ML20236E821
| ML20236E821 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 06/03/1998 |
| From: | Scarano R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Ferreira R SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236E822 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-98-02, 50-312-98-2, NUDOCS 9806100194 | |
| Download: ML20236E821 (3) | |
See also: IR 05000312/1998002
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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R EGloN IV
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611 RY AN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
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ARLINGTON, TEXAS 760118064
June 3, 1998
Richard Ferreira, Assistant General Manager
Energy Supply and Chief Engineer
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
6201 'S' Street
Sacramento, Califomia 95852
SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-312/98-02 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION
. Dear Ferreira:
From May 19-21,1998, a routire security inspection was conducted at your Rancho Seco
Nuclear Generating Station reactor facility. The enclosed report presents the scope and results
of thatinspection.
- Areas examined during this inspection included portions of your physical security program.
During the inspection, one violation of NRC requirements was identified. The violation involved
your failure to: review and consider all information obtained during a background investigation,
and consider if criminal history information had been willfully omitted or falsified from the
individust's personnel security questionnaire. The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of
Violation (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding this violation are described in detail in the
enclosed report. Please note that you are required to respond to this letter and should follow the
instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use
your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure
compliance with regulatory requirements.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions conceming this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss thern
with you.
Sincerely,
'$ b -
MRoss A. Scarano, Director
Division of Nuclear Material Safety
i
Docket No.: 50-312
, License No.: DPR-54
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9906100194 990603
ADOCl4 05000312
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Sacramento Municipal Utility District
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Enclosures:
2. NRC inspection Report
50-312/96-02
cc w/ enclosures:
Thomas A. Baxter, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbndge
2300 N. Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
Jerry Delezinski, Licensing Supervisor
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
Rancho Seco Nuclear Generatmg Statxm
14440 Twin Cities Road
Herald, Caldornia 95638-9799
Cindy Buchanan, Site Document
Control Supervisor
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station
14440 Twin Cities Road
Herald, Califomia 95638-9799
Sacramento County
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Board of Supervisors
700 H. Street, Suite 2450
Sacramento, California 95814
Ms. Helen Hubbard
P.O. Box 63
Sunol, Califomia 94586
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Dana Appling, General Counsel
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
6201 'S' Street
P.O. Box 15830
Sacramento, Califomia 95813
Mr. Steve Hsu
Radiologic Health Branch
. State Department of Health Services
P.O. Box 942732
Sacramento, California 94234
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E-Mail report to D, Lange (DJL)
E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK) .
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WDRecidey, NRR/ADPR/CBLA (12D22)
SHWeiss, NRR/PDND (11B20)
LLWheeler, NRR/DRPM/PDND (11B20)
RFDudley, NRR/DRPM/PDND (11820)
~ Elaine Koup NRR/DRPM/SGB (MS:OWFN 11E-22)
< Ellen Potest, OCFO/LFARD, (MS! TWFN 9310)
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FAWenslawski, WCFO
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RIV Files - 4th floor file room (Part 50 Docket)
DRS Security File (Hodges)
DRS Action Item File (98-G-0093)(Goines)
DOCUMENT NAME: R:\\,,RS\\RS802RP.DWS
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WDReckley, NRR/ADPR/CBLA (12D22)
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DOCUMENT NAME: R:\\_RS\\RS802RP.DWS
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To pocolve copy or alocument, indcate in boa: "C" = Copy without endoeures "E" = Copy with endoeures "9f" = No copy
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9906100201 990603
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ENCLOSURE 1
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
Docket No. 50-312
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Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station
License No. DPR-54
During an NRC inspection conducted on May 19-21,1996, one violabon of NRC requirements
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was identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC
Enforcement Achons," NUREG-1600, the violation is listed below
10 CFR 73.56(b)(2)(l) requires, in part, that the licensee provide high assurance that
individuals granted unescorted access to protected areas are trustworthy and reliable. In .-
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this regard, the licensee's program for granting unescorted access authorization to the
plants' protected area must include a background investigabon, includmg informahon
concoming an individual's criminal history.
License Condition 2.C.(3) of the licensee's facility operating license requires, in part, that
the licensee mantain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the physical security
plan approved by the Commission and all changes and amendments made pursuant to
the authonty of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and 10 CFR 50.90.
Section 5.1.2.2 of the licensee's physical security plan states, in part, that, " Personnel
authorized unescorted access to the protected area shall meet all requirements of the
Access Authonzation Program which meets #1 elements of Regulatory Guide 5.66 to
satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56."
Paragraph 7.1 of the Appendix to Regulatory Guide 5.66 dated June 1991
(NUMARC 89-01) requires, in part, that a licensee review and consider all information
obtained during a background investigation and base its decision to grant unescorted
access authorization upon the results of this review.
Paragraph 7.1a of the Appendix to Regulatory Guide 5.66 dated June 1991 (NUMARC 89-01) requires, in part, that in making a ostermination of trustworthiness and reliability,
that the licensee considc,' the willful omission of falsification or material information
submitted in support of a request for unescorted access authorization.
Contrary to the above, on May 20,1998, the inspector determined that the licensee failed ~
to: (1) review and consider all information obtained during a background investigation;
and (2) consider if available criminal history information had been willfully omitted or
falsified from the individual's personnel security questionnaire. Specifically, on May 11,
1998, the licensee received criminal history (misdemeanor conviction) information from
the state of California that had not been included on an individual's personnel security
questionnaire. As of May 20,1998, licensee management had not reviewed this criminal
history information, nor determined if this information had been willfully omitted by the
individual from his personnel security questionnaire.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement lil) (50-312/9802-01)
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Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Sacramento Municipal Utility Distnct is hereby
required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the
Regional Admimetrator, Region IV,611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Artington, Texas 78011,
within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Nohce of Violation (Nobce). This reply
should be c!. arty marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each
vblation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation'or
seventy level, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the
corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full
compliance will be achieved Your response may reference or include previous docketed
correspondence, if the correspondence =d+7_ ste'; addresses the required response if an
adequate reply is not rocsived within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for
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information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked,
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or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown,
consideration will be given to extending the response time.
If you contest this enforcement schon, you should also provide a copy of your response to the
Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001.
Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent -
possible, it should not include any personal privacy, propnetary, or safeguards information so
that it can be placed in the PDR without redachon if personal privacy or proprietary information
is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your
response that identsfies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your
response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you_must
specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in
detsel the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will
create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by
10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial
information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please
provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
Dated at Arlington, Texas,
this 3rd day of June 1998
9906100206 990603
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ENCLOSURE
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
50-312
License No.:
Report No.:
50-312/98-02
Licensee:
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
Facility:
Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station
Location:
Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station
14440 Twin Cities Road
Herald, Califomia
Dates:
May 19-21,1998
Inspector:.
D. Schaefer, Security Specialist, Plant Support Branch
Approved By:
D. Blair Spdzberg, Ph.D., Chief,
Nuclear Materi:Is Safety Branch 2
Attachment
SupplementalInformation
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EXECUUVE SUMMARY
~ Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-312/98-02
This was an announced inspection of the licensee's physical security program.' The areas -
inspected included access authorization; alarm station and communications; access control of
personnel and packages; testing and maintenance; protected area barriers and detection aids-
assessment aids; compensatory measures; security system power supply, security program
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' plans and procedures; security event log; personnel training and qualification; management
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support; staffing levels; and security program audit. During this inspection, the reactor was shut
down and defueled.
Plant Support
Overall, an effective access authorization program was implemented. A violation was
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identified involving the failure to review and consider all information obtained during an
individual background investigation, and the failure to consider if available criminal
history information had been v illfully omitted or falsified from the individual's personnel
security questionnaire. An inspection followup item was identified involving the practice
' of acquiring .' developed" references by telephoning local unions (Section S1.1).
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An effective alarm station and security radio communication system were maintained.
An adequate number of portable radios was available for members a the security
organization. An inspection followup item was identified involving outdated information
contained in the Alarm Station Security Computer Operator's Manual (Section S1.2).
A good program for searching personnel and packages entering the protected area was
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rnaintained. The explosive detector at the entrance to the protected area had recently
experienced increased periods of inoperability. Several photo identification key cards
were in a poor state of repair (Section S1.3).
Security systems were repaired in a timely manner. The testing and maintenance of
security equipment were generally completed in a timely manner and were properly
documented (Section S2.1).
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An effective protected area barrier and detection system were in place that would provide
delay and detection to individuals attempting unauthorized entry. Additionally, the
protected area barrier and detection system effectively limited access to only authorized
personnel (Section S2.2).
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"Ihe assessment sids system inside the protected area provided excellent assessment of
portal alarms, and produced a clear image on monitors in the security alarm station
(Section S2.3).-
The compensatory measures program was effectively implemented. Security personnel
. were well trained on the program requirements (Section 2.4).
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The security backup power supply system performed well (Section S2.5).
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Changes to security programs and plans did not decrease the effectiveness of the plans.
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Implementing procedures met performance requirements in the physical security plans
(Section S3.1).
A properly maintained records and reports program was in place. The securiiy staff was
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correctly reporting security events (Section S3.2).
A good security training program had been implemented. Security officers displayed
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excellent conduct and knowledge of procedural requirements. The documentation of
training tasks for security officer annual requalification was weak (Section 5.1).
The security program was effectively managed and management provided strong
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support. The morale of the security officers was good (Section 6.1).
The licensee's on-shift security staffing was properly maintained (Section SC.2).
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The annual audit of the security program was of good quality (Section S7.1).
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Report Details
IV. Plant Support
51
Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
S1.1
Access Authonzation
a.
Inspechon Scope (81700)
Portions of the access authorization program were reviewed in order to determine
compliance with 10 CFR 73.56 and the physical security plan.
b.
Observations and Findings
The inspector reviewed four access authorization records. The records indicated that
thorough background investigations were completed.
As an initiative, the licensee continued to submit the fingerprints for all persons
requesting unescorted protected area access to the Califomia Department of Justice.
The principle advantage of this system is that once an employer (such as the licensee)
registers a person with the Califomia Department of Justice, the employer will be notified
of any futurs reported criminal activities involving this person. In accordance with
10 CFR 73.56, the licensee also submitted fingerprints through the NRC to the Federal
Bureau of investigation.
10 CFR 73.56(b)(2)(1) requires, in part, that the licensee provide high assurance that
individuals granted unescorted access to protected areas are trustworthy and reliable. In
this regard, the licensee's program for granting unescorted access authorization to the
plants' protected area must include a background investigation, including information
conceming an individual's criminal history.
License Condition 2.C.(3) of the licensee's facility operating license requires, in part, that
the licensee maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the physical security
plan approved by the Commission and all changes and amendments made pursuant to
the authority of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and 10 CFR 50.90.
Section 5.1.2.2 of the licensee's physical security plan states, in part, that, " Personnel
authorized unescorted access to the protected area shall meet all requirements of the
Access Authorization Program which meets all elements of Regulatory Guide 5.66 to
satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56."
incomolete Review of Deroaatorv information
Paragraph 71 of the Appendix to Regulatory Guide 5.66 dated June 1991
- (NUMARC 89-01) requires, in part, that a licensee review and consider all
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- information obtained during a background investigation and base its decisiori to
grant unescorted access authorization upon the results of this review.
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Paragraph 7.1a of the Appendix to Regulatory Guide 5.66 dated June 1991
(NUMARC 89-01) requires, in part, that in making a determination of
tru6tworthiness and reliability that the licensee consider the willful omission of
falsification or material information submitted in support of a request for
unescorted access authorization.
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During the inspection, the inspector identified issues with an individual's
background investigation file. The file indicated that on February 15,1998, the
individual stated that he had been arrested for- (1) " Traffic" in 1991, (2) "DUl" in
1989, and (3) " Fighting with brother" in 1990. The individual also stated that he
had never been convicted of a criminal offense. (Note: The licensee interpreted
this to mean that the individual had not been convicted of any other criminal
offense.) Later, on March 12,1998, upon completion of necessary background
investigation requirements and submission of the individual's fingerprints to the
FBI and to the state of Califomia, Department of Justice, the licensee
appropriately granted the individual temporary unescorted site access to the
protected area at Rancho Seco.
On May 11,1998, the licensee received fingerprint results from the Califomia
Department of Justice stating that the individual had been charged on
December 16,1983, for disederly conduct and prostitution. No disposition was
listed. The fingerprint resuu. also stated that on December 23,1983, the
individual was fined for a misdemeanor conviction of " Fight (ing)/ Noise / Offensive
Words." The individual had not listed this information on his personnel security
questionnaire.
On May 20,1998, nine days after receiving this information, the inspector
determined that licensee management had not reviewed or considered the
criminal convection information contained in the fingerprint results from the state of
Califomia. Additionally, the licensee had not considered the possibility that the
individual had willfully omitted or falsified the additional criminal history
information on his personnel security questionnaire.
The licensee's failure to review and consider all information obtained during an
individual's background investigation, and the failure to consider if available
criminal history information had been willfully omitted or falsifMxf from the
individual's personnel security questionnaire, is a violatio1 of the physical security
plan (VIO 50-312/9802-01).
. Conduct of Backaround investigations
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Paragraph 6.4(d) of the Appendix to Regulatory Guide 5.66 dated June 1991
(NUMARC 89-01) requires, in part, that temporary unescorted access
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authonzation be granted upon (favorable) recommendation of one ' developed *
character reference with frequent and direct assoaabon with the applicant
Information Notice 91-59, " Problems With Access Authorizabon Programs,* dated
September 23,1991, identified that union busmess agents had proveusly
certified false information to licensees conducting twa ivund irr::SM-is.
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This Notice discouraged the telephoning of union halls for persorial references
During this inspection, the inspector revowed the background investigabon file for
an individual granted temporary unescorted site access. This file indicated that
Wackenhut Company had acquired a ' developed * reference by ::':ys#6
(" canvassing") the local union. There was no information in the file indicabng why
the " developed" reference had not been obtained by ::':ywks one of the five
- listed * references.
The licensee's practice of acquiring " developed" references by telephoning local
unions is considered to be an inspechon followup item to be reviewed during
subsequent security inspectons (IFl 312/9802-02).
c.
Conclusion
Overall, the access authorization program was adequate. The access authonzation
program also included the submission of fingerprints to the state of California,
Department of Justice. A violation was identified involving the licensee's failure to review
and consider all information obtained during an individual background inveshgabon, and
failure to consider if available criminal history information had been willfully omitted or
falsified from the individual's personnel security questionnaire. An inspection followup
item was identified involving the practice of acquiring developed references by
telephoning local unions.
S1.2 Alarm station and Communicabons
a.
Insoection Scoon (81700)
The alarm station and communications were inspected to determine compliance with the
requirements of the security plan. The areas inspected included the requirements,
capabilities, and protection of the alarm station, operability of radio and telephone
systems, and the capability to effectively communicate with the local law enforcement
agences through both of the systems.
b.
Observabons and Findings
The inspector determined through observations and interviews that the security alarm
station, located in the control room, was equipped with appropriate alarm, surveillance,
and communication capability. The alarm station was continually manned by a control
room operator / alarm station operator whose duties did not interfere with the execution of
assessment and response functions. The inspector determined that the control room
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operator / alarm station operator was capable of maintaining contmuous communication
with each security oNicer on duty and was also capable of calling for assistance from the
local law enforcement authonty. The licensee maintamed an adequate number of
pWable radios for use by members of the secunty organization. Radio checks with the
local law enforcement authonty were conducted at least once each 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The inspector observed that the licensee's Alarm Staten Secunty Computer Operator's
Manual dated January 19,1995, required revision as follows:
Discussion of the security uninterruptible power supply system (UPS) in the
manual was outdated. The UPS described in the manual had been replaced in
earty 1997.
Discussion of the perimeter alarm zones in the manual was outdated. The
licensee discontinued use of this alarm system in early 1997.
The licensee's reference to outdated information in the Alarm Station Security Computer
Operator's Manual is considered to be an inspection followup item to be reviewed during
subsequent security inspections (50-312/9802-03).
c.
Conclusions
An effective alarm station and security radio communication system were maintained.
An adequate number of portable radios was available for members of the security
organization. An inspection followup item was identified involving outdated itdormation
contained in the Alarm Station Security Computer Operator's Manual.
S1.3 Prei ded Area Access Control of Personnel and Pack =aas
a.
Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspector reviewed the access control program for personnel and packages into the
protected area to determine compliance with the security plan. (this it is not possible
for vehicles to enter the protected area.)
b.
Observations and Findinos
Upon entering the industrial prea, persons were issued a photo-identification security key
card which authorized access, as appropriate, to the industrial area and the protected
area. Persons not authorized a key card were escorted at all times within the industrial
and protected areas. Prior to leaving the industrial area, all persons left their key card
with the attending security officer.
The inspector determined through observations that personnel access to the protected
area was effectively controlled. The inspector verified that the licensee had a search
program as committed to in the security plan for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices,
and other unauthorized materials. The fixed metal detector and the explosive detector at
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- Secunty Door FB-308 were inspected and found to be operational most of the time.
However, the licensee's maintenance records indicated that from May 1-21,1998, the
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explosive detector was only operational approximately 50 percent of the time. The
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licensee compensated for the inoperative explosive detector via pat <fown searches of all
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personnel entering the protected area.
In addition to the protected area at the spent fuel building, the licensee also maintained
" security areas" throughout portions of the turbine building (industrial area). Security
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' areas included the control room (housing the security alarm console) and the
communications room (housing the two security computers). Personnel utilized their
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photo identification key card to access these security areas.
The inspector also determined through observation that several photo identification key
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cards were in a poor state of repair and needed to be replaced. The edges on several
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cards were wom and the badge laminating material was separating.
c.
Conclusions
A good program for searching personnel and packages entering the protected area was
maintained. The explosive detector at the entrance to the protected area had recently
expt,rienced increased periods of inoperability. Several photo identification cards were in
a poor state of repair.
S2
Status of Security Facilities and Equipment
S2.1
Testing and Maintenance
a.
Insoection Scoos (81700)
The inspector reviewed the testing and maintenance program to determine compliance
with the requirements of the security plan,
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspector determined through interviews with security officers and supervisors that
repairs to security equipment were generally completed in a tim'ely manner. On May 19,
1998, the inspector observed members of the security staff perform functional testing of
several door alarms. All equipment performed as designed.
c.
Conclusions
1 Security systems were repaired in a timely manner. . The testing and maintenance of
.. security equipment were generally completed in a timely manner and were properly
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S2.2 - Protected Area Barner and Detection Aids
a.
Inspection Scope (71750 and 81700)
' The inspector reviewed the protected area barrier and detection aids to determine
compliance with the requirements of the physical security plan. The areas inspected
included the features of the protected area barrier and the design and capabilities of the
detection aids system. (Nois: The licensee had no vital areas or vital equipment as
defined in 10 CFR 73.2.)
, b.
Observations and Findings
The inspector determined through observation that the protected area (the fuel storage
building) was appropriately locked and alarmed and that the protected area barriers were
adequate to ensure delay of a potential adversary and to ensure that unescorted access
was limited to authorized personnel. The alarm system consisted of balanced magnetic
switches at the entry points to the protected area and infrared and microwave detection
aids inside the protected area. The alarms annunciated in a continuously manned alarm
station. The inspector verified through testing that an alarm for each component
annunciated in the alarm station. The protected area door locking mechanisms and
alarms were properly tested. Emergency exits from the protected area were locked and
alarmed.
The inspector observed the licensee test the perimeter alarm system at two locations.
The detection system at both areas performed as designed. All attempts to intrude into
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the protected area were detected. The licensee's tests of the system were performance
based to ensure that system failures were discovered and corrected.
c.
Conclusions
An effective protected area barrier and detection system were in place that would provide
delay and detection to individuals attempting unauthorized entry. Additionally, the
protected area barrier and detection system effectively limited access to only authorized
personnel.
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S2.3 Assessment Aids
a.
Insoection Scooe (81700)
The inspector reviewed the assessment aids to determine compliance with the physical
security plan. The areas inspected included the closed-circuit television monitors located
in the alarm stationi
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b.
. Observations and Findinas
The inspector verified through observation that a closed-circuit television system was
installed inside the protected area and that the closed-circuit television cameras were
positioned to provide assessment of the protected area portal alarms. Following an
alarm, each closed-circuit television camera produced a clear image on a monitor in the
security alarm station.
c.
Conclusions
The assessment sids system inside the protected area provided excellent assessment of
portal alarms and produced a clear image on monitors in the security alarm station.
S2,4 Compensatory Measures
a.
Inspechon Scope (81700)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's compensatory measures program to determine
compliance with the requirements of the physical security plan. The areas inspected
included deployment of compensatory measures and the effectiveness of those
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b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspector confirmed that the licensee deploys compensatory measures in a manner
that adequately compensates for any degraded security system. The inspector
determined through intentiews of security officers that the officers scheduled to be
assigned to compensatory posts were adequately trained for those duties.
.c.
Conclusions
The compensatory measures program was effectively implemented. Security personnel
were well trained on the program requirements.
. S2.5 Security System Power Sunolv
a.
Insoection Scoos (81700)
The inspector reviewed the security system power supply to determine compliance with
the physical security plan.
. b.'
Observations and Findinas
The security plan requires that sufficient backup power for a specific period to time be
provided to the security computer, alarm system, and the radio communications system.
The licensee provided this backup power through an uninterruptible power supply.
system. The inspector reviewed the licensee's records for testing of the backup power
.
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system. These records indicated that this system had been performance tested on
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May 13,1998, and had performed as required.
c.
Conclusions
The security backup power supply system performed well.
83
Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation
S3.1
Security Proaram Plans and Procedures
a.
Inspechon Scope (81700)
The licensee's Physical Security Plan for Long-Term Defueled Condition, Amendment 7,
dated March 28,1998, and some implementing procedures were reviewed to determine
compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p),10 CFR 50.90, and
b.
Observabons and Findings
The inspector determined from a review of security plans and procedures and interviews
with licensee security personnel that changes to the licensee's NRC-approved Security,
Contingency, and Training and Qualification Plans, as implemented, did not decrease the
effectiveness of the respective plans. Plan changes were submitted in accordance with
NRC requirements and the changes had not decreased the effectiveness of the plans.
c.
Conclusions
Changes to security programs and plans did not decrease the effectiveness of the plans.
Implementing procedures met performance requirements in the physical security plans.
S3.2
Security Event Loos
a.
Insoection Scooe (81700)
The inspector reviewed safeguards event logs and security incident reports to determine
compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21(b) and (c),10 CFR 26.73, and the
physical security plan.
b.
Observations and Findinos
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The inspector determined that the licensee conformed to the regulatory requirements
regarding the reporting of security events. The necessary records were available for
review and maintained for the time required by regulations. The inspector specifically
reviewed the security event logs for the period January 1997 to present. There were no
. events recorded in the event logs.
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c.
Conclusions
A property maintained records and reports program was in place. The security staff was
correctly reporting secunty events.
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' Security and Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification
SS.1
Personnel Traning and Quahfication
a.
Inspachon Scope (81700)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's security training and qualification program to
determine compliance with the requirements of the training and quakficebon plan.
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b.
Observations and Findings
During the inspection, the inspector observed security officers performing their duties. All
security officers displayed excellent conduct and knowledge of the procedural
requirements,
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The secunty organization conducted all required training in accordance with its approved
security, training, and contingency plans. The inspector confirmed, by a review of the
composite security training records, that the required training was conducted every
12 months.
The inspector determined from a review of four training records and interviews with
security officers that the licensee had a good program to ensure that security officers
were trained, equipped, and qualified to perform each assigned security-related task or
duty. The records reviewed were maintained current and well organized. The inspector
interviewed security officers and confirmed that the annual medical examinations were
thorough.
Section 3.3.1.3 of the licensee's security plan requires that security officers be requalified
in accordance with the Rancho Seco Security Training and Qualification Plan at least
every 12 months. The Training and Qualification Plan requires completion of 17 required
tasks for security officer annual requalification. During this inspection, the inspector
determined through interviews that all security officers had received annual
requalification training. However, in some cases, the security shift leaders and the
individual security officers had documented completion of job duties rather than
completion of the required individual training tasks.
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c.
Conclusions
A good security training program had been implemented. Security officers displayed
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very good conduct and knowledge of procedural requirements. The documentation of
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training tasks for security officer annual requalification was weak.
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84
' Security Organization and Administration
- S6,1
Management Support
a.
Inspachon Scope (81700)
The inspector reviewed the effectiveness and adequacy of management support to
determine the degree of management support for the physical security program.
. b.
Observations and Frwhngs
The inspector determined through observatens and from dina malans with secunty force
personnel that licensee management was =-T- c+i'M::/ managing the security program,
was well informed about secunty program requirements, and provided strong support for
the program. Further, the inspector determined that all members of the security
organizabon had a clear understanding of their duties and responsibilibes, and the
morale of tlw secunty officers was good
c.
Conclusions
The security program was effectively managed management provided strong support.
The morale of the security officers was good
S6.2 Staffing Levels
a.
Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspector verified that the total number of trained security officers and armed
personnel immediately available at the facility to fulfill response requirements met the
number specified the physical security plan.
b.
Observations and Findings
The inspector deterrnined from discussions with security supervisors and reviewing the
security shift personnel rosters that there was an adequate number of security officers
ahways available to meet the number specified in the physical security plan.
c.
Conclusion
The loconsee's on-shift security staffing was properly maintained.
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S7
Quality Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities
S7.1 ' Secunty Proaram Audit (81700)
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a.
Inspechon Scope
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The inspector reviewed the annual audit of the physical security program to determine
compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p),10 CFR 73.55(g), and the security
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plan.
b.
Observations and Findinos
The inspector reviewed Rancho Seco Audit Report 97-A-020 dated December 18,1997,
which documented the !icensee's audit of the Rancho Seco Security Program and the
effectiveness of program implementation. This audit was conducted during the period
,
December 8-17,1997, and concluded that the Ranch Seco Security Program was
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appropriate for a defueled plant. Additionally, the inspector confirmed that members of
the audit team were independent of plant security management, that the audit was
partially performance based, and that the audit results were reported to the appropriate
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level of management. The overall quality of the audit was good.
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c.
Conclusions
The annual audit of the security program included observation of performance and the
overall quality was good.
V. Management Meetings
X1
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at
the conclusion of the inspection on May 21,1998. The licensee acknowledged the
findings presented.
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ATTACHMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
E. Brandt, Security Department, Rancho Seco
R. Colombo, Manager, Special Nuclear Materials, Rancho Seco
J. Delezenski, Superintendent, Quality Assurance, Licensing, and Administration, Rancho Seco
D. Dungey, Manager, General Services, SMUD
J. Field, Superintendent, Technical Services, Rancho Seco
P. Long, Security Department, Rancho Seco
L. Langley, Security Specialist, Rancho Seco
E. Nava, Supervisor, Security Operations, SMUD
S. Redeker, Plant Manager, Rancho Seco
T. Robinson, Supervisor, l&C, Rancho Seco
T. Tucker, Superintendent, Operations, Rancho Seco
W. Wilson, Superintendent, Radiation Protection / Chemistry, Rancho Seco
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
Physical Security Program for Power Reactors
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
ltems Ooen
50-312/9802-01
Failure to: review and consider all information obtained during an
individual's background investigation, and consider if available
criminal history information had been willfully omitted or falsified
from the individual's personnel security questionnaire.
50-312/9802-02
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Practice of acquiring " developed" references by telephoning the
local union
50-312/9802-03
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Outdated information included in the Alarm Station Security
Computer Operator's Manual
items Closed and Discussed
None
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LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Security Event Logs and inadent Complaint Reports from July 1997 to May 1998
Plant Maintenance Manual Procedure,1.408, Revision 26, " Security Door Card Readers and
Alarms"
Rancho Seco Audit Report No. 97-A-020 dated December 18,1997
Composite list of dates of training and medical examination
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