ML19269E392

Forwards LER 79-028/03L-0

ML19269E392
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	06/22/1979
From:	Cooney M PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:	Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19269E393	List: ML19269E392 ML19269E395
References
NUDOCS 7906280116
Download: ML19269E392 (2)

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PHILADELPHI A ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHI A. PA.19101 (2151841-4000 June 22, 1979 Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Region I '

United States Nuclear Regulatory Conmission 631 Park Avenue 19406 King of Prussia, Pennsylvania

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SUBJECT:

Licensee Event Report Narrative Description The following occurrence was reported to Mr. Greenman, Region I, Office of Inspectica and Enforcement on May 24, 1979

Reference:

Docket Number 50-277 a

Report No: LER 2-79-28/3L June 22, 1979 Report Date:

Occurrence Date: May 24, 1979 Facility: Peach Botton Atomic Power Station R.D. 1 Delta, PA 17314 Technical Specificat_ ion

Reference:

is Table 3.2.B.

The applicable Technical Specification Descriotion_ of the Event _:

During he performance of a routine surveillance test on electronic instrument LSL-2-3-72C on 5/24/79, the redundant start signal to the HPCI system was found to be inoperable.

Consequences _ of Event:

The initiation of the HPCI was not inhibited by the inoperable channelother because the HPCI channels, receivesthe therefore, a redundant safety start signal from three significance is minimal. 2170 001 f9oob

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Mr. Boyce H. Grier Page 2 June 22, 1979 LER 2-79-28/3L Cause of Event:

The cause of the occurrence was human error. During electrical drawing preparation for a cable rerouting modification, the draftsman accidentally removed a wire to a relay which provides a start signal to the HPCI. The independent I review performed by the drawing checker failed to discover the

! error. The wire to the HPCI start relay was physically disconnected during the modification work performed on 5/21/79.

The error was beyond the scope of the modification work and was therefore not found during post-modification testing.

Corrective Action:

Immediately following the identification of the disconnected wire, a jumper was placed in the circuit to place the initiation input in the tripped position. Subsequently, the drawing has been corrected, rechecked and reissued. The wiring error has been corrected and the surveillance test performed successfully.

Additionally, all logic system functional tests of systems in C32 panel (where the relay is located) were satisfactorily completed by 5/25/79. All instrument surveillance tests of systems which interface with C32 panel were successfully completed by 5/26/79.

The importance of accuracy in performing drafting and review work on safety system drawings was stressed to the draftsman and checker responsible for the error. The seriousness and potential consequences of such errors were emphasized.

The Engineering Quality Assurance Group is conducting a review of the circumstances and procedures pertaining to the event and will provide, if appropriate, recommendations to prevent the recurrence of similar mistakes.

Yours truly,

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/M. J. Coone7l Superintendent Generation Division-Nuclear Attachment cc: Director, NRC - Office of InspectLon and Enforcement Mr. Norman M. Haller, NRC - Office of Management &

Program Analysis 2i70 002