ML20211R004
| ML20211R004 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron, Braidwood, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1986 |
| From: | Miosi A COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 1887K, IEIN-84-90, NUDOCS 8607280078 | |
| Download: ML20211R004 (22) | |
Text
r Commonwealth Edison Z } 72 West Adams Street, ChicP90. Illinois O
) Address Reply to. Post office Box 767 f Chicago, filinois 60690-0767 l
July 22, 1986 Mr.' Harold R. Denton, Director U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, DC. 20555
Subject:
Byron Station Units 1 & 2 Braidwood Station Units 1 & 2 Evaluation of Environmental Effects of Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment (IE Information Notice 84-90)
NRC Docket Nos. 50-454, 50-455, 50-456, and 50-457
Reference:
January 8, 1985 T.R. Tramm letter to H.R. Denton
Dear Mr. Denton:
Provided in the Enclosure is our evaluation for Byron and Braidwood Stations of environmental effects of a main steam line break outside the containment as identified in IE Information Notice
- 84-90. This detailed evaluation of the potential effects of increased temperature on equipment required for safe shutdown demonstrates that if the superheated steam condition did occur, it would not render the required safe shutdown equipment inoperable.
Mass / energy release rates for the spectrum of postulated MSLBs have been calculated for groupings of Westinghouse plants and reported in WCAP-10961-P. The conditions for the postulated breaks were chosen to conservatively envelope the plant-specific design of all plants in a given group. The evaluation of MSLB release effects on equipment qualification for Byron and Braidwood stations considered a spectrum of 40 breaks. Two of the resulting temperature transients for the safety valve rooms were identified as bounding cases for the purpose of qualification of equipment required to mitigate the consequences of the postulated MSLB.
In the case of an extremely low probability MSLB with consequent superheat environment, the main steam isolation valves I (MSIVs) and the steam generator pressure transmitters, which are required for safe shutdown, could be exposed to temperatures above 8607280078 860722 PDR G
ADOCK 05000454 PDR Boo l ili
their original qualification temperatures. It has been shown, however, by an analysis based on the available test results, MSIV component material normal allowable temperatures, predicted component temperatures determined by conservative heat transfer calculations, and engineering judgement that the MSIVs and steam generator pressure transmitters are environmentally qualified to perform their function for the postulated MSIV.
Please direct any questions you may have regarding this matter to this office.
One signed original and fifteen copies of this letter and unclosure are provided for your review.
Very truly yours, Anthon D. Miosi Nuclear Licensing Administrator
/klj cc: J. Stevens L. Olshan encl.
1887K i
l BVALUATICDI 0F ENVIROIWWITAL EFFECTS OF l BIN _ STEAM LINE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAIIBIENT BYPON/BRAIDWOOD JULY 16, 1986
- 1. INTRODUCTION With IE Infonnation Notice No. 84-90, " Main Steam Line Break Effect on Environmental Qualification of Equipment," the NRC notified all PWRs of a potential equipment qualification problem due to superheated steam release from some postulated main steam line breaks. In response, a subgroup of the Westinghouse Owner's Group was formed with the responsibility of generating mass and energy release data which conservatively accounts for postulated superheat effects. This work was completed in October, 1985 and reported in WCAP-10961-P (Reference 1).
A detailed evaluation of the potential effects of increased temperature on equipment required for safe shutdown has been completed. The evaluation demonstrates that if the superheated steam condition did occur, it would not render the required safe shutdown equipment inoperable.
- 2. DESCRIPTION OF POSTULATED EVENT A spectrum of main steam line breaks (MSLBs), ranging from small cracks to large double-ended ruptures have been postulated over a wide range of plant operating conditions. Very small breaks do not cause uncovering of the steam generator tubes because auxiliary feedwater (AFW) flow is adequate to maintain steam generator level. Very large breaks result in a rapid pressure drop and, consequently, reactor trip and steam line isolation occur prior to uncovering the steam generator tubes. At an intermediate range of break sizes, steam line isolation may not occur until sometime after the steam generator tubes have been exposed. If the steam generator tubes are exposed, the steam produced in the steam generator can become superheated as it rises. This results in increased temperatures in the area near the postulated break.
Mass and energy release rates for the spectrum of postulated MSLBs have been calculated for groupings of Westinghouse plants and reported in WCAP-10961-P. The conditions for the postulated breaks were chosen to conservatively envelop the plant-specific design of all plants in a given group. The evaluation of MSLB release effects on equipment qualification for Byron and Braidwood stations considered a spectrum of 40 breaks. The spectrum of breaks covered break sizes between 0.1 ft2 and 4.6 ft2 at both 102% and 70% power levels. APW flow rates were modeled at the group's minimum AFW flow rate and constant AFW flow rates of 200 and 300 gpm. AFW flow rates of 200 and 300 gpm are included in the spectrum of breaks to cover the range of calculated Byron and Braidwood specific minimum AFW flow rates.
The temperature transients for the postulated breaks were calculated using the RELAp/ MOD 6 computer code, with a conservative model of the conditions in the area of concern. All temperature transients were then compared with the duration of the transient and the maximum resulting temperature. The trar.aient was postulated to terminate at the MSIV closure time (no equipment in the safety valve rooms is required to operate after the MSIV closure), but not later than 1800 seconds into the transient when operator action is taken credit for isolating the affected steam generator. Two of the resulting temperature transients for the safety valve rooms were identified as bounding cases for the purpose of qualification of equipment required to mitigate the consequences of the postulated MSLB (Figure 1 and Figure 2).
Figure 1 depicts the safety valve room temperature transient (caso 1) for the postulated break of 0.2ft2 at 102% power with minimum AFW flow. For this postulated break, the reactor trip occurs at 387 seconds into the transient. The reactor trip is followed by feedwater isolation (430 sec.), APW actuation (445 sec.), safety injection (700 sec.), and steam generator tube bundle uncovery (974 sec.). This transient is terminated by operator action 1800 seconds into the blowdown. The safety valve room temperature reaches 343*F by that time.
The safety valve room temperature transient (case 2) shown on Figure 2 was calculated for the postulated break of 0.3ft2 at 102% power and a constant 300 gpm APW flow rate. The initial transient is characterized by reactor trip (36 sec.), feedwater isolation (65 sec.), safety injection (229 sec.), and AFW actuation (272 sec.). Steam generator tube bundle uncovery (692 sec.) marks the beginning of the superheat effect. Automatic main steam isolation terminates this transient at 1577 seconds. The compartment temperature reaches 399'F by that time.
Qualification beyond this temperature is not required.
- 3. AFFECTED SAFE SHUTDOWN EOUIPMENT The safety related equipment located in the safety valve rooms has been identified and is listed on Table 1. No safety related equipment is located in the steam tunnel itself. The only components in the safety valve rooms which are required for safe shutdown following a main steam
, line failure are the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) and the steam generator pressure transmitters. These are required to isolate the steam generators. Following MSIV closure, the components are not required to actively function during the remainder of the transient.
The only cables in the valve rooms which must remain operable until MSIV closure is obtained are the cables associated with the MSIVs and the steam generator pressure transmitters. The function of all safety related equipment located in the safety valve rooms is described below.
f
A. Main Eteam Valves Environmental effects from a MSLB outside containment will not cause a spurious actuation of a valve in the main steam rystem.
The MSIVs, MSIV bypass valves, and the steam generator power operated relief valves (SG PORVs) are required to be in the closed position to isolate the steam generator pressure boundary.
The MSIV bypass valves are used during plant start-up at low flow conditions to temper the main steam lines and are closed during normal operation. In case of a control failure, the MSIV bypass valves fail closed.
The SG PORVs are not required either during a MSLB or to maintain the plant at hot stand-by conditions. (The main steam safety relief valves which do not contain non-metallic parts will prevent overpressurization of the secondary system.) The SG PORVs will fail closed upon loss of electrical or hydraulic power. Secondary depressurization can be accomplished with hydraulic hand pumps on the SG PORVs if the electrical controls on the SG PORVs become inoperable. An analysis shows that the hand pump will be accessible within 30 minutes after main steam isolation.
The MSIV safety function (closure) must be completed in order to isolate the steam generators to prevent blowdown of all steam generators. Qualification of the MSIVs to accommodate a MSLB is required and is described below in Section 4. Failures in the electrical or hydraulic system of the MSIVs will result in the valve remaining in its as-is position. Section 4 demonstrates that environmental effects will not result in failure of the MSIVs to actuate and, therefore, main steam isolation will te achieved.
B. Feedwater Valves Feedwater isolation valves are normally open, but will close on a low-low steam generator water level signal well before the steam generator tube bundle is uncovered. The feedwater isolation bypass valves are normally closed and used during plant start-up at low flow conditions. They are not required te function during a MSLB.
1 The feedwater bypass valves are set to provide approximately 10% of
! the main feedwater flow to the upper feedwater nozzle. This flow path is automatically isolated by check valves upon loss of feedwater flow and, as a result, the feedwater bypass valves are not required to function following a MSLB.
J
C. Blowdown and Sample Line Valves The steam-generator blowdown isolation valves are normally open, fail closed valves. The flow in this system is normally between 15 and 90 gpm per steam generator. Control valve SD007, located in the auxiliary building, can be used to isolate blowdown outside containment. The steam generator sample line isolation valves are normally closed, fail closed valves and are used only when taking samples of secondary coolant. Their function is not required during a MSLB event because sampling of secondary coolant is not required to achieve safe shutdown.
D. Main Steam Instrumentation Pressure switches on each MSIV hydraulic actuator and accumulator tank provide an alarm only in the event of component failure or malfunction. Failure of the switches will not result in loss of MSIV operability. Therefore, these switches do not require qualification for the MSLB transient.
The steam generator pressure transmitters must operate during the MSLB to transmit the low steam pressure signal to close the MSIVs.
The transmission of the signal and the closure of the MSIVs is accomplished in less than seven seconds after the pressure set point is reached. The qualification of these transmitters is discussed in below Section 5.
E. Radiation Detection Instrumentation Radiation detectors mounted near the main steam penetrations and in each safety valve room are not required to function during a MSLB event. Their function is to monitor radiation levels from potential valve and penetration leakage, and to detect radiation in the main steam line in the event of a steam generator tube rupture.
- 4. MSIV OUALIFICATION The MSIVs are required to close to prevent blowdown of all steam generators. Once a MSIV is closed, minimal differential pressure across
- the valve disc will maintain it in the closed position. Therefore, the valve actuator is required to remain functional only until the MSIV is closed.
The MSIVs have been qualified using an accident transient which peaks at 328'F. To evaluate the effects of higher temperatures, the individual components of the MSIV have been reviewed for possible non-metallic material degradation or other high temperature effects which could adversely affect their performance. Environmental qualification of the MSIVs is established considering available test results, material normal l service temperature limits, and predicted temperatures determined by conservative heat transfer calculations as follows:
i i
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- The hydraulic actuation cylinder and pneumatic reservoir contain ethylene-propylene rubber (EPR) seals. A conservative heat transfer analysis was performed to determine the expected temperature which the seals would experience. The results of this analysis, shown on Figures 3,4,5 and 6, demonstrate that the Itaiting seal temperatures for the hydraulic actuation cylinder and pneumatic reservoir at the time of MSIV closure are below the normal allowable temperature of 300*F for EPR, with a margin of over 30'F. Moreover, EPR O-rings have been tested when used for a similar application to 420*F (Reference 5).
- The hydraulic accumulator contains viton and teflon seals. Normal allowable temperature for both materials is 450*F.
- The solenoid valve (normally de-energized) is energized during closure of the MSIV, which takes less than or equal to 5 seconds.
The solenoid valve contains viton seals, teflon coil lead j
insulation, class H coil insulation, and a class H resin potting compound. The viton seals and teflon coil lead insulation are considered qualified due to high normal allowable temperature for both materials. The class H insulation is rated at 180*C (356*F) for continuous operation. Additionally, solenoid valves with
- class H insulation have been successfully tested to 420*F in other applications (Reference 3). Therefore, the solenoid coil insulation and potting compound are environmentally qualified for predicted temperatures during the postulated MSLB and the solenoid valve will perform its required safety function.
- The NAMCO limit switch, Model BA-180, contains silicone rubber gaskets, ethylene-propylene-diene monomer (EPDM) 0-rings and an asbestos filled phenolic contact block. Normal allowable temperature is 500*F for the silicone rubber, and 300*F for both l
EPDM and asbestos filled phenolic. To establish qualification for the EPDM O-rings and the asbestos filled phenolic, test results and l a conservative heat transfer analysis were considered. The heat transfer analysis showed that at the time of MSIV closure, the phenolic contact block surface temperature would still be below 340*F (Figure 7). For this analysis, the initial temperature of the limit switch housing prior to the postulated break was assumed to be the same as the valve room maximum operating temperature of 122*F. The limit switch has been successfully tested to a peak temperature of 373*F and momentary peak transient of 391*F, followed by 340*F for a duration of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (Reference 7). In addition, the EPDM O-rings have been tested in a similar application to a peak temperature of 420*F (Reference 5). Based on these considerations, it has been concluded that the limit switch l is environmentally qualified for the MSLB, and that it will perform l
its intended safety function as required.
l
- The cables associated with the MSIV operation are Okonite control and power cables, and Brand-Rex control and power cables. The cables are only required to be operable until MSIV closure is achieved. Based on test results, previous experience and engineering judgement, as noted below, these cables are found qualified for the MSLB conditions.
. The 1000V Okonite control / power cables have been successfully tested to a peak temperature of 455'F (Reference 4).
. The Brand-Rex control / power cables have been qualified to 385'F (Reference 2), just marginally below the peak temperature calculated at the time of MSIV closure. The higher temperature, up to 399'F for a very short period of time, will not impair the operability of the cables or cause spurious signals.
. The cable insulation is a thermosetting compound. Thus, the cable will operate until destructive temperatures (self ignition, approximately 700*F) are reached. The mechanical protection for the cable is provided by the cable jacket.
. The voltage rating of the insulation is at least twice the rating of the applied voltage. This provides additional dielectric protection during the event.
- Two components, Amphenol connectors and Marathon NUS terminal blocks associated with the MSIVs are being removed at all four Byron and Braidwood units. These components have been qualified by test using an accident transient peaking at 328'F. Extrapolation of test data, consideration of material properties and engineering judgement of required functions provided support for continued operation of Byron Unit I when considering the potential effect of superheat conditions. However, as a prudent measure to maintain a consistent level of conservatism in the qualification of the MSIVs, these components were removed from Byron Unit 1 during the recent outage. Similarly, these components will be removed from the other three units prior to their fuel load.
The Amphenol connectors were used for wiring connection to the solenoid coils on the MSIVs. The new replacement solenoid coils installed at Byron Unit 1 are factory sealed with pig-tails and do not use such connectors.
The Marathon terminal blocks associated with the MSIVs were located in junction boxes and thus protected from direct steam effects.
The terminal blocks were removed at Byron Unit 1 and replaced with Raychem WCPS-N splices which are the in-line bolted type, and are qualified for temperatures up to 442*F. However, further qualification testing for these or similar terminal blocks is being considered. Re-installation of qualified terminal blocks may be performed in the future to aid plant maintenance.
. - .. . =. _ _ .
- 5. STEAM GENERATOR PRESSUI2 TRANSMITTERS OUALIFICATION The steam generator pressure transmitters are required to function only long enough to provide the main steam isolation signal. Sufficient margin exists in the environmental qualification testing to assure the operability of the transmitters at the maximum calculated temperature of 399'F at the time of main steam line isolation (1577 seconds). The transmitters are qualified for a maximum of 420*F for three minutes, followed by 340*F for 15 minutes and 250*F for 16 days (Reference 5).
The qualification transient is more severe than the predicted transients shown in Figures 1 and 2. Additionally, the transmitters are mounted on the valve room concrete wall where temperatures will be lower.
Instrumentation cable used with the pressure transmitters is 600V Samuel Moore cable. This cable and splice have been successfully tested at a temperature of 440*F for 3 minutes, followed by a temperature ramp for 10 days (Reference 6). For this reason, it was found that the cable and splice are environmentally qualified for the MSLB conditions and that they will perform their required function.
- 6. CONSERVATISM AND MARGIN IN ANALYSIS The re-evaluation of the MSIV and pressure transmitter environmental qualification is consistently conservatve in the assumptions made and procedures utilized. The postulated initiating event, a main steam line rupture, is a very low probability event. In addition, only a limited range of break sizes will result in steam generator tube uncovery prior to closure of the MSIVs by automatic or operator intervention, thus leading to superheated steam release and creating an environment potentially in excess of existing equipment qualification. Breaks of 1.4 ft2 area or larger will experience automatic MSIV closure prior to i steam generator tube uncovery. Operator response within 30 minutes of break occurrence, as conservatively assumed in this analysis, will
< result in MSIV closure before steam generator tube uncovery for very small break sizes. However, an operator response within 10 minutes of break occurrence would also result in MSIV closure before steam generator tube uncovery occurs for break sizes up to 0.3 ft2 Rapid operator response is very likely in this event due to the nature of the i transient. The small break sizes will appear as a step load increase, causing control rod motion (automatic control mode), and/or primary coolant temperature deviation alarms (manual control mode). For larger break sizes, the resultant up-power maneuver and primary depressurization will provide clear indication to the operator of excess heat removal via the secondary side. Longer term indications include 1 safety injection (low pressurizer pressure) and decreasing steam generator levels and pressures.
f Mass and energy release rates for the postulated MSLB were calculated with parameters set to maximize the superheat effect. As stated in WCAP-10961-P, the assumptions include: conservatively high decay heat level, nominal main feedwater flow with no increase in the flow rate in response to increase in steam flow due to the postulated break, high main feedwater temperature, main feedwater isolation assuring minimum delay following generation of the first isolation signal, minimum auxiliary feedwater flow rates for each group of plants assuming a failure of the highest capacity auxiliary feedwater pump, minimum initial steam generator fluid mass, conservative modeling of the protection system actuation using the most limiting setpoints plus
- uncertainties, and minimum safety injection system flow rate assuming a failure of one safety injection train.
Some of the above conservatisms could potentially have a very significant effect on the calculated consequences for the postulated event. For example, the main steam line low pressure setpoint, which provides the MSIV actuation signal, is 640 psig. For the blowdown model, however, it was assumed that the MSIV closure signal was generated only when the main steam line pressure fell to 364.4 psig. The assumption reduces the main steam line low pressure setpoint by the associated instrument channel total error allowance (21.2% of the instrument span - 1300 psig). The total allowance includes a statistical allowance (16.5%) and margin (4.7%). The largest contributor to the statistical allowance is the environmental error (14.1%) attributed to the Barton Model 763 pressure transmitter operating in post-LOCA conditions. This environ-mental error is a sum of the post-LOCA temperature and radiation affects. However, it should be noted that radiation is not present for the postulated break in the steam tunnel. In addition, available data on the time dependent error (References 8 and 9), although representing an overall small statistical sample of 7 transmitters, indicates that the transmitter response through the first hour after a LOCA consistently shows a pronounced negative error due to the temperature / humidity l effect. Larger positive errors are not observed until hours or days into the post-LOCA conditions. Negative error would, of course, cause a MSIV closure signal to occur earlier and at main steam line pressures higher than the setpoint. This observed tendency of the transmitter to respond during the initial post-LOCA temperature / humidity conditions with a negative or small positive error, in conjunction with the 2-out-of-3 logic for the pressure transmitter signal on any of the 4 main steam lines (2 main steam lines per valve room), clearly makes a strong case for a conclusion that the MSIV closure will in fact occur earlier and at a main steam line pressure much higher than 364.4 psig.
That could eliminate a significant portion of the spectrum of considered breaks and result in lower valve room temperatures for the remaining postulated breaks.
I i
The model for calculation of the safety valve room temperature is also conservative because it takes no credit for heat transfer from the steam to the structure and equipment. This results in higher predicted environmental temperatures, particularly during the period of superheated conditions when the blowdown flow rate is substantially reduced.
- 7. CONCLUSION In the case of an extremely low probability MSLB with consequent superheat environment, the MSIVs and the steam generator pressure transmitters, which are required for safe shutdown, could be exposed to temperatures above the original qualification temperatures. It has been shown, however, by an analysis based on the available test results, MSIV component material normal allowable temperatures, predicted component temperatures determined by conservative heat transfer calculations, and engineering judgement that the MSIVs and steam generator pressure transmitters are environmentally qualified to perform their function for the postulated MSLB.
- 8. REFERENCES (1) Steamline Break Mass / Energy Releases for Equipment Environmental Qualification outside Containment, WCAP-10961-P, October 1985 (Proprietary)
(2) Byron /Braidwood EQ Binder EQ-BB024, Rev. 3 (3) Byron /Braiddood EQ Binder SQ-BB026, Rev. 5 (4) Okonite Engineering Report #355, Dated September 17, 1981 (5) Byron /Braidwood SQ Binder EQ-BB063A, Rev. 2 (6) Isomedix Report for Samuel Moore Cables Under Main Steam Line Break Simulation, October 1979 (7) NAMCO Control Test Report #QTR 105, Rev. 04, January 9, 1984 (8) Barton Qualification Test Report for Model 763 Gauge Pressure Electronic Transmitter, Report No. R3-763-6, September 30, 1982, and Addendum, December 9, 1983.
(9) WCAP-8687, Supp. 2-E01A, Rev. 2, March, 1983; EQ Binder No. ESE-1A.
1876K
1 TABLE I LIST OF SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT IN SAFE'IY V ALVE ROOMS PAGE 1 EQUIP. DESCRIPTION REQ'D S. FUNCTION LEVEL OF
& MANUFAC'IURER S& L TAG N0 ' S. DURING MSLB QUALIFICATION REMARKS 1 Anchor / Darling MSIV 1,2MS001 A-D Required for 328 F By Type Test i
Actuator isolation 328 F-399 F By component i
evaluation i
2 A/D Valves 1,2 M."901 A-D Required for 1200 F Qualified by (Mechanical) isolation analysis
! 3 NAMCO Limit Switch, Model 1,2ZS-MS001 A-D Required for 373 F By Type Test EA-180 isolation of- 340 F-399 F By component i
MSIV , MS001 evaluation 1,2 ZS-MS101 A-D Not required for 1,2 ZS-MS018 A-D isolation
- I ,2 ZS-SD002 A-H 1,2 ZS-SD00 5A-D l,2ZS-FWOO9A-D 4 Marathon Terminal Blocks Not required for 345 F By Type Test j isolation 4
1 i
TABLE I (cont.)
LIST OF SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT IN SAFETY VALVE ROOMS PACE 2 EQUIP. DESCRIPTION REQ'D S. FUNCTION LEVEL OF
& MANUFACTURER S& L TAG N0 'S. DURING MSLB QUALIFICATION REMARKS 5 Barton SG Pressure 1,2 PT-514 Required for 420 F By Type Test Transmitters, Model #763 1,2 PT-515 isolation 1,2 PT-516 1,2PT-524 1,2PT-525 1,2PT-526 1,2PT-534 1,2PT-535 1,2PT-536 1,2PT-544 1,2PT-545 1,2PT-546 l 6 BISCO LOCA Seal for: 1,22S-MS010 A-D Not required 390 F By Type Test 1,2ZS-MS101 A-D during MSLB 1,2ZS-SD002A-H 1,2 ZS-SD00 5A-D 1,2 ZS-FW00 9A-D 7 Anchor / Darling FW 1,2 FWO39 A-D Not required 1200 F By analysis; Air Isolation Valves during MSLB Actuator up to (Mechanical) 450 F (Viton used) 8 Anderson Greenwood Check 1,2 FWO3 6A-D Not required 1400 F By analysis Valves (Mechanical) during MSLB 9 Dresser Relief Isolation 1,2 MS013 A-D Required for No non-metallic Valves (Mechanical) 1,2 MS014 A-D prevention of materials 1,2MS015A-D overpressurization 1,2MS016A-D of Secondary 1,2MS017A-D System.
4 TABLE I (cont.)
LIST OF SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT IN SAFETY V ALVE ROOMS PAGE 3 EQUIP. DESCRIPTION REQ'D S. FUNCTION LEVEL OF
& MANUFACTURER S&L TAG N0 'S. DURING MSLB QUALIFICATION REMARKS 10 Borg Warner FW Isolation 1,2FWOO9A-D isolation occurs 1200 F By analysis Valves (Mechanical) before SG tube bundle uncovery 11 Borg Warner FWIV Actuator 1,2FWOO9A-D Isolation occurs 390 F By Type Test before SG tube bundle uncovery 12 ASCO Solenoid Valves 1,2 FSV-MS101 A-D Not required 420"F By Type Test i ,2 FSV -FWO3 5 A-D during MSLB 1,2 FSV-FWO4 3 A-D 1,2 FSV -FWO 3 9A-D 1,2 FSV-SD002 A-H I ,2 FSV-SD005 A-D 1,2 FSV-SD054 A-D 13 WKM PORV (Mechanical) 1,2 MS018 A-D Not required 950 F By analysis during MSLB 14 Borg Warner PORV Actuator 1,2MS018A-D Not required 345 F By Type Test during MSLB l5 Masonellan Valves 1,2 SD002 A-Il Not required 340 F By analysis I (Mechanical) 1,2 SD005 A-D during MSLB 1,2MS101 A-D 1,2 FWO35A-D 1,2 FWO4 3 A-D 1,2SD054A-D 1
j
TABLE 1 (cont.)
LIST OF SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT IN SAFETY VALVE ROOMS PAGE 4 EQUIP. DESCRIPTION REQ'D S. FUNCTION LEVEL OF
& MANUFACTURER S&L TAG NO'S. DURING MSLB QUALIFICATION REMARKS 16 Rosemount Pressure 1,2PT-MSO41 Not required 328 F By Type Test Transmitters 1,2 PT-MS042 during MSLB I,2PT-MSO43 1,2PT-MSO44 -
l7 C.A. Radiation Detectors 1,2 RE- AR022 A-D Not required Qualified for 1,2 RE-g R023 A-D during MSLB normal operation 1,2 RE-A, R024 A-B
!8 Okonite Cable (Control & Required for MSIV 455 F By Type Test Pawer) & Splice 19 Samuel Moore Required for SG 440 F By Type Test Instrumentation Cable & Pressure Splice Transmitters
! 20 Brand-Rex Cable (Used with Required for MSIV 385 F By Type Test MSIV Actuator) 399 F By analysis 1
i 21 Raychem Splice WCFS-N; in Required for MSIV 442 F By Type Test line bolted type l
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IN HYD. CYLINDER, CASE 2 FIG. 4 TEMP. REPPONSE AT CRITICAL SEAL
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. RESERVOIR CYL. CRP SERLS ,
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FIG. 6 TEMP. RESPONSE AT CRITICAL SEAL IN PNEUMATIC RESERVOIR, CASE 2 l
i
05/22/86 08:53:17 500. .
s -
0.3 FT BREAK 450. I 102% POWER LEVEL s 1 300 GPM AFW FLOW RATE * -
400.I VALVE HOUSE TEMPERATURE _
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PHENGLIC CONTRCT BLOCK ,
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(1576.6 SEC) -
l 3 gg , _
s
- 100 .
] 0 2 .4 6 .8 1.0 12 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 l TIME RFTER MSLB (SECONOS) 1000 X i
i FIG 7 : TEMP RESPONSE INSIDE NAMC0 LIMIT SWITCH HOUSING, CASE 2 i
I
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - .