ML23128A349

(Vegp), Unit 4 Initial Test Program and Operational Programs Integrated Inspection Report 05200026/2023006

ML23128A349
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	05/09/2023
From:	Bradley Davis NRC/RGN-II/DCI
To:	Coleman J Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR 2023006
Download: ML23128A349 (45)

Text

May 9, 2023 Jamie Coleman Regulatory Affairs Director Southern Nuclear Operating Company 7825 River Road, BIN 63031 Waynesboro, GA 30830

SUBJECT:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT (VEGP), UNIT 4 - INITIAL TEST PROGRAM AND OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05200026/2023006

Dear Jamie Coleman:

On March 31, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 4. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which the inspectors discussed on April 25, 2023, with Mr. Glen Chick, VEGP Units 3 & 4 Executive Vice President, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined a sample of construction and testing activities conducted under your Combined License (COL) as it relates to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of these documents. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

The inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.

This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Unit 3.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Unit 3.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component

J. Coleman 2 of NRC's document system ADAMS. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.

Sincerely, Signed by Davis, Bradley on 05/09/23 Bradley J. Davis, Chief Construction Inspection Branch 2 Division of Construction Oversight Docket Nos.: 5200026 License Nos: NPF-92

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report (IR) 05200026/2023006 w/attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

ML23128A349 x Non-Sensitive x Publicly Available x SUNSI Review Sensitive Non-Publicly Available OFFICE RII: DCO RII: DCO RII: DCO NAME J. Eargle C. Even B. Davis DATE 05/09/2023 05/09/2023 05/09/2023 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region II Docket Numbers: 5200026 License Numbers: NPF-92 Report Numbers: 05200026/2023006 Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-006-0031 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc Facility: Vogtle Unit 4 Combined License Location: Waynesboro, GA Inspection Dates: January 1, 2023, through March 31, 2023 Inspectors: J. Eargle, Senior Resident Inspector - Testing, Division of Constriction Oversight (DCO)

S. Egli, Senior Construction Inspector, DCO J. England, Senior Construction Inspector, DCO C. Even, Senior Construction Inspector, DCO J. Parent, Resident Inspector, DCO R. Patel, Senior Construction Inspector, DCIP M. Riley, Senior Construction Inspector, DCO S. Sanchez, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety Approved by: Bradley J. Davis, Chief Construction Inspection Branch 2 Division of Construction Oversight Enclosure

SUMMARY

OF FINDINGS Inspection Report (IR) 05200026/2023006; January 1 - March 31, 2023; Vogtle Unit 4 COL, initial test program and operational programs integrated inspection report.

This report covers a three-month period of announced inspections of Inspections, Tests, Analysis, and Inspection Criteria (ITAAC), preoperational test program, startup test program, and operational program inspections by resident and regional inspectors. Two findings were determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) by the inspectors. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2519, Construction Significance Determination Process. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0613, Appendix F, Construction Cross-Cutting Areas and Aspects.

All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy and the temporary enforcement guidance outlined in enforcement guidance memorandum 11-006. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe construction of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in IMC 2506, Construction Reactor Oversight Process General Guidance and Basis Document.

A. NRC-Identified and Self Revealed Findings (Green) An NRC-identified construction finding of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for the licensees failure to ensure that all measuring and test equipment (M&TE) used to perform baseline thermal expansion measurements at the beginning of hot functional testing (HFT) were verified to be within their calibrated frequencies prior to use and documented on the M&TE usage log in accordance with procedure B-GEN-ITPA-004, Conduct of Test. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as CR 50171546 and reperformed the test using calibrated M&TE that was accurately recorded in the M&TE usage log.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it represented a substantive failure to implement an adequate program, process, procedure, or quality oversight function. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) due to the licensee demonstrating with reasonable assurance that the design function of the applicable systems was not impaired by the deficiency. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of Challenge the Unknown in the area of Human Performance.

Specifically, the licensee should have questioned the calibration status of the M&TE to be used during the test prior to certifying the test prerequisites were satisfied. [H.11] (Section 1P01)

B. Licensee-Identified Violations None 2

REPORT DETAILS Summary of Plant Construction Status During this report period for Unit 4, the licensee completed various activities to satisfy aspects of the Vogtle Unit 4 initial test program. The licensee performed portions of hot functional testing activities which included testing the reactor coolant system (RCS), residual heat removal system, passive core cooling system (PXS), etc. at elevated temperatures and pressures. While heating the plant and operating equipment, Thermal Expansion Dynamic Effects and Vibration measurements were taken to ensure piping and components are properly installed and supported such that the expected movement does not result in excessive stress or fatigue.

The licensee performed preoperational and component tests of various structures, systems, and components and their control systems, e.g., protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) and PLS. Class 1E direct current and uninterruptible power supply system, electrical distribution system testing was performed to verify the functional capability of those systems to support electrical loads during normal and off-normal conditions. Preoperational testing of safety-related valves was performed for the RCS and PXS squib valves, and containment system check valves.

1. CONSTRUCTION REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Design/Engineering, Procurement/Fabrication, Construction/Installation, Inspection/Testing IMC 2503, Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) - Related Work Inspections 1A01 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.1.02.11a.i (46) / Family 10C

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.1.02.11a.i (46). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.C-02.02 - Construction Test Observation The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to witness the licensee's test performance to verify if controls in the main control room operated to cause a signal at the squib valve electrical leads which was capable of actuating the fourth-stage ADS squib valve. The inspectors observed the tests to verify if the test performance satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.

B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F374, RCS-PL-V004A-I2-F Component Test 2, Ver. 1 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F378, RCS-PL-V004B-I1-F Component Test 2, Ver. 1 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F370, RCS-PL-V004A-I1-A Component Test 2, Ver. 0 3

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A02 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.1.02.11a.ii (47) / Family 10C

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.1.02.11a.ii (47). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.C-02.02 - Construction Test Observation The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following procedure to verify if the first stage automatic depressurization system isolation motor operated valve performed its active function within 30 seconds after receiving a signal from the PMS. The test was observed to verify if it satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.

B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F399, RCS-PL-V011A Component Test, Ver. 2

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A03 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.1.02.11b.i (48) / Family 10C

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.1.02.11b.i (48). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.C-A4.10 - Instrumentation & Control Components & Systems The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to witness the licensee's test performance to verify if controls in the main control room operated to cause a signal at the squib valve electrical leads which was capable of actuating the fourth-stage ADS squib valve. The inspectors observed the tests to verify if the test performance satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.

B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F374, RCS-PL-V004A-I2-F Component Test 2, Ver. 1 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F378, RCS-PL-V004B-I1-F Component Test 2, Ver. 1 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F370, RCS-PL-V004A-I1-A Component Test 2, Ver. 0 4

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A04 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.01.09 (110) / Family 10A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.01.09 (110). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.C-02.02 - Construction Test Observation The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following procedures to verify if the valves performed their active function after receiving a signal from PMS. The test was observed to verify if the tests satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.

B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F480, VFS-PL-V009-S1 Component Test, Ver. 1 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F479, VFS-PL-V004-S1 Component Test, Ver. 1

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A05 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.02.07b.i (138) / Family 06D

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.02.07b.i (138). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.C-02.02 - Construction Test Observation The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following procedure to verify if the passive containment cooling water storage tank isolation valve, SV4-PCS-PL-V001A, performed its active function of transferring open after receiving a signal from the PMS. The test was observed to verify if it satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.

B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F297, PCS-PL-V001A-S1 Component Test, Ver. 1

b. Findings No findings were identified.

5

1A06 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.10 (206) / Family 10A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.10 (206). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.C-02.02- Construction Test Observation The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following procedures to verify if the valves performed their active function after receiving a signal from the PMS. The test was observed to verify if the tests satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.

B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F322, PXS-PL-V101 Component Test, Ver. 1 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F359, PXS-PL-V130A S1 Component Test, Ver. 1 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F314, PXS-PL-V002A-2 Component Test, Ver. 2 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F317, PXS-PL-V014A-S1 Component Test, Ver. 1 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F323, PXS-PL-V108A-S1 Component Test, Ver. 1.0

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A07 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.11b.i (209) / Family 10D

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.11b.i (209). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.C-A4.10 - Instrumentation & Control Components & Systems The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to witness the licensee's test performance to verify if the squib valves received an electrical signal at the valve electrical leads that is capable of actuating the valve after a signal is input to the PMS. The inspectors observed the test and reviewed the results to verify if the test performance satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.

B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F346, PXS-PL-V123A-I1-F Component Test 2, Ver. 1 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F344, PXS-PL-V123A-I1-A Component Test 2, Ver. 1 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F348, PXS-PL-V118B-I1-A Component Test 2, Ver. 1 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F348, PXS-PL-V118B-I1-F Component Test 2, Ver. 1 6

b. Findings No findings were identified.

IMC 2504, Construction Inspection Program - Inspection of Construction and Operational Programs 1P01 Pre-operational Testing 70702-02.04 - Test Witnessing

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following procedure to verify if adequate thermal expansion measurements were taken to evaluate interferences caused by thermal effects of plant components during hot functional testing. The test was observed to verify if it satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR.

4-GEN-ITPP-507, Thermal Expansion, Version 1.0 The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following procedure to verify if adequate dynamic effects and vibration measurements were taken to evaluate movement of safety-related components during hot functional testing. The test was observed to verify if it satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR.

4-GEN-ITPP-509, Reactor Coolant System Dynamic Effects and Vibration Testing, Version 1.0

b. Findings Introduction An NRC-identified construction finding of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for the licensees failure to ensure that all measuring and test equipment (M&TE) used to perform baseline thermal expansion measurements at the beginning of hot functional testing (HFT) were verified to be within their calibrated frequencies prior to use and documented on the M&TE usage log in accordance with procedure B-GEN-ITPA-004, Conduct of Test.

Description The administrative procedure B-GEN-ITPA-004, Conduct of Test, describes how all preoperational and startup testing is to be conducted and performed at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4. Procedure B-GEN-ITPA-004, Section 4.10, Step 2, 7

required the licensee to use M&TE that was verified to be within its calibration frequency prior to use, and document all M&TE used during the test performance on B-GEN-0ITPA-004-F03, M&TE Usage Log.

On March 20, 2023, the licensee was in the process of performing the ambient baseline thermal expansion measurements as part of hot functional testing in accordance with 4-GEN-ITPP-507, Thermal Expansion, when NRC observed the licensee was utilizing measuring devices that either had expired or had no calibration records. Additionally, the inspectors observed that the licensee had not recorded the non-calibrated M&TE on the M&TE Usage Log. This was not in accordance with B-GEN-ITPA-004, Section 4.10, Step 2. Subsequent to NRC questions, the licensee stopped the test and removed all non-calibrated equipment that was being used to perform this test and used calibrated Southern Nuclear Company, Inc. equipment to reperform the test.

The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as CR 50171546 and reperformed the test using calibrated M&TE that was accurately recorded in the M&TE usage log.

Analysis The inspectors determined that the failure to ensure that all M&TE used to perform baseline thermal expansion measurements at the beginning of HFT were verified to be within their calibrated frequencies prior to use and documented on the M&TE usage log in accordance with procedure B-GEN-ITPA-004 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it represented a substantive failure to implement an adequate program, process, procedure, or quality oversight function. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure calibrated M&TE was utilized during preoperational testing.

The inspectors concluded the finding was associated with the Inspection/Testing Cornerstone and assessed the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2519, Construction Significance Determination Process, Appendix A, AP 1000 Construction Significance Determination Process, Section 4. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) due to the licensee demonstrating with reasonable assurance that the design function of the applicable systems was not impaired by the deficiency. The licensee reperformed the test using calibrated M&TE that was accurately recorded in the M&TE usage log.

The performance deficiency did not impact an ITAAC, thus it was determined to be a construction finding.

In accordance with IMC 0613 Appendix F, Construction Cross-Cutting Areas and Aspects, the inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of H.11, Challenge the Unknown, in the area of Human Performance. Specifically, the licensee should have questioned the calibration status of the M&TE to be used during the test prior to certifying the test prerequisites were satisfied.

8

Enforcement 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, states in part, Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.

Contrary to the above, on March 20, 2023, the licensee failed to accomplish preoperational testing activities in accordance with procedure B-GEN-ITPA-004.

Specifically, the licensee failed to utilize M&TE that was calibrated within the proper calibration frequency and document the equipment in the M&TE usage log to perform baseline thermal expansion measurements during HFT.

The licensee entered this issue into the CAP as CR 50171546, stopped the test and removed all non-calibrated M&TE from being utilized to perform the test. The licensee then reperformed the test using calibrated M&TE that was accurately recorded in the M&TE usage log. Because this violation was not repetitive or willful, was of very low safety significance (Green), and was entered into the licensees CAP, this violation is being treated as a NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 05200026/2023006-01, Failure to Use Appropriate M&TE).

1P02 Pre-operational Testing 70702-02.04 - Test Witnessing

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors used appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensees performance of the following procedures for performing the channel calibration for the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger and containment flood up level transmitters. The tests were observed to verify if they satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR.

B-GEN-ITPCI-019-F326, PMS Channel Calibration Test for 4-PXS-FT049B, Ver. 1 B-GEN-ITPCI-019-F338, PMS Channel Calibration Test for 4-PXS-LT050, Ver.

1 B-GEN-ITPCI-019-F340, PMS Channel Calibration Test for 4-PXS-LT052, Ver.

1

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1P03 Pre-operational Testing 70702-02.04 - Test Witnessing 9

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors used appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensees performance of the following procedures for performing the channel calibration for reactor coolant system level and pressure transmitters. The tests were observed to verify if they satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR.

B-GEN-ITPCI-019-362, PMS Channel Calibration Test for 4-RCS-LT195D, Ver.

1 B-GEN-ITPCI-019-370, PMS Channel Calibration Test for 4-RCS-PT191D, Ver. 1

b. Findings No findings were identified.

3. OPERATIONAL READINESS Cornerstones: Inspection/Testing, Operational Programs IMC 2503, Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) - Related Work Inspections 3T01 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.1.02.08d.i (32) / Family 03D

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.1.02.08d.i (32). The inspectors used the following NRC inspection procedures (IPs)/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.D-02.03-Test Results Review The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to review the licensee's test results to verify if the calculated automatic depressurization system (ADS) piping flow resistance from the pressurizer through the sparger with all valves of each ADS group open is less than or equal to 2.91E-6 ft/gpm2. The test package was reviewed to verify if the test results satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.

SV4-PXS-T2R-070, Vogtle Unit 4 4-PXS-ITPP-503 Section 4.6 ADS Stages 1, 2, and 3 Flow Line Resistance Test Engineering Report, Rev. 0

b. Findings No findings were identified.

10

3T02 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.1.02.13b (64) / Family 10D

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.1.02.13b (64). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.D-02.03-Test Results Review The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to review the licensee's test results to verify if the reactor coolant pumps trip after receiving a signal from the PMS. The ITAAC technical report and references were reviewed to verify if the test results satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.

SV4-RCS-ITR-800064, U4 Testing Results for Reactor Coolant Pump Trip from PMS, Rev. 0

b. Findings No findings were identified.

3T03 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.01.11b (118) / Family 07D

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.01.11b (118). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.D-02.03-Test Results Review The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to review the licensee's test results to verify if, after a loss of motive power, each remotely operated valve assumes the indicated loss of motive power position. The test packages were reviewed to verify if the test results satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.

2.2.01.11b-U4-CP, ITAAC Completion Package, Rev.0

b. Findings No findings were identified.

3T04 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.08c.i.01 (177) / Family 06D

a. Inspection Scope 11

The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.08c.i.01 (177). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.D-02.03-Test Results Review The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to review the licensee's test results to verify if the injection line flow resistance from the core makeup tank to the reactor vessel was 1.81 x 10-5 ft/gpm2 and 2.25 x 10-5 ft/gpm2. The ITAAC technical report and references were reviewed to verify if the test results satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.

SV4-PXS-ITR-800177, Unit 4 Recorded Results of PXS Core Makeup Tank Injection Line Flow Resistance: ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.i.01 - NRC Index Number:

177, Rev. 1

b. Findings No findings were identified.

3T05 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.08c.i.03 (179) / Family 06D

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.08c.i.03 (179). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.D-02.03-Test Results Review The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to review the licensee's test results to verify if the flow resistance from the IRWST injection line and the reactor vessel is within the acceptable design values. The test package was reviewed to verify if the test results satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.

SV4-PXS-T2R-001, Vogtle Unit 4 4-PXS-ITPP-507 Section 4.2 IRWST Injection to DVI Nozzle Flow Resistance Test Engineering Report, Rev. 0

b. Findings No findings were identified.

3T06 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.08c.i.04 (180) / Family 06D

a. Inspection Scope 12

The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.08c.i.04 (180). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.D-02.03-Test Results Review The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to review the licensee's test results to verify if the calculated flow resistance for each containment recirculation line between containment and the reactor vessel was within the analyzed values. The ITAAC technical report and references were reviewed to verify if the test results satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.

4-PXS-ITPP-507, IRWST Flow Tests, Ver. 1.0

b. Findings No findings were identified.

3T07 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.08c.ii (181) / Family 06D

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.08c.ii (181). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.D-02.03-Test Results Review The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to review the licensee's test results to verify if the flow resistance from the cold leg to the core makeup tank was 7.21 x 10-6 ft/gpm². The test package was reviewed to verify if the test results satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.

SV4-PXS-T2R-006, Vogtle Unit 4 4-PXS-ITPP-503 Sections 4.4 & 4.5 CMT Cold Leg Balance Line Test Engineering Report, Rev. 0

b. Findings No findings were identified.

3T08 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.09a.i (201) / Family 03D

a. Inspection Scope 13

The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.09a.i (201). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.D-02.03-Test Results Review The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to review the licensee's test results to verify if the calculated flow resistance for each IRWST drain line between the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) and the containment was 4.44 x 10-6 ft/gpm2. The test package was reviewed to verify if the test results satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.

SV4-PXS-T2R-003, Vogtle Unit 4 4-PXS-ITPP-507 Section 4.3.1 and 4.3.3 IRWST to Containment Recirc Sump Flow Resistance Test Engineering Report, Rev. 0

b. Findings No findings were identified.

3T09 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.12a.iv (216) / Family 07D

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.12a.iv (216). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.D-02.03-Test Results Review The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to review the licensee's test results to verify if passive core cooling system check valves changed position to perform their active safety function under preoperational test conditions. The ITAAC technical report and references were reviewed to verify if the test results satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.

SV4-PXS-ITR-800216, Unit 4 Recorded Results of PXS Check Valves Change Position as Indicated in Table 2.2.3-1: ITAAC 2.2.03.12a.iv - NRC Index Number: 216, Rev. 0

b. Findings No findings were identified.

3T10 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.5.02.06a.ii (530) / Family 10D

a. Inspection Scope 14

The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.5.02.06a.ii (530). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.D-02.02-Test Witnessing The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensees performance of the following component test procedures used to verify if the PMS cabinet and divisional diagnostics tests assessed the software was loaded on to the cabinets successfully, no software or hardware errors were present, intra cabinet communication links were operable, and the cabinets were communicating the cabinet health status to the interface test processor. The tests were observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.

B-GEN-ITPCI-001, PMS Cabinets, Ver. 4.0 B-GEN-ITPCI-001-011, PMS Cabinets - Cabinet Diagnostics, Ver. 2.1 B-GEN-ITPCI-001-012, PMS Cabinets - Division Diagnostics, Ver. 1.0 The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensees performance of the following preoperational test procedure used to verify if all bypassed channels will alarm in the MCR (Division Bypass Alarm verification). The test was observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.

4-PMS-ITPP-521, Protection and Safety Monitoring System Logic Test Preoperational Test Procedure, Ver. 1.0

b. Findings No findings were identified.

3T11 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.6.03.04c (603) / Family 08D

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.6.03.04c (603). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.D-02.02-Test Witnessing The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the Class 1E direct current and uninterruptable power supply system preoperational tests to verify if the:

1) divisions A battery banks, C 24-hour battery banks, and spare battery banks could supply power to the DC switchboards' loads at the required voltage for the required design duty cycle; 15

2) divisions A and B 24-hour battery chargers & spare battery charger supplied required output current and voltage to the DC switchboards' bus loads while maintaining the corresponding battery charged;

3) divisions A and B 24-hour inverters could supply their AC loads with the required voltage and frequency; and

4) division A regulating transformer could supply AC loads at the required voltage when powered from its 480V motor control centers.

The test packages were reviewed as part of the ITAAC Technical Report to verify if the test results satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and ITAAC.

4-IDS-ITPP-505, IDSA Class 1E DC and UPS Preoperational Test, Ver. 1 4-IDS-ITPP-506, IDSB Class 1E DC and UPS Preoperational Test, Ver. 1 4-IDS-ITPP-507, IDSC Class 1E DC and UPS Preoperational Test, Ver. 1 4-IDS-ITPP-509, IDSS Class 1E Battery and Charger Preoperational Test, Ver.

1

b. Findings No findings were identified.

3T12 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.7.06.02.ii (725) / Family 07D

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.7.06.02.ii (725). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.D-02.03-Test Results Review The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to review the licensee's test results to verify if the containment vacuum relief isolation valves open within 30 seconds. The ITAAC technical report and selected references were reviewed to verify if the test results satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.

SV4-VFS-ITR-800725, Unit 4 Recorded Results of Stroke Testing for Containment Vacuum Relief Isolation Valves: ITAAC 2.7.06.02.ii, Rev. 0

b. Findings No findings were identified.

16

4. OTHER INSPECTION RESULTS 4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

.1 Exit Meeting.

On April 25, 2023, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. G. Chick, Vogtle 3&4 Executive Vice President, and other licensee and contractor staff members. Proprietary information was reviewed during the inspection period but was not included in the inspection report.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensees and Contractor Personnel S. Briggs, Testing and Turnover Director A. Nix, ITP Director E. Loehlein, Operations Director J. Coleman, Regulatory Affairs Director R. Nicoletto, NI Manager S. Leighty, Regulatory Affairs Manager W. Garrett, Licensing Manager T. Takats, Electrical Manager K. Roberts, ITAAC Manager J. Olsen, NI Supervisor D. Johnson, Maintenance Supervisor G. Bauer, Electrical Supervisor LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Item Number Type Status Description 05200026/2023006-01 NCV Open/Closed Failure to Use Appropriate M&TE LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Section 1A01 Test Package V4-PXS-T0W-1244543, PXS-PL-V004A-I1-A Component Test 2 & 1-F Component Test 2 (ITAAC) PMS CIM Squib, Rev. 0 Work order (WO) 1244674 WO 1244663 WO 1192630 Section 1A02 WO 1292996 17

Section 1A03 Test Package V4-PXS-T0W-1244543, PXS-PL-V004A-I1-A Component Test 2 & 1-F Component Test 2 (ITAAC) PMS CIM Squib, Rev. 0 WO 1244674 WO 1244663 WO 1192630 Section 1A04 WO1291587 WO 1247641 Section 1A05 WO 1199867 Section 1A06 WO 1243370 WO 1243375 WO 1293076 WO 1191738 WO 1243371 Section 1A07 Test Package PXS-PL-V123B-I1-A Component test 2 & 1-F Component Test 2 (ITAAC) PMS CIM Squib WO 1244558 WO 1244543 Section 1P01 4-GEN-ITPP-517, Pre-Core Hot Functional Testing (HFT) Sequence Procedure, Ver. 2.0 WO: 1290102 Section 1P02 WO 1283709 WO 1191437 WO 1243380 Section 1P03 WO 1261769 WO 1261760 Section 3T01 4-PXS-ITPP-503, TPC for Passive Core Cooling System Pre-Core Flow Testing with RV Head Installed Preoperational Test Procedure, Rev. 1.0 SV4-PXS-T0W-1191260, (ITAAC) Perform Preop Test IAW 4-PXS-ITPP-503, Rev. 0 SV4-RCS-ITR-800032, Unit 4 Inspections and Associated Analysis of the ADS Stages 1-3 Piping Flow Path: ITAAC 2.1.02.08d.i, Rev. 0 18

SV4-PXS-T2C-007, Vogtle Unit 4 4-PXS-ITPP-503 Section 4.6 ADS Stages 1, 2, and 3 Flow Line Resistance Test Calculation, Rev. 0 APP-PXS-T1-501, Passive Core Cooling System Preoperational Test Specification, Rev. 4 APP-PXS-M3C-019, IRWST / Containment Sump Injection Lines and ADS Line Resistances, Rev. 5 2.1.02.08d.i-U4-CP, ITAAC Completion Package, Rev. 0 34VP1522 Digital M&TE Record PZR P-1 Instrument 34VP1523 Digital M&TE Record PZR P-2 Instrument 34VP1528 Digital M&TE Record ADS VAC-A Instrument 34VP1529 Digital M&TE Record ADS VAC-B Instrument 34VP3029 Digital M&TE Record UFM-1 ADS 1-3 Instrument 34VP3027 Digital M&TE Record UFM-2 ADS 1-3 Instrument 34VP3031 Digital M&TE Record UFM-3 ADS 1-3 Instrument 34VP3033 Digital M&TE Record UFM-4 ADS 1-3 Instrument Section 3T02 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F269, ECS-ES-31 Component Test, Ver. 1.0 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F270, ECS-ES-32 Component Test, Ver. 1.0 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F271, ECS-ES-41 Component Test, Ver. 1.0 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F272, ECS-ES-42 Component Test, Ver. 1.0 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F273, ECS-ES-51 Component Test, Ver. 1.0 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F274, ECS-ES-52 Component Test, Ver. 1.0 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F275, ECS-ES-61 Component Test, Ver. 1.0 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F276, ECS-ES-62 Component Test, Version 1.0 CP Number: 2.1.02.13b-U4-CP-Rev0, RCS Reactor Coolant Pumps Trip Control From PMS, Rev. 0 ND-22-0646 WO 1196120 WO 1289047 WO 1289048 WO 1289049 WO 1289050 WO 1289051 WO 1289052 WO 1289053 Section 3T03 SV4-CNS-ITR-800118, Unit 4 Test Results for CAS Containment Isolation Valve - Loss of Motive Power Testing: ITAAC 2.2.01.11b, Rev. 0 SV4-CNS-ITR-801118, Unit 4 Test Results for CCS Containment Isolation Valve - Loss of Motive Power Testing: ITAAC 2.2.01.11b, Rev. 0 SV4-CNS-ITR-802118, Unit 4 Test Results for SFS Containment Isolation Valve - Loss of Motive Power Testing: ITAAC 2.2.01.11b, Rev. 0 SV4-CNS-ITR-803118, Unit 4 Test Results for VFS Containment Isolation Valve - Loss of Motive Power Testing: ITAAC 2.2.01.11b, Rev. 0 SV4-CNS-ITR-804118, Unit 4 Test Results for VWS Containment Isolation Valve - Loss of Motive Power Testing: ITAAC 2.2.01.11b, Rev. 0 19

SV4-CNS-ITR-805118, Unit 4 Test Results for WLS Containment Isolation Valve - Loss of Motive Power Testing: ITAAC 2.2.01.11b, Rev. 0 WO 1189901 WO 1190298 WO 1191780 WO 1191775 WO 1288906 WO 1203063 WO 1203207 WO 1203099 WO 1203069 WO 1203251 WO 1291585 WO 1203844 WO 1203968 WO 1204002 WO 1206354 WO 1206363 WO 1206373 WO 1206407 Section 3T04 CR 50160177 2.2.03.08c.i.01-U4-CP-Rev0, PXS Low-Pressure Injection Test CMT Flow Resistance, Rev. 0 4-PXS-ITPP-506, PXS CMT Mapping and Line Resistance Test, Version 1.1 APP-PXS-T1-501, Passive Core Cooling System Preoperational Test Specification, Rev. 4 ND-22-0645, Southern Nuclear Operating Company - Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 4 -

ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.i.01 [Index Number 177],

Dated: Oct 14, 2022 SV4-PXS-ITR-800177, Unit 4 Recorded Results of PXS Core Makeup Tank Injection Line Flow Resistance: ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.i.01 - NRC Index Number: 177, Rev. 1 SV4-PXS-T2C-005, Vogtle Unit 4 4-PXS-ITPP-506 Sections 4.2 & 4.4 CMT Injection Line Flow Resistance Test Calculation, Rev. 0 SV4-PXS-T2R-005, Vogtle Unit 4 4-PXS-ITPP-506 Sections 4.2 & 4.4 CMT Injection Line Flow Resistance Test Engineering Report, Rev. 0 SV4-PY25-GNR-000002, SV4-PXS-PY-R01 A/B Orifice Bore Diameter Change - ESRs 50148574/50148446, Rev. 0 Traveler Number: 919463-001, PCI Quality Assurance Traveler, Rev. 0 ESR 50141071 ESR 50148446 ESR 50148574 ESR 50152004 WO 1191263 Section 3T05 4-PXS-ITPP-507, IRWST Flow Tests, Ver. 1.0 NMP-MA-053, M&TE Calibration Services Receipt Checklist For 34VP1666, 11/10/2021 NMP-MA-053, M&TE Calibration Services Receipt Checklist For C4000000774194, 11/10/2021 SV4-PXS-T0W-1191264 20

ND-22-0521, ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.i.03 [Index Number 179], 01/20/2023 SV4-PXS-T2C-001, Vogtle Unit 4 4-PXS-ITPP-507 Section 4.2 IRWST Injection to DVI Nozzle Flow Resistance Test Calculation, Rev. 0 2.2.03.08c.i.03-U4-CP, ITAAC Completion Package, Rev. 0 APP-PXS-T1-501, Passive Core Cooling System Preoperational Test Specification, Rev. 4 Section 3T06 4-PXS-ITPP-507, IRWST Flow Tests, Ver. 1.0 APP-PXS-T1-501, Passive Core Cooling System Preoperational Test Specification, Rev. 4 Completion Package for U4-2.2.03.08c.i.04, NRC_180 PXS Low-Pressure Injection Test Containment Recirculation Flow Resistance CR 50146836 ES 50145446 M&TE Certification No: C4000000773938:1658142460 M&TE Certification No: C4000000773939:1658146726 M&TE Certification No: C4000000774165:1632318135 M&TE Certification No: C4000000774179:1632304915 M&TE Certification No: C4000000774203:1632320117 ND-22-0522, Southern Nuclear Operating Company - Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 4 -

ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.i.04 [Index Number 180],

Dated: January 19, 2023 SV4-PXS-T2R-020, Vogtle Unit 4 4-PXS-ITPP-507 Section 4.3.2 and Section 4.3.4 Containment Recirculation Sump to DVI Nozzle Flow Resistance Test Engineering Report, Rev. 0 WO 1191264 Section 3T07 SV4-PXS-T2C-006, Vogtle Unit 4 4-PXS-ITPP-503 Sections 4.4 & 4.5 CMT Cold Leg Balance Line Flow Resistance Test Calculation, Rev. 0 APP-PXS-T1-501, Passive Core Cooling System Preoperational Test Specification, Rev. 4 WO SV4-PXS-T0W-1191260 ND-23-0039, ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.ii [Index Number 181], 02/03/2023 Section 3T08 SV4-PXS-T0W-1191264, (ITAAC) Perform Preop Test IAW 4-PXS-ITPP-507, Rev. 0 4-PXS-ITPP-507-V1.0-01, TPC for IRWST Flow Tests, Rev. 1.0 SV4-PXS-T1-501, Passive Core Cooling System Preoperational Test Specification, Rev. 4 SV4-PXS-T2C-003, Vogtle Unit 4 4-PXS-ITPP-507 Section 4.3.1 and 4.3.3 IRWST to Containment Recirc Sump Flow Resistance Test Calculation, Rev. 0 2.2.03.09a.i-U4-CP, ITAAC Completion Package, Rev0 APP-PXS-M3C-019, IRWST/Cont Sump Injection Lines & ADS Line Resistances, Rev. 5 APP-PXS-M3C-033, Containment Flood-Up Volume Calculation, Rev. 3 APP-PXS-M3C-034, Containment Flood-up Level, Rev. 5 C4000000774165, Sump Low DP-2 Instrument Calibration Document C4000000774179, Sump Hi DP-1 Instrument Calibration Document C4000000774203, PT L113A Instrument Calibration Document 21

Section 3T09 2.2.03.12a.iv-U4-CP-Rev0, PXS Check Valves Position, Rev. 0 4-PXS-ITPP-502, PXS Accumulator Mapping and Line Resistance Test, Ver. 1.0 4-PXS-ITPP-503, Passive Core Cooling System Pre-Core Flow Testing with RV Head Installed Preoperational Test Procedure, Ver. 1.0 4-PXS-ITPP-506, PXS CMT Mapping and Line Resistance Test, Ver. 1.1 4-PXS-ITPP-507, IRWST Flow Tests, Ver. 1.0 Certification No: 34VP3002:1642777594 CR 50141654 ND-23-0026, Southern Nuclear Operating Company - Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 4 -

ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.2.03.12a.iv [Index Number 216], Dated:

January 13, 2023 SV4-PXS-ITR-800216, Unit 4 Recorded Results of PXS Check Valves Change Position as Indicated in Table 2.2.3-1: ITAAC 2.2.03.12a.iv - NRC Index Number: 216, Rev. 0 SV4-PXS-T2C-004, Vogtle Unit 4 4-PXS-ITPP-502 Sections 4.1 - 4.4 Accumulator Injection Line Flow Resistance Test Calculation, Rev. 0 SV4-PXS-T2R-004, Vogtle Unit 4 4-PXS-ITPP-502 Sections 4.1 - 4.4 Accumulator Injection Line Flow Resistance Test Summary Report, Rev. 0 WO 1191256 (502)

WO 1191260 (503)

WO 1191263 (506)

WO 1191264 (507)

Section 3T10 4-PMS-ITPP-521, Protection and Safety Monitoring System Logic Test Preoperational Test Procedure, Ver. 1.0 B-GEN-ITPCI-001-011, PMS Cabinets - Cabinet Diagnostics, Ver. 2.1 B-GEN-ITPCI-001-012, PMS Cabinets - Division Diagnostics, Ver. 1.0 B-GEN-ITPCI-001, PMS Cabinets, Ver. 4.0 WO 1236131 WO 1288975 WO 1236106 WO 1236104 WO 1236102 Section 3T11 4-IDS-ITPP-505, IDSA Class 1E DC and UPS Preoperational Test, Ver. 1 4-IDS-ITPP-506, IDSB Class 1E DC and UPS Preoperational Test, Ver. 1 4-IDS-ITPP-507, IDSC Class 1E DC and UPS Preoperational Test, Ver. 1 4-IDS-ITPP-509, IDSS Class 1E Battery and Charger Preoperational Test, Ver. 1 B-GEN-ITPCE-006, ENERSYS Batteries, Ver. 8.1 B-GEN-ITPCE-008, Class 1E and Non-Class 1E Battery Testing, Ver. 12 B-GEN-ITPCE-009, Battery Charger Load Test, Ver. 3 4-GEN-ITPCE-011-V1.0-01, TPC for Class 1E DC Inverter Capacity Test, Static Transfer Switch Test, and Regulating Transformer Capacity Test, Ver. 1 APP-DB01-Z0-001, Design Specification for Class 1E 250 VDC Batteries and Racks, Rev. 10 WO 1290475 WO 1290477 WO 1290478 22

WO 1290479 WO 1290480 Section 3T12 B-GEN_ITPCI-039-F482, VFS-PL-V800A Component Test, Ver. 0 B-GEN_ITPCI-039-F483, VFS-PL-V800B Component Test, Ver. 0 ND-23-0223, ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.7.06.02.ii, 03/16/2023 SV4-VFS-T0W-1203251, Perform PMS/PLS Interface Test for SV4-VFS-PL-V800A, Rev. 0 SV4-VFS-T0W-1291585, Perform PMS/PLS Interface Test for SV4-VFS-PL-V800B, Rev. 0 23

ITAAC INSPECTED No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analysis Acceptance Criteria 32 2.1.02.08d.i 8.d) The RCS i) A low pressure flow test i) The calculated provides automatic and associated analysis will ADS piping flow depressurization be conducted to determine resistance from during design basis the total piping flow the pressurizer events. resistance of each ADS through the valve group connected to sparger with all the pressurizer (i.e., ADS valves of each Stages 1-3) from the ADS group open pressurizer through the is < 2.91E6 outlet of the downstream ft/gpm2.

ADS control valves. The reactor coolant system will be at cold conditions with the pressurizer full of water.

The normal residual heat removal pumps will be used to provide injection flow into the RCS discharging through the ADS valves.

Inspections and associated analysis of the piping flow paths from the discharge of the ADS valve groups connected to the pressurizer (i.e., ADS Stages 13) to the spargers will be conducted to verify the line routings are consistent with the line routings used for design flow resistance calculations.

46 2.1.02.11a.i 11.a) Controls exist i) Testing will be performed i) Controls in the in the MCR to cause on the squib valves MCR operate to the remotely operated identified in Table 2.1.2-1 cause a signal at valves identified in using controls in the MCR the squib valve Table 2.1.2-1 to without stroking the valve. electrical leads perform active which is capable functions. of actuating the squib valve.

24

47 2.1.02.11a.ii 10. Safety-related Inspection will be Safety-related displays identified in performed for retrievability displays identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can be of the safety-related Table 2.1.2-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. displays in the MCR. ii) retrieved in the MCR.

11.a) Controls exist Stroke testing will be ii) Controls in the in the MCR to cause performed on the other MCR operate to the remotely remotely operated valves cause the remotely operated valves listed in Table 2.1.2-1 operated valves identified in Table using controls in the MCR. (other than squib 2.1.2-1 to perform ii) Testing will be valves) to perform active functions. performed on the other active functions. ii) 11.b) The valves remotely operated valves The other remotely identified in Table identified in Table 2.1.2-1 operated valves 2.1.2-1 as having using real or simulated identified in Table PMS control perform signals into the PMS. iii) 2.1.2-1 as having an active safety Testing will be performed PMS control perform function after to demonstrate that the active function receiving a signal remotely operated RCS identified in the table from the PMS. 12.b) valves RCSV001A/B, after receiving a After loss of motive V002A/B, V003A/B, signal from PMS. iii) power, the remotely V011A/B, V012A/B, These valves open operated valves V013A/B open within the within the following identified in Table required response times. times after receipt of 2.1.2-1 assume the Testing of the remotely an actuation signal:

indicated loss of operated valves will be V001A/B < 40 sec motive power performed under the V002A/B, V003A/B <

position. conditions of loss of 100 sec V011A/B <

motive power. 30 sec V012A/B, V013A/B < 60 sec Upon loss of motive power, each remotely operated valve identified in Table 2.1.2-1 assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

48 2.1.02.11b.i 11.b) The valves i) Testing will be i) The squib valves identified in Table performed on the squib receive a signal at 2.1.2-1 as having valves identified in Table the valve electrical PMS control perform 2.1.2-1 using real or leads that is capable an active safety simulated signals into the of actuating the squib function after PMS without stroking the valve.

receiving a signal valve.

from the PMS.

25

64 2.1.02.13b 13.b) The RCPs trip Testing will be The RCPs trip after after receiving a signal performed using real or receiving a signal from the PMS. simulated signals into from the PMS.

the PMS.

110 2.2.01.09 9. Safety-related Inspection will be Safety-related displays identified in performed for displays identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can be retrievability of the Table 2.2.1-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. safety-related displays retrieved in the MCR.

10.a) Controls exist in in the MCR. Stroke Controls in the MCR the MCR to cause testing will be operate to cause those remotely performed on remotely remotely operated operated valves operated valves valves identified in identified in Table identified in Table Table 2.2.1-1 to 2.2.1-1 to perform 2.2.1-1 using the perform active safety active functions. 10.b) controls in the MCR. functions. The The valves identified in Testing will be remotely operated Table 2.2.1-1 as performed on remotely valves identified in having PMS control operated valves listed Table 2.2.1-1 as perform an active in Table 2.2.1-1 using having PMS control safety function after real or simulated perform the active receiving a signal from signals into the PMS. function identified in the PMS. the table after receiving a signal from PMS.

118 2.2.01.11b 11.b) After loss of Testing of the remotely After loss of motive motive power, the operated valves will be power, each remotely remotely operated performed under the operated valve valves identified in conditions of loss of identified in Table Table 2.2.1-1 assume motive power. 2.2.1-1 assumes the the indicated loss of indicated loss of motive power position. motive power position.

138 2.2.02.07b.i 7.a) The PCS delivers i) Testing will be i) When tested, each water from the performed to measure one of the three flow PCCWST to the the PCCWST delivery paths delivers water outside, top of the rate from each one of at greater than or containment vessel. the three parallel flow equal to: - 469.1 7.b) The PCS wets the paths. ii) Testing and gpm at a PCCWST outside surface of the or analysis will be water level of 27.4 ft +

containment vessel. performed to 0.2, - 0.0 ft above the The inside and the demonstrate the tank floor - 226.6 outside of the PCCWST inventory gpm when the containment vessel provides 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of PCCWST water level above the operating adequate water flow. i) uncovers the first (i.e.

deck are coated with Testing will be tallest) standpipe -

26

an inorganic zinc performed to measure 176.3 gpm when the material. 7.c) The the outside wetted PCCWST water level PCS provides air flow surface of the uncovers the second over the outside of the containment vessel tallest standpipe -

containment vessel by with one of the three 144.2 gpm when the a natural circulation air parallel flow paths PCCWST water level flow path from the air delivering water to the uncovers the third inlets to the air top of the containment tallest standpipe - or discharge structure. vessel. ii) Inspection a report exists and 7.d) The PCS drains of the containment concludes that the as-the excess water from vessel exterior coating measured flow rates the outside of the will be conducted. iii) delivered by the containment vessel Inspection of the PCCWST to the through the two upper containment vessel containment vessel annulus drains. 7.e) interior coating will be provides sufficient The PCS provides a conducted. heat removal flow path for long-term Inspections of the air capability such that water makeup to the flow path segments will the limiting PCCWST. 9. Safety- be performed. Testing containment pressure related displays will be performed to and temperature identified in Table verify the upper values are not 2.2.2-1 can be annulus drain flow affected and the PCS retrieved in the MCR. performance. ii) is able to perform its 10.a) Controls exist in Testing will be safety function to the MCR to cause the performed to measure remove heat from remotely operated the delivery rate from containment to valves identified in the long-term makeup maintain plant safety.

Table 2.2.2-1 to connection to the ii) When tested perform active PCCWST. Inspection and/or analyzed with functions. 10.b) The will be performed for all flow paths valves identified in retrievability of the delivering and an Table 2.2.2-1 as safety-related displays initial water level at having PMS control in the MCR. Stroke 27.4 + 0.2, 0.00 ft, perform an active testing will be the PCCWST water safety function after performed on the inventory provides receiving a signal from remotely operated greater than or equal the PMS. 11.a) The valves identified in to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of flow, motor-operated valves Table 2.2.2-1 using the and the flow rate at 72 identified in. Table controls in the MCR. hours is greater than 2.2.2-1 perform an Testing will be or equal to 100.7 gpm active safety-related performed on the or a report exists and function to change remotely operated concludes that the as-position as indicated in valves in Table 2.2.2-1 measured flow rates the table using real or simulated delivered by the 11.b) After loss of signals into the PMS. PCCWST to the 27

motive power, the iii) Tests of the motor- containment vessel remotely operated operated valves will be provides sufficient heat valves identified in performed under removal capability such Table 2.2.2-1 preoperational flow, that the limiting assume the indicated differential pressure, containment pressure loss of motive power and temperature and temperature position. conditions. Testing of values are not affected the remotely operated and the PCS is able to valves will be perform its safety performed under the function to remove conditions of loss of heat from containment motive power. to maintain plant safety. i) A report exists and concludes that when the water in the PCCWST uncovers the standpipes at the following levels, the water delivered by one of the three parallel flow paths to the containment shell provides coverage measured at the spring line that is equal to or greater than the stated coverages. - 24.1 +/- 0.2 ft above the tank floor; at least 90% of the perimeter is wetted. -

20.3 +/- 0.2 ft above the tank floor; at least 72.9% of the perimeter is wetted. - 16.8 +/- 0.2 ft above the tank floor; at least 59.6% of the perimeter is wetted ii)

A report exists and concludes that the containment vessel exterior surface is coated with an inorganic zinc coating above elevation 135'3". iii) A report exists and concludes that the containment 28

vessel interior surface is coated with an inorganic zinc coating above the operating deck. Flow paths exist at each of the following locations: - Air inlets -

Base of the outer annulus - Base of the inner annulus -

Discharge structure With a water level within the upper annulus 10" + 1" above the annulus drain inlet, the flow rate through each drain is greater than or equal to 525 gpm. ii) With a water supply connected to the PCS long-term makeup connection, each PCS recirculation pump delivers greater than or equal to 100 gpm when tested separately. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.2.2-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to cause remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 to perform active functions. The remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as having PMS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from the PMS.

iii) Each motor-29

operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.2-1 under preoperational test conditions. After loss of motive power, each remotely operated valve identified in Table 2.2.2-1 assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

177 2.2.03.08c.i.01 8.c) The i) A low-pressure injection i) The injection line flow PXS test and analysis for each resistance from each provides CMT, each accumulator, source is as follows: 1.

RCS each IRWST injection line, CMTs: The calculated flow makeup, and each containment resistance between each boration, recirculation line will be CMT and the reactor and safety conducted. Each test is vessel is 1.81 x 10-5 injection initiated by opening ft/gpm2 and 2.25 x 10-5 during isolation valve(s) in the ft/gpm2.

design basis line being tested. Test events. fixtures may be used to simulate squib valves. 1.

CMTs: Each CMT will be initially filled with water.

All valves in these lines will be open during the test.

179 2.2.03.08c.i.03 8.c) The i) A low-pressure injection i) The injection line flow PXS test and analysis for each resistance from each provides CMT, each accumulator, source is as follows: 3.

RCS each IRWST injection line, IRWST Injection: The makeup, and each containment calculated flow resistance boration, recirculation line will be for each IRWST injection and safety conducted. Each test is line between the IRWST injection initiated by opening and the reactor vessel is:

during isolation valve(s) in the Line A: 5.35 x 10-6 design basis line being tested. Test ft/gpm2 and 9.09 x 10-6 events. fixtures may be used to ft/gpm2 and Line B: 6.15 simulate squib valves. 3. x 10-6 ft/gpm2 and 1.05 IRWST Injection: The x 10-5 ft/gpm2.

IRWST will be partially filled with water. All valves in these lines will be open during the test.

Sufficient flow will be provided to open the check valves.

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180 2.2.03.08c.i.04 8.c) The i) A low-pressure injection i) The injection line flow PXS test and analysis for each resistance from each provides CMT, each accumulator, source is as follows: 4.

RCS each IRWST injection line, Containment makeup, and each containment Recirculation: The boration, recirculation line will be calculated flow resistance and safety conducted. Each test is for each containment injection initiated by opening recirculation line between during isolation valve(s) in the the containment and the design basis line being tested. Test reactor vessel is: Line A:

events. fixtures may be used to 1.33 x 10-5 ft/gpm2 and simulate squib valves. 4. Line B: 1.21 x 10-5 Containment ft/gpm2.

Recirculation: A temporary water supply will be connected to the recirculation lines. All valves in these lines will be open during the test.

Sufficient flow will be provided to open the check valves.

181 2.2.03.08c.ii 8.c) The ii) A low-pressure test ii) The flow resistance PXS and analysis will be from the cold leg to the provides conducted for each CMT CMT is 7.21 x 10-6 RCS to determine piping flow ft/gpm2.

makeup, resistance from the cold boration, leg to the CMT. The test and safety will be performed by filling injection the CMT via the cold leg during balance line by operating design basis the normal residual heat events. removal pumps.

201 2.2.03.09a.i 9.a) The i) A flow test and analysis i) The calculated flow PXS for each IRWST drain line resistance for each provides a to the containment will be IRWST drain line between function to conducted. The test is the IRWST and the cool the initiated by opening containment is 4.44x 10-outside of isolation valves in each 6 ft/gpm2.

the reactor line. Test fixtures may be vessel used to simulate squib during a valves.

severe accident.

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206 2.2.03.10 10. Safety-related Inspection will be Safety-related displays of the performed for the displays identified in parameters identified retrievability of the Table 2.2.3-1 can be in Table 2.2.31 can safety-related displays retrieved in the MCR.

be retrieved in the in the MCR. ii) Stroke ii) Controls in the MCR. 11.a) Controls testing will be MCR operate to exist in the MCR to performed on remotely cause remotely cause the remotely operated valves other operated valves operated valves than squib valves other than squib identified in Table identified in Table 2.2.3- valves to perform 2.2.3-1 to perform 1 using the controls in their active functions.

their active the MCR. ii) Testing ii) Remotely function(s). 11.b) will be performed on the operated valves The valves identified remotely operated other than squib in Table 2.2.3-1 as valves other than squib valves perform the having PMS control valves identified in active function perform their active Table 2.2.3-1 using real identified in the table function after or simulated signals into after a signal is input receiving a signal the PMS. iii) Testing to the PMS. iii) from the PMS. 12.b) will be performed to These valves open After loss of motive demonstrate that within 20 seconds power, the remotely remotely operated PXS after receipt of an operated valves isolation valves PXS- actuation signal.

identified in Table V014A/B, V015A/B, After loss of motive 2.2.3-1 assume the V108A/B open within power, each remotely indicated loss of the required response operated valve motive power times. Testing of the identified in Table position. 13. remotely operated 2.2.3-1 assumes the Displays of the valves will be performed indicated loss of parameters identified under the conditions of motive power in Table 2.2.3-3 can loss of motive power. position. Displays be retrieved in the Inspection will be identified in Table MCR. performed for 2.2.3-3 can be retrievability of the retrieved in the MCR.

displays identified in Table 2.2.3-3 in the MCR.

209 2.2.03.11b.i 11.b) The valves i) Testing will be i) Squib valves identified in Table performed on the squib receive an electrical 2.2.3-1 as having valves identified in signal at the valve PMS control perform Table 2.2.3-1 using real electrical leads that is their active function or simulated signals into capable of actuating after receiving a the PMS without the valve after a signal from the PMS. stroking the valve. signal is input to the PMS.

216 2.2.03.12a.iv 12.a) The squib iv) Exercise testing of iv) Each check valve valves and check the check valves with changes position as valves identified in active safety functions indicated in Table 2.2.3-1 identified in Table 2.2.3- Table2.2.3-1 1

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perform an active will be performed under safety-related preoperational test function to change pressure, temperature, position as indicated and fluid flow in the table. conditions.

530 2.5.02.06a.ii 6.a) The PMS An operational test of ii) PMS output initiates an automatic the as-built PMS will be signals to the reactor reactor trip, as performed using real or trip switchgear are identified in Table simulated test signals. generated after the 2.5.22, when plant An operational test of test signal reaches process signals reach the as-built PMS will be the specified limit.

specified limits. 6.b) performed using real or This needs to be The PMS initiates simulated test signals. verified for each automatic actuation of An operational test of automatic reactor trip engineered safety the as-built PMS will be function. Appropriate features, as identified performed using the PMS output signals in Table 2.5.2-3, PMS manual actuation are generated after when plant process controls. i) An the test signal signals reach inspection will be reaches the specified specified limits. 6.c) performed for limit. These output The PMS provides retrievability of plant signals remain manual initiation of parameters in the MCR. following removal of reactor trip and iii) An operational test the test signal. Tests selected engineered of the asbuilt system from the actuation safety features as will be performed using signal to the actuated identified in Table each MCR fixed device(s) are 2.5.2-4. 8.a) The position control. performed as part of PMS provides for the Inspection will be the system-related minimum inventory of performed for inspection, test, displays, visual alerts, retrievability of displays analysis, and and fixed position of the open/closed acceptance criteria.

controls, as identified status of the reactor trip ii) PMS output in Table 2.5.2-5. The breakers in the MCR. signals are plant parameters An operational test of generated for reactor listed with a "Yes" in the as-built PMS will be trip and selected the "Display" column performed using real or engineered safety and visual alerts simulated test signals. features as identified listed with a "Yes" in An operational test of in Table 2.5.2-4 after the "Alert" column the as-built PMS will be the manual initiation can be retrieved in controls are the MCR. The fixed actuated. i) The position controls plant parameters listed with a "Yes" in listed in Table 2.5.2-5 the "Control" column with a are provided in the MCR. 8.c) Displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers can be retrieved in the MCR.

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9.a) The PMS performed. An "Yes" in the "Display" automatically operational test of the column, can be removes blocks of as-built PMS will be retrieved in the MCR.

reactor trip and performed. With one iii) For each test of engineered safety channel in bypass, an an as-built fixed features actuation attempt will be made to position control listed when the plant place a redundant in Table 2.5.2-5 with approaches channel in bypass. a "Yes" in the conditions for which "Control" column, an the associated actuation signal is function is designed generated. Tests to provide protection. from the actuation These blocks are signal to the actuated identified in Table device(s) are 2.5.2-6. 9.b) The performed as part of PMS two-out-of-four the system-related initiation logic reverts inspection, test, to a two-out-of-three analysis and coincidence logic if acceptance criteria.

one of the four Displays of the channels is open/closed status of bypassed. All the reactor trip bypassed channels breakers can be are alarmed in the retrieved in the MCR.

MCR. 9.c) The The PMS blocks are PMS does not allow automatically simultaneous bypass removed when the of two redundant test signal reaches channels. the specified limit.

The PMS two-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels is bypassed. All bypassed channels are alarmed in the MCR. The redundant channel cannot be placed in bypass.

603 2.6.03.04c 4.c) Each IDS 24- Testing of each 24-hour The battery terminal hour battery bank asbuilt battery bank will voltage is greater supplies a dc be performed by than or equal to 210 switchboard bus load applying a simulated or V after a period of no for a period of 24 real load, or a less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> hours without combination of with an equivalent recharging. 4.d) simulated or real loads load that equals or Each IDS 72-hour which envelope exceeds 36

battery bank supplies the battery bank design the battery bank design a dc switchboard bus duty cycle. The test will duty cycle capacity. The load for a period of 72 be conducted on a battery terminal voltage is hours without battery bank that has greater than or equal to recharging. 4.e) The been fully charged and 210 V after a period of no IDS spare battery has been connected to less than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> with an bank supplies a dc a battery charger equivalent load that equals load equal to or maintained at 270+/-2 V or exceeds the battery greater than the most for a period of no less bank design duty cycle severe switchboard than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to capacity. The battery bus load for the the test. Testing of terminal voltage is greater required period each 72-hour as-built than or equal to 210 V after without recharging. battery bank will be a period with a load and 4.f) Each IDS 24-hour performed by applying a duration that equals or inverter supplies its ac simulated or real load, exceeds the most severe load. 4.g) Each IDS or a combination of battery bank design duty 72-hour inverter simulated or real loads cycle capacity. Each 24-supplies its ac load. which envelope the hour inverter supplies a 4.h) Each IDS 24-hour battery bank design line-to-line output voltage battery charger duty cycle. The test will of 208 +/- 2% V at a provides the PMS with be conducted on a frequency of 60 +/- 0.5% Hz.

two loss-of-ac input battery bank that has Each 72-hour inverter voltage signals. 5.a) been fully charged and supplies a line-to-line Each IDS 24-hour has been connected to output voltage of 208 +/- 2%

battery charger a battery charger V at a frequency of 60 +/-

supplies a dc maintained at 270+/-2 V 0.5% Hz. Two PMS input switchboard bus load for a period of no less signals exist from each 24-while maintaining the than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to hour battery charger corresponding battery the test. Testing of the indicating loss of ac input charged. 5.b) Each as-built spare battery voltage when the loss-of-IDS 72-hour battery bank will be performed input voltage condition is charger supplies a dc by applying a simulated simulated. Each 24-hour switchboard bus load or real load, or a battery charger provides an while maintaining the combination of output current of at least corresponding battery simulated or real loads 150 A with an output charged. 5.c) Each which envelope the voltage in the range 210 to IDS regulating most severe of the 280 V. Each 72-hour transformer supplies division batteries design battery charger provides an an ac load when duty cycle. The test will output current of at least powered from the 480 be conducted on a 125 A with an output V MCC. 6. Safety- battery bank that has voltage in the range 210 to related displays been fully charged and 280 V. Each regulating identified in Table has been connected to transformer supplies a line-2.6.3-1 can be a battery charger to-line output voltage of retrieved in the MCR. maintained at270+/-2 V 208 +/- 2% V. Safety-related

11. Displays of the for a period of no less displays identified in Table parameters identified than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to 2.6.3-1 can be retrieved in in Table 2.6.3-2 can the test. Testing of the MCR. Displays be retrieved in the each 24-hour as-built identified in Table 2.6.3-2 MCR. inverter will be can be retrieved in the performed by applying a MCR.

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simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads, equivalent to a resistive load greater than 12 kW. The inverter input voltage will be no more than 210 Vdc during the test. Testing of each 72-hour as-built inverter will be performed by applying a simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads, equivalent to a resistive load greater than 7 kW.

The inverter input voltage will be no more than 210 Vdc during the test. Testing will be performed by simulating a loss of input voltage to each 24-hour battery charger. Testing of each as-built 24-hour battery charger will be performed by applying a simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads.

Testing of each 72-hour as-built battery charger will be performed by applying a simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads.

Testing of each as-built regulating transformer will be performed by applying a simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads, equivalent to a resistive load greater than 30 kW 38

when powered from the 480 V MCC. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the safety-related displays in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the displays identified in Table 2.6.3-2 in the MCR.

725 2.7.06.02.ii 2. The VFS provides ii) Testing will be ii) The the safety-related performed to demonstrate containment functions of preserving that remotely operated vacuum relief containment integrity by containment vacuum relief isolation valves isolation of the VFS isolation valves open (VFSPL-V800A lines penetrating within the required and VFSPL-containment and response time. V800B) open providing vacuum relief within 30 seconds.

for the containment vessel.

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