ML20236J633

Forwards Response to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-312/98-02.Corrective Actions:Util Revised RSAP-1003 to Clarify District Security Staff Responsibilities Re Handling & Review of Criminal History Info

ML20236J633
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	06/30/1998
From:	Redeker S SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
50-312-98-02, 50-312-98-2, MPC&D-98-102, NUDOCS 9807080283
Download: ML20236J633 (6)

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(~ ') SMUD SACHAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT O R O. Box 1583o. Sacramento CA 95852-1830, (916) 452-3211 AN ELECTRIC SYSTEM SERVING THE HEART OF CALIFORNIA l

l MPC&D 98-102 June 30, 1998 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Docket No. 50-312 Rancho Seco Nuclear Station License No. DPR-54 DISTRICT RESPONSE TO NRC NOTICE OF VIOLATION 50-312/9802-01 Attention: Document Control Desk In NRC Inspection Report 50-312/98-02, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District (the District) received a Notice of Violation related to activities conducted at the Rancho Seco Nuclear Station. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.201, the District provides the enclosed response to Notice of Violation 50-312/9802-01.

Members of your staff requiring additional information or clarification may contact Jerry Delezenski at (916) 452-3211, extension 4914.

Sincerely, Dl

%C M Steve J. Redeker Manager Plant Closure & Decommissioning l

l cc w/ Encl: E. W. Merschoff, NRC, Arlington, Texas D. Dudley, NRC, Rockville 9807080283 980630 PDR ADOCK 05000312 O PDR RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION O 14440 Twin Cities Road. Herald, CA 95638-9799; (209) 333-2935

Resnonse to NRC Notice of Violation 50-312/9802-01 NRC Statement of Violation:

10 CFR 73.56(b)(2)(i) requires, in part, that the licensee provide high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access to protected areas am trustworthy and reliable. In this regard, the licensee's program for granting unescorted access authorization to the plant's protected area must include a background investigation, including information concerning an individual's criminal history.

License Condition 2.C.(3) of the licensee's facility operating license requires, in part, that the licensee maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the physical security plan approved by the Commission and all changes and amendments made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and 10 CFR 50.90.

Section 5.1.2.2 of the licensee's physical security plan states,in part, that," Personnel authorized unesconed access to te protected area shall meet all requirements of the Access Authorization Program which meets all elements of Regulatory Guide 5.66 to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.50."

Paragraph 7.1 of the Appendix to Regulatory Guide 5.66 dated June 1991 (NUMARC 89-

01) requires, in part, that a licensee review and con;ider all information obtained during a background investigation and base its decisic. to grant unesconed access authorization I upon the results of this review.

t Paragraph 7.la of the Appendix to Regulatory Guide 5.66 dated June 1991 (NUMARC 89-01) requires, in part, that in making a determination of trustwonhiness and reliability, that the licensee consider the willful omission or falsification of material information submitted in support of a request for unescorted access authorization.

Contrary to the above, on May 20,1998, the inspector determined that the licensee failed to: (1) review and consider all information obtained during a background investigation; j and (2) consider if available criminal history information _had been willfully omitted or falsified from the individual's personnel security questionnaire. Specifically, on May 11, 1998, the licensee received criminal history (misdemeanor conviction) information from j the state.of California that had not been included on an individual's personnel security questionnaire. As of May 20,1998, licensee management had not reviewed this criminal history information, nor determined if this information had been willfully omitted by the individual from his personnel security questionnaire.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement Ill).

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Response to NRC Notice of Violation 50-312/9802-01 4

District Response:

Admission or Denial of Violation The District acknowledges that it did not review state of Califomia criminal history information for the subject individual from May 11,1998, to May 20,1998.

Reason for Violation District Security did not perform a more timely review of the individual's state of California criminal history infomiation because District Security office staff did not forward the criminal history information to District Security supervision as is typically done. Instead Security office staff placed the state of California criminal history information into the individual's badge information folder without District Security supervision review.

The District believes District Security would have reviewed the state of Califomia criminal history information after District Security receis ed the subject individual's FBI criminal history information. In accordance with District access authorization procedures, District Security evaluates relevant background information collected in an individual's badge information folder before the District grants permanent protected area unescorted access authorization. District Security needed the outstanding FBI criminal history information before District Security could upgrade the subject individual from temporary to permanent protected area unescorted access authorization. District receipt of the FBIinformation would have prompted a review of the individual's badge information folder, which contained the state of California criminal history information.

Discussion of Violation District Security completed the required, initial background investigation, submitted fingerprints to the FBI and the State of California, Department of Justice, and granted the subject individual temporary protected area unesconed access authorization on March 12, 1998. District Security performed this activity in accordance with:

1. NRC regulations (10 CFR 73.56),

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Resoonse to NRC Notice of Violation 50-312/9802-01 a

Discussion of Violation (Continued)

2. NRC guidance (Regulatory Guide 5.66),

3. Industry guidance (NUMARC 89-01),

4. NRC approved Rancho Seco Physical Security Plan (RSPSP), and

5. Rancho Seco Administrative Procedure RSAP-1003.

10 CFR 73.56(c)(2) allows access authorization programs to specify provisions for granting temporary protected area unescorted access authorization. The District's temporary access authorization program, as specified in the RSPSP and RSAP-1003,

" Access Screening Requirements," meets the guidance contained in NRC Regulatory Guide 5.66," Access Authorization Program for Nuclear Power Plants" and NUMARC 89-01," Industry Guidelines forNuclear Power Plant Access Authorization Programs."

The District met its procedural requirements and NRC regulations and guidance when it granted the subject individual temporary protected area unescorted access authorization.

The RSPSP allows granting individuals temporary protected area unescorted access for up to 180 days to permit, in part, sufficient time to complete the necessary criminal history review required for permanent unesconed access authorization. The Rancho Seco Security computer automatically locks out any individual with temporary protected area unescorted access authorization that has not received approval for permanent unesconed i access authorization within the 180-day time limit.

On May 11,1998, District Security received state of California criminal history information for the subject individual. As of May 20,1998, the District Security supervision had not reviewed this state of California criminal history information. This delay occurred because District Security office staff placed the criminal history information in the individual's badge information folder instead of routing the info >mation to District Security supervision for review as is typically done. )

District Security completed a review of the state of California criminal history information on May 21,1998. As of June 30,1998, District Security was still waiting for FBI criminal history information so the District could complete its permanent protected ,

area unescorted access authorization review. The subject individual would not have reeched the ISO-day temporary protected area unescorted access authorization limit until September 8,1998.

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I ResDonse to NRC Notice of Violation 50-312/9802-01 a

I Corrective Actions Taken and Results Achieved When the NRC inspector informed the District that District Security had not yet reviewed the state of Califomia criminal history information, District Security supervision immediately initiated the appropriate review. District Security reviewed the state of California criminal history background investigation information and determined the individual omitted one 15-year old misdemeanor conviction (soliciting a prostitute) from his personnel security questionnaire due mainly to embarrassment. Also, District Security determined the individual did not report other criminal history information that should not have be.en on his record (i.e., criminal charges that had been dropped and never prosecuted). l District Security completed a review of the subject individual's California criminal history information on May 21,1998, determined the individual's personnel security questionnaire was not completely accurate, and removed the individual's temporary protected area unesconed access authorization.

Additionally, based on (1) interviews with the subject individual's Rancho Seco supervisors and (2) the individual's productive, three-plus months work experience at Rancho Seco, District Security concluded the individual had not exhibited characteristics that detracted from his reliability or trustworthiness. District Security did not identify any significant reliability or trustworthiness concerns that would (1) warrant discontinued employment or (2) prevent consideration for permanent protected area unescorted access authorization before District Security received and reviewed the individual's FBI criminal history information.

I Finally, the District revised RSAP-1003 to clarify District Security staff responsibilities i regarding the handling and review of criminal history information. This information is not to be placed in an individual's badge information folder until after appropriate District Security supervision review. The RSAP-1003 procedure changes will help ensure more timely District Security review of criminal history information.

l Corrective Actions to be taken to Avoid Further Violations In addition to the RSAP-1003 revision, District Security will train the Rancho Seco Security staff on the RSAP-1003 changes, including the responsibilities and expectations regarding the proper handling and review of criminal history information. Also, to ensure continued proper handling and review of criminal history information, District Security will include this training as part of the annual Security staff refresher training.

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Resoonse to NRC Notice of Violation 50-312/9802-01 Date when Full Compliance achieved District Security updated its review of all information obtained during the subject individual's background investigation by completing a review of his state of California criminal history information. Also, District Security considered if criminal history information had been willfully omitted from, or falsified on, the individual's personnel security questionnaire. District Security completed these evaluations and achieved full ,

compliance on May 21,1998. '

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