ML20098A180
| ML20098A180 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1984 |
| From: | Cassel D BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL PEOPLE FOR THE PUBLIC INTERES, DEKALB AREA ALLIANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE ENERGY, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS |
| To: | Callihan A, Cole R, Smith I Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8409240340 | |
| Download: ML20098A180 (3) | |
Text
- 9M -Business BPI and Professional People for the Public Interest Chicago, Illinois 60602 Telephone: (312) 641-5570
(' 'OX[1[0I9 North
Dearborn Street,
Suite 1300 j
'84 SEP 21 M1:24 September 18, 1984 0FFICE OF SEWEIAsi
00CKETggid. Smith, Chairman Dr. Richard F. Cole and Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and
! Board- Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. A. Dixon Callihan Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board c/o 102 Oak Lane Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830
Dear Administrative Judges:
i fC., :._.e.
/ CO /
Enclosed is Intervenors' proposed supplemental initial decision. For convenience, it is in the form of a mark-up of Edison's proposal, with handwritten interlineations indicating our changes . In addition, where we have proposed ,
additional or substitute paragraphs , they are inserted at the appropriate location in between Edison's pages.
We have utilized this form because we believe it is easiest to follow. Please do not hesitate to inquire if any part of it is unclear.
Respectfully submitted, h
Douglass W. Cassel, Jr.
V h
0 Attorney for Intervenors League DWC: beg of Women Voters and DAARE/ SAFE Encl.
cc: Service List Disectors James M AHer Slaunton O Flanders Byron S Miller Staff 2- w asaler a-ana- Pa**' ue M ="~
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A,e ander P . ', o - ~e ~~ >- *ea- *~~~
Juhart L Berman Douglass W. Cassel, Jr Msten C. Hausman Jeremy Warburg Russo Douglass W Cassel, Jr Jeanne L Yeedel Richard P K4tiart Fraria Cecero Christie Hefner Alan Saks GenessJ Counsel Admmestrative Ass,srant Dura Wdleams Marstyn D Clancy Peter Hunt Bettylu K. Saltzman John R Hammell Past Pres 6 dents V,ce Presidents George Cohan Arnold B. Kanter Dianne L. Sautte' Mary Ganoway James Dona:d R Dann Joseph Kosiman Ball Singe' %@n & perman Charles M Mdl. Ss Elezabeth L. Lassar Leon M. Despres Elhot Lehman Cec i J. TroF Ensot Lehman 7, fg Robert J, Vollen Howard A. Learner Lu's E Otaz Peter Robert B. Latton M. Whe rt B Lahon
$r6v,a R Sche <nfeld Carot Y Far*eil . Mict.ael D Maitz James O Webb Jane,,aff,,y, cher 4
hcretdry Steve Fiffer E. Hoy McConnels ni Morton Weesman Leon D. Finney John L McKnight Wayne W Whalen 8409240340 840918 PDR ADOCK 05000454 h&) G PDR
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?'84 SEP 21 All:24 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA gEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION
$. 'GFFICE OF SE N h h Ih0MIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In.theLMatter of: .)
)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-454 OL
) 50-455 OL
- (Byron Nuclear Power Station,-)
-Units:1 and.2) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE lI hereby certify that I have, on'this 19th day of September, 1984, served copies of Intervenors' Proposed Supple-mentaliInitial Decision on the following persons by having said.c' o pies placed;in envelopes, properly addressed, and delivered by_ mail, except that John Streeter.'s copy was hand delivered.
'*~ Ms '. Diane 1Chavez
- General Counsel, Region III 528 Gregory Street- Office of Inspection and L' . Ro ckford ,' ILi 61108 Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
~* Ms. Betty. Johnson Commission 19073-Stratford Lara 799 Roosevelt Road
'Rockford, IL 61107- Glen Ellyn,'IL 60137
- '.Ms. Patricia Morrison' '* Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman
~ 5568 Thunderidge' Drive Administrative-Judge
' Rockford, . .IL 61107~ Atomic Safety & Licensing Board
- Dr.-' Bruce VonZellen U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Department of Biological 4350 East / West Highway zSciences- Bethesda, MD 20814 Northern Illinois' University DeKalb, IL 60115
- Docketing & Service Section E . Office of the Secretary
- : Atomic-Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory-Comm.
' Appeal Board: Panel Washington,-D. C.-20555
- U. S.. Nuclear' Regulatory-Commission
- Dr.-Reginald L. Gotchy
. Washington, D. C. 20555 Administrative Law ~ Judge Atomic Safety & Licensing Brd
- :Howard A. Wilber
-Administrative Law Judge U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
1 ' Atomic Safety &' Licensing Board 4350 East / West Highway 20814 Bethesda, MD U. S . - Nuclear Regulatc,ry Comm.
43501 East / West' Highway
~
..Bethesda, MD 20814'
^UC #" Y V-) kW W
,: September- 19,. 198'4 V
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~
UNITED' STATES OF AMERICA CCCHETED NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION USN6C BEFORE'THEATOMICSAFETYANDLICENSIMg;BgARSj gj 74
-In:the Matter of: ) 0fflCE OF SECR Docket N60CH30mgSfd(IAdY
)~ dlCI.
H COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ) 58RM5 OL
)
(Byron Nuclear Power Station, )
Units 1 and 2) )
-CERTIFICATE-OF SERVICE I hereby certify'that I:have, on this 18th day of September, 1984, served copies of Intervenors' Proposed Supplemental Initial Decision on the .following persons by having said copies placed in envelopes, properly addressed, and delivered via Federal Express, except that Mr. Miller's copy was hand-delivered.
- Ivan W. Smith, Chairman
- Stephen Lewis, Esq.
Administrative Judge Office of Executive Legal
. Atomic Safety and Licensing Director Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555
- Dr. A. Dixon Callihan # Joseph Gallo, Esq.
Administrative Judge Isham Lincoln & Beale Union Carbide Corporation 1120 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
'P.O.' Box Y Washington, D.C. 20036 Oak Ridge, TN.
~
37830 Michael I. Miller, Esq.
- Dr. Richard F. Cole Michael R. Goldfein, Esq.
Administrative Judge Isham Lincoln & Beale Atomic Safety & Licensing Three First National Plaza Board Chicago, Illinois 60602 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission'
' Washington, D.C. 20555 September. 18, 1984 Attorne'f
\; __
- p. .
~ BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICpy(4){y ggg 00CKETING & SERVICC BRANCH In The Matter of )
)
_ COMMONWEALTH. EDISON COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-454 OL
) 50-455 OL
)
.(Byron Nuclear Power Station, :)
Units 1 & 2) )
(AIT2K VCAloKS' cc::. :::..;;;.=:: :D;x., ..: .z 's PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL INITIAL DECISION I. INTRODUCTION
- 1. On January 13, 1984 this Board issued'its initial deci-
'sion denying Commonwealth Edison Company's (" Applicant's" or
" CECO's") application'for a license to operate the Byro'n e Nuclear Power Station (" Byron"). Although we ruled in Appli-cant's favor on seven of the eight issues in controversy which
!were litigated.during public. hearings in the spring and summer of 1983, we found that CECO'had not met the burden of proof on the issue of quality assurance.
- 2. The quality assurance issue as set forth in Inter-vencrs' contention IA and as originally litigated in the spring of-1983 was quite broad. Applicant was required to demonstrate its "willingnesc and ability to implement a.d maintain an ade-Tquate quality assurance program." To make this broad showing, CECO submitted.the testimony of a range of witnesses with both ll *, corporate and' Byron specific QA experience and insight.
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p INTERVENORS' PROPOSED PARAGRAPHS 2a, 2b AND 2c 2a. Our initial . decision summarized our findings . with respect to CECO's quality assurance program'by stating that CECO has
" failed in-its responsibility to assure that its contractors carried out. their) delegated quality assurance tasks" .(p. 4);
that we had-not concluded that CECO "is institutionally unable or unwilling to maintain a reliable quality assurance program," but rather that Ceco " began to deal effectively with its contractors ' problems too late, but is catching-up" (pp . 6-7); that there were " widespread failures in the contractors ' quality assurance programs" at Byron (p. 7);
- and that although we had not found widespread hardware or
- construction problems , "we are not confident that such problems would have been discovered" (id.) . (See e.g.,
D-429, 433, 434,-441, 442, 448, and 449.)
2b. In affirming that an operating license for Byron could not issue on the prior record because of a " cloud overhanging the adequacy of safety-related facility construction,"
(ALAB-770, . slip op. at 21), the Appeal. Board remanded for a " full exploration of - the significance of the
[ reinspection] program in terms of whether there is currently : reasonable assurance -that the Byron facility has been properly constructed" (id. at 27) . Within this full exploration, the remand was ordered to focus on (Inte rvenors ' Proposed 11 2a, 2b and 2c, p. 1)
n.
.. :o,-
INTERVENORS' PROPOSED PARAGRAPHS 2a, 2b AND 2c
'whether'the; Byron Reinspection Program ("BRP") "has now pro-
- vided the:. requisite degree of confidence that the Hatfield and Hunter quality assurance inspectors were competent and, th'us , : can 'be presumed to have uncovered any' construction defects of...possible safety consequence" (id. at 28).
2c. In :other words , the basic issue on remand was whether the now completed reinspection program justifies a finding that the " ascertained quality assurance failings [were]
either cured or [were] overcome to the extent necessary to reach an informea -judgment that the facility has been properly constructed" (id. at 9). For the reasons
~
summarized in paragraph 166 below, we find that it does not, i.e., that the reinspection program has not sufficiently cured or overcome the quality assurance failings' identified in our Initial Decision. Consequently we cannot conclude -that an' operating license for Byron is now appropriate.
(Intervonors' Proposed 11 2a, 2b and 2c, p. 2)
,iw "'
- 3. In the first set of hearings on the quality assurance H13
-issueinMarch1andApril,[we'didnotconsideranitemofnon-compliance found in the March, 1982 NRC Construction Assessment Team inspection regarding the certification practice for quali-ty control inspectors by contractors at Byron. Our attention was drawn to-this matter before the additional hearings we held in: August 1983 as a. result of granting Intervenors' motion to 1
reopen the hearing record. At that time, testimony was adduced
~
on (1) the training and certification of a former QC inspector of the Hatfield Electric Company ("Hatfield"), (2) the very
,recently completed program of recertifying inspectors to re-vised criteria based on ANSI N45.2.6-1978, and (3) the struc-ture and preliminary results of a reinspection program designed to show that inspectors who conducted incpections prior to the revised certification procedures were adequately qualified. On the basis of .tl e evidence before us with respect to this last assing
-issue we denied the ' operating license application (r. expr%s A o var-vn.)
reservatior5 W about the reinspection program.;__12 a..; 'h"
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- 4. When the evidentiary record was closed the reinspection program was still in progress, and a final report on its efs fiswed b4 o. Zurwle m<_nhn/ Mpee t' In
~
I ve *- I TS'l-results was not published until February 1984) In our initial decision we expressed several-reservations regarding the ade-quacy of the Byron quality control inspector reinspection pro-
.y
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gram -((,"BR?") , none'of which we thought had beea eliminated by 5 evidenco presented at.the. August 1983 hearing. We noted that
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'it had not been' established that'the program used a statisti-
~
cally significant and reliable sample. (I.D., T D-382-4, 436)
~ We also' expressed concern about documentation deficiencies which were~ discovered;during.a CECO audit of the ERP. (I.D.,
1 SD-379-382, _438) These. concerns, together with the fact.that E 'the1 testimony of the Region III Staff indicated that it was not satisfied completely with some. aspects of the program's struc--
tures and that it would not be able to judge the success of the.
lBRP.until'its'resuHs were known, caused us to deny the operat-ing: license application.
-5. Applicant appealed and, following briefing and , oral argument, the Appeal Board remanded this proceeding to the
[L'icensing Board with instructions to receive further evidence i Lon the BRP as it applied to'Hatfield and Hunter and to render a
~
supplemental initial decision. The Appeal Board agreed that
- the record was insufficient to warrant issuance.of an operating license,.-but held that further hearings should be conducted to p allow a full-exploration of the BRP to determine whether there
-is reasonable assurance that Byron-has been properly con-structed. (Memorandum and Order,: dated May 7, 1984, ALAS-770, b -19 NRC. (Sli'p Opinion at 27, 28)) ([ec 9 1b
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- 6. ~ Additionally,.the. Appeal Board noted the recent' dis-
,g; closure of deficient welds on cable pan hangers supplied to the
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. site by Systems Control Corporation (" SCC") and that Ceco had apparently not fully met' commitments to perform source inspec-tions of SCC equipment. These matters raised questions con-cerning the overall adequacy of equipment supplied by SCC. To tAmse resolve thse7 question the Appeal Board determined that further I
'essissuefon the evidentiary record was war-exploration of ranted. (ALAB-770, slip opinion at 31, 32)
- 7. Finally, the. Appeal Board stated that the Licensing Board would have discretion to include within the scope of the reopened evidentiary record any other question which it deemed relevant to the ultimate question whether reasonable assurance
-exists that the Byron facility has been properly constructed.
(ALAB-770, slip opinion at 35, note 72.) Thereafter, we sought the advice of the parties on the proper exercise et this dis-
'cretion. (Transcript of Conference Call, May 9, 1984, at 8032.)
- 8. Applicant reviewed the Board's initial decision and in a letter dated May 9, 1984, identified various issues as those it perceived to be of concern to the Board and as to which the Board might require an evidentiary showing. These issues in-cluded the issue of the Region III Staff's acceptance of the ERP; the basis for the determination of inaccessible and non-recreatable inspection attributes in the BRP; the relationship of deficiencies identified during the BRP to a trend analysis; the number of Hatfield inspectors requiring recertification and retraining at the inception of the BRP; Hunter documentation 4
i5-
-practices' regarding _ discrepant conditienc identified ' uring-d the LBRP; further evidence regarding possible fraudulent; practices
, by. cont'ractors .in : the '~ certification of quality control . and quality assurance. personnel;-the disposition of allegations
^2 ~open as of the.close of the record in August 1983; Applicant's t
'generallcontrol of its site contractors; and supplemental.evi-dence1regarding Hunter " tabling" practices and any pattern-of nonconformances b'y Hatfield.
- 9. As we ruled subsequently, Applicant's list was accurate
.and: fairly complete. However, the Board added the issue of whether-CECO's commitment to repair-any defects identified dur -
~
'ing'the BRP,had been effectively satisfied. (Memorandum and Order Following Prehearing Conference at 4, dated June 8,.
1984.)*/ The Intervenors. proposed se';.ral additional issues of
'their own. Applicant _ objected to Intervenors proposal on the ground that'it-presented issues not relevant'and material to the issues remanded by the Appeal Board for-further considera-tion. 'These-conflicting views were fully exchanged during a prehearing conference conducted on May 30 and 31, 1984.
- 10. On June 8, 1984,-we issued an order setting the scope of the reopened hearing. Beyond the-issues diccussed above we
~ ruled that certain of the matters proposed by Intervenors
- i. */ We observe that the Appeal Board characterized this issue as'whether "all identified discrepant conditions . . .
,,7 [have] been' properly resolved". (ALAB-770, slip op.
'( J. ~
at 29.) As. discussed in Section IX, infra, repair was not the only. basis on which discrepancies were dispositioned.
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should:be litigated. We ruled that the NRC Staff should pre-sent evidence on certain worker allegations which the Staff had expected would be resolved by the BRP. For one silegation,
- that electricalfcables were.overstressed by. excessive pulling
'during installation by Hatfield, we requested a full eviden-tiary presentation on the cause and safety significance of the alleged episodes and their relationship to the BRP. Finally, we. ruled that Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory ("PTL") should be added as one of the contractors to be considered with respect to the BRP. In this regard, we advised the parties that we ex-
.pected a general showing of the scope of PTL's work and a dis-cussion of whether the BRP has provided reasonable assuranc'e that-PTL's work presents no safety problems. ,
- 11. Hearings commenced on July 23, 1984. To address the
-issues in the reopened hearing, Applicant presented the testi-many of 22 witnesses in four segments. The first segment de-scribed the formulation and implementation of the BRP and its results with. respect to the qualification of the Hatfield, Hunter and PTL QC inspectors. The second and third segments of.
the. testimony addressed the questions of the significance of the discrepancies discovered during the BRP and the adequacy of the~Hatfield and Hunter work. Finally, evidence was presented a
cKCo*s o ve#:rM A+' =f J'CC &,
concerning other issues, namely,gtheadequac?ofthehardware furnished by' Systems Control Corp., the use by Hunter of a
" tabling" practice and the adequacy of cable installed by 4.i-
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w 4herfassory e.rier, . Ereffered - e x p <- t i ,.hef<eJ.-d lin:nh.
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YI.J.aay a the. oOper- M h/K.rt s4 A/vebar .Z~ r enf EcfOn ,
h*fA of v) hose. krbMay tha- E%erpf </c.c l in e d h r e.c.c h t e. _
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Hatfield that had been subjected to excessive stress or over-tensioning.
I
- 12. The NRC Staff submittec two witness panels who addressed these same issues. In addition, Mr. Keppler, admin-istrator of NRC's Region III, provided an overview and insight I with respect to the Region's judgment concerning the adequacy of the BRP. Mr. William Forney, an NRC employee who was for-merly senior resident inspector at Byron.also testified. An affidavit prepared by him which described his differences with the testimony of an NRC Staff witness panel with respect to the {
conclusions to be drawn from the results of the BRP was re-
{
ceived into evidence as his direct testimony. Intervencrs pre-sentect three witnesses. One witness questioned the adequacy of the engineering evaluations performed by Sargent & Lundy of the discrepancies discovered during the BRP. The remaining two witnesses challenged the adequacy of varicus assumptions used by Edison in the formation of the BRP and the applicability of statistical principles to the results of that program.g
- 13. All testimony was presented during the course of 3 weeks of hearings held in July and August of this year. The record was closed on August 24. All parties filed findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of their respective positions.
- 14. On the basis of the extensive testimony presented dur-ing the July and August hearing, and after careful censidera-A j U Th- 8.a<s Jr. etsed. 4 s awve p.. n ., a=
3,1 h,ie.,.e er. -t,,v- % .- dery j d y.<ho up i,, u aa,-i& sderve-ob ' w.r%2r&a4c.a wy r.crua.r, yer ./;,,,,,,, u a ca.-,. . ,.y I,a f e,=1~ -,2ra L: /. Q m. -emb- &-
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.-~1ty ntion of the proposed findingsLand' conclusions submitted ~by the q- .
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_ parties,iwe conclude that Applicant-has new prevailed on Inter-venor" Contention;1Alon qualit'y; assurance.*/7 The basis for this
- determinationsfollows.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
- 15. LAn' operating-license for a nuclear power plant may be issued'at?such time as the NRC ' renders the findings required-by
'10 C.F.R. $J50.57(a). The' Commission, subject to the immediate-effectiveness provisionf of_10 C.F.R. $ 2.764,-has vested the Director.-of Nuclear . Reactor. Regula'. ion. with the authority to
'make._the findings under.section 50.57(a). 110 C.F.R.
, $'2.760(a). Our_ authority is limited to deciding matters in' controversy among1the parties. 10 C.F.R. $ 2.104(c) and i
- $12.760(a). .It was in the, cont' ext of this_ regulatory regime
-thatLContention IA was decided against_the Applicant.
16.
, We were unable to make thase1 findings-in our Initial
_. . . L k le 96 fe Wf Decision of. January , 13,'1984fbecauseofoutstanding. questions raised by.an' item.of~ noncompliance contained in NRC Staff c Inspection-Report 82-05. Epecifically, noncompliance 82-05-19 questioned the' qualifications of contractor QC incpectors cer-r
.tifi'ed'under procedures which theJStaff deemed defective. The
,h/ The specific' findings of fact and conclusions of law con-
.tained in our initial decision which are altered by this supplemental'intitial decision are set forth in-Section
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. Appeal Board. agreed:that the' record previously before us was
' insufficientito support c the issuance of an operating license, but.. remanded the-record to us
~
to permit a full-exploration of the-signifi-cance of the [ reinspection]. program in terms of whether~there'-is currently reasonable
-assurance that the Byron facility has been properly constructed. Stated otherwise, the
' focus of-the. inquiry.should be upon whether, as formulated-and executed, the reinspection program haslnow provided the requisite degree of confidence that the Hatfield and Hunter
-qu'ality assurance inspectors vere competent
-and, thus,'can-be presumed ~to have uncovered any construction-defects of possible. safety Lconsequence.
(Memorandus and Order, dated May 7, 1984, ALAE-770, 19 NRC . Slip Opinion at-27, 28) 17., Further,, subsequent to our-initial decision new infer-mation~regarding another item of noncompliance resurrected
. questions we had deemed closed in our initial decision. (I.D.,
~1 D-442; 1s 204'- 263, infra.) Noncompliance 80-04-01, con-
'tained in a December 30,.1980 inspection report, asserted that Applicant had failed to take prompt and. effective corrective c action with respect to deficient equipment supplied to the
~
Byron Station by Systems. Control Corporation (" SCC"). While we-had been willing;to delegate the closure of this item of non-compl'iance to the NRC Staff, the Appeal Board, as a result of the new information, directed that we hold further hearings on this issue as-well.
- 18. Notices of violations regarding items of noncompliance i which.are found during the course of NRC Staff inspection 9
.i
-activitic:s constitute an enforcement action prescribed by the
. Commission's regulations. (10 C.F.R. Part 2,-Appendix C,
.IV. A. " Notice of Violation.") The relationship between the resolution of NRC Staff enforcement actions and the finding we are~ required to make under 10 C.F.R. 50.57(a) is found in 10 C.F.R.-Part 2, Appendix C " General Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions." The introduction to that Appendix states that the purpose-of the NRC enforcement program is to promote
.and protect the health and safety of the public by, among other things, " ensuring compliance . with NRC regulations and license conditions."
- 19. The basic issues in the reopened hearing, therefore, to.d.,Ad het A n.f /te? M_+e.
cr :'"t fthe acequacy or corrective actions taken'by the-Appli-cant to close.out these items of noncompliance to the satisfac-
. tion of the NRC Staff. The closing of Noncompliance 82-05-19 involved re;ertification of.QC inspectors for, inter alia, I Hatfield and Hunter, and a demonstration by way of the ERP that even prior.to their recertification, the inspectors were compe-tent. As discussed in-the body of th'is decision, the BRP also provided.-one basis for determining work quality of these two 1
contractors. Full and proper resolution of this item of.non-could fettsfy compliance not-_!ima the concerns we expressed in our Initial Decision. " I E. *
- 20. With regard to the issue of the adequacy of equipment Esupplied by SCC, Noncompliance 80-04-01 has not been closed.
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .)
- ,I
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t-T4 ' Noweveri.the-testimony-of the NRC' Staff and Applicant indi-cateszthat only'one' discrete' issue remains to be resolved. A-
- . program"foriresolution of the.one outstanding issue by way'of a 100%Linspection.of certain components, is in progress and the NRC? Staff expressed confidence that this program will satisfy their^ concerns.
~
121. It-is within our authority to delegate an issue to the
.NR.C: Staff when-it is clear that the NRC Staff can adequately
~
Jresolve:therissue. (See generally our discussion in the Ini-tial Decision,-1's D-419'- 427- and cases cited therein.) LThe nature of the program for resolution of the outstanding SCC.
issue, as discussed below, presents an appropriate' case for delegation.to the NRC Staff and we so ruled at the close of the hearings. (Tr. 11,169-71.)
III's 'THE INCEPTION OF THE BYRON REIMS$ECTION PROGRAM 2 2 '. cA special4 inspection was' conducted at Byron during the-Spring.of 1982 by an NRC Construction Assessment Team (" CAT").
'The CAT findings were. published in.IE Report Nos. 50-454/82-05
'and;50-455/82-04. One of the findings (noncompliance 82-05-19) 1 questioned the adequacy.of the on-site contractors' programs "for1 certifying QC inspectors. The CAT inspectors found defi- .
ciencies in (i) the contractors' evaluations of initial inspec-r -tor. capabilities, (ii) the documentation of initial certifica-
- tion, and!(iii) the criteria used to establish inspector quali-y ,.
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"' 4 fication.- f(Applicant's' Exhibit 8; Del George, prepared testi-
. , mony?atL6,1-ff. Tr. 8406.) 'Although there was no finding that theseTdeficiencies had compromised-the quality of-constructien, i the'NRC! Region III" Staff adopted the position that the site contractors'iQC inspect'or qualification programs had to be
. , upgraded"and'that the quality of the inspections already-com-pleted' required verification. '(Del George,' prepared testimony-at 5, ff. Tr. 9406.)
'23. In response to the Staff's criticisms, Edison ini-4 . tiated a recertification program between June and September
-i ( . 19E2,.-to' review in accordance with the guidelines.of ANSI N45.2.6-1978, and'to revise where'necessary, contractors' QC
- inspector certification
- procedures. These upgraded procedures.
-were used'to certify inspectors beginning-on. September 30, 1992. 'This action solved the. Staff's concern with respect to the qualification. of QC inspectors af ter September 30, 1982;
, however, it:did not provide assurance that the inspectors who 4
performed-QC inspections prior to that time were qualified.
The BRP.was constituted to' address this latter concern.
' (Hansel, prepared testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 8901; Del George, prepared testimony.at-7-10, ff. Tr.' 8406; Connaughton, Staff
. prepared: testimony at.16, ff. Tr. 9510.)*/
- /. A full. discussion of the recertification program is con-tained in paragraphs D-385 through D-393 of our initial
~
idecision.
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&' . -2 4. TTo verify the effectiveness of inspector qualification
( - iand certification practices used by site contractors between January 1976'and' September 1982, the ERP was structured to
~
reihspect the: original QC' inspections;and to analyce any dis-
' ~ ~
.'crepancies;(differences between the results of the original-
' inspections and the~reinspections): to determine their signifi-cance. - The' data would then be used to draw inferences about Ethe' qualification of thec total inspector population on a con-tractor-by-contractor basis. Thus, the original purpose cf the ERP was notito directly validateJwork quality at Eyron. Given
'the concerns about' work quality raised in our initial decision, however,-..both Applicant and the' Staff determined that the BRP data couldLalso be used as one basis for determining the qual--
ity of the construc' tion work. (Del George, prepared testimony atL6, 7,'ff.-Tr. 8406; Little', Staff prepared testimony at 4,
, 'ff., Tr.f9510.).
- 25. The NRC Staff's characterication of the purpoce of the BRP is stated. differently than the deceription we have just
- articulated. The Region:III' panel testified.that the-primary purpose of the BRP.was to determine _whether QC inspectors'had- m overlooked significant safety-related hardware deficiencies.
(Little, Staff prepared testimony:at 4,ff. Tr. 9510; Tr.
.9577.) However,'Mr. Little also agreed, on behalf of the
' panel, that determining whether QC inspectors had overlooded
[i -
iseef cale<< Ne. Mf d 'fo s
u.J Med significant deficiences was equivalent to determining whether they were competent. (Keppler, Tr. 10,134; Little, Tr. 9582-83.) .Indeed, William Forney, former Region III senior resident inspector at Byron, testified for the Staff in August 1983 that t
the purpose of the BRP was "to determine whether or not [the contractors] have used qualified inspectors."*/ (Forney, Tr.
(f.fIn som it it below.)
7991.) sum, it _ry ;: ti '(any difference between the pur-pose of BRP as stated by CECO and the NRC Staff is a matter of semantics rather than substance.
IV. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PROGRAM
- 26. The BRP was formulated to address the qualification of QC inspectorc who performed inspections for 8 on-site conctruc-tion contractors during the period January 1976 through Septem-ber 1982. In general, the adequacy of the original incpection results was determined by reinspection using qualified QC inspectors. Inspectors were selected for reincpection by a
- /
We note that Mr. Forney's most recent testimony contradicts this characterization. Mr. Forney tectified at the re-opened hearing that in his opinion, the fact that inspec-tors have not failed to discover significant deficiencies is not necessaril heir competence.
-His reasoning'?;;y;_.; a demonstration
- __ ...a. ...eof_,....e.m..
t . a- -=D 76~-&av- i idaH there .ny not be .ery many significant Y (F .ncy, Tr. 10,063-64,
< iiscrepancies discove.
.0,082.) In .y event, Mr. .orney himself characterizes
. tis disagree nt as " min cu e" in importance. (Forney, Tr. 10,068. We will me ba to an evaluation of Mr. j Torn n'e e4- 4. _e o 4 q s'4*" pnr* ion of this de s W /
Aie
~
f N ;, gis ,,,,.J i., 9 79 icl~-
m V
he tffrdIe.,,~'orecA ble sampling technique and the first 90-days of thei work was reinspected. The subject matter of the inspections was grouped into.two work categories called " subjective" and " objective" attributes." If the reinspector agreed with at least 95% of the original inspector's calls for objective attributes or 90%
for subjective attributes, the inspector was deemed qualified.
The work of any inspector who initially failed to pass either acceptance criterion was subjected to an expanded inspection process; wherein the inspector either passed based on a rein-spection of a second 90-day period, or if the inspector still jen+:fsests, es.saneeftLiv j failed, allofhis/workwasreinspected. These program ele-I ments will be discussed in detail below.
,lkrert pg a. Selection Of Contractors 1
fregnet 27. The.first element of the BRP was the selection of site INE A' s contractors whose QC inspectors would be subjected to reinspec-3 6 C , a*/
tion. Mr. Del George explained that eight of the 19 contract-160)
[, II,w.sy ors who had performed or were performing safety-related work at fhts ^ Byron were subjected to reinspection. The work inspected by g
P *j ,
these eight contractors accounted for approximately 93 percent gg , 4 ,,,,
of the safety-related work at Byron. (Del George, prepared testimony at 8, 9, ff. Tr. 8406.)
- 28. Of the eleven contractors not subjected to reinspec-tion, three were excluded because they were not subject to AMSI N45.2.6-1978. In other words, the qualification of their QC x-
y -
.; f
. r' .
IINTERVENORS' PROPOSED PARAGRAPH 26A 26A. CECO did not apply sufficient expertise to develop the BRP appropriately. Mr. Louis Del George had lead responsibility for managing the development of the BRP and the final decision for CECO 1respecting the BRP's content. (Del George, Tr.
-8466,- 8471.) This was the'first' time that Mr. Del Georga.
- had had such lead. responsibility for a reinspection program (Del George,.Tr. 8467-69, 8476). Moreover, his previous reinspection experiences were-focused.on work quality,
. rather than inspector performance (Del George, Tr. 8467-70).
~
u _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _
w -.
~...
x INTERVENORS' PROPOSED PARAGRAPH 26B
- 26B. The BRP_ was ' developed by CECO wi.thout . regard to statistica1 validity. Mr. Louis Del'. George -had lead responsibility for managing;the-development of the BRP. Ilowever, lir. Del George is _not a statistician, has had virtually no statistical training and ~ did not consule vith a s tatis tician lin developing the BRP. (Del George, Tr. 8466-67). CECO
- concedes that the BRP was not- developed to a specified statistical sampling plan. (Del George, Tr. 8467.)
l
r:-- ,
.;c ...
INTERVENORS'. PROPOSED PARAGRAPH 26C
.26C.. ' CECO did not develop a sampling plan to demonstrate work quality based on the BRP (Del George, Tr. 8467.) Never-theless,'Mr. Del George assumed that if inspector performance were adequate, then the work quality was sound.
~
(Del George, Tr. 8488, 8494.) However, many of the sampling elements in the BRP.as developed'by Mr. Del George, such as the 95%/90% acceptance criteria and reliance on the first three months of inspector performance had never been applied in reinspection programs at other nuclear power plants.
(Del George, Tr. 8472-73.)
E s t
9
~
-inspectors was'not-in question. Three~other contractors were already undergoing extensiveTreinspection of their work, making
~
-it, unnecessary =to address the question of their QC inspector qualification. Five contractors were excluded from the ERP
_ because their work 1was neither accessible nor recreatable for
-purposes-of. reinspection. (Del George, prepared testimony at
-10, 11, ff. Tr. 8406; Del George, Tr. 8724-28.)
- 29. ;The selection of contractors included in the ERP was
- not a material issue in this proceeding. I*. appears' that of
- the contractors who performed on-site construction work, the significant ones were captured'in the program. Their work represented 93% of the safety-related work at Byron, in any Jevent,'these-remanded proceedings were limited to Hatfield, Hunter and-PTL,.and1these contractors were included in the ERP.
.b. Selection Of Inspectors 3 30. The:second element of the ERP was the selection of inspectors for, reinspection. The inspection work of the origi--
nal:QCl inspectors of Hatfield, Hunter and PTL-was reinspected on a sampling basis. (Del George, prepared testimony at 11, ff. Tr.. 8406.) Edison and the MRC Staff agreed that a 100 per-
. cent reinspection effort was not necessary since a properly structured sampling plan permits sound judgments to be drawn.
concerning the total population based on the sample results.
(Hansel, prepared testimony at 10, ff. Tr. 8901; Del George, i
- .)
-Ic-
I
=_
yi se farmite .t'o vnd J., mwbr $ be. do%wn e*se m , -r%z dehd y =f u Is.Non. lt)hs. +$ er- CECO 't y o myem.m w a .,
y ,p es-/,
Jfevc.}veeef , &a Wt VnV', or d.eefleo* yon Yien , Js.tourred a.f-7 t's l_71-t[ be./sw.
)
Tr. 8482-3; Little, Staff prepared testimony at 4, ff. Tr.
9510.) (Ale de **f el ira f L L- YNAY
- f!**f v'lf Ih'Ncd f* *f kn
- 31. The names of inspectors for Hatfield, Hunter and PTL were compiled on rosters and listed chronologically by date of certification. The fifth and every fifth inspecter thereafter on the roster was included in the ERP. In addition, the NRC Staff senior resident inspector, Mr. Forney, reviewed the sample and added both the first inspector certified and two to four additional names to each contractor's group of inspect-ors. This selection method resulted in 27%, 26% and 27% of Hatfield, Hunter and PTL QC incpectors, recpectively, being included in the program. (Del George, prepared testimony at 30, 31, 33, ff. Tr. 6406.)
- 32. The table contained in Mr. Del George's testim:ny
, edgws _-fm keyeJ showsthatApplicant/madecertainthe inspectors selected were not only sufficient in number but represented the range of incpection activities for the entire six year span of inter-est. The table also shows that inspectors were chosen from each year of work activity. (Del George, prepared testimony at S*Y*
- 3 M*f
$g c ,,'e e. ' be.Qs M'I~'N in Y ^
L 13. T: 7 1 f, a Sc- cm c s i i. .u...e ad/aninspecter had to perform at least 50 reinspectable inspections during the e en o,*n eed*# who e , lac.hd) period subject to reinspection. InthecaseofPTL,/,25inspec-e, usere e.svlJ be ine)vded tionc "eir " R m . . -_ d t o ' .- c acc;p;ctie because of the '.imited 6
r:
$o a:$telJe.d on 3 s Ys' h % I* !b " N*N !*AfMer t who pekem.A fuaer- % +1s m;&,eam eur*Lw of o .rp cedio.u- w :,, w L a_
tikely 1s pe< % <r wstt se wpe< trr w i, g+g aa .e
%. 34 long er. ,
~
number of inspections for the typical inspector. Where rein-b spection was initiated for the original inspector but it was subsequently learned that the " minimum quantity" was not avail-able, all reinspections actually performed for the original inspector were nevertheless included in the BRP data base.
(Del George, prepared testimony at 16, 17, ff. Tr. 8406.)
- 34. The Staff concluded that the sample si o of inspectors whose work was reinspected was sufficiently large and provided an adequate basis for evaluating the qualifications of inspec-tors whose work was not reinspected. The Staff emphasized the adequacy of the selection methodology, including the two to four inspectors added for each contractor by the resident inspector. (Little, Staff prepared testimony at 4, 5, ff. Tr.
9510.)
...- . . . _ y u w. 0 L L a K.p . . s i g ,...c...u .,7.- ti n. i ; - ' I '- [ ^^^-
eagineerin judgment that for a small population of ir ector:,
hcomplesi:o1. excess of 20 percent would prov- e a reliable.
indicator of the qua.' ty of the total popu . ion of the Hat-field, Hunter and PTL in ectors, p- ,1ded the sample covered the entire range of interest om January 1976 thrcugh Septem-bor 1992. The enginea' ..lg judgmer. of both CECO ar.d Staff acrsonnel which .ed to the selection o. the sampic of inepec-tors whr work was reinspected in rerpons1*. to our concerns r Mi .g 9 ; tat.o . M a.,.1-fic m.u .
anu m l ; r..111 t y ^ r A
~9 ,
[ es hdfM S44 0r* C ' fr'Df*fA
, n - u.~ ->
nu p.y. .]
INTERVENORS ' PROPOSED PARAGRAPH 34A 34A. Neither the staff, nor the Applicant, however, tested the assumption that the staff had added the worst ,
inspectors to the list. What little data is available in the record (covering !!unter weld inspections) shows that the overall discrepancy rt. .e for inspectors added by the NRC was less than the overall discrepancy rate for the inspectors chosen by taking every fifth inspector. The NRC selected inspectors had an overall discrepancy rate of 1.5% (9 out of 594) (for these elements), less than half of the discrepancy rate of 3.37. (103 out of 3134) for those not chosen by the NRC.
(Ericknen, prepared testimony Attachment D. Supp., ff.
Tr. 11, 045.) Applicant and staff have failed to show that the deviation from random selection of inspectors was conservative. In fact, availabic data indicatos that the NRC's additions may have introduced a non-conservative bias in the results.
/ .
INTERVENORS' PROPOSED PARAGRAPit 35
- 35. In our initial decision, we mado clear that we were concerned about several unexplained aspects of the reinspection program for llatficid. In particular wo expressed concern as to whether the size of the samplo reinspected was largo enough to provido a statistically significant and reliable sample and whether the sample was adoquate to provide assurance that inaccessible and non-rocroatable inspections woro adequate. (Initial Decision, D-436, D-437.)
The evidenco now makes clone that the inspector sampling scheme was the result of an engineering judgment that for a small population of inspectors, a samplo sizo in excess of 20% would provido a rollable indicator of the quality of the total population of the llatfield, llunter and PTL inspectors, provided the samplo covered the entiro range of interont from January 1976 through September 1982. (Little, Tr. 9817-19.)
This baro contention by staff and Ceco that "ongineur-ing judgment" justifies their conclusions that the sample was adequato is similar to the argument presented in the recent Comancho Poak decision involving donign quality assuranco. */ In Comancho Peak tho applicant
~/ Toxas Utilitica Generating Comp ~any (Comancho Ponk IItonm Electric St.at.lon Units 1 51Id 2) LBP-83-81, 18 NRC 1410 (1983) (footnote omitted) .
(Inte rvonora ' Proposed 1 35, p. 1)
. .m . .
y _ ,
L ,. f v _' :..
t
%~ <
urged;the Board.toJ put substantially more. weight on the r-
~
mc expert testimony. offered by its engineering witnesses and the sthff's. engineering witnesses than on evidence
- introduced? by lintervenors . The applicant and the staff
'also urged the Board . to accept conclusions based on
" engineering ~. j udgment . " The Board rejected this argument, Letating in -pertinent part:
_[W]e do not! consider it satisfactory to
.present engineering judgment ~ without any ~
- -explanation. - Engineers should be able to explain the reasons for their j udgments.
lanation An beyond inability the baldto providestatement an exp' of engineering judgment," erodes this Board's confidence
'in the validity of the statement.
. (18.NRC at-1420.)
Here, too, mere ' invocation of engineering- j udgment
~
cannot' justify inferences that inspectors were qualified andf work' quality was adequate. As we made clear in our .
initialEdecision, we were concerned that no one had determined that the reinspection of 25% of Hatfield
-inspectors' was a statistically significant sample or
~~
that statistically : reliable sampling had been conducted -
l0 '
y'; to provide : assurance that inaccessible and non-recreatable inspections were adequate. (I.D; D-436 and 437.) More-1 . o ver , the n
applicant's initial reliance on statistics .
3 ,
- belies its-subsequent' claim -- made only after its
- statis tical witness: Dr'. Singh faltered -- that
. statistics isjunimpordant'in. evaluating the adequacy
' (Intervenors' Proposed 1.35, p. 2)
?. N p u ,mjy q .p .y- y yp ,p-e y ,, g' .,,p yr -4 m,, y p,w,p ,,., -a,p-p.y , .,. ., 4 e ,m.,,_.ym,,. ,_.. p , q g
)L .
s of the reinspection program. Finally, we recognize that whenever one generalizes from a sample to a pc e alation, one is making a ' statistical statement.
(Ericksen, Tr. 11, 074.) In the absence of a probability. sample, an engineer can make estimates on the basis of assumptions but the assumptions should be . clearly stated with j ustifications. (Ericksen, Tr.
H '1073.) Here', the Applicant clearly failed to set forth its assumptions or justifications. Instead, it relied on bald general assertions of engineering judgment, even on points as to which available data does not support its assumptions .
For example, as cited in 134A above, CECO claims
. that its engineering judgment is reinforced by the nature of the selection process used by the NRC staff to add inspectors to the program. Because Mr. Forney selected inspectors whose qualifications he believed-to be questionable, CECO argues that the sample' of inspectors was . biased to include the inspectors who would most likely be_ determined to be unqualified.
(Little,-Tr. 9817-19.).
.However,~ the Applicant and staff presented no evidence to support this assumption, and what little data' exists in the record is to the contrary (134A above).
'(Intervenors' Proposed 1 35, p. 3) l
1 l
l l
(~ Y
-b . .
-r e ctor sa...e_. ou..u.on,
- .
- ;._ m .u vu2 au2 .o. e .m . . . . . _
there 'as not a rigorous application of mathematical sta*'oti-
- a1 theory *o the inspector selection process. It w ald ap-pear, therefore that a sufficient and represen wive number of inspectors was capt' red by the sampling pro ss to procide
- onfidence that infere.. es could be dra- with respect to the qualification'of the Hatfic'd, Hunte and PTL inspectors not captured in the BRP. This jud .. nt is reinforced by the nature of the selection process ue by th NRC Staff to add inspec-tors to the program. sed on his judgm t, Mr. Forney se-ected inspectore hose qualifications he bel. .ed to be ques-1 .ionable; a as a result, the list of inspectors t be rein-
"pect> was biased to. include the inspectors who would me t
)
- c'; S: d;t_..._..m- __ .; m.qac._;1ec. ( :::e, _;. ::_c- _: ->
T- - M r"-.: c
. -2. . . . g . c m_ . . t cny :. d ncc w. . : . -_2- -
ly challenged the mple selection process for inspa- rs othe .
th an two general asse. tions by Professor Er' .r:sen, an expert st 1tistician. The first assertion i hat at any time a sample is selected and one wishes to .e a generalization to the tc tal population, that p . son is making a statistical state-mc nt. (Ericksen, * . 10,964.) econd, in his prepared testi-m ny Dr. Eric men asserted it is pr oer statistically to make enerali: ion only to all population 'ements which had a
<now , non-zero chance of being selected 1.*o the sample.
bE 1 keuu, picem.cd tcotimony m. 3, If. T.. 12,-045.) TP. *.T E a ,
b hO fYOfO$ -->
%% 4./4ws lh u pg e.}
. . .. ~
INTERVENORS' PROPOSED PARAGRAPH 36'
- 36. In-his' testimony, Intervenors' witness Professor Ericksen, an expert statistician, emphasized the statistical flaws in . CECO's inferences regarding work quality. He did not focus on flaws 'in CECO 's inferences regarding
' inspector qualifications. Nonetheless, he identified problems with the statistical reliability of Ceco's
-inferences regarding inspector qualifications. He testified that the inferences were questionable because inspectors who did less than a certain amount of work were excluded from the sample and because CECO did not test its assumption that the NRC staff added-inferior inspectors to the sample. (Ericksen, Tr. 11,083.) Dr.
Ericksen further explained that generalizations to a population from a sample are straightforward if one utilizes-a probability sample, a- sample drawn from. a population in which all elements have a known .non-zero chance of being selected. (Ericksen, prepared testimony at 8, ff. Tr. 11~,046 and Ericksen, Tr. 11,073.)
~
In the absence of such a probability sample, Dr.
Ericksen testified, generalizations can still be made based on assumptions reflecting some model or view of the real world. The assumptions in that model or view should be . stated clearly with j ustification. If data
- exists which are inconsistent with the assumption, the (Intervenors' Proposed 1 36, p. 1)
assumption needs to be changed and the generalization must be. revised. (Ericksen, Tr. 11,073.) He testified that neithe'r a probability sample, nor a clear statement
- of assumptions, : underlay CECO 's ' generalizations regarding inspector qualifications. (Id. and prepared testimony We' agree.
~
- at 8,'ff. Tr.'11,045.)
i Et 4
5 J
a (Intervenors ' Proposed 1 36, p. 2) a:: :
. -, ,, . . - - . ,_. , , . . - . . . , . . _ , . . _ . . , _ . , , - . . , , , . . , , . . ,.,-....._.,,,,.,___,,,,,r ,
p e. F'< a . ka I ca r ~ t .t u c-<- w A c +* ce he- wo" M ure a.ve ; [< Lle. e <.h. h + cst 1% e.cweaey af th- 9 mece'r o.rr omf> He^.t. ( FreeJcs/, W. d,/37.) Las ayeca weh Dr + % f . + rr age <*
-+ -'- + -^-- p.af w vie fat +. k.rt r~ct O. L < -r.e--e Er m s.
. skin -- r* ' * 'r * "c -
- .pl c . k.. ...' e a piuvas.. f am..ylm. ( E 2 ., u r, s e . . , T-1,072.) Dr. Ericksen nelt d that since certain inspectors l
had "no chance" of being uded in the sample, there was e Lnadequate statistica basis fro.. which to draw inferences f t bout these inspe mors. (E22uhaea, prepared test m .q ,
l f f_ Tr. 11.04C I
- 37. Dr. Martin Frankel, an expert statistician testifying on behalf of Applicant agreed that the inspector sample does not qualify as a " probability sample", mainly because of the addition of designated inspectors whose qualifications were considered suspect by the NRC Staff. (Frankel, prepared testi-i mony at 7-8, ff. Tr. 11,120.) Although the sample of inspec-tors does not meet the criteria for a probability sampl.e, Dr.
Frankel believes that inferences to the total pcpulatien cf inspectors can be drawn if supported by the judgnents of indi-viduals with appropriate substantive knowledge. (Frankel, pre- '
)
pared testimony at 7-8, ff. Tr. 11,120.) h y. __. The fea-ture of the sampling scheme for inspectors which causes it to not constitute a probability sample is the addition of inspec- <
i nc. r-fe R*'e arter h.~ Het ,
tors to the sample by the NRC resident inspector./gheseaddi-in inscec-tions to the sample were designed to inc'udeCe..,
, ,x..as A. e cer+the ERP-s.y 5 ,44 tors whose qualifications we'ie suspec 4t ::r1A "- - 4 w s .. .~ . . ::::: :: rc ::t i n f e r : .. ~ u. m. .. ru. th_ . m ._. .:
th ZEI sj u <.ec t 2 u.. m m. gin r: :npleyed :- y lyc l _ w. . ud 4 E.a:f, a : 11 ;: by _ndep nd nt ::nculta .tr b :ed 2 - __-mm1 %
a di 4 We Jah ryesb U% "'*'t * Y' h* ** I""
-(esye a F. .<) . UJe- cla t" h a ve aQvJe. a.rruru c
([ ) . $ d $$n inf f JA mfd ' L*fW f M $
_4 e + 4 , . s 4r2+4nn nc e t-i - t i n i 4-,-,, m ---m . +- u .' - o 6qp ftfGr* VC- h I4rt-- ) Ahk.W. -L C y -m... ...y-- - . . -
. . . . -- ' conc 1ude that the i de e. h
~
, r e tea b Ie- s results[ form an adequate basis for/ inferences to the qualifica-tions of inspectors whose work was not reinspected.
- c. Selection Of Inspector Work To Be Reinspeqted
- 38. The third element of the BRP involved the selection of the part of each inspector's work which would be reinspected.
This work was categorized into discrete work activities called Y49.I attrioutes. All safety-related work attributes { :rc r:! : n' ,
" ' ' i. . y were M recreatable ew.L.
y accessible, attribute was considered recreatable if it could be traced to a specific inspector and the condition or state originally inspected was capable of reinspection at a later time. An attribute was accessible for reinspection if extensive dismantling war not required for the reinspection to be performed. However, attri-butes were deemed accessible if reinspection could be.accomp-lished through the ere ction of scaffolding or through the removal of paint, insulation or fireproofing. (Del George, f
prepared testimony at 17-19, ff. Tr. 8406.)
-- .--y pferveavj t 39. Approximately 80 percent of Hatfield's total inspec-
'['T A tions performed at Byron (up to the date its revised certifica-93tv9 tion precedures were implemented) were reincpec chle. For
.f,/(.wy
, Hunter, this figure was approximately 70 percent. (Tuetken, w
h Aard- prepared testimony at 25, 26, ff. Tr. 8408.) Somewhat less and ,- Q , fi a id e ha ra y Id in rydv N*d * " *
- af p_.i r, indu,6f Le & SRP, Lfe.f aD 14 A,.yf es users ih Scd re*nmeeM q- -u-
.INTERVENORS' PROPOSED PARAGRAPH 38A 38A. For. Hatfield,, all welds for which the original inspector
~
could not be identified were excluded from the program.
'(Ericks'en, prefiled testimony, Table 1, p. 1, Tr. 11,045.)
This may'have--been a nonconservative bias, since one can: reasonably question whether those welds for which
> lthere 'was 'no adequate record identifying the welder are likely to be of less reliable quality'than fully documented welds for which the welder can be identified.
% w
-p-w w- - p ..,g.,-, e ,,9++ ~ - . , . , , . . . 7.g,, e.
T ** - e -ar-e- +-m.3 -
p,y9
1 l
l l
4 ,
qr than 50 percent of the inspections performed by PTL prior to the implementation of its revised certification procedures were reinspectable. (Tuetken, prepared testimony at 25, 26, ff.
Tr. 8408.) This is because PTL performed mainly concrete and soil inspections, which are not recreatable. (Tuetken, Tr. 8664.) It is undisputed that placement of work in either aa inaccessible or nonrecreatable category was supported by proper documentation which showed appropriate reasons why a certain inspector's work could not be reinspected. (Hansel, prepared testimony at 17, ff. Tr. 8901; Hansel, Tr. 8932.)
- 40. Finally, some attributes for work to be reinspected were not captured in the BRP. This was the case for 2 of 11 Hatfield inspection attributes and 5 of 48 Hunter inspection elements. The two Hatfield attributes involving component sup-port and equipment final inspection (cable pan covers and cable pan idantification) were not reinspected because this work had not been initiated before September 1982. (Del George, pre-1 y7- ,f pared testimony at 17, 18, ff. Tr. 8406.)
[a h r m v.r'\ ~".- _. -av cayu or e .. se.eccem ...%
j 1 f%/ >*d v s reinspected. (.' nsel pre- red testimony at 11, ff. Tr.
j y '134. j l gt.,, f 901; Del George, Tr. #90. Ecth Edison and the IRC Staff A IV z gree that the first 90 a s of work is an apprcpriate periot i f'8*>f Acre-i j .o evaluate to determi.e insp tor qualification. If trainin ;
has been inadequate -o produce a aalified inspector, the fir 3t e y = --- - + t 1 = .h ; . .. . ,e=;m. .m_ uk=:z t.
[ r, hace.<r
- Papad y 9 +1 1- % B' o-py ur EN h* NoW'*} j>Q*
& i
+.
. e A,
- INTERVENORS PROPOSED PARAGRAPH 40a Applicant's witness Del George claimed to have evaluated
~
-the nadbreLof non-reinspectable work but in his prepared
- testimony he was mistaken'in his analysis of what items were
. and-were not reinspected. For example, he reported that piping and component support temporary attachment,-piping component
- inspection and' whip restraint component inspection were
. reinspected (Dei George, prepared testimony, Attachment B, page 11 of 14). .After intervenors informed the Applicant
'of numerous data errors, however, the Applicant stated that portions of these items were non-recreatable and thus were
. not1 reinspected. (Ericksen prefiled testimony,- Amended Attachment B, page 6.).
F 4
J M
2
o l
,a
' , ne.mistaxes- a tumult Of th2t i--dequate t; emu.uy. tnern-fore, in the judgme.t of CECO the Staff, a conservative t f
bias was factored into t.* element of the BRP. (Hansel, pre <
pared testimony at 11, 2, ff. r. 8901; Hansel, Tr. 8948; Del George, Tr. 87 -91; Little, C__ preprred tertiren; .: d, hr# T- on,n. r4 +12, 7, ;;;;,
- 42. Thir j u d gn _.. . i; u2apmemd L, Int:r"e u rr' _'_ . . c s1 r.
ev. S. Kochhar, a human factors expert from the Unive mity o Iichigan. According to Dr. Kochhar, inspector pe ~ rmance can ae expected t attain its highest proficiency evel in the
] >eriod immediate following completion o' training. He testi -
t ied that in genera newly trained ine ectors perform better i nitially because the n velty of +'e job causes them to be mo e a ttentive. This " initial "ou al" wears off as novelty and I t ensory stimulation decline o er time. According to Dr.
f
} .ochhar, the level of p rformanc effectiveness also decline: .
'hus, in Dr. Kochha s opinion, rei epection of only the fi st 30 days of insp tors' work is likely have caused a nonc :rd-servative b' s in the BRP results. The be ter course, acc rd-Lng to D .
Kochhar, would have been to reinsp ct the work of nsp . tors over-the full range of their tenure a Byron.
, r - ^; 1 r : d t ; _ _ _......, o; 7-10, ff. ~- 10.53 ,
" ; . --- '.; Lavo di a - ..c d 2 #=d - "l T-^"' " ** tD-
, plication of Dr. Kochhar's an ysis to Byron. Dr. Kochhar's c ' 4 - " ,' " crercei;;; th; .;_y pg p :; cf tLm nr , *iw . r)s
'(k)
- JH s f e e m . . .. u s 2. _ .'. . ;
- * +-='-4 ; A cc-tifId.:. e. 3 2 sed by ontractors befcre 1982 were produ .ng qualified g nspectors. en confronted with this urpose on cross-exam-nation, Dr. Kochh agreed that it .asnec.essarytoreinspeft period of an inspecto 's work grior to the time his experi
< nce on the job might mask - - lack of adequate training.
I Kochhar, Tr. 10,571.) n th? Eo -d's view, it is obvious phat
'he period of inter t is the first months of an inspect
>r's job perfor .nce. The question become therefore, whether
- )r. Kochha"' testimony persuades us whethe ...; fi . :t C: i./s I
r rr s t- : 1:n;;;r ;;rie d i- --- 4 n - A .
- s. 2 .
- m. .
a_.
t~m nar me.... . .u u v..m. u.o .u.ja.- app. lea, .v.
+ e most part, onl' to the inspectic of subjective attri-autes, that is, visuc' weld insp .tions. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,54J-43.) For objective at ibu* s, where. measuring devices are used, the human factors .esues addressed in Dr. Kochhar's tes -
timony are of less neern.'/ (Kochhar, Tr. 10,543.) In th" s regard, Dr. Ko ar admitted at the only inspection proce-dures he r .iewed at Byron were isual weld inspection proc -
dures. e did not review inspecti n procedures for any - jec-IC,::s.)
(;- .. ,_;;;;;. attri'rur^- G:::'r' ,, Tr
(
in "a, rea ..tal L e s u r.w i., ~2 J tL_...a.., .'u..._.
1/ colm Somsag, Hunter QA Matfie. A/QC manager, and -
supervisor, . kes plain + t objective inspections invoire the application re _ated use of standard measurement.
and other easily ve .7able' criteria. (Buchanan, prepar2d
- testimony at 5-6 If. Tr. ,17' c^-~'? pr nared tee' -
-ry at 5-6. f Tr. 11 7
.- -. ~ . - , . -. . --
4 ,1.
%. / __ _
s . ut. nocnnar furtner aamittea snat ils experience o.
ir pectio activities has been limited, rimarily, to assembl:
1 .ne or bate manufacturing operatio s involving a Firestone re and Rubber ompany assembly .ine operation where inspec-tors inspected thr or four jor attributes on tires which lassed by at a control d ate. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,548.) Dr.
- ochhar's laboratory -e er. ents involved television monitors c n which simulated roducts mo, across the screen at con-1 rolled rates. The subject inspect s were required to ident L-y any f a - es or defects in the pr acts as they moveu u .<egl L
tuu m a c ii . ruw.aut, it. Av,s;u.j 1
Thu , . . f_... n1s review t une chr, ur. acenngr as no e>. erience at all with nuclea
. plant inspection actiti-
- ies. (Koch.. r, Tr. 10,547.) Nev .theless, Dr. Kochhar as-Eerts that his c'restone and lab atory results are applicab .e o Byron QC inspect. n activiti s. (Tr. 10,547-48.) Surpri -
i ngly, Dr. Kochhar mak this assertion without having evalu-a :ed the actual duties of ' e Byron QC inspectors. (Kochhar, T . 10,589.) He was awar th t the work of QC inspectors was
- omewhat varied", that they loo.ed at different kinds of w alds, that welds-wer located in va lous locations throughou, the plant, and tha access to some wel was difficult.
Kochhar, Tr. 10 589-91.) Nevertheless, D. Kochhar simply assumed that +. eir tasks like those which wer the subject of uis ovperi ce wonia equire _ubjuv 2vu s cdg=cr.to Laoec c: pr:-
a S.&
~.
J
(-
8 1 Qd d _ e i ..m . . : d r #*a*i = n' o r ' " 'r. 10,500.) 0.. c..e.n i : 12 r he Board, he agreed tha th varied duties of the QC inspec-tors might tend.to break he tedium that inspectors on /
f
- rmbly linco v.dina .lj experichqe. (ho uau., Tr 10,591_)
- ' i . ks:'.J.ui o__. tc:tificd th t ...._ cf '.__ .
m..y
._nts lasted mo e than 2 or 3 days. (Kochhar, Tr. 10 SS.) . qe Ls not aware of at studies which have examined +..is job per-formance phenomenon ver an extended period . time. (Kochh r,
'r. 10,558.) He testi.'ed that his pred etions concerning
.ong-term job performance are based .1 a simple analogy to
!aily performance. (Kochha , Tr 10,568, 10,592.) Yet Dr.
- ochhar also testified that, sed on what he has read in the
.iterature, it is likely + at th predicted dcwnturn in in- ,
spector performance w d begin a_ er only a ccuple of days .
Kochhar, Tr. 10,5 .) Given this, ~ t is logical to assume that any downt '.n in inspector performa ce at Byron would h ave accurred wi . in an inspector's first 90 a ys. This obvious ly 1 )elies 'sargumentthatmorethanthreemo.thsofaninspep-
- 1. o r ' work should have been r r in2F;2t29 ir O r %; r
_J c- < -i ti o m - - 2: :::m_..
- s. manally, ur. Kocnnu2 wu_ .__.c . 3 - _ . . - . _ ;< ne e::ec t of the alle ed nonconservativ cias on the results of the ERF.
r was he able say wb_n, if ever, an inspector who was in -
ially performing hie
- asks competently would beceme inc - .g e -
Rent. (Mochhar ' O , 51, . ) Mc tm__.Z.eu ao Zull cr
p ~_m-
._ Nr _
--INTERVENORS' PROPOSED PARAGRAPHS 41 THROUGH 49B
- 41. .Only the first 90 days of each selected inspector's work was : reinspected. (Hansel prepared testimony at 11, ff. Tr.
8901'; Del George, Tr.-8490.) Both Edison and the NRC Staff
~
> agree that' the ' first 90 days of work is an appropriate period to evaluate to determine' inspector qualification. They_ reason that if the' training has been inadequate to produce a qualified inspector,;the first-90 days cover the time when an inspector ris most likely to make mistakes as-a result of that inadequate training. 1Therefore, CECO and the Staff assume that a con-servative bias was' factored into this element of the BRP.
'(Hansel, prepared testimony at 11, 12, ff. Tr. 8901; Hansel,
. .Tr.'8948; Del George, Tr. 8790-91; Little, Staff prepared testimony at-5,fff. Tr. 9510; Little, Tr. 9646.) However, CECO'and the Staff are'not aware of.any studies'or previous reinspedtion programs that support _this view. (Del
~
E l George, Tr. 8472). They admit that they know of no nuclear _ power plant or other construction reinspection program that'similarly relied upon an. inspector's first 90 days of work. _( Del George, Tr._8472.)
- 42. Intervenors'. witness Dr. Dev S. Kochhar, an expert on' human factors m
affecting engineering systems and-design *, from the University of Michigan, disagrecs with-this view. He has engaged in extensive re:
search.and. industrial consultation activities on how human factors Laffect. quality control. inspection. Dr. Kochhar testified that L (Interveno rs ' Proposed 11 41-49b, p. 1) n
,. ,v - -
^b ,
i Linspector performance can be expected to attain its highest
~
proficiency ~ level in ' the period irmmediately following completion.
of training. In general, newly trained inspectors perform better initially because the novelty of'the job causes them-tocbc more attentive. As novelty _and sensory stimulation 4
decline-over time, the level of performance effectiveness also
- declines. The reason for this pattern of_ performance is the
- repetitive, dull and unstimulating nature of the inspection
-task. Thus reinspection of only the first 90 days of the
~
. inspectors' work is-likely to cause a nonconservative bias in
~
the BRP .resuWs. The better course, according to Dr. Kochhar, would have been to_ reinspect the work of inspectors over the fullirange of their tenure a. Byrons (Kochhar, prepared testi-many at 7-10,1ff. Tr. 10,538.) The question becomes therefore, whether Dr. Kochhar's testimony ~persendes us.that reinspec-tions. directed only to the first 90 days are appropriate.
43 '. We recognize,_as Dr. Kochhar acknowledges, that there are no
-dispositive' longitudinal or other studies.that: clearly establish
- a- pattern of inspector performance. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,569).
.However, CECO and the Staff provide no empirical basis whatso-
.ever to justify their reliance on reinspections of only- the first 90 days _of inspection. performance. To the contrary, I Intervenors have presented the expert testimony of Dr. Kochhar (Interveno rs ' Proposed 11 41-49b, p. 2).
J
y- -
h a-c ..
who .has-. extensively. researched and reviewed ' studies of quality control 1 inspections. (Kochhar, prepared testimony at 2, Attachment A, ff. Tr. 10,538.) These studies involve both Lstationary-and roving inspectors principally at manufacturing
' facilities. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,597-98).
- 44. Dr. Kochhar reviewed - the BRP, and we are persuaded that his
. experience with human factors affecting quality control inspec-tions at. industrial ~ facilities is applicable to nuclear plant
- inspection. We recognize that Dr'. Kochhar's direct experience with nuclear-plant inspections is limited. (Kochhar, Tr.
10,547). However,'the human factors relating to. quality
^
, control. inspections have common elements in both environments.
The inspection task undertaken is characterized by the same
' monotony, in which the worker repeatedly undertakes the same decision-making task -- an item is. viewed, measured and then
- y. ' determined to be acceptable or unacceptable (a binary decision)
W if in accordance with specified criteria. Regardless of the en-
$' .vironment.or the particular pace of work, the operational
? .. ..
task of inspection is the same. (Kochhar, prepared testimony b -at 4-5 ff. Tr. 10,538).
145. -Similarly, there are-no~ substantial differences between the stasks- being performed by the individual under examination in the laboratory _and the inspector at Byron. The individuals are: performing a mundane task in which essentially the same
-(Intervenors' Proposed 11 41-49b, p. 3) n __
~m ,
- .. +.
c - .,/
1:
I .-
)[_
y type 'of binary decision is to be made based on certain criteria.
~
Knowledge of the human factors affecting inspector performance
~
obtained from laborat'ory experiments.can then be applied to workplace/ settings. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,559-60, prepared testimony at 6-7,.ff. Tr. 10,538). We are convinced that general
. patterns ofiinspector performance -identified in laboratory ex-
-periments are pertinent to the BRP.
- 46. 'Dr. Kochhar acknowledges that his human factors analysis
. applies predominantly'to the inspection of subjective attributes, that is, vist.al weld. inspections. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,~ 542-43. )
Still, for objective attributes, where measuring devices are
-used, there 'is some element of subje'etivity. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,542-3.-) -We are persuaded that Dr. Kochhar's humanLfactors
- analysis is applicable to the BRP, especially to the subjective visual weld inspections. (Kochhar,~Tr. 10,591.)
- 47. Dr. Kochhar described the pattern of inspector' performance that h'a s~ been foun~d 'in various human factors ' studies . We are aware that none of-Dr. Kochhar's laboratory experiments
, lasted;more than 2 or' 3 days. _(Kochhar, Tr. 10,558. ) , and that there are not any studies in this field which have
- examined these job performance phenomena over an extended-
~ period of' time. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,560.) However, Dr. Kochhar-
. identified a significant pattern of daily performance, -in Lwhich performance begins high and then tapers off, that would be: repeated over time (Kochhar, Tr. 10,567.) This pattern of (Interveno rs ' Proposed 11 41-49b , . p . 4) q; , +
Ee ___--__.-.---_.___.___-__-__-__.--____.______.._._)
INTERVENORS'. PROPOSED PARAGRAPHS41-49B inspector performance when viewed over a long period of time reflects a fairly well-maintained consistency of performance in the initial stages. When fatigue and monotony begin to set in, "the curve" of performance decreases until gradually it begins to flatten out or settle. Overall, the pattern re-flects that performance is good initially, and then over a period of time, it decreases and then flattens out. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,566.)
This pattern would not show Byron inspector performance declining in the first two days following the conclusion of training. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,566-67). Instead, the trend for Byron inspectors would reflect better performance in their first 90 days following training than in later periods.
(Kochhar, Tr. 10,568).
- 48. This phenomenon of quality control inspector performance tedium and decline has been recognized by industry, not just revealed in laboratory experiments. Industry often compensates for this problem by rotating inspectors to different, unrelated jobs. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,602). At Byron, inspectors performed only inspection tasks.
- 49. We are persuaded that inspector performance is likely to attain its highest level of proficiency in the period following completion of training and then decline over time reaching a plateau. Thus by limiting inspectors to only the first 90 (Interveno rs ' Proposed 11 41-49B, p. 5)
hE
. ~
.{ >
.? :P ~
l
-INTERVENORS' PROPOSED PARAGRAPHS41-49B days.offinspector_ performance most likely biased the
~
. BRPJ results 'in' a non-conservative manner, rather than' con-servative' manner as suggested by CECO and the Staff. CECO's and the Staff's assumption is misplaced. We agree with Dr.
-Kochhar that the'BRP would have more accurately er.amined inspector performance cnd' qualifications if the reinspec--
L tions had tested inspector performance over an extended range
.of-the work period. (Kochhar, prepared' testimony-at 9-10, ff. Tr. 10;538.)
'49A. :Dr. Kochhar' acknowledges that unless inspector performanceris examined over a longer period of time, the precise degree of-the bias cannot be quantified. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,601). None-theless, we can conclude that the bias of relying on'the first '90 days of inspector performance was opposite to that
~
assumed by: CECO and the Staff. "We agree with Dr. Kochhar that.this phenomenon most probably led to a higher percentage of inspector work.foun-d to be acceptable (i.e., confirming)
~ by thel BRP: than would otherwise have been justified by the circumstances. 'BRP is thus flawed and reliable conclusions Labout its results can only be made after-this non-conservative ibias is taken into account. .( Kochhar, prepared testimony ate 13,
'ff. Tr. 10,538)..
49B. 'Therefore,.we find that Ceco's and the Staff's reliance on (Interveno rs ' Proposed 11 41-49B, p. 6) b i
4.. ..;
INTERVENORS' PROPOSED PARAGRAPHS-41-49B
' ~
.- reinspections .of the first 90. days of inspector performance was arbitrary and oversimplified. While the selection of
.this : period was' understandable for purposes of validat'ing inspector training and pre-employment qualifications, it
.is nonconservative for purposes of generalizations concerning the levels of inspector performance over time at Byron, and for- purposes of any inferences concerning
- work : quality .made on the- basis of the BRP sample.
s (Intervenors' Proposed _ 11 41-49B, p. 7)
/
\~)
I res, ;11 w I'- -
2 . ..g 2a wq I don't hink anybody could antify that
't ias. The act is that if yo had taken a p eriod of t e that was lor er and then s ampled, it m have been , ore reflective c f t Te actual work g span.
Q. Dr. Kochh , 'ust so-we'are clec r or this, you don't now as you sit here tc day -- whether e reins,ection results h ve been. overs ted by a ha' f a percent r 2 percent bec ase of the sel -tion of t5 e irst190 day A. that's correct. '
-s _ r - s .
,.:cr".. . 'it. le,GQ2, .0,uva, 10,;^4.)
- . . ~ , an appuatu--uas u . uuw .a. a _..;a,, n...v. .a l'.ited t ubjective attribu _s and based on limited relevan xperience, wou have its mpact, if at all, in the.first 90-days of an inspe r' job performance. Consequently we ae not persuaded-that Ap i nts choice of the first 90-days wa inappropriate. .Ind _d, we fin' that reinspection of an Lnspector's firs three months of w > was appropriate to
-e etermine whe+.er the inspector fi
_d:. ? '". .d fb '- ; ';; ...icial t-......g.
- d. Inspector Qualification Acceptance Criteria
- 50. In order to evaluate the performance, and thus the c4alifications, of the original inspectors, it was necessary to establish appropriate acceptance criteria. To facilitate the establishment of such criteria, the reinspection of QC inspec-tions was divided into two attribute categori~es: objective and
m.
.r%
() subjective. (Hansel, prepared testimony at 13, ff. Tr. 8901; Del George, prepared testimony at 19, 20, ff. Tr. 8406.)
- 51. An attribute is subjective if its inspection reTaires qualitative interpretation by the inspector. Visual weld exam-ination was the only subjective attribute in the ERP. An attribute was classified as objective if its inspection was not significantly affected by qualitative interpretation.
The (Del George, prepared testimony at 19, 20, ff. Tr. 8406.)
types of inspections included in this category, such as dimen-sions thr.t should not change and verification of materials and shape, are repeatable and regaire very little exercise of judg-ment by the inspector. (Hansel, prepared testimony at 13, ff.
Tr. 8901; Del George, preapred testimony at 18, 20, ff. Tr.
8406.) A/meMe l*ff; Id// **
- l the.
- 52. For inspections involving objective attributes, fAe 5
accentance level was set at 95 percent, which ne r c.shrpeeder- agru *c wifk fKe. i; ** 1*}iss.f 0 fin luf /< fans cher in2 that in :_;t:d .;;;h ..J - % C ;
'n:r::nt cf th-4 f *A; af fla. re-nrye f IerfeclP al e to l* nt.
7"'
- f; tk_ crig_c._1 in :_ tr g (Hansel, prepared testimony at 13, ff. Tr. 8901; Del George, prepared testimony at 19, 20, ff.
Tr. 8406.) f
- 53. Both Applicant and NRC Staff witnesses testified that the 95 percent acceptance level for objective attributes was reasonably conservative and recognized that unintentional human error precludes total agreement. (Del George, prepared testi- <
' $s/ $
= N W) . t .
- t. Q {C4%%f C>
I N) mony at 23, ff. Tr. 8406; Little, Staff prepared testimony at "fAc. le.ve/ war acceph kle e~n cur- % men +.
,8, ff. Tr. 9510.) 'A. , ,
- 54. For inspections involving subjective attributes, the
-acceptance level was set at 90 percent. (Hansel, prepared tes-timony at'13, ff. Tr. 8901; Del George, prepared testimony at 23-25, ff. Tr. 8406.) The 90 percent acceptance level for sub-jective attributes recognized the likelihood for reasonable disagreement between inspectors and reinspectors where judg-mental decisionmaking was involved in the inspection.
(Del George, prepared testimony at 24, ff. Tr. 8406; See also, t&n.s',r e.a rerl' e , uw e *n e cHn g%t , _
Little, Tr. 9560, 9574. )[+;s John Hanse{testifiedg tne inspec-tion agreement rate on a piece of hardware can range from 20 percent for a very complex piece to 80 percent for a very sim-ple~ piece. (Hansel, Tr. 8942.) Mr. Hansel ranked visual weld inspections in the 7C to 80 percent agreement range. (Hansel, 1Juneiseferr Tr. 8943.k T:a we find that the subjective attribute rate of
, elbe;+ n+ demontfrs% ceswh*
90percentusedintheERPisacceptableQ(Hansel, Tr. 8943.)
- 55. If an acceptance criterion was not met for the first 3 months of an inspector's job performance, inspections during the second three months of the individual's incpection tenure
.were reinspected for the attributes for which the inspector failed the acceptance criterion. If the results of the second three month period did not meet the acceptance criterion, the inspector wac judged to be unqualified. In this event, 100 percent of the inspections performed by that inspector of the
.[w $c/ ff.s *(a h. sn u./h.'d MA t'. llAoss.t l C.f r~en c.e<Is /
s r.4.:ed here. Jehe/ et < 2 n / ~e % c Jes- # Jry S. r& a.J c6L ~y y. n ,e a.A, m Tc.
3ce na es dTrca.+er. (ree /1,
, 9 n,;, .s 6 A1,. &,y 9.yzt,tuwzz./ n9yz.7-yo.)k
. i 9s /0mL.%aee g.vi +e d.Wer~t.
_ u .t _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
ynx -
kk" a:
~/
a Y:' > .
.typelfound-toffail'the acceptance criterion were reinspected.
.In* addition,--the'. original'. inspector sample population for the~
- particular' contractor' involved was, expanded b'y as much as 50- '
, percentJfor.the, attribute in'. question, depending on.the number
'of. inspectors 1still available for inclusion in the program.
Applicant s. i selection of inspectors added to the sample was made fromfan overall. list of-inspectors certified in the
- specific area;where the unqualified inspector.was' identified.
(Del George,: prepared testimony at 26, 27,.ff. Tr. 8406.)
- 56. If an inspector had no inspections beyond three-months andidid.-not meet:an acceptance criterion, the next-inspector certified-chronologically was-substituted and-his first three months of work.was reinspecte'. d .The qualification of the orig-
.inallinspector in such a. case was considered indeterminate,x but hisDresults werefretained in the program data base,;and all obse'rved discrepancies were' evaluated for' design significance.
(Del: George, prepared testimony.atL27,-ff. Tr. 8406.)
!F7. The Board finds that the~ mechanisms used to expand the creinsp'ection process.in the event that inspectors failed to pass:thefapplicable-acceptance criterion were reasonable.
-Furthermore,.we:agreejit'was prudent to include tha results of allbreinspections in the/ERP, including those of the inspecttrs characterized as: indeterminate.
-m '
~~
w -
y V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM
- a. Meetings With Contractors
- 58. Implementation of the ERP began in February 1983. At that time Applicant's representatives met with the contractors whose work'was to be reinspected.
- 59. We note that the contractors whose inspectors were the subject-of the BRP had no input into the formation of the pro-gram. According to Mr. Tuetken, the only contact between Applicant and the contractors prior to NRC Staff approval occurred when.Mr. Tuetken asked the contractors whether it was
.possible to produce a listing of inspectors by certification date. (Tuetken, Tr. 8845.~) No details of the reinspection plan were released to the contractors until after MRO Staff raodification and approval of Applicant's proposal for a rein-spection program on February 3, 1983. (Tuotken, Tr. 8764.)
Subsequently, at its initial meeting with the contractors, the purpose and nature of the reinspection activities to be per-formed, an outline of the prograr. and criteria for reinspection were discussed. The basic instructions given to the contrac-tors were (i) the reinspecticns were to be conducted employing the acceptance criteria used at the time of the original inspections;.(ii) individuals involved in the reinspecti:n of work could not be the same inspectors wno performed the origi-nal inspection, and (iii) the need for removal of fireproofing, j $, paint and insulation did not render an item inaccessible for
&, .J ,f ,,,aa-a a b . m i 6 .o M L f rF. -h h t M u>ar 3 g je c.amy/ded Q Jsty i, in (rueth, To~. M -*!),
,m @, f rMr. Vo cl'k% or'.y o r.<.fly ht*f. f ut a l h Fr g,,.;./;4 W n, b e 4 $/dt C*vW Nc. .ref b&ar-e 'A.n.
iQ s
sA,, fam e. o F t u_er* X s<.rnt.f d 'n U ( bb , Tv , RoQ
~ purposes of reinspection. (Tuetken, prepared testirony at 4, 5, ff. Tr. 8408.)
- 60. As the BRP proceeded, weekly meetings were held between the participating contractors and the CECO project construction department to discuss and resolve questions con-cerning the ongoing program, establish methods for recording results, and determine action to be taken on discrepancies observed in the reinspection effort. A series of written interpretations regarding implementation of the ERP were created, as necessary and disseminated to all contractors for their quidance. (Tuetken, prepared testimony at 5, ff. Tr.
8408; Shewski, prepared testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 8423. See Attachment A to Teutken, prepared testimony at 5, ff. Tr. 8408.)
- b. Physical Reinsoection Activities
- 61. Physical reinspection activities began in the middle of March 1983. (Tuetken, prepared testimony at 6, ff. Tr.
8408.)*/ The BRP was performed by reinspectors who were prop-
- /
The Appeal Board noted that the reinspection program cnly covered inspectors certified up to September 1982 and the recertification program was not completed until early 1983. It therefore questioned whether Applicant had en-cured that inspectors certified between those dates were capable of performing their task.s. (ALAB-770, clip opinion at 29.) To address this concern, Mr. Tuetken er.plained that the reinspection program examined the first three months of work performed by inspectors right up to the date the revised certification procedures were implemented. The first three months of work oi at least a small number of inspectors who were certified during the summer of 1992 were included in the BRP and this three month period ex-
$ tended beyond September, 1982. (Tuetken, prepared testi-4 many at 18, ff. 8408.)
7 s
I
'4.-
s
)
'erly recertified to ANSI N45.2.6 (1978) before commencing rein-spections.*/ .(Del' George, prepared testimony at 20, 21, ff. I
- :Tr. 8406: Tuetken, prepared testi' mony at 16, 17, ff. Tr.
8408..) :The. proper certification of the reinspectors was con-firmedJon the basis of~ extensive overview inspections by Appli-cant's project' construction;and quality assurance departments (and the? NRC. Staff. .(Del Georga, Tr. 8789; Ward, Tr. 9691-92.)
s
-62. :Reinspections were performed to the same.or more stringent. criteria than had been used in the original inspec-
~
tion. (De1' George, prepared testimony at 21, ff. Tr. 8406.)
F This' introduces a f__2.__ conservatism, since the reinspectors, having been trained to 1983 standards, were required to apply less stringent; earlier criteria. Mr. Tuetken testified,that in
'many-cases it was simply not'possible to ignore the influence
-of the' current standards. (Tuotken, Tr.. 8706-07.)
- 63. . More than 80,000 man-hours of actual'reinspections were performed, and more than 160,000 additional man-hours were spent in construction, clerical, and administrative support
- / .In our Initial Decision, we identified a concern about the number of Hatfield inspectors that required recertification and/or retraining at the inception of~the ERP. (I.D.
5D-436-). In response, Mr. Connaughton explained that as of September 30, 1982, Hatfield empicyed 46 inspectors who re-quired additional training, to: ting,cand,or documentation to comply with the new QC inspector certification require-ments. Mr. Connaughton also explained that there is no particular. significance'to the. number of Hatfield inspec-tors requiring.recertification inasmuch as all of them were
. included in.the' population considered in the BRP. (Con-() naughton, prepared _ testimony at 28-19, ff. Tr. 9510.)
[
r x l
af l hh hr. 'Naerred d:f teaf r400 j e< Ny r's fe.rvrcr. s r, y A < < r- q .e d o x w h . p < + m pM in th ex r (1;-- nor.).
Th}
x- <
-3 ,,
work' related to the BRP. More than 202,000 inspection points s
s -
were' reinspected. (Tuetken, prepared testimony at 19, ff.
a ~ ;, ;7 Tr. 8408 ,;,Behnke, prepared testimony at 14, ff. Tr. 9336.)
- 64. EachchntractoruseditsownQCinspectorsasrein-specto$s. (Del George, prepared testimony at 21 ff. Tr. 8405; no Hansel,Ar. 8928.) However, steps were taken to ensure that
~
insFcctorfreinspected his own work. (Hansel, prepared testi-e .
mony at,'1'5,s f f. Tr. 8901; 8917.) Supervisors assigned work to
\
,reinspectors only after verifying that the inspector performing
- P )d '
- the r.einspection was not the original inspector. (Tuetken, prepared testimony at 20, ff. Tr. 8408.)
rnor /*
- 65. In eeme cases, a reins reinspecting. [ i::_.._'NC*1 (Ge.t 1, y: 8CTE'
- pector 42I.\ knew 2:.}- R .m.s. whoseaudit M sample work he wa by Mr. Hansel found no evidence or patterns indicating the presence,of a buddy system or any attempt to alter the resul (Hansel, prepared testimony at 16, ff. Tr. 8901;
' Centeg e en,ffy Th: r Del George j Tr. 8480: See also, Little, Tr. 9854-57.)
gp/ve e A tr< j w uegevidence that reinspectors were concerned and/or.influ-enced by the potential economic consequences to their employer
/, ht. weq A t. 1Ac. ro e ir h .@
, ff e.n f ./ /es f.
of adverse ~ program resultg O m.m c.or.t. m. 4 the reinspectors were y -
,_e 53 ". ::n.::1 t; i professionals concerned with ar4 their personal reputation $ "r M :::1 t::-if M that they
- i.. y br
- would not be likely to jeopardize their own repu-tations for the sake of the contractor. (Hansel, Tr. 8928-33.)
.Q .
hy wej.if,,',,,
hAN
+ a~ -.
- , . g - - - y , ---
3
f~
t-j' A >
- 66. - Independent-third-party reviews were conducted by
. Level.III inspectors of=all visual weld inspections which were
.foundidiscrepant. (Tuetken, prepared testimony at 19, 20, ff.
Tr. 8408.) . Third-party reviewers' examined 3,136 weld discrep-
.ancies identifiedf by Hatfield reinspectors, and determined that-1,150 of L these should have been accepted by the reinspectors
,1
' rather than : rejected. lThe~ third-party reviewers exanined 121 weld discrepancies identified by Hunter and determined that 12 should'have'been accepted rather than rejected. For FTL the
- third-party reviewers examined 999 weld discrepancies identi-fled by reinspectors, concluding that 94 should actually have
( GCs tenfen/r fW
~beenaccepted.[2hesethird-partyreviewresultsconfirmthat the reinspectors of--Hunter, Hatfield, and FTL generally evalu-ated weld inspections' consistently and conservatively.
~(Tuetken, prepared testimony at 30, ff. Tr. 8408.) This judg--
e se v.weM P -j ment was ;;5f :x;;'by- the NRC Region III Staff. (Ward, Staff prepared testimony at 10-11, ff. Tr. 9510; Ward, Tr. 9691-92, 9776; Del ~ George,-prepared testimony at 25, ff. Tr. 8406.)
- 67. Mr. Ward,7the Region's welding expert, testified that he found no instance where a reinspector had' missed a defi-
.ciency. Indeed, in'his opinion, in many cases the reinspectors
'were-overly ~ conservative, classifying welds as unacceptable
..even though they were in fact acceptab el un er d the AWS Cede.
(Ward, Tr. 9774-76; Ward, Staff prepared testimony at 10-12,
. j$)
ff. Tr. 9510; See also Little, Staff prepared testimony at i
r aL.,f /% - 3.7 o -
ef }%_
ps $sery tospec/kd infy rno w fire,e L A /er & P TL ta c/d.,
P 4000- . Ms.4[ red /
N && rL*f f Y-
- 7~r , 99//,)
~k.
14-16,-ff. Tr. 9510.) Mr. Hard estimated that reinspections were overly conservative in about 10-percent of the cases.
(Hard Tr. 9868. ) koq Nr. {A)ard hetenf N Cr judymd
- 68. To verify'the accuracy of the reinspections, Edison directed PTL to perform a special unit concept inspecticn to determine whether PTL's inspectors would independently arrive at the same results as the contractorsQC inspectors who were
. performing the reinspections. (Tuetken, prepared testimony at 19,.20, ff. Tr. 8408.) PTL performed a sample reinspection of the items inspected during the reinspection program. PTL randomly selected QC inspectors and activities for reinspec-tion, PTL inspectors were able to reproduce the reinspection results for Hatfield and Hunter at a very high rate (See
/fewe d Wi- N Shewski, prepared test at 21, ff.Tr.8423Apr:.idir;# .. u_
^ t *, r oergnee. ceuf.-Jone.e.. P7Z. A <J e w ow/<'f*ve.
t geeders .r: la de l _f est ..fa..: th-t th; . u...,_;;i;n: b H :fi::_ "
ae J Jf.? % for e // Mi inrye<f e.t w h a r<. rlb) ec.+,n w -k 1 'me =m -t:_ (;;.m m , pr:: r:d "
was r<n.epe.cfaj~ J. ie& 77*g f ,...m..
om
- g ...-
fy , ,e) y; w.e,g, j
f t .*ff . .
it.*n 44 m
fft. .eetf U remple, f&od. ped y, p' gg
- 69. The special unit concept inspection also verified that I
l' the reinspection personnel for Hatfield and Hunter were not t
-involved in the. reinspection of work that they had originally
.esu. PW 2- 2d'itir.., th; np;;ducibilit-2 I 1.c --
inspected.
., :.- ...,_ . ,,~..a E ~c;= ~-- ~ 'm =
' r nf ::unt-. mphym , oemonstrateo Inat tne resawcde.
a, l
'~
v . as t b 1 a n e i = m a t ; :...,u. : y = f 1 = i-2m - + ~->
(
a@j erl = = u i n _ ., .
- , p;;p = c e t= t s.=..y e
- m..=k.
m.._...__,,,,._,._.-_.._..,.m . .-. ~. . e+-,
2 1 __m .__
rr
%_ . n on
,,y ead k h m y JM& Q y, . 6,
- 6-W. 7; . 1906.)
g
,,ector was simply asked to measure the dimens ons of certai n components as-built.. In these ca, s, the r in-spectors' measurements were compared with the ensure ents H in 1 inspecte c . ("vup arv Jog a . ,
m-
'Q) -
^::ti-""y-2* ??, II. 12. Av, cas.; ur..socanar further ec*i-f ed, however, that he had never personally observed .is phe.-
a me.. n in any of his laboratory experiments; rather is test:--
m ony r garding this theory is based on his review of the liter-ature. Kochhar, Tr. 10,620.)
- 74. A with Dr. Kochhar's earlier theor' es, we are not
- )ersuaded th t a mimic effect played a sig ificant factor in
- he results of the BRP. First, by progr .. definition, the orly
.nspections whic. were subject to reine ection were those wh"re t he items inspecte hadbeenfoundorginallytoconformtof r equirements. (Kochh r, Tr. 10,618 ) Thus, the original i ;spection results can viewed s a constant, the origina:
1 1spector al.;ays having fo'nd e items to meet requirement s.
W e find, as a matter of com.- n sense, that the mimic effect is l ess likely to operate in onj ction with such a constant.
- 75. Moreover, and f even mo e importance, Dr. Kochhar 's t heory is inconsiste . with the act 1 evidence which the re-s ults of the BRP p oduced. Dr. Kochh conceded that if the-
.nspectors were ery thorough and rigid 'n their reinspecti on,
- he mimic effe t would be lessened. (Koc har, Tr. 10,621~22.)
1
- uch thorou . ness and rigidity in f act took lace. The soaff
- estified hat weld reinspectors were often o erly conser' a-tive , e n to the point of being " gun shy", in heir asse ssment of ea ier inspection alLE. (Warc, I M 790; S e also t
i[.'<gs _
- . 0,625.)
l .
D
, 's x
, INTERVENORS' ' PROPOS'ED' PARAGRAPHS70-76A g
n -
~
'.1 170. ?Dr;iKochhar. testified for Intervenors that knowledge:by the?reinspectors ofothe identities of the original inspectors (could' have biased the ' reinspection results nonconservatively,
~
n -
'thattis, incfavorlof conforming reinspections. Even
- thoughithe precise amount of bias could not be quantified (Kochhar, Tr. 10,605),Eit was important. (Kochhar, Tr.
~
10,610-)-
. Dr. Kochhar testified-that the reinspection effort should have been undertaken ~ by individuals with no previous involvement;. at the-site in order to minimize any bias, _(Kochhar,
-prepared testimony at.11, ff. Tr. 10,538.)
70A; - According to Dr. Kochhar, workplace dynamics and social
, associations,can influence the:reinspector's decision-making criteria. The BRP assigned site contractors
~
. responsibility to reinspect their own inspections.
lSomeLprocedureslin theiBRP may have mitigated these biases:
reinspectors wereJnot permitted to verify.their own inspec-tions , and PTL ' conducted a -limited number of over-inspections.
Nonetheless, even though some Hatfield, Hunter and PTL inspec-tors were no longer on-site during the reinspections, a large number of original ' inspectors were on-site at the
' critical time, and these inspectors and reinspectors may have
. continue'd personal associations with the off-site inspectors.
~
(Kochhar,. prepared testimony at 11, ff. Tr. 10,538). The key
- factor l's not~whether the individual remains on the site, but (Intervenors' Proposed 11 70-76A, p. 1) 6
-: <7s - , - -
4 .
s g.w
~; -
-2 I '
1 'whhther;there was,any.'personaliassociation between the
) inspector;and reinspector. (Kochhar,.Tr. 10,608.)
'L70Sh(Werecognize,thecommonLsenselogicofDr.Kochhar's.
j _
' testimony. that in : order, to have the maximum confidence in
? the? validity of the reinspection results, the reinspector should- bel" independent"' of ;the original inspector.
Not only
~
^
t should the inspector's name be: concealed,1but to minimize biasithe reinspector should have no -previous . involvement at
'the' site',cand thus no economic incentive to: demonstrate a
_ y -
hidhilevel.of~workquality. That reinspectors were. employed Sbkisitecontractors,andreceivedtheir.initialinstructions
~
Jand general supervision from these:same contractors., also may
!have led to-bias of the reinspection results.
NRC regulations may permit site contractors to do both inspections and' rein -
lspections, but nevertheless.the reinspectors' knowledge of the-y inspectors names led to bias. We' acknowledge that,zin practice, it'might be difficult .~to undertake a completely in-3 .. dependent : reinspection . program,. but preventing the reinspectors (from knowing the names of'the original inspectors would I?ssen
.the . potential for a non-conservative bias resulting from
_ reinspectors being more lenient. (Kochhar, prepared
^ ~
_ ; .destimonyf, at 12, ff. Tr. 10,538.)
7 13 We are persuaded by Dr. Kochhar that a reinspector's knowledge (Interveno rs ' Proposed 11 70-76A, p. 2)
.) #.
h y' , y. _;
,i <
l.s. '
fP:t y
+
x , j. -
'+
,,e t 4pb d
t *y 5
- c e
~
.ofptheLidentity"of the inspector' introduces a bias that, in 1 -
- m'ost!Jeases,Ewoul'd be -lenient 'and tihus tend to overstate an Einspector's-results. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,607.) This. bias is
- important , and pertinent..to nuclear power plant inspection's.
.m x c(KochharF.Tr. 10,610-11.)-
y s72:. sWetfind that in most_ cases, the reinspectors knew the-identities H
l[' jf[theinspector'swhoseworktheyexamined. This tended to.
- generally overstate the.BRP results-by leading to a higher
- ~ '
fpercentagesof; conforming reinspections than otherwise would'
.T
~
.have been justified under the circumstances. ' Reliable con-
+ :. ,
,, clusionscabout the BRP'results can be made only after this
+_
x 1 human Lfactor : bias is' taken into account. This non-conservative-l, ' = bias 1 undermines our confidence that the BRP was appropriate w m '
"to; determine'whether an' inspector was adequately qualified,
(
- 3. . Ifollowing his initial training.
, c g= E7 3 In'mostiinstances the reinspectors knew the resuir,s of the i ~
Sorihinal~ inspections. (' Hansel,.Tr. 8933-5; Kochhar,
. prepared testimony ~atl12,.-ff. Tr. 10,538) The reason for this J:.g , cis: easy]to understand. The reinspection program-was set up so .i that thelonly:. inspections which.were reinspected were those M_y where the items inspected 'had_ b'een found originally to b
s c'onform to; requirements.*/; However, it is neither typical nor
- / The . single exception is with respect to "as-builts ," uhere the rein-iipector was Lsimply asked to measure the dimensions of certain components
. -fas-built. In these cases, the'reinspectors' measurements were compared 1.with . the measurements of the original' inspectors. (Kochhar, Tr.10,619.)'
- (Inte rveno rs Proposed 11 70-76A, p. 3)
(c desirable industry practice to permit the reinspector to know the original inspection results. (Kochhar prepared testimony at 12, ff. Tr. 10,538.)
74 Dr. Kochhar testified that this knowledge of the original results introduces another source of possible bias. Based on his human factors studies, the fact that in most instances the reinspectors knew the results of the original inspections could have resulted in a " mimic" effect where reinspectors conform their results to the original inspection results.
(Kochhar, prepared testimony at 12, ff. Tr. 10,538.) Dr.
Kochhar testified that this phenomenon is based on the
" general human tendency to avoid deviation from a prior determination." (Kochhar, prepared testimony, at 12, ff. Tr.
10,538.) Dr. Kochhar further testified, however, that he had never personally examined this phenomenon in any of his laboratory experiments; rather his testimony regarding this theory is based on his review of the studies undertaken by others. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,620.)
- 75. Dr. Kochhar conceded that if the inspectors were very thorough and rigid in their reinspections,the mimic effect would be lessened, and the bias could be somewhat offset. (Kochhar, Tr. 10,621-22.) The Staff testified that weld reinspectors may have been sometimes overly conservative in their (In te rveno rs ' Proposed 11 70-76A, p. 4) n
gy m .
m:-
i% e .*
D, ,
' ^
F-l.
iassessment of. earlier inspection results. (Ward , Tr.
, 9776'- 9790
, See also Kochhar, Tr. 10,625.)
s 76. We are? persuaded by Dr. Kochhar that the reinspector's knowledge,in most cases, of inspection results biased the BRP:results and most probably led to a higher percentage of conforming'reinspections. Thus the percentage of the
' original inspectors' work found to be acceptable by the reinspectors would be higher than otherwise would have been:Justifi'ed by-the circumstances. Reliable conclusions-about the BRP results can be made only after the biar from this human factor,-even though it cannot be prec'isely
. quantified, is-taken into account.
76A. Overall, we find that the cumulative effect of these three
=particular human factors identified by Dr. Kochhar as present in. the structure and implementation of the BRP -- reliance on reinspections .of the inspectors' fi'rst three months of job performance;.that, in mos t cases , the reinspectors knew the names of_the original inspectors; and that, in most cases, the reinspectors knew the original inspection results -- biased the program results, and most probably led to_a. higher percentage of conforming reinspections. The percentage of i
the original inspectors' work found to be acceptable by the
.reinspectors thus would be higher than otherwise would have been justified by the circumstances. Reliable conclusions about
-(Intervenors ' Proposed 11 70-76A, p. 5) 5-W
gy ,
a,~ -
wc -
2 , , .
lA
$\ '
. ' the BRP results can- be made. only af ter the biase's f rom
. 1 'these human' factors are taken into account. These non--
s conservative; biases undermine our ' confidence that - the BRP was1 appropriate Lt o determine whether an inspector was
- ' la'dequately qualified'following .his initial training.
4
,(,.
s 9
b 4
o Y
. (Inte rveno rs ' Proposed 11 70-76A, p. 6)
.f
Fin ;. 2 . '. .. . :: .. . .~ 1 .. 2Z w w... we s eau %c. w.
ew thei. work would receive a g at deal of attention. The- '
ew particula. that they t ...selves might be reinspected, y the NRC Staff, by a ECo a- itor or by someone like Mr. Hanse -
- n Mr. Hansel's judgme ,
the reinspectors were strongly met -
rated to perform th .r jobs p erly, even stringently, not to r;;;
t_ cf .;m .. 1. . ... .su ("* ea' .
nimic th 7_. . .
h^27 ': 0 . )
- c. Termination Of Allen Koca
- 77. In our June 8 Order setting forth the scope of the reopened proceedings, we denied Intervenor's request to make the circumstances surrounding the termination of Allen Koca, former Hatfield QA supervisor, a mandatery issue to be addres-sed. However, Interveners had been granted the right to d s-cover information concerning Mr. Koca's termination (Tr. 8156-61.) . and we stated that the parties themselves should determine its relevance, if any, to the BRP. (Memorandum and Order Fol-lowing Prehearing Conference, dated June 8, 1984, at 6.) In the interest of a complete record, Edison and the Staff pre-sented undisputed testimony concerning Mr. Koca.
- 78. First, Mr. Koca's release from Hatfield in October 1983 was not related in any way to his work on the BRP.
-(Tuetken, prepared testimony at 8, ff. Tr. 8408; See also Hayes, Tr. 9965.) Second, Mr. Koca's role in the BRP was limited to supervising the Hatfield QA clerical staff review of
.y a:
3,-
E i_,J 1 certification-records _to identify the roster of inspectors based.on certification dates. Thereafter, his role consisted solely ofLsupervising the' clerical. staff members who were res-pensible for searching the inspection record files to identify each individual inspection performed by the selected inspecters during their first 90 days. (Tuetken, prepared testimeny at 7, ff. Tr.' 8408.)
- 79. Finally, Mr. Koca's work on the ERP was satisf actory, as demonstrated by audits performed by the Ceco Site QA Depart-
-ment in June 1983 ( Audit 6-83-66) and August 1983 ( Audit 6-83-124). 'These audits confirmed that Hatfield had properly prepared 'the chronological listing of inspectors free w(.ich the
= reinspection sample was selected, and had properly established the. population of inspections for each selected inspector.
(Tuetken, prepared testimony at 8,- f f. Tr. 84C8. )
VI. OVERSIGHT OF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION a.. CECO QA' Audits And Surveillances
- 80. Ceco's quality assurance department conducted three audits and four surveillances of the ERP. Two of the audits including dealt with tne activities of mil site contractors, The third audit involved only Hatfield. .
. Hatfield and Hunter.
- Additional surveillances were performed to close out all audit
' ? "% findings and observations. These audits and survellances were
- P f ;
described in detail in the testimony ,of Walter 5 ewski, Mr.
- - - ---_- - - __ .c3
1 5=
s -
j"%
\
li 5.sF}-
1 l
Shewski- testified that -all findings, observations or other con-cerns raised as a result of these audits and surveillances have been Lclosed by Applicant on the basis of acceptable corrective actions. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 5-20, ff. Tr. 8423.)
We ' discuss the specifics of the audits in the following para-
. graphs. s
- 81. Audit 83-66 was conducted between June 21, 1983 and l
' July 6,1983 and examined the following areas for each of the seven contractors involved in the BRP:
-- Reinspection sample sice of inspectors and inspection items. .
-- Items determined to be inaccessible.
-- Third party review of potentially un-acceptable subjective type inspect: ens.
-- Dispositions of nonconforming condi-tions discovered during the EEP.
--- Adequate documentation of the reinspec-tion program as implemented by the con-tractors.
-- Qualifications of inspection personnel performing reinspection.
Audit 6-83-66 resulted in a single finding. Part A of that C to finding applied to Hunter, Part B to Hatfield and Par ff. Tr.
PTL. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 8, Attachment E, 8423.)
- 82. Part A of- the audit finding identified two problems e- with potential consequences on the analysis of the BRP re-c; e sults. The first problem involved the use of field problem L
7--
. ,:~
Yb '
sheets by Hunter rather than discrepancy reports. A sWbsequent dis-
. quality' assurance surveillance (number 5189) verified that crepancy. reports had in fact been initiated for the particular discrepancies as required by Hunter's procedures. (Shewski,_
prepared testimony at 9, Attachment F, ff. Tr. 8423.) The second problem involved the reinspection of bolted connections by Hunter. This item was dispositioned by a letter from Sargent & Lundy which stated that the particular bolt values would relax over time and thus could not be reproduced for purposes of = the -reinspection program. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 9, ff. Tr. 8423.)
- 83. Part B of the audit f 2nding determined that Hatfield was using field problem sheets to resolve discrepancies identi-fled during reinspection for conduit and terminatien attri-
.butes. A subsequent quality assurance surveillance (5202 El) found that Hatfielt 10R number 674 was written to dispositien a deficient item discovered during the reinspection process which had previously been the subject of a field problem sheet.
.(Shewski, prepared testimony at 10, ff. Tr. 8423) .
- 84. Part C determined that PTL had not yet transmitted
' inspection reports generated during the BRP to the apprcpr: ate contractors. These inspection reports described discrepant conditions in work performed by other contractors, but in-
. with nonconforming conditions would be reported,to the contrac-
~
i
+
j9 V
I tors upon> completion of.the BRP. Upon being advised during the audit to?immediately transmit nonconforming. reports to the
-appropriate contractors after concurrence by the independent' third party. inspector, PTL began and continued transmitting-
- such' reports as 'they were prepared. No further corrective action was required. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 10, ff.
Tr. 8423.)
- 85. The second audit, 6-83-93, was conducted between November 14 and November 17,J1983 and examined the following Lar'eas for each of the seven contractors involved in the ERF :
-- Accuracy of BRP results as reported to the NRC in the Interim Report.
-- The design basis for the engineering evaluation of visual weld inspection discrepancies as described in the Interim Report.
-- Qualifications of the third party
!c inspectors.
t
-- Documentation of third party inspec-
~
tions.
-- Basis for project construction depart-ment " Interpretations" regarding the BRP.
-- Correction of deficiencies identified as a result of the BRP.
(Shewski, prepared testimony at 14, Attachment N, ff. Tr. 8423.)
~
uB 6. Audit 6-83-93 identified no findings or observations applicable to Hatfield or Hunter. It did, however, result in c
A7 one finding applicable to PTL. Following implementation of a PTL
' project construction department interpretation of the BRP,
' ' ', ~ - - - - ~ - , _ , , , + . - , e f b an _ _ _ __ _
b yy A
%./ !
z:,
had.~ ch6cged the deficient status of some welds which previously ihad received third party concurrences on rejectability without allowing the; independent third party inspector to concur or disagree with the changes. Corrective action for'this Finding
^
involved'the resubmittal to the third. party inspector of the
.particular reports which changed the deficient status of the rejected. welds for reasons other than those addressed by the Interpretation. In addition, the contractors were advised that
- such second inspections should.not be performed without allow-Ling the third party to concur or. disagree. This corrective action _was documented in Ceco surveillance 5696. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 15~, Attachment 0, ff. Tr. 6423.) ,
- 87. The thirdLCECo quality assurance audit, 6-83-124, was directed solely at Hatfield and was conducted between August 24 and September 1, 1983. Its purpose was to verify preper imple-
- mentation of the BRP by Hatfield. The audit examined welding and Hatfield reinspection methodology for welding. Specif1-
.cally, field and record reviews were performed to determine that Hatfield had adequate traceability of weld travelers to installations in the field. The reviews were accomplished by retrieving weld travelers from Hatfield for a particular compc-nent and then going.into the field to determine which weld travelers corresponded to which weld on the component. Since
^ gg welders identify welds on a component with a unique identifica-gy tion number assigned to them traceability of weld traveler to m e
. , . _ . - - ,~ .
weld could be made. In addition, this audit reviewed the method Hatfield used to identify hangers which had been re-worked or renumbered so that a reinspection could be performed if required. This was done by reviewing the inspection histcry of a component to determine the completeness of inspection as well as identification of the most current inspection. Final-ly, the audit was performed to verify that Hatfield was proper-ly inspecting combination cable pan hanger welds (hangers shared with the HVAC contractor). This was perfermed thrcugh identification of combination hangers, and review of ins alla-tion and inspection documentation to support the installatien.
(Shevski, prepared testimony at 16-18, Attachment P, ff. Tr-8423.)
- 89. Audit 6-83-124 resulted in two findings. The first finding was that in some cases the weld traveler cards did not adequately identify the weld in the field for inspection. The second finding was that not all combination hanger inspections had been documented to indicate conclusively that the inspec-
- tinn was completed. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 18, ff.
l Tr. 8423.)
- 89. Hatfield's corrective action for the first finding was to correlate the weld traveler inspection data to design drawing cable pan hanger data using computer data base manage-
' ' ' ment techniques to demonstrate traceability of inspection.
t This use of the computerized data base identified the welders 2 - .. _
~
c
.)
W(j and inspectors who worked on and inspected the component as well as components not inspected. For those components for which no correlation existed between component and inspection data,- it' was assumed that no weld inspection had ever occur-re'd . An inspection was initiated to complete the documentation and any necessary repairs. This corrective action was docu-mented.in Ceco QA surveillance 5275. (Shewski, prepared testi-mony.at 19, Attachment Q, ff. Tr. 8423.)
- 90. Hatfield's corrective action for the second finding
' involved the identification of all combination hangers for which inspection accountability was indeterminate. The hangers identified were considered as. never having been inspected. An inspection was performed and, where required, rework was per-
[
formed. This-corrective action was documented in CEOo. surveil-(Shewski, prepared testimony at 19, Attachment R,
~
.1ance 5274.
ff. Tr. 8423.)
- 91. .The audit finding in Audit 6-83-66 regarding the use of field problem sheets by Hatfield and Hunter was one of the matters discussed' in our initial decision as indicating con-tinuing documentation problems on the part of Hatfield and Hunter. (I.D. SD-444.) In the remanded hearing we had the opportunity to place that audit finding in the context both of
. the overall evolution of documentation requirements for 4% Hatfield and Hunter (see infra 1's 301 - 306) and oversight 6f y1 the BRP by the CECO Quality Assurance Department.. While we do O_
M w
not condone the use of the field problem sheets p novgc n;t if' sfW
.f%v a)wre. eSTset en f b l2.a that J.y 2 n i . .~ . . . ' #th mm_ hars bem corr'ecN. ? e reliability of the results o the BRFg Moreover, CECO's overall quality assurance effort, including the special audit of Hatfield (t's 87 - 90) and the special unit concept inspection of the BRF by PTL adds to our confidence that the program was conducted in accordance with the program description, that there were no alterations of the results and hat the reported results are accurat fu kjed Ya k ina cwracA er it wtred 'n 9 /3'fa- 6 e /* W.
- b. NRC Staff overview Tf. m f f c m . i ;'.^. vf i.Lc amu ^. auon 01 de h# ""
ieen extensive. Mr. Ward testified .at he and another Staf.
.nspec. r visually examined approxi ..ately 500 welds which had i i
cean prev ously examined by Hatfi Id, Hunter or FTL inspector and which h d been subject to t.e ERP (Ward, Staff prepared testimony, at 0, Enclosure 1 t 37, ff Tr. 9510). The Staff inspectors exam ned the weld to determine that they had in fact been reinspe *ed and at the reinspector had not over-looked a discrepanc M . Ward testified that he also examined the documentation of ds generated by the BRF as well as th-documentation genera
- d the original weld inspection. he also held discussio .s with *upervisors and lead weld inspe:-
tors. (Ward, Sta f prepared estimony at 10, 11, enclosures ,,
J, ff. Tr. 9510
- 93. Mr. ard testified that du.4ng his oversight inspec-k uu o be fed,d uw vane or a reinar cter -irring c dd4 M a h/ mon ' t% par J $ 72-R
- f. Ifouse O 7 "f* * .
mm . ,-, ,
k] g l_,
J' ' ~
p 9M g - , ,
g, - .
y,:- a _
- - 3 ..
. : INTERVENORS' PROPOSED PARAGRAPHS 92-94 q: ,-. _
N '
[
i:- - c 192. itaff[overbight' of' the ' implementation 1of the BRP has
?
~
Ibeeniextensivel[ Nut. inconsistent and overstated. Mr.
.:y.
P1 : Ward Itestifisd1thaty he: and ~ another staff inspector
- .g
- Jvisuallyy. examined approximately - 330 welds which-.had w
.been previotisly; examined by Hatfield, Hunter o.r PTL z
,hs finspectors and which had been subject to-the BRP (Ward ~,
1 .
LTr? 9639, . 9911;) . The staff inspectors examined the Lweldsf to determine that they had in fact been
~
reinspected and thathhe ~ reinspector had. not overlooked
+
a:: dis crepancy . On : theibasis of his . review, Mr. Ward k "
- concluded that
- "it. is my- opinion l that Byron is probably.
^
,, Fthe; safest plant there is because' of'all this Yet Mr. ; Ward acknowledged that ' he
~
+ ; reinspection-. 4."
e did no t , think - that there was : any. need / toiconduct the "BRPgand,that his: expertise was limited. to welds . (Ward,
~Tri 9910.-). Then;Mr. Ward conceded that his statement "J Jwasi based.on.havingLinspected only those 330 Itunter,
,* : Hat' field and' PTL welds , less than a 17.' sample of the
~
L36,000 welds' that- were- subj ect to the BRP and even a
' smaller percentage 'of the many Byron plant welds. We
.~
find that Mr. War'd's assertions are overstated in light g -
n:
u.
of his 511mited review.- (Ward, Tr. 9639, 9911.)
[A. t i e
1 J 4 l
.-L.-__._. .-__:--_.~.. '
Y:-
.L) the contrary, nr. Ward cvuwludud LL i iu seny c-sci L pection results were overly co ervative because rein:pec-rei tors w e classifying welds and tributes as unacceptable 1 even though, in r. Ward's judgment they were in fact acceptab e under the app cable welding ode. Nor did Mr. Ward find a
- y instance of a rei spection et being conducted correctly.
" Finally, Mr. Ward fo d o deficiencies in the documentatic a generated by the BRP
- the original inspections. (Ward ,
Staff prepared testd ..ony at 1, ff. Tr. 9510.)
- 94. For othe then welding ttributes, Staff oversight of Hatfield and Hu ter included the rev w of inspection repor ts, nonconforman* reports, deficiency report. and the observa tion of work at ivities, including inprocess inspec d
ens. (War.,
T-Love, 0 - -## r**p red te-tin;ny ;t 11, encic ure 3,
._ '^4 me.W M
- 95. TheStaffalso/;:Eifi:d Applicant's oversight of the BRP by reviewing audit and surveillance reports and by inter-views with Ceco personnel. (Love, Staff prepared testimony at 11, 12, ff. Tr. 9510.)
VII. METHOD OF EVALUATING RES*JLTS OF BEF
- 96. The original inspection record and the reinspection record were compared and evaluated to determine whether any cm discrepancy between the two records existed. (Del George, pre-9, pared testimony at 20, 21, ff. Tr. 8406.) .
O e
=
f', .
~.
1
- 97. Acceptable items were defined as those for which the 1
reinspector agreed with the condition recorded on the original )
inspection record. Without that agreement, the item was graded as unacceptable. (Del George, prepared testimony at 21, ff.
Tr. 8406.)
- 98. All observed discrepancies were recorded and tabulated and subsequently compared to the BRP acceptance criteria.
These discrepancies were counted against the original inspector whether or not the observed diacrepancy was later demonstrated to be a valid discrepancy when compared to current design or installation parameters and tolerances. (Del Cecrge, preparad testimony at 22, ff. Tr. 8406.)
F 7 VIII. RESULTS OF THE REI!SPECTION PROGRAF.
pferI AS THEY RELATE TO IN5?ECTOR QUA*.IFICATION I
- rn kva* N -. n._ = _ : _ c . ;; . : a : d -
t= : e rT- ...,.m_
fn# l_ t rs demonstrated with ve'r
. few ex psions, that the sampi
[, /l.g, nspectors were qualified. 1 Hatfield, Hunter and PTL
[
h.f Lnspectors passed the 95% a e tance criteria for objectiv e
' attributes during their # rst th ee months of inspections.
4, p<s. I I (Del Goorge, prepared estimony at '7, 28 ff. Tr. 640^- :e V '
(1-
_ ":n :1, y.cy twu sw umu, : 2 , ff n SOM.
100. For the subjective attribute (visual weld inspec-tion), Hatfield and Hunter each had one inspector whose first m't three months of work failed to meet the 90% acceptance crite-ria. PTL had two such inspectors. Because these, individuals
.v INTERVENORS' PROPOSED PARAGRAPH 99
- 99. 'khe7BRP results ' fall short of establishing that contracter iguality. control' inspectors at Byron were qualified and may
- thus 'be presumed to .have detected safety significant construction defects.
Overall, the-universe of inspectors covered by the BRP included >356. inspectors. Of these, 110 were-sampled.
.0f these, at least 18 did not achieve program acceptance levels either in their first three months or thereafter.
(BRP - February , 1984 Report at ES-3 and Exhibit V-2.)
(Two more inspectors did not. pass the acceptance criteria in their first three months , but passed after their second three months. ~(BRP Report, Ex. V-2.)
In other words, approximately 16% of the sampled inspectors did not achieve either 90% on visual weld inspections or 95% on inspections of objective attributes.
This fact alone weakens any inference that all 356 inspectors were qualified, and that none of them overlooked safety significant deficiencies.-
More fundamentally, even if a higher percentage of inspectors had achieved program acceptance levels, the program as defined did not generate data from which one can reliably infer inspector qualifications. This point was made in the testimony of two experienced NRC staff members, including-the principal author of the original NRC inspection findings questioning the qualifications of.
Byron quality control inspectors.
(Intervenors' Proposed 199, p.1)
m o
INTERVENORS' PROPOSED PARAGRAPH 99 That inspector, Mr. Forney, testified:
. . . My belief is that the data base that's available does not provide conclusively that an inspector is caaable. There are other things that could be taken into considera-tion.
For example, if you're going to qualify an individual and you're going to give him the capability demonstration test, you give him a sample of demonstration pieces with known problems, which would have a hign percentage of problems involved, and you determine the individual's ability to discern the relative effects.
The Reinspection Program, in my mind, - be-cause I believe that the work out there is generally of good quality - skews the data aase in such a direction that most often in my mind, an inspector is merely looking at work that is already good. So it's difficult, then, to say whether 3c's determining good or bad.
(Tr. 10, 063.)
Asked whether he was suggesting, "that it's really more important to focus on what proportion of the defects were detected by the original inspector, rather than the data which was actually used to score the results of the Reinspection Program," Mr. Forney replied, I included that as one of the things that I would include in the population if I were going to post facto try and determine the capability. I would possibly want to be interested in did this inspector ever iden-tify anything and cause it to be corrected.
The Reinspection Program wasn't designed to take that type of look and factor it into the program.
(Tr. 10, 064-065.)
(Intervenors' Proposed 199, p. 2)
=-
)-
INTERVENORS' PROPOSED PARAGRAPH 99 As an illustration, Mr. Forney pointed out, For example , if you had 100 widgetts or what-ever and 10 of them were bad, one position could be that you have 90 percent confidence in that inspector's ability to discern the quality of the work. Another person might take the view that if those are the only 10 -
or you don't know that those are the only 10 bad widgetts that were in the sample, that you have a 0 confidence in that inspector's ability.
And another person might take the position that would say, I would like to know something about the population of widgetts that that inspector ever caused to be fixed, and then integrate that knowledge together to come up with soma perspective of your belief in an inspector's capability.
(Tr. 10, 065-066.)
Despite the importance of the inspectors' defect det ccion raten in his view, neither Mr. Forney nor any other- member of his panel was " aware of any data generated by the Reinspection Program that would enable one to examine what proportion of the defects initially jconfronted by the original inspector he detected" (Tr.
j ,10, 071), and CECO produced no evidence of such data at the hearing.
Mr. Torney was not the only NRC staff member to hold the foregoing views . In February, 1984, panel member i llayes had written an internal NRC memorandum questioning (Intervenors' Proposed 199, p. 3)
T
)
INTERVENORS' PROPOSED PARAGRAPil 99 whether inspector capabilities could be inferred from the BRP results . Although he had described the memorandum
- as a devil's advocate position, when asked whether what he "actually believed" was "approximately the same then as what Mr. Forney has just described now," he answered:
A. Yes, I believe so.
Q: And you hold those same views today?
A: Yes ....
(Tr. 10, 071.)
We find the logic of the position argued by Mr. Forney (and concurred in by Mr. llayes) to be persuasive on the issue of inspector qualifications. If one believes -- as Mr. Forney does and as CECO vigorously asserts -- that the quality of the work in the BRP sample was good, then the agreement rate betwoon the original inspector and the reinspector tells one little about the capabilities of the original inspector.
Applying Mr. Forney's illustration directly to the BRP, consider an inspector who " scores", say, 95% on visual weld examinations. What this tells one is that the reinspector agreed with the original inspector in 95 out of 100 cases. But what does it tell one about the capabilities of the original inspector, assuming that the reinspector is capable? If there were 10 defective welds in the population of 100 welds examined, it tells (Intervenors' Proposed 199, p. 4)
[ O. .
?
a.
?
gc INTERVENORS' PROPOSED PARAGRAPH 99 t
one f.that the- original inspector detected only five out of the 10 ' defective welds . Had the BRP been graded on this basis, the original inspector would have " scored," not 95%
..as Ereported' by CECO, but- only 50%.
~
TNat, in turn, would offer weak support, if.any, for
- CECO's contention that Byron has been' safely constructed.
Would .anyone be comforted. to know that of all the discrepant welds - at Byron, the original ~ quality control inspectors detected only 50%?~
r.
Ms. Forney is not troubled by the logical difficulty
-:in-inferring inspector capabilities from the BRP data, because he~ believes' on- other grounds that Byron is safely Ibuilt.
L.
He thus characterizes his argument on this issue as a'" miniscule point." .(Tr. 10, 064.)
However, whether Mr. Forney's point is miniscule .or inot depends on the degree to which one agrees with him that m: the re are , in fact, sufficient grounds other than an inference of-inspector capabilities for finding reasonable assurance-th'at Byron is built. safely. As discussed in 1166
.below, this . Board finds the other grounds asserted by -
=
CECol~to be overstated;as well. Consequently, we view.
Mr. Forney's1 argument as a significanticritique ' of CECO 's contention that one can ' reasonably infer, from the BRP 1d ata,,that the inspectors were capable, and thus can be (Intervenors' Proposed 199, p. 5) e t
c- , ,
"y. [ A a
, . . . - INTERVENORS'-PROPOSED PARAGRAPH-99 s
' presumed'to have. detected any safety signficant defects in i
- the' 90-95% of -Hatfield .and Hunter' work at Byron which was '
.not'.re nspec i' et d. (See -: 1166-c below.)
c -
y; 1
s
" i:
c- ,
e f
L
- Yk
); .
,e
-1.%
4 n
(Intervenors' Proposed 199, p. 6)
'4('
.T: .,
- ?. :--se
- T. f=
i (
L k~d '
a had no further: work, their qualifications could not be assessed further.andLunder the terms-of the BRP were censidered indeter-
- minate. The. reinspection results for these inspectors were
- retained'in the BRP data base. A substitution was made for-each of these inspectors .and each substitute's reinspected work was determined to meet program acceptance criteria.
(Del- George, prepared testimony at 28, ff. Tr. 8406. )
101. The performance of one PTL inspector _did .not meet the 90% subjective - acceptance criterion for either his first or second three-month period. Therefore, all of this inspector's
' remaining work was reinspected. In addition, PTL was subjected to an inspector sample expansion which. captured the fir,st three months of work for visual welding inspection of all remaining
-inspectors whose work was accessible. Each of the four add:-
. tional inspectors passed the 90% acceptance criterion. (Del George, prepared testimony at 28, ff. Tr. L8406; Shewski, pre-
~
pared testimony at 24, ff. Tr. 8423; Little,-Staff prepared testimony'at 9, 10, ff. Tr. 9550. ) (ht '.ree 9 (, f a lev e..
, .rema of 1 .
102. .Both'Edisonanq(theStaffhaveconcludedthatthe number.of: inspectors whose work was reinspected, the amount and type of. work reinspected, and the requirement for sample expan-sion provides'a valid basis to' draw positive conclusions about the qualifications of the overall population of inspectors, and
. g y. specifically .those - for Hatfield, Hunter and PTL. (Del George,
.nr2-
- prepared testimony 29-53, ff Tr. 8406; Hansel, p,repared testi-4
- m e
r'_N Nowwer i de th rear..,s rfaleef in # 1 T
- Me, w ] l W 4- Af]e r~t?.C* .
- L mony at 23, ff. Tr. 8901; Little, Staff prepared testimony at 4, ff. Tr 9510; Connaughton, Tr. 9876. ) As Mr. Del George emphasized, the fundamental objective of the BRP was to verify by_ reinspection the adequacy of the qualification and certifi-cation practices for contractor QC inspectors. He concluded, 7
- % that the BRP demonstrated the effectiveness of these practices for a representative sample of inspectors from which
_it can be inferred that the same practices were effective as applied to the remaining inspectors and, therefore, as to all inspection work performed by the entire inspector populatien.
(Del George, prepared testimony at 33, ff.Tr.8406.)[
103. The f act that certain inspections were inaccessible
,& thfar.co,e,e concarnres inspect-r ep*AAd*Ki since, as or net _ recreatable coes not affect /th::: c d l ~ .A Mr. Del George pointed out, the qualification and certif catien programs for inaccessible and non-recreatable attributes were the same as those verified by the BRP. (Del George, prepared testimony at 22, ff. Tr. 8406.) Indeed, Messrs. Buchanan and Somsag testified that Hatfield and Hunter QC inspectors were selected and trained in the same manner regardless of the types of inspections they were to perform. (Buchanan, prepared rebuttal testimony.at 3, 4,.ff. Tr. 11,174; Semsag, prepared testimony at 2-5, ff. Tr. 11,172.) The requirements. imposed for prior experience, job training, and performance demenstra-g tion have the same general scope and technical content for each e- - _
of these attributes. In addition, the attributes not rein-
.- -W
f y f .(se ff.s. . na.ceu tst ed cf NIW 9 I9if a W*e J V,/m--
~
spected are similar in many respects to those captured for reinspection. (Del George, prepared testimony at 33-35, ff.
'Tr.-8406;- Muffet, Tr. 9871; s_ee generally, Muffet, Staff pre-
-. pared testimony at 21-23, ff. Tr. 9510.)
104. We-have previously found that the sanple selection process for inspectors whose. work was to be reinspected was n.Y gf.)tshasl!4 s. oat 9pprop;irt^>(1 37, supra); that the choice of the first 90 days A
of an inspectors tenure on the site was a proper time period
~ and ini-for checking , be t' the validity of an &inspector's a **e-ueeterve.hve traininh o+Aer avryerer ( Lf.
tialqualification.(5498, supra [;theacceptancecriteriafor establishing whether an inspector was cualif:ed, based on the o a c est hr bis . Ad nof dsen ons&n A f.1 >
results of the reinspection are , propri;;; ar.yconse'rvative O
(I's 53,.+G, supra) the results of the ERP are accurate and
. , exJee .
reliablef(!91, supra), and there was -" ~ "'r.w"- oversight of
,fr.;<.M o M ied 4 > '
the entire ERP by CECO's QA department ancfthe NRC Regfonal Staff (5's 80 - 90,, supra). Based on the results of the-ERP,'8 M c-It un k le- h h>cf i
- the Board d'-ythat Applicant has provided reasonable assur-ance that the ' Hatfield, Hunter and PTL inspectors who performed inspections at Byron, beginning with the construction of safety-related work in 1976 through Septenber 1982, were qual-ified, even though their certifications'were not in strict ,
accordance with ANSI N45.2.6 (1978).
[ gg a
s 0
-w
\
u) .
IX. SARGENT & LUNDY DISCREPANCY EVALUATIONS L105. On July 26 and 27, 1984, Applicant presented testi-mony.on the engineering evaluation of discrepancies performed by Sargent & Lundy.
Applicant presented a panel conprised of:
John M. McLaughlin, Partner and Manager of the Structural
. Department at Sargent & Lundy; Ernest B. Branch, Associate and Director of Mechanical Design at Sargent & Lundy; Richard X.
. French, Partner and Manager of the Electrical Department at Sargent & Lundy; and-Anand K. Singh, Associate and Assistant Head of'the Structural Analytical Division at Sargent & Lundy.
On July 30'and 31,. 1984, the NRC Staff presented'the testi=cny
< .of William Little, Branch Chief in the Division of Reactor Safety, NRC Region.III; Kavin D.' Ward, Ray Love and Janes Muffett, Reactor Inspectors in the Division of Reactor Safety,
. NRC Region III; and Kevin Connaughton, Resident Inspector at Byron. On August 22, 1984, Intervenors presented the testi=cny
. of Charles'C. Stokes,-an. engineering consultant with P/S Asso-
~
ciates. In response to questions raised by Mr. Stokes relating to-Sargent & Lundy's engineering evaluation of discrepancies, Applicant presented the rebuttal testinony of Bryan A. Erler,
. Associate and Director of the Structural Division at Sargent &
Lundy; Robert W.-Hooks,' Assistant Division Head of the Struc-tural' Engineering Division at Sargent & Lundy; Dennis DeMoss, Mechanical Project Engineer in the Project Management division ap;,
e
-S4-ba..-
Ni tt) at Sargent & Lundy; and Ernest B. Branch, who was part of the original panel.
106. -Sargent & Lundy performed an engineering evaluation of discrepancies in work performed by Hatfield involving hard-ware installation and work performed by Hunter involving hard-ware installation and related documention, which were catego-rized as objective attributes. A total of 63,085 reinspections of Hatfield objective attributes was performed as part of the Reinspection Program out of which 2,153 discrepancies were identified. Another 3,896- reinspections of Hatfield objective attributes were performed under a supplemental reinspection program and 158 discrepancies were identified. A total of 71,510 reinspections of Hunter' objective attributes was per-formed under the Reinspection Program out of which 689 discrep-ancies were identified. (French, prepared testimony at 4,6, p 12, ff. Tr. 9044; Branch, prepared testimony at 5-7, ff. Tr. rf
9051.) 'As we will explain below, ;;21;;._ fn; 1,244 of the 4- l q. i t Hatfield discrepancies and 614 of the Hunter discrepancies were determined upon evaluation either not to exceed design param-eters or tolerances or ,toerinvolve inconsecuential documentation ht +em was vzed % c.tc m ow BRP.,
items and were, therefore, not" valid" discrepancies) ((t's li2 and 122, infra.)
107. Sargent & Lundy also performed an engineering evalua-tion'of-visual weld discrepancies on welds produced by Hatfield tQ v- covered.by the American Welding Society ("AWS") standard and welds produced by Hunter covered by AWS and the American
m U: ..
' Society;of Mechanical Engineers ("ASME") Code. The ASME Code governs welding for piping and' pressure vessels and the AWS Code-' governs all other welding. A total of 27,538 Hatfield AWS weldstwere subjected to reinspection during the original pro-gram, out of'which 1,986 discrepancies were identified. A total of 3,~725 Hunter welds were reinspected (27% AWS welds, 73% ASME welds), out of which 109 discrepancies were identi-fled, 60 AWS and 49 ASME. (McLaughlin, Prepared Testimony at 3-5,-7,'14, ff. Tr. 9047; Branch, prepared testimony at 6, 10-11, ff. Tr. 9051.)
- a. ' Objective Attributes -- Hatfield Discrepancies-108. Hatfield installed all the components,' materials and equipment associated with the electrical systems at Syron, including the installation of electrical equipment, cable tray and conduit and the pulling and terminating of cable. Hatfield also~ installed concrete expansion anchors that were initially
~
inspected'and reinspected by PTL. This work was' divided into the followi'ng objective attributes.for reinspection: conduit installation, cable termination, cable-tray and cable-tray-hanger. installation,- equipment modification, conduit as-built reconciliation, A-325 bolting, and concrete expansion anchers.
~ (Visual weld inspection, discussed infra, was separately char-
. acterized as a subjective Hatfield attribute.) (French, pre-pared : testimony at- 5, ff. Tr. 9044; Summary of Objective Dis-c%
T DI I crepancy Evaluation--Hatfield,'ff. Tr. 9239.)
o
y w
s t
v y2W'+- "u at 1 3,s 109. -The 63,085-reinspections of Hatfield objective attri-but'es performed as part of: the reinspection program included 2,840.reinspections of concrete expansicn . anchors inspected by PTLi*/ Of the 2',153 discrepancies identified, 38 were associ-ated.with' concrete expansion anchors. Most.of the discrepan-
-cies were" associated with conduit as-built reconciliation.
These discrepancies consisted primarily of differences between the1 installed locations of conduit, conduit supports and junc-tion boxes and the locations shown on the installation draw-
-ings. - (French,-prepared testimony at 6-8, ff..Tr. 9044.)
'110. For;th'e 2,153_ observed discrepancies, 1,713 evalua-tions were. performed. The number of evaluations was less'than:
the total: number of discrepancies because_some evaluations covered more than one discrepancy.' The discrepancies were V
.first. compared with current design parameters and tolerances.
This involved aLeomparison of installed component locations and id'imensions1with the corresponding. locations, dimensions,'and tolerances shown on the design drawings.
The discrepancies found 'tx>- be outside of design ' tolerances were evaluated either by:-er.2ineering judgment or by engineering calculations.
-(French, prepared testi=eny at 6. ff. Tr. 9044) 111. EngineeringLjudgment evaluations were performed in
.two ways,IM/_either a review of the component design function v
_i.
'eb ' *j/ As[ indicated supra, PTL 'only provided inspection services; it did not' perform any construction work at the Byron site.
(.
()
to determine whether the function of the component was affected by the discrepancy, or a comparison of the discrepancy to the current design to determine whether the discrepancy had design significance. Engineering calculations were used to resolve the remaining discrepancies. (French, prepared testimony at 6, ff. Tr. 9044.)
112. .Of the 1,713 evaluations, 1,244 found the discrepan-cies to be within current design parameters and tolerances.
The reason the reinspectors identified these as discrepancies was that the acceptance tolerances established for the Rein-spection Program were more stringent than the tolerances indi-cated on the installation drawings. (French, prepared testi-h e w* * *"l ff. Tr. Z4 r.t-OL . i cu u f e/<ar,it.u3 there cr-en m: :d d' -A y, Se e-*'
mony at 7, of- fKese d.'rmeercl*J9044.
.r )hw// /r* de- deJ&<d S . . my & or,yo..J
. . _ - - me
___:_e ,m.. n ,3, r,a ,u ,._____e_ . ...w . .v,.
rIs e.g.,}av f bgce/ e fis Vf5 N),S.t A 4$$ b e-q r_urt rf ; ;:n;;;=tix 13 ;tru;::::e rein:;:: tier pre r - e 113. Eighty evaluations of discrepancies were deemed
. acceptable by engineering judgment. Approximately two-thirds
'of these evaluations involved a review of the component design function to determine whether the function was impaired by the
' existence of-the discrepancy. None of these discrepancies impaired component design function. The balance of these eval-uations involved a comparison cf the discrepancy to current
~ design requirements to determine significance. None of the discrepancies was significant. (French, prepared testimony at c%
J 'l # - '7, ff. Tr. 9044)
- u
}
- n J l k-m/
114. The remaining 389 evaluations were conducted by re-viewing the conduit support, junction box loading, and mounting detail design calculations. The variations in support loca-
-tions and associated variations in loads were rccalcul;-c-7 m. 3-found to be acceptable. (French, prepared testimony at 7-8, ff. 9044) 115. The detailed engineering evaluation of the discrepan-cies in Hatfield objective attributes demonstrated that none of the evaluated discrepancies had design significance and, there-fore, no safety significance. (French, prepared testimony at 8 f ', ' 9044*)
0% W k*'K!,
9 4cef;rr*J 4 & AJ4C
"' I'm ri W *e/ * % ,
116.[$JIsupplementalprogramwasestablishedfortherein-spection of certain Hatfield attributes, namely, equipment set-ting, equipment modification, A-325 bolt installation and con-(fee 9F/17 4 */.w .) '
duit-support bolting. [TLl: pre;r : :; c;;;cl;;hed, e - -
eth: r--re-- te p-~*id- 'urth: ;;;ur u.;; th;t ;.m a. .. . c _ f F
rrr r- r r , ::13 . . , (French, prepared testimony at 9, ff.
Tr. 9 44.)
117. With respect to equipment setting. 778 inspections associated with 50 pieces of electrical equipment identified 34 discrepancies. The majority of the discrepancies consisted of equipment anchoring details with weld length and weld spacing deviations. An evaluation of the discrepancies determined that none had design significance. (French, prepared testimony at D-D9 With respect to equipment modification, a 100%
9, ff. 9044.)
u
.s"%
.f .
wiring inspection performed on 1,850 elements associated with
- 50 pieces of safety-related equipment identified 44 discrepan-cies. The discrepancies were minor wiring variations that did
- not affect the functioning of the equipment. An evaluation of the discrepancies determined that none had design signifi-cance. (French, prepared testimony at 10, ff. Tr. 9044.) With respect to A-325' bolting, which was used in the assembly of
' cable-tray riser supports, inspection of 295 bolts on 50 sup-
-ports identified'46 discrepancies. The discrepancies repre-
- sented ' bolts with torque less ithan the acceptance criteria.
-The design of the associated connections was reviewed and it was determined that the connections were structurally sound
~
despite:the lack of complete bolt torque. Therefore, the dis-crepancies were determined.to have no design signiiicance. In
-any event, all.A-325 bolted connections were retorqued because of the. unsatisfactory discrepancy rate. (French, prepared tes-timony at 10-11, . ff. Tr. 9044. Tr. 9232-34. )
118. With respect to the supplemental reinspection of con-duit-support bolting, inspection of 1,008 conduit-support bolts on 305 supports identified 34 discrepancies. The discrepancies
-were evaluated and determined to have no design significance.
(French, prepared testimony at 11, ff. Tr. 9044.) However, two
- missing conduit clamps were detected during the inspection and,
.because a missing clamp at a critical location could have am N *1 design significance, a walk-down was performed of all 8,532
~
1 1
i 1
%)
critical clamp locations. Ten locations were found with mis-sing bolts or clamps. Based on these results, a walkdown of the remaining accessible conduit clamps and bolts was conduct-ed. An evaluation of the 10 cases showed that the discrepant conditions had no design significance. The last of these eval-uations to be completed involved a missing clamp on a six or seven foot run of conduit in a hard to reach location. Due to the presence of another conduit and a large piece of steel in the area, even without the clamp, the conduit could only move a fraction of an inch. Sargent & Lundy's evaluation demonstrated that the conduit could not be pulled out during a seismic event and that there was no design significance. (French, prepared testimony at 11-12, ff. Tr. 9044. Tr. 9282-85.)*/
119. Including the supplemental reinspections discussed in paragraphs 116-118, 66,981 reinspections of IIatfield objective discrepancies were performed. Although 2,311 discrepancies
- / The' design significance of another discrepancy was debated during the cross-examination of the Region III Staff Panel. This discrepancy involved the miswiring of a damper that without correction would not have closed automatically b J under certain accident conditions. ::: r-- 4+ -- rr '" P-g Md ci: % - ~ "-" gthat the discrepancy lacked significance
'( d since operation of the damper on a manual basis, an accept-able. alternative to automatic operation, was not impaired.
Moreover, although the discrepancy had been missed by the original inspector, by the time of the BEP, it had already been discovered and repaired during system turnover test-ing. T'ni : - r^:ti : crtirr p :::nt: ; ;;;d :x1 .'" ^# **:"
- _ _ _ . ful ;; ;. ti
- n rf 9: . . . w. . m . . m . m.~ L'-. : t -r 'A 4_.
- b . .. .
Wkeev N e-' ' bMrb
.. .; _yf .t--
,, A 1 . . . ., _ . .
~
-9732-47.) C o N m a( T r . eval 3 tvs4 e.r Y~M.T a n d Oe-p(we Mer Afone le eycos& N e jd h!.hM
- ,perfosi m./ws J q Mhy syst%m, wk. cu,,4 ese
%f Ke drquey we.r ofM-ly clevoid hP . rah.Q
.cc3 n i(; c a e e .
I s
~
4 L) .
' were-identified, none of the evaluated discrepancies had design signi fi c an~ce . - (French', prepared testimony at 12, ff. Tr.
.9044.): Accordingly,.the quality of the foregoing reinspected
~ Hatfield work is adequate. (French, prepared testimony at 12
,ff. Tr.19044. Tr.(9273-74.)
- b. Ob3ective Attributes -- Hunter Discrepancies 1120. Hunter was-responsible'for the installationLof-nearly all'the mechanical systems at. Byron. This work' included in -
stallation of mechanical equipment and interconnective process piping and. supports, and the~ supply-of miscellaneous piping and welding. materials. As noted supra, the Hunter work fell inte 1
~
three attributes: hardware installation, related documenta-tion, characterized:as objective attributes, and welding, char-acterized as a subjective attribute. Each obje-tive attribute consisted of a number ~of elements. For example,:the.documenta-
' ~
tion ~ attribute was ' subdivided into such inspection points as
. work process sheets, weld material regulation sheets, field
- inspection reports and discrepancy reports. (Branch,. prepared s
testimony at 5-6, ff. Tr. 9051; Summary of Objective Discrep-ancy Evaluation--Hunter, ff. Tr. 9265.)
121. : A~ total' of 69,624 reinspections of Hunter. objective
, .Lattributes was performed as;part of the Reinspection Program.
Another 1,886 Hunter installations of concrete expansion Lj"( ' anchors were. inspected by PTL. Thus, there were 71,510 total reinspections.of Hunter objective attributes. 0/,this amount,
?Nu m
i r
- 4N M 9;
. a total of 689.discrepancier were reported. The 689 discrepan-
. cies involved 441' documentation and 248 hardware discrepan-cies. Five of these discrepancies were associated with con-crete expansion anchors inspected-by PTL, - (Branch, prepared'~
~
--testimony at 6-7, : ff. Tr. 9051. )
122. Sargentf& Lundy evaluated all 689-discrepancies.,The evaluations were performed by the same procedure as described i
for the discrepancies associated with the Hatfield objective attributes. (Branch, prepared testimony at 7-9, ff. Tr.
.9051.') A total of 614 discrepancies .in Hunter objective attri-
- butes twas evaluated by comparison to the design parameters and.
. tolerances. This included all 441 documentation discrepancies and 173; hardware discrepancies ~. Discrepan'cies evaluated typic-allyfincluded cosmetic flaws, minor dimensional errors, and documentation' errors. The' dimensional errors consisted primar-ily of minor as-built piping and pipe support dimensional-errors . cur incomplete as-built information. Documentation errors consisted primarily of- minor data-entry errors and omis--
^ sions on-work reports and process sheets. These discrepancies were evaluated by. reviewing corroborating information on the affected documents and other independent documents. The-evalu-ation showed.that all hardware discrepancies were within the
[ . current design parameters and tolerances. All-documentation ,
discrepancies:were deemed acceptable based upon reviewing other I# corroborating documentation. (Branch, prepared , testimony at 8, e
vu % e , -w , , , w-g-- ,w y ,- -g,~m,--+,,-mw s--n- w e m -- - , - - , . - , ,m.,e- ---,,,-y ,,as, - , e vw-m.-
k-
' herm ww clehned ,% ffs W .
'ifls.
3 m
Again, this class of discrepancies, like simi-
- ff. Tr. 9051.)
~1ar'ones for Hatfield,.contains discrepancies which are either ca -m o.m.> 7 inconsequential or in conformance with current design we.r e.- n.P a <,
- r M
- requirements,l and as such theyger n:t be considered valid 123. A total of 54 hardware discrepancies was evaluated by
- engineering judgment. Discrepancies evaluated included dimen-
- sional errors and omissions for piping, pipe supports and pipe y -.
whip. restraints; hardware substitutions; minor configuration
- changes; and minor mechanical joint bolting deviations. None of these-discrepancies impaired component design functions or
- h'ad_ design significance. (Branch, prepared testimony at 8,. ff.
Tr. J 9051.' )
-124. A'to'tal of 21 hardware discrepancies was evaluated-
-using-detailed' engineering calculations. Discrepancies evalu-ated -included ~ three as-built -pipe support dimensions, four cen-crete expansion anchors, three pipe whip restraints, and 11 small-bore pipe. bends with excessive ovality. These elements were originally established by engineering calculation and a new calculation was necessary in order to account for the iden-For example,_with respect to pipe ovality,
~
- tified discrepancy.
which .is a measure of the pipe roundness at the point of bend- !
.ing,-the 11 pipe bends exhibited average ovality values of-i 10.5%,.which is in excess of the 8% limit of ASME, Boiler and Pressure . Vessel Code -- Section III, Nuclear Power Plant Com-y: . ponents -- Division I (1974 Ed. Summer, 1975 Addenda). Accord-qt ?
i
/m Q) .
. ingly, calculations were: performed verifying the acceptability s
of the pipe-wall thickness and flow-area reductions allowed by the ASME Code. Stress -intensification effects were evaluated as' negligible because all of the pipe bends are five pipe dia-meters in. radius. (Branch, prepared testimony at 9, ff. Tr.
9051).
125. The detailed engineering evaluation of. the 689 dis-crepancies in Hunter objective attributes denonstrated that none of the discrepancies had any design significance and, hence, no safety significance. (Branch, prepared testimony at 10, ff. Tr. 9051.) .Accordingly, the quality of the foregoing _
reinspected Hunter work is adequate. (Branch, prepared test-imony:at 14, ff. Tr.'9051; Tr. 9277 *'S.)
-126. 'The-Beard finds that, based upon the Sargent & Lundy evaluations of discrepancies in the Hatfield and Hunter object-
'ive attributes, none of the discrepancies had design signifi-cance an'd,.accordingly no safety significance y 6Wdt
- c. Subjective Attribute AWS Welding -- J..rg. .y Ar%/
.Hatfield Discrepancies M 9 gg ,,4 4,,y, 127~.
The .Hatfield AWS welding covered by the Reinspection
-' Program included the welding of conduit supports , junction-box supports, cable-tray supports, cable-tray holddown welds, and
_ auxiliary steel for electrical supports. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 5, ff. Tr. 9047.)
, .128. Of the'27,538 AWS Hatfield welds that were subjected gi to . reinspection during the original program, 1,986 welds were
1
'I
~ identified with various discrepant conditions.
A total of 169 !
welds was taken from this group for analysis by Ssrgent'& l Lundy. _An. additional 197 discrepant welds was included as a l part of the sample to be analyzed by Sargent & Lundy when, in response to NRC questions, additional inspections were made of welds not initially covered by the Reinspection Program. Thus, a total sample of 356 Hatfield discrepant welds was analyzed by Sargent-& Lundy. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 7, ff. Tr.
9047.)
129. Of the 356 Hatfield weld discrepancies analyzed by Sargent.&.Lundy, 50 were selected-at random, 50 were selected by a third-party inspector on the basis of being the worst
-of:rved I
welds from a M liscrepancy viewpoint, and the remaining 256 M
discrepancies involved welds at[the rnost highly-stressed cort-nections, where the design margin was least. (McLaughlin, pre-pared testimony at 7-8, 17, ff._Tr. 9047.) Thus, the sample of 356 Hatfield weld discrepancies analyzed by Sargent & Lundy was i a reonr!% 4 )
biasedtoexamine/themosthighlystressedweldsin~theRein-spection Program, where the greatest potential existed for exceeding design margins. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 8, 16-17, ff. Tr. 9047.) ""
N">'% N S b'J' 4 #'h 130. A review of weld maps for the 356 discrepant Hatfield welds indicated that five of the discrepant welds involved are strikes, spatter and convexity. Arc strikes and spatter are Kr ~
cosmetic discrepancies which would create a strength problem Q pe f fy .cb er& <+2t/$ *lWd *'h y ggepud m ~t &'N h "WE
. M/rf . & 9/ . . . -. .-
O,6 -
^
. only if'there were-.a large number in a given weld. The weld:
-maps.' indicated that are strikes and spatter were minimal. Con-vexityJisLof-no consequence when, as in this case, the welds en the' structures under consideration are not subject to fatigue loading. Thus, these five weld discrepancies do not reduce the load-carryina capacity of the veld and, therefore, have no structural-impact. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 10, ff.
Tr. 9047.)'.
131. A detailed engineering evaluation based on the weld
-maps was conducted with respect to the. remaining 351 discrepant welds to-determine (1) the effect of the discrepancy on the strength of the weld and.(ii).because the discrepant welds were among the several welds. joining steel me:nbers and components, the effect of strength reductions on.these joints or connec-tions. It was' detarmined that 162 welds had strength reduc-a strength tions of less than 10%
gendang and r-eh slemfA 186 ehw di'screpant welds of up h, M */.had(M@lo'n,
. N 4tG-)\ '
reductions equar to or greater than 10%g Three welds had cracks. Irrespective of the actual strength reduction,- the discrepant portion of the weld was entirely disregarded for evaluation purposes. For example, if the weld map indicated
'that 1-1/2" of porosity existed in a 10" weld, Sargent & Lundy.
recalculated the capacity.of the connection on the basis of only 8-1/2" of weld. This is a conservative calculation in that.there is probablyLno reduction at all in the capacity of
-h the connection for this 1-1/2" of porosity. In the case of 1
k A) .
welds-with cracks, no credit was given in the evaluation for the presence of the weld. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 10-11, ff. Tr. 9047.)
132. After the weld strength reductions were determined, an evaluation.of the connections' ability to withstand the expected loads or forces was performed. The forces on the con-nections are made up of two major loadings. The first is the
-dead weight or static load of the cables and the tray. The second is the seismic load on the connection. With respect to the static load, Sargent & Lundy reviewed the cable loadings to confirm that the loads on the esbles were less than that assur-ed in the original design. Because maximum or bounding loads were used in the original design of the cable tray and conduit system,-the actual loads are expected to be less than design loads. In each case, where Sargent & Lundy calculated the actual load, it found that load to be less than the original design load. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 11-12, ff. Tr.
9047.) The neighboring welds to one of the three cracks, which involved a cable-tray hold-down weld, bore a slight additional load (still within the Code allowable) as a result of the The
] crack. These welds were inspected by Sargent & Lundy.
{[nsed p p ,y.s . inspection revealed that none of the neighboring welds was f*/* *S discrepant. (Erler, prepared rebuttal testimony at 5-6, ff.
47 13& dL 3
? f- ,pf, Tr. 11,158.)
133. Sargent & Lundy next reexamined the seismic loading
/R4 "l y% .YbU and performed a seismic analysis representative.of the Byron L,4 g,ng
INTERVENORS' PROPOSED PARAGRAPH 132A 132A. In general, however, the evaluation of the neighboring welds' ability to withstand the expected loads was a theoretical evaluation, because, according to Mr.
McLaughlin, the neighboring welds were not reinspe c te d for discrepancies, unless they happened to be captured in the BRP. (McLaughlin, Tr. 9154-56.) Thus, it was possible that the neighboring welds contained defects that were assumed not to exist in the calculations .
This approach contrasts unfavorably with the calculation of load redistribution effects done by Mr. Kostal with respect to SCC welds for purposes of his testimony in this case. (Kostal, Tr. 10,238-240.)
n
1 b11
^
site which reduced-the load from that determined initially.
The seismic loading used in-the original design of the cable tray and conduit system was based on a response spectra design method, a very conservative design method used in the nuclear industry. The reevaluation of the seismic loading on connec-tions was based on a time-history seismic analysis, which as indicated is a more refined and accurate determination of the seismic loading. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 11-12, ff.
Tr. 9047.)
134. Due to the recurring nature of two types of discrep-ancies, additional investigation was performed by Sargent &-
- Lundy to determine their - significance. The first recurring discrepancy involved a fit-up. gap between the horizontal and vertical cable-tray members. Strength tests performed by Sar-gent-& Lundy demonstrated that even though the AWS Code requir-ed that :the strength of this connection be reduced, there was
-.no actual reduction in the joint capacity. The second recur-ring discrepancy involved the use of a partial penetration weld
'rather than a fillet weld as called for in the design. Labora-tory testing by Sargent & Lundy demonstrated that the as-built partial penetration weld had less than a 10% reduction in capa-city when compared to the original design. (McLaughlin, pre-pared testimony at 12-14, ff. Tr. 9047.)
135. The detailed evaluations described above were con-f"! ducted on all 356 discrepant Hatfield welds. The results of y,
9
~
Y
%f l
~.
these evaluations demonstrated that none of the discrepancies
- exceededTdesign margin'and, accordingly, none had design or safety significance. Accordingly, the quality of this rein-spect$d work'is adequate.
~
(McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 12,-ff. Tr.:9047.)
- d. Subjective Attribute AWS and ASME Welding -- Hunter Discrepancies g 136. The' Hunter AWS welding covered by the Reinspection Program included pipe supports and pipe restraints.
(McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 6, ff. Tr. 9047.). The
. Hunter ASME~ welding covered by the Reinspection Program includ-ed large-bore butt welds, socket:and fillet welds, NF support
- welds, and pipe penetrations and. reinforcing saddles. (Branch,
'-prepared testimony at 11, ff. - Tr. 9051.) of the 3,725 welds produced by Hunter that were reinspected =(27;fAWS welds, 73%
ASME welds), 109 discrepancies were observed. One hundred per-cent of these 109 discrepant welds were evaluated by Sargent & -
Lundy. .As noted-above, this included 60 AWS welds and 49 ASME welds. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 5, 14, ff. Tr. 9047; Branch, prepared' testimony at 6, 10-11, ff. Tr. 9051.)
137. The 60 discrepant Hunter AWS welds were evaluated by
. the same procedure as described for the Hatfield discrepan-
- cies. Nineteen of the welds-fell into the no-structural impact category encompassing are strikes, weld spatter and convexity,
- , ; which do not reduce the load-carrying capacity of the veld.
~
4-s ' Eighteen-of the welds had a capacity reduction of less than k
10%. The remaining 23 welds had a capacity reduction of 10% or more. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 14-15, ff. Tr. 9047.)
138. The detailed engineering evaluation of the 60 dis-crepant Hunter AWS welds indicated that none of the discrepan-cies exceeded design margin and, accordingly, none had design or safety significance. Accordingly, the quality of this rein-spected work is adequate. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 15, ff. Tr. 9047.)
139. The evaluations of AWS weld discrepancies by -
Sargent & Lundy were performed pursuant to the 1983 edition of the AWS Dl.1 Structural Welding Code while the welding itself was performed pursuant to earlier editions of the Code. Mr.
Stokes questions this procedure on the premise that differences among the Code editions could result in mere lenient standards for the evaluation performed by Sargent & Lundy. (Stokes, pre-pared testimony at 19-20, ff. Tr. 10,770.) Contrary to Mr.
Stokes' assertion, the Board finds that this practice is appro-priate. Excluding the year 1978, a revised version of the AWS Code has been published every year from 1975 to the present.
The design requirements have not changed significantly since the issuance of AWS D1.1-75, which was the Code in effect at the time of initial construction. The allowable stresses are
~ the same. The few changes that have been made with respect to calculation of stresses have all been more restrictive with *
? regard to weld capacity. These stricter weld design require-
q;.
ments in no way require less demanding calculations for evalu-ating a discrepancy. If anything, it is conservative to use the latest edition of AWS Dl.1 for evaluation of discrepan-
-cies. (Erler,' prepared rebuttal testimony at 9-10, ff. Tr.
11,158.)
140. The 49 discrepant Hunter ASME welds were evaluated to ASME Section III Code design criteria using three methods to determine whether the Code was met and whether the discrepant welds.had design signiricance. The initial method involved comparing the weld discrepancy with the current design para-meters and tolerances and the'ASME Code to determine if it was acceptable on that basis. For example, in some cases, such as with surface porosity, the visual welding reinspection criteria
'were overly stringent and exceeded code acceptance criteria.
These reported discrepancies were determined to meet the code design criteria and were, therefore, judged to be acceptable.
If it was not possible to disposition a discrepancy using the first approach, the second method involved evaluation by engin-eering judgment based on a comparison of the effect of a weld discrepancy to design margins or the component design func-tion. The final method of resolution of the weld discrepancy was an evaluation by detailed engineering calculation.
. (Branch, prepared testimony at 11-12, ff. Tr. 9051.)
141. Three discrepancies were reported involving large-j") bore piping butt welds. Two were within current design param-I
~72-
s
- - l f
"'N -
LJ
- eters and tolerances. The third was compared to design margins and determined to be acceptable by engineering judgment.
(Branch, prepared testimony at 12, ff. Tr. 9051.)
-142. A total of 30 discrepancies involving socket and fil-d let welds was reported. Three were within current design para-meters and tolerances;~four were compared to design margins and
- determined to be acceptable by engineering judgment; and 23 were evaluated by. engineering calculation and met ASME Code design. criteria. The majority of the calculations involved a simple arithmetic. computation of the code-required fillet weld size. (Branch, prepared testimony at 13, ff. Tr. 9051.)
143. A total o'f 14 discrepancies involving NF support welds was reported. One was within current design para oters and tolerances and 13 were reviewed by calculation and met'ASME Code design criteria. The majority of the calculations involv-ed recalculating the designed weld with consideration of the discrepancy accounted for. All welds were found to meet ASME Code design criteria. (Branch, prepared testimony at 13, ff.
Tr. 9051.)
144. A total of two discrepancies involving welds with pipe penetration and reinforcing saddles was reported. Both were reviewed by engineering calculation and found to meet ASME
- Code design criteria. Both welds were compared to actual design requirements and neither of the discrepancies was deter-mined to have design significance. (Branch, prepared testimony Th) at 13-14, ff. Tr. 9051.) ,
&~ ' .
145. Intervenors' expert alleged that two ASME welds were impermissibly accepted by Sargent & Lundy because of the impre-cision in the gauges used in measuring weld undercut. Specifi-cally, Mr. Stokes stated that the 1/64-in. accuracy of the gauges supplied for measuring the welds was in violation of some ASME Code section allegedly requiring " machine shop type accuracy to the thousendths." (Stokes, prepared testimony at 24-25, ff. Tr. 10,770.) The ASME Code does not expressly state a tolerance for the measurement of undercut; it does not re-quire " machine shop type accuracy to the thousandths" to deter-mine Code compliance, as alleged by Mr. Stokes. The acceptance criterion for undercut is stated in ASME Section III, paragraph ND-4424 as a common fraction, 1/32 inch, which means that the Code intended the value to be treated as an approximate, frac-tional dimension. Whenever the Code intends exa t precision, an acceptance value is stated as a decimal value. (Branch, prepared rebuttal testimony at 3, ff. Tr. 11,158.)
146. An acceptance criterion stated in terms of 1/32 inch has an acceptance level within 1/64 inch, that is, the Code is met if the measurement for undercut is 3/64 inch or less. The undercut measurements of the two welds referred to by Mr.
Stokes were .041 and .037 inch. Inasmuch as these values fall
. below 3/64 inch, the Code requirement has been met. (Branch, prepared rebuttal testimony at 3 ff. Tr. 11,158.)
147. In any event, Sargent & Lundy did not rely solely on
$}-
s this Code interpretation to disposition these diperepancies. A
-- .. _ _ _ _ _ . l
_ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - = - - . - - - - - - - - - - -
L calculation was done to establish the effect of the reported undercut on code minimum wall thickness requirements and code stress criteria. The calculation was performed to answer two questions. First, was the depth of undercut sufficient to encroach on code-required minimum pipe wall thickness? Second, was the stress intensification introduced by the undercut suf-ficient to cause code allowable stresses for moment loading to be exceeded? The calculation was conservatively biased in that it assumed that the undercut extended completely around the total weld circumference when it actually extended around only a portion of the weld circumference. In addition, the stress intensification factor for the undercut was multiplied by the intensification used in the original analysis for the weld joint instead of treating the effects separately. (Branch, prepared rebuttal testimony at 3-4, ff. Tr. 11,158) 148. The pipe wall thicknesa calculation showed that the wall thickness remaining after deductir.g the maximum undercut and the manufacturing tolerance was about 27 times the code-required minimum wall. This is not surprising because the ser-vice pressure for the system is 150 psi and schedule 80 pipe was selected to provide adequate mechanical strength for a power plant environment. The stress intensification calcula-tion showed that even when considering the maximum undercut to conservatively extend all the way around the circumference of ps, the weld, and multiplying the fillet veld intensification by g?
b 4
w i
k;* '
-the undercut--intensification,-code-allowable stresses for the applicable'. loading conditions, including seismic--load, were not exceeded. . (Eranch', prepared; rebuttal testimoony at 4-5, ff.
Tr.ill,'158)
.149. In the case of all 49 ASME discrepant welds, the weld connections met Code design criteria. The-Sargent & Lundy evaluations:of.the Hunter ASME weld discrepancies demonstrate that, as was true with respect to the Hunter AWS weld discrep-ancies,~as well as the Hatfield weld discrepancies, none of the discrepancies had design significance and, hence, no safety significance. cAccordingly, the quality of this reinspected work'is adequate. .(Branch, prepared testimony at 14, ff. Tr.
.9 051. ) .
~
150. The' Board finds that, based upon the Sargent & Lundy evaluations of~the Hatfield AWS discrepant welds and the Hunter UN AWS.and ASME' discrepant' welds, none of the discrepancies had
. design ~ significance and, accordingly, no safety significance.
~
- e. -Matters Raised-By Intervenors' Witness, Mr. Stokes 151. - The portion of Mr. Stokes' testimony that was ad-mitted into evidence essentially consists of a call for an
, independent review of discrepancies based on an alleged lack'of objectivity and impartiality on the part of.Sargent & Lundy.
- lWe'will now address the specific concerns ra sed i by Mr. Stokes that.have not already been discussed and his allegations re-AN garding the need for an independent review of discrepancies.
%1
u First, Mr.-Stokes asserted that pipe supports which were in-cluded in Sargent & Lundy's' Hunter AWS welding discrepancy evaluations are subject to fatigue loadings and, thus, con-vexity should have been considered a defect more serious than a cosmetic flaw. (Stokes, prepared testimony at 18, ff. Tr.
10,770.)- However, as Mr.-Stokes acknowledged, the American
. Institute of Steel Construction ( AISC) Code does not require a reduction in the allowable stress in a weld for fatigue loading until the number of stress cycles exceeds-20,000. (Stokes, Tr.
- 10',841-42; Erler,. prepared rebuttal ~ testimony at 7-8, ff. Tr.
-11,158.) Further, Mr. Stokes admitted that he did not have
-adequate information to determine whether pipe supports at
. Byron would experience 20,000 cycles of fatigue loading over their111fetime. (Stokes, Tr.. 10,842-43.) - In fact, the number-of stress. cycles experienced by pipe supports at Byron is sub-stantially less than 20,000. (Erler, prepared rebuttal testi-mony at 8, ff. Tr. 11,158.)
152. Mr. Stokes also asserts that waterhammer could cause fatigue loading. '(Stokes,' prepared testimony at 18-19, ff. Tr.
10,770..) The. evidence indicates, however, that waterhammer
-- loading on a piping system is not a. loading that could cause a fatigue. problem. Waterhammer is a dynamic pulse loading with
. low frequency of occurrence. Therefore, the number of stress cycles is extremely low and fatigue is not a problem as defined a" in the AISC Code. (Stokes, prepared testimony at 9, ff. Tr.
y r-
[ 10,.770; Tr. 10,844-65.) ,'
[ ] & w w W- T Wll bart '" nee m t NA "
Q ky pe,// froes lvr ey ([e. 9/fy heJew.)
l I,kk.
l 153. The' discrepancy evaluations performed by.Sargent &
Lundy inclu'ded 30 flare-bevel AWS welds produced by Hatfield and captured by the Reinspection Program. Intervenors' expert expressed concern with flare-bevel welding based upon Attach- )
- ment}7 to his testimony indicating that Sargent-& Lundy may have used invalid assumptions in establishing design parameters for flare-bevel welding. (Stokes, prepared testimony at 16-17, ff. Tr. 10,770.) On cross-examination, Intervenors' expert iconceded,that if.the attachment and the information contained therein were' void, he would have no concern with the flare- /
bevel weld radii at Byron based on that attachment))[(Stokes, .
Tr. 10,792.) As Applicant's witness testified, that attachment has been voided and the information contained-therein is not applicable to either Byron or Braidwood. (Hooks, prepared testimony at 3-5, ff. Tr. 11,158.)
154. Intervenors' expert also expressed _ concern because flare-bevel groove welding was included under a prequalified welding procedure designated as 13AA. (Stokes, Tr. 10,800-
.01.) LSuch welding should be produced against a qualified weld-y ing procedure,'i.e., one that is validated by establishing
.through a_ field demonstration that the procedure produces an adequate weld. However, the Hatfield AWS flare-bevel welds
. captured in the Byron Reinspection Program were produced during ,
=the period May, 1978 through September, 1982. During that
[ AC{ , period, flare-bevel groove welds were, in fact, produced under r ,
a l
l 1
l 1
- f N
.;t C qualified procedures 13Q and 13AB. Procedure 13AA, a prequali- j I
fied welding procedure, was not approved until December 30, l 1983, and flare-bevel groove welding was' erroneously included
'in that procedure. -This error is being rectified and the pro-cedure- for flare-bevel groove welding is being issued as a qualified procedure. (Erler, prepared testimony at 7, ff. Tr.
-11,158.)
155. In any event, the 30 flare-bevel welds produced by
.Hatfield and captured by the Reinspection Program were inspect-ed for a determination of the actual radius. The inspection Lyielded a radius measurement of at least two times the tube wall thickness (2T)-for all tubes except one, which had a radius equal.to'1.75 T. The stress of each weld was conservat-ively evaluated using the AWS formula for effective threat of 5/16 R with the smallest R measurement of 1.75 T. This demen-strated that the AWS allowable stresses were met. (Erler, pre-
. pared rebuttal testimony at 6-7, ff. Tr. 11,158) T: . 2. _ _ d-
- ..;luf;; ^ -t n; 1 3 ...i. ... .....
- .... i;;n
- :ir:d i'k _
r;_r .. -w f l . .. . 1 . 1 m. .. , ;t t'- Pyrrr pi rr t *"~
156. Intervenors' expert also alleged that the discrepant ASME welds identified in Attachment 8 to his testimony were not evaluated by Sargent & Lundy. (Stokes, prepared testimony at
./17-18,'ff. Tr. 10,770.) This allegation is incorrect. With the exception.of three welds that were not part of the Rein-x?v Ni #
4
t 1
- /., .
kI . . .
spection Program,*/-all the welds in Attachment 8 to Mr.
Stokes' testimony, including the 46 ASME welds, were evaluated by Sargent & Lundy. This can be demonstrated by a comparisen of the drawing numbers in Attachment 8 with the compenent num-bers in Sargent & Lundy document ERP-1, which is a summary of Hunter _ discrepant welds that were evaluated in the reinspection program. A comparison of the two sets of numbers reveals that these are the same welds. (DeMoss, prepared rebuttal testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 11,158; Stokes, Tr. 10,829-34.)
- 157. Applicant's witnesses were questioned about the-fact that some of the Hunter visual' weld discrepancies and dis-crepancies in Hatfield and Hunter objective attributes were
. repaired prior to evaluation by Sargent & Lundy. The repair of a discrepancy in no way interferred with Sargent & Lundy's engineering evaluation inasmuch as all the information neces-sary to perform the evaluation was contained in the discrepancy reports. (McLaughlin, French, Branch, Tr. 9278-80; 9293-96.)
158. All discrepancies subject to ASME Code examination acceptance criteria were reparied, even though they were deter-
- / These welds, which were alluded to by Dr. Ericksen (Ericksen, Tr. 10,951, 10,956), were initially included in the program because it was believed that they were attri-butable to Inspector A, an inspector captured in the pro-gram. It was subsequently learned that these three welds had been reworked and inspected by a QC inspector other-than Inspector A. Thus, the reinspection of these three 4.
welds could not be attributed to Inspector A and, accord-vo ; ingly, they were excluded from the program and the statis-tics shown for Inspector A in Table B-3 in Applicant's Exhibit R-4. (DeMoss, Tr. 11,162-63. ) (.re4- ,. W (f'/4 6< law.)
s'
-.i mined by evaluation not to have design significance. All other discrepancies' vere either reparied or dispositioned as accept-able."as-is" based on the engineering evaluation results.
(Del George, prepared testimony at 36, ff.'Tr. 8406.)
159.~ The Board was initially surprised by the absence of any design significant discrepancies out of all those analyzed t farasef 9 f vemafw a}+r- bufer Urr e-es It
- - --- '*7 1 y
'fto the exten-
. by Sargent &-Lundy eif*Acet4 j sive marga incorporated in the Byron design and, as explained by-the Sargent-& Lundy panel, is an inherent consequence of the design process. Engineers design a structure such that it is sufficiently strong to withstand the expected forces and stres-ses -withispare or extra strength to account for uncertainties andicontingencies. This extra strength is called margin.
Design margin is that margin imposed by' engineers during the Ldesign process. For example, connections are designed in groups rather than individually. As a consequence, the force
' or' load-bearing capability for each connection is established on the basis of the most highly-stressed connection. The ac-tual stresses for most connections will be less than those established by the design process. The difference between the
's farg es#' 6 l vnko coef u dt##)
..two.is.an example of design margin y Xne existence of this oe-p sign margin.in the work evaluated by Sargent & Lundy is the
~ primary reason that none of the weld discrepancies was found to
- -be design significant. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 8-9, p(W - 11 12, . f f. Tr. 9047; French, Branch, McLaughlin, Tr. 9254-61.)
de-ro r.C haf y e./ ' on.** ifrae- o %
& seroneaC . at & Tsj(** %y+
a se/ in err * <d1e fg, y y!.enadeen % Foa d <pa h %- af r n*'c.rwe am wed ,.acM !, f
.<p~r.re . n La .,
'&. </ n y W U S*j!b n _ ') n =
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V 160. There is a second margin in the structural design of connections. This is the margin that the code writers put into the design process in the form of allowable stresses. The code writers typically attempt to obtain a margin of approximately two when they write the code.< This means that a structure designed to a code could carry approximately twice the design load and not fail. _(McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 9, ff.
A##
- Y * * * "
Tr* 9047*) ,
GJc. vve/a.f h . (fe * > e .y. , fr I2. 8/ a hve..)
161. In Sargent & Lundy's detailed engineering evaluation, the Code allowable was not exceeded for any discrepancy.
(McLaughlin; prepared testimony at 9, ff. Tr. 9047; Erler, pre-pared rebuttal testimony at 4-5, ff. Tr. 11,158; McLaughlin,
-Tr. 9271-72. )[Although Mr. Stokes initially stated that some of.Sargent & Lundy's calculations " appeared" to exceed the Code allowable for stress (Stokes, Intervenors' Prepared Testimeny at 7, 8, ff. Tr. 10,770), following cross examination Inter-venors and Applicant stipulated that after reviewing the calcu-bajad a fn& b Las/sg olor,9 s cr ifwy lations - and discussing t$em with Sargent & Lundy personnel,[Mr.
Stokes found no calculations for work performed by Hatfield or Hunter where the actual stress exceeded the Code allowable.
(Tr. 10,936.)
162. There were a few instances where a 10% overstress factor was used by Sargent & Lundy at an intermediate point in ,
the calculative process. The 10% overstress factor refers te a r WIN 'Yt2 10% limit where Sargent & Lundyp ngineers ::: c ' '. to use
.h.
G 2
^^
~/
,u%. .
'their knowledge of the margin in the structural analysis to
. decide, when the. calculated stress is less than or equal to 1C*;
greater than allowable, that the calculated stresses have suf-ficient conservatisms or margin in them to meet the AISO Code stress allowable. (Erler,' prepared rebuttal testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 11,158.) However, as Intervenors and Applicant stipu-lated,_in each of these instances, the overstress factor was not relied upon for'the ultimate conclusion in the calculation that the actual stress did not exceed the Code allowable. (Tr.
10,936;-Erler, prepared rebuttal testimony at 4-5, ff. Tr.
11,158; Tr. 11,159-60.)
163. Intervenors' witness charged that the judgments and assumptions used' by Sargent & Lundy in _its evaluation of the BRP discrepancies lacked " objectivity and impartiality" and, hence, an~ independent review was required. (Stokes, prepared
-testimony at 7, ff. Tr. 10,770.)- However, outside of pointing to an alleged inconsistency between Sargent & Lundy's structur-al engineering group and the mechagical engineering group in the treatment accorded fatigue loading (Stokes, Tr. 10,893),
Mr. Stokes could point to no specific instance, including no specific calculations,-where Sargent & Lundy demonstrated a
-lack of " objectivity and impartiality." (Stokes, Tr.
-#10,885-904.) As Mr. Stokes himself stated, "I'm just saying they iSargent & Lundy] ignored certain things, but I can't cite one." (Tr. 10,894.) ke. 4/.T e .c Ne /e8 M d I /,f f cat a /
,v r be. red u .JAu khw J,14 % feard par had # .nbek e.keef f. r eee.ne. (9. n,y19C)
1
.h 164. With respect to the alleged inconsistency between the mechani~ cal group and the structural group in their treatment of fatigue loading, Mr. Stokes asserted that if mechanical designs account for fatigue in the piping system, then the structural group should take that into account when designing those respective pipe supports. (Stokes, prepared testimony at 18,
' ff. Tr. 10,770.) Contrary to Mr. Stokes' assertion, there is no inconsistency in Sargent & Lundy's treatment of fatigue loading for piping and for pipe supports. Due to the nature of loading on a piping system, the requirements may very depending on the class of the system. For example, the ASME Code requires an explicit calculation of fatigue loading for a Class
- 1 piping system while Class 2 and 3 piping systems are affected by cyclic loading only if the number of cycles ex.eeds 7,000 (ASME Section III NC 3611.2). For pipe supports with respect
.to Class 1, 2 and 3 piping, both ASME and AISC are consistent in not requiring any reduction in allowable stress for less than 20,000 cycles. (Erler, prepared rebuttal testimony at 8, ff. Tr. 11,158.) At Byron, for Class 1 piping systems, the analysis has accounted for the number of cycles as required by the Code. Fatigue loadings were properly neglected for Class 2 and 3 piping systems and for pipe supports because the number of cycles experienced is less than the threshholds established in the Codes for requiring a reduction in the allowable stress Am Y" limits. (Erler, prepared rebuttal testimony, at 8, ff. Tr.
l l
l I
. ph s n>
-11,158.) ." r . Ot:h:; 1;;r ent1; f;i L ; . ...;m. ..J t:.. J -f b
1 ....; OvJe .....u Zvr I .tc.in; frti fr 1r: ding; ir. h:O -
c .;i v.. vf L,y & v44. :; in;:ncirtr cy -irtr --9 -
"- Ma'
'--iti;iom u i c j ec ucu[
165. The Board finds that the Sargent & Lundy evaluations were performed in accordance with proper engineering standards and that the assumptions used in performing these evaluations were sufficiently conservative. In the words of Mr. Muffett, Sargent & Lundy's progran for evaluating the discrepancies was "more than adequate." (Muffett, Tr. 9813.) Accordingly, the gn _ fX Lr re s* dj Board finds no evidence /to support the need for an independent review based upon any alleged lack of objectivity or impar-tiality on the part of Sargent & Lundy. In addition, in re-sponse to the issue added by the Board concerning Applicant's repair of defects, the Board finds that all discrepancies were either repaired or dispositioned as acceptable "as-is" based on engineering evaluation results, thereby resolving this issue.
[fowser Joer sef j fin:11yi the Boa findg that the absence of any design-sig-
,in 17s. 8 R P .rorn pre j nificantdiscrepancies/demonstratesthatthepre-September, 1982 inspectors had not overlooked any significant safety-fe.4- c
[ related deficiencie (herch..j.2nforci..w9 t r: 77 Lhe
- Aave uvu- tuea:n.) c: :t "
th_ i..v::n.; .. ,__n q ~
w w /C u/h re'A W A.f m
my a e rerf c N'
r=
q.
C) ~X. QUALITY OF THE WORK
'a. Introduction oo. Au c;1un'4"? "Orh gu 12uj, we Degin with the Ap'_a93 oard bservation, previously noted, that for purposes f this proceedi a presumption of work quality follows a owing of inspector.c mpetence. (ALAB-770, slip opinion a 28.) This i:,
also consisten with the position taken by Edi on and by the Staff. As Mr. L ey testified, the presenc of competent inspectors suggest that significant dis epancies are unlikel f
- o'go undetected. I eed, as noted a ve, this very phrase-( . logy.was used by tha S aff in its escription of the purpose c f.the BRP. (Little, Sta prep red testimony at 4, ff. Tr.
9510.) By removing doubt as o the qualification and capabil-ity of the whole body of spe tors, the BRP has provided con-fidence in the qualit f the wo that was originally inspect-e d. (Laney, prepa d testimony at 8, ff. Tr. 9339; Little, I taff prepared estimony at 4, ff. Tr 9510.) We have already lound the i pectors in question to be alified. (U 104, supra.) ccordingly, in line with the Ap al Board reasoning, this inding, on its own, raises a presumpti n of the adequac3 i us+riola ,-a u..-;;r
~ .s gaut uj .uum nua uut occu im c' .
as stofat in 7 /44 -/ %
- A A* w p 167. Applicant,[{:uc: 2, did not rely solely on the favor-able results of the BRP. It presented extensive testimony of seven witnesses who relied on various additional bases for con-q'f) m t< r *f h htr- @ or.f ?&f0Fe.$ #ff f 8 $ ~ lb b 6, q f.//. q h 73e, 6 here
' - ~ - - -- - - -
. g.
- q. - ,. . _
= ..v-M : INTERVENORS' PROPOSED PARAGRAPHS: 166l-166a, 166b, 166c' AND 166d
-/.t.i
.._)
166. . As.:weinoted Latithe outset'-(112a, : b and c above) , . the ultimate iissue is .whether the evidence on remand-sufficiently cures
![ or-: overcomes the' quality assurance failures identified in
[
> .. Jouriinitialidscision,Esuch that'we'can now find that
. Byron has ? been properly constructed, 'i.e . , that there is
--- . reasonable assurance that' the plant can be operated safely.
SFo'rDthe.' reasons summariz'ed in this paragraph, we cannot -so
~
. find.
- FromLbeginning to end in the remanded hearings, CECO has consistently identified the following three major
- grounds. for: inferring- that the quality of the work at
- 1 Byron.is adequat'e:
.1. 'One can infer from.the Reinspection. Program
,results that the. quality 1 control inspectors at' Byron'were. qualified, and thus-did not s , . overlook -unsafe work.
- 2. One. can infer from the large number of reinspections' conducted, and the. fact that most dis-
- crepancies detected ~ were inconsequential and none-were-found to be= design significant, that-the overall quality of work at Byron is
^
W [ adequate.
3.. ' One can infer from CECO's comprehensive QA
,' ; program that the work quality at Byron is t ' adequate.
7
..(In terveno rs ' Proposed 11166, 166a-166d, p. 1 4
- .2 MWL
-Jokrbs - nh Of ,r.
u di, D& .y '
,s, ;u 16'
'. ) ,
m
!(E. g. , L CECO . proposed supplemental ' initial y
' ~
, Jdecision, zt202. )-
y =' ,
LWeDare V not persuaded 'by any- of these proferred grounds .
x ~
.. +
166a.itFirst,Lwe--have already found,' based.mainly on the testimony of NRC staff members Forney and Hayes, that none .cannot ureasonably infer from the BRP results that
'quali'ty control : inspectors _ at Byron prior to March, 1983
.were qualified.. (See 199 above.)
As we noted, Mr. Forney L thought ' this point to be of
~
'little consequence, and thus his reservations about the
- pertinent NRC . staff testimony to be " miniscule," because
. he believes that: regardless sof. inspector qualifications,
.the . work;at- Byron is adequate : based on other factors .
However, we-: find those other factors unconvincing as well. .
? Thus, unlike Mr. Forney, we find his ' point 'that one cannot b -reliably infer inspector capabilities from the BRP results to be important.
166b. -Turning-to those.other factors, Ceco argues, second, that
- one can reasonably infer directly from the reinspections conducted in the BRP that the quality of unreinspected
- workc at Byron is adequate. -For several reasons , we are notl pers uaded. As CECO acknowledges (e.g. , Del George prepared testimony.at 7, ff. Tr. 8406), the BRP was
.(Intervenors' Proposed 11 166, 166a-166d, p. 2)
&{ -
N_ _ - - :
V e
t
'D m
originally designed only to address the issue of inspector qualifications . Information about work quality was to be s
only tan incidental by-product of the BRP. Had the BRP been intended to demonstrate work quality directly, it
- should (and . presumably would) have been designed differently in several key' respects. For example, a BRP designed to demonstrate work quality directly
. would not have omitted any reinspections whatever of two of 'the eleven Hatfield attributes that could be reinspected, and three of the twenty-one Hunter elements that could be reinspected (see CECO pro-posed findings 11172,.173).
. would not have reinspected. .in general, only the first three months of an inspec-tor's work. While reinspection of only this initial period was logical for pur-poses of validating inspectors' training and initial qualifications , use of only this period was nonconservative for pur-poses of providing a representative sample of all the inspections, because of the ten-dency of inspectors ' performance.to decline over time, 'a s testified to by Professor
.Kochhar. (See 142 above.)
. would'not bava reinspected relatively few inspections in some categories of greater safety significance than those which were heavily reinspected, (e.g. , Ericksen, knended Attacinent B, ff. Tr. .ll,~ 045.) This point is one of engineer-ing judgment and simple common sense, as well as formal statistical methodology.
It is thus not surprising that even CECO's work quality expert Mr. Laney testified on cross-examination that he could not, based on the February,1984 BRP above, infer that the quality of Hatfield and Hunter
. (Intervenors' Proposed 11 166, 166a-166d, p. 3)
n
[ .
' work.at-Byron was-adequate. (Tr. 9 378- 79. ) He was also
~
uncertain as to' what inference, if any, could be drawn even af ter the BRP's June, ~1984. supplement. (Tr. 9379 .)
' Rather,-his testimony on work quality relied on the r BRP results~in fconjunction with two CECO documents d; scribing CECO's overall quality assurance program.
(Tr. 9379-80.)
Because the BRP was not designed to demonstrate work
- quality directly,' Edison's argument that one can infer work quality directly from it is compelled to rely on
~
the point made by Mr. Laney: that even if the BRP results alone do not show work quality, they do so in combination with. other factors . The problem is that these other factors -- the assertion that inspectors twere qualified (which is critiqued in 199 above) and the assertion that Ceco's overall quality assurance program was adequate, (critiqued in 1166c below) --
are=not independently convincing either. Three unper-suasive rationales, even in combination, do not a convincing showing make.
CECO also contends that _ the sample size --
5 to 10% of all Hatfield and Hunter inspections --
is so large, and so similar to the unreinspected
-- work, that one can reliably infer directly (Intervenors' Proposed 11 166, 166a-166d, p. 4)
L _ - - - - - _ _ -_ _ _ - - - . - - - _ _ - - - - - - _ _ - - -
- -=- - -. -
x
',' v. - ,
E ,
L i from the" adequacy of the reinspected toithe ' adequacy of
.the;unreinspected work. . (CECO proposed findings , 11175,
" This; contention overlooks the. fact that dispro-
_17 6 '. )
- port iona'te: numbers of. reinspections focused - on documen-tation I inspections of- no direct safety consequence. (See Ericksen~ Amended Attachment B, ff. Tr. 11, 045.) It was-
, .thus predictable that discrepancies-in-these inspections 1
would be found not to have direct safety significance.
(But, from .these facts ,. this Board cannot confidently infer thaticomparable proportions of reinspections of other i
kinds of inspections -- of- greater safety significance ,
according to CECO's Mr. Tuetken -- would also show no L discrepancies of safety significance. (Tuetken, cross-examination, Etr. 8539-45; Intervenors Ex. R-1, ff. Tr. 11, 033;- Ericksen Amended Attachment B, ff. Tr. 11, 045.)
' gain, A ' this is a matter of judgment and common sense, in
, addition to being a lesson of statistical ~ science. (See
_11178-182 below.)
166c. The' third of CECO's three unconvincing grounds for its -
' inference of adequate work quality at Byron is the .least
' persuasive o f - all: its supposedly effective overall quality assurance program.
True,'it appears that CECO may finally have " caught up" with its contractors' problems at Byron, with respect to their current activities. But for all the reasons stated in our initial decision,- and' based on extensive quality-assurance' evidence in the 1983 (Intervenors ' Proposed 11 166, 166a-166d, p. 5) a .._ _-.___-__-__________.-____
_ ~.
hearings, we found that over the years .the CECO quality assurance program has failed to meet Ceco's obligation .to oversee _its contractors, to whom it delegated much of its quality assurance responsibilities. (See 12a above.)
- And as we found in our initial decision, , CECO's belated improvement .does not retroactively _ justify confidence that its quality assurance efforts in earlier years pro-vide an independent ground for inferring that contractor work performed during those years was adequate.
True also, CECO's' program may have appeared adequate on paper, even in those earlier-years. But CECO's paper program,. and the protestations of its officers -- on
~
which CECO, expert.Mr. Laney relied to reach his conclusion
~
U that work quality could be inferred from Ceco's quality' assurance program (Laney, prepared testimony at 23-24, ff.
. Tr. 9339) -- are not enough. We are not moved by the self-
-serving generalities offered by Mr. Behnke and other CECO execu. ves on remand. What counts is evidence of perfor-
-mance, and at least two items of evidence on remand reinforce our conclusion in the initial decision that CECO's historical quality assurance performance, as opposed to its paper program, has been inadequate.
First is a clear indication in Mr. Benhke's testimony, on a point not fully appreciated in our
. ' initial decision, that "PTL acts as an arm of our (Intervenors' Proposed 11 166, 166a-166d, p. 6)
L
p; - , - -
t quality assurance department in conducting overview and unit concept inspections at Byron and Braidwood."
'(Behnke, prepared testimony at 6, ff. Tr. 9336.) Attach-oment L A to Mr. Behnke's prepared testimony shows that a
- major portion of CECO's entire quality assurance over-
~
sight. of Hatfield and Hunter over the years -has in fact b'een carried out by PTL, not by CECO. Un fortuna tely,
~his CECO and PTL figures are not directly comparable, and Mr. Behnke' on cross-examination attempted to downplay the extent of PTL's role.. (Tr. 9347.) But for example, during '1982, the last year before the BRP, while CECO's quality assurance department was directly conducting 10 audits and 100 surveillances of Hatfield, PTL per-
. formed 713. overview inspections of Hatfield and reviewed 1,398 items in Hatfield Unit Concept Inspections.
(Behnke, prepared testimony at Attachment A page 1, ff.
Tr. 9336.) . During the following year, 13 CECO audits
, and 355 CECO surveillances of Hatfield were accompanied by .1007 PTL overinspections of Hatfield and 16,846 items reviewed by PTL in-Hatfield Unit Concept Inspec-tions. (Id.). The numbers vary from-year to year, but Ceco has clearly relied heavily on PTL as an " arm" of its quality assurance department.
L This fact is of concern because PTL's performance at Byron has been less than examplary, and in some (Intervenors ' Proposed 11 166, 166a-166d, p. 7)
=
I wA
- respects has been worse than= that of the contractors- it was1 supposed to oversee on behalf of CECO. In the BRP, PTL's'eompany-wide average performance _on visual weld
- inspections (85%) was not only less'than the program's
_ acceptance level for individual inspectors (90%), but also less than the company-wide averages for Hatfield (93%) and Hunter (96%) . -(Del George, prepared testimony Attachment.E at .1, 4 and 6, ff. Tr. 8406.)
Most recently- PTL violated BRP groundrules by attempting to override a third-party-review inspector's finding of a discrepancy. (Shewski, prepared testimony iAttachment 0,-ff. Tr. 8423.) While CECO expert Mr.
Hansel presented _a hearsay report that the attempted override was not concealed (Tr. 9315-18), an elementary
- familiarity with BRP groundrules should have alerted a . competent quality assurance organization to the unacceptability of such an override effort. The incident thus reinforces the Board's concern over Edison's extensive reliance on a contractor with an unimpressive track record at Byron to oversee the quality assurance programs of other contractors.
Second is CECO's 'sorry record in supervising SCC at Byron. In our initial decision, "We concluded that the Systems Control Corporation quality assurr 'e program broke down, was unreliabic and fraudulent and that Applicant defaulted in its respective oversight (Intervenors ' ' Proposed 11 166, 166a-166d, p. 8)
p.,,%.[ " _
f
- s 0
. s t. ,,
C1 ,
1 responsibility." (D-442.) However, we nonetheless dele-gated the SCC; matter. to sthe staff for resolution because,
. . 2 wes were advised," Ceco has arranged for a 100% reinspec-:
L tion _of 'allj SCC work. '(Id. ) ~
W1' ' No't so, . we nowilearn. Fol1.owing our initial decision ~,
_the: staff ' advised the Appeal Board .of. continuing discov-eries of deficient welds on SCC cable pan ~ hangers at
. Byron. ~ (ALAB ' 770 at 31. ) In remanding, the-Appeal Board identified the question "why were not the defects uncovered Elong ago?"' (I_d.'at 31432.)
-'In CECO's proposed supplemental initial decision CECO chose simply to'i'gnore this. issue --' broadly _ stated, CECO's quality 1 assurance oversight of SCC -- and to propose: findings on the "AdequacyJ of Equipment Supplied
~
by . SCC," as if that were the only = issue.
~
(CECO proposal Lat 110j) ;However, the very fact that CECO -- in mid-1984
- .was'still finding it _necessary to ' commission batteries cof additional engineering analyses of defects in SCC
- equipment, and to undertake-extensive additional rein-
, spections of SCC' equipment at; Byron (see 11209-262 below), provides further confirmation of the finding in our initial decision that CECO " defaulted" in its quality.
. assurance oversight' responsibility with respect to SCC.
(D-442'. )
3
.(Intervenors ' Proposed 11 166, 166a-166d, p. 9) '
t
t Yi . -'
In fact,_ the evidence with respect to CECO quality
- assurance oversight of SCC' presented on romand reveals
- even less satisfactory CECO performance than shown by the' evidence in' the 1983 hearings . (See generally,
. Marcus, prepared testimony and cross-examination, ff.
Tr. .10, 319 and Hayes, Connaughton and Muffett, p repared
-testi mony and cross-examination, ff. Tr. 10, 478.)
It i~s now clear that with respect to the supposed
- 100% PTL source inspection of SCC equipment shipped after February,1980, CECO was both internally confused and externally misleading (albeit. not intentionally) in
- its representations' to the NRC staff. (Id. ; prepared testimony at 2-3, 5-7, and Marcus' explanation on cross-examination of the inaccuracies and ambiguities
- in that letter, ff. Tr.'10, 320.) Except for local 4
instrument panels, the 100% source inspections, which CECO apparently thought were being conducted and which
.the NRC staff. understandably thought were being conducted, missed some -shipments altogether during 1980-81, and covered only samples of shipments after February, 1981.
(See CECO proposed supplemental initial decision 1208 and note thereto.)
(Intervenors' Proposed 11 166, 166a-166d, p. 10) b rik-
y
.,; s 1
Nor was this the only ineffectual CECO remedial response to SCC. deficiencies. While CECO procurement practices'~are not an issue'in this proceeding, this Board
~ cannot overlook _ the' facts that in response to the SCC l p roblens ', (1) CECO purported to refrain from further
- purchases of SCC equipment, (2) CECO failed to do so, but continued its purchases' through changes to existing
. orders, and (3) CECO failed to so advise the NRC staff,
.which discovered the practice only though its own inspec-tion following the disclosure of further discrepant SCC welds in early 1984. (See CECO proposed supplemental 1212 note.) ,
In sum, the evidence on remand strengthens rather than detracts from the finding in our initial decision that CECO quality assurance over the years failed effectively to oversee contractors at Byron. Even if Ceco has now at last " caught up" with respect to contractors' current activities, CECO quality assurance over the years affords no reliable independent basis for an inference as to the adequacy of the 90% to 95% of Hatfield and Hunter work that was not reinspected in the BRP. If the BRP does not show work quality at Byron, either directly or through proving the corapetence of ' inspectors, and it does neither, then it cannot be salvaged for this purpose by reliance upon Ceco's inadequate quality assurance oversight of contractors at By ron .
(Intervenors ' Proposed 11 166, 166a-166d, p . 11)
~
166d.- In addition to the foregoing three grounds asserted by CECO in claiming that there is reasonable assurance of' adequate work at Byron, CECO also sometimes cites, and the'NRC staff relies upon NRC inspection efforts as an additional ground. (E.g. , testimony of Mr. Forney and Mr. Keppler, quoted in CECO proposed supplemental initial decision 11200, 201, respectively.) While the NRC staff inspections would indeed provide some additionni confirmation of work adequacy if inspectors were shown to be qualified, and if the _BRP results demonstrated work quality directly, and if CECO's overall quality assurance program at Byron had been adequate over the years, the NRC staff's effort does not suffice to overcome CECO's shortcomings on each of these three points.
This is true both because of the limited extent and the necessarily non-uniform nature of NRC inspection efforts at Byron. No great evidentiary showing is required to persuade the Board of the NRC's limited inspection resources. One of many examples which could be cited is the fact that despite the obviously high priority of the BRP, the NRC staff welding specialist was able to -inspect less than 330-- or about 17. -- o f the more than 31,000 Hatficid and Hunter wolds reinspected in the BRP. (Ceco proposed supplemental ;
initial decision at 11128, 136 Ward, cross-examination ,
Tr. 9911. )
(Intervenors ' Proposed 11 166, 166a-166d, p. 12)
+.
p NRC inspection efforts are also necessarily non-uniform. .They are often undertaken in response to worker
, allegations which, as we recognized in our initial decision, f.
are "necessarily random." (D-431. ) Coupled with the fact that superficially plausible allegations may or may not prove meritorious following extensive investigation, this means that NRC inspection resources necessarily reflect a non-uniform sampling of contractor activities.
(Intervenors' Proposed 11 166, 166a-166d, p. 13)
F INTERVENORS' PROPOSED PARAGRAPH 166e p
.166e.. In short, the evidence on remand has not cured or overcome-the quality assurance' failings identified in our initial decision. We therefore cannot conclude that there is' reasonable assurance that Byron can be operated safely.
l'
p
[ . ]);
., 'cluding that the quality of the Hatfield and Hunter work was g adequate.- The testimony of these witnesses, that of the NRC Staff and the Intervenors, a3 well as-that of Applicant's re-At h $ V wTsear2nd
- -buttal. witness,----9----g(below,
- b. 'Sargent~& Lundy Evaluation Results 168. Based on the engineering evaluation performed by Sargent'& Lundy of. discrepancies found in the.Hatfield and Hunter work reinspected, numerous witnesses concluded that the quality of all Hatfield and Hunter work at the Byron plant is adequate. John M. McLaughlin, Partner and Manager of the Structural Department at Sargent & Lundy, whose testimony was discussed in the previous section, concluded that based on his engineering judgment, the Sargent & Lundy evaluation demon-
.strates that the quality of all Hatfield and Hunter work per-formed at the Byron Station is adequate. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 16-17, ff. Tr. 9047.) His conclusion is premised on the fact that none of the visual weld discrepancies or dis-crepancies in objective attributes identified with the Hatfield or Hunter work had design significance. (McLaughlin, prepared ;
~ testimony at 17, ff. Tr. 9047.) This encompasses an engineer-ing evaluation of over 3,400 discrepancies. (See Section IX, e supra.) In reaching this conclusion, Mr. McLaughlin observed that of the 356 Hatfield weld discrepancies analyzed by Sargent
& Lundy, 50 were selected at random, 50 were selected by a h
6 ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
H m hG u,,c/v,L s.ad Asr & n a:n wD
& A. m r. .,s i daN in wat-use de re. , of sus lf err d(ase. Je W (7?-ff bd*W.
)
third-party inspector on the basis of being the worst welds from a weld discrepancy viewpoint, and the remaining 256 dis-crepancies involved welds at the moct highly-stressed connec-tions where the design margin was the least. (McLaughlin, pre-pared testiaony at 7-8, 17, ff. Tr. 9047.) Thus, the sample of 356 Hatfield weld discrepancies analyzed by Sargent & Lundy was biased to examine the most highly-stressed welds in the Rein-spection Program, where the greatest potential existed for exceeding design margins. (McLaughlin, prepared testimony at 8, 16-17 ff. Tr. 9047; Laney, prepared testimony at 14-15, ff.
Tr. 9339.) Yet, no design-significant discrepancies were found.)Mr.McLaughlin'sconclusionthattheHatfieldand ytoht As c/*> m o et" y.
Hunterworkisadequateisalsobasedon[ conservative loadings and cssumptions used in the design of the Byron plant, and the a h c. m faeeds are j marginsp nherent in thht design. (McLaughlin, prepared tecti-mony at 16-17, ff. Tr. 9047.)
haw% h W m M Id/ d "1 169. Mr. McLaughlin's conclusion on overall work quality was reinforced with respect to Hatfield by Richard X. French, Partner and Manager of the Electrical Department at Sargent &
Lundy. Mr. French testified that, based upon the absence of any discrepancies with design significance out of over 60,000 Hatfield objective attributes reinspected, he would conclude that the similar unreinspected Hatfield work was also ade-quate. (French, Tr. 9305-06.)
I M 'l* ^ '
,m ()<<',j ot f.t M e f if LJ tHfavwoet M "# h V / n / ri ,; & ,4 <_.
e v, w ,,,
mt &% th $~d upmm no Vrbw oM h Erf!ba WC-fo'y s< ,
- - - -- \
ke- l[s r**r* *rf INeA h V/W obove ?
.c.p p r err =f c e V7m en Ik f de,ynhm& e &So"0 R. k
( $q g w.di(ee.d N d= .fo . (&.yren1.ifHo.) 3 3
, ex.prerved & snMa ~
O 17o.
ar.tener=:t1=i=.stheetheeneineerineenetveieef ,
2 discrepancies demonstrates that inherent design conservatism -
a renders virtually all the discrepancies inconsequential. f 's h _ tics, ;;.i... ' iu. ou v. - m . . .y .i m m oc. __.in:-
- ion of weld discrepanc .s (the AWS Code defines as a discre >-
mi l
incy almost any deviation rom a erfect weld even though th i h -
I
- ode also states that discrepa les need not actually be de- # E ccts), results in the gener,elon of reports of many discrer an-7{
cies that are later found be acce table. ( .m j , e. cMd testimony at 10, 19-23, f . Tr. 9339.) '
i 'is is readily demon -
tratedbythefr.r..t r f 'md,
-.;h :ti - u . c m ; ; c:1 .: c' 1.2 abd199 ' o rw m Mr. Laney concluded that the total absence of '
any identified design-significant discrepancies provides addi-tional assurance that the work of Hatfield and Hunter is ade-quate. (Laney, prepared testimony at 23, ff. Tr. 9339.)
171. Mr. Del George and Mr. Behnke similarily conclude -
that Sargent & Lundy's finding of no design-significant dis-
=
crepancies contributes to a demonstration of the adequacy of -
the Hatfield and Hunter work. (Del George, prepared testimony q
n at 49, ff. Tr. 8406; Behnke, Applicant Prepared Testimony at 5 14, ff. Tr. 9336.)
y
- c. Scope Of Work Reinspected 1 2
172. Mr. Lancy, testifying on behalf of Applicant, also -
explained how the scope of the reinspection program supported
'}
d his conclusion that the quality of the Hatfield and Hunter work "
n.
tj e B
. - sme --
pg f wf f* Y '
$ 91 f a f" in < twh a ottdbo . [L W &P' fos 6dosa.)
h was adequate. He stated that he assessed the adequacy of the \
Hatfield and Hunter data in relation to all work performed by Hatfield and Hunter. (Laney, prepared testimony at 11, ff. Tr.
9339.) Specifically, Mr. Laney performed a comparison of the k attributes that were inspected with the total of each contrac-tor's attributes. For Hatfield, nine out of 11 attributes that !
could be reinspected were reinspected. The two that were i accessible but not reinspected were cable pan covers, not yet l installed, and cable pan identification, a less significant \
{
attribute. Ten attributes were either inaccessible or not recreatable. These 10 attributes were, according to Mr. Laney, less significant in size and importance than the nine that were f reinspected. In addition, these attributes were installed us-ing the same procedures as attributes that were reinspected.
j (Laney, prepared testimony at 12, 13 ff. Tr. 9339.){
173. For Hunter, 18 out of 21 work elements (comprising the three Hunter attributes) that could be reinspected were
(,6A* ree 1r sf 4e L e.fw. )
reinspected.[ Fourteen work elements were not reincpect.ed f either because they were not recreatable or were inaccessible.
Seven of the 14 that could not be reinspected were welding-in-process inspection points such as preheat or welding interpass to,q r ce m eu f r.__ 'e- h <ho c e*t is.rnee r-:e okj temperature. However, thelRP found Hunter's[ welding qulitja--
to be good, with less than a three percent discrepancy rate on 3,725 welds and no design-significant discrepancies. The BRP also reinspected Hunter's quality-cssurance documentation.
Q r
.-uu-win--man n' o w ekf W Y We W: Oh
% & e.e n f & n t Wof R Mob MOV)DeclW.
L e4+/u.q (
Twenty-fiveoutof33documentationelementswerereinspected l
l and found satisfactory (Laney, prepared testimony at 13, 14, i
i ff. Tr. 9339.)
174. In addition to the fact that a broad range of attri-h butes was examined, Mr. Laney also noted that over 160,000 reinspections of Hatfield and Hunter work were performed.
(Laney, prepared testimony at 27, ff. Tr. 9339.) Eleven per-cent of all Hatfield inspection months were reinspected in the program and six percent of all Hunter inspection months were reinspected. From this it is reasonable to infer that, over-all, some five to ten percent of the total work of these two
{contractorswasreinspected. (Laney, prepared testimony at 14-15, ff. Tr. ange of 9339. )] The damount and the t was cofred upon tw M r. L o ey a.r ,
w -
Hatfield and Hunter work reinspected p - o i- ga ' asis f o r Mai..
3 r; t. D conclusions on the work quality of these two contractors. (Laney, prepared testimony at 13-15, ff. Tr. 9339) 175. Next, Mr. Laney testified that the BRP data shows that for Hatfield, of 87,783 inspections made, less than 4,000 discrepancies were found. Only approximately 11% of these needed to be anaAyzed by calculation to determine their signif-icance. And, as discussed above, none of these Hatfield dis-crepancies had design significance and none reduced design mar-.
gins below the level required by conservative design practice.
(Laney, prepared testimony at 16, ff. Tr. 9339.) For Hunter, the BRP data sho- that of 73,349 inspections performed, less r
m
- Ad. d(( M M ydAh Sn a 5cA-SW"' k Y, a \
& thfW ekv5 W:m ,.e .ue g.s n -- 1 do .ro em Fw '/h. M r w .r4/>& & m et (fr~.1377.
()
than 800 discrepancies were found. Only approximately 10% o. T7??
these needed to be analyzed by calculation to determine their significance. As discussed above, none of these Hunter dis-crepancies had design significance and none reduced design mar-gins below the level required by conservative design practice.
(Laney, prepared testimony at 16-17, ff. Tr. 9339.)
176. In short, of the over 160,000 reinspections of Hatfield and Hunter work, fewer than 500 discrepancies were of such a nature as to require an engineering calculation to determine their significance. And, as discussed previously, the evaluations demonstrated that none had design signifi-cance. Thus, Mr. Laney concluded that, ia addition to the qualification of inspectors, the absence of any discrepancies with design significance combined with the inherent design con-servatism, and CECO's QA program, the scope of thy reinspected work demonstrates that the quality of all the Hatfield and Hunter work at the Byron plant is adequate.
177. Mr. Del George similarly concluded that the-large number of Hatfield and Hunter items reinspected, the relatively small number of discrepancies, and the absence of any design-significant discrepancies (discussed above) provide a basis for his conclusion that the quality of work is adequate.
(Del George, prepared testimony at 49, ff. Tr. 8406.) Specifi-cally, Mr. Del George pointed to (1) the inspection of approxi-mately 130,000 Hatfield and Hunter objective attributes and a,
- Sf f l
) 30,000 Hatfield and Hunter subjective attributes and (2) the I
diverse data base developed for Hatfield and Hunter, including )
1 related indicia of acceptability for inaccescible and not l recreatable attributes. (Del George, prepared testimony at l 50-51, Attachment E, ff. Tr. 8406.)*/ l
- 11 J._
- m.euiw mi m r, #. m y w- ...m- ..
4e
(
b sis o engineering judgment rather than on the ois of the a pplication f mathematical statistical theo . (Del George, "r. 8518; Litt Staff Prepared Testim f at 4, ff. Tr.
5 510.) Notwithstan g the use by +4ese expert witnesses of ongineering judgment as e bae'a for determining that the w >rk
< [uality was adequate, Inte ors presented the testimony of I >r. Ericksen in an eff t to dem strate that, applying math e-
- tatical statistica theory, inferenc - could not be made regarding the tire scope of Hatfield ar. Hunter work based 2pon the s aple of the work reinspected in th BRP.
17 . In assessing the significance of the tes ' mony of n_rrfer. css' m utiomical capuit, 0;. E c achcrn, "^
"^'^)\d -
- / In response to a Board concern, Mr. Del George's testimony explained that the results for all attributes were evalu-ated on a contractor-by-contractor basis to determine whether any trends existed in the observed discrepancies that might warrant further review. Only two such trends were found, one involving reproduction of original visual weld inspection reports by PTL, the other involving a relatively large number of Hatfield visual weld discrep-ancies associated with sheet steel welds. Both of these j ve'g,vf trends involvec discrepancies that were 2i.._ --in r-tur- and P were caused by (factors that have since been remedied.
(Del George, prepared testimony at 38-41, ff. Tr. 8406.)
i?[O (N+ Jar,yh L
say.&wdy f D Womrx frop.ud 97 /78- tff g g<ar &thwy y. 91 LJoa.] r
)
~
(,)
- hm
- t uvso /
avu puigus u uv um au e ,.g u t v in un aes19a, c oa-,
s ;ru tion or evaluation of nuclear power pla ts and that he : las nm exp rience as a quality control inspec* r at a nuclear po ser p: ant. r. 11,026-11,045). He is an pert statistician, but he recogni s that the conclusions ex ressed by knowledgeable prafessional gineers in this proc eding may in fact not be st atistical sta ments at all, bu rather the results of an engineering analy 's. (Erickse , Tr. pp. 11,077-78.) The 1:.mited role of a st tisticia. in these circumstances was alsc recognized by Dr. Fran el, t .e statistical expert testifying c n r< tbuttal for Applicant, explained thet a sampling statis-tLcian is not qualified t raw inferences where a non-proba-bL11ty sample is'used, t ca only assist the subject matter l e< pert in drawing infe ences fr m that sample and has no role ta play when a subjec matter exp t does not purport to apply mathematical statis cal theory at 11. (Frankel, prepared testimony at 8. ff Tr. 11,120.) Non of the witnesses pre-eented by Applica or Staff, except Dr. Singh, purported to rest their concl sions on an application # mathematical sta-tistical theory nd Mr. McLaughlin specific ly stated that t e results of a s tistical analysis were immate.4al to his con c lusions. (Mc: aughlin, Tr. 9272-74.) Thus, rec gnizing tha-n athematical s :atistical theory plays an extremely minor rol a j n the evalua ion of the quality of Hatfield and Hun er's wc frk, n to = conciderctic. of Dr. E&wkuen's testimonyT L
h '00. E.. E & . w ra m . ' o uusic criticisms locussed vu a 'b-.21^
ust d by r. Singh to calculate the reliability for Ha ield a Hu ter ins ection attributes. That reliability cal lation e> pressed the roportion of work items in a total population w1 ich had no di repancies with design signific nce and is st ated in the form a R = 1 - 2.9955/n where - = reliability at a 95% confidence leve and n = number of i pections. (SingL ,
pr epared testimony at 5, ff. Tr. 9055.) .pplication of the fc cmula resulted in calcul ted reliabil ties in excess of 99%
fo r all but two Hatfield insp ction a tributes (the two whici we re lower had small sample siz a.d were in excess of 96%)
an 4 1 for both Hunter attributes. ingh, prepared testimony at 6, ff. Tr. 9055.) Dr. Ericksen test #ied that use of the re .i-a ility formula in Dr. Singh' testimo - was valid only if t ae i:ispectors within the samp' were homogen ous. (Ericksen, p ce-p.tred testimony at 10-11 ff. Tr. 11,045.) Dr. Ericksen pur -
ported to demonstrate at the inspectors wer not homogenec as b tsed on a mathemat' al calculation of "intrac ass correla-t Lon," a statisti al technique for measuring hom eneity.
, ( Sricksen, pre red testimony at 11, ff. Tr. 11,04 .) However, E r.
Erickser s calculations on which he based his co clusion t
hat the 'nspectors were not homogeneous used data rel ting :o
<, bserv d discrepancies. Dr. Ericksen admitted that a ca ul -
tio based on design significant discrepancies would lead
- -laulamuu 2nt.raclass correlanon of ut u uud -Lhua a cor.cl mivq
,4
f') 1 .
\_ j nac Anaguccata wuiu uvmogeneous. (ir. 11,uaoj v& . m.- ,
o4 serv discrepancies are not a measure of the adequacy Ha : field nd Hunter work. It is only the existence of re I
vir usly unde ected design significant discrepancies hich tould cal l the adequ cy of those contractors work into estion and it eas the likel hood of undetected design sign ~ficant disc rep-anc:es that Dr. Si.gh was attempting to estir te. We find, ther 3 fore, that this criticismon the use o the reliability formula by Dr. Singh m. understands the asic purpose of thc ct lation and does not etract from onclusions expressed ay any v itness regarding the equacy f Hatfield and Hunter wo rk.
2 81. Dr. Ericksen's seco d .iticism of Dr. Singh's app Li-catic n of the reliability form' a, that it did not take the b
effec ts of " clustering" the oampl into account, is based on a simi lar misreading of the significa ce of the data collected by the iRP . Dr. Ericksen estified tha the calculation of int ra-class correlation is sed in another c culation which deter -
mines to what ext- t clustering, i.e., tl limitation of the sample of work the inspections of the s- ected inspector: ,
aff 2 cts the liability of the statistics ge orated by the or-mul a used y Dr. Singh. (Ericksen, prepared t stimony at J 5, ff. Tr. 1,045.) This calculation is known as t.e " design ef-fe<:t" There can be no effect on the reliability f the s imple as '
result of clustering with respect to design si ifica it
[pscrepo.m.;, fu ..'.. d " ^ i " t r : 1 c. - w .._;c.ti--
ir c^ .
?-#
/ I f 11,066) As a result, zu v alu ulu m.y J- % .i effeu , wu n
- he spectors are homogeneous (roh=0 in Erickson's esign effect ormula) the design effect of using any c stered simple of desig significant discrepancies is 1. As result, the sample siz required to generate reliable da a as to design significant iscrepancies is unaffected b clustering.
(Frankel, Tr. 11,124.) Accordingly, Dr. Singh's reliabili y calculations a e reasonable estimates. (Frankel, Tr.
11,124-25.)
182. Dr. Eri ksen also criti =ed Edison's aggregation of inspection elements claiming t at in some cases the sample sizes of individual i spectio elements for Hunter were too small to be meaningful #or trapolation of the results to the remaining population. T BRP basically aggregated inspections into two categories, su tive and objective (See H50 supra) and Hunter identified nly o objective inspection attribt.tes, documentation and ha dware. r. Ericksen himself acknowlec ged that such an aggre ation might e proper if done under the guidance of a su ject matter expe t. (Ericksen, Tr. 11,048 -9.)
183. The ebuttal testimony o Mr. Somsag established the similarity o all the Hunter hardwar inspections and specifi-cally demo strated that the same inspe tion parameters, typ3, I
size, 1 ation and condition applied to variety of inspection eleme ts, some of which had been identifie by Dr. Ericksen . .s
- La ing adequate sample size. (Somsag, R*" gl . u m .. .
q'; ~ - G ,2 Tr 1,177 3 1
,m
() 't A D.. Eticaseu s scanisticaA arguments i similar'Y.o tho e w 'ch were rejected by the Licensing Bo d in the rece nt She eham cision.*/ At Shoreham, an indepe dent verificati on of construc ion ~ adequacy was conducted by n engineering fir a, Tc rey Pines echnology. Witnesses for uffolk County, an intervenor, cr ticized Torrey Pines fo its decision to rely on engineering jud ent rather than sta istical methodology in the sclection of the tructures, syste.o and components which wer e in spected during th verification The Board rejected any sug-gestion that an appli ation of eatistical methodology contro l-le 1 its evaluation of t e adec acy of construction at Shoreha n, stating in pertinent par
[T]here has been application of stat-istical methodolo to a problem as diverse and complex as t e s rification of con-struction of a cle power station. . ..
The Commission s Quali Assurance Criteria, 10 C.F.R. Par 50, Appe dix B, do not require the se of stati tical sampling methodology Moreover, t. oughout the nuclear.po r industry, i is not the practice utilize statis ' cal methodology in qualit assurance auditi g programs.
i18 NRC at 619-2 .)
f 185. We do not believe that there h s been any~showin that Applican 's use of statistics was eri neous. In any event, math ...atical statistical theory play d little, if <ny, irole in t conclusions reached by the engin ring witnee es
~
'k */ Lod Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Mucle r Powe cw station, vuAu 2j, L;!-C: E7, 12 -
it -
s . -)-
T' >
i INTERVENORS' ' PROPOSED PARAGRAPHS 178 THROUGH 185 l
178A. _ Applicants;have= offered numerous broad generalizations l
'concerning _the _ adequacy of the sample selected for the l reinspection program and urge us to accept their conclusions :concerning the adequacy based on " engineer-i ing j udgment" alone, arguing that statistics should
- have .little or no effect on our decision.
(Del George, Tr. 8518; Little, staff prepared testimony at 4, ff.
Tr. 9510.)
178B. As'we statedsin paragraph 35B, bald assertions of engineering judgment cannot provide an adequate basis on which'to rest our decision. See Texas Utilities Generating Company - (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Stations, Units l'and 2) LBP-83-81, 18. NRC 1410 (1983) .
178C. LIn~our. initial decision we made clear that we were concerned about the lack of determination that a statistically significant sample had been chosen for reinspection. (Initial Decision, D-436.): We also expressed concern that a statistically reliable sampling had been conducted to - provide assurance that finac'cessible and non-recreatable inspections were adequate. (D-437.) Where, as here, the inspector
. qualification program was shown to be inadequate and a 100 p'ercent reinspection is neither possible nor
' practical, statistics can serve a useful role in (Intervenors' Proposed 11 178-185,~p. 1)
s- .
u a -
t M' ,
^
Of >
/ju's tifying: inferences tconcerning theJguality. of work
,; 'y '
'i_.
fthat was not reinspected.
~
s */
m g "i J*/- ?We Edid not . -- and s tillido not -- take the position fthatuthe Quality Assurance Criteria, .10 CFR Part 50,.
~
- Appendix B. requires-_.use of j statistical sampling
^
~ j methodology zinh all ' quality a'ssurance auditing pro-
~
- ' grams. It.-is:the' initial finding that-inspector; gy . qualification was inadequate that led to the-need Rfor.a , reinspection program. : The program is supposed
. itoibe r used by this Board as a basis 1for = justifying J iinfere~nces .concerning lthe. quality of work- that .was
't - ~ not reinspected. As such, the' reinspection program
% fis-different than general quality; assurance-. auditing programs , 'which . are not - used as a basis for drawing inferences to the total: population. 'See:Long Island- .
Lighting Company ;(Shoreham' Nuclear. Power Station,
. Unit 1) , LBP-83-57, 18 NRC 455,- 584, 620 (1983) .
? Applicant's reliance'on Shoreham as a basis for
' - -rej ecting use _ of statistics is . therefore inappro-
- p ria te . In'Shoreham, the Board s tated, :in pertinent
, , , ,part:
- The Board explicitly notesf that the audits ,.
" ~
Eincludinglthe Torrey Pines study, allow:
^
conclusions no more-~and'no;1ess than what
+,_ :they actually.did.show:(morefabout this zin Section 'II-K.9. c. ,- TorreyTPines ',n below) .
~ ~
- Forsthose , specific-. things looked at, 7they
- , complied or they. did not comply;with ;LILCO "
-or NRC requirements. Any1 conclusion that
-because,Lfor the~ sample chosen, no.~non-r . compliances' were found, no .noncompliances
- "> , ifor the-total. population now exist 1or will exist in the . future is totally unjustified.
We_certainly' don't: draw;that conclusion, nor'need;we.
~
- 6 Here,-in contrast to Shoreham, we do seekLto reach
- a conclusion concerning the quality of the rein-spected. work of Hatfi' eld, Hunter -and PTL.
J _( Intervenors' Proposed 11 178-185, p. 2)
~
4 4
T 3 s
wc -- - -
79 _
j 3
+--
.' .--Applicant's on-again, off-again position'on_the use-of 178D.
. statistics appears,somewhat inconsistent. ' Applicant's )
^
t initial-reliance on statistics belies its subsequent'-
'I Lclaim --~ adopted only when problems with ~ its statistical Lanalysis _ were~ revealed -- ' that - statis tics play a minor S role; in evaluating- Hunter's and Hatfield's' work.
c l78E. ;_ Applicant rinitially. presented the testimony of Dr.
' Anan'd K. 'Singh, Assistant H'ead of the Structural
~
Analytic Division of Sargent & Lundy to apply principles of ; statistics _and- probability: theory to the results of -
~
Ap'plicant 's . engineering evaluations . (Singh prepared
^
testimony at 3-4, ff. Tr. 9055.)
1The~ conclusions of this analysis appeared in the prefiled testimony. of Mr. McLaughlin (McLaughlin prefiled
' testimony at 17,~ff. Tr. 9047). -Mr.'McLaughlin
. disavowed reliance.on this testimonyfonly after cross-examination illustrated problems with the'statiscical work. ~(McLaughlin, Tr. 9272-74.-) .At this' time, Mr.
French admitted- that he looked at Singh's ' work but
. stated it was not a-significant part of the analysis of _ the discrepancies. (Id.)
-178F. -Intervenors' witness, Dr. Eugene P. Eri~cksen, _a statistical' expert, provided testimony concerning Edison's use of statistics in reaching " conclusions concerning
. Lwork-quality. He explained that where a _100 percent (Intervenors ' Proposed 11 178-185, p. 3)
~ -s
w s
reinspection is.not possible or practical but one wishes
.to make a judgment about overall work quality, statistics can:be used to draw inferences from reinspected work.
to non-reinspected work. (Ericksen prefiled testimony at-4,' ff..Tr. 11,045.)
1178G. Dr. Ericksen~ explained.that statistics enable one to make generalization's .to the population from which a
- sample is selected. If one has a probability sample, then generalizations can be based on a rather straight-i forward mathematical procedure. (M. )
-178H. In the -absence lof 'a probability sample, people -- including engineers - who make generalizations make estimates on" the : basis 1of some model or view of the real world.
- 7 - The model or view requires assumptions . The statistician canlassist the engineer in determining whether1or not these assumptions are supported by..the data. (Ericksen,-
TR. 11,073-07'4.)
1781. Dr. Singh presented.no rebuttal ~ testimony for CECO.
Dr. Frankel', the new statistical expert' testifying on rebuttal for Applicant, stated that a sampling statis-tician 71s not qualified to draw inferences where a non-
.p'robability sampel is used, but can only assist the
- subject matter expert in drawing inferences from the.
s e sample. He stated.that a statistician has no role to ,
play.when a subject matter expert does not. purport to apply mathematical . statistical theory at all.
(Frankel,
- prepared testimony at 8, ff. Tr. 11,120.)
r (Interveno rs ' Proposed 11 178-185, p. 4) r _
rm . . .
.+,
, .h-179. iThis position defies common sense.
We agree that when an l engineer makes a generalization he based his conclusion
~
on- certain assumptions . If data is available, a statistician can~ help the engineer to determine whether orL not the assumptions ~are correct. (Ericksen, Tr. 11,074,
11.109-10.) The statistician need not be an expert in the design, construction or evaluation of nuclear power I
plants or a quality control inspector in order to provide
.this useful. assistance.
180. Through cross-examination of Dr Singh and the direct testimony of Dr. Ericksen, intervenors. identified several problems with the statistical analysis of Dr. 'Singh and.
- the assumptions that underlay the Applicant's j udgments concerning the adequacy of the reinspection program.
One serious problem was created by Edison's inappropriate aggregation of data in computing reliabilities. Edison aggregated items based on the untested engineering judg-ment that tasks were 'similar for each element in the iace.of dat'a-showing that, in fact , discrepancy rates for the various elements differed significantly. In addition, .
enough inspections were done of many elements to provide adequate assurance-of safety. Moreover, the sample sizes were further devalued by the effect of cluster. Edison
.never properly determined the reliabilities.that Hatfield-and ~ Hunter work met ' design requirements , both because (Intervenors' Proposed 11 178-185, p. 5)
~
l Edison l improperly aggregated-data and because Dr. Singh 1
based his .calcula'tions on an inappropriate formula. l
. . l In addition,. Dr. 'Singh did. not evaluate reliabilitics at.a' higher than 95 percent confidence level for attributes and elements- that were particularly important to plant
-safety. .(See; generally, Ericksen, prepared testimony, if'f. Tr. 11,045.) For all these reasons the BRP failed to -provide adequate assurance that the unreinspected work of Hatfield and Hunter is adequate.
Dr. Ericksen criticized Dr. Singh's use of an inappro-
. priate formula ' to calculate the . reliability for Hatfield-and Hunter. inspection attributes . Dr. Singh's reliability-calculation purported -to express the proportion of work
. items in a total pop.ulation which had no discrepancies
~
L ;with designfsignificance and was expressed as ~ the formula
- R = 1=- 2.9955/n where R = reliability at a 95% confidence.
level and n = number of inspections. (Singh, prepared testimony at 5, ff. Tr. 9055.) Dr. Singh's application ofJthe ' formula. resulted in calculated reliabilities in excess of- 99%. forL eight of the ten Hatfield inspection attributes. '(The two other attributes were reported to have reliabilities in excess of 96%.) The 38,603 inspections of Hunter attributes were divided into only two categories, subjective work and objective work.
Dr. Singh reported reliabilities in excess of 99% for these aggregated attributes. (Singh, prepared testimony at 6, ff. Tr. 9055.) Dr. Ericksen testified that accord-ing to the. text from which Dr. Singh derived his (rntervenors' Proposed 11 178-185, p. 6)
o 1 I -
j e
reliability : formula, the formula was valid only if the inspectors within the sample were homogeneous and the
-sample of: inspections was . randomly chosen. (Ericksen, prepared testimonyfat 10-11, ff. Tr. 11,045.') Dr.
'Singh also~ stated that his analysis assumed that Linspectors . were homogeneous , that . "you don' t have one person doing everything wrong and another doing everything right." (Singh, Tr,. 9105-06.) Dr. Ericksen demonstrated that the inspectors were not homogeneous
_ . through a mathematical calculation of "intraclass correlation" and application of the F-test, two statis-ticalLtechniques for measuring homogeneity. He demon-strated that inspectors. who performed well in one inspection would tend to perform ~ well in others and
' inspectors who performed badly in one inspection would
~
. tend to perform badly in o thers . (Ericksen, prepared
?testimonyoat 11-12, ff. Tr. 11,045.)
Dr. Singh admitted and Dr. Ericksen made-clear x that- Edison did not select a random sample of inspections, but instead inspections were clustered by inspector.
-(Singh <Tr. 9093-95, Ericksen,.prefiled testimony at 10, ff. Tr. 11,045.) Dr. Ericksen further demonstrated
. that reliabilities will be inflated when not adj usted for cluster. (Ericksen, prepared testimony at 15, ff. Tr. 11,045.) Dr. Ericksen stated that because Edison had such a heavily clustered sample, it was (Intervenors' Proposed 11 178-185, p. 7)
__.I__m__. _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _
_ _ _ m _ _ _ m a- _ r - -
impossible to apply the reliability equation on which Mr. Singh relied. (Ericksen, Tr. 11,083.) Edison in its findings argued that Dr. Ericksen should have evaluated homogeneity and the effects of cluster using the number of previously undetected design significant discrepancies as inputs to calculations. Dr. Singh, however, assumed homogeneity of discrepancy rates as a basis for his analysis. (Singh, Tr. 9105.) Dr. Frankel did not justify use of design significant discrepancies and further stated that the design effect created by cluster would be indeterminate (Ericksen, Tr. 11,125.)
Edison's argument that one should evaluate the effect of cluster using the number of discrepancies with design significance rather than the number of discre-pancies equates the likelihood that someone who makes no errors in his work will make an error which is design significant with the likelihood that someone who makes many errors will make an error of design significance. This is not supported by testimony and defies common sense.
181. We,therefore, concur in Dr. Ericksen's criticism and conclude that Dr. Singh's reliability calculations are not reasonable estimates.
182. In reporting reliabilities Edison aggregated Hatfield
_ data in 10 objective attributes and aggregated Hunter data in one objective and one subjective attribute.
(Intervenors' Proposed 11 178-185, p. 8)
~ ~
L
.'bp- 5'% .+:s:
y W. _
',4 f i, ^ m- ^ ,
s py - } m _
J 1. D f ' , ((Singh ' prepared -testimony at 6-8, ff. Tr. ' 9055.) --
Dr.
< g _;
+4 Ericks'enLillustrat'ed and Dr.'Singh admitted that the
~
- c' sample' size' of"some'iindividsal Hunter elements was
- > too small1if one. looked ;at individual elements.
~
'M , (Ericksen. prepareditestimony at 7-8,- ff. Tr. 11,045;
- Singh; Tr.19111. ) Dr. Singh: justified reliance on .;
? aggregated resultsiby1 emphasizing the simil'arities in s tihe requirements ~ for inspecting each element. (Singh ,~
- uTr.~9111.) In ' explaining why he did not review the
. , ' ; number ofcinspectors who inspected -and -. reinspected ..
q
'each element in Ericksen" Attachment B, Dr. Singh stated-Ithat he : relied. on !his: understanding that if a person
~
- r
, idid_ well on iobj ective attribute .. number :one, he would .
I' - fdo'well'onl attribute-three, fobr and five. LMr. Somsag- .
~
Lalso offeredL rebutital-t'estimony describing purp6rted
[
4
- a. s'imiiarities of f all Hunter hardware" in'spections - through - t discussions 1of- the in'spection parameters of' type, .
[ isize , : lo cation : and - condition. _(Somsag, rebuttal q Ltestimsny at15-6,-ff;-Tr.-11, 172.). Ericksen Tables-
=
14 and 5 :show, however, that for individual inspectors
- 3 . the discrepancy rates -varied substantially even when -
- - ~
comparing two_ types Jof finished weld inspections , and y_ % discrepancy: rates :for -one; typ'e of element could vary e
- substantially from contractor to. contractor. -Although c, .
L
. Edison . engineers may 'have believed the' inspections of g
aliitypes ofJelements we're .the same and hence o ..
f(Intervenors' Proposed. 11 178-185, p. 9) a #
+
s
.r . .s = a A. .e ,_ ...-b r'. d .--a-',- ,- -----~,.--a..; -,r~,----.- i-,..--..-----,-,--e.
7...-
f-(,
~
k
[f performance would be the same _for each inspector, the ic >
~
l data on reinspections clearly sho'rs some tasks were f
more difficult for- certain people than others . While raggregation might be proper if:done under the guidance of .a' subject matter. expert making justifiable assumptions ,
here the data sh'ows that aggregation was inappropriate.
(Ericksen, Tr. -10,962-63, 11,048-49 ; 11,109-11,110. )
Therefore, Edison was not justified'in drawing inferences to ~ non-reinspected items nor justified in aggregating
' data'in reporting reliabilities for Hunter work.
(Ericksen, Tr. 10,963-64.)
183. The 'same conclusion can be presumed to apply to Hatfield.
Edison failed to provide any disaggregated h cfield-
' data. _(Ericksen, prepared testimony at 8 and Ericksen
' Attachment C, ff. Tr. 11,045, Ericksen, Tr. 10,965.)
~
184A. The results of the BRP are also suspect because of Edison changes in data on those results and repeated errors, up to -and including the hearings , in providing-
. data requested. (Tr. 9122; Ericksen, prefiled testimony, Tab le ' 2! ,' ff. Tr. 11,045; Tr. 10,960.)- Such inability to provide correct information undercuts this Board's -confidence in the data 'provided and in the Applicant's ability to keep accurate records
.concerning BRP-results.
(Intervenors' Proposed 11 178-185, p. 10)
^
{
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J
t
- , 185. -We believe that Applicant improperly used statistics in reaching its conclusions. In addition, data illustrated
'that the. engineering judgment concerning.the adequacy of-the-sample was based on~ incorrect assumptions. The.BRP
~
failed to provide adequate support for reliable conclusions concerning:Hatfield and Hunter's work. While a large
-amount of data was collected which showed no design signi-ficant discrepancies, the data did not adequately cover all attributes and did not include results from enough inspectors. We conclude that-this data does not provide adequate assurance of the quality of Hatfield and Hunter work.
s
. (Intervenors Proposed 11 178-185, p. 11)
7
(. ) 1 rno appearea ue.
..d ; fi m oll, de v i..ic j
m- L c. :: '"
c onclusions regard g work quality on an appli tion of stati a-1 .ical methodology. e BRP, although no ntended to specifi -
c ally address the adequ cy of Hatfie and Hunter's work, col-
.ected a large amount of ta w ch showed no design signifi-c ant discrepancies. Know eableandexperiencedengineersf c onclude that this d a is use ul in reaching conclusions i egarding the of those two ontractors which was not re in-
- pected. Will not ignore this ta either and it is one J >asi or our cone-i n ci nn thn* ekn un- -#
"* # 4 a d H" . .e r
~ m_cqua
- d. Applicant's Overall QA Program 186. In concluding that the quality of work at Byron is adequate, Applicant's witnesses also relied on their familiar-ity with CECO's overall QA program. We recognize initially that CECO's corporate commitment to safety and the adequacy of the structure of its QA program are no longer issues open to dispute in this proceeding. Indeed, in our initial decision we noted the express failure of Intervenors to file any proposed findings whict. controverted either CECO's commitment to safety or the adequacy of its corporate structure pertaining to qual-ity assurance. (ID, D-12.) We went on to find that CECO's g rar d) qualityassuranceprogram[sfundamentallysound, comprehensive and independent. (ID, D D-71, D D-89.) 2. x fi 1 A ru:::" h.im_, J. _ : i r. i t i c '. 21..d.. , uic sc..izv _2 h, +- h : m: M rm
,e a (f,#n r=-- WT 2 a. M /M c. g h ve ,
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' t;;tix;.., :f C C. ' . ga gi v 3. m. . : . :--.' - ---n-aka -i:29"'
Q[. yavymumo y.O.10 ; fuuwnut wasAs Av& vut uv. 1"~4^" *b'* '^
- _11 i ti
- f " . 21.12 ..m iluu mu. m'. 1' E--
. ir :da r '^A 187. Wallace Behnke, the Vice Chairman of Commonwealth Edison Company and the individual to whom Mr. Shewski reported in the 1980-March, 1984 period testified regarding the scope and coverage of CECO's quality assurance program as it applied to Hatfield and Hunter at Byron. Mr. Behnke has experience with CECO quality assurance activities dating back to 1965. In 1973, when he was elected Executive Vice President, Mr. Behnke revised CECO's quality assurance organisation and established a separate quality assurance department which reported directly to him. (Behnke, prepared testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 9336.)
Given his position within the Company, Mr. Behnke has had a unique opportunity to view the effectiveness of CECO's QA pro-gram as it relates to Hatfield and Hunter work quality at Byron.
188. According to Mr. Behnke, the activities of the CECO QA department have taken place in an overall context of un-equivocal corporate management commitment to quality. (Behnke, prepared testimony at 7, ff. Tr. 9336.) Ceco's QA program has expanded significantly over the years both in terms of person-nel and financial resources committed to the QA function.
L(Behnke, prepared testimony at 5, ff. Tr 9336.) With Mr.
Behnke's knowledge and concurrence the level of supervision of the site quality assurance organisations was increased in hli
-100-
1980. This led-to the appointment of QA. superintendents at
'eachiconstruction site. 1982 brought the implementation.of the Unit ~ Concept Inspections by PTL at Byron and Braidwood. A spe-cial and more comprehensive CECO management audit was conducted at Byron'and_Braidwood in 1983 as well as a number of independ-ent-audits. (Behnke, prepared testimony at 6, 7 ff. Tr 9336.)
1189. Mr. Behnke was also familiar with Hatfield's and Hunter's work history at Byron. He testified that on three separate occasions Hatfield's activities resulted in senior management attention. In 1980, an NRC inspection of Hatfield's
-activities at the Byron site led to multiple items of noncom-pliance and issuance of a stop-work order by the Quality Assur-ance organization. At Mr. Behnke's suggestion, CECO's presi-dent met with the president of Hatfield and communicated directly.and forcefully CECO's concerns regarding the quality of Hatfield work. In 1981, an increased-audit schedule of Hatfield by the CECO QA department was implemented. In 1982, extensivejreinspection of cable pan hangers installed by Hatfield wau performed at CECO's request because of incomplete documentation of inspections by Hatfield. -Mr. Behnke knew of these matters and concurred in implementation of increased quality assurance attention for their resolution. (Behnke, prepared testimony at 10, 11, ff. Tr. 9336.) To Mr. Behnke's knowledge, Hunter's activities have not necessitated similar intervention. (Behnke, prepared testimony at 10, ff. Tr. 9336.)
p.
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- 10 3. -
As ,.h) .4 W % 6 c ~ hv*>
h 190./2fietableswhichcompriseAttachmentAtoMr.
4 v4,t/.
Behnke's testimony show the extent % CECO's quality assurance itel'd *n %J programforHatfieldandHunterg~Thetablesshownumerous audits by both contractors personnel and audits and surveil-t twns cave- J 1ances by Applicant's QA department, as well a Qoverview in-spections and unit concept inspections by PTL. When asked to compare the inspection effort performed by CECO's own QA de-partment with that of PTL, Mr. Behnke testified that the bulk or mainline of the effort was by Co's own QA department, d M *j d h e. Jew.% PfL as an "*m" *f C* QA .
g (Behnke, Tr. 9346-48.)
191. On the basis of his extensive experience with CECO's QA program and his knowledge of the coverage of that program artedd over the activities of Hatfield and Hunter, Mr. Behnke y that the QA program adequately controls the activities of Hatfield and Hunter and provides assurance that the work of these two contractors is adequate. (Behnke, prepared testimony at 12-14, ff. Tr. 9336.) While these conclusions are not based on any detailed evaluation of the various discrepancies in Hatfield and Hunter's work over the years, they rest on the judgment of an experienced senior officer of CECO who has viewed the QA program in its totality over the years. Mr.
Behnke specifically recognized that a number of construction discrepancies had been uncovered with respect to Hunter and Hatfield's work, but concluded that discovery of these discrep-ancies was an indication that the QA program is functioning
-102-
/
(') effectively. (Behnke, prepared testimony at 12, ff. Tr.
$w W (**.c & & is W idC C 9336.) 't n:t^ * * -^--
J :: . L'...'~'c f4 fc./f-rerv:ds
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_ _ . - _ ..-_.4__m,_
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g, g6 O [ NO q
192.g,Mr. Del Georgej;-_i_; t_-_ifi g that his confidence in the Hatfield and Hunter work quality at Byron was based in part i 1
on the many independent layers of inspection and review of the j work of Hatfield and Hunter. (Del George, prepared testimony at 51, ff. Tr. 8406.) He noted that both Hatfield and Hunter I had implemented several reinspection programs, apart from the BRP, over the course of their tenure at Byron. Hatfield rein-spections included concrete expansion anchor verification in 1979, cable routing reinspection in 1981, and 100% weld travel-er card validation and 100% cable pen hanger configuration and dimension reinspection between 1982 and 1984. Hunter reinspec-tions involved a 100% reinspection of all hangers installed prior to 1980, and of all concrete expansion anchors installed prior to 1979. (Del George, prepared testimony at 52, ff. Tr.
8406.) Similarly, Mr. Laney based his engineering judgment on the adequacy of Hatfield and Hunter work in part on the cover-
, ar__ derc.e-et-el :e, fu)* GECo pspCC")
age and effectiveness of CECO's quality assurance progra (Laney, prepared testimony at 26-27, ff. Tr. 9339.)
193. We recognize that the ERP was never intended to make a definitive and all-inclusive statement regarding the adequacy NOWW, ht '6#e- oF &
of the Applicant's QA program. lt 1: r.1 2 .. 1 '. . _ y c r. ; _ J J^ -
w 1 i t. , n o _. .. _ ~ m u % .i m.iu m a iu..#_.v.. e . g . m.. .c P y19,-e.J &A pn4M cl-l ~ F y" n, M. 8R7 wa.r
-103-
l I
- #$ ?7' h
, ee, & or w a b -M. -S <J j O'*'i " ]
(,)
i r- r ;;
-(substitute for a functioning quality assurance pro-gram. See](PacificGas&ElectricCo. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2), ALAB-763, 19 NRC 571, 582 (1984).
imm u ,~ ! ? ' -- th=t : ;: .1. Q _ . w.- u _ ~ .. ::=
r'--- ' E$I;;, Indeed, the BRP was originally conceived as a response to one Severity Level IV item of noncompliance identi-fied by the Staff in the CAT inspection dealing with inspector qualification. Considering both the record in the remanded proceeding and our findings in our initial decision regarding (O hof f CECO's QA program, Vegfind the program sufficient to provide an appropriate basis for -euh b nelusion that the work of those contractors is adequate.
194. Following completion of the ERP, two sets of Staff Inspection Reports were issued which relate to Hatfield QC activities. (Del George, prepared testimony at 42, ff.
Tr. 8406.)
195. IE Report 454/84-27, 455/84-19 identified two items of non-compliance. The first noncompliance involved failure to incorporate a drawing requirement on cable pan cover installa-tion into an inspection procedure. However, the affected con-tractor personnel had been trained on the drawing requirement and are believed to have properly implemented it. There is no basis to conclude that inspectors who were trained did not effectively monitor the pan cover installation activities.
(Del George, prepared testimony at 43, ff. Tr. 8406.)
em i#
-104-
fh 196. The second item of noncompliance identified a limited number of discrepant cable pan hangers caused by deficient inspector activity. The majority of the observed discrepancies involved an inspection element only recently applied (fit-up gap) and does not ccmpromise the integrity of previously per-formed inspections. The valid discrepancies were shown not to be significant. (Del George, prepareo testimony at 43-45, ff.
Tr. 8406.)
197. IE Report 454/84-09, 455/84-07 identified one appar-ent item of noncomplicace involving a single Hatfield discrep- .
ancy report (DR-3382) which dealt with the removal of a cable from a conduit. The discrepancy report inaccurately described the pulling force applied in the removal of that cable, result-ing in a deficient engineering evaluation. This event was determined to be an isolated occurrence. (Del George, prepared testimony at 45, ff. Tr. 8406.) This matter is discussed fully, infra,H293-297.
198. Taken together, these three items of noncompliance do identify an apparent weakness in translating design require-ments into inspection procedures. However these procedural discrepancies have not resulted in major rework on the affected safety-related components. (Del George, prepared testimony at 47, ff. Tr. 8405.) Om.. m mu .,, ;;; - . . '. m m . v . . . c. _ - f a J. . 7-5 I'? upr 2" *k^ effecti,_.. mm m CCC_ ' _ g? pr:grc- .: r ;*-
bacim fm. ouppu. i r.; th 22:qun:) o f ::stficia a.m :: . m ' m ,, . k O e' . _... ..i u i.e u u u y s m *-
-105-
(fh e. NRC Staff Conclusions On Work Quality 199. Mr. Little, on behalf of the NRC Staff, testified that Region III believes that the reinspection of over 160,000 safety-related elements for Hatfield and Hunter, the results of
.those inspections, and the analysis and disposition of the reinspection findings provide reasonable assurance that the overall quality of the work of those contractors is good.
(Little, Staff prepared testimony at 6, ff. Tr. 9510.) When polled by the Board, the members of the Region III Staff panel reinforced this conclusion with their personal views. For example, Mr. Ward testified that with respect to welding Byron is probably the safest plant ever built. (Ward, Tr. 9872, 9910.) Mr. Muffet agreed with Mr. Ward, adding that the Staff review of Byron construction was unusually " critical" in its search for discrepancies. Mr. Muffet concludes that the results of the BRP reinforce the Staff's already positive con-clusions about Byron. (Muffet, Tr. 9872.) Messrs. Little, Love and Connaughton each testified that contractor work qual-ity was adequate, even rigorous, and that Byron can be operated safely. These conclusions are based, not only on the results of the BRP, but also on the Region's long and detailed inspec-tion history at Byron. (Little, Tr. 9872-73; Love, Tr. 9875; Connaughton, Tr. 9876-77.) ko#,N N de I= d
- M.
200. Moreover, the testimony of William Forney, as it concerns work quality, is entirely consistent with that of the es k-1
-106-
h Region III panel. Mr. Forney testified, vigorously, that the results of the BRP provide assurance that Byron construction quality is adequate. As with the Region III panel, Mr.
Forney's conclusions on work quality are based as well on his extensive experience with Byron construction activities. Mr.
Forney's point of departure with the testimony of the Staff panel has to do with inferring QC inspector competence from the fact that they did not overlook safet significant deficien-cies.(fee W 97 4Novc..)
M thon;;h t g.r_ mnefEA e ,*,1,i m
.-..y u m. ..u . - _ _
litti: cm sw one basis for his position appears to be Mr. Forney's very strong belief, based on his experience as the senior resident inspector, that safety-significant discrepancies do not exist at Byron. In Mr. Forney's words:
[I]t has been Region III's position all along, and . . . mine, that the construction at the Byron plant was good, because we had not discovered obvious hardware problems like we have at other sites. . . .
I feel at this time that the information provided by the reinspection program did, in fact, provide a very large data base to con-firm Region III's position that the quality of the Byron site is acceptable and that it is generally good. . . .
And when you c A ;e this with the work . .
that the worlyre to, which I believe to be generally s or quality, the inspection programs t ( r. only does the NRC under-take, but ;ccenses has inspection programs, they've had reinspection programs, they've had overinspection programs, you have that, coupled with the construction testing before it's turned over to preoperational testing, and when you put those all together and you '
have the overlap, . . . it's my belief and es R1 '
-107-l l_ _ am,-__ _ _----- - .- - '
O my professional opinion that th se t gether have provided that degree of assurance re-quired by 10 CFR 50, Appendices A and B, as to the requisite safety and health of the public.
g
-(Forney, Tr. 10,044-45).
M. #
"hi- Eri?; uae *b e e/o u.eT he# ch r--^ ther; ir ?l i" S-},e , foresaq's e,etcAvreen on
;,; ::: - c-- Mr vn r- m.j ' - "m4-iMg u;rsoc . (CtsL- 17 /Uthe_
c..im" a 4 - 7 , - - - - + , i t 'c_
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?*2ff ,r:ne' -igh g- 4 et ._ rigi,, ,, , ,
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M -elievcu o v myl, a. t y - - a 7_,2 - ,7-5-.rr j ,-g_ . g 4 ._ , , _ 201. James Keppler, the Region III administrator, describ-ed his own conclusions and those of the Staff on Byron work quality. ~His views are perhaps best summed up by the following passage from his testimony: I want to take this opportunity to emphasize to the Board that, despite the identifica-tion of certain quality assurance problems at the Byron site, my staff and I had, and continue to have, confidence in the quality of completed construction at Byron. This confidence is based on our overall inspec-tion effort and was reinforced by the spe-cial team inspection conducted in early 1982. The applicant's reinspection program further reinforced our confidence. Unfor-tunately, I believe that in the August 1983 hearing we may have failed to convey to this Board our degree of confidence. (Keppler, prepared testimony at 2, ff. Tr. 10,135).
- f. Board Conclusions On Work Q,uality 202. After thoroughly reviewing the evidence, the Board observes that Applicant has presented numerous bases to support a determination that the quality of the Hatfield and Hunter work at the Byron plant is adequate. We have already found pop & 4ro nof fWVerM . WlU- /SSt-alove.
-108-
y - 6._) that plicant's quality control inspectors ere qualified, from whic based on the Appeal Board's ob ervation, an infer-ence of ade te work quality can be mad . However, we do not rely on this in erence alone. Applica t also presented evi-dence demonstrati that of all the iscrepancies analyzed by Sargent & Lundy, non was found to . ave design significance. Applicant's evidence a o demons ated that over 160,000 f inspections were performe of atfield and Hunter work covering
- a. wide range of the work th 'e two contractors performed. Of the approximately 5,000 di cr ancies found in all these rein-h spections, the inherent esign nservatisms or margin rendered most of them inconse ential. Th fewer than 500 discrepancies that did need to be dispositioned b* detailed calculations were all found to be w thin Code stress alt wables and, as noted above, were no design significant. Fin lly, Applicant's com-prehensive Q' program adds to our confiden e in the adequacy of g the Hatfi d and Hunter work. -
d Q lfe ' 203. Intervenors%rni, r:-ljchallenge,(gotheoverallqual-ity of the Hatfield and Hunter work li ~ r- th:ir ^^~~rti-..- - (ce,lidrone of % j r -25:t, based upon mathematical statistical th::r A/ inferences s wum m oso au mm-=-regarding the entire scope of the Hatfield and Hunter work based upon the sample of work reinspected in the Byron Reinspection Program. As noted above, we -m .~z
' - ^ -
,believe that th:r^ '.:: -; ch:1 -. 3 -uum Applicant's use of O- ^ . _ ,.: n i (n
-statistics was erroneous. . . _.. , 1 . _.,t.
_ . 2 n ,wier a.
.3 as#
-109-
l I cs l
) -" a - "m,4 14 + M . < r a n., vnim 4- m -- . - . , , ,
reached by the engineer 1 g witnesses. These itnesses made
': lear that their conclusio were based o engineering judg-;
nent. As did the~ Licensing B ard'in e recent Shoreham dec L-sion when it noted that 10 CFR P r 50, Appendix B. does not require the use of, nor is it t e p actice in the nuclear
-.ndustry to utilize, statist' cal samp 'ng methodology, we sp a-cifically decline to base any conclusion regarding work qua -
.ty on the application f that methodology. We find that the aumerous bases prese ed by-Applicant, conside ed together, demonstrate that tb overall quali , or tne nu : _id - . d F : t i; york.n* *ka Ryrnn lant is a d a q" , _.
OTHER ISSUES XI. ADEQUACY OF EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED'BY SYSTEMS CONTROL CORPORATION
- a. Background 204. Systems Control Corporation (" SCC") is the vendor that supplied safety related electrical equipment to Byron Sta-tion,'specifically main control panels, local instrument panels, DC fuse panels, cable trays, and cable tray hangers.
205. At the 1983 licensing hearings, evidence was present-ed of past deficiencies in the implementation of SCC's quality assurance program, some of which led to the assessment of an item of noncompliance by the URC Staff in an inspection report
-110-
p- .= := L _ y
, idated' December 30, 1980. (Inteccenors' Exhibit No. 8 - NRC
, Inspection: Report 454/80-C*'. , Based on theJevidence of the
-~c'orrective; actions. taken with regard to SCC's work, we found Ethatathe' matter could be resolved by the NRC Staffras a delega-
.. ble function. Thus,'we concluded that there was nothing_left
'to adjudicate with respect to SCC. -(I.D., D-442.)(f**SI/ SIC a bove.)
~206. Subsequent to-the 1983 licensing hearings, uncorrect-
.d e w' eld ~ deficiencies were found'on equipment supplied by SCC.
It also'became~ apparent that the Applicant-had not fully met
.its' commitments with respect to the corrective actions it aad taken in~ response to the December, 1980 item of noncompliance.
LThrough. boa'rd notifications made by counsel for the Applicant
- - andLby the-NRC Staff in March-and April, 1984~ these matters twere brought-to the-attention of the Appeal Board, which then hadijurisdiction. (Letter of Michael Miller, dated March-14, 1984; ' letter of Thonas Novak, NRC Board Notification 84-074,
- dated April' 17,=1984.) Based on this new'information, the
_ Appeal _ Board deemed that the adequacy of the equipment supplied hby-SCC' warranted further exploration in'the remanded hearing. (ALAB-770, slip op. at31-32.)(A W /CC o. e leg 207. . Evidence. presented at the 1983 hearings and the
> remanded hearings' recounted _the history and extent of the cor-
- rective ~ action program regarding SCC's work. In early 1980,
,A'pplicant identified _a generic problem with welds on local
~ instrument' panels supplied-by SCC. At the same time, as the
- j% -
h "5 , -111-L L b
~
4' k 're'sult'of allegations by an SCC,. employee, the NRC Staff was con' ducting an investigation of SCC quality assurance activities 7
, :(I'.D. , .'1 D-97-98; Hayes, Connaughton, prepared < testimony at 4-5;cff.:Tr. 10,478.) To resolve-this problem,-on February 15,
'1980? Applicant implemented an' inspection program for local i
. instrument. panels. All safety-related11ocal instrument panels shippedI prior to that date were inspected at Byron by Pitts-
[ burgh 1 Testing-Laboratory-(PTL) and'either repaired and rein-spected on site or sent back to SCC for repairs. Local instru-ment panels initially shipped from SCC.after February 15, 1980 - _w ere; inspected-by PTL prior'to shipmentJ(" source inspected").
; Ultimately, all safety-related local instrument panels were
-independently inspected by PTL and accepted. (Hayes,
'Connaughton, prepared testimony at 5, ff. Tr. 10,478.)[heo*//*
F / G c e. s e v :
.~
'208. On December-30, 1980, the Staff issued its inspection-
= report concerning'its investigation of SCC quality assurance 7 practices and found that Applicant had failed to take timely
'and effective actions to assure that deficiencies in the SCC qualit'y.a'ssurance program and equipment fabrication activities
.[.:were.' corrected. (Intervenors' Exhibit No. 8 - NRC Inspection
-Report'454/80-04..) .On J'anuary.26, 1981, eleven months after
- the, implementation'of the source inspection program described Labove, Applicant sent a letter to the Director of Inspection and Enforcement for Region'III in' response to the item of non-
~ compliance. 1(Hayes, Connaughton, prepared testimony at 5-6 and eel-R i-
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- c. . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. ... .. ..
N
Attachment:
A, ff. Tr. 10,478.) Applicant's January 26, 1981 letter indicated that-all safety-related equipment (not just local instrument panels) shipped from SCC since Februar", 1980
-had been source inspected by PTL prior to shipment.*/ (Hayes, Connaughton, prepared testimony at 6, ff. Tr. 10,478.) Subse-i quently, it was determined that 100 percent source inspections for that eleven month period were performed only for the-safety-related local instrument' panels. (Hayes, Connaughton, prepared testimony at 6, ff. Tr. 10,478.) Shipments made dur-ing that time of other safety-related equipment were only in-spected on a sample basis and there were no source inspections for'seven' main control panels shipped in that period. (Marcus, prepared testimony at 6-7 and Attachment A.) Mr. George F.
Marcus, Applicant's Director of Quality Assurance for Engineer-ing1and Construction, acknowledged that Applicant failed to Efully meet the commitment as stated in the January 26, 1981 letter regarding source inspection of equipment shipped during the period from February, 1980 to January, 1981. (Marcus, pre-pared testimony at 7-8,'ff. Tr. 10,319. ) (fer T /66 c- a Swc.) 209. Nonconformance reports issued by Applicant in-late 1983 and early 1984 regarding. SCC weld discrepancies led the
; */ Applicant's Janaury 26, 1981 letter also' stated that all future shipments of safety-related equipment would be. cub-iect_to source inspection. Om.. t;__ -. m _ua. __mr-'*g, **; .Fource inspections odla sample of each SCC shipment were performed subsequent to January 26, 1981. (Hayes, Connaughton, prepared teetimony at 6, ff. Tr. 10,475.)
(Q$$g, 9 /$6 &
- hen.
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(fh NRC Staff to believe that SCC quality control inspections, as well as Applicant's corrective actions, had not been effect-ive. (Hayes, Connaughton, Muffett, prepared testimony at 8, ff. Tr. 10,478.) Thus, the NRC Staff took the position that Applicant had to demonstrate that all equipment supplied by SCC as built is able to withstand as-built loads in conformance with applicable codes. (Hayes, Connaughton, Muffett, prepared testimony at 8, ff. Tr. 10,478.) 210. Applicant's primary witnesses on this matter were Mr. Bradley F. Maurer and Mr. Kenneth T. Kostal. Together, their testimony described the showing that Applicant has made to the NRC Staff to demonstrate the adequacy of the SCC equipment. Mr. Maurer, a Senior Engineer with the Equipment Qualification Analysis Department of the Water Reactor Division of Westing-house Electric Corporation, described the inspections and analyses that were performed by Westinghouse to address the structural adequacy of the main control panels. (Maurer, pre-pared testimony, Ef. Tr. 10,158.) Applicant retained Westing-house in 1982 to evaluate the SCC main control panels. West-inghouse had previously been conducting similar evaluations on the main control panels supplied by Westinghouse which monitor and control the nuclear steam supply functions. (Maurer, pre-pared testimony at 5-6, ff. Tr. 10,158.) 211. Mr. Kostal, a Partner and Assistant Manager of the Structural Department of Sargent & Lundy, detailed the inspec-4+, S
-114-
(hk) tions and evaluations performed by Sargent & Lundy of the SCC DC fuse panels, cable trays, cable tray hangers, and local instrument panels. (Kostal, prepared testimony, ff. Tr. 10,159.) Sargent & Lundy's conclusions regarding the ad2quacy of those components which were only inspected on a sample basis are supported by a statistical analysis performed by Dr. Anand K. Singh, a structural engineer and Assistant Head for Sargent & Lundy's Structural Analytical Division. (Singh, pre-pared testimony, ff. Tr. 10,160.) 212. The NRC Region III Staff presented a panel of three witnesses who described their review and evaluation of the analyses which were performed by Westinghouse and Sargent & Lundy.*/ The panel was comprised of Messrs. K. A. Connanghton, D. W. Hayes, and James Muffet, all of whom have been identified previously in conjunction with their testimony regarding the
*/ The NRC Staff witnesses also addressed Applicant's procure-ment practices with respect to SCC. The NRC Staff believed that VD-105 of our Initial Decision, which stated that Applicant had barred SCC indefinitely from procurement activities on safety-related puchases, should be qualified to indicate that, although new purchase orders did not issue after January, 1978, Applicant did procure additional .
safety-related items from SCC through change orders to existing orders. (Connaughton, prepared testimony at 8, ff. Tr. 10,478.) Applicant objected to this testimony as being beyond the scope of the remanded hearings and irrele-vant to any of the admitted issues. (Tr. 10,467-69.) Al-though we agree with Applicant that procurement practices is not an issue and is unimportant to the issue of the ade-quacy of the SCC equipment, we admitted this testimony into = evidence for the limited purpose of clarifying the nature practices associated with the purchases. and (Tr. extent of the(fe c. W /f,6 C 4 fov e 3 10,475-76.) c /
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~ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . - ..
.( f Reinspection Program. (Hayes, Connaughton, Muffet, prepared testimony, ff. Tr. 10,478.) Except for a few concerns raised by Mr. Stokes which are disposed of below, Intervenors pre-sented no witnesses addressing the adequacy of the SCC work, instead relying on their cross examination of Applicant's and the NRC Staff's witnesses.
213. In addition to the Westinghouse and Sargent & Lundy inspections and evaluations, and the subsequer.t NRC Staff re-view thereof, Applicant sponsored the testimony of Mr. Louis D. Johnson, a mechanical engineer and Manager of Projects for Torrey Pines Technology ("Torrey Pines"). (Johnson, prepared testimony, ff. Tr. 10,294.) Torrey Pines conducted a further review of the SCC equipment and components. The purpose of the Torrey Pines review was to provide a third-party opinion on the adequacy of the safety-related SCC hardware at Byron. The personnel used in the Torrey Pines review were either qualified inspectors or engineers experienced in the fields of scructural analysis, quality assurance, statistics, mechanical systems, and project management. (Johnson, prepared testimony at 12, ff. Tr. 10,294.) 214. The Torrey Pines review encompassed all of the SCC components: main control panels, DC fuse panels, cable trays, cable tray hangers, and local instrument panels. The Torrey _ Pines review program included the following tasks for each com-ponent: collection of all records pertinent to the accepta-AS qy
-116-
.~
p),, }, lygan hcfNlrd b * .CU CT 'S f"' rNU We' *I ' m J,y a go A.
./;i,,d,,b,en aci, J w /A.t]. deel n / wi.ih
(~) (Dac , c. ' ? W ,fo,2.1't er ses .) y bil uty of SCC ltems; a review of records and evaluation of their objectivity; an engineering evaluation of the technical bases used to substantiate the acceptability of SCC items; identification of samples of the SCC work for reinspection; and documentation of any discrepancies found during the Torrey Pines reinspection between an observed condition and a required condition. (Johnson, prepared testimony at 9-12, ff. Tr.
)
10,294.)[ 215. The results of the various evaluations demonstrate that, except for one discrete area still under review and dele-gable to the NRC Staff for final resolution, the SCC work at the Byron Station is adequate to accept design loads without exceeding the code-allowable stresses. Based on this uncontro-verted evidence, we conclude that the quality of the SCC work is acceptable. The bases for this conclusion is discussed be-low.
- b. Main Control Panels 216. The main control panels are located in the main con-trol room and house various controls, monitors and instruments necessary for all aspects of operation of the Byron Station.
The main control panels comprise the main control board, which is a U-shaped assembly of separate panels. Main control panels also stand alone or in panel line-ups in the main control room apart from the main control board. (Maurer, prepared testimony gs at 5-6, ff. Tr. 10,158.) vp
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;g n j X
, 217. To determine the structural adequacy of the main con-trol panels to withstand seismic loadings, Westinghouse per-formed a_ detailed computer analysis using finite element model-ing techniques. By'this method, the structural elements of the
. main control panel are modeled by mathematical representations and the seismic loadings are determined by using the appro-priate response spectra at the elevation of the main control room. _Moreover, it was assumed that the welds were adequate to keep the joints in a. fixed condition and thus able to transmit loads. The, finite element modeling analysis thereby determined the loads.and stresses on each structural member. (Maurer, prepared testimony at 7-8, ff. Tr.10,158; Maurer, Tr. 10,169,
-10,284.)
218. To assure that the finite element analysis addressed the as-built condition of the control panel welds, Mr. Maurer, ( accompanied by a Westinghouse Level II welding engineer, visu-ally inspected all of the accessible welds in each of the con-trol panels in the main control room. (Maurer, prepared testi-mony at 8-9, ff. Tr. 10,158.) The minimum values for weld length and' size found as a result of the visual inspection (the
" lower bound weld cond' ;;. ~ ) , and the maximum seismic loads acting (on each . type of st-uctural member as determined by the
. finite element analysis, were then applied in a calculation to E
determine whether specific welded connections would have suffi-(') A; > cient strength to withstand applied loads. (Maurer, prepared I
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(w Y test'imony at.10,.ff.JTr.:10,158; Maurer, Tr. 10,310-11, 10,165-
~67, 10;-283-84.) -The maximum stress calculated was found to be-L
/within the allowable' stress criteria prescribed by the applica-ble codes. (Maurer,1 prepared testimony at 11, ff. Tr. 10,158;
- Maurer, .Tr. 10,284.) In view of the margin of safety present in the construction of the main control panels, Mr. Maurer. con-Ecluded that the structural integrity of the Byron main control panels,. including those supplied by' SCC, will.be maintained in the D event of design basis ~ earthquake for the Byron Site.
-(Maurer,. prepared, testimony at 11-13, ff. Tr. 10,158.)
219. .NRC Region.III. Staff witness Mr. Muffett reviewed the
. Westinghouse analysis of the structural adequacy of the main control panels, and further reviewed correspondence between
.Sargent-& Lu'ndy~and Westinghouse regarding the analytical methodology applied. From this revieu,.Mr. Muffett concluded
'that the Westinghouse analysis demonstrated that stresses in
.the. structural members and welds of the main' control panel.are within code' allowable stresses and accordingly found this equipment acceptable. (Muffett, prepared testimony at 8-9, ff.
Tr. 10,478.) y 1
. _220.
Torrey Pines reviewed the seismic analysis performed by Westinghouse of the main control panels and confirmed the validity of that analysis' . Further, Torrey Pines conducted its
.own reinspection of one of the main control panels. This inspection verified that the weld discrepancies found were com-h -
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y
' parable to discrepancies' identified on main control panels _in previous' weld. inspections. The Torrey Pines review also found
'that redundant load paths were present in the structure of the main control panels, and that significant design margins were present in the' components of the main control panels. Based on these findings of Torrey Pines, Mr. . Johnson concluded that the
~ safety-related main control panels were capable of accepting design loads without exceeding code-allowable stresses.
(Johnson, prepared testimony at 13-18, ff. Tr. 10,294.) 221. Intervenors' witness, Mr. Stokes, expressed concern over the reported use of tack welds and Bondo, an auto body repair compound, in the repair of main control board panels. (Stokes, prepared testimony'at 22-24 and attachments 12, 13, ff. 10,770.) Specifically, Mr. Stokes questioned this practice when design drawings cal) for full penetration welds. Further, Mr.' Stokes postulated that the Bondo could-crack and cause par-ticles to lodge in contact switches. (Stokes, prepared testi-mony at 23, ff. 10,770.) 222. In rebuttal, Mr. *:aurer_ explained that epo..y resin surface filler such as Bondo was used by both SCC and Westing-h'ouse to repair surface marks or ccratches on the main control
~
panels. (Maurer, prepared rebuttal testimony at 2-3, ff. Tr. 11,158.) However, in three. instances.it was discovered that Bondo was used for other than cosmetic purposes. In three locations on the face of the main control panels, steel plates sw WN
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fr- - .
.had been tack' welded-and filled with epoxy resin surface filler
.rather than~ welded with full penetration welds. (Maurer, pre-
, pared' reb'uttal testimony at 3, ff. Tr. 11,158.) To repair these conditions, the steel plates were welded using full pene-tration welds. '(Maurer, prepared rebuttal-testimony at 3, ff.
Tr.'11,158.) .In addition,'a complete inspection of all of the main. control. panels supplied by Systems Control and Westing-house was performed and no other instances of tack welded
-plates with Bondo.were found. (Maurer, prepared rebuttal tes-
.timony at 3-4, ff. Tr. 11,158.)
223. In the course of their cross examination of the Staff witnesses, Intervenors also raised the question of whether the full penetration welding repair could cause unacceptable warp-ing of the main' control panels. (Tr. 10,528-29.) Mr. Maurer explained that the welding of the steel plates was. performed using techniques that limited the heat build up, thus, minimiz - ing.the potential for warping of the panels. (Maurer, prepared rebuttal' testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 11,158; Connaughton, Tr. 10,517-18.) Moreover, the panels were inspected upon comple-tion of the welding and no warpage was found. (Maurer, pre-pared rebuttal testimony.at 4, ff. Tr. 11,158.) 224. :Mr. Maurer also explained, in response to Mr. Stokes' other concern, that it is not possible for particles of Bondo. to become lodged in a safety-related control switch since those switches are enclosed to protect the contacts from dirt and p% TV
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debris. (Maurer, prepared rebuttal testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 11,158.) 225. Mr. Stokes also questioned whether SCC had been allowed to write its own acceptance criteria to close out NCR-F-544. This NCR was issued in August, 1980, and it indicated that certain main control panels did not meet the AWS Code. (Stokes, prepared testimony at 24, ff. Tr. 11,158.) Mr. Maurer explained that SCC did not supply the acceptance cri-teria to close out the nonconformance report. Rather, Westing-house established the criteria in accordance with AWS Dl.1 (Maurer, prepared rebuttal testimony at 5, ff. Tr. 10,770.) The results of the Westinghouse inspection of the welds in the main control panels have already been discussed in this deci-sion, and the conclusion renders moot any concerns raised by the nonconformance report. (Maurer, prepared rebuttal testi-mony at 5, ff. Tr. 11,158; Maurer, prepared testimony at 8-10, ff. Tr. 10,158; Connaughton, Tr. 10,520.)
- c. DC Fuse Panels 226. Four DC fuse panels were supplied to Byron by SCC.
These cabinet-type structures are used to house the fuses and relays which protect the DC electrical system. The fuses and relays are mounted to the internal structural steel members of the panels. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 45-46, ff. Tr. 10,159.) 4's 227. In 1981 discrepant welds were found on the SCC DC %'l fuse panels during an inspection by Sargent & Lundy level III
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inspectors. Of the 2,170 welds inspected, 986 were found dis-crepant. In addition stitch welds were missing on one location in one of the panels, Panel No. 2DC10J. These inspection re-l sults caused Applicant to question the efficacy of a seismic qualification analysis of the DC fuse panels performed by Wiley , Laboratories in 1980. Consequently Sargent & Lundy was re-l quested to requalify these four DC fuse panels by performing a further analysis. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 46-47, ff. Tr. 10,159.) 228. The 1980 Wyle Laboratory seismic qualification test consisted of a resonance test and a " shake table" test per-formed on one of the DC fuse panels, Panel No. 1DC10J. The latter test simulated the grcund motion to be experienced by the DC fuse panels during the design basis earthquake. The panel tested by Wyle contained the discrepancies discovered by Sargent & Lundy in 1981. Consequently, the Sargent & Lundy requalification analysis compared the discrepant veld condi-tions in the other three panels with the discrepancies in the Wyle-tested panel to determine equivalency. Based on this analysis, two of the non-tested panels were found to have greater effective weld than the Wyle-tested panel, thus those two panels were determined to be equivalent to the tested panel and were therefore considered seismically qualified. (Kostal, prepared testimoney at 48, ff. Tr. 10,159.) 229. The panel with the missing stitch welds, Panel No. 4% W7 2DC10J, was found in one location to have less effective weld
-2.~?-
n m - v.
.quantityEthan the Wyle-tested panel. 'Sargent & Lundy performed a finite element model computer analysis of that' panel to
-determineLwhether-it.was equivalent 1to the Wyle-tested panel
'for purposes of seismic qualification. The finite element model incorporated'the as-built condition of the panel, includ-
.ing the missing welds. The computer analysis utilizing this model determined-that the dynamic characteristics.of the panel were similar to the dynamic. characteristics found in the Wyle-
. tested panel. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 48-49, ff. Tr.
10,'159.) Thus, Mr. Kostal concluded that panel 2DC10J is equivalent to the Wyle-tested DC fuse panel in terms of seismic qualification. (Kostal,-prepared ~ testimony at 49, ff. Tr. 10,159.) Further, Sargent & Lundy determined that all stresses in the members and the weld are well within code-allowables. (Kostal, prepared. testimony at 49-50, ff. Tr. 10,159.)
'230. The NRC Region.III Staff reviewed the Sargent & Lundy analysis of the DC fuse panels and concluded that the struc-tural. adequacy of the DC. fuse panels had been demonstrated.
(Muffett, prepared testimony at 10-11, ff. Tr. 10,478.) 231. Torrey Pines also concluded that the DC fuse panels werel adequate for design use. (' Johnson, prepared testimony at 20,=ff. Tr.' 10,294.) Torrey Pines reviewed the seismic quali-fication testing on the DC fuse panel performed by Wyle
~
. Laboratories and independently inspected 47 welds in the DC fuse panels which revealed three nonsignificant discrepancies.
(~} y-e
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- p. - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
5 L
'"[ (Johnson, prepared testimony'at 20-21, ff. Tr. 10,294.) Based
.on'its1 inspection and review, Torrey-Pines concluded that the non-tested DC' fuse panel.can be deemed equivalent to the tested panel for the purposes of seismic qualification. (Johnson, prepared-testimony at.21, ff. Tr. 10,294.) Torrey Pines also
~
-found that the structure of the DC fuse panels has redundant load-paths which do not depend on single welds or single weld
. connections for structural integrity and that there was signif-icant design margin in the construction of the DC fuse panels.
(Johnson, prepared testimony at 21, .ff. Tr. 10,294.) Torrey Pines also reviewed the. finite element model computer analysis performed by Sargent & Lundy on the one panel found by Sargent &'Lundy to have a weld quantity less than the Wyle-tested panel. Based on this review, Torrey Pines concluded that Sargent & Lundy properly conducted that analysis, thus
-validating its conclusion. (Johnson, Tr. 10,299-300.)
- d. Cable Trays
-232. Cable trays supplied by SCC are used to support and protect electrical cables in the Byron Station. A majority of the cable trays are constructed of sheet metal formed into troughs 12 to 30 inches wide and 4 to 6 inches deep. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 24 and Figure 7, ff. Tr. 10,159.) These flat bottomed trays have-V-shaped sheet metal stiffeners stitch welded across their bottom at 5 feet intervals to provide addi-tional support. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 24 and Figure
%JI
-125-N_^_ :_ .
8, ff. Tr. 10,159.) Cable tray fittings are used to accommo-date changes of directions in a cable tray run, to connect cable tray intersections, or to adapt trays of different sizes. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 24 and Figures 2, 7, ff. Tr. 10,159.) Less than three percent of the entire length of cable trays is comprised of ladder-type cable trays and ladder-type tray fittings. Ladder cable trays are constructed by con-necting two sheet metal side channels with pipe rungs at approximately 12 inch intervals. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 25 and Figure 10, ff. Tr. 10,159.) T-type ladder tray fit-tings are used to join intersecting ladder trays and are con-structed in a similar manner to straight ladder trays. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 25, ff. Tr. 10,159.) Sargent & Lundy performed engineering evaluation on all these types of cable trays and fittings. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 25, ff. Tr. 10,159.) Cable Tray Stiffeners 233. Discrepant welds on cable tray stiffeners were ident-ified in July, 1980. To address this issue, a random sample of stiffeners was inspected, encompassing cable trays and fittings from all building floor elevations. (Kostal, prepared testi-many at 26, ff. Tr. 10,159.) This inspection, conducted by Pittsburgh Testing Laboratories and verified by Applicant's site quality assurance personnel, found weld in excess of the minimum amount required by design on all of the 227 stiffeners o
-126-f ;; $ c.g m . y y -
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O inspected. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 26-27, ff. Tr. 10,159.) Subsequently, at the request of the NRC Staff, the same stiffeners were reinspected for veld quality. This rein-spection found weld discrepancies on each stiffener. The weld discrepancies found included lack of fusion, undersize, craters, undercut, and porosity. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 27, ff. Tr. 10,159). In addition, small linear crack indi-cations approximately 1/4 inch in length were observed. These cracks were determined to be non-propogating. (Kostal, pre-pared testimony at 27, ff. Tr. 10,159.) 234. Sargent & Lundy's engineering evaluation of the dis-crepant welds, which conservatively deleted the discrepant por-tion of the weld from total weld length, determined that all welds were adequate to transfer design loads. (Kostal, pre-pared testimony at 27, ff. Tr. 10,159.) An additional engi-neering evaluation of the stiffeners which were found to have the small crack indications conservatively assumed the complete absence of the stiffener from the cable tray. This additional evaluation showed that the complete absence of tray stiffeners is not significant to the design, and cable trays will carry design loads even without stiffeners. (Kostal, prepared testi-mony at 28-29, ff. Tr. 10,159). Based on these evaluations, Sargent & Lundy concluded that the stiffeners supplied by SCC to Byron are adequate to carry design loads. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 28-29, ff. Tr. 10,159.) h)
-127-
r+- 235. The NRC Region III Staff reviewed Sargent & Lundy's analysis of the effect of a missing cable tray stiffener on
-cable tray design and generally agreed with the conclusion that the stiffeners are not required to carry the design loads.
(Muffett, prepared-testimony at 14-17, ff. Tr. 10,478.) How-ever, the NRC Staff did observe that the load combination methodology used by Sargent & Lundy did not adhere to the methodology to which the Byron plant is committed pursuant to its FSAR. (Muffett, prepared testimony at 16, ff. Tr. 10,478.) In response to this concern, Sargent & Lundy per-formed a re-analysis using the appropriate combination method-ology. This re-analysis has been received and reviewed by the NRC Staff and found to be acceptable. (Muffett, Tr. 10,479-480.) 236. Based on its review of the Sargent & Lundy analysis of SCC cable trays, Torrey Pines concluded that the Sargent & Lundy evaluation provides a valid demonstration of the adequacy of the SCC cable trays. (Johnson, prepared testimony at 37-38, ff. Tr. 10,294.) Torrey Pines' conclusion regarding the valid-ity of Sargent & Lundy's evaluations is supported by the re-suits of its own inspection of the cable trays. (Johnson, pre-pared testimony at 38-39, ff. Tr. 10,294.) Further, Sargent & Lundy's conclusion is supported by the results of other cable tray inspections performed over the years, the presence of redundant load paths in the structure of the cable trays, and
%^
-128-
O-the significant design margin in the cable trays. (Johnson, l prepared testimony at 39-40, ff. Tr. 10,294.) l l Cable Tray Fittings ' 237. Cable tray fittings were inspected in 1977 as part of an overall response to a nonconformance report regarding SCC welder qualifications and procedures. 99 out of the approxi-mately 1200 fittings then present at Byron were inspected by Industrial Contract Services for the purpose of determining SCC weld quality. Four fittings were found to have side channel weld discrepancies, including lack of fusion, porosity, and a missing weld attaching a corner bent plate to the cable tray side channel. An engineering assessment performed at that time of the weld discrepancies concluded that none of them had de-sign significance. This conclusion was based on the presence of alternate load paths available to transfer loads through the fitting around the discrepant fitting weld. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 29-30, ff. Tr. 10,159.) 238. In June, 1984, an additional engineering evaluation by Sargent & Lundy confirmed that the fitting welds are not required to meet structural load-carrying requirements for any fitting because of the presence of alternate load paths to carry the cable loading through the tray fittings. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 30, ff. Tr. 10,159.) However, the eval-untion determined that in one configuration, involving the out-gf} side fitting weld of a 90 degree fitting, only one load bearing s e
-129-
O. redundancy exists, and that is the redundancy offered by the fitting stiffener. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 31, ff. Tr. 10,159.) In order to ensure that either the outside weld or the stiffener weld is present at each 90 degree fitting, all such fittings were inspected. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 31, ff. Tr. 10,159; Kostal, Tr. 10,234-35.) The inspection found that all of the outside fitting welds were present. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 31, ff. Tr. 10,159; Kostal, Tr. 10,234-35.) 239. The NRC Region III Staff reviewed the Sargent & Lundy evaluation of the cable tray fittings and concurred in the con-clusion that fitting welds are not required to carry the design loads except where the fitting stiffener weld is missing. (Muffett, prepared testimony at 15-16, ff. Tr. 10,478.) Upon hearing Mr. Kostal's testimony that the inspection had been completed and that all outside fitting welde were found to be in place, Mr. Muffett expressed confidence that the reinspec-tion effort with respect to cable tray fittings had been con-cluded and indicated satisfactory welding on those fittings. (Muffett, Tr. 10,521.) Ladder Cable Trays and Fittings 240. A recent inspection of ladder cable trays and fit-tings supplied by SCC found that a particular weld called a
" horizontal weld," prescribed in the design drawings, was pas generally missing. This weld was one of two welds contemplated 4 ~f
-130-
@ for use to connect the tray rungs to the side channel to the ladder cable tray. The discovery of the missing welds prompted a further inspection to assure the adequacy of the trays. The inspection, which included a random sample of 17 straight sec-tions of ladder tray encompassing 300 weld connections, dis-closed several weld discrepancies. No welds were missing (other than the horizontal welds as noted above) and no cracks were observed. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 33, ff. Tr. 10,159.) In addition, 10 randomly selected ladder tray fit-tings were inspected and it was thereby verified that the welded connections there are similar to those found in the straight sections of ladder trays. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 33, ff. Tr. 10,159.) 241. Sargent & Lundy performed engineering evaluations to determine whether the inspected ladder trays could adequately support the design loads given the missing horizontal welds and the identified weld discrepancies. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 33, ff. Tr. 10,159.) The results of these evaluations show-ed that the ladder cable trays were structurally adequate, assuming the absence of the horizontal welds, and that none of the weld discrepancies had design significance. (Kostal, pre-pared testimony at 34, ff. Tr. 10,159.) Thus, the ladder trays and ladder tray fittings supplied by SCC were determined to be of adequate quality. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 34, ff. Tr. 10,159.) k*
-131-
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.Ei 3 E ' 242.j TheiNRC Region'III Staff reviewed the Sargent & Lundy ,
; analysisLof-the structural adequacy the ladderjcable. trays and ,
fittings.and,iwith one' reservation,' concurred with Sargent~& y,, ~ ,
'Lundy's conclusion.- (Muffett,_ prepared testimony at 13-14, ff. .
. - lTr.910N78.)? The.NRC Staff believed;that the.Sargent-& Lundy
', : method'for calculating the' strength-of-those weld connections s -
.where:the pipe: rung on:a. ladder tray fitting intersects the -
;sideLchannelSat a.45 degree-angle should be refined to-take.
~
2 g-K f into; account the reduction-in effective' weld throat at such-
, " intersections. :(Muffett," prepared testimony at.14, ff._Tr.
? -10,478.)' In response'to;the NRC Staff's concern, Sargent.&'
zn mL. Lundy performedfrecalculations incorporating the suggested-
-refinement. The'NRC Staff has received and reviewed.the~re--
R-analysis and found it~ acceptable. .
,(Muffett, Tr..10,479.)
~ 243.: Torrey Pines also conducted a' review of the Sargent &
~
g ((O ' ' Lundy analysis.of'the ladder cable'traysiandIfittings. supplied
~
by.' SCC.--Based on'that review,.Torrey-Pines confirmed that the' J: t as-built condition of the ladder-' cable trays and fittings-is
, _2 -
'E - adequate to accept' design loads. (Johnson, Tr. 10,302-03.)
Conclusion Regarding Cable Trays a 1244. Basedfon.the absence of.any design significant weld
' discrepancies on SCC cable tray work, the. load' bearing redun-
{ .- dancies present in the cable tray system, and the conservative design..of the cable trays and conservative analytical criteria-W used by Sargent;&_Lundy,' we conclude that the quality of the
.f. &
Y t. 132-
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k 9 L._ _ . __smm__ _u.-__.m____m-____. ____ __.i_.- __.______m._w______._-___.m-__.-.- __ _h_____ _ _ _ - . ._.u-____________.___m_____.__-__- -_.___a__.___
+
s s
);
[ cable-trays supplied by. Systems Control, including solid-bottom trays and-fittings and. ladder-trays and fittings, is adequate. (Kostal,: prepared testimony at.34-37, ff. Tr. 10,159; Kostal, Tr. 10,235; Johnson, prepared testimony at 37-41, ff. Tr. 10,294; Johnson, Tr. 10,302-03; Muffett, prepared testimony at' - 12-16, ff. Tr.'10,478; Muffett, Tr. 10,479-80, 10,521.)
=e. Cable Tray Hangers
-245. ' Cable tray hanger assemblies supplied by SCC are
-installed to support the cable trays. A typical assembly has horizontal,and vertical' members that are joined by connections whichl are comprised of welds applied in the shop by SCC and
. welds applied =in the field by Hatfield Electric Company, the contractor responsible for hanger installation. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 10.11, ff. Tr. 10,159.)
3 246. Mr. Kostal detailed the several engineering evalua-EIons that have been performed on varying aspects of the cable 3
-s otrah.hangersystemoverlastseveralyears, none of which ever found any;Neld discrepanices of design significsnce. (Kostal, prepared. testimony at 12-20, ff. Tr. 10,159.)~ The most signif-icant of these evaluations was concucted in 1984 pursuant to Applicant's nonconformanco reports regarding weld quality dis-3.
crepancies found by Hatfield Electric Company on the SCC shop welds. (Kostal,- prepared testimony at 12, ff. Tr. 10,159.) To address the general concern for SCC weld quality, Sargent & Lundy identified for weld inspection a random sample of 80 Q b -133-O ./'
hangers out the population of 5717 SCC cable tray hangers at the Byron Station. The sample captured all commonly used con-nection types, and 44 connections that were deemed to be highly stressed. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 12-13, ff. Tr. 10,159.) The 80 selected hangers included 358 SCC shop-welded connections. Of these, 252 were found to have no discrepan-cies, and 106 were found to have some form of discrepancy such as underlength, undersize, overlap, undercut, add craters. Two of the discrepant connections were missing portions of welds. No cracks were found on the welds. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 12-13, ff. Tr. 10,159.) 247. Sargent & Lundy's engineering evaluation of the die-crepant SCC hanger welds conservatively deleted the discrepant portion of the weld from the total weld length, and new connec-tion capacities were thereby calculated. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 13, ff. Tr. 10,159.) Comparison of these newly calculated connection capacities against the design capacities showed that none of the discrepant welds had design signifi-cance. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 13, ff. Tr. 10,159.) 248. A further analysis was performed with respect to the most discrepant welds identified during the inspection pro-gram. Detailed computer models were developed for the three hanger assemblies which contained the three welds found during the evaluation of the 358 connections to have the greatest reductions in load capacity. All identified weld discrepancies 5% Q't
-134-
7-L/
.. for~each of those hanger assemblies were incorporated in the computer model. The_ analysis of this model redistributed the
-loads among the' hanger connections to reflect the presence of weld discrepancies. This analysis showed that despite the reduction in weld capacity,.there remained a design margin of l
at'least a. factor of-three, that is, each of the three hanger assemblies analyzed could accommodate three times the design _ load without exceeding code-allowable stress for any of the connections or structural members. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 14-15, ff. Tr. 10,159;'Kostal, Tr. 10,241.) 249. Although the two instances of missing portions of welds on the SCC cable tray hanger connections were evaluated and found to be without design significance, they caused the
~ greatest' amount of capacity reduction in the evaluated connec-tions. The greatest capacity reduction was found to be 53
. percent. (Kostal, Tr. 10,261-62.) To assure that missing
. welds do not compromise the adequacy of other connections, an
? additional inspection program was undertaken. This program
. called-for every connection which cannot accommodate a capacity e
L reduction of 53 percent when subjected to design loads to be L inspected for~ missing portions of welds. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 23', ff. Tr. 10,159; Kostal, Tr. 10,243-248, 10,255-256.) -The program also called for any welds found to be missing a portion of weld to be evaluated and restored if
~
required by design. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 23, ff. Tr.
'u " 10,159.):
, -135-
P
)
There are approximately 3000 SCC hanger' connections i .- 250. which1cannot accomodate a 53 percent capacity reduction under
~
- design loads. -(Muffett,' Tr. 10,506.) At the time.of Mr.
Kostal's. testimony, the additional inspection program was. approximately 30 percent completed. (Kostal, Tr. 10,256.) By the time'the NRC Staff witnesses testified, slightly more than two weeks later,;that program had been completed and had
' identified at:least one instance where a hanger connection capacity was reduced-by more than 53 percent. (Muffett, Tr.
'10,507.) i 251. Because of the finding of an instance where a missing j weld 1 caused a hanger connection capacity reduction in excess of
~
'53. percent, the inspection program - was expanded to include
~ inspection of al-1. accessible SCC hanger connections for missing welds. (Muffett, prepared ' testimony at :17-18, ff. Tr.
10,478.) In addition,.all. SCC DV-8 and DV-8(a) type connec-y tions are being reinspected, regardless of their accessibil-
~
Lity, i.e. fireproofing or' block walls will be removed to access these connections. (Muffett, Tr. 10,484,'10,488-489.) The DV-8 and DV-8(a) connections are being 100 percent-inspected since they have been found to have had the most discrepancies,
-including the missing welds. (Muffett, .Tr . 10,484.)'
252. LUnder~the expanded hanger connection inspection pro-gram, if~a portion of a missing weld is found, an evaluation
~will be performed to determine.whether the capacity of the con-
'c,
-136-
> - - =. .
dkh nection is reduced by greater than 53 percent. (Muffett, Tr. 10,512.) If any hanger connection is found to have a capacity reduction in excess of 53 percent, the program will be further expanded to include all inaccessible connections. (Muffett, Tr. 10,483, 10,512-13.) However, further expansion of the inspection program may not be necessary if Applicant can demon-strate the NRC Region III Staff circumstances associated uith the connection which would obviate the necessity of inspecting all inaccessible connections on the hangers. (Muffett, Tr. 10,483-84.) 253. The expanded hanger connection inspection program is an extensive undertaking. There are approximately 10,000 DV-8 and DV-8(a) connections, accessible and inaccessible, and approximately 20,000 connections of all other types, 80 to 90 percent of which are accessible and therefore subject to the expanded reinspection program. (Muffett, Tr. 10,488.) At the time of the hearings, Applicant had established a procedure for conducting the expanded program of inspection for missing welds on SCC cable tray hanger connections. This procedure was reviewed by the NRC Region III Staff and found to be acceptable for the purpose of determining the acceptability of the in-stalled cable pan hangers. (Muffett, prepared testimony at 17-18, ff. Tr. 10,478; Muffett, Tr. 10,480-81, 10,500; NRC Staff Exhibit R-1 " Instruction for Walkdown of Cable Tray Hanger Connection Welds, Byron Station.")
-137-
l 4
. J:
~~', 254. .Although the results of the expanded inspection pro- l l
gram were not yet available at the time of the hearings; we find no need to' hold the record open for its results. (Tr. 11, 169-71.) We conclude that responsibility for final resolution of the. adequacy of~the SCC cable tray hangers may be appro-priately delegated to the NRC Region III Staff. As a basis for. this conclusion, we note that the expanded inspection program for SCC. cable tray hangers calls for a 100 percent inspection of all accessible hanger connections for missing welds. This is aLtask requiring little subjective.or skilled analysis.
-(Tr. 10,253.) All that remains to be done is to confirm that this work is completed and that any necessary repairs are made. The NRC Region III Staff's acceptance of the expanded inspection program confirms our judgment that the program will adequately resolve any question as to the quality of the SCC cable-tray hangers.
- f. Local Instrument' Panels 255. : Local instrument panels are located throughout the Byron plant-and are'used to support instruments which monitor and control functions and equipment located in proximity to the panels. SCC supplied 76 local instrument panels to the Byron Station. The panels are four feet or eight feet wide and are constructed.of horizontal, vertical-and angular steel members
. joined by welded connections. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 37-38 and Figures 11, 12, ff. Tr. 10,159.)
g.
-W
-138-L
256. As stated previously in the background discussion of this section, a 100 percent reinspection of the SCC local instrument panels was performed by PTL after the discovery in 1980 of discrepant welds in the panels. Weld discrepancies on the local instrument panels discovered during the PTL reinspec-tion were repaired to preserve the validity of prior seismic qualification tests conducted by Wyle Laboratories. These tests concluded that all local instrument panels fabricated by SCC were seismically qualified as long as their fabrication conformed with the fabrication drawings and specifications that were used in the fabrication of the panel tested by Wyle Labo-ratories. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 38-40, ff. Tr. 1 10,159.) 257. However, in June, 1984, during the course of its sam-ple inspection of seven of the SCC local instrument panels, Torrey Pines found 17 weld discrepancies. The Torrey Pines inspection encompassed 205 welds, which is approximately 10 l percent of the total number of welds on the sample of seven panels. Three of the panels had no discrepancies. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 40-41, ff. Tr. 10,159; Johnson, prepared testimony at 23-24, ff. Tr. 10,294.) 258. The Torrey Pines inspection findings raised the pos-sibility that the as-built condition of the non-tested local instrument panels might be sufficiently different from the con-dition of the Wyle-tested panel such that the seismic qualifi-43 T1
-139-
cation test results could not be used as a basis for reaching conclusions regarding the seismic qualification of all remain-ing local instrument panels. (Johnson, prepared testimony at 28-29, ff. Tr. 10,294.) Thus, Applicant implemented a weld inspection program to confirm that the local instrument panels installed at Byron were sufficiently equivalent to the Wyle-tested panel to warrant application of the seismic test results to the entire population of local instrumen' r.anels. (Johnson, prepared testimony at 28; Kostal, prepared testimony at 41, ff. Tr. 10,159.) 259. Under this new weld inspection program, Sargent & Lundy Level III weld inspectors inspected 17 of the local instrument panels including the Wyle-tested panel. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 41-42, ff. Tr. 10,159.) A total of 389 connections, encompassing 1455 welds, were inspected. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 42, ff. Tr. 10,159.) The inspection found 271 discrepancies, none of which were crackr or missing welds. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 42, ff. Tr. 10,159.) Based on comparisons of the total effective weld, Sargent & Lundy found the untested panels are equivalent to the Wyle-tested panel for purposes of application of the seismic quali-fication. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 43, ff. Tr. 10,159.) Sargent & Lundy thus concluded that the entire population of SCC local instrument panels at the Byron Station is in suffi-ciently equivalent condition to the Wyle-tested panels to jus-b Q :)
-140-
1
)
l j' . .
'T.~ tify application of the-seismic qualification test results to the non-teste'd panels. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 43-44,
'ff. Tr. 10,159.)
~
~260. Sargent-&'Lundy's conclusion is further supported by a computer analysis it performed utilizing a finite element
.model of one of-the local instrument' panels. A dynamic analy-sis of the model found that the model shared similar dynamic characteristics with the Wyle-tested panel. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 44, ff. Tr. 10,159.) The analysis also showed that1the most' highly stressed connection was stressed to only 10 percent of'the code-allowable stress. Further, application of the greatest reduction in weld capacity that was identified lin the inspections of the local instrument panels to the most highly stressed connection showed that connection to be stress-ed to only 12 parcent of its code-allowable stress, thus indi-
*M .cating a design margin. factor of'at least eight in all local
. instrument panel connections. (Kostal, prepared testimony at 44-45, ff. Tr. 10,159.) .Thus, Sargent & Lundy concluded that the quality of the SCC local instrument panels is adequate.
.(Kostal, prepared testimony at 45, ff. Tr. 10,159.)
261. Torrey Pines'also concluded that the SCC local instrument panels are adequate for design use. (Johnson, pre-
. pared' testimony at.24, ff. Tr. 10,294.) Torrey Pines' con-
~ clusion is based on its' review of the seismic qualification testing performed by Wyle Laboratories, and the equivalency of n
)
-141-
=
0 . the seven local instrument panels inspected by Torrey Pines to the Wyle-tested panel. (Johnson, prepared testimony at 24-27, ff. Tr. 10,294.) Torrey Pines' conclusion is also based on the - - presence of redundant load paths in the panels' components and the significant design margin in the construction of the pan-els. (Johnson, prepared testimony at 27-28, ff. Tr. 10,294.) Torrey Pines also reviewed the recent inspection and evaluation performed by Sargent & Lundy of the local instrument panel welds and found that analysis to be complete and accurate. (Johnson, Tr. 10,302.) 262. The NRC Staff also reviewed the Sargent & Lundy eval-uation of the local instrument panels and the Wyle Laboratory seismic qualification tests. (Muffett, prepared testimony at 11, ff. Tr. 10,478.) The NRC Staff found that the equivalency analysis and the finite element model computer analysis demon- _ strate the structural adequacy of the SCC local instrument panels. (Muffett, prepared testimony at 11, ff. Tr. 10,478.)
- g. Conclusion Regarding Adequacy Of Systems _
Control Work Corporation's Ecuipment
~--
263. We do not condone the fact that Applicant did not fully meet its cc..;.itment to the NRC Region III Staff in 1980 to conduct source inspections of the SCC-supplied equipment. However, Applicant has not attempted to justify its failure to fully meet its source inspection committment, devoting its attention instead to an extensive inspection and analytical effort designed to evaluate the adequacy of SCC equipment in
")
-142-
-a its as-installed condition. The results of this effort are satisfactory, indicating both that the design of these compo-nents was sufficiently conservative so that they could accomo-date many minor discrepancies in fabrication without compromis-ing their ability to withstand design basis events and that the recent inspection efforts have been sufficiently extensive so as to have uncovered any significant discrepancies that had previously gone undetected.
264. Based on this uncontroverted evidence, we find that, except for cable tray hangers, the SCC equipment at the Byron Station has been demonstrated to be adequate to accept design loads without exceeding the code-allowable stresses. With regard to the cable tray hangers, we find as discussed above that the final resolution of the adequacy of that equipment may be delegated to the NRC Region III Staff. Thus, we conclude that the adequacy of SCC equipment no longer presents a safety issue requiring our further attention. XII. CABLE OVERTENSIONING 265. In our June 8 Order we requested a full evidentiary presentation on the cause and safety significance of alleged instances of overstressing of electrical cables during pulling and the relationship of these instances to the Byron Reinspec-tion Program. This matter was not considered during the rein-spection program because cable pulling is not a recreatable es 4J activity. (Love, prepared testimony at 25, ff. Tr. 9510.)
-143-
s-w m.
. :266. ' Applicant presented two witnesses to address this
-issue. James O.' Binder, Applicant's= Project Electrical Super-visor at Byron, discussed the' history of the cable overtension-ing issue-at Byron and explained Applicant's response to items L
of noncompliance'and open items regarding cable overtensioning. whichlwere identified.by the Staff'during various inspections. Bobby _G. Treece,ISargent;& Lundy's Senior Electrical Project Engineer,at Byron, described the analysis performed by Sargent
& Lundy of all of the safety-related electrical cables in-stalled in conduit at Byron before December, 1982. The purpose
' of this. analysis was.to determine whether any of those cables h'ad been rendered unacceptable due to overtensioning. (Treece, prepared testimony at 3, ff. Tr. 9408.) The testimony of R. S.
Love of the NRCiStaff also addressed the question of possible cable overtensioning. (Love, prepared testimony at 25, ff. Tr.
-9510.)
~2 67. Hatfield Electrical Company was responsible for cable installation at Byron. Cable-tension criteria, addressing both
~ maximum allowable tensile strength and maximum allowable side- _wallLpressures, have been established to give reasonable assur-
~
ance that the cable's published rating will not be impaired Eduring installation. Tension in excess'of either criterion could-render a cable unable to' perform its intended function. (Binder,Lprepared testimony at 3-4, ff. Tr. 9406.) K f)J
-144-
~ ~
V . . 268. Possible cable :overtensioning was first identified
. l
.during an NRC Staff inspection conducted in September, 1981, ,
Lwhen it was observed'that Hatfield's procedure gove'rning class {
'lE cable installation did'not address verification that allow-able tension has not been exceeded when small cables were pu'lled. (Binder,_ prepared testimony at'5 and Attachment A -
-Inspection Report 81-16/81-12 at A-7 to A-8, ff. Tr. 9406.)
~
- Hatfie1d revised its procedure to address the precautions to be taken~when_small~ cables are pulled and the NRC Staff subse-quently; closed this unresolved item. (Binder, prepared testi-mony at 6 and' Attachment.B - Inspection. Report 83-16 at B-6, f f . 1hr . 9406.)
r-
-269. The Construction Assessment: Team (" CAT")' inspection Econducted in the Spring of'1982 found that Hatfield's cable
. installation procedures did not address the requirements for calculating electrical cable sidewall pressure and did not pro-vide _ instructions regarding cable-rework. (Binder, prepared testimony' at 6 and Attachnent C - Inspection Report 82-05/82-04 at C-70 to C-71, ff. Tr. 9406.) In response, Hatfield revised
.its procedures to address allowable' pulling tension considering sidewall 1 pressure limitations and instructions regarding elec-trical~ cable-rework. The revised procedures were implemented
'in_ December, 1982. The NRC Staff found the revised-procedures satisfactory and closed this portion of the item of noncompli-b Q.4 .
-145-3
7 I.
,- y-
\ '
ance. L(Binder,- prepared testimony at 7 and Attachment B In-l spection Report'83-16 at B-6,.ff. Tr. 9406.) 270. For cables installed prior to the implementation of the revised:pr.ocedures, Applicant committed to review the reports for previously, installed cables against the current criteria and to take appropriate corrective action, if needed, to ensure that regardless of when installed, all cables would perform their intended function. (Binder, prepared testimony at 8 and Attachment D'at D-3, ff. Tr. 9406.) 271. Mr. Treece explained the details of the analysis and methodology of this review, which was performed by sargent and Lundy. -The analysis covered all safety-related cables in-stalled in conduit prior to December, 1982, including those cables for which cable pull reports do not exist. Most of these: cables were found acceptable based ~on information found
~
, in the cable pull reports, or, where such reports are non-existant, on calculations which showed that the expected pull-L ing tensions did not exceed the cable's. allowable pulling tension. (Treece, prepared testimony at 5-9, ff. Tr. 9408.)
For those cables for which the actual or expected pulling ten-
.sion was found or calculated to have exceeded the allowable J pulling tension,. specific analyses were performed by the manu-facturers of the cables to determine whether the cables were acceptable. (Treece,-prepared testimony at 6-7, 9-10, ff. Tr.
9408.)- Based on this review by Sargent-& Lundy and the cable
-146-
pg
\s/ . - .
.- manufacturers, all safety-related-cables pulled in conduit
~before December, 1982,-were determined to be acceptable, i.e.
- 'their ability to perform their' intended functions.had not been impaired by'overtensioning. (Treece,. prepared testimony at.10, ff. Tr. 9408.)'-
272. The:NRC Staff reviewed Sargent & Lundy's analysis and concluded that there was reasonable assurance that the safety-related cables that were the subject of the analysis would perform'theirl intended functions. (Treece, prepared testimony at 11 and Attachment.D - Inspection Report 84-27/84-19 at D-14
.to D-15, ff. Tr. 9408; Love, prepared testimony at 26-27 ff.
Tr. 9510.l 273. Allegations'concerning Hatfield's construction
. activities prompted an NRC Staff.special inspection between August, 1983, and January, 1984. As a result of that inspec-
. tion it-was determined that the one allegation regarding an instance in which.a cable had been overstressed to the breaking point'had been mooted by the documented replacement of that cable. (Binder,' prepared testimony at 9 and Attachment F -
Inspection' Report 84-02 at F-14, ff. Tr. 9406.) 274. The NRC-Staff' inspection in response to the allega-tions also involved a review ofLApplicant's Nonconformance Report (NCR) Log; at least 25.NCRs concerning potential cable overtensioning were found. The allegations thus resulted in an open item, pending verification of corrective action on cables w j4
-147-
I'
# installed prior to December 1982, and cables identified.in NCRs and Discrepancy Reports (DR) as potentially overtensioned.
(Binder, prepared testimony at 9-10 and Attachment F at F-17, ff. Tr. 9406.) The former part of this open item was closed out-by the Sargent & Lundy analysis and the nubsequent NRC review described above. The latter portion of this open item prompted an NRC Staff review of Applicant NCRs. Since some of the NCRs had yet to be closed by Applicant, the NRC considered the' item unresolved. (Binder, prepared testimony at 10-11 and Attachment.G - Inspection Report 84-09 at G-6 to G-9, ff. Tr. 9406.) The unresolved item was closed by the Staff upon their review of Applicant's subsequent disposition of the open NCRs. The NRC Staff found the disposition of'the NCRs pertaining to potential cable overtensioning to be acceptable. (Binder, pre-pared testimony at 11 and Attachment E at E-15, ff. Tr. 9406.) 275. Applicant dispositioned its NCRs pertaining to poten-p tial-cable overtensioning by determining the acceptability of the cable as installed through analyses performed.by Sargent & Lundy or by-the cable manufacturer. When analysis demonstrated that a cable was unacceptable, it was replaced. (Binder, pre-pared testimony at 11-12, ff. Tr. 9406.) 276. The NRC Staff inspection also reviewed 1,000 dis-crepancy reports ~ prepared by Hatfield. One of those reports,
-which concerned potential cable overtensioning of neighboring cables during a cable removal, was determined to have been h
- s. -
4
-148-
l ) [ ' inadequately dispositioned and resulted in an item of noncom-pliance.- (Binder, prepared testimony at 12 and Attachment C - Inspect' ion Report' 84-09/84-07-at G-12 to G-13, ff. Tr. 9406.). The On-was faulted for providing an inadequate written
-description of the problem, which prevented the evaluating engineer.from addressing'the actual problem. Subsequent veri-fication' by .a different QC inspector determined that the engi-neering resolution adequately addressed the problem as de-scribed, thus closing the discrepancy report. (Binder, pre-pared testimony at 13-14, Tr. 9406.)
277. This item of. noncompliance was resolved by replace-
. ment of all cables in question-and review of all other DRs con-
~
cerning. cables pulled out of. conduit to confirm that the
-inaccurate description associated with1the improperly disposi-
- tioned discrepancy report was an isolated incident. (Binder, prepared testimony at 14-15 and Attachment I - April 25, 1984, letter from Applicant to NRC, ff. Tr. 9406.)- To prevent recur-rence of this kind of problem, Applicant established criteria for datermining the allowable pulling tension when cable is
- pulled out of conduit. ~(Binder, prepared testimony at 15 and Attachment J - February 2, 1984 letter from Applicant to
'Hatfield.) The'NRC Staff accepted this resolution of the item of noncompliance. (Binder, prepared testimony at 15 and Attach-ment E--= Inspection Report 84-27/84-19, at E-15, ff. Tr. 9406.)
es.
- Q,)
-149-
~I 278. Based on the revised procedures implemented by Hatfield in December, 1982, and the Sargent & Lundy analysis of the safety-related cables installed in conduit at Byron prior to that time, the Licensing Board concludes that all such cables at the Byron Station are acceptable and that their ability to perform their intended functions has not been impaired by overtensioning. Although the inspection of this activity by a quality control inspector was deemed not recreat-able for purposes of the BRP, the revision to procedures and analyses described above indicate the acceptability of the cables. aee! d2......... t'. . _ t th r . ,.. t t h :. -l^ " ri: :n ai w un ,.1, ,,, , a 4 + , , we ao i a
XIII. TABLING ALLEGATION 279. During the hearings held in the Spring of 1983, former Hunter QA auditor Michael Smith testified, inter alia, that he was sometimes instructea not to include in his final inspection reports discrepant conditions he had discovered. He
.was told, he said, that the problem would be caught later on.
As an example, Mr. Smith described an incident in which he was allegedly instructed not to document missing component supports and support documents. (I.D., 137.) In our Initial Decision we found that Edison had failed to meet the thrust of this
~ " tabling" allegation. (I.D., 139.) We concluded that the essence of the tabling allegation had been substantiated, our ,~
w-
-150-t
l (% w;
~
particular concern'being a perceived lack of assurance that missing component supports'had been identified and that ade-quate documentation existed foraall component supports. (I.D., t 1 144.) We also concluded that an_ effective reinspection pro-gram was essential to a verification of the adequacy of Hunter's QA program. (I.D., 1 170.) 280. We identified this tabling issue as a proper subject for the remanded hearing, insofar as the BRP would address our
. concerns'regarding tabling. Applicant addressed this concern
. through the testimony of Malcolm Somsag. Mr. Somsag is the-
. site quality assurance supervisor for Hunter at Byron. He has previously testified for Applicant, primarily in response to Mr. Smith's allegations. (Somsag, prepared testimony at 1, ff.
~ Tr. 9452.) Messrs. Connaughton and Ward uddressed the tabling issueton-behalf of the Staff. (MRC Staff, prepared testimony at 19-21, ff. Tr. 9510.)
[G .t'a my'e of] 281. TheBRPincludedareviewo([ safety-relatedcomponent a rs er/m *F ,, supports installed by Hunter Corporation and of; documentation associated with the installation of such supports. (Somsag,
.ran.y/c.
prepared. testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 9452.) TheBRP[didnotiden-j tify one instance in which documentation of safety-related com-ponent supports required by the design was missing or one
- instance in.which documentation existed but the associated sup-port.was not installed. (Somsag, prepared testimony at 4, ff.
s4med fa _1
. , , Tr. 9452.) Thus, the results of the BRP,[ confirm the adequacy
.'Q1:
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e
' %J -
; of th'e' inspection program. established by Hunter to provide
~
l 1. assurance that component supports at Byron have been properly installed-and documented. (Somsag, prepared-testimony at 4,
' ff.1Tr. 9452; NRC Staff, prepared testimony at 21, ff. Tr.
9510.) 282. Mr. Somsag described the inspection program to which the BRP was. applied in detail. The program consists of four broad inspection types to which all safety-related work, in-
~
- cluding-the installation of safety-related component supports, is subjected. Type 1 inspections are conducted during initial installation of-activities to verify the existence and adequacy-of. required _ documentation. Type 2 inspections are also con-ducted during installation activities and are designed to determine whether the hardware meets design requirements and whether the. documentation-continues to-reflect the status of construction.and-inspection. (Somsag, prepared testimony at 2, 3, ff. Tr. 9452.)*/
283. Once the work and Type 1 and 2 inspections associated with the' work on a construction drawings are completed, Type 3 inspections are conducted to verify the overall adequacy work. Type 3 inspections include a detailed review of documentation
*/ Mr. Somsag testified that this program was established in March, 1980. Hunter conducted an inspection of 100% of the supports installed prior to March, 1980 to assure that these supposts had been properly installed and documented.
(Somsag, prepared testimony at 2, ff. Tr. 9452.)
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. 1 1
1
~ r ~'vt l.
t LQJ
. -generated during construction to verify that all required inspections have been conducted and documented, and that the hardware conforms ~to-the requirements of the construction draw- '
ings.and; associated as-built documentation. (somsag, prepared I testimony'at 3, ff.1rr. 9452.) _284.' Type 4' inspections take place immediately before
-Hunter notifies Applicant that its work on a given system has
~been completed. .The Type 4 inspection program was developed in part to deal with the concern we expresced in'our initial deci-sion,.that hangers which had been installed and inspected might subsequently be removed during construction without follow-up inspection. The Type 4 inspection program requires-physical ,
reinspection of.100 percent of the safety-related hardware in-stalled by Hunter to verify that the installations have remain-ed in place,fintact and undamaged. (Somsag, prepared testimony at~3-5, ff. Tr.'9452.) 295. lir. Somsag further testified that even if, following completion of Type 3 or Type 4 inspections, hardware is removed or altered other than as required by a design change, the Hunter QA program requires that a Hardware Removal / Alteration Report be filed detailing-the change. ' The report is routed to the_QA Department and triggers reinspection to verify that the
. hardware has.been reinstalled and is acceptable. (Somsag, pre-
. pared. testimony at 5, ff. Tr. 9452.)
- 153-m ey w p *=vm-y yv w'v--r W'-+ + + - - -
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n j-
. 286. We find that the design of the program described by u sf exuatJ smeerk, wwW s ~
Mr. Somsag assure (tha't component. supports were properly in-stalled and documented, and that supports were not subsequently altered or removed without the knowledge of the Hunter QA orga-H..awer,we Av w.I~i=)&.r d rc~ 3 nization. ' fi..d tL _ tr.: rb't; cf a = -.. fit.. Jim thi fes+,noeg fbe sl b*W _ _ _ *_ _ , bet e? s *e' _ .__,____m, kJ A *"ch m , f.> q p/ pd* Y,p' yeye5 Aur.- f ew ;s) $ [ r[ W in % dA 5 N *- 4.t XIV. APPLICANT QA OVERSIGHT OF HATFIELD, HUNTER AND PTL SINCE AUGUST 1983 l 287. In accordance with our June 8 Order, Applicant, through Mr. Shewski, provided testimony regarding QA department oversight of Hatfield, Hunter and PTL between August 1983, when we closed the record, and the start of the reopened proceedings. 288. Mr. Shewski told us that special audit and surveil-lance attention was paid to Hatfield during this period. He
'Z.~2~2.-
testified that 14 audits and at least es surveillances of (-- hej.g (Shewski, prepared testimony at 32, C* 9 Hatfield were performed. ff. Tr. 8423.) i
*/ In passing, we also note that Mr. Somsag also directly ad-dressed Mr. Smith's tabling allegation. According to Mr.
Somsag, during the ceurse of a Hunter audit (059-3), Mr. Smith initially selected for review certain non-safety re-lated component supports. Since non-safety related sup-ports are not subject to quality assurance review, Mr. Somsag instructed Mr. Smith not to review those supports as part of the audit. Mr. Somsag believes these were the sup-ports which were referenced in Mr. Smith's testimony. Thus, Mr. Somsag ascribes no safety significance to Mr. Smith's specific allegation. (Somsag, prepared testimony at 5-7, ff. Tr. 9452.) '?; 2;;r;; ith 1. 1...
,m. R a
(> e
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w 289. -TheSaudits covered Hatfield's work activities,_
'nclu'ing welder qualification-testing, material traceabil'ity,
~
i d procedures, inspections, auditing, personnel qualifications, corrective actions, training,- installation activities, calibra-Ltion activities, records,_ fire p' rot'ection, storage'and house-Jkeeping, field change. requests,' design control and document j control. (Shewski, prepared t'estimony at 32, ff. Tr. 8423.).
-290. The Hatfield surveillances. looked at such items as corrective actions, personnel qualifications, calibration acti-Evities, document control, welding, inspection reports, instal-
,lation-activities and design change: control. -(Shewski, pre-Epared. testimony at 33, ff. Tr. 8423.)
1291. The Hatfield audit-results identified 17 deficiencies l(7 findings and 10 observations). The findings' involved audit follow up~and objective errors, inadequate identification on
.weldjtraveIer-cards, lack of inspection of combination hangers, s
~
is. proper-disposition.of discrepancy reports and failure of seme.
,QCfinspectors to perform _ required read / study activities.
(Shewski,' prepared testimony at 32, 33, ff. Tr. 8423.) 292. Hatfield's correction actions consisted of additional
-_ inspections, auditing, training, review of personnel documenta-tion; packages an'd review of_ discrepancy reports _to ensure prop--
er. disposition. Mr. Shewski testified that for all audit find-
- ~ings' acceptable corrective action by Hatfield has been achieved
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. -e
or is underway. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 33, ff. Tr. 8423.) 293. Mr. Shewski concludes that, overall, quality assur-ance implementation by Hatfield during this period has been acceptable. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 33, ff. Tr. 8423.) 294. In Hunter's case, Applicant's quality assurance orga-nization has conducted 14 audits and at least 142 separate sur-veillances between August, 1983 and the start of the reopened hearing. The audits covered the key aspects of Hunter's work activities and quality program requirements, including width restraint installations, handling, storage and shipping, non-conformances, welder qualification testing, inspector qualifi-cations, design and installation methodology, control of field change notices, concrete expansion anchors and bolted connec-tions, equipment installation, corrective action, auditing, piping and equipment component support, installation and engi-neering activities, document control and quality assurance implementation in general. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 30, ff. Tr. 8423.) 295. The 142 surveillances performed of Hunter looked at such items as personnel qualifications, calibration activities, welding and weld rod control, housekeeping and storage, in-specting and walkdown activities and installation activities. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 31, ff. Tr. 8423.) a ,
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296. In view of the extensive' scope of these-audits and surveillances, the results demonstrate exceptional perfor-mance by Hunter. Of the 16 deficiencies identified (6 finding and-10 observations), none'were found to be significant and each requ' ired only minor corrective action.
All deficiencies were-closed out by subsequent surveillances. (Shewski, pre-pared _ testimony at 30, 31, ff. Tr. 8423.) 297. For'PTL, 8 audits and at least'51 surveillances have been performed since August, 1983. The audits covered PTL's inspection" activities in such areas as tool, gauge and instru-ment control, calibration activities, corrective actions, trending, inspections of electrical installations, document control,. test / inspection reports, visual weld inspections, handling, storage and shipping, procurement and equipment con-trol, auditing,;and radiographic and ultrasonic examination.
- (Shewski, prepared testimony at 31, ff. Tr. 8423.)
F 298. The 51 surveillances of PTL covered such items as calibration activities, personnel qualifications, ultrasonic, radiographic, magnetic particle and dye penetrant examinations, visual weld inspections, document-control, material centrol and civil activities. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 31, 32, ff. g Tr. 8423.) 299. The PTL audits identified 10 deficiences (4 findings and 61observatio'ns). These involved an-inspector improperly accepting seven two-inch welds, a receiving inspector not hav-A
\oJ-
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$;) 'ing proper certification, whiteout having been used by one per-son on sample logs, and incomplete documentation on ultrasonic test records. -Corrective action for these. deficiencies basic-
. ally involved retraining. Mr. Shewski testified that these PTL
= findings and observations did not have significance and that adequate corrective measures were easily achieved. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 32, ff. Tr. 8423.)
300. . Applicant's QA program prescribes that a large number
.of varied types of audits and surveillances be conducted at its nuclear construction sites. As-we noted in our Initial Deci-sion, Applicant's practice is to delegate the initial responsi-bility for quality control and quality assurance to the con-tractors actually performing the work. (I.D., T D-80.)
According to Mr. Behnke, this is based on CECO's belief that the organization doing the work will produce a higher quality product.if it inspects and audits itself. This is also con-sistent with CECO's policy to. insist on obtaining documented quality performance from each of the contractors and vendors
- with whom it does business. (Behnke, prepared testimony at 5, 6,'ff. Tr.,9336.) We find.that Applicant's QA oversight since Au gust, 1983 of Hatfield,. Hunter and PTL was extensive and n in rar b fge.
indicates that Applicant hasgovercome eng(excessive delegation of the quality assurance function to those contractors which was previously observed. Mo M, CE8- W "' "**
~
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V 4 f5 _ Qf XV. APPLICANT'S QA MEASURES TO PREVENT IN-ACCURATE OR UNRELIABLE CONTRACTOR DOCUMENTATION PRACTICES 30lL Given the concerns expressed in our initial decision regarding the reliability of Hatfield's documentation _and_o'ur
- assessment that.-Applicant's initial evidentiary presentation on
.thisLissue " bordered-on default," we heard, evidence in the -
1 reopened proceeding regarding Applicant's current efforts to assurecitself-that quality documentation'is accurate and relia-ible. fAs: background for-this issue Mr. Shewski testified on'the
. changes,in Hatfield' documentation which.have taken place over ?
the years and on the current state of Hatfield's documentation ,
-_ practices. _ (Shewski, Tr. 8755-60.)
. .302. According to Mr.': Shewski, Hatfield's documentation procedures have gone through several changes since Hatfield (be'gan work at Byron in 1976. Originally, weld inspections were
- . performed using drawings as the' inspection document. In this 6
- regard,.about 5% of the welds were. spot checked against the
. drawings and the results were-indicated on the drawings.
'Thereafter, Hatfield changed from inspections based on drawings nto:the u'se of. weld traveler cards. - These-traveler cards con- .
cstitute.the primary record of weld quality and record the inspection results-by Quality Control Inspectors (See App. Ex.
^
R-1)f In 1981, Hatfield= changed from spot checks to 100%-
- inspection of~all' welds. (Shewski', Tr. 8756-57.) It should.be notedithat all cable pan hangers installed prior to this re-159- ~ m-y -ry - - - - , --+g--,-,--.-*-+---===y --+ = - - - +---ee =e-,----*--t y-w*--~ m' +-*-m-*w+- y v
I
- wJ quirement for 100% inspection were inspected on a retrospective basis,-(Shewski. Tr.'8758; Del George, Tr. 8760; Behnke, pre-pared _ testimony.at 10, ff. Tr'. 9336.)- Mr. Shewski testified that, based on his experience, neither Hatfield's documentation practices-nor its procedures over time differ markedly from those'of electrical contractors at other nuclear sites.
(Shewski, Tr. 8736.) This_ evolution in inspection practices and documentation is at:least partially responsible for the apparent difficulty which Hatfield has experienced in maintain-
-ing proper documentation from time to time. Since Hunter per-forms much of'its construction. work under the ASME Code they have always had a weld traveler system and documented inspec-tions and have not experienced documentation problems compara-ble'to Hatfield's. (Shewski, Tr. 8761.)
303. Mr. Shewski told us that since mid-1982, special
~
attention has been given by Applicant's site quality assurance organization to actions by site contractors which might lead to inaccurate or unreliable documentation. Training for detecting possible alterations to documents was conducted for site QA personnel. L'ead auditor retraining also covers this subject. Auditors have been trained to check for improper records as part of document review activities, even when-specific ques-tions~are not on the audit checklist. We earlier discussed
~~ CECO's audit of Hatfield's implementation of the BRP which specifically included a review of the accuracy and reliability f)
()
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of Hatfield's records (1's 87 supra).
~
-~90, There is no evi-
~dence that the records of: certification of QC and QA inspectors or'of the BRPTa're inaccurate or' unreliabley/ (Shewski, prepared c3 testimon'ytadL25, 26, ff. Tr. 8423; Hansel, Tr. 9013.)
304. ALtwo month long Applicant audit of over 10,500 rec-ords was conducted in late 1982 to verify the authenticity of contractor.QC~ documentation. Another.related audit was per-1 formed-for the BRP-in early 1984 by Applicant'c' general office' l i quality assurance department. -Hunter, Hatfield and PTL records wNre-coveredbytheaudit.- One purpose of the audits was to make certain.that no fradulent documentation practice has occurred. - The contractors' method of control and administra-
. tion of'QC qualification tests were reviewed, including reviews s
to verifylth'ht retests were done with a different test than the original and that tests and test answers were controlled. Calibration records were reviewed to ensure that inforn.ation and~date were unique, complete and not improperly altered and
~
a-
'y that' signatures on documents were original and by authorized
, ' personnel._ Reviews were also conducted to verify that site QA e
g personnel ~were checking contractor welder qualifications and QC inspector-qualification packages for acceptability and authen-ticity. No fradulent ' activities were identified. (Shewski, prepared. testimony at 26, ff. Tr. 8423.) . 305.}Mr. Shewski concluded that recently increased audit f 3; and-surveillance programs have shown that all of-the contrac-
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. tors, including Hatfield, are currently doing a good job of maintaining accurate documentation. (Shewski, Tr. 8669.) In his opinion, any problems have been isolated and have involved human errors or misunderstandings without serious impact.
'(Shewski, Tr. 8685, 8759.)
Dscyi% 306.- ^n t:. L_- cf Mr. Shewski's testimony, we find that i of w! *o bs in our initial decision, at 19 NRC 214-15, paragraph D-438, we,[ rwisasddo fd mini. 2-._'- :f(Hatfield's documentation procedures when we stated that Hatfield appeared incapable of maintaining reliable OnI soone- of fKe records. ' [ confusion was caused in ;"OI-by Hatfield's changing documentation methodology. (Shewski, Tr. 8756.) +4d"~
*4 pir: ::nc1"A- +'-* " piir:r' '-- - '-
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XVI. ACTIVITIES OF PITTSBURGH TESTING LABORATORY 307. PTL has been on site at Byron since September, 1977. PTL has not been responsible for any underlying construction work. (Del George, prepared testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 8406.) Rather, PTL reports to the CECO Site QA Department and per-forms independent inspections and destructive and nondestruc-tive testing involving many of the key activities of the site contractors. The scope of work performed by PTL includes non-destructive testing of welds, concrete testing, aggregate test-ing, concrete expansion anchor inspection and testing, soils fw j
-162-
testing, calibration, and bolting inspection. The nondestruc-tive testing includes radiographic testing of welding and most of the magnetic particle, liquid penetrant and ultrasonic test-ing. -(Shewski, prepared testimony at 27, 28, ff. Tr. 8423.) 308. PTL also performs overinspections to check construc-tion work performed and inspected by the site contractors and to survey contractor activities in the structural, mechanical and electriccl disciplines. These overinspections have been L performed by PTL since 1980 and are in addition to the QC
'" inspections required of the site contractors. They generally cover up to 10 percent of a work activity and have been concen-trated in the areas of welding, electrical installations and HVAC installations.
309. In September, 1982, Applicant's quality assurance department initiated an additional form of inspection called a unit concept inspection ("UCI") which PTL is required to per-form each week at Byron. PTL uses a team of inspectors who are qualified in various disciplines to inspect items installed within particular spatial boundaries or in conjunction with specific equipment for compliance with vendor and engineering documents. This particular inspection encompasses all contrac-tors who performed work activities within a given area. These
- UCIs are in addltion to the normal inspections and overinspec- .
' tions performed on site. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 28,
< -163-
s c
'.' 29, ff. Tr. 8423; Del George, prepared testimony at 53, ff. Tr.
8406.) gyfg$4(m W /6C C e $.ere, Ao f N 310. '4 +O..gfverinspectionsandUCIs
,la+H&j providefadditional confidence that the field work and the inspection activities of the contractors have been performed acceptably. (Shewski, prepared testimony at 28, ff. Tr. 8423.)
XVII. DISPOSITION OF ALLEGATIONS 311. In our Initial Decision, we expressed concern over several matters regarding Hatfield arising from worker allega-tions that were still pending with the Region III and the Office of Investigations, and noted that the NRC Region III Staff intended to close out several allegations on the basis of
~t he results of the reinspection program. (I.D., S's D-406,
.D-407, D-439.) In our June 8, 1984 prehearing order, we clari-fled that our concern was limited to whether, in accordance with~the NRC Staff's expectations, the BRP has been effective in : resolving some of the worker allegations. We also asked whether the NRC Staff or Applicant had identified any allega-tions, as having independent and important relevance to the reinspection program. (Memorandum and Order at 8-9, June 8, 1984.)
312. The NRC Staff presented a panel of two witnesses,
-Messrs. Hayes and Connaughton, to address these matters.
(Hayes, Connaughton, prepared testimony, ff. Tr. 9964.) The j'% L ,!
-164-
E 1 BRP was relied upon to resolve two worker allegations regarding Hatfield welding, and supplemented the resolution of three others. The remainder of the 23 allegations assigned to Region i g III and as yet uninvestigated at the close of the August, 1983 hearings have since been resolved independent of the BRP. [ (Hayes, prepared testimony at 3, ff. Tr. 9964.) I - 313. Of the two allegations resolved by the BRP, one con-E [ cerned widespread undercut in excess of AWS code limits. This
- allegation was found to be unsubstantiated through third-party
] inspections and independent NRC inspections. (Hayes, prepared testimony at 3 and Attachment A, ff. Tr. 9964.) The other allegation, received in August, 1982 stated that two QC inspec-tors were unqualified. The allegation was considered substan-tiated, but was subsequently resolved by the BRP's extensive examination of the work of QC inspectors at the Byron Station. (Hayes, prepared testimony at 3-4, ff. Tr. 9964). = 314. The three allegations whose resolution was supple-mented by data from the BRP all concerned Hatfield welding. - (Hayes, prepared testimony at 4 and Attachment C, ff. Tr. 9964.) One allegation, that approximately 90 percent of cer-tain Hatfield hangers which were covered with fireproofing and which were inspected because of missing weld trevelers were [ rejectable, was disproven by results of inspections which were E conducteC to resolve a related nonconformance report. The BRP [ reinspected welds that were covered with fireproofing and found E
-165-w .
p [ { i
- l~ ;
'[ ~ none'that required repair, thus confirming the above results.
.(Hayes, prepared testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 9964.) A second alle-gation claimed .that the rejectica rate for Hatfield hanger welds merited removal of fireproofing to reinspect additional
. welds. This allegation was resolved in the course of the BRP, which-removed all the-fireproofing in areas identified by the alleger and-the finding thereby of only one unacceptable con-nection. (Hayes, prepared testimony at 4-5, ff. Tr. 9964.)
315. A third allegation charged that fireproofing covered tack welds-and that there.was no documentation of such un-acceptable welds. This allegation was resolved by the inspec-tion and completion of the welds identified by the alleger, and the BRP inspection of 5,500 fireproofed welds which found only two tack welds. Further, it was found that discrepancy reports were not issued because the tack welds had not yet been accepted by QC'at'the time of the allegation. (Hayes, prepared testimony at'5,'ff. Tr. 9964.) 316. In response to our second request, the NRC Staff found, with one exception, no other allegations of independent and important relevance to the BRP. In the<one exception, the o NRC. Staff found an allegation regarding the improper certifica-tion of one QC inspector to be substantiated. Appropriate cor-rective actions were taken with respect to this. individual and found acceptable to.the NRC Staff. (Hayes, prepared testimony at 5-6, ff. Tr. 9964.)
. ~ , .
-166-
O 317. Based on the NRC Staff's testimony, we find that the ee ty eF Jensa UP7% BRP has been 'f_ e ._, . ...y . - uj wu n.w m ; ~., for resolving certain allegations regarding Hatfield. ~". ,, __ ' Cr:ti:n; . . L . .,_ J :. .. L .. ;;_f N XVIII. MODIFICATION OR WITHDRAWAL OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN INITIAL DECISION 318 hw Based on this supplemental decision, . . . 1 of the findings and conclusions in our Initial Decision of January 13 O .c Oc u-2 . . . - - . . p must F nt; CF now be' either modified or withdrawn.1
- - - k.i ti - '
_ _ . _ . . -ves not constitute any sortion of our factual fin ings and e make no change in that part of our Initial Decisio . Sir larly, we make no change in the Conclusion and Order Sec ion of the Initial Decision, stat-ing, however, that it is supe _ded in its entirety by the Con-
- lusions of Law and Order Sec ons of this SuppIemental Initia
)ecision.
319. Findings D-137 t ough -145 of our Initial Decisio
<re modified insofar as t y sugg st that Mr. Smith's allega t ion of " tabling" has sa ety signi icance. (See 's 279 -
2 86.) Accordingly, our onclusion 'n finding D-169, that t e a leged " tabling" is a serious matte which could have imp r-ta t consequences, is althdrawn.
- 20. Finding D- 8 is modified to reflect the final /re-ts of tha '"':' f o i ir. pc c tei p l i r 4 c - M c- '% s 1 & kyof e , & a e}.ry),,4f jerch
&d $'* ' 'h N N ' s ~a"'I' A
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() 1 soi. Auc vvuweina expressea 2n Ianuiuva u- a ana u-eus ^ re gar ng possible fradulent contractor practi es have now been resolve in our satisfaction and CECO has es ablished that Haufield d umentation is not fraudulent a d is adequately reliable and ccurate. (See 1's 301 - 3 6.) 322. Findi D-410 is modified i ofar as it suggests that Reyion III has ta n exception to t 90 percent acceptance criterion for subjec.ive inspectio s and the definition of sub-jective weld attribute Undisp ted testimony in the reopened hearing has shown that th Sta f fully concurs with this accep-tance criterion and the def1 tion of subjective weld attri-bt tes. (See 1 54.) 323. Finding D-414 i modif ed insofar as it suggests tha : E dison's presentation o the BRP h s been inadequate. 324. Finding D-42 , which conel des that Intervenors pre-N ail on the essence the quality ass ance contention, is v ithdrawn. We now onclude that Edison s fully met its bur-cen of proof on t quality assurance issu 325. The se nd sentence of finding D-43 , which conclutes that Edison doe not have an adequate quality a curance pro-gram, is withd wn. 326. In f nding D-434 we concluded that we did ot have confidence in the quality of Hatfield's work at Byron. On the ic s.estimony adduced at the reopen h arius, w O
-168-
O , Lo.i eenfid-nee in +k^ quality of Hatfield'; ucrk. Fin . D-434 therefore withdrawn. 327. indings D-435, D-436 and D-437, which ra' e ques-ions as the adequacy of the BRP, are withdrawn. 328. Findi g D-438 is withdrawn. The te timony of Mr. Shewski and other has convinced us that tfield is not inca-p able of maintaining reliable records nonconforming and d tviating conditions, n addition, our concerns as to the v4.lidity and accuracy of he BRP results for Hatfield have be en satisfied. 329. Findings D-439 Id -440 are modified to reflect the fai:t that the BRP has solved 1 allegations within the scope of the reinspectio conducted pu uant to that program. 330. Findi D-441, which conci des that Hatfield's qual - ity assuranc program is inadequate, i withdrawn. The BRP re sults, ogether with the other testimo - is the reopened h aari , show that Hatfield quality control inspectors were cu ified, that Hatfield work quality is ade te and that ni-tficid'; smmlity A^run;nt;tien i: ;d: quat-. f ri -&&t. Finding D-442, which states our conclusion regarding most, $ecf the adequacy of SCC equipment, i s ri t h _ . _ ,:- c.:::pt fr _tc fo inwfo& eve ef;f<vre;.a, op roc rh 9ptu o aJ..ve. fi.~t t'. . . ; . . . t c c. : : hich m;; ::nrir ;; stat;d. T.._ ; ; t " r ' c ' l.yy l . ; _..t ' ~ ...........t t: ;;ndu-* em"*c= inenacH e"e ^# MW Md $bk b M46b bV .hd8h- W . - O
-169-
.. ( \ 'N
-]# work has been addressed in this suppl ental decision. (See 1's 204 - 265.)
f 332. Finding D-444 is mo ifi insofar as it suggests that the quality of Hunter's work i inadequate. Testimony in the reopened hearing has shown th unter inspectors were quali-Foo*T' yy)
. fled and that Hunter work lity 's 4,Tadequate. f--((dfe' 333. The first senten e of Fin 'ng D-448, which concludes that Edison's QA performa ce with res ect to Hatfield and Hunter has been inadequa e, is withdra .
XIX. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW re $"
'f 2 o .-099" Applicant hasfmet its burden of proof with respect to
.f orTa m'd.
-Contention 1A, and the contention is hereby ::jer*^d 71-I..y mg , _ _ y. 4 ~, e a os : -- M ". m... 4.oa met its burden of proof with respect t other seven issues in con -
troversy, the Licensing Board c neludes with respect to each of these contentions that there sr sonable assurance that the f Byron Nuclear Power Statio can be Lu w2 uvue m m . . , . . .N (3_ t__,.w ._2 __,_m_. _, _ _..u,4 XX. ORDER WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 55 2.760(a) and 2.762, that the Initial Decision as modified by this Supplemental Initial Decision shall constitute the final action of the Commission thirty (30) days after the date of C
-170-l
- _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ l
2
,n l_) issuance hereof. Within ten (10) days after service of our Supplemental Initial Decision any party aggrieved by that deci-sion shall notify the Appeal Board of its intention to modify
-i ts pleadings and briefs before the Appeal Board.- The form of such further pleadings and briefs and the time within which such further pleadings and briefs shall be filed,'shall be-in accordance with an order issued by the Appeal Board.
l O
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