05000272/LER-1982-043, Forwards LER 82-043/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:m o-O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038
          . Salem Generating Station                            July 28, 1982 Mr. it . C.      Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania                      19406
 
==Dear Mr. Haynes:==
 
LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272                                                                                                        ,
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE                82-043/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Gezierating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-043/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.
Sincerely yours, f , vh?Iwd H. J. Midura General Manager -
Salem Operations RH:k's    '[
l
:        CC:    Distribution l
i i
8208130249 820728 gDRADOCK 05000272 PDR                                                                                    ihp The Energy People
                                                                                                                % 2189 (20M) 1181
 
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  ;      Report Number:      82-043/03L Report Date:        07-28-82 Occurrence Date:    07-04-82 Facility:          Salem Generating Station, Unit l-Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey  08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
Containment Plant Vent Radioactivity Monitor - Inoperable.
This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-169.
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
Mode 1 - Rx Power 67% - Unit Load 703 MWe.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
At 2024 hours, July 4, 1982, during routine operation, the Control Room Operator discovered an Air Particulate Detector (APD) trouble alarm on Panel 1RPl. The APD was declared inoperable, taken out of service and Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.1.b Actions 20 and 22 were entered.
DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
l Investigation into the APD Trouble alarm revealed the cause j        to be filter failure. The filter paper supply was exhausted.
The roll had been replaced during weekly preventive maintenance, and sufficient paper existed on the roll at that time for one week of operation at the average rate of consumption. Increased use of paper from clearing the filter in the fast mode of operation resulted in the roll running out. Increased frequency of contain-ment pressure reliefs due to the unit returning to full power had increased the need for clearing the filter. Past experience has indicated that weekly replacement of the filter paper is adequate to ensure uninterrupted operation.
ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
The Containment Plant Vent Radioactivity Monitor provides indication of the concentration of radioactive gas and particulate in containment for the purpose of detecting Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage. It is also used to ensure that the release rate during purging or pressure relief is maintained below limits speci-fied by the Technical Specifications. A high radioactivity level initiates automatic closure of the containment purge duct and pressure relief isolation valves. Redundant RCS leak detection capability is provided by the Containment Sump Monitoring system.
 
        'LER'82-043/03L                                ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:    (continued)
Backup for the containment purge and pressure relief functions is provided by the Plant Vent Effluent-Monitor 1R16, and relies on operator action to isolate the vent path. Failure of the containment plant vent monitor,;therefore, constitutes operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b. Due to the backup monitoring capability, the event resulted in na risk to the health and safety of the general public.
Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.lb Action 20 requires:
With only two of the RCS leakage detection. systems operable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided the grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least'once per 24 hours when the required gaseous and/or particulate monitoring system is inoperable; otherwise be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.
Action 22 requires:
With the Containment Purge and Pressure Vacuum Relief Isolation System inoperable, close each of the purge and pressure relief penetrations providing direct access from the containment to the outside atmosphere.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
The containment purge duct and pressure relief isolation valves were being maintained closed in accordance with operating instructions, in compliance with the Limiting Condition for Operation. A new roll of filter paper was installed in the monitor, and it was returned to service. The unit was declared operable, and at 2042 hours, July 4, 1982, Limiting Condition for Operation Actions 20 and 22 were terminated.
A similar occurrence took place on June 16, 1982, and was documented in Licensee Event Report 82-040/03L. A commitment to counsel personnel to use fast speed operation only when required was made at that time. Only part of the personnel involved had been instructed at the time of recurrence.
FAILURE DATA:
Not Applicable.
Prepared By    R. Heller                    ,          bv 6e'ne(al Manager -
Salem Operations SORC Meeting No. 82-70
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Latest revision as of 00:40, 1 April 2020

Forwards LER 82-043/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20062G970
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 07/28/1982
From: Midura H
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20062G972 List:
References
NUDOCS 8208130249
Download: ML20062G970 (3)


LER-2082-043, Forwards LER 82-043/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
2722082043R00 - NRC Website

text

m o-O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

. Salem Generating Station July 28, 1982 Mr. it . C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 ,

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-043/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Gezierating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-043/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, f , vh?Iwd H. J. Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RH:k's '[

l

CC: Distribution l

i i

8208130249 820728 gDRADOCK 05000272 PDR ihp The Energy People

% 2189 (20M) 1181

n D

Report Number
82-043/03L Report Date: 07-28-82 Occurrence Date: 07-04-82 Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit l-Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Containment Plant Vent Radioactivity Monitor - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-169.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 67% - Unit Load 703 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 2024 hours0.0234 days <br />0.562 hours <br />0.00335 weeks <br />7.70132e-4 months <br />, July 4, 1982, during routine operation, the Control Room Operator discovered an Air Particulate Detector (APD) trouble alarm on Panel 1RPl. The APD was declared inoperable, taken out of service and Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.1.b Actions 20 and 22 were entered.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

l Investigation into the APD Trouble alarm revealed the cause j to be filter failure. The filter paper supply was exhausted.

The roll had been replaced during weekly preventive maintenance, and sufficient paper existed on the roll at that time for one week of operation at the average rate of consumption. Increased use of paper from clearing the filter in the fast mode of operation resulted in the roll running out. Increased frequency of contain-ment pressure reliefs due to the unit returning to full power had increased the need for clearing the filter. Past experience has indicated that weekly replacement of the filter paper is adequate to ensure uninterrupted operation.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The Containment Plant Vent Radioactivity Monitor provides indication of the concentration of radioactive gas and particulate in containment for the purpose of detecting Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage. It is also used to ensure that the release rate during purging or pressure relief is maintained below limits speci-fied by the Technical Specifications. A high radioactivity level initiates automatic closure of the containment purge duct and pressure relief isolation valves. Redundant RCS leak detection capability is provided by the Containment Sump Monitoring system.

'LER'82-043/03L ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

Backup for the containment purge and pressure relief functions is provided by the Plant Vent Effluent-Monitor 1R16, and relies on operator action to isolate the vent path. Failure of the containment plant vent monitor,;therefore, constitutes operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b. Due to the backup monitoring capability, the event resulted in na risk to the health and safety of the general public.

Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.lb Action 20 requires:

With only two of the RCS leakage detection. systems operable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided the grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least'once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when the required gaseous and/or particulate monitoring system is inoperable; otherwise be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Action 22 requires:

With the Containment Purge and Pressure Vacuum Relief Isolation System inoperable, close each of the purge and pressure relief penetrations providing direct access from the containment to the outside atmosphere.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The containment purge duct and pressure relief isolation valves were being maintained closed in accordance with operating instructions, in compliance with the Limiting Condition for Operation. A new roll of filter paper was installed in the monitor, and it was returned to service. The unit was declared operable, and at 2042 hours0.0236 days <br />0.567 hours <br />0.00338 weeks <br />7.76981e-4 months <br />, July 4, 1982, Limiting Condition for Operation Actions 20 and 22 were terminated.

A similar occurrence took place on June 16, 1982, and was documented in Licensee Event Report 82-040/03L. A commitment to counsel personnel to use fast speed operation only when required was made at that time. Only part of the personnel involved had been instructed at the time of recurrence.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable.

Prepared By R. Heller , bv 6e'ne(al Manager -

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No. 82-70