reports

! 50-424/86-12 and 50-425/86-18; 50-424/86-29 and 50-425/86-14; and

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50-424/86-112 and 50-425/86-51. This item is closed for both units.

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(Closed) III.D.1.1 " Integrity of Systems Outside Containment Likely to

Contain Radioactive Material." This TMI-2 Action Plan requires that the

licensee shall implement a program to reduce leakage from systems outside

containment that would or could contain highly radioactive fluids during a

serious transient o accident to as-low-as practical levels. FSAR Sections

! 9.3.4.1.3.5 and 12.1.3 describes the licensee's commitment to have a program

to reduce leakage from licensee's systems . outside containment. NRR has

reviewed the FSAR submitted and subsequent licensee correspondence which

documents the licensee's intent to implement a program to reduce leakage

from systems outside containment. This item was found to be acceptable to

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the staff as documented in Section 11.5.3 of Supplement No. 3 to the SER

with the exception for the leak rate test results. A license condition was

identified in Supplement No. 3 to the SER in Section 11.5.3 stating that the

applicant must provide the leak rate test results before 5% power is

exceeded.

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The inspector conducted a review of the licensee's leakage assessment

program for compliance with the FSAR, subsequent correspondence, and Section

6.7.4 (a) of the VEGP Final Draft of Technical Specifications. The

following procedures were reviewed:

Procedure No. Title

50024-C Leakage Assessment Program

55010-1 Containment Spray System Leakage Assessment

55011-C CVCS Leakage Assessment

55012-1 Residual Heat Removal System Leakage Assessment

55013-1 Gaseous Waste Processing System Leakage Assessment

55014-1 Nuclear Sampling System Leakage Assessment

55015-1 Post Accident Sampling System - Liquid

55016-1 Safety Injection System Leakage Assessment

The inspector had the following comments regarding the above procedures:

1) The data sheets which identified areas in the system to check for leakage.

did.not reflect the latest system configuration, and 2) The data sheets did

not reflect a check for leakage assessment on the entire suction and return

lines to the RWST on the Containment Spray, Safety Injection and Residual

Heat Removal System. Discussions were held with the Engineering Department

Mechanical Discipline Supervisor responsible for developing and implementing

the Leakage Assessment Program. The procedures are currently undergoing a

revision to update them as a result of a physical field walkdown to verify

that the procedure can be used and that it reflects the latest configuration

as shown on the piping and instrument drawing. The licensee has committed

to review and resolve the inspector's comments as appropriate.

The licensee intends to perform these leakage assessment procedures to

collect system baseline leakrate data during the power ascension test phase

prior to achieving 5% rated thermal power.

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Based on the above review the inspector has determined that the licensee has

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developed a sai ~. sf actory leakage assessment program and therefore when

properly implemented the requirement of NUREG-0737, Item III.D.1.1, will be

met. This item is closed for both units.

j, 24. Followup of Reportable Items - Units 1 & 2 (92700)

This inspection was conducted to determine whether the items have been

received by the licensee, evaluated and corrective action taken, where

appropriate. The inspector utilized discussions with cognizant personnel

and review of applicable documentation, and field verification as a basis

for closure of each item.

[ (Closed) 50-424/50-425 CDR 85-87 " Damage to Internal Wiring By Space

Heaters in Limitorque Valve Motor Operators." The applicant determined this

item to be reportable in a March 20, 1986 letter. The Bechtel Power

Corporation Final Engineering Evaluation Report dated February 28, 1986, was

reviewed. The space heaters and their associated wiring are not required to

perform or support the performance of a safety function, however, there was

evidence that damage had occurred to the safety related motor power leads.

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Damage to these power leads could render the motors inoperable, thereby

preventing the associated valve from performing the. intended safety

function. The results of the evaluation indicated that had this condition

gone uncorrected, it could have impacted the safety of the plant. In order

to prevent potential damage to the power leads of the Class IE Limitorque

motor operators, the applicant stated in letters to the dated November 18,

1985 and dated March 20, 1986, that the permanent power circuits to the

space heaters will be disconnected and as the circuits are disconnected,

existing internal wiring will be checked for damage and will be repaired or

replaced as necessary. Upon review of the documentation for CDR 85-87 the

inspector was unable to verify that the internal wiring was checked as

required. The applicant's further review of the corrective action indicated

that the work had been done, but documentation could not be located. The

inspector then selected seven of these valves containing the Limitorque

Motor Operators from Unit 1 for inspection. Assistance was requested from

Electrical Maintenance and Quality Control Personnel. During the inspection

two of the seven Limitorque Motor Operators were found to have burn damage ,

to the motor operator power leads. The applicant, in response to this NRC

finding, formed a task force to review the documentation and direct

re-inspections as appropriate. Re-inspections were performed on 110

operations with no further identification of burned power leads.

Documentation of positive QC inspections were located for an additional 47

valves, 10 are planned for inspection. Four valves contained within the

encapsulation vessels will not be inspected due to the lack of finding any

burned wire and access difficulty associated with these valves.

Until the results of inspections can be reviewed this item will remain

unresolved and identified as Unresolved Item 50-424/86-111-01, " Review

Inspection Results of the Licensee's Inspection of Burn Damage on Limitorque

Operator Power Leads".

(Closed) 50-424/50-425 CDR 86-93 " Process and Root-Vent-Drain Valves".

This item concerns a reportable condition where valves may not have been

installed in accordance with the design requirements defined in the Valve

Designation list as described in the GPC letter dated October 23, 1985. The

applicant kept the resident inspector apprised of this item thru routine

meetings. Bechtel evaluation DER-113 was reviewed. Documentation

demonstrated that work was completed.

25. IE Circular Program - Units 1 & 2 (92701)

This inspection consisted of a review of the IE Circular Program as defined

in VEGP Project Policy and Procedures Manual Section 7.7. The inspector

reviewed a random sample of previously issued circulars to determine if the

circulars were reviewed, if appropriate action was taken, if the results

were documented and maintained. All outstanding IE Circulars are considered

closed based on this programmatic review.

One problem was noted with Circular 77-CR-15 (Degradation of Fuel Oil to the

Emergency Diesel Generator). Upon inspecting actions regarding this

circular the inspector determined that zinc was used to coat the inside

surface of the diesel fuel oil storage tanks. Circular 77-CR-15 states that

zinc could degrade diesel engine performance by affecting the fuel. Further

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investigation revealed that NRR is aware of this discrepancy as stated in a

letter to Richard Conway of GPC from B. J. Youngblood of NRR, dated

November 21, 1986. This item will receive followup as part of the closeout

action associated with the license condition to be established by NRR.

No violations or deviations were identified.

26. Safety Committee Activity - Units 1 & 2 (40301)

.This inspection consisted of a review of the on-site and off-site safety

review committees to determine if they have been properly established and

functioning. The following requirements, guidance and licensee commitments

were utilized as appropriate:

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10 CFR 50.59 Change, Tests, and Experiments

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ANSI N18.7-1976 Administrative Controls and Quality

Assurance for the Operational Phase

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Regulatory Guide 1.33 Quality Assurance Requirements for the

Rev 2, 1978 Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants

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FSAR Section 13.4.1 Final Safety Analysis Report -

thru Amendment 27 Operational Reviews

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NUREG 1137 and Safety Evaluation Report

Supplements

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Draft Technical Section 6.4, Review and Audit

Specification

a. Plant Review Board (PRB)

This review included attendance at two PRB meetings and review of the

meeting minutes for the last 90 days. Administrative procedure 00002-C

Rev. 4, " Plant Review Board - Duties and Responsibilities" and pending

changes were reviewed against appropriate commitments. This review was

to determine if the following had been established:

(1) Responsibilities and authorities

(2) Review group membership

(3) Method and responsibility for designating alternate members

(4) Quorum requirements

(5) Meeting frequency

(6) Requirements for minutes

(7) Lines of communication with other review

l (8) The written program requires review of Technical Specification Section 6.4 items

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The following items were identified during the above inspection and

forwarded to NRR for resolution where Technical Specifications were

involved:

(1) Group membership had exceeded the allowed six members by the

addition of memoers from other departments and by designating two

members to represent operations. This item would be allowable by

the Final Draft Technical Specification (DTS).

(2) Membership Designation has been performed by the Chairman and not

by the GMVNO as required by DTS.

(3) Procedure 00002-C, Rev. 4 did not reflect the DTS accurately. The

licensee stated that the Final Draft Technical Specification would

be reconciled and incorporated.

Inspector Followap Item 50-424/86-111-02, " Review PRB Procedure for

Proper Incorporation of Technical Specifications". This item will be

reviewed post fuel load.

b. Safety Review Board (SRB)

This inspection ccnsisted of a review between the Final Draft Technical

Specifications and the procedures established to implement the

requirements. The following procedures were reviewed:

NOP-10-400 Safety Review Board 5/23/86

NOI-10-401 Conduct of the Nuclear Safety Review Board

Meetings 5/23/86

NOI-10-402 SRB Review of Documentary Material 8/15/86

NOI-10-403 Processing of SRB Material 5/23/86

NOI-10-404 SRB Records Retention and Handling 5/23/86

NOI-10-405 SRB Subcommittees 5/23/86

NOI-10-406 SRB Conduct on Onsite Reviews and Audits 8/15/86

In reviewing NOP 10-400, the inspector noted a caveat which states that

until the Technical Specification (TS) proposals between Hatch and

Vogtle are resolved, that the appropriate Plant TS will be the

controlling requirement. The applicant intends to standardize the SRB

administrative requirements between sites.

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The activities of the SRB will be further inspected after licensing.

No violations or deviations were identified.

27. Management Meetings - Unit 1 (30702)

On December 12, 1986, the resident inspectors and members of the Region II

staff participated with Commissioner Carr and his aide in a GPC presentation

,

and site tour.

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