ML20154N307: Difference between revisions

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| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE, UTILITY TO NRC
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE, UTILITY TO NRC
| page count = 39
| page count = 39
| project = TAC:60462
| stage = Other
}}
}}


Latest revision as of 04:19, 10 December 2021

Forwards Design Basis Rept for Mods to Facility Based on 851226 Transient
ML20154N307
Person / Time
Site: Rancho Seco
Issue date: 03/12/1986
From: Reinaldo Rodriguez
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
To: Miraglia F
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RJR-86-111, TAC-60462, NUDOCS 8603170279
Download: ML20154N307 (39)
v • d • e


Text

e-esuun SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT C P. O. Som 15830. Sacramento CA 05852-1830,1916) 452 3211 AN ELECTRIC SYSTEM SERVING THE HEART OF CALIF OHNIA RJR 86-111 March 12, 1986 DIRECTOR OF NUCLEAR REAC10R REGULATION ATTENTION FRANK J MIRAGLIA JR DIRECTOR PWR-B DIVISION US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON D C 20$55 DOCKET 50-312 RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT NO 1 MODIFICATIONS BASED ON DECENBER 26, 1985 TRANSIENf Mr. Syd Miner of your staf f requested additional information on modifications to Rancho Seco based on the December 26, 1985 transient.

At' ached for your information is the Design Basis Report for these modifications. If you need any additional information contact Jerry eergnskiofmystaffatRanchoSeco.

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% 'Q (D*h R. J. RODRIGUEZ s\

AS$1STANTGENERALHA)jiGER, NUCLEAR Attachment A

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(v' w)$ MUD momcrent unuTY DtSMCT ECN NO.R-0357 Revo l I Sheet of ENGINEERING CHANfaE NOTICE ., _ , _

, L. Conklin 1/15/86 2 w ig u C THE FOLLOWING SYSTEM:$1 W!!.L BE AM'"ED EY THIS CHANGE L.foonklin 1/15/86 Arw , ICS, MSS -

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L. Wittrup

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REASON FOR CHANGE '

108503 N/A lo provice operator control in the control room of we o. i:=

OTSG Pressure and Level in the event of loss of smcutaa O uuoa I sus O ICS Power.

C DES *:R!' TION OF THIS CHANGE

,=cves A otra Lso casesnenom ame Ts tretcT o= Plan? catmation. wcwot sat :w -

osscenes ano amstmart wow cua=ct is to puncTion as waa as iu.ustsatt perte as a=o cmen acarsi arm =ewT wme oustwo i=eoewsriow touvawant. me,ce-tto co.eetrmT w a? =rw coessoaegp,Tt:1 Amt Rfouset: tvets er Omawfuss artte?tt ame Estlesatte tetal testeroneJte*

L BRIEF TITLE or eon:

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Control.of Cooldown on loss of ICS Power

." ;" 2 oEs:RIPTioN oF. CN A NGE:

' " : .. - Automatic positioning of AFW Valves on loss crf ICS Power and Manual control

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of AFW Valves.. '

. - Automatic closure of ADV's and TBV's on loss of ICS Power

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\j iggyQ p uumem uur oismer ECN NO. R-0357A gpy sn : 1 Cf 3 ENGINEERING CHANGE NO"TICE . . ,

%, m T. Beeves 1/15/86

,, 73 3 g pg.pNG SYSTEMfSI W!U. BE AFrE.TTED BY THIS CHANGE

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Auxiliary reeowater (,ontroi vaives. NN1 Cabinets, L. Conklin e -

1/15/86 u w ' N-o - -

primary Svstem Panel H2PS. and AC Panel SIN 1-1 o- g ,

...._..,.,mm,_.. .-

wtpa ososa sec, . s.r A s.c.

O REASON FOR CHANGE .

108503 To orovice tne coerators manusi controi or tne m o. i:

Auxiliary Feeowater Control Valves inceoencent Trom smcutAR U w ea 3 sue 3 the ICS in the event of loss of ICS Power.

C DESOPJFT10N OF TH!S CHANGE

,eoriot A ot;mr zo otS mrmoa Amo t?s t*Ft: on Pwr? catmartom. m sow Wot sur o.u A=o efhtm armatitt e=*omucion to cou my otSCOSE cemec=End?rst ANo AmtILWSTnATt steouve 'c *CMAMCI IS To PU=CT1oM As wtM. AS ILW5TRATI Wfftt8ACIt31 wffh Dus?>ec gguipugMT, merc.r*?

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L aRitr TITLE or EcN:

Automatic positioning on loss of ICS power and Manual Control of the AFW Valves.

2. DESCRIPT)oN oF OHANCE:

SEE ATTACHED SHEETS.

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. ECN No. R-0357 4 Rev. 0 Sheet 2 of 3 This ECN covers the following work:

. . _ _ (See attached sketches for work scope) 1..' Procurement of one (1) Bailey Dual Edgew'ise Indicator, Type RY; Two (2)

Manual Control Stations (4-2Dma Output); two (2) 3-way soleniod valves (normally open) two (2) I/P converters, one (1) 24VDC Power Supply and two (2) Auxiliary Relays.

2. Installation of two (2) Manual Control Stations, one (1) Dual Indicator, one (1) 24VDC Power Supply, and two (2) Auxiliaty Relays on Panel H2PS with all respective internal panel wiring modifications.
3. Installation of one (1) 3-way soleniod valve (normally open) in each Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Control Valves control air tubing.
4. Installation of two (2) I/P converters at each of the AFW Control Va'1ves.
5. Installation of cabling to provide 120 VAC to the new instruments on H2PS from AC Panel 51N1-1.

. 6.e Installation of signal cabling from the NNI cabinets.to the two (2) new

'indicatorr. on H2PS. ,

"7. . Installation of control cabling from the two (2) new Manual Control Stations on H2PS to the new solenoid valves and I/P converters on the AFW Control Valves.

8. Installation of cabling to provide " Loss of ICS Power" signals (contact closure) from the ICS Cabinets to H2PS.

Total, Estimated Cost: 5100,000 Drawings Affected: H2PS Panal Layout and Internal Wiring Drawings, NNI Cabinet Drawings, Installation Diagrams, and Electrical -

Wiring Drawings.

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  • If oaeocsat soave 50.49 inas (Ch issued for more av 500 01/84 D~ 434#6,,f) d w , p

[;+}$ MOO ECN NO. R-03578 m o

_ N' sacnamame muascress. umrr pismer I sh.et . e. 5 ENGINEERING CHANGE NOTICE , , , , , , , ,

-cw T. Beeves 1/15/86 2 C THE FOLLCM/ING SYSTEMISI WILL BE AFrEZ EY THIS OHANGE ( ',w j-Atmosoneric Dumo Valves, turoine oyoass system, Conklin ,7 1/15/86 u~..%..

5nutcown Panel ts250, Boron Analyzer Panei anc -

7 IC5 System

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C REASON FCR CHANGE 1,08503 To insure closure of the Atmosoneric Dumo Vaives and w., e. ,,

Turnine Bvoass Vaives f rom"ine Control Room in tne sa.cua O uA.iea C sus E event of loss of ICS Power.

  • C CESCRIPTION OF TH!S CHANGE .!

}

DESCptret AND R.M.; STRATE Peow CHANGE 18 70 FUNCTION As wU.L As tu.uSTnAT1 vfttm8Act:P

. t r,y ComemosofetTTS1 Amt ascuimC ?v e t S O F D R A w twa s A r t t C? t D A m c E Stim tes?Orpe0 JECT.a?t D TC ~ T A L31 wffw E2.2571NG 4 L' BRIEF TITLE oF EON:

Closure of ADV's/TBV's from the Control Room on loss of ICS Power.

2. DESCRIPT1oN oF CH A NG E:

SEE ATTACHED SHEETS.

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_. . This ECN covers the following work:

(See attached sketches for work scope)

1. Procurement of two (2) 3-way ' selector switches.
2. Installation of two (2) 3-way selector switches on the Reactor and ICS Console H1RI.
3. Modificatien to the internal wiring in the ICS Cabinets to provide " Loss of -

Power" contacts from existing spare auxiliary relay. I

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4. Procurement and installation of cabling from the Shutdown Panel H2SD to H1RI and from H1RI to the ICS Cabinets.

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Drawings Affected: E-311; E-206 sheet 159 and 160; P&ID's M-530 sheet 2; Electrical Wiring Diagrams; Wiring and Front Face Drawings.; Reactor and ICS Panel H1RI and ICS Cabinets Internal Drawings.

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L PURPOSE OF DESIGN CNANGE:

See attached.

IL CESIGN CRITERIA USED*

See attached.

IIL CALCULATIONS & DESIGN IN FOR M ATION:

See-attached.

IV. FAILURE MODES:

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VHl. CCPNENTS :

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R-0357 Log No. 738 "

. _T _...ECN-No- -

DESIGN BASIS REPORT I. PURPOSE OF DESIGN CHANGE:

' ~

This design change is in response to the 12/26/85 loss of Integrated Control System (ICS) power transient.

The purpose of this modification is to provide automatic and manual controls and instrumentation to help prevent overcooling of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) following a loss of ICS power. This will be accomplished by the addition of new control stations for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) valves, Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) and Turbine Bypass Valves (TBYs), independent of the ICS and by adjusting the Main Steam Line Failure Logic (MSLFL) setpoint. The need for these changes are temporary and will be re-evaluated for applicability when the Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) System is installed.

II. DESIGN CRITERIA A. Sumary of Chance

. . 1. AFW Flow Control Valves Station i .

' Two Leeds & Northrup (LAN) hand / auto (H/A) controllers and both Once Through Steam Generators (OTSG) startup level indications will be added +w H2PS providing:

a. Automatic means to position the AFW flow control valves *w a pre-determined position on loss of ICS power (currently the valves fail 50% open).

.- b. H/A stations which can be selected by the operator to provide manual control of the AFW flow control valves, independent of the Bailey H/A controllers and the ICS.

These stations will override the position noted in A.l.a.

and will provide full range control to the operator,

c. OTSG-A and OTSG-B Star *wp Level indicators to support

, manual AFW valve control.

2. ADV/TBV Station Two 3 position control switches (one for ADVs, one for TBVs) will be installed on HlRI. The three modes of the control switches will be:
a. " NORMAL" Mode - Providing control from the ICS with an automatic means to forces the ADVs and TBVs closed on loss of ICS power. (Currently the valves fail 50% open. )

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. .. . e .

b. "CLOSE" Mode - forces the ADVs/TBVs to close or remain closed regardless of the status of ICS power.
c. "AUTOCLOSE DISABLE" Mode - ADVs/TBYs remain under the control of the ICS regardless of the status of ICS power (valves will fail 50% open on loss of ICS power.

B. Design Bases a- ,

The following were used as guidelines for the design:

NEP 4109 Rancho Seco Configuration Control Procedures NEP 4112 Drawing Change Notices NEP 4118 Environmental Qualification Program Procedures NEP 4119 Fire Protection Program Control NEP 5104.1 Electrical System Design Parameters NEP 5104.2 Selection & Sizing of Power & Control Cables NEP 5104.3 Raceway Installation NEP 5104.6 Independence of Electrical Systems NEP 5204.11 Layout Design NEP 5204.17 Grounding System Design Nep 5204.30 Terminal Boxes, Junction Boxes and Gutters

~ NEP 5105.3 Centralized Plant Controls Criteria NEP 5204.37 Calculation of Voltage Drop and Regulation in AC Power Circuits NEP 5204.44 Redundant Circuit Separation

, NEP 5204.39 Design of AC and DC' Control Circuits NEP 5204.59 Grounding Notes, Symbols and Details NEP 5300 Electrical Construction Procedures NEP 5427 Feedwater System NEP 5435 Integrated Control System NEP 5444 Main Steam System Control Room Design Review Criteria Report Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to 10CFR50 (ECNs A-5152 and A-5106)

IE Bulletin 79-27

' Additional Criteria:

1. Attenuate the expected AFW flow rate to allow time for the control room operator to adjust AFW flow, if necessary, following loss ICS power. The response time required for operator action to prevent rapid overcooling or undercooling '

' shall be consistent with the controls and indications available in the control room to perform the actions.

2. Modification will be acceptable from a human factors viewpoint.
3. Provide automatic closure of ADYs & TBVs on loss of ICS power 4 Provide manual control of AFW flow control valves independent of ICS (and ICS power) l l

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5. Prevent condensate pumps supplying water to OTSGs thru WW &
6. Ensure that these modifications would not alter the conclusions reached in the District's response to NUREG 0737 II.K.3.7 concerning expected challenges to the Pilot Operated Pressurizer Relief Valves (PORV).

. C. Scope This modification will cause the AFW flow control valves to go to a preset position on loss of ICS power and allow the operator to control the AFW flow control valves with manual controllers (to be added on H2PS) completely. independent of the ICS and the Bailey H/A controllers.

In order to aid the operator in controlling steam generator level, indication of startup-range OTSG level will also be added to H2PS.

Operate-range & auxiliary feedwater flow indication currently exist

. , on H2PS.

A new station will be added on HlRI to provide auto and manual closure of ADVs and TBVs. The control stations will be interposed in existing circuits and will provide automatic (on los's of ICS power) or manual closure of the ADVs and TBVs independent of ICS power.

4 Additionally, these circuits allow manual opening of ADVs/TBVs on

', loss of ICS power.

D.. Eauipment Class and Power Recuirements All equipment circuitry and power required for this modification will be Class 2.

E. Testino

.- Acceptance testing is required.

III. CALCULATIONS AND DESIGN IN:0RMATION A. Desian Features

1. AFW Valves t

This change will allow the operator to manually take control of the AFW flow control valves (e.g., in the event that ICS does not operate properly). One (1) Leeds & Northrup manual control station (Model #074825 C. A.T. ) will be added to H2PS for each AFW flow control valves (FY-20527 and FV-20528). See Figure 1.

When the L&N H/A station is in the "AUT0" mode the LED on the

H/A station will glow green. When the station is placed in the

" MANUAL" mode the LED will change to red. The controller's "M,ANUAL" mode switch, via the auxiliary relays in H2PS, will energize an ASCO 3-way solenoid valve (Model fs 8302D25 and 8302A81) to transfer control of the AFW control valve instrument control air from the Bailey H/A controller and the ICS to the new manual station. The controller will provide a 4-20ma signal to its Bellofram, (Model

  1. 221-961-070) current-to-pneumatic (I/P) converter. The I/P converter will regulate the instrument air pressure (3-15. psig) to its AFW valve positioner. This will allow the operator to have full

' control at the H2PS panel of each of the AFW flow control valves independent of the status of ICS power or the Bailey controllers.

On loss of ICS power, contact closures in the ICS via the auxiliary relays in H2PS will transfer each AFW valve control to its new manual control station which will be set to feed a preset bias signal to its AFW flow control valve. The auxiliary relays in H2PS will energize the 3-way solenoid valves to transfer control from ICS to the new manual stations.

This modification will allow ICS control when the controller is in "AUT0" (and power is available to the ICS). In the " MANUAL" mode, the controller will allow the operator to position the AFW valve independent of ICS and the Bailey controllers. A red light is being added above each controller which will indicate when the these new LAN stations are controlling the AFW valve positions (i.e., in

" MANUAL" or ICS power has failed).

m-The system parameters required to verify control of the AFW valve:

are AFW flow and steam generator level. Currently, AFW flow and operate-range OTSG levels are available on H2PS. Steam generator startup-range OTSG 1evels will be added to H2PS on a dual edgewise (RY) indicator located between the two new controllers. The OTSG startup level signals will be provided from the sional conversion cabinets (taken from the NNI input terminal strip).

. The dual indicator, the two controllers, the I/P converters, and the 3-way solenoid valves will all be powered from the SIN 1-1 distribution panel. S1N1 provides battery backed power from an uninterruptable power supply and should be available in the case of loss of offsite power. All the additions (except the ICS power f ail relay) will be electrically independent of NNI/ICS control and power supplies. ,

2. ADVs and TBYs This modification will provide automatic closure of the ADVs and the TBVs from H1RI, reducing the possibility of overcooling due to depressurization in the event of loss of ICS power. The operator can switch ADVs and/or TBVs to the "AUTOCLOSE DISABLE" mode and allow the valves to go to 50". open (while the ICS is without power) if desired (e.g., TBVs in the event of a steam generator tube leak and the condenser has vacuum).
2. 'ADYs and TBVs The modifications to close the ADVs and TBYs will tie into
  • existing circuits that can be used by the operators to drive the ADYs and TBVs closed from the shutdown panel . H2SD -

(see Figures 2 & 3).

These circuits will provide various locations for closing the ADVs & TBYs. The ADVs can be closed by:

. . _ . a. Loss of ICS power (if Autoclose switch on H1RI js in e c- -

" NORMAL"))

b. Placing the ADY Autoclose switch on H1RI (in control room) in the "CLOSE" position
c. Placing the ADV switch on H2SD (shutdown panel) in the

" MANUAL" position

d. Placing the key switch on the local ADY control panel in the turbine building in the " MANUAL" position
e. By opening breaker #115 on distribution panel S1N1-1 (this will also close the TBYs)

The TBYs can be closed by:

a. Loss of ICS power (if Autoclose switch on H1RI is in

" NORMAL")

b. Placing the TBV Autoclose switch on H1RI (in control room) in the "CLOSE" position -
c. Placing the TBY switch on H2SD in the " MANUAL" position
d. By opening breaker #115 on distribution panel 51N1-1 (this will also close the ADYs)

The signal indicating loss of ICS power will be provided by the ICS DC power supply monitor thru a 120 VAC (ICS AC) auxiliary relay. Thi.s will ensure actuation in case of loss of ICS AC and/or DC power.

C. Desian Calculations

. On loss of ICS power the AFW flow control valves FV-20527 and FV-20528 positions will be preset to 21% (Calculation Z-FWS-IO105) based on a desired flow of 280 gpm per OTSG at an OTSG pressure of 1050 psig with P-318 and P-319 both running. According +a B&W Calculation (calculation 2-FWS-IO102), a total flow of 560 gpm *w the OTSGs is sufficient to cool the RCS from any operating power

_ level without violating minimum subcooling requirements. This ,

, value of flow, split equally between generators, was chosen on that basis. Calculation 2-FWS-IO105 sets the valve position for the expected flow case. Other flow cases are possible based on component failures or circumstances. It is the' Control Room operator's responsibility to determine that sufficient, but not too much flew to either or both OTSG is occurring following onset of the transient. The Calculation does not replace the current R-0357-6 2DBAICS

One 3-position switch will be added for the six ADVs and one 3-position switch for the four TBVs. These switches will be new stations in existing circuits (see Figures 2 & 3) that currently allow the operators to close the ADYs and/or TBVs at the shutdown panel (H2SD). IDADS will record the time the valus are closed (alarm) by the circuit aid when the, put in "AUTOCLOSE DISABLE" or returned to ICS control (normal). This could aid in determining possible release of radiation through the ADVs to the environment r during an ICS power failure transient.

The option to close the valves regardless of the status of ICS power will also be provided in the Control Room. This will allow the operator to ensure the valves stay closed while the ICS stabilizes during restoration of power.

The switch positions are:

"CLOSE" (Close valves)

" NORMAL" (ICS control with Auto-close-on-loss-of-ICS-power)

"AUTOCLOSE DISABLE" (Auto-close-on-loss-of-ICS-power contacts bypassed, control retained by ICS. independent of power status -

this allows the valves to be opened manually during a loss of ICS power)

a. The "CLOSE" switch position will force the valves to close or remain closed independent of ICS power availability.
b. The " NORMAL" switch position will automatically close the ADV and/or TBY valves in the event of a loss of ICS power. If ICS is powered, ICS will control the ADYs and TBYs.
c. In the "AUTOCLOSE DISABLE" position, the ADVs or TBYs will remain under the control of the ICS (even on loss of power).

This can be viewed as a bypass of the "N0pJ4AL" mode and will result in the valves opening to 50'.' open during loss of ICS

.- power.

B. Functional Descriotion

1. AFW Yalves This design change will automatically set the AFW valves *a a "

' preset position (See Section III.C) on loss of ICS power and allow the operator to take control of the AFW flow control valves at H2pS. The operator will have OTSG startup and operate-range level and AFW flow indication adjacent to the controllers to aid in modulation of the AFW valve positions.

The AFW flow control valves can always be opened from HISS pushbuttons. The HlSS pushbuttons will override both ICS and the new LAN controllers.

.- .. .. '/ .

Technical Specification requirement for AFW flow capability to either OTSG of 780 gpm at 1050 psig SG pressure. Calculation

(,2-FWS-10105) has estimated that a valve setting of 21% would not cool the RCS below the Interim Brittle Fraction Limit of 5000F in less than 1.6 minutes assuming worst case conditions of no decay heat, initial RCS temperature of 532oF, and OTSG depresssurizing to 200 psig. The equivalent controller output to the'1/P and the I/P output were also detemined in calculation Z-FWS-10105.

' Calculation Z-FWS-IO105 assumes no main feedwater or condensate flow to the steam generators. The operators will be expected to trip the MFW pumps in the event of an overcooling transient in accordance with procedures. The condensate pumps could begin to introduce flow to the steam generators thru the startup feedwater valves, (MFW and startup valves are 50% open and the M W block valve is fully closed when ICS power is lost).if the secondary side were to depressurize below approximately 500 psig. For this reason, the setpoint for the Main Steam Line Failure Logic (MSLFL) will be changed from 435.5 psig to 575 psig (Calculation 2-MSS-19106) 25 psig. The MSLFL will close MFW control valves and startup control valves preventing a gradually increasing flow thru the startup feedwater control valves which may not be readily apparent to the operator.

IV. FAILURE MODE A. Failure Modes for AFW Flow Control Valves 1.

Failure valve toof-instrument fail open. Thisair will still cause the AFW control is the existing failure mode.

2. Failure of the power supply from S'lN1-1 will cause control of the AFW control valves to remain / revert to ICS control. If ICS

- power is also lost the operator may locally throttle the AFW valves or control AFW flow by starting and stopping the AFW pumps.

3. Failure of controller signal (s) to the I/P(s):
a. Solenoid (s) Energized - A short or open circuit to the I/P(s) will result in the AFW valve (s) going closed. A hot short will result in an unpredictable f ailure mode for the AFW control valve (s). The operator can control manually at .

the AFW flow control valve (s).

b. Solenoid (s) De-energized - A short, open, or hot short will-not effect the AFW valve (s). ICS will maintain control.
  • The operator can control manually at the AFW flow control -

valve (s ).

R-0357-7 j

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4. Fa'ilure of the controller signal (s) to the'~iol noid(s): -
a. Open or Short Circuit - The solenoid (s) will be de-energized for both "AUT0" and " MANUAL" modes of the LAN H/A stations. Therefore, the ICS E/P(s) will control the AFW valves. If ICS power is also lost the AFW valve (s) will go 50% open. The operators can control marually at the AFW flow control valve (s). ,
b. Hot Short - In "AUT0", the AFW valve (s) will go to the preset position independent of an ICS Power loss. The operator can control the valve (s) at the LAN Manual Controller (s) by placing the controller (s) in " MANUAL" on the H2PS panel.
5. Bias Current (from 24 VDC Power supply) fails :
a. Auto - A short, open, or hot short to the I/P(s) will have no effect on AFW valve positions. If ICS power is also lost, the AFW valves will position as in Section IV.3.a. '

The operators can control manually at the AFW flow control valves.

b. Manual - A short, open or hot short will have no effect 'on

- manual control of the AFW flow control valve positions from 3 , the L&N controllers.

, 6. ' Failure of the Auxiliary relay in H2PS:

s

a. Contacts . closed Auto - The AFW valves will open to the preset bias position and the red lights above the new L&N controllers will be lit. Operators can control manually at H2PS.

Manual - Manual Mode Control and the red lights above the new L&N controllers will be lit. The operators can control the AFW control valves manually at H2PS.

l

b. Contacts Open Auto & Manual - ICS Bailey H/A controllers will control. If ICS power is also lost, the AFW control

' valves will go 50% open. Operators can control manually at the AFW flow control valves.

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7. Failure of the solenoid valve (s) stuck closed will result in

. ICS or Bailey H/A control only. If ICS power is also lost, the operators can control AFW flow manusily at the valves. Fail ure of the solenoid valve (s) stuck open will prevent ICS control or Bailey H/A control but will not cause the light (s) above the LAN controller (s) to be lit. In the Auto Mode the AFW valve (s) would open to the preset bias position. The operator could

~*  ; switch to the " MANUAL" mode on the LAN controller (s). In the

" MANUAL" mode the red light (s) would be lit and the operators would have the ability to control the AFW valve position (s) at H2PS.

8. Mechanical Failure of I/P Converters (s):
a. Solenoid (s) Energized (I/P controlling) - The I/P(s) can fail such that the output air control signal (s) could be from 0 psig to supply air pressure resulting in a corresponding AFW control valve position.
b. Solenoid (s) De-energized (E/P controlling) - The I/P(s) failure will not immediately affect the AFW control valve (s) (until control is switched to the I/P(s).
9. On loss of H4SCA (signal conversion cabinet) power (Class 1 SlGA), the new OTSG startup level indicator will fail to midscale. Alternate indication is available elsewhere in the Control Room on SPDS and IDADS from the H4SCB Cabinets powered from SlGB (also Class 1). The signals from H4SCA to the RY indicators are electrically isolated.

B. Failure Modes Common to AFW valves, ADYs and TBYs

1. Failure of the ICS Auxiliary Relay (AR) Contacts (Loss of ICS Power Output):

, a. AFW Yalves

" MANUAL" mode (AR contacts stick open or closed) - With the L&N controller (s) in manual, the controller (s) will

. retain control of the AFW control valve (s). The red light (s) above the controller (s) will be lit. ,

"AUT0" mode - If the AR contacts stic. open while in

. " MANUAL", the ICS or the Bailey H/A will retain centrol of the AFW valves. If ICS power is also lost, the operators may control the AFW flow control valves manually. If the AR contacts stick closed the AFW valves will open to the preset bias position. The red lights above the controllers will be lit. The operators can control AFW valves manually at H2PS.

. ,* - l ,

b. ADV/TBV

" NORMAL" position - Failure of the AR contacts in the closed position will cause the ADV/TBY valves to remain under ICS or Bailey H/A control. Operators can close the valves with the Autoclose switches on HlRI.

Failure of the AR contacts in the open position will remove Bailey H/A or ICS control from the ADVs and TBVs. The valves will remain closed. IDADS will

',c

  • alarm. ICS control can be returned by placing the ADY and TBV Autoclose Switches in the "AUTOCLOSE DISABLE" positions.

"CLOSE" and "AUTOCLOSE DISABLE" Positions - The "CLOSE" and "AUTOCLOSE DISABLE" modes are unaffected by this failure.

C. Failure Modes for ADVs and TBVs

1. The addition of normally closed switches' will not affect the Appendix R. analysis for these circuits. An "open circuit" will cause the ADYs/TBVs to close or remain closed. An alarm on IDADS will notify the operators of the failure. " Shorted contacts" will remove the shorted station from operability leaving the other methods of operating the circuits intact. A

" hot short" in the new circuitry udll still leave the

~ " downstream" actuators in H2SD and the turbine building operable (Ref. ECN A-5152; ECH A-5106). A short to ground udll cause the ADVs and TBVs to close and an alarm on IDADS.

This is an existing failure mode.

2. Repeated cycling of the ADYs and TBVs using the " NORMAL" and "AUTOCLOSE DISABLE" switch positions will not damage the valves (See attached Telephone Conversation Log).
3. NUREG 0737 II.K.3.7 required an analysis to " assure that the frequency of anticipated PORY openings is less than 5% of the total number of overpressure transients". That analysis (B&W 12-1122779; BAW-1584) was sent to the NRC January 16, 1981.

These modifications do not affect the analysis.

The analysis used both operating historical data and fault tree analysis to show that the criteria was satisfied. Table -

2.2.2-1 of that analysis shows the basis for estimated PORY opening en delayed AFW. It references an average AFW unavailability of 1.4 x 10-3 per reactor year for all B&W Auxiliary Feedwater Systems. The Rancho Seco contribution to that AFW unavailability i: calculated in a separate analysis dated September 10, 1979. The three cases analyzed are Loss of Main Feedwater (LOMF), LOMF with loss of offsite power, and LOMF with loss of all AC power. None of the three cases

.-..... R-0357-10

, . 3 :, .; ,

directly assume loss of power to the ICS. Failures of the ICS (including loss of all control power) are handled analytically

" - by assigning an expected unavailahility for typical fluid control systems hardware. The failure rate of 7 X 10-J per demand used in the analysis in an NRC supplied probability (transmitted directly to B&W per uAW-1584 Reference 1). Since the modifications are a simple extension of the complex IJ'S -

controls, no change to the assumed control system failure rate is warranted. Since the modifications addressed in this report WP

' do not affect the NRC supplied probebility of failure, the previous analysis sent to the NRC is still valid. Therefore, the frequency of anticipated PORY openings remains less than 5%

of the total number cf overpressure transients (as specified in NUREG 0737.)

Summary With these modifications in place, a loss-of-ICS-power transient should be much less severe than the 12/26/85 overcooling transient. With the ADVs and TBVs closed, pressure (and inventory) can be maintained in the steam generators. Adequate flow and control of AFW snould be available thru the AFW flow control valves.

. These modifications are entirely separate fror SFAS. Because the Class 1 SFAS AFW valves are in ' parallel with the AFW flow control valves, they provide an alternate AFW flow path.

For all failure modes discussed in Section IV. A the AFW valves can be opened from HS-20527 and HS-20528 items f98 and f97 on Panel H1SS.

These hand switches udll override othe ICS, the Bailey H/A controllers v and the new controller on H2PS and open the AFW valves.

If the ADV/TBV Autoclose Switches are in " NORMAL" and the AFW Manual Controllers are in "AUT0", repeated losses of ICS power will result in repeated responses by the ADVs, TBVs and AFW control valves as described in Section III.B.

If, after a loss of ICS power, any components of the new additions do not function, the operator can still take local control of ADYs, TBVs and AFW valves.

R-0357-11 2DRPICS

. AFW Yalves Circuitry Failure Modes '

I l Effect on AFW Yalve Control Failure Modes l Controller in "AUT0" l Controller in " MANUAL" l I i 1

.e 1. Instrument air system l AFW valves full open l AFW valves full open l l

2. SINI power supply i ICS control  ! ICS control I
3. Centroller output *w I/P . l

. Open circuit l No effect ,

AFW valves close (light)

. Short circuit l No effect l AFW valves close (light)

Hot short (0-20ma)* l No effect l AFW valves open l l , proportionally (light) l I (unpredicatable)

4. Controller signal to i  !

solenoid valve: l l Open circuit  ! ICS control l ICS control Short circuit i ICS control l ICS control Hot short l AFW valves to preset l No effect I position (light) l l l 5.. Bias current fails l I Without ICS power i AFW valves close (light) i No effect With ICS powered l ICS control l No effect I l

6. H2PS aux relay con +ac+a l I fail l 1 Closed
  • l AFW valve to preset i No effect I position (light) 1 Open  ! ICS control l ICS control i I
7. Solenoid valve sticks l l Open (L&N H/A controls)) ArW valves to preset l No effect I preset position 1 Closed (ICS controls) l ICS control l ICS control I l

< l l

8. I/P fails l l -

. Solenoid de-energized l No effect l No effect

. Solenoid energized 1 AFW valve position l AFW valve position l corresponds to air i corresponds to air I signal I signal l l

9. ICS power fail relay l l contacts fail l l Closed 1 AFW valves to preset l No effect I position (lignt) l Open* l ICS control l No effect l l l l light - red light above L&N controller (s) is lit
  • Uni fkely failure mode

k l' + ,*; * ,

i L y, SPECIAL MAINTENANCE REOUIREMENTS '

L l N/A I

i VI. SPECIAL OPERATING REQUIREMENTS I I

The normal operating mode for the new AFW valve controllers should be  !

"AUT0", allowing ICS to control. The normal operating mode .for the ADV/TBY switches should be " NORMAL" to automatically close the valves on  ;

loss of ICS power. The Emergency Operating Procedures (E0Ps) and  :

Casualty Procedures (cps) should be revised to include these additions  !

for loss of ICS transients. The Operating Procedures should be revised to ensure systems are energized and operable before plant startup. ,

l l

' Loss of ICS Procedures should direct the operators to place the ADY and

' TBV Autoclose Switches in the "CLOSE" mode, and AFW LAN flow control

_ controllers in," MANUAL" before attempting to reestablish power to ICS.

Once ICS is powered and stable, control of ADYs, TBVs and AFW valves can ,

t be returned to the ICS by placing the ADY and TBY Autoclose switches in l

" NORMAL" and the Manual Controllers in "AUT0". l c

The red lights above the LAN Controllers can be tested by momentarily i

' placing the LAN controllers in " MANUAL" as long as AFW is not in service '

there will be no effect on plant operation. -

' i

' Operating Procedure B.2 should be revised to enable the MSLFL when OTSG l _

pressure is above 790 psig. Operating Procedure B.4 should be revised  !

to inhibit the MSLFL when OTSG pressure is at 620 psig (Calculation #2-MSS-I-1016).

\

l VII. VERIFICATION REOUIREMENTS N/A i

VIII. COPMENTS ,

l i The location of these instruments has been reviewed and approved by a human factors engineer associated with the Detailed Control Room Design i Review (CRDR), as noted in the attached report.

Items associated with these ECNs are not pertinent to safe shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of a pipe break accident. Items covered by ,

l ,

these ECNs do not contain lines which could create high or moderate line j

break environments no HELBA analysis or protection is required for these ECNs.

Based on previous studies performed by Seismic Qualification Utilities l

Group (SOUG), and Nureg 1030 (Draft) standard mounting practices are ,

sufficient for the installations in the control room panels and consoles, t

! 1 Based on walkdowns by civil / structural engineers of the panel, the t

additional relays and fuses and relocating an existing relay assembly l will not affect the seismic intggrity of the panels. The existing class l

1 cables and equipment will also not be affected i l l l

..,-.-_____,-,-.,_______,.__,,,._,.---_,_-_____-._,--,,,--,-.t

. ~ r e- 't .,

SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT OFFICE MEMORANDUM To. Jerry Williams January 30, 1986 DATE:

p,ou.

Linda Conklin k '

susncti ECN R-0357; DESIGN OPTIONS CONSIDERED AND REJECTED The following are alternate designs that were considered by IAC, Electrical  ;

and Human Factors Engineers. These alternatives were all rejected based on engineering judgment. Calculations were not performed to verify the decision to reject them.

^

, Octions' Considered and Rejected AFW

1. Automatic closure of AFW valves on loss of ICS power with manual AFW control through new controllers or SFAS modulating valves was  ;

considered. This option was rejected based on the undesirability of "

preventing AFW flow entirely during the first few minutes of a loss of ICS power transient. This automatic action, while preventing overcooling, could lead to an undercooling if the operators did not take prompt action to introduce AFW flow.

2. Allowing the AFW valves to fail to 50s position on loss of ICS power was considered. This was rejected based on the probability of initiating an overcooling if the operators did rat take prompt action to throttle AFW flow.
3. Installing the new controllers on H4BS or H1SS ere both considered.

Both alternate positions were rejected based on the unavailability of pertinent plant parameters required to control AFW flow / Steam Generator level. '

4 Automatic operation of the AFW control valves independent of ICS was consioered. This was rejected because prepositioned valves and manual control was considered appropriate for the remainder of this fuel cycle. EFIC will provide Class 1 ICS independent control for Cycle 8 Startup.

. HUMAN FACTORS EVALUATION OF PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION OF ECN R-0357 i

PURPOSE:

l This report documents the human factors considerations of the controls and  ;

displays being installed on panels H1RI and H2PS in the main Control Room in i implementation of ECNi R-0357.

p r. ,.x - , ,

l AsstMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS:

This report only considers the front panel mcunted har& tare which the  !

operators will use, not internal components or systems inside the panels or  ;

external to the Control Room. It assumes implementation in the Rancho Seco Control Room configuration as of January 1985 (which was the configuration evaluated by the Control Room Design Review). The results of this report will ,

caese to apply once the Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC)  !

modifications and modifications to the Control Room recommended by the Control l Room Design Review are implemented.

i l EVALUATION:

EQUIPMENT LOCATION H2PS

~

.The key result of ECW R-0357 will be the establishment of a viable control ,

? station for manually throttling Auxiliary Feedwater flow. Should manual throttling of AFW be required, operators may choose to use this new station rather than using the Bailey process controllers on the left side  ;

of H1RC. From this station both steam generator levels and AFW flows can j easily be seen. It is difficult to see AFW flows and operate range steam l

generator levels from the Bailey control station. Although the new '

station provides better information for controlling OSTG 1evels than is available at H1RC, it does not have as much instrumentation available for  ;

evaluating the effects on RCS parameters. Narrow range RCS tempera *wres and extreme low range RCS pressure is observable from the station on H2PS, but pressurizer level is not. Operators throttling AFW from H2PS will '

have to obtain information on pressurizer level and RCS parameters outside i of the range of H2PS instrumentatit.n from H1RC & H1RI or from the SPDS.

! H1RI:

The location of the ADY and 13V overrides on H1RI is the best possible location for these devices. They will be adjacent to the normal controls  ;

for the valves, wnere all relevant carameters are readily available.

. i i

l i

I

. ,e- *-

Within-Panel Layout Considerations H2PS:

The auxiliary feedwater controllers will be mounted higher than would be' ideal for continuously utilized manual operation, however they are still located well witnin prescribed height locations for mounting controls on vertical panels. The new OTSS startup range level indicators will be at an excellent location from a Human Factor viewpoint, with respect to the AFW controllers. The location of the AFV flow displays above and to the right is significantly offset from the controls, but can be readily seen.

The location of the operate range level recorders below and to the right of the new controls will mean that a right-handed operator will be blocking the view of these recorders when actually adjusting the valve controllers. This should not present operational problems; continuous adjustment of the controls is not required and systam response is slow enough.

HlRI:

The ADV' and TBY switches will be mounted one above the other, immediately above the A loop TBY controller. This will be somewhat confusing since one switch will :ontrol the TBYs for Loop A & Loop B and the other switch will control the ADVs for Loop A & Loop B. Training and labeling will have to reinforce this. Ideally the ADY switch should be to the left of the TBV switch. Given a vertical array, putting the TBY switch above the ADY switch conforms to established human engineering standards (i.e., top to bottom should confonn to left to right).

Static Component Level Considerations Bailey RY Meters:

The majority of the vertical analog meters in the Control Room are of the Bailey RY type, so these will conform to established expectation. Due to the. meter curvature, there is a problem reading the upper quadrant of the scale when these meters are mounted significantly above eye level. The selected location is low enough to preclude this problem. The RY meter is susceptable to mid-scale failure. This is a well known problem which may partially be mitigated by putting a yellow band at the midscale failure point (recommendation of Control Room Design Review). Backup operate range recorders are readily available on the same panel and on the SPDS displays.

Leeds & Northruo Tyoe 074825 (C. A.T. ) Manual Controller:

These hand / auto controllers have not previously b'een used at Rancho Seco.

They differ in many respects from the Bailey process controllers which are ordinarily used for similar functions in the plant. From a human engineering viewpoint, however, the differences between the L&N and Bailey designs are not apt +4 cause operator error.

1* '

There are several individual human engineering observations that can be  :

' applied to these LAN devices which must be recognized. It is difficult and somewhat confusing to determine the controller status from a distance. The controller is switched from manual to automatic by a single large rectangular pushbutton. In the manual position it protrudes.

approximately 5.5m from #M controller face and in the automatic mode it protrudes about 10m. It is difficult to recognize this difference from in front of the device, and a 9m raised lip bezel along the sides of the mem'" device precludes seeing the difference from the side. A single small

' (5m) LED indicates Auto / Manual status. When in automatic, it glows green; when in manual, it is red. This is apt to cause confusion because the Baileys use red lights to indicate automatic and white for manual.

The L&N red / green color convention does not strictly conform to the more 9enerally used red = flow / energized and green = no flow /de-energized convention used predominantly in the Control Room. This coding would be impossible for red / green color deficient operators to recognize. There is at least one such operator at Rancho Seco. The addition of a red status light above each controller to indicate when it has control (either in manual or during loss of ICS) mitigates the difficulties in determining controller status. Labeling 3m high specifically identifies the meaning of. RED and GREEN but the lettering is too small to be read over 3 feet away. The industry standard symbol of two arrows in a circle head-to-tail i

associated with AUTOMATIC and a raised hand, fingers closed, associated with MANUAL is used rather than written text for HAND or MANUAL and -

AUTOMATIC. These "ymbols are often mistaken to mean GO and STOP rather than AUTO and MANUAL, but once the symbols are explained the meaning is

. not apt to be forgotten.

! The scale on the smal'1 integral meter displaying controller output is reasonable for its use of qualitative information. It may be difficult to locate from a distance. Since the pointer is the some color (black) and stroke width as the major scale markings. The pointer should be larger and in another contrasting color (e.g., red) to facilitate  ;

recognition.

The.use of the smaller rectangular " BALANCE" pushbutton to permit comparing outputs to make a "bumpless" transfer is not obvious but will be easily learned with minimal training. The manual adjustment control is a standard and well designed rotating knob that will pose no problems, even

, though this type of control is not used in the Control Room.

There is a large 8m high L&N logo adding significant clutter across the '

(

bottom of the controller face which should be removed.  !

GE Tyoe CR 104PSG33991 Three Position Rotary Switches i Although there are no similar rotary switches used in the Control Room, these are of a standard design conforming well to population stereotypes and expectations. The position assignment - CLOSE - NORMAL - AUTOCLOSE DISABLE conforms to stereotype and established Rancho Seco criteria.

These switches should pose no human factors problems. 1 o .

j

- . . - . . - . - -, - -... , , ,_ ,, -----, .-_,.,,--.c . . - . - - - - . - - - , - - - , . , - - _ -

\'j  %.

~

s~ '. .

Operational Considerations:

The ability for the operators to take control over the AFW valves at any time from H2PS could pose'a problem. From this station the operator can easily lose track of the overall picture of plant status since cost of the the actions and information presented would be behind them. The AFW station on HlRC is still the prefered station for controlling AFW flow.

This should be stressed in training.

. Labelling Considerations

  • To be in accordance with the CRDR Criteria Report, the labels should appear as in the attached sketch.

Recommendations:

1. Stress in training that the AFW station on H2PS should only be used when the Bailey controllers or the ICS has failed.
2. Enlarge and change color of pointers on L&N controller meter to enhance contrast.
3. Cover over logo band on bot *wm of controllers to reduce clutter.
4. If possible, modify existing single lamp status indicator to two lamps (to less ambiguously indicate sta'as), otherwise change colors to conform to existing Bailey conventions - Red = AUTO, White = HAND.

.25 JAa U human Factor,singineer

  • Date Y

R0357 Page 4

e I

I

~

LABELS l

=. .

HC-2032? HC-20528 p _ l' T .Ds _ _

~

_ .. N G C _

V T,Ds ~ '. __ _T G OR OR LDSS OF ICS POWER LDSS OF ICS POWER AFbJ OTSG A AFbJ TSG B u r _ oun. 5. 2 7 im . uC ii o 0. s=J u' vo u

CONTROL _ER C0bTR]__ER

_TSG SU c-uVrl --

A 3

~ l - '. .

~

Jerry Williams January 25, 1986 ADV and TBV

1. Automatic closure of ADVs and TBYs on loss of ICS power (without the

'" " .' * "AUTOCLOSE DISABLE" and "CLOSE" options) was considered. 'The "AUTOCLOSE DISABLE" mode was added to allow the operator to return control to the ICS to:

Open valves to 507. (after loss of ICS power) to allow pressure relief of the secondary side.

. Override the " NORMAL" mode in the unlikely event of an erroneous power f ail signal.

The "CLOSE" mode was added to the design to allow the operator +4 close the ADVs and TBVs to:

Ensure the valves remain shut during power up of the ICS.'

. Close the valves in the unlikely event that ICS sends!an erroneous open signal to the valves. ,

2. Installation of the Autoclose switches on H2PS and H4BS was considered. These alternate panels were rejected because the operator would not have available the information required to open the valves to allow pressure relief if he chose to do so.
3. The possibility that this modification would allow the District to remove the Shift Supervisor's locked-valve tags from the ADVs was considered. However, auto isolation of ADVs on loss of ICS power does not preclude other single failures from causing the same concerns (based on B&W Document 12-1125041 Task 170; NI Calibration

- Error, dated March 1981.

4. Automatic control of ADVs was considered and rejected because EFIC will be installed during the next refueling outage (Cycle 8). Manual on/off control is considered appropriate for the remainder of fuel Cycle 7. .

<- power Sucoly Monitor Installation of a redundant Power Supply Monitor (PSM). was considere.d.

Since an in-depth study would be required to determine if this is desirable, this modification if it is done, will be under a separate ECN.

Jerry Williams .

  • January 25, 1986 ICS Annunciators Removal of the fan failure alarms from the "ICS or Fan Power Failure"

% .= -  ;,. annunciator window was considered. These alarms are currently under review as part of the annunciator study (Premod 8522). Separating the alarms at this time was rejected due to the similarity of the functions of the alarms. If the .*an in Cabinet #2 were to fail, it would be an early warning that the power supplies will likely fail shortly. Fan failures in the cabinets are a indication that ICS abnormalities may be developing due to overheating of the modules. In either case, the procedure for this alarm window should direct the operator to:

a. insure stability of the plant
b. go to the cabinets & identify whether the alarm is power failure or which fan has failed.

cc: Engineering Files - Plaza 50

^

Design City Files Trailer 8 Files 2DBRICS LTC/pm 1

.LA E 1 .

ADV AUTOCLOSE CLDIE ON LDSS OF ICS POWER NORMAL -

CLDSEs EDCLDSE DISABLE l

TBV AUTOCLOSE -

CLDSE ON LDS1 DF ICS POWER NORMAL

Lggg .tJ tinr.i nc DISABLE t

)

SIMI-l ito VAC P--P--------------t------*----- ,

, 1 M 7PS I

g 3

, I H'I F I

I MAuuAL 24 VDC' I LED l coMTROL POWER I Sl6u A L SUPPL

ICs O i (4-20 M A)

.qo((~'VAC I

~

f-- , I l M ANU AL - RED I I I I I AUTO-6REEMi  ; I I I I I

'couTdcT

+24 I I I OPEuou i i I I r- - - - -

LOSS OF '

24 8 I I Ic5 DC. I ccWTACTS I MAu.E AUTO. M AW.d s[. cLoSE ou AUTO. PEE, fg LDSS OF /

ICS ICS POWER H 7.F5 AUX. RELAY . ! l g  ;

t_________,,____ u lp,^c,u,xu ,u,

' 1 STATIOM slui-l

,. _ _ .J

. - 120 VAC f - - - - - - - - ,

g RED Ll6HT , gqpg I DM WHEU Q

SDLEMOID  :, $ AUX gggly g l

EMEREl2ED l

_S_

. HISS - ~ ' " *'

5 " "

1/ "

{PEM pg b ~' ~ " ,, p 3#4 LOSE: f VEMT- "

,l'

,l' [ AIR SUPPLY r 3 r D-LO" t

AFW E coMTROL POS IC.S.

VALVE' #

' AIR .

>jN SUPPLY.,

AUXlLI ARY FEEDWATER CONTROL IND E PEND ENT OF I.C.S.

. y-i ,

NEW SCOPE' U .CLOSE CLOSE RELAY C(OSE NOf] MAL,-- MJTO AUTO

,sy, ,

CONTACT SWITCllON LOCAL OPEN ON DishBLE tl2SD SWITCH LOSSOF ICS POWER

.IDADSh AL AR M

h h 6 SOLENOl DEENEIG12 TO CLOSE -

ADVS 1

A JV V A\ UAL cod RO_ ~.

FIGURE 2 e

1

o

.. g

(

NEW SCOPE
  • l .

l jS CLOSE CLOSE RENAY ,

if NOf3- MAL _ MJTO su -

CONTACT SwlTCllON .

OPEN ON DIShBLE il2SD LOSSOF ICS POWER IDADS AL AR M khh 4-SOLENOID:

DEENERGlZE TO CLOSE TBVS a

T3V V A \ UAL CO,\ ~~T _

FIGURE 3 4 0

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