ML20234C279
| ML20234C279 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 06/24/1987 |
| From: | Rogge J, Schepens R, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20234C229 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-87-31, NUDOCS 8707060400 | |
| Download: ML20234C279 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000424/1987031
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMiss10N
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REGION H
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report No.: 50-424/87-31
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Licensee: Georgia Power Company
P.O. Box 4545
Atlanta, GA 30302
Docket No.:
50-424
License No.: NPF-68
Facility Name: Vogtle 1
Inspection Conducted: April 18 - May 22,1987
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Inspectors:
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J., F. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector,
Date Signed
Operatio s
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R. J. Schepens, Resident Inspector, Operations
Date Signed
Accompanying Personnel:
C. W. Burger
P Holmes-Ray
Approved by:
CL]M
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67
M. V. Sinkule, Section Chief
Date' Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
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SUMMAR
Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection entailed Resident Inspection in
the following areas: Plant Operations, Radiological Controls, Maintenance,
Surveillance, Fire Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Security, Startup Test
Program, Quality' Programs and Administrative Controls Affecting Quality, and
Follow-up On Previous Inspection Identified Items.
Results:
Two violations were identified Failure to Prescribe Appropriate
Procedures for Performing Maintenance (MSIV 1HV-3006B) and failure to Declare
Both RHR Trains Inoperable and Comply with Technical Specification 3.5.2.
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8707060400 870626
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
P.-D. Rice, Vice-President, Vogtle Project Direction
R. H..Pinson, Vice-President, Project Construction
C. W. Whitney, General. Manager, Project Support
G. Bockhold, Jr. ,- GeneralL Manager Nuclear Operations
E. M. Dannemiller, Technical Assistant to General Manager
- T. V. Greene, Plant Manager
- R. M. Bellamy, Plant Support Manager
- P. R. Bemis, Manager of Engineering
C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance Manager
- C. E. Belflower, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Operations
+W. E. Mundy, Quality Assurance Audit Supervisor-
'W. C. Gabbard, Regulatory' Specialist .
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C. F. Meyer, Operations Superintendent
- R. M. Odom, Plant Engineering Supervisor
- M, A. Griffis, Maintenance. Superintendent
- G. R. Frederick, Quality Assurance Engineer / Support Supervisor
- R. E. Srinnato, ISEG Supervisor
J. F. D' A tico, Nuclear Safety & Compliance Manager
- W. F. Kitchens, Manager Operations
V. J. Agro, Superintendent Administration
A. L. Mosbaugh, Assistant Plant Support Manager
M. P. Craven, Nuclear-Security Manager
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J. E. Swartzwelder, Deputy Manager - Operations
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- P. H. Burwinkel, Engineering Supervisor - HVAC-
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Other licensee employees ccntacted included technicians,, supervisors,
engineers, operators, mechanics, inspectors, and office personnel.
- Attended Exit Interview
2.
Exit Interviews - Unit 1 (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were sumr..srized on May P2,1987 with
those persons indicated in paragraph.1 above. The inspectors described the.
arehs inspected and discussed in- detail the . inspection results.
No
dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee ~did not
identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by-
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the inspector during this inspection. . Region based NRC exit interviews-
were attended during the inspection period by a. resident inspector. This-
inspection closed two unresolved items. The items identified during this
inspection are:
a.
Viciation
50-424/87-31-01
" Failure
to
Prescribe
Appropriate
Precedure- 'or Performing Maintenance on safety Related Equipment
(MST" itiv uG6B)" - Paragraph 5.b.(7).
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b.
Violation 50-424/87-31-02 " Fail ure to Declare Both RHR Trains
Inoperable and Comply with Technical Specification 3.5.2"
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Paragraph 7.
c.
Unresolved Item 50-424/87-31-03 " Complete Review of Crud Tank
Overpressurization" - Paragraph 4.
d.
Inspector Followup Item 50-424/87-31-04 " Review Methodology for
Control of Throttle Valves" - Paragraph 5.b.(1).
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters - Unit 1 (92702)
Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items - Unit 1(92701)
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is requi.ed to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or
deviations.
One unresolved item identified during this inspection is
discussed in Paragraph 5.b.(4).
5.
Operational Safety Verification - Unit- 1 (71707) (93702)
The plant began this inspection period in power operation (Mode 1)
conducting startup testing at the 50% power plateau. On April 23, the
unit achieved 75% power plateau but was forced to reduce power to perform
repairs on the B main feed pump and EHC hydraulic leaks. On April 29, the
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reactor tripped from 74% power on OT-delta-T and returned to Mode 1 on
April 30.
The unit remained at the 75% plateau until May 4, when the
reactor again tripped on OT-delta-T.
Following this trip a faulty card
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was ide7tified as the cause for both trips. On May 6, the unit returned
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to Mode 1 and performed further testing unt',1 the reactor tripped on
May 9.
This trip was due to low steam generator water level following the
10% load upswing test from 65% power in v nich the power overshot to 80%
with insufficient feed capability due to one feed pump out of service. On
May 10, the unit returned to Mode 1 and completed the 75% power plateau
testing on May 12. On May 13, the reactor tripped from 90% power when
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improper maintenance on one main steam isolation valve resulted in valve
closure.
Plant management elected to proceed to cold shutdown (Mode 5) and conduct
a main turbine bearing inspection. On May 19 the unit proceeded from Mode
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5 to hot standby Mode 3 in preparation for reactor restart when plant
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management placed a startup hold while the site responded to contamination
of the demineralized water header problem. The unit was in Mode 3 at the
end of this inspection period. During the inspection a total af ten (10)
ESFAS actuations occurred as follows:
Five (5) control room ventilation
isolations from three (3) radiation monitor problems and two (2) chlorine
detector proble.'s; one (1) containment ventilation isolation resulting
from breaker switching; two (2) main feedwater isolations due to Hi-Hi
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steam generator levels; two (2) auxiliary feedwater actuations resulting
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from low suction pressure trip of the main feedwater pumps.
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a.
Control Room Activities
Control Room tours and observations were performed to verify that
facility operations were being safely conducted within regulatory
requirements.
These inspections consisted of one or more of the
following attributes as appropriate at the time of the inspection.
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Proper Control Room staffing
Control Room access and operator behavior
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Adherence to approved procedures for activities in progress
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Adherence to Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Conditions
for Operations (LCO)
Observance of instruments and recorder traces of safety related
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and important to safety systems for abnormalities
Review of annunciators alarmed and action in progress to correct
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Walkdown of main control board; electrical auxiliary control
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board; heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning systems
panel; and miscellaneous systems and equipment panel
Safety parameter display and the plant safety monitoring system
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operability status
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Discussions and interviews with the On-Shift Operations
Supervisor, Shift Supervisor, Reactor Operators, and the Shift
Technical Advisor to determine the plant status, plans and
assess operator knowledge
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Review of the operator logs, unit log and shift turnover sheets'
Additional inspections conducted consisted of an in-depth review of
the following clearances:
1-87-1337
RWST Sludge Mixing Pump
1-87-1341
Steam Generator Main Feed Pump "B"
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Facility Activities
Facility tours and observations were performed to assess the
effectiveness of the administrative controls established by direct
observation of plant activities, interviews and discussions with
licensee personnel, independent verification of safety systems status
and LCO's, licensee meetings and facility records.
During these
inspections the following objectives are achieved:
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(1) Safety System Status (71710)
Confirmation of system
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operability was obtained by verification that flowpath valve
alignment, control and power supply alignments, component
conditions, and support systems for the accessible portions of
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the ESF trains were
proper.
The inaccessible portions are
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confirmed
as
availability
permits.
Additional
indepth
inspection of the containment isolation system and the essential
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chilled water system was performed to review the system lineup
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procedure with the plant drawings and as-built configurations,
compare valve remote and local indications, walkdowns were
expanded to include hangers and supports, and electrical
equipment interiors. The inspector verified that the lineup was
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in accordance with license requirements for system operability.
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The inspector utilized FSAR Table 0.2.4.1 and the following
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piping and instrumentation drawings to conduct the walkdown of
the containment isolation system.
DWG N0.
TITLE
1X4DB110
Post Accident Sampling System
IX4DB112
IX4DB114
Chemical & Volume Control System
IX4DB120
Safety Injection System
1X4DB121
Safety Injection System
4
IX4DB127
Waste Processing System - Liquid
1X4DB140
Nuclear Sampling System - Liquid
1X408143
Containment & Auxiliary Building
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Drains - Radioactive
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1X4DB174-4
Fire Protection Water System -
1X4DB186-1
Service Air System
1X4DB186-4
Instrument Air System
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This inspection also encompassed a. walkdown of Surveillance
Procedure 14475-1 " Containment Integrity Verification - Valves
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Outside Containment" as well as a technical review to verify it
satisfied
Technical Specification 4.6.1.la
surveillance
requirements.
The inspector utilized the following piping and instrumentation
drawings to conduct the walkdown of containment integrity.
DWG NO.
TITLE
1X4DB120
Safety Injection System
IX4DB121
Safety Injection System
IX4DB130
Spent Fuel Cooling & Purification System
1X4DB131
Containment Spray System
1X4DB132
Miscellaneous Leak Detection
1X4DB159-1
Main Steam System
IX4DB159-3
Main Steam System
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1X4DB186-1
Service Air System
AX4DB190-2
Plant Demineralized Water System
1X4DB213-1
Purification and Clean-up System
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The inspection of the essential chilled water system consisted
of a walkdown of Train
"A"
to verify proper alignment for
standby readiness per Operations Procedures 13744-1 " Essential
Chilled Water System" and 11744-1 " Essential Chilled Water
System Alignment for Startup and Normal Operation" and Piring
and Instrumentation Drawing Nos. 1X4DB221 and 1X4DB233.
Per
Procedure 11744-1 the required position for cooling coil outlet
valves from the ESF coolers is throttled.
These valves are
throttled to flow balance the system. The inspector noted that
there is no requirement that these valves be locked in position
once set nor is their throttled position specified (i.e. number
of turns opened).
Discussions with Engineering personnel
reveaied that the system is being. flow balanced frequently due
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to these valves being closed by operations to support main-
tenance on the ESF coolers.
Pending review of the licensee's
program for controlling throttle valves to address the above
noted comments this item will be identified as IFI 50-424/
87-31-04 " Review Methodology for Control of Throttle Valves".
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(2) Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and
components and cleanliness conditions of various areas through-
out the facility were observed to determine whether ' safety
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and/or fire hazards existed.
(3) Fire Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing and
equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was
appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment,
actuating
controls,
fire
fighting
equipment,
emergency
equipment, and fire barriers were operable.
(4) Radiation Protection (71709) - Radiction protection activities,
staffing and equipment were observed to verify proper program
implementation.
The inspection included review of the plant
program effectiveness.
Radiation work permits and personnel
compliance were reviewed during the daily plant tours.
Radiation Control Areas (RCAs) were observed to verify proper
identification and implementation. On May 19, 1987 the licensee
identified that the Crud Tank had pressurized and resulted in
the contamination of the demineralized water header and other
back flushable filter systems.
At' the conclusion of this
inspection period, complete assessment of the root cause had not
been completed. Until this review can be completed by both the
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licensee. and NRC it is identified as Unresolved Item
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50-424/87-31-03
" Complete
Review
of
Crud
Tank
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Overpressurization",
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(5) Security (71881) - Security controls were observed to verify
that security barriers were intact, guard forces were on duty,
and access to the Protected Area (PA) was controlled in
accordance with the facility security plan.
Personnel within
the PA were observed to verify proper display of badges and that
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personnel requiring escort were properly escort.ed.
Personnel
within vital areas were observed to ensure proper authorization
for the area. Equipment operability of proper compensatory
activities were verified on a periodic basis.
(6) Surveillance (61726)(61700) - Surveillance tests were observed
to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified
personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to
verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized;
and TS requirements were followed.
The inspectors observed
portions of the following surveillance
and reviewed completed
data against acceptance criteria:
SURV. NO.
TITLE
14000
Mode 1 and 2 Daily Surveillance
14980-101
Diesel Generator 1A Operability Test
14220-101
Main Turbine Valves Weekly Stroke Test
14850-101
Cold Shutdown Valve Inservice Test
24551-101
Containment Hydrogen Monitor Train "A"
Analog Channel Operational Test and
Channel Calibration
During an NRC walkdown of the control room miscellaneous systems
and equipment panel on April 20, 1987, the inspector questioned
the valve alignment of the Train "A"
hydrogen monitor.
The
isolation valves which are normally closed were found to be in
the open position. The licensee determined that Surveillance
Procedure 24551-1 " Containment Hydrogen Monitor Train "A" Analog
Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration" had been
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performed during the day.
This procedure required the opening
of the Train "A" hydrogen monitor inlet (1HV-2792A and 1HV2791B)
and outlet (1HV-2793B) isolation valves;
however, it lacked a
requirement to close the valves when restoring the system. The
licensee is revising Surveillance Procedure 24551 to require
closing the subject valves in the system restoration section.
The hydrogen monitoring system is a closed system designed to
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operate following an accident. The normal alignment for these
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valves following an accident is open. Therefore, the fact that
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these valves were not found to be in the closed position is of
no safety significance.
However, the fact that the operators
did not question the position of these valves when the
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surveillance procedure work was reported to be complete for the
day is an indicator of inattention to detail. This matter was
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discussed in the enforcement conference held with the licensee
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on May 20, 1987 in Region II.
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The inspec' tor observed
(7) Maintenance Activities ('62703)
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maintenance activities.'to _ verify that correct equipment
clearances were in effect; work' requests 'and fire prevention
work permits, as_ required, were ' issued and being '.followed;
quality control
personnel were available for inspection
activities as required; retesting and return of systems to -
service was prompt and correct; TS requirements were being
followed. Maintenance backlog was. reviewed. Major maintenance
activities observed by the. inspector were on the steam generator-
main feed pump "B" and the main turbine bearing inspection.
The inspector conducted an inspection of the maintenance being
performed on Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) 1HV-3006B-as part-
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of a. followup inspection to the reactor trip which occurred on
May 13, .1987 as a result of MSIV 1HV-3006B closing.
The
inspector reviewed the following- documents pertaining to the'
event:
DOCUMENT TYPE /NO.
TITLE
MWO #1-87-06119
Investigate Hydraulic Leak on MSIV
Clearance #1-87-1378
Deficiency Card
Reactor Trip on Lo-Lo SG #1 Level
- 1-87-1281
LCO #1-87-507
MSIV IHV-3006B Blocked Open
Adm. Proc. 00350-C
Maintenance Program
Adm. Proc. 00054-C
Rules for Performing Procedures
Maintenance Work Order 1-87-06119 was generated on May 11, 1987
identifying a hydraulic leak (possibly a solenoid valve leaking
by).
Subsequently, on May 12, 1987, the MSIV Loop- 1 trouble
alarm came in.
The shift declared MW0s 1-87-06119 and
1-87-06120 as emergency .in accordance with Administrative
Procedure 00350-C and entered a 3-day LCO on MSIV 1HV-3006B per
The OSOS met with the maintenance crew to discuss
the work to be conducted on the MSIV (i.e. block the valve open
and replace the leaking pumpside solenoid valve). Subsequently,-
maintenance proc 2eded with physically blocking open the valve
with a pipe and mechanically removing the pumpside solenoid-
valve. At this point, operations hung clearance.1-87-1378 to
de-energize power to MSIV IHV-3006B' which' actuated the MSIV to
close,.
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During the inspector's review of the above event which included
discussions with appropriate maintenance
and
operations
personnel, the following discrepancies were noted:
1) The
maintenance work being performed was not a true emergency as
defined
in Administrative Procedure 00054-C " Rules for
Performing Procedures" Section 4.3 and Administrative Procedure
00350-C " Maintenance Programs Section 2.6,
2) Maintenance
personnel ' were performing work on safety-related equipment
without written work instructions while the MW0s were still in
work plannirg and had not been issued to the field for work, 3)
Clearance 1-87-1378 was inadequate in that it only addressed the
electrical and not the mechanical side for isolating the MSIV in
the open position. The Train A & B normally locked open manual
manifold isolation valves should have been on the clearance to
be closed prior to de-energizing the power to the MSIV solenoid
valves, and 4) Verbal instructions given by operations to the
maintenance crew was unclear in that the maintenance crew
interpreted block open the valve to mean physically blocking it
open with a pipe, not closing the Train A & B normally locked
open manual manifold isolation valves.
The foregoing is considered to be in violation of Technical Specification 6.7.la and will be identified as " Failure to
Prescribe Appropriate Procedures for Performing Maintenance on
Safety Related Equipment (MSIV IHV-3006B)".
(8) Emergency Preparation
The Hatch Senior Resident Inspector familiarized himself with
the site for emergency purposes, obtained a badge for unescorted
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access, toured the emergency response facilities and major plant
areas. The inspector reviewed the licensee's emergency plan and
the emergency plan implementing procedures.
The review was
limited to a brief familiarization with the documents.
Thi s
familiarization was
conducted with the Senior Resident
Inspector.
No violations or deviations were identified except as identified in
paragraph (7) above.
6.
Followup on Previous Inspection Items - Unit 1 (92701)
(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-424/86-136-01 " Review Inspection Results of
the Licensee's Review of the Containment Combined Leak Rate Surveillance
Calculation for All Penetrations & Valves Subject to Type B and C Tests."
The completed Deficiency Report (No. 1-87-331) was reviewed for root cause
determination and corrective action to prevent recurrence. The licensee's
currective action consisted of but was not limited to the following:
1.)
A review to verify that all Type B and C penetrations per FSAR Table
6.2.4-1 were included in Surveillance Procedure 28916-1 " Containment. Type
A, B, & C Leakage Totalization"; 2.) An update to NRC Report on Reactor
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Containment Building Integrated Leakage Rate Test to reflect the current
leakage rates for all required penetrations including the encapsulation
vessels per Surveillance 28916-101; and 3.) A re-summation of total
leakage in Preoperational Test Procedure 1-300-04 " Containment Local Leak
Rate Testing" which included the encapsulation vessels (Penetrations
36-39) to verify total leakage within acceptance criteria.
Based on the above the inspector has concluded the omission of the
encapsulation vessels from the total leakage calculation was an isolated
case with no safety significance since the re-summed total leakage
including the encapsulation vessels was found to be within the acceptance
criteria; therefore, no violation has occurred and this item is considered
to be closed.
(Closed)
Unresolved
Item 50-424/87-27-03 " Deportability of CRVI
Actuations As a Result of the Chlorine Gas Monitors".
This item was
discussed during an NRC Staff Meeting with the licensee at Vogtle on
April 28, 1987. The licensee agreed to abide by the staff's position to
report CRVI actuations as a result of the chlorine gas monitors.
The
inspector also has reviewed corporate deportability guidance to the site
to verify that it included CRVI actuations as a result of toxic gas as
reportable.
The licensee is submitting Licensee Event Reports as
appropriate to document all CRVI actuations as a result of the toxic gas
monitors.
Based on the above, the inspector has concluded that no
violation has occurred; therefore, this item is considered to be closed.
7.
Review of Licensee Event Reports - Unit 1 (90712)(92700)
Licensee Event Reports (LERS) and Deficiency Cards (DCs) were reviewed
for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether
corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events which were reported
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immediately, were reviewed as they occurred to determine if the Technical
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Specifications were satisfied.
Deficiency Card (DC) 1-87-1192 was generated on April 28, 1987, at
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1:45 p.m.
This DC identified that the Train A & B RHR Heat Exchanger
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Discharge Valves (1HV-0606 & 1HV-0607) were noted by local observation to
be only 90-95% of full open.
This position was determined from the
positioner card and the fact that the valves had a slight loading pressure
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on the diagram even though the remote hand controllers HIC 0606A and HIC
0607A on the Main control room board had full demand. The OSOS evaluation
for LCO applicability was signed off as not applicable.
During the inspector's review on April 29, 1987, at 1:00 p.m.
the
inspector questioned the status of the subject valves and RHR system
operat ility.
The inspector determined that the valves were still in the
above noted condition and that MW0s 1-87-05802 & 1-87-05803 had been
written to perform a calibration check of the subject loop such that M/A
station output corresponds with valve position.
Also Operations had not
declared RHR inoperable based on the following:
1) The remote hand
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controllers HIC 0606A and HIC 0607A indicated full demand, 2) The Group 1
status monitor lights which illuminates when the valve is at least 95%
closed was not illuminated, and 3) the latest completed ECCS Check Valve
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Cold Shutdown Inservice Surveillance Test Procedure 14896-1 indicated
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acceptable RHR injection line flow rates.
The inspector questioned
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operations decision of the RHR system being operable based on the
following concerns:
1) With the subject valves identified as being
partially
closed Technical
Specification
Surveillance
Requirement
Section 4.5.2b(2) which states, " Verify that each valve (manual, power
operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or
otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position", had not been
demonstrated, and 2) With-the valves in the 90-95% open position would tha
RHR System be capable of delivering 3788 gpm with a single pump running,
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in the cold injection mode from the RWST per Technical Specification,
Surveillance Requirement Section 4.5.2h(3).
During the performance of MW0s 1-87-05802 and 1-87-05803 the following
was determined: Train A RHR Heat Exchanger Valve (1HV-0606) was found to
have a cable identification tag restricting the movement of the bellows
assembly in the valve controller I-P.
After repositioning the cable
identification tag the valve was returned to the full open position.
Train B RHR Heat Exchanger Valve (1HV-0607) was found to have a positioner
out of calibration. This affected the valve opening stroke and prevented
the valve from opening to the full open position.
The controller was
recalibrates which returned the valve to the full open position.
These
repairs were completed on April 29, 1987, at 10:00 p.m. and the valves
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were returned to the full open position.
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Subsequently, Engineering conducted a review to determine if the TS
minimum flow requirement was satisfied.
Utilizing the RHR System
Preoperational Test Data Engineering generated a valve position versus
indicated flow curves.
These curves in conjunction with the most
conservative value for the as-found valve position of 90% open were used
to determine the as-found pump flow.
Using these curves Engineering
determined the Train A flow rate to be 3762 gpm (.7% below TS limit) and
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Train B flow rate to be 3686 (2.7% below TS limit).
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The inspector reviewed the RHR System Preoperational Test Data contained
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on Data Sheets 7.5 & 7.6 in Preop 1-3BC-01. The flows recorded in the
preop were 4158 gpm for Train A and 4064 for Train B.
The latest
completed Surveillance Procedure 14896-1 was reviewed which indicated
Train A to have an actual flow rate of 3875 on February 3,1987,- and
Train B to have an actual flow rate of 4050 gpm on January 9, 1987. Also,
a review was conducted of all MWO's performed on the subject valves to try
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to determine how long this condition could have existed.
Based on the
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inspector's review it was not possible to determine if the condition
existed during the latest completed surveillance; however, it was
concluded that between the preop which was completed on February 24, 1986,
for Train A and February 23, 1986 for Train B there was a change in flow
rate due to these valves being partially closed.
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In conclusion, based on the licensee's engineering evaluation using the
conservative figure of the valve only being open 90%, the calculated flows
delivered by each RHR preop would have been marginally .below the TS
i
minimum of 3788 gpm.
The foregoing is considered to be in violation of Technical Specification 6.7.1.a and will be identified as Violation 50-424/87-31-02 " Failure to
Declare Both RHR Trains Inoperable and Comply with Technical Specification 3.5.2" and is being evaluated for possible escalated' enforcement action.
8.
Management Meetings - Unit 1 (30702)
The Resident Inspectors attended a meeting at Vogtle with the NRC Staff
and the licensee on April 28, 1987, to discuss Vogtle's startup history.
Mr. A. F. Gibson,
Director-Division
of
Reactor
Projects
and
Mr. V. L. Brownlee, Acting Deputy Director - Division of Reactor Projects
were in attendance from the Regional Office.
On May 11, 1987, the Resident Inspectors attended a presentation on Vogtle
Electric Generating Plant given by the licensee to Commissioner
Mr. F. M. Bernthal
and
his
Technical
Assistant
Mr. J. F. Meyer.
Mr. M. L. Ernst, Deputy Administrator and Mr. V. L. Brownlee, Acting
Deputy Director - Division of Reactor projects were in attendance from the.
Regional Office.
On May 20, 1987, the Resident Inspectors attended an NRC Enforcement
Conference held with the licensee in Region II. The subject was proper
System / Component alignments and attention to detail.
The licensee's
presentation discussed six (6) component alignment events and a summary of
both short and long term term corrective actions. While it was noted that
the licensee could not identify the root cause in some of the component
alignment events, the licensee hoped that the establishment of additional
measures for valve manipulations would be helpful in identifying the root
cause for future cases should one occur,
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