ML23198A380

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05200026/2023002

ML23198A380
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	07/19/2023
From:	Nicole Coovert NRC/RGN-II
To:	Coleman J Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR 2023002
Download: ML23198A380 (1)

Text

July 19, 2023 Jamie Coleman Regulatory Affairs Director Southern Nuclear Operating Company 7825 River Road, BIN 63031 Waynesboro, GA 30830

SUBJECT:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 4 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05200026/2023002

Dear Ms. Coleman:

On June 30, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated inspection at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Unit 4. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which the inspectors discussed on July 11, 2023, with Mr. G. Chick, VEGP Units 3 and 4 Executive Vice President, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined a sample of construction activities conducted under your Combined License as it relates to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of these documents. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

The NRC inspectors documented two findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. Each of the findings involved a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating the violations as noncited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or significance of the NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at VEGP, Units 3 & 4.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspects assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at VEGP, Units 3 & 4.

J. Coleman 2 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding. Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me at 404-997-4510.

Sincerely, Signed by Coovert, Nicole on 07/19/23 Nicole Coovert, Chief Construction Inspection Branch 1 Division of Construction Oversight Docket No.: 5200026 License No: NPF-92

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report (IR) 05200026/2023002 w/attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

ML23198A380 Cover Letter Only: X Non-Sensitive X Publicly Available X SUNSI Review Sensitive Non-Publicly Available OFFICE RII/DCO RII/DCO RII/DCO NAME G. Khouri R. Mathis N. Coovert DATE 7/18/2023 7/18/2023 7/18/2023 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region II Docket Numbers: 5200026 License Numbers: NPF-92 Report Numbers: 05200026/2023002 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc Facility: Vogtle Unit 4 Location: Waynesboro, GA Inspection Dates: April 1, 2023, through June 30, 2023 Inspectors: B. Kemker, Senior Resident Inspector, Division of Construction Oversight (DCO)

B. Griman, Resident Inspector, DCO J. England, Senior Construction Inspector, DCO T. Fredette, Reactor Operations Engineer, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation - Vogtle Project Office R. Mathis, Senior Construction Inspector, DCO R. Patel, Senior Construction Inspector, DCO R. Patterson, Physical Security Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety A. Ponko, Senior Construction Inspector, DCO J. Vasquez, Construction Inspector, DCO Approved by: Nicole Coovert, Chief Construction Inspection Branch 1 Division of Construction Oversight Enclosure

SUMMARY

OF FINDINGS Inspection Report (IR) 05200026/2023002; 04/01/2023 through 06/30/2023; Vogtle Unit 4, integrated inspection report.

This report covers a three-month period of inspection by resident, regional, and headquarters inspectors. The report documents one Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Inspection Criteria (ITAAC) finding and one construction finding of very low safety significance (Green), each with an associated noncited violation (NCV). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2519, Construction Significance Determination Process.

Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0613, Appendix F, Construction Cross-Cutting Areas and Aspects. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe construction of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in IMC 2506, Construction Reactor Oversight Process General Guidance and Basis Document.

A. NRC-Identified and Self Revealed Findings (Green) The inspectors identified an ITAAC finding, with five examples, of very low safety significance with an associated NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the licensees failure to maintain physical separation between two Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E and non-Class 1E cables, as required by electrical specification APP-G1-V8-001, AP1000 Electrical Installation Specification. The licensee entered the issues into its corrective action program (CAP) as condition reports (CRs) 50177188, 50177227, 50177240, 50177297, and 50177336 for evaluation and identification of corrective actions.

Corrective actions included rework to restore compliance with the separation requirements and for two examples, the licensee conducted an analysis that supported the as-built configuration being left as-is with no impacts to applicable structures, systems, or components (SSCs).

The performance deficiency (PD) was of more than minor safety significance, and thus a finding, because it represented an adverse condition that rendered the quality of the safety function associated with the Class 1E cable raceway system unacceptable and required substantive corrective action. The finding was Green because it was associated with Class 1E cable raceway system, which is assigned as an intermediate risk importance, and was assigned to Row 1 of the significance determination matrix, and for each of the five examples, if left uncorrected, the finding could reasonably be expected to impair the design function of only one train of a multi-train system. This violation was determined to be an ITAAC finding because it impacted the acceptance criteria of ITAAC 3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800),

which states physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables inside the containment. The inspectors determined the proximate cause of the PD was indicative of present licensee performance and was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of Avoid Complacency in the area of Human Performance. [H.12] (Section 1A22)

(Green) The inspectors identified a Construction finding of very low safety significance with an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to have an analysis demonstrating the as-built configuration of support 2

SV4-1222-SH-E804 would meet design requirements. The licensee entered this finding into its CAP as CR 50177001 for evaluation and identification of corrective actions.

The PD was of more than minor safety significance, and thus a finding, because it represented an adverse condition that rendered the quality of an SSC, unacceptable or indeterminate, and required substantive corrective action. Specifically, the analysis and design of support SV4-1222-SH-E804 documented in calculation APP-1220-SHC-301 did not adequately account for the as-built configuration of the conduits attached to support SV4-1222-SH-E804. The finding was of very low safety significance because it was associated with the Class 1E dc and uninterruptible power supply system, which is assigned as a high system risk importance, and was assigned to Row 1 of the significance determination matrix, and if left uncorrected, the finding could reasonably be expected to impair the design function of only one train of a multi-train system. The finding was indicative of current licensee performance and was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of Design Margins in the area of Human Performance. The proximate cause of the PD was attributed to the failure to maintain equipment within design margins. [H.6] (Section 1P03)

B. Licensee-Identified Violations None.

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REPORT DETAILS Summary of Plant Construction Status Unit 4: The licensee completed all major structural, mechanical, and electrical construction and was in the process of finalizing details needed to complete all Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC). Hot functional testing was completed.

1. CONSTRUCTION REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Design/Engineering, Procurement/Fabrication, Construction/Installation, Inspection/Testing IMC 2503, Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) - Related Work Inspections 1A01 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.1.02.02a (13) / Family 06F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.1.02.02a (13). The inspectors used the following NRC inspection procedures (IPs)/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.03-02.07 - Review of Records 65001.06-02.01 - General Installation 65001.06-02.05 - Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed documents associated with Stone & Webster (S&W) work package SV4-RCS-P0W-1051836 for installation of pressurizer safety valves SV4-RCS-PL-V005A and SV4-RCS-PL-V005B that provide overpressure protection of the reactor cooling system (RCS). The inspectors reviewed associated documents to determine if the bolted flange joint connections to the inlet 6-inch and outlet 8-inch diameter pipe flanges were assembled in accordance with the requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code,Section III, Subsection NB, for Class 1 components.

The inspectors reviewed S&W piping installation data sheets to verify quality control (QC) inspector hold points for identification/marking of these PV62 safety relief valves with respective serial numbers N900028-00-0013 and N900028-00-0014 for material traceability (including bolts, nuts, and gaskets), internal cleanliness, and calibration of torquing tools were deemed satisfactory and signed by QC inspectors in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code,Section III, Article NCA-3000, with final signatures by the authorized nuclear inspector.

The inspectors reviewed S&W bolted joint data sheets to verify QC inspector hold points for alignment/fit-up with flexitallic gaskets and flanges sequentially torqued in gradual steps to the final values were deemed satisfactory and signed off by QC 4

inspectors in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code,Section III, paragraph NB-2128, and Section II, Part D, Subpart 1, Table 4, with final signatures by the authorized nuclear inspector.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A02 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.1.03.13 (88) / Family 05F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.1.03.13 (88). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.05 - Inspection of ITAAC-Related Installation of Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals 65001.05-02.01 - Purchase and Receipt of Components 65001.F- Inspection of the ITAAC-Related Design and Fabrication Requirements 65001.F-02.02 - Fabrication Records Review The inspectors performed an inspection to verify a report exists and concludes the fuel assemblies and rod cluster control assemblies (RCCA) intended for the initial core load and listed in Table 2.1.3-1 of Appendix C to the Vogtle Unit 4 Combined License (COL),

have been designed and constructed in accordance with the principal design requirements.

The inspectors reviewed APP-SSAR-F5-001, AP1000 Safety Analysis Checklist, Revision 1, which is specific to the Vogtle Unit 4 first core design and additional changes made to the AP1000 fuel assembly, RCCA, and gray rod control assembly designs. The inspectors reviewed the Safety Analysis Checklist to confirm the first core safety analysis performed by Westinghouse for the first operating cycle (Cycle 1) meets the principal design requirements listed in the VEGP 3&4 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 4.1.1, and more broadly the UFSAR Chapter 4 requirements.

The inspectors also reviewed the Unit 4 Cycle 1 Core Operating Limits Report (COLR),

which is specific to the Vogtle Unit 4 Cycle 1 core design and provides the applicable core operating limits of the safety analysis (e.g., fuel thermal mechanical limits, core thermal hydraulic limits, passive core cooling system (PXS) limits, nuclear limits such as shutdown margin, transient analysis limits, and accident analysis limits). The inspectors reviewed the COLR to confirm the core operating limit results were consistent with those in the Safety Analysis Checklist and the UFSAR Chapter 4 requirements.

The inspectors reviewed selected quality records including the Unit 4 Cycle 1 Core Loading Plan and the letter documenting the verification and certification of the fuel assemblies and RCCA from the vendor to verify the components conformed with the design requirements.

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b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A03 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.01.02a (91) / Family 06F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.01.02a (91). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:

65001.03-02.07 - Review of Records The inspectors reviewed as-built design reports and associated ASME N1 and a sample of the N5 installation data reports for the containment system (CNS), which included the containment vessel (CV) and the penetration assemblies, to verify the components, listed below, were designed, fabricated, constructed, examined, and tested in accordance with the design specifications, engineering drawings, and requirements of the 2001 Edition with Addenda up to and including 2002 of the ASME Section III, Division 1, Subsections NCA for general requirements and NE for Class MC metal containment vessels:

CV Electrical penetration assemblies consisting of canisters, weldment rings, and extension sleeves for penetrations E01 thru E03, E06 thru E07, and E09 thru E32 Fuel transfer tube penetration P11 Normal residual heat removal system for reactor coolant system to passive residual heat removal penetration P19 Steam generator system (SGS) main steam penetrations P23 and P24 SGS main feedwater penetrations P25 and P26 SGS steam generator blowdown penetrations P27 and P28 SGS startup feedwater loops 1 and 2 penetrations P44 and P45 Guard pipes, extension sleeves, flued heads, attachment rings, and/or bellows expansion joints for penetrations P05, P19, P20, P22 thru P28, P44, and P45 Instrument penetrations P46 thru P49 The inspectors reviewed as-built design reports SV4-CNS-S3R-001 and SV4-MV50-S3R-100 to verify certification by a registered professional engineer and the contents were in accordance with the requirements of ASME NCA-3260, that include or reference supporting calculations for the design, service, and loading conditions stated in certified design specifications for ASME Code jurisdictional pressure boundaries.

The inspectors also reviewed as-built design reports to verify reconciliation of design output documents for design changes and nonconformances were addressed in accordance with the applicable requirements of ASME NCA-3260 and NCA-3500.

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The inspectors reviewed the contents of ASME N-5 installation data report SV4-CNS-MUR-001 (including SV4-CNS-MJR-001, -MJR-002, and -MJR-003-1) for the CNS penetration assemblies welded to the CV pressure boundary to verify data reports were completed and certified with signatures by the certificate holder representative and authorized nuclear inspector in accordance with the requirements of ASME NCA-3350 and NCA-8000.

The inspectors reviewed the contents of quality assurance record package SV4-MV50-VQQ-004P1P36 for the ASME Section III Class MC CV (Serial No. VOGTLE 4) to verify the N-1 data report was completed and certified with signatures by the certificate holder representative and authorized nuclear inspector in accordance with the requirements of ASME NCA-3350 and NCA-8000.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed preservice inspection reports and data sheets for the following to verify the required attributes for visual examination were completed and signed off by the authorized nuclear inspector:

CV course 5, outside diameter weld at elevation 155 feet CV course 10, inside diameter weld at elevation 218 feet - 9 inches Outside diameter weld of electrical penetration number 20

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A04 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.01.05.i (98) / Family 11A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.01.05.i (98). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.08 - 02.04 - Inspection of Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPAs) 65001.A - As-Built Attributes for SSCs associated with ITAAC 65001.A.02.02 - Installation Records Review 65001.A.02.04 - Review As-built Deviations/Nonconformance 65001.E-02.06 - Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed the equipment qualification reconciliation reports (EQRRs) for the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) listed below to determine whether the licensee assessed work packages, design changes, and nonconformances to confirm the as-built configuration, including anchorage, was seismically bounded by the analyzed conditions in accordance with the applicable data sheets and design specifications:

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Demineralized water transfer and storage system (DWS) supply containment isolation check valve - SV4-DWS-PL-V245 Liquid radioactive waste system (WLS) reactor coolant drain tank gas outlet containment isolation air operated valve (AOV) - SV4-WLS-PL-V067 Central chilled water system (VWS) return containment isolation auxiliary relief valve - SV4-VWS-PL-V080 CNS instrumentation penetration P47 - SV4-PCS-PY-C02 The inspectors also reviewed EQRRs of the SSCs listed below to verify the as-built equipment satisfies the seismic Category 1 and harsh environment acceptance criteria of ITAAC 2.2.01.05i:

Class 1E electrical penetration assemblies (EPAs) - IDSA-EY-P11Z, IDSD-EY-P15Y, and IDSB-EY-P32Y Non-class 1E EPAs ECS-EY-P01X and DAS-EY-P03Z Containment air filtration system (VFS) purge isolation butterfly AOV - SV4-VFS-PL-V009 WLS sump discharge containment isolation plug AOV - SV4-WLS-PL-V055 The inspectors reviewed the licensee's methodology and selection of applicable work orders, data sheets, and design drawings, to determine whether the inspections and analyses demonstrated the installed components were bounded by the analyzed design characteristics. The inspectors reviewed the equipment qualification summary reports and equipment qualification data packages to determine whether installation restrictions were translated to the drawings and EQRRs. The inspectors performed a review of as-installed electrical connections for the motor-operated valves and pneumatic connections for the AOVs to determine whether the electrical and pneumatic connections were installed as tested so the valves would function during a design basis accident.

The inspectors performed walkdowns of the as-built valves to verify each valves make/model/serial number, mounting, orientation, and location. The inspectors verified the mechanical anchorage and electrical connections were bounded by the tested conditions.

The inspectors performed walkdowns of the as-built Class 1E, and non-Class 1E EPAs to verify make/model and associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in harsh environments. The inspectors verified the EPAs and associated wiring, cables, and terminations qualified for harsh environment were bounded by the tested and analyzed conditions. Further, the inspectors reviewed documents for EPAs to verify:

the licensee used the appropriate limiting design basis parameters as input for the seismic qualification of the SSCs and the necessary design basis documents and calculations were correctly incorporated in the qualification program for the SSCs; seismic qualification was adequately completed and controlled in accordance with ASME QME-1-2007, Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE)

Std. 344-1987, and applicable design specifications; 8

licensee records established adequate basis for acceptance of the ITAAC with qualification criteria attributes and the qualification report concluded the SSCs can withstand the conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis seismic event without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function; and seismic qualification documentation was maintained in an auditable manner, was compete, and clearly documented completion of the ITAAC acceptance criteria for the samples inspected.

The inspectors also interviewed licensing personnel to determine how inspection and analyses were performed for applicable nonconformance and disposition reports (N&Ds) and engineering and design coordination reports (E&DCRs) issued during fabrication, handling, installation, and testing to ensure all deviations were bounded by the seismically analyzed conditions.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A05 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.01.08 (109) / Family 08F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.01.08 (109). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.08-02.04 - Inspection of Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPAs) 65001.F-02.02-Fabrication Records Review The inspectors reviewed the as-built protection analysis report for Vogtle Unit 4 containment EPAs to verify the penetrations are protected against currents that are greater than their continuous ratings as required by ITAAC 2.2.01.08 in the Vogtle Unit 4 COL. The inspectors sampled and reviewed the electrical fuse data in the as-built analysis report for the eight (8) control power EPAs associated with the Class 1E dc and uninterruptible power supply system (IDS). The inspectors verified the fuses were sized and rated, for these EPAs, in accordance with the acceptance criteria for this ITAAC.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

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1A06 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.02.02a (120) / Family 07F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.02.02a (120). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.03-02.03 - Installation and Welding 65001.03-02.06 - Nondestructive Examination 65001.07-02.02 - Component Welding 65001.B-02.05 - Inspection The inspectors reviewed the as-built design report and associated ASME N-5 installation data reports for the passive containment cooling system (PCS) to verify the PCS and the following components were designed, fabricated, constructed, examined, and tested in accordance with design specifications, engineering drawings, and the requirements of the 1998 Edition with Addenda up to and including 2000 of the ASME Code Section III, Division 1, Subsections NCA for general requirements, ND for Class 3 components, and NF for supports:

valves within the PV01, PV02, PV03, PV10, PV11, and PV13 valve commodities; instruments and instrument manifolds within the JE22, JE43, and JZ01 commodities; piping, tubing, and valve supports, including Class 3 piping supported by concrete embedment; standard piping penetrations within portions of the piping system; items (process pipe, inline fittings, and flanges) within jurisdictional boundaries of piping-to-piping, and piping-to-supports (attachments), and Class 3 spectacle blind flange (installed during operation) within the PY90 commodity.

The inspectors reviewed certified as-built design report SV4-PCS-S3R-001 to verify contents were in accordance with the requirements of ASME NCA-3260 using reference supporting calculations for the design, service, and test loading conditions for jurisdictional pressure boundaries highlighted on piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) APP-PCS-M6-001 thru -003. The inspectors verified reconciliation of design output and input documents for design changes and nonconformances or deviations requiring modifications (including use of Code Cases) were addressed in accordance with the applicable requirements of ASME NCA-3260 and NCA-3500.

The inspectors reviewed preservice inspection program plan SV4-GW-GEI-100 to verify VT-1 visual testing for discontinuity detection and VT-3 visual testing for general mechanical and structural conditions were performed on welded anchor attachments and rigid supports of the PCS.

The inspectors reviewed the contents of ASME N-5 installation data report SV4-PCS-MUR-001 (including SV4-PCS-MJR-003, -004 and -007) for the above components, items, and supports to verify they were completed and certified with signatures by the 10

certificate holder representative and authorized nuclear inspector in accordance with the applicable requirements of ASME NCA-3350 and NCA-8000.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A07 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.02.05a.i (126) / Family 14A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.02.05a.i (126). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.10-02.02.c - As Built Verification 65001.A - As-Built Attributes for SSCs associated with ITAAC 65001.A.02.04 - Review As-built Deviations/Nonconformance 65001.F-02.04 - General QA Review The inspectors reviewed the EQRRs for the PCS safety related isolation valve and sensors listed below to determine whether the licensee assessed work packages, design changes, and nonconformances to confirm the as-built configuration, including anchorage, were seismically bounded by as-tested conditions in accordance with the applicable data sheets and design specifications, and satisfy the seismic Category 1 acceptance criteria contained in ITAAC 2.2.02.05a.i:

Passive containment cooling water storage tank (PCCWST) isolation air operated valve - PCS-PL-V001B PCS water delivery flow sensor - PCS-JE-FT001 PCCWST water level sensor - PCS-JE-LT010 In addition, the inspectors reviewed EQRR for the PCS safety related containment pressure sensors SV4-PCS-JE-PT007 and SV4-PCS-JE-PT008 to determine whether the licensee assessed work packages, design changes, and nonconformances to confirm the as-built configuration, including anchorage, were seismically bounded by as tested conditions in accordance with the applicable data sheets and design specifications, and satisfy the seismic Category 1 and harsh environmental acceptance criteria contained in ITAAC 2.2.02.05a.i.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's methodology and selection of applicable work orders, data sheets, and design drawings to determine whether the inspections and analyses demonstrated the installed components were bounded by the design characteristics that were contained in the analyses. The inspectors reviewed the equipment qualification summary reports and equipment qualification data packages to determine whether installation restrictions from testing were translated to the drawings 11

and EQRRs. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the installed components to confirm the satisfactory installation of the Class 1E sensors and associated wiring, cables, and terminations that are qualified for either seismic or seismic and harsh environment was bounded by the type tests, analyses, or combination of type tests and analyses. The inspectors performed a review of as-installed electrical connections to determine whether the electrical connections were installed as tested so the isolation valves would function during a design basis accident. The inspectors also verified the mechanical anchorage was bounded by the tested conditions.

The inspectors verified each sensor and valve manufacturer make/model/serial number, location, and mounting orientation were in accordance with the design drawings. The inspectors reviewed the work packages and confirmed the torque values applied were consistent with the required design drawing and the torque wrenches used were within their calibration cycle.

The inspectors also interviewed licensing personnel to determine how inspection and analyses were performed for applicable nonconformances and E&DCRs issued during fabrication, handling, installation, and testing to ensure all deviations were bounded by the seismically analyzed conditions.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A08 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.02.07b.i (138) / Family 06D

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.02.07b.i (138). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.A - As-Built Attributes for SSCs associated with ITAAC 65001.A.02.02 - Installation Records Review 65001.F-02.02 - Fabrication Records Review The inspectors reviewed SV4-PCS-ITR-801138, "Unit 4 Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS) Inspection Coatings: ITAAC 2.2.02.07b.i (Item 7.b.ii and iii)," Revision 0, to verify the inside and outside surfaces of the containment vessel above the operating deck (elevation 135 feet - 3 inches) were coated with an inorganic zinc (IOZ) material as specified in Table 2.2.2-3 of Appendix C of the Vogtle Unit 4 COL. The inspectors reviewed the inspection test report to determine if coating records concluded the as-applied coatings to the interior surfaces of the containment vessel above the operating deck and the exterior surface of the containment vessel above the operating deck were coated with a safety related IOZ coating. The inspectors also reviewed coating repair records to verify the correct material was used and the dry film thickness of the repaired areas were in accordance with the design specification for protective coatings used in the AP1000 plant. Lastly, the inspectors reviewed the inspection test report to determine if the methyl ethyl ketone test was satisfactorily performed as required for Containment Service Level I (interior) and Service Level III (exterior) surfaces.

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b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A09 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.01 (158) / Family 14A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.01 (158). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:

65001.14-02.01 - General Installation The inspectors performed an inspection of selected portions of the Unit 4 PXS functional arrangement to verify the as-built system components conform to the system design description of Section 2.2.3 of Appendix C of the Vogtle Unit 4 COL, including Table 2.2.3-5 and Figure 2.2.3-1.

The inspectors performed a walkdown of the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger, core makeup tanks, accumulator tanks, pH adjustment baskets, in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST), IRWST and containment recirculation screens, and selected portions of system piping, valves, and instruments to assess whether the as-built piping and components were physically arranged consistent with Figure 2.2.3-1 and located as identified in Table 2.2.3-5 of Appendix C of the Vogtle Unit 4 COL, such that the components will support system functions described in the design description of Section 2.2.3 of Appendix C of the Vogtle Unit 4 COL and Section 6.3 of the VEGP 3&4 UFSAR.

The inspectors also reviewed quality records including the Principal Closure Document (PCD), piping and instrumentation diagrams, and as-built drawings to verify the PXS functional arrangement.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

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1A10 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.02a (159) / Family 06F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.02a (159). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.03-02.05 - Pressure Testing 65001.06-02.04 - Testing and Verification 65001.06-02.05 - Problem Identification and Resolution 65001.C-02.01 - Program and Procedure Reviews 65001.C-02.03 - Construction Test Record Review 65001.F-02.04 - General QA Review The inspectors performed inspection of ASME Section III hydrostatic testing activities associated with the PXS. The inspectors reviewed work packages for the piping and components ASME Section III hydrostatic tests. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the work package instructions and the licensee's procedure for construction pressure testing to determine whether the following test attributes were included:

the system boundary included all pressure vessels, piping, pumps, and valves that were part of the piping system to be tested; the system was vented during the filling operation; water quality was specified as required by the latest licensee approved specifications for the temperatures to be present during the test; temperature requirements were stated to ensure components were maintained above the nil ductility transition temperature during hydrostatic pressure testing; minimum hydrostatic test pressure was as specified in the applicable design and/or fabrication specification; maximum hydrostatic test pressure was less than the limits in the applicable design and/or fabrication specification; hydrostatic test pressure was maintained for a minimum of 10 minutes before initiation of the examination for leakage; and examination for leakage included all joints, connections, and regions of high stress, such as openings, attachments, and thickness transition sections at a pressure equal to the design pressure or three-fourths of the test pressure, whichever was greater.

The inspectors reviewed the results from the ASME Section III hydrostatic test pressure datasheets to determine if the results conformed to the requirements of ASME Section III, Subsection NB-6000. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the test results to determine if they were adequate to furnish identifiable and retrievable evidence of activities affecting quality and were reviewed and verified to be complete per the licensee procedures.

The test pressure datasheets reviewed confirmed the following:

the latest revisions of the test procedures were documented; pressure test prerequisite checklist was complete; 14

valve lineup/system checklists were completed; water quality and temperature were as stated in the procedures; pressure test did not exceed 1.25 times design pressure; properly calibrated pressure gauges of the required range were used where required; properly calibrated relief valves of the required set point and capacity were used where required; testing was performed as required by the approved procedure; testing was independently witnessed by quality control inspector and third-party authorized nuclear inspector; hydrostatic test results were reviewed and approved by test director; and post test valve lineup/system checklists were completed.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A11 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.08c.ix (194) / Family 06A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.08c.ix (194). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.06-02.01 - General Installation 65001.A - As-Built Attributes for SSCs associated with ITAAC The inspectors performed an inspection of the insulation installed on the Unit 4 ASME Class 1 piping and components located inside the reactor containment building to verify the type of insulation used is a metal reflective type as specified in Table 2.2.3-4 of Appendix C of the Vogtle Unit 4 COL. In addition, the inspectors performed an inspection of the insulation installed on other piping and components located inside the reactor containment building within the zone of influence (ZOI) and below the maximum flood level of a design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) to verify the type of insulation used is a metal reflective type as specified in Table 2.2.3-4 of Appendix C of the Vogtle Unit 4 COL.

The inspectors verified the only non-metal reflective insulation within the ZOI and below the maximum LOCA flood level was the neutron shield blocks that form part of the reactor vessel insulation system and the refueling cavity floor. For this installation, the inspectors verified a report exists that concludes the insulation used is a suitable equivalent as described in Section 6.3 of the VEGP 3&4 UFSAR and as required by the acceptance criteria.

The inspectors performed independent walkdowns of the ASME Class 1 portions of the RCS, PXS, the chemical and volume control system (CVS), and normal residual heat removal system (RNS) piping and performed an independent assessment to verify the as-built insulation installation was consistent with Section 6.3 of the VEGP 3&4 UFSAR, the mechanical equipment and piping insulation design specification, the pipe line designation tables, and the piping and instrumentation diagrams.

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The inspectors also performed independent walkdowns of the pressurizer, steam generators, and reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) and performed an independent assessment to verify the as-built insulation installation was consistent with Section 6.3 of the VEGP 3&4 UFSAR, the mechanical equipment and piping insulation design specification, and the piping and instrumentation diagrams.

Additionally, the inspectors performed independent walkdowns of other (i.e., non-ASME Class 1) piping and components located inside the reactor containment building located within the zone of influence and below the maximum LOCA flood level, and performed an independent assessment to verify the as-built insulation installation was consistent with Section 6.3 of the VEGP 3&4 UFSAR, the mechanical equipment and piping insulation design specification, the pipe line designation tables, and the piping and instrumentation diagrams.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A12 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.08c.vii (192) / Family 06A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.08c.vii (192). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.06 - Inspection of ITAAC-Related Installation of Mechanical Components 65001.06-02.01 - General Installation 65001.A- As-Built Attributes for SSCs associated with ITAAC The inspectors performed an inspection to verify the protective plate located above the Unit 4 containment recirculation screen was no more than 1 foot, 3 inches above the top of the face of the screens and extends at least 8 feet, 3 inches perpendicular to the front and at least 7 feet to the side of the face of the screen as specified in Table 2.2.3-4 of Appendix C of the Vogtle Unit 4 COL.

The inspectors performed a walkdown of the Unit 4 containment recirculation screens with the licensee and performed an independent assessment to verify the protective plate was installed consistent with the installation drawings. The inspectors observed the licensee perform field measurements of the protective plate with respect to the screens and took independent measurements to validate the licensee's determination of the minimum dimensions in accordance with ITAAC. The inspectors also reviewed quality records including the Principal Closure Document, licensee field measurement results, and design and as-built drawings to verify the ITAAC.

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b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A13 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.08c.viii (193) / Family 06A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.08c.viii (193). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.06 - Inspection of ITAAC-Related Installation of Mechanical Components 65001.06-02.01 - General Installation 65001.A - As-Built Attributes for SSCs associated with ITAAC The inspectors performed an inspection of the three Unit 4 IRWST screens and the containment recirculation screen to verify the surface areas and number of pockets in the screens were in accordance with the ITAAC.

The inspectors reviewed quality records including PCDs, licensee field measurement results, licensee and vendor calculations, and as-built drawings to verify the following as specified in Table 2.2.3-4 of Appendix C to the Vogtle Unit 4 COL:

The screens utilize pockets with a frontal face area of greater than or equal to

() 6.2 inches2 and a screen surface area 140 inches2 per pocket; IRWST Screens A and B each have a sufficient number of pockets to provide a frontal face area 25 feet2, a screen surface area 575 feet2, and a screen mesh size of less than or equal to () 0.0625 inch; IRWST Screen C has a sufficient number of pockets to provide a frontal face area 50 feet2, a screen surface area 1150 feet2, and a screen mesh size 0.0625 inch; and Each containment recirculation screen has a sufficient number of pockets to provide a frontal face area 105 feet2, a screen surface area 2500 feet2, and a screen mesh size 0.0625 inch.

The inspectors observed the licensee perform field measurements and took independent measurements of the screen pockets and counted the number of pockets used in each screen to validate the licensee's determination of the screens' dimensions in accordance with Table 2.2.3-4 of Appendix C to the Vogtle Unit 4 COL.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

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1A14 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.08c.viii (193) / Family 06A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.08c.viii (193). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.06 - Inspection of ITAAC-Related Installation of Mechanical Components 65001.06-02.01 - General Installation 65001.A - As-Built Attributes for SSCs associated with ITAAC The inspectors performed an inspection of the three Unit 4 IRWST screens and the debris curb in front of the containment recirculation screen to verify the height of the IRWST screens and the debris curb are in accordance with the ITAAC.

The inspectors reviewed quality records including the PCD, licensee field survey and measurement results, and as-built drawings to verify the bottoms of the IRWST screens are located 6 inches above the bottom of the IRWST and a debris curb exists in front of the containment recirculation screens, which is 2 feet above the loop compartment floor as specified in Table 2.2.3-4 of Appendix C to the Vogtle Unit 4 COL. The inspectors observed the licensee perform field measurements and took independent measurements to validate the licensee's determination of the minimum dimensions in accordance with Table 2.2.3-4 of Appendix C to the Vogtle Unit 4 COL.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A15 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.08c.x (195) / Family 14F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.08c.x (195). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.14-02.04 - Qualification Criteria 65001.14-02.05 - Problem Identification and Resolution 65001.F-02.04 - General QA Review The inspectors reviewed quality records, including the PCDs, associated with this ITAAC to verify the density requirements of coatings and other materials, such as, signs and tags, caulking, and ventilation filters and fire barriers, located inside containment meet the requirements of Appendix C of the COL. This inspection focused on the review of five PCDs and their reference documents for onsite coated SSCs, offsite coated SSCs, signs and tags, caulking, and ventilation filters and fire barriers.

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The inspectors reviewed PCD SV4-PXS-ITR-801195 to verify the report concluded protective coatings applied onsite on SSCs located inside containment have a dry film density of 100 pounds per cubic feet (lb/ft3) and IOZ coatings used on these surfaces are Safety-Service Level I (SL1), or otherwise have been quantified and justified in a program for management of unqualified coatings to demonstrate the unqualified coatings are acceptable for use.

The inspectors reviewed Quality Assurance Data Package Inspection Report SV4-GW-ITR-001, to verify the report concluded protective coatings applied offsite (i.e., by a vendor) on SSCs located inside containment have a dry film density of 100 lb/ft3 and IOZ coatings used on these surfaces were SL1, or otherwise have been quantified and justified in a program for management of unqualified coatings to demonstrate the unqualified coatings were acceptable for use.

The inspectors reviewed PCD SV4-PXS-ITR-803195 to verify the report concluded the caulking used inside containment below the maximum flood level of a design basis LOCA or located above the maximum flood level and not inside cabinets or enclosures have a dry film density of 100 lb/ft3.

The inspectors reviewed PCD SV4-1100-ITR-804195 to verify the report concluded the tags and signs used inside containment below the maximum flood level of a design basis LOCA or located above the maximum flood level and not inside cabinets or enclosures are made of steel with a density of 100 lb/ft3 and that coatings used on these signs or tags have a dry film density of 100 lb/ft3.

The inspectors reviewed PCD SV4-PXS-ITR-805195 to verify the report concluded the ventilation filters and fire barriers inside containment within the zone of influence or below the maximum flood level of a design basis LOCA have a dry film density of 100 lb/ft3.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A16 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.5.02.02.i (522) / Family 10A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.5.02.02.i (522). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.09-02.02 - Attributes of Electrical Cable installation 65001.09-02.03 - Documentation 65001.10 - Inspection of ITAAC-Related Installation of Instrument Components and Systems 65001.10-02.02.c - As Built Verification 65001.A.02.04 - Review As-built Deviations/Nonconformance 65001.F-02.02 - Fabrication Records Review 19

The inspectors reviewed the EQRRs for the protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) cabinets, main control room/remote shutdown room (MCR/RSR) transfer panel, and MCR/RSRs play and control panels listed below to determine whether the licensee assessed work packages, design changes, and nonconformances to confirm the as-built configuration, including anchorage, were seismically bounded by the as-tested and/or analyzed conditions in accordance with data sheets and design specification, and satisfy the seismic Category 1 criteria:

PMS cabinets SV4-PMS-JD-ILCA02, SV4-PMS-JD-NICC01, SV4-PMS-JD-QDPB01, SV4-PMS-JD-BCCD01, and SV4-PMS-JD-SVCD01 MCR/RSR transfer panel SV4-OCS-JW-001 MCR/RSR display and control panels SV4-OCS-JC-10 and SV4-OCS-JC-11 The inspectors reviewed the licensee's methodology and selection of applicable work orders, data sheets, and design drawings to determine whether the inspections and analyses demonstrated the installed components were bounded by the as-tested and analyzed design characteristics. The inspectors reviewed the equipment qualification summary reports and equipment qualification data packages to determine whether installation restrictions from testing were translated to the drawings and EQRRs and whether any differences between as-built and as-designed condition were reconciled in accordance with approved modification or change process.

The inspectors performed a walkdown of the installed components to confirm the satisfactory installation of the Class 1E equipment, associated wiring, cables, and terminations that are qualified for room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration. The inspectors verified each equipments manufacturer model/serial number, location, and mounting were in accordance with the design drawings. The inspectors verified the cables and raceways had sufficient physical separation between Class 1E cables of different divisions and non-Class 1E cables and were identified by an appropriate color-coding scheme.

The inspectors reviewed the work packages and confirmed the torque values applied were consistent with the required design drawing and the torque wrenches used were within their calibration cycle.

The inspectors also interviewed licensing personnel to determine how inspection and analyses were performed for applicable nonconformances and E&DCRs issued during fabrication, handling, installation, and testing to verify deviations were bounded by the seismically analyzed conditions.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

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1A17 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.6.03.02.i (597) / Family 08A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.6.03.02.i (Index 597). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.09-02.01 - Physical Separation of Cables 65001.09-02.02 - Attributes of Electrical Cable installation 65001.09-02.03 - Documentation The inspectors reviewed the EQRRs for the IDS components listed below to determine whether the licensee assessed work packages, design changes, and nonconformances to confirm the as-built configuration, including anchorage, were seismically bounded by the analyzed conditions in accordance with data sheets and design specifications, and satisfy the seismic Category 1 criteria:

IDS 24-hour battery chargers IDSD-DC-1 and IDSA-DC-1 IDS 72-hour battery charger IDSC-DC-2 IDS 250 Vdc 24-hour battery bank 1 IDSA-DB-1 IDS 250 Vdc 72- hour battery bank 2 IDSB-DB-2 IDS 250 Vdc distribution panels IDSB-DD-1 and IDSD-DD-1 IDS 120 Vac distribution panel IDSB-EA-1 IDS fuse panel IDSA-EA-5 IDS fused transfer switch boxes IDSA-DF-1 and IDSB-DF-1, IDS regulation transformer IDSC-DT-1 IDS 24-hour inverters IDSC-DU-1 and IDSB-DU-1 IDS 250 Vdc switchboards IDSA-DS-1 and IDSB-DS-1 IDS 250 Vdc motor control centers IDSC-DK-1 and IDSB-DK-1 The inspectors reviewed the licensee's methodology and selection of applicable work orders, data sheets, and design drawings to determine whether the inspections and analyses demonstrated the installed components were bounded by the as-tested and analyzed design characteristics. The inspectors reviewed the equipment qualification summary reports and equipment qualification data packages to determine whether installation restrictions from testing were translated to the drawings and EQRRs and that any differences between as-built and as-designed condition were reconciled in accordance with approved modification or change processes.

The inspectors performed a walkdown of the selected Unit 4 IDS installed components to confirm satisfactory installation of associated cable raceways and conduit, cable/wiring, and terminations at component penetrations. Additionally, the inspectors assessed penetrations that included Roxtec electromagnetic compatibility hardware to verify correct installation and configuration to ensure free-air cable physical separation.

The inspectors verified the cables and raceways had sufficient physical separation between Class 1E cables of different divisions and non-Class 1E cables and are identified by an appropriate color-coding scheme per design basis requirements. The 21

inspectors reviewed the work packages and confirmed the torque values applied were consistent with per the required design specification.

The inspectors also interviewed licensing personnel to determine how inspection and analyses were performed for applicable nonconformances and E&DCRs issued during fabrication, handling, installation, and testing to ensure all deviations were bounded by the seismically analyzed conditions.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A18 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 3.3.00.02a.i.a (760) / Family 01F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 3.3.00.02a.i.a (760). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.01-02.07 - Identification and Resolution of Problem 65001.02-02.07 - Problem Identification and Resolution 65001.A- As-Built Attributes for SSCs associated with ITAAC 65001.A.02.04 - Review As-built Deviations/Nonconformance The inspectors reviewed the as-built summary report for the containment internal structures to verify the report reconciled deviations during construction, including Table 3.3-1 wall and floor thicknesses, and concluded the as-built containment internal structures, including the critical sections, conform to the approved design and will withstand the design basis loads specified in the design description without loss of structural integrity or the safety related functions, and without impacting compliance with the radiation protection licensing basis. Specifically, The inspectors verified the as-built summary report addressed deviations that were reconciled after the effective date of the as-designed summary report.

The inspectors reviewed Table 3-2.1 and Table 3-2.2 of the as-built summary report to verify the as-built strength of the structural components and connections, after reconciliation of deviations to the standard plant issued after the effective date of the as-designed summary report and site specific N&Ds and E&DCRs, were equal to or greater than the required strength. The inspectors also reviewed the design summary of critical sections provided in the as-built summary report to verify they were consistent with VEGP 3&4 UFSAR Tables 3.3.8-4, 3.3.8-5, 3.3.8-6, and 3.3.8-7.

The inspectors noted design changes were reviewed in the report to identify significant changes to structural configuration (mass, thickness, etc.) and 22

equipment layout (mass and location) and the report concluded the as-built design changes reviewed within the report do not impact the AP1000 seismic analysis model or had already been incorporated.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed Table 4-2 of the as-built summary report to determine if the as-built construction met the concrete wall thicknesses and radiation shielding requirements of VEGP 3&4 UFSAR Table 3.3-1, and any localized deviations from Table 3.3-1 were appropriately evaluated and reconciled to the approved design.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A19 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 3.3.00.05b (785) / Family 01F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 3.3.00.05b (785). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.01 - Inspection of ITAAC-Related Foundations & Buildings 65001.01-02.06 - Records 65001.01-02.07 - Identification and Resolution of Problem 65001.F-02.04 - General QA Review The inspectors reviewed SV4-1000-ITR-800785, Unit 4 Inspections of Auxiliary Building Safety Related Equipment Flood Prevention: ITAAC 3.3.00.05b, NRC Index Number 785, Revision 0, to determine whether the licensee assessed work packages, design changes, and nonconformances to confirm the as-built configuration was in accordance with the applicable drawings and design specifications to satisfy the ITAAC requirements for flooding.

The inspectors performed a walkdown to inspect the sealing of doorway, cable tray, piping, tubing, electrical embedded conduit, and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) penetrations at the following locations to determine whether the boundaries between mechanical equipment rooms and the electrical and instrumentation control equipment rooms of the auxiliary building were constructed as-designed to prevent flooding of rooms that contain safety related equipment up to the maximum flood level for each room:

the floor between room 12306 with flooding source (36-inch) and adjacent room 12211 (12306-ML-E02-Electrical, 12306-ML-E06-Electrical, and 12306-ML-I01-Piping) the floor between room 12313 with flooding source (3-inch) and adjacent rooms 12203/12207 (12313-ML-E12-Electrical, 12313-ML-H01-HVAC, and 12313-ML-H02-HVAC) the floor between room 12312 with flooding source (3-inch) and adjacent room 12212 (12312-ML-E01 Electrical,12312-ML-E35 Electrical, 12312-ML-E45 Electrical, 12312-ML-E82 Electrical) 23

the wall between room 12401 with flooding source within 1-inch of the floor and adjacent room 12411/12412 (12401-AD-D01-Door) the floor between room 12406 with flooding source (36-inch) and adjacent room 12306 (12406-ML-E03-Cable Tray, 12406-ML-E10-Conduit, and 12406-ML-P20-Piping) the floor between room 12501 with flooding source (3-inch) and adjacent rooms 12401/12411/12412 (12501-ML-H05-HVAC, 12501-ML-P19-Piping, and 12501-ML-P37-Piping)

The inspectors also interviewed licensing personnel to determine how inspection and analysis were performed for nonconformances and E&DCRs issued during fabrication, handling, and installation to ensure all deviations were bounded by the analyzed conditions.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A20 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 3.3.00.05c (786) / Family 01F

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 3.3.00.05c (786). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.01-02.06 - Records 65001.01-02.07 - Identification and Resolution of Problem 65001.F- Inspection of the ITAAC-Related Design and Fabrication Requirements The inspectors reviewed SV4-1100-ITR-800786, Unit 4 Inspections of Accumulator Rooms and CVS Room Flood Prevention: ITAAC 3.3.00.05c NRC Index Number: 786, Revision 0, to determine whether the licensee assessed work packages, design changes, and nonconformances to confirm the as-built configuration was in accordance with the applicable drawings and design specifications to satisfy the ITAAC requirements for flooding.

At elevation 107 feet - 2 inches, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the watertight hatches to the PXS A compartment (room 11206), PXS B compartment (room 11207), the entrance to CVS valve room (room 11209), and hatches located in room 11300 (SV4-11300-AD-H03, SV4-11300-AD-H05, and SV4-11300-AD-H11) to determine whether the boundaries between these rooms containing safety related equipment were constructed as designed to prevent flooding between these rooms. The inspectors also performed a walkdown of the SL32 instrumentation tubing penetrations and electrical A6-2 embedded conduit sleeve penetrations listed below to determine whether the penetrations (i.e., embedded, sealed, welded, or blocked by a weir or hatch) were constructed as designed to prevent flood water up to the maximum elevation from flowing across the barrier separating the rooms:

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11202-ML-I06 11209-ML-I18 11300-ML-E28 11300-ML-E90 The inspectors also interviewed licensing personnel to determine how inspection and analysis were performed for applicable nonconformances and E&DCRs issued during fabrication, handling, and installation to ensure all deviations were bounded by the analyzed conditions.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A21 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 3.3.00.07c.i.a (795) / Family 09A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 3.3.00.07c.i.a (795). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.09-02.01 - Physical Separation of Cables 65001.09-02.03 - Documentation 65001.09-02.04 - Problem Identification and Resolution 65001.A.02.02 - Installation Records Review The inspectors inspected cable pulls, terminations, and raceways in rooms located inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building. The rooms inspected include the following:

12101 - Division A battery room (Fire Area 1202 AF 04) 12204 - Division B battery room 2 (Fire Area 1201 AF 02) 12207 - Division B DC equipment room (Fire Area 1201 AF 02) 12306 - Valve/piping penetration room (Fire Area 1201 AF 05) 12312 - Division C RCP trip switchgear room (Fire Area 1202 AF 03) 12423 - Reactor trip switchgear 1 (Fire Area 1243 AF 01) 12501 - Nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system (VBS) MCR Divisions A and C equipment room (Fire Area 1250 AF 01) 12207 - Division B DC equipment room (Fire Area 1201 AF 02) 12312 - Division C RCP trip switchgear room (Fire Area 1202 AF 03) 12201 - Division A DC equipment room (Fire Area 1202 AF 04) 12205 - Division D DC equipment room (Fire Area 1201 AF 03) 12301 - Division A instrumentation and control (I&C) room (Fire Area 1202 AF 04) 12302 - Division C I&C room (Fire Area 1202 AF 03) 25

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the cable pulls, terminations, and raceways inside the rooms to verify separation between raceways that route Class 1E cables of different divisions, and between raceways that route Class 1E cables and raceways that route non-Class 1E cables. During the walkdown, the inspectors verified the raceways and cables were identified by the appropriate color code and the division cables were routed in their respective raceways. The inspectors also walked down cables installed in trays to verify cable fill design requirements were met, as applicable.

The inspectors reviewed applicable construction specifications, installation procedures, written instructions, drawings, work packages, and quality control inspection reports to verify raceways that route Class 1E cables were installed in accordance with design requirements. The inspectors reviewed work packages, test and inspection records, and cable pull tickets to confirm the non-Class 1E cables needed to meet the ITAAC requirements of Appendix C of the COL were installed at the time of ITAAC verification.

For the raceways installed in these rooms, the inspectors verified the size, material, and style were as specified in design documents and work procedures. The inspectors verified raceway supports were located at points specified in approved instructions and that maximum distance between supports were not exceeded. The inspectors also verified fittings and clamps were installed according to work procedures. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective actions for issues entered into the CAP to verify issues were identified, evaluated, and corrected.

The inspectors reviewed ITAAC Technical Report SV4-1200-ITR-800801, Revision 0 and supporting documentation to determine, within the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, whether the licensees inspection results confirmed the separation between raceways that route Class 1E cables of different divisions, and between raceways that route Class 1E cables and raceways that route non-Class 1E cables met separation requirements; Class 1E electrical and communication cables associated with only one division, and the raceways that route these cables were identified by the appropriate color code; and Class 1E electrical and communication cables associated with only one division were routed in raceways assigned to the same division.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

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1A22 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800) / Family 09A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.09-02.01 - Physical Separation of Cables 65001.09-02.03 - Documentation 65001.09-02.04 - Problem Identification and Resolution 65001.A.02.02 - Installation Records Review Electrical raceway supports were inspected in the following Unit 4 containment rooms:

11206 - PXS valve/accumulator room A 11301 - Steam generator 1 lower manway area 11402 - Steam generator 2 tubesheet area 11703 - Upper automatic depressurization system (ADS) valve area at elevation 176 feet - 10.5 inches The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the raceways inside the rooms. At least two samples were gathered from each room to verify structural supports were properly installed and design requirements were met.

The inspectors reviewed applicable construction specifications, installation procedures, written instructions, drawings, work packages, condition reports (CRs), E&DCRs, and quality control inspection reports to verify they were installed in accordance with design requirements.

For the raceways installed in these rooms, the inspectors verified the size, material, welding, and style were as specified in design documents and work procedures. The inspectors verified raceway supports were located at points specified in approved instructions and maximum distance between supports were not exceeded. Inspectors also verified fittings and clamps were installed according to work procedures.

The inspectors walked down and verified cable pulls, terminations, and raceways in rooms located inside the Unit 4 containment, including the following:

11206 - PXS valve/accumulator room A 11301 - Steam generator 1 lower manway area 11402 - Steam generator 2 tubesheet area 11703 - Upper ADS valve area 11201 - Steam generator compartment 1 11306 - Electrical penetration room 11400 - Maintenance floor/mezzanine 11500 - Operating deck 11202 - Steam generator compartment 2 11603 - ADS valve area lower tier 27

11403 - Pressurizer spray valve room 11208 - RNS valve room The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the cable pulls, terminations, and raceways inside the rooms to verify separation between raceways that route Class 1E cables of different divisions, and between raceways that route Class 1E cables and raceways that route non-Class 1E cables. During the walkdown, the inspectors verified the raceways and cables were identified by the appropriate color code and the division cables were routed in their respective raceways. The inspectors also walked down cables installed in trays to verify cable fill design requirements were met, as applicable.

The inspectors reviewed applicable construction specifications, installation procedures, written instructions, drawings, work packages, and quality control inspection reports to verify raceways that route Class 1E cables were installed in accordance with design requirements. The inspectors reviewed work packages, test and inspection records, and cable pull tickets to confirm the non-Class 1E cables needed to meet the ITAAC requirements of Appendix C of the COL were installed at the time of ITAAC verification.

For the raceways installed in these rooms, the inspectors verified the size, material, and style were as specified in design documents and work procedures. The inspectors verified raceway supports were located at points specified in approved instructions and maximum distances between supports were not exceeded. The inspectors also verified fittings and clamps were installed according to work procedures. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective actions for issues entered into the CAP to verify issues were identified, evaluated, and corrected.

The inspectors reviewed ITAAC Technical Report SV4-1100-ITR-800800, Revision 0 supporting documentation to determine, within the containment building, whether the licensees inspection results confirmed the separation between raceways that route Class 1E cables of different divisions, and between raceways that route Class 1E cables and raceways that route non-Class 1E cables met separation requirements; Class 1E electrical and communication cables associated with only one division, and the raceways that route these cables were identified by the appropriate color code; and Class 1E electrical and communication cables associated with only one division were routed in raceways assigned to the same division.

Unit 4 License Amendment 187, which was issued on November 22, 2022, authorized the consolidation of the containment electrical separation ITAACs into a single ITAAC.

The requirements of ITAAC 789, 792, 803, 806, and 809 have been consolidated in ITAAC 800.

b. Findings Introduction The inspectors identified an ITAAC finding, with five examples, of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated noncited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code 28

of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to maintain adequate physical separation between divisions of safety-related (SR) cables and between SR and nonsafety-related (NSR) cables as required by ITAAC 3.3.00.07d.ii.a and in accordance with electrical installation specification APP-G1-V8-001, AP1000 Electrical Installation Specification, Revision 12.

Description During cable separation inspections on June 14 and 15, 2023, the inspectors identified five cable separation nonconformances in the Unit 4 containment building, in which the separation between divisions of SR cable trays/conduits and SR conduits/NSR cables did not maintain required separation as specified in electrical installation specification APP-G1-V8-001, Appendix I, detailed as follows:

1) Division B safety related conduit SV4-1133-ER-BZC05 crossing over and approximately 1/2 inch from the top of Division D enclosed power cable tray SV4-1133-ER-DXT02AB. The B SR cables provide the arm signal for PMS to the fourth stage of the ADS squib valve and squib valve position indication for:

a. containment recirculation squib valve PXS-PLV118A;

b. IRWST injection squib valve PXS-PLV123A; and

c. the fourth stage ADS squib valve RCS-EJ-PLV004D.

The D 250 VDC power cabling provides power to:

a. RCS to RNS inner hot leg suction isolation valve SV4-RNS-EJ-PLV001;

b. RCS to RNS inner hot leg suction isolation valve SV4-RNS-EJ-PLV001B; and

c. RCS to RNS inner hot leg suction isolation valve SV4-RNS-EJ-PLV001A.

2) RCS hot leg narrow range temperature element SV4-RCS-EJ-132C conduit was within 5 feet of 1B RCP 6.9kV power cables, SV4-ER-NWT01D. The temperature element is one of the six RCS loop 1 hot leg temperature elements and provides a signal to PMS for a two-out-of-four logic for core makeup tank actuation on high hot leg temperature coincident with low steam generator level. The temperature element also provides input for the various PMS functions including Tavg calculation, overtemperature delta-T reactor trip, and overpower delta-T reactor trip.

3) The licensee performed an additional inspection of the NRC selected rooms and identified conduit SV4-1120-ER-AZC3 for Division A safety related instrumentation for 2A and 2B RCP bearing temperature element cables within three horizontal feet of 2A and 2B RCP 6.9 kV power cables in open cable trays SV4-1120-ER-NWT03A and SV4-1120-1120-ER-NWT04A. These temperature elements provide input signals to the PMS. These temperature signals provide a temperature indication and input to a high temperature alarm in the main control room. The signal is also an input into a two-out-of-four coincidence per pump that will trip all RCPs following a trip of the reactor.

4 & 5) The inspectors identified the 2A and 2B RCP bearing temperature elements SV4-RCS-JE-TE213B and SV4-RCS-JE-TE214B were less than five feet from their respective RCP power cables. These temperature elements provide input signals 29

to the PMS. These temperature signals provide a temperature indication and input to a high temperature alarm in the main control room. The signal is also an input into a two-out-of-four coincidence per pump that will trip all RCPs following a trip of the reactor.

The inspectors determined the electrical physical separation issues discussed above rendered the quality of the affected Class 1E SSCs unacceptable. The licensee initiated CRs 50177188, 50177227, 50177240, 50177297, and 50177336 to address these issues.

The licensee dispositioned the issues identified in 4 and 5 above through analysis as allowed by IEEE-384. The inspectors reviewed the analysis documented in E&DCR SV4-1120-GEF-000024, IEEE 384 Lesser Separation Distance for RCS-JE-TE213B/TE214B, Revision 0. The inspectors verified PMS protocols for temperature element signals that could be impacted by reduced spatial separation from medium voltage (6.9kV power cables) were conservative, and the functionality of the RCP bearing temperature elements would not be impacted.

Analysis Per the guidance in IMC 0613, Power Reactor Construction Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated November 4, 2020, the inspectors determined the licensees failure to maintain physical separation between two Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E and non-Class 1E cables, as stated in electrical specification APP-G1-V8-001, was a performance deficiency (PD) warranting a significance evaluation because it was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct and it was contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings.

Per the guidance in IMC 0613, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Construction Issues, dated November 4, 2020, the inspectors determined the PD was a finding of more than minor significance because it represented an adverse condition that rendered the quality of the Class 1E structures unacceptable and required substantive corrective action.

Specifically, it impacted the structures design function to maintain physical separation between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E and non-Class 1E cables. The inspectors also reviewed the Appendix E examples of minor issues and noted Example 1 described an as-built SSC that did not meet the applicable design or construction specification and the PD would not be of minor significance if the as-built SSC required substantial rework to meet the design or construction requirements.

This finding, with five examples, was associated with the Construction/Installation cornerstone of the Construction Reactor Safety strategic performance area. The inspectors assessed this finding using IMC 2519, Appendix A, AP1000 Significance Determination Process, dated October 26, 2020. This finding was not associated with a security program; it was not associated with an IMC 2504 operational/construction program; and it was not associated with a repetitive, NRC identified omission of a program critical attribute. The finding was Green because it was associated with Class 1E cable raceway system, which is assigned as an intermediate risk importance, and was assigned to Row 1 of the significance determination matrix, and for each of the five examples, if left uncorrected, the finding could reasonably be expected to impair the design function of only one train of a multi-train system. This violation was 30

determined to be an ITAAC finding because it impacted the acceptance criteria of ITAAC 3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800), which states physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables inside the containment.

The inspectors determined the proximate cause of the PD was indicative of present licensee performance and was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of Avoid Complacency [H.12], in the area of Human Performance in accordance with IMC 0613, Appendix F, Construction Cross- Cutting Areas and Aspects, dated November 4, 2020.

Enforcement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.

Appendix H of APP-G1-V8-001 AP1000 Electrical Installation Specification, Revision 12, requires 1-inch physical separation between divisions of SR cable trays, and requires 5-feet vertical separation and 3-feet horizontal separation between SR and NSR cables.

Contrary to the above, on or before June 14 and 15, 2023, the licensee failed to ensure activities affecting quality were accomplished in accordance with the instructions, procedures, or drawings. Specifically, the licensee failed to meet electrical separation requirements as documented in APP-G1-V8-001 AP1000 Electrical Installation Specification, Appendix H, for five cable separation configurations in Unit 4 containment rooms. Because this violation was not repetitive or willful, was of very low safety significance, and was entered into the licensees CAP, this violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 05200026/2023002-01, Failure to Maintain Cable Separation Requirements in Containment).

The licensee entered this issue into its CAP as CR 50177188, 50177227, 50177240, 50177297, and 50177336. Immediate corrective actions for this issue included rework to restore compliance with the separation requirements, and in two examples, the licensee conducted an analysis that supported the as-built configuration being left as-is with no impacts to applicable SSCs. Based on the review described above, the inspectors determined the licensee took acceptable corrective actions to address the ITAAC finding, and the nonconforming conditions were appropriately addressed such that the acceptance criteria of ITAAC 3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800) was no longer impacted. As a result of the licensees corrective actions to restore compliance, this ITAAC finding is opened and closed in this report.

1A23 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 3.3.00.07d.ii.b (801) / Family 09A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 3.3.00.07d.ii.b (801). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

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65001.09-02.01 - Physical Separation of Cables 65001.09-02.03 - Documentation 65001.09-02.04 - Problem Identification and Resolution 65001.A.02.02 - Installation Records Review The inspectors inspected cable pulls, terminations, and raceways in rooms located inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building. The rooms inspected include the following:

12101 - Division A battery room (Fire Area 1202 AF 04) 12204 - Division B battery room 2 (Fire Area 1201 AF 02) 12207 - Division B DC equipment room (Fire Area 1201 AF 02) 12306 - Valve/piping penetration room (Fire Area 1201 AF 05)12312 - Division C RCP trip switchgear room (Fire Area 1202 AF 03) 12423 - Reactor trip switchgear 1 (Fire Area 1243 AF 01) 12501 - Nuclear island VBS MCR Divisions A and C equipment room (Fire Area 1250 AF 01) 12207 - Division B DC equipment room (Fire Area 1201 AF 02) 12312 - Division C RCP trip switchgear room (Fire Area 1202 AF 03) 12201 - Division A DC equipment room (Fire Area 1202 AF 04) 12205 - Division D DC equipment room (Fire Area 1201 AF 03) 12301 - Division A I&C room (Fire Area 1202 AF 04) 12302 - Division C I&C room (Fire Area 1202 AF 03)

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the cable pulls, terminations, and raceways inside the rooms to verify separation between raceways that route Class 1E cables of different divisions, and between raceways that route Class 1E cables and raceways that route non-Class 1E cables. During the walkdown, the inspectors verified the raceways and cables were identified by the appropriate color code and the division cables were routed in their respective raceways. The inspectors also walked down cables installed in trays to verify cable fill design requirements were met, as applicable.

The inspectors reviewed applicable construction specifications, installation procedures, written instructions, drawings, work packages, and quality control inspection reports to verify raceways that route Class 1E cables were installed in accordance with design requirements. The inspectors reviewed work packages, test and inspection records, and cable pull tickets to confirm the non-Class 1E cables needed to meet the ITAAC requirements of Appendix C of the COL were installed at the time of ITAAC verification.

For the raceways installed in these rooms, the inspectors verified the size, material, and style were as specified in design documents and work procedures. The inspectors verified raceway supports were located at points specified in approved instructions and maximum distance between supports were not exceeded. The inspectors also verified fittings and clamps were installed according to work procedures. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective actions for issues entered into the CAP to verify issues were identified, evaluated, and corrected.

The inspectors reviewed ITAAC Technical Report SV4-1200-ITR-800801, Revision 0 and supporting documentation to determine, within the non-radiologically controlled area 32

of the auxiliary building, whether the licensees inspection results confirmed the separation between raceways that route Class 1E cables of different divisions, and between raceways that route Class 1E cables and raceways that route non-Class 1E cables met separation requirements; Class 1E electrical and communication cables associated with only one division, and the raceways that route these cables were identified by the appropriate color code; and Class 1E electrical and communication cables associated with only one division were routed in raceways assigned to the same division.

Unit 4 License Amendment 187, which was issued on November 22, 2022, authorized the consolidation of the electrical separation ITAACs for the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building into a single ITAAC. The requirements of ITAAC 790, 793, 804, 807, and 810 have been consolidated in ITAAC 801.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A24 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 3.3.00.16 (821) / Family 17A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 3.3.00.16 (821). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:

65001.17-02.13 - Secondary Power Supplies for Alarm Annunciation and Communication Equipment The inspectors reviewed acceptance testing documents to determine if the secondary security power supply equipment for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communication equipment met the requirements as specified in Table 3.3-6 of Unit 4 COL. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the Vogtle Unit 4 vital area to verify the secondary security power supply equipment for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communication equipment was located within a vital area in accordance with the site design specifications, Vogtle Unit 4 security plan, and the ITAAC.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

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1A25 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 3.3.00.17 (822) / Family 17A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 3.3.00.17 (822). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:

65001.17-02.05 - Protected Area Perimeter Intrusion Detection Systems 65001.17-02.11 - Vital Area Access Controls The inspectors reviewed the acceptance testing documents to determine if vital areas were locked and alarmed with active intrusion detection systems as specified in Table 3.3-6 of Appendix C of the Vogtle Unit 4 COL. The inspectors observed the alarm testing and reviewed the test records for the Vogtle Unit 4 vital area doors to verify vital areas were locked and alarmed with active intrusion detection systems and intrusion was detected and annunciated in both the central and secondary alarm stations in accordance with the manufacturers specifications, Vogtle Unit 4 security plan, and the ITAAC.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1A26 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 3.5.00.01.i (823) / Family 19A

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 3.5.00.01.i (823). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:

65001.19-02.02c-Completed Work/As-Built The inspectors reviewed as-built documentation of Unit 4 containment high range radiation monitor assembly (PXS-JE-RE163) to verify the panels that are located in the non-radiological portion of the auxiliary building have been qualified as seismic Category I components, and the detector which is located inside containment has been qualified as a seismic Category I component and for harsh environment conditions.

The inspectors also reviewed as-built documentation for the containment atmosphere gaseous and particulate radiation monitoring skid (PSS-JS-26/PSS-JE-027) which is located in the radiological portion of the auxiliary building to verify the skid has been qualified for its environment and as a seismic Category I component.

The inspectors reviewed the EQRRs for these components and conducted a walkdown to verify the as-built configuration, such as equipment make, model, serial number, location, and anchorage were bounded by the as-tested conditions in the equipment 34

qualification data package, as specified in Section 3.5 of Appendix C of the Vogtle Unit 4 COL.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

IMC 2504, Construction Inspection Program - Inspection of Construction and Operational Programs 1P01 Construction QA Criterion 16 35007-A16 - Appendix 16. Inspection of Criterion XVI - Corrective Action 35007-A16.04 - Inspection Requirements and Guidance 35007-A16.04.02 - Inspection of QA Program Implementation

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed a sample of two CRs that had been initiated in February 2023 for Vogtle Unit 4 associated with safety related electrical cable routing in the non-radiological portion of the auxiliary building.

The inspectors reviewed the CRs to verify issues related to cable routing and terminations in PMS equipment room 12305 (Division D) were properly identified, appropriately characterized, and dispositioned.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1P02 Construction QA Criterion 16 35007-A16.04.02 - Inspection of QA Program Implementation

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed one sample to assess implementation of the CAP associated with ITAAC 2.3.11.03b (454) and ITAAC 2.2.04.12a.iii (250) for failures of Flowserve PV44 valves. The inspectors reviewed CR 10968674, 3-HDS-V012B has a broken stem; CR 10958192, MFP C miniflow potential stem/actuator separation; CR 10963631, Stem broke/separated from Plug; CR 1095154, 3-HDS-V012B potential stem/disk separation; and corrective action record (CAR) 417576, Stem Broke/Separated from Plug. This CAR documented the causal analysis completed by the licensee to determine and prescribe corrective actions to address the chronic nonconformances of these valves. The inspectors reviewed the causes that were identified for the event to determine if the causes were consistent with the objective evidence and the extent of condition review. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the 35

corrective actions that were developed to address the causes to determine if the corrective actions were adequate to address the issue. The inspectors also reviewed the extent of condition to determine if any of the types of issues identified by the licensee affected ITAAC.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1P03 Construction QA Criterion 3 35007-A3 - Appendix 3. Inspection of Criterion III - Design Control

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a walkdown of the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building to evaluate the as-built condition of electrical raceway supports as well as to sample the structural assessment performed on these supports by the licensee. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed drawings, E&DCRs, engineering specifications, calculations, and CRs associated with electrical raceway supports located between elevations 66 feet - 6 inches and 100 feet of the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building. In addition, the inspectors performed field measurements of sampled raceway supports to verify the requirements from design basis were translated from structural calculations, engineering specifications, and construction drawings to the final as-built condition.

b. Findings Introduction The inspectors identified a construction finding of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to adequately implement measures to assure the design basis was correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions, which called into question the ability of support SV4-1222-SH-E804 to perform its safety related function.

Description During the week of January 30, 2023, the inspectors observed 4-inch diameter safety related rigid conduits SV4-1222-ER-BXC03 and SV4-1222-ER-BXC04 supported by seismic category I support SV4-1222-SH-E804 in Unit 4 room 12207. These conduits carry cables associated with safety related electrical equipment. Specifically, AP1000 Tag No. IDSB-SB-2A is a 125-volt 60 cell battery in IDS Division B and is part of the second battery bank in Division B, which is designated as the 72-hour battery bank. The second battery bank is used for those loads requiring power for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following an event of loss of all ac power sources concurrent with a design basis accident (DBA). The IDS provides reliable power for the safety related equipment required for the plant instrumentation, control, monitoring, and other vital functions needed for shutdown of the plant. In addition, the IDS provides power to the normal and emergency lighting in the main control room and at the remote shutdown workstation. IDSB-DB-2A supplies 36

inverter IDSB-DU-2, which supplies panel IDSB-EA-3. This panel supplies power to the post-accident monitoring instrumentation system (PAMS), which provides the capability to monitor plant variables and systems operating status during and following an accident. PAMS also includes those instruments provided to indicate system operating status and furnish information regarding the release of radioactive materials.

Support SV4-1222-SH-E804 is specified on drawing SV4-1222-ER-619 and consists of two Unistrut conduit clamps attached to a single Unistrut channel welded to a steel filler plate, which is, in turn, welded to another steel plate attached to a primary structural wall. The configuration at the support consists of a rigid conduit section supported approximately at its midpoint with flexible conduits attached to each cantilevered end of the rigid conduit section. Given the as-built teeter-totter configuration of the support, which could result in rotational forces at the support from seismic loads, the inspectors questioned the use of a single support for the rigid conduit section at this location.

The structural design of support SV4-1222-SH-E804 is documented in calculation APP-1220-SHC-301. However, the licensee determined, during development of responses to the inspectors questions, that the existing analysis did not adequately address the as-built configuration of the conduits and the associated support. As a result, the inspectors concluded the calculation did not adequately demonstrate support SV4-1222-SH-E804 would be able to withstand the design basis loads without loss of structural adequacy or any safety related functions.

The licensee initiated E&DCRs APP-1220-GEF-501, APP-1220-GEF-502, and APP-1220-GEF-503 to evaluate the as-built configuration and address the inspectors questions. In all the E&DCRs, the licensee completed both an initial calculation and an analysis using the GT STRUDL structural analysis and design software program and compared the results between the two methods.

The inspectors reviewed APP-GW-S1-006, Design Guide for Raceway Systems, Revision 4 and noted in Section 4 it is stated that the basic stress allowables for conduit supports utilizing light gage cold rolled channel type sections are based on the manufacturers published catalog values and the basic stress allowables for conduit supports utilizing structural shapes are in accordance with ANSI/AISC N-690. The inspectors further determined the basic stress allowables for Unistrut components are summarized in Annex C, Guidance for Structural Acceptance Criteria for Elastic Design Method, of calculation APP-SH25-S3C-002, AP1000 Seismic Category I Standard Conduit Supports. The inspectors also noted supports are evaluated in APP-SH25-S3C-002 to verify compliance with IEEE 628-2001 (R2006), IEEE Standard Criteria for the Design, Installation, and Qualification of Raceway Systems for Class 1E Circuits for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Similarly, E&DCR APP-1220-GEF-503 states seismic Category I raceway systems for Class 1E cables shall comply with IEEE 628.

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The inspectors reviewed manufacturers catalog information and E&DCRs APP-1220-GEF-501, APP-1220-GEF-502, and APP-1220-GEF-503. The inspectors determined adequate technical justification was not provided in the E&DCRs for some of the assumptions used to evaluate the as-built configuration of the conduits. Specifically, the dimensions of the conduit clamp, the seismic forces, and structural acceptance criteria appeared to be nonconservative and inconsistent with the manufacturers catalog information, design guide APP-GW-S1-006, calculations APP-1220-SHC-301 and APP-SH25-S3C-002, and IEEE 628.

In E&DCR APP-1220-GEF-503, which was the most current analysis and design of support SV4-1222-SH-E804, the licensee assumed the in-plane rotational forces at the support would be resisted by a force couple developed by shear in the conduit clamp bolts. The licensee also assumed the distance between the bolts to be equal from the end-to-end length of the conduit clamp. Based on the manufacturers catalog information, however, the bolts are located 11/16 of an inch from each end of the conduit clamp, which would decrease the distance between the bolts by approximately 20%.

Accounting for the reduction in distance between the bolts would lead to a corresponding increase in the in-plane rotational forces.

In E&DCR APP-1120-GEF-503, the licensee calculated the seismic forces using the equivalent static load method of analysis. This method is typically used for simple systems with a factor of 1.5 conservatively applied to the peak acceleration to account for multi-mode effects. The licensee assumed this method was appropriate for calculating the seismic forces without providing justification demonstrating it is applicable or conservative for this specific case. Given the teeter-totter configuration of the support, however, this method of accounting for seismic forces potentially underestimates the rotational forces due to seismic loads, which could control the design of the support.

Along these lines, the inspectors noted IEEE-628, Subclause 4.10.3, Structural Analysis, allows both dynamic and equivalent static load analysis for calculating the effects of dynamic loads on raceway systems, but also states the selection of the analysis method shall take into account the complexity of the system and the adequacy of the analytical technique to properly predict the response of the system while under dynamic excitation and other dynamic loads.

In many instances, the structural acceptance criteria assumed in E&DCR APP-1120-GEF-503 deviated from those provided in design guide APP-GW-S1-006, calculations APP-1220-SHC-301 and APP-SH25-S3C-002 and recommended in IEEE Standard 628.

Some examples are as follows:

1. In the interaction equations of E&DCR APP-1120-GEF-503, a limit of 1.6 is assumed for load combinations, which include earthquake loads. However, the allowable stresses for the P1000 Unistrut channel provided in APP-1220-SHC-301, Appendix A.2 and assumed in the E&DCR incorporate a factor of 1.6 to account for seismic loading. As a result, the appropriate limit for the interaction equations associated with the Unistrut channel should be 1.0.

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2. The allowable stresses provided for the P2558 conduit clamps in APP-SH25-S3C-002, Annex C are based on 50% of the average ultimate load capacity.

Accounting for the 1.6 limit, the allowable stresses assumed in E&DCR APP-1120-GEF-503, however, are approximately 28% higher.

3. The allowable stresses for the Unistrut bolting hardware provided in APP-SH25-S3C-002, Annex C, are 53% of the ultimate capacity of the fastener and include a 1.6 increase factor to account for seismic loads. However, the allowable stresses assumed in E&DCR APP-1120-GEF-503 are based on the full ultimate capacity of the fastener and are compared to a limit of 1.6 in the interaction equations. In effect, the allowable stresses assumed for the bolts in E&DCR APP-1120-GEF-503 exceed the ultimate capacities of the fasteners. As a result, the allowable stresses assumed for the bolts in E&DCR APP-1120-GEF-503 are nonconservative and do not comply with APP-GW-S1-006 since they exceed the manufacturers published values. Additionally, the allowable stresses assumed for the bolts in E&DCR APP-1120-GEF-503 are inconsistent with IEEE-628, which recommends in Annex C, Guidance for structural acceptance criteria for elastic design method, that the maximum allowable stresses should not exceed 0.9 time the yield strength of the material and the allowable load should be two-thirds of the ultimate load or a load corresponding to one-half of the displacement at the ultimate load, whichever is smaller.

The licensee did not provide adequate technical justification in E&DCR APP-1120-GEF-503 for these examples where the structural acceptance criteria used to evaluate the as-built configuration of support SV4-1222-SH-E804 deviated from those provided in design guide APP-GW-S1-006, calculations APP-1220-SHC-301 and APP-SH25-S3C-002 and recommended in IEEE 628. The inspectors also noted that the cumulative impacts from inconsistencies in the spacing of the bolts, the potential underestimation of the rotational forces on the support due to seismic loads, and inadequately justified deviations in the structural acceptance criteria could result in stress ratios exceeding the allowable limits.

As a result, the inspectors concluded that the ability of Support SV4-1222-SH-E804 to withstand the design basis loads without loss of structural integrity or any safety-related functions was indeterminate.

The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as CRs 50168340, 50171703, and 50174047 to evaluate the cause and to identify appropriate corrective actions.

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Analysis The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to have an analysis demonstrating that the as-built configuration of support SV4-1222-SH-E804 would meet design requirements was a PD and violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, warranting a significance evaluation.

Per the guidance in IMC 0613, Power Reactor Construction Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated November 4, 2020, the inspectors determined the PD was of more-than-minor safety significance, and therefore a finding because it represented an adverse condition that rendered the quality of an SSC unacceptable or indeterminate and required substantive corrective action. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 2519, Construction Significance Determination Process, Appendix A. The inspectors determined the finding was not associated with a security program, or an operational program listed in IMC 2504; however, it involved the requirements of a construction program listed in IMC 2504 (i.e., the Quality Assurance (QA) Construction Program, which requires compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B). The inspectors determined the finding could be associated with a system (IDS) but was not material to the acceptance criteria of a specific ITAAC. The inspectors determined the finding affected the Design/Engineering cornerstone and was a construction finding since it could not be associated with a specific ITAAC. The finding was associated with IDS, which is assigned as a high system risk importance, and was assigned to Row 1 of the significance determination matrix because, if left uncorrected, the finding could reasonably be expected to impair the design function of only one train of a multi-train system. As a result, the inspectors concluded the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).

The inspectors determined this finding was indicative of present licensee performance and was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of Design Margins, in the area of human performance in accordance with IMC 0613, appendix F Construction Cross-Cutting Areas and Aspects, dated November 4, 2020. The proximate cause of the PD was attributed to the failure to maintain equipment within design margins. [H.6]

Enforcement Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that the design basis is correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. These measures shall include provisions to assure that appropriate quality standards are specified and included in design documents and that deviations from such standards are controlled.

APP-GW-S1-006, AP1000 Design Guide for Raceway Systems, Section 4.0, states, in part, that the basic stress allowables for conduit supports utilizing light gage cold rolled channel type sections are based on the manufacturers published catalog values.

These allowable stresses are summarized in Annex C, Guidance for structural acceptance criteria for elastic design method, of calculation APP-SH25-S3C-002, AP1000 Seismic Category I Standard Conduit Supports. The design of conduit 40

conduit support SV4-1222-SH-E804 is documented in calculation APP-1220-SHC-301, Structural Analysis of Cable Conduit Supports in Auxiliary Building, Areas 1 and 2, El.

82-6.

Contrary to the above, on or before April 20, 2023, the licensee failed to adequately implement measures to assure that the design basis was correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions and to control deviations from quality standards. Specifically, the analysis and design of support SV4-1222-SH-E804 documented in calculation APP-1220-SHC-301 did not adequately account for the as-built configuration of the conduits attached to support SV4-1222-SH-E804. E&DCRs APP-1220-GEF-501, APP-1220-GEF-502, and APP-1220-GEF-503 completed to evaluate the as-built configuration used nonconservative dimensions for the conduit clamps and did not provide adequate technical justification for the revised assumptions used to determine the seismic loads and deviations from the structural acceptance criteria provided in design guide APP-GW-S1-006, calculations APP-1220-SHC-301 and APP-SH25-S3C-002, and recommended in IEEE Standard 628.

Because this violation was not repetitive or willful, was of very low safety significance, and was entered into the licensees CAP as CR 50177001, this violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 05200026/2023002-02, Failure to Adequately Implement Design Control Measurements Resulting in Lack of Technical Justification for Support SV4-1222-SH-E804). This construction finding is opened and closed in this report.

1P04 Construction QA Criterion 16 35007-A16.04 - Inspection Requirements and Guidance 35007-A16.04.01 - Inspection of QA Implementing Documents 35007-A16.04.02 - Inspection of QA Program Implementation

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed issues entered into the licensee's CAP daily to assess issues that might warrant additional follow-up inspection, to assess repetitive or long term issues, to assess adverse performance trends, and to ensure the CAP appropriately included regulatory required non-safety related SSCs. The inspectors periodically attended the licensee's CAP review meetings, held discussions with licensee and contractor personnel, and performed reviews of CAP activities during the conduct of other baseline inspection procedures. The inspectors reviewed conditions entered into the licensee's CAP to determine whether the issues were classified in accordance with the licensee's quality assurance program and CAP implementing procedures. The inspectors reviewed corrective actions associated with conditions entered into the CAP to determine whether appropriate actions to correct the issues were identified and implemented effectively, including immediate or short-term corrective actions, in accordance with the applicable quality assurance program requirements and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the corrective 41

taken to determine whether they were commensurate with the significance of the associated conditions in accordance with the licensee's CAP implementing procedures.

The inspectors completed reviews of CAP entry logs to verify issues from all aspects of the project, including equipment, human performance, and program issues, were being identified by the licensee and its contractors at an appropriate threshold and entered into the CAP as required by licensee's CAP implementing procedures.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

4. OTHER INSPECTION RESULTS 4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

.1 Exit Meeting.

On July 11, 2023, the inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. G.

Chick, VEGP Units 3 and 4 Executive Vice President, and other members of your staff.

Proprietary information was reviewed during the inspection period but was not included in the inspection report.

42

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensees and Contractor Personnel C. Castell, WEC Licensing Engineer N. Chapman, SNC Licensing Engineer K. Durrwachter, SNC Licensing Engineer W. Garrett, SNC Licensing Manager D. Kettering; SNC Engineering G. Koucheravy, Construction Project Director S. Leighty, SNC Licensing Manager B. Macioce, WEC Engineering J. Mackiewicz, SNC Electrical ITAAC Field Engineer T. Mattson, SNC PI/CAP Project Director K. Roberts, SNC ITAAC Manager G. Scott, SNC Licensing Engineer C. Smith, SNC Electrical ITAAC Project Manager S. Sorn, SNC Engineering S. Stimac, Unit 4 Plant Manager LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Item Number Type Status Description 05200026/2023002-01 NCV Open/Close Failure to Maintain Cable Separation Requirements in Containment 05200026/2023002-02 NCV Open/Close Failure to Adequately Implement Design Control Measurements Resulting in Lack of Technical Justification for Support SV4-1222-SH-E804 LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Section 1A01 Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) SV4-RCS-PLW-014, Reactor Coolant System Containment Building Room, Revision 1 WEC SV4-PV62-V2-100001, Pressurizer Safety Valve General Assembly, Revision 1 WEC SV4-PV62-V2-100002, Pressurizer Safety Valve General Assembly, Revision 1 SV4-PV62-VMM-001, Instructional Manual for Pressurizer Safety Valve, Revision 2 S&W Piping and Installation Data Sheet SV4-RCS-PLW-01K, Reactor Coolant System Containment Building Room 11603 Upper Tier ADS Piping to Relief Valve, Revision 0 S&W Piping and Installation Data Sheet SV4-RCS-PLW-01D, Reactor Coolant System Containment Building Room 11603 & 11703 Lower Tier ADS Piping to Relief Valve, Revision 1 S&W Piping and Installation Data Sheet SV4-RCS-PLW-01L, Reactor Coolant System Containment Building Room 11603 Lower Tier ADS Piping to Relief Valve, Revision 1 43

WEC Nonconformance and Disposition (N&D) Report, SV4-PV62-GNR-000001, N&D SV0-PV62-GNR-000001 Closed Before All Actions Complete (ESR 50126969), Revision 0 WEC N&D Report SV4-PV62-GNR-000004, Damaged Outlet Flange Stud on SV4-RCS-PL-V005A (ESR 50154298), Revision 0 S&W Work Package SV4-RCS-P0W-1051836, ASME Section III, Install Relief Valves SV4-RCS-PL-V005A & SV4-RCS-PL-V005B Upon Completion of Hydro and Flushing, Revision 0 Section 1A02 APP-SSAR-F5-001, AP1000 Safety Analysis Checklist, Revision 1 VEGP 3&4 UFSAR, Chapter 4, Reactor, Revision 10 Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 4 Cycle 1, Version 1, April 2021 2.1.03.13-U4-PRF, ITAAC 88 Core Design Principal Closure Document, Revision 0 NF-GP-23-038, from Westinghouse to Mr. Rob Szollosy, "SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNIT 4, Notification of Fabrication of Fuel and RCCAs," 5/18/2023 NF-GP-21-033, VEGP Unit 4 Cycle 1 Core Loading Plan, 6/23/2021 Section 1A03 Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) SV4-CNS-MUR-001, AP1000 Vogtle Unit 4 Section III System Code Data Report for the Containment System Penetration Assemblies (CNS),

Revision 0 WEC SV4-CNS-S3R-001, Vogtle Unit 4 Containment System Penetration Assemblies (CNS)

ASME Section III As-Built Design Report, Revision 0 WEC SV4-MV50-VQQ-004P1P36 Chicago Bridge and Iron Services Quality Assurance Record Package for the AP1000 Containment Vessel, Serial No. Vogtle Unit 4, Revision 1 Chicago Bridge & Iron Services Form N-1 Certificate Holders Data Report for Nuclear Vessels, as Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for the Vogtle Unit 4 Advanced Passive Light Water Reactor Containment Vessel (AP1000) for WEC, 05/12/2022 WEC "Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation or Shop Assembly of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, as Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for the Containment System (CNS) Penetration Assemblies Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV4-CNS-MUR-001 installed for the Southern Nuclear Operating Company, 04/19/2023 WEC SV4-MV50-S3R-100, Vogtle Unit 4 Containment Vessel ASME Section III As-Built Design Report, Revision 0 PCI Energy Services SV0-RCS-VQQ-800062, Vogtle Unit 4 AP1000 Electrical Penetration Assembly Retaining Ring Fabrication and Installation for Containment Penetrations E01-E03, E06, E07, and E09-E32, Revision 0 PCI Energy Services SV4-RCS-VQQ-800074, Vogtle Unit 4 AP1000 Fuel Transfer Tube Assembly Penetration 11 Installation (SV4-CNS-MJR-002), Revision 1 Stone & Webster (S&W) "Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation or Shop Assembly of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, as Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for the Containment System (CNS) Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV4-CNS-MJR-001 installed for WEC, 04/14/2023 PCI Energy Services, Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation or Shop Assembly of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, as Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for the (CNS) Fuel Transfer Tube Assembly Penetration 11 Installation Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV4-CNS-MJR-002 installed for S&W 012/30/2021 44

PCI Energy Services, Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation or Shop Assembly of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, as Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1," for the (CNS) Fuel Transfer Tube Assembly Penetration 11 Installation Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV4-CNS-MJR-003-1 installed for S&W 11/04/2022 S&W Work Package (WP) SV4-CNS-THW-1138153, ASME III- CNS Pneumatic Tests SV4-CNS-TH-P9001A-P90015A For Penetrations SV4-CNS-ML-E01/E02/E03/E06/E07/E09/E11/E12/E13/E14/E15/E16/E17/E18, Revision 0 S&W WP SV4-CNS-THW-1138156, ASME III- CNS Pneumatic Tests SV4-CNS-TH-P90016A-P90029A For Penetrations SV4-CNS-ML-E19 Through E32, Revision 0 S&W WP SV4-VUS-THW-1128839, ASME III - Perform Pneumatic Test SV4-VUS-TH-P9002A, SV4-VUS-TH-P9003A, SV4-VUS-TH-P9004A, SV4-VUS-TH-P9005A, Revision 0; WEC SV4-CNS-VQQ-001, Vogtle Unit 4 ASME Section III Certificate of Conformance for Containment Penetration Assemblies (CNS) Welds, Revision 1 S&W WP SV4-FT01-THW-1174934, ASME III - Perform Hydrostatic Test of Fuel Transfer Tube Caps in Accordance With E&DCR SV4-FT01-GEF-000002, Revision 0; S&W WP SV4-FHS-THW-1098548, ASME III- FHS Hydrotest SV4-FHS-TH-H9001A, Perform Fuel Transfer Tube SV4-FHS-FT-01 Pressure Test, Revision 0 WEC Report No. SV4-IWE-23-012, IWE Class MC Containment Components Visual Examination Data Sheet for SV4-CV-03-Course S10 - Carbon Steel with IOZ Coating, 2/1/2023 WEC Report No. SV4-IWE-23-223, IWE Class MC Containment Components Visual Examination Data Sheet for SV4-P20 - Carbon Steel with IOZ Coating, 5/03/2023 WEC Report No. SV4-IWE-23-019, IWE Class MC Containment Components Visual Examination Data Sheet for SV4-CV-06-Course S5 - Carbon Steel with IOZ Coating, 3/9/2023 Section 1A04 2.2.01.05.i-U4-EQRR-PCD001, Containment System EQ Reconciliation Report, Revision 0 2.2.01.05.i-U4-EQRR-PCD002, Containment System EQ Reconciliation Report, Revision 0 2.2.01.05.i-U4-EQRR-PCD003, Containment System EQ Reconciliation Report, Revision 0 2.2.01.05.i-U4-EQRR-PCD004, Containment System EQ Reconciliation Report, Revision 0 SV4-PV02-VBR-016, Equipment Qualification Data Package for Samshin Limited Nozzle Check Valves for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 0 SV4-PV16-VBR-002, Equipment Qualification Data Package for Auxiliary Relief Valves for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 1 SV4-PV14-VBR-002, Equipment Qualification Data Package for Fisher HPNS Control Valves for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 2 SV4-PV11-VBR-004, Equipment Qualification Data Package for Air-Operated TRICENTRIC Butterfly Valves for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 2 SV4-PV10-VBR-006, Equipment Qualification Data Package for Air-Operated Plug Valves for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 1 SV4-EY01-VBR-004, Equipment Qualification Data Package for Low Voltage Power, Control, and I&C Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPAs) for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 3 Engineering and Design Coordination Report (E&DCR) SV0-FSAR-GEF-003, Implementation of AP1000 Electrical Penetration Assembly Retaining Ring for Vogtle 3 and 4 (NL-1421),

Revision 0 E&DCR SV0-CNS-GEF-001, Modification to Containment Vessel Electrical Penetrations (ESR 50051794), Revision 0 Nonconformance and Disposition Report (N&D) SV4-PV00-GNR-000001, ESR 50137791 -

ASCO Solenoid Valves - Unsupported Flex Length, Revision 0 45

N&D SV0-PV00-GNR-000001, Safety-Related Valve Cable (Pigtail) Traceability (ESR 50086742), Revision 0 N&D SV0-PV00-GNR-000003, Acceptability of ASCO Solenoid Valves Qualified to ATR-35115, Rev. D (ESR 50106156), Revision 0 N&D SV4-CNS-GNR-000007, Arc Strikes on Upper Personnel Airlock (ESR 50158093),

Revision 0 N&D SV4-CNS-GNR-000008, Vogtle Unit 4- U4 Personnel Arc Strike Removal (ESR 50164942), Revision 0 N&D SV4-MV50-GNR-000005, SV4-SGS-PY-C03B(P28) Guard Pipe Damage (ESR 50117703), Revision 0 Design Report SV4-MV50-S3R-100A, Vogtle Unit 4 Containment Vessel ASME Section III As-Built Design Report Addendum 01, Revision 0, 5/25/2023 Condition Report (CR) 50106159, Follow-up on ESR 50041852, Manual Update, 9/2/2021 PCI NCR-919841-002, CV Personnel Air Lock Arc Strikes/Vogtle Unit 4, 1/4/2023 PCI Liquid Penetrant Examination Report NDE-919841-004, Containment Vessel Personnel Air Lock Outer Shell H3, Arc Strike# 1, 1/3/2023 PCI Ultrasound Calibration/Technique Record NDE-919841-005, Containment Vessel Personnel Air Lock Outer Shell H4, Arc Strike# 1, 1/3/2023 CR 50176454, 4-CNS-ITPP-502 missed procedure opportunity, 5/31/2023 E&DCR APP-PV10-GEF-028, PV10-Z0D-100 Stem orientation rotation (ESR 50067690),

Revision 0 E&DCR APP-PV10-GEF-031, Drawing Gasket Dimensions Revision, Revision 0 E&DCR APP-PV03-GEF-058, Incorporation of Revised Application Reports into PV03 Nozzle Check Valve EQ Documentation, Revision 0 E&DCR APP-GW-GEF-1628, Implementation of Updated Zone 1 Abnormal Group 1 Pressure per AGW-GEE-5226, Revision 0 E&DCR APP-FSAR-GEF-035, Updating EQ Accident Temperatures for Rooms 12156 and 12244, Revision 0 E&DCR APP-PV14-GEF-850004, PV14 Valve Packages - Effects of Carbon Steel on TopWorx Switches (ESR 50066427), Revision 0 E&DCR APP-PV02-GEF-063, Updates to PV03 Equipment Qualification Documents to Address Outstanding Design Change Proposals, Revision 0 SV4-PV02-VMM-001, PV02 2 & Smaller Manually Operated Globe and Check Valves Installation, Operating and Maintenance Manual, Revision 5 Work Package (WP) SV4-SFS-P0W-1133786, ASME III - Install SFS Relief Valve SV4-SFS-PL-V067 After Completing of Testing and Flushing, Revision 0 WP SV4-VFS-P0W-1014299, Install ASME III LB Pipe & Supports Per ISO SV4-VFS-PLW-045/SV4-VFS-PLW-043, Revision 0 WP SV4-VWS-PVW-1150183, ASME III - Remove and Install Valve SV4-VWS-PL-V080 To Support Testing, Revision 0 WP SV4-SFS-P0W-1107341, ASME III, Remove/Reinstall SFS Valves SV4-SFS-PL-V032, V039, & V067 To Support Hydro Test, Replace Gasket for Valve SV4-SFS-PL-V035 Reference CR 50075679, Revision 1 WP SV4-P11Z-EYW-1124275, U4 NI - Perform Feedthrough Conductor Electrical Testing and Label Verification For EPA SV4-IDSA-EY-P11Z, Revision 0 WP SV4-CNS-MLW-1007362, ASME III - Fabrication/Installation of Electrical Containment Vessel Penetrations SV4-CNS-ML-E01, E02, & E03, Revision 0 WP SV4-CNS-MLW-1007359, ASME III - Fabrication/Installation of Electrical Containment Vessel Penetrations SV4-CNS-ML-E11, E12, E13, Revision 0 WP SV4-CNS-MLW-1007368, ASME III - Fabrication/Installation of Electrical Containment Vessel Penetrations SV4-CNS-ML-E14, E15, E16, E27, & E28, Revision 0 46

WP SV4-CNS-MLW-1007369, ASME - Fabrication/Installation of Electrical Containment Vessel Penetrations SV4-CNS-ML-E29, E30, E31, & E32, Revision 0 WP SV4-EY-EYW-800003, EPA32 SV4-IDSB-EY-P32Y Installation - Electrical Scope, Revision 0 WP SV4-EY-EYW-800027, Installation of EPA SV4-ECS-EY-P01X, Revision 0 WP SV4-EY-EYW-800028, EPA03 SV4-ECS-EY-P03Z Installation - Electrical Scope, Revision 0 SV4-EY01-E0R-132, Electrical Penetration Assembly SV4-IDSB-EY-P32Y - Weight Calculation Report, Revision 1 SV4-EY01-EYW-1175288, U4 Aux- Remove EPA Covers, Reinspect Cables, and Reinstall EPA Covers for All EPAs ORC, Revision 0 SV4-EY01-E0R-132, Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA) SV4-IDSB-EY-P32Y-Weight Calculation Report, Revision 1 SV4-EY01-E0R-111, Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA) SV4-IDSA-EY-P11Z-Weight Calculation Report, Revision 1 SV4-EY01-E0R-115, Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA) SV4-IDSD-EY-P15Y-Weight Calculation Report, Revision 2 Section 1A05 ND-RA-001-008-F01, ITAAC Principal Closure Document Review Form, Version 9.0 SV4-CNS-Z0R-001, Unit 4 Containment Electrical Penetration Assembly ITAAC 109 As-Built Analysis Report, Revision 0 APP-IDS-E0C-014, Verification of IDS Low-Voltage Class 1E Safety Related Electrical Penetration Assemblies, Revision 4 Closure Package (ITAAC 109), 2.2.01.08-U4-CP, Revision 0 Section 1A06 2.2.02.02a-U4-PRF-Rev 0, ITAAC Principal Closure Document Review Form, for ITAAC 2.2.02.02a, NRC Index # 120, Unit 4, 3/31/23 SV4-PCS-S3R-001, Vogtle Unit 4 Passive Containment Cooling System ASME Section III As-Built Piping System Design Report, Revision 0 SV4-PCS-MUR-001, AP1000 Vogtle Unit 4 ASME Section III System Code Data Report for the Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS), 3/31/23 SV4-GW-GEI-100, AP1000 Preservice Inspection Program Plan for Vogtle Unit 4, Revision 2 APP-PCS-M6-001, Piping & Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) Passive Containment Cooling System Class 3, Revision 12 APP-PCS-M6-002, Piping & Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) Passive Containment Cooling System Class 3, Revision 14 APP-PCS-M6-003, Piping & Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) Passive Containment Cooling System Class 4, Revision 10 Stone & Webster (S&W) Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation or Shop Assembly of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1, for Passive Containment Cooling System by Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV4-PCS-MJR-001, 3/30/23 S&W Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation or Shop Assembly of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1, for Passive Containment Cooling System by Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV4-PCS-MJR-002, 7/27/22 S&W Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation or Shop Assembly of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions 47

of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1, for Passive Containment Cooling System by Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV4-PCS-MJR-003, 9/15/22 S&W Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation or Shop Assembly of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1, for Passive Containment Cooling System by Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV4-PCS-MJR-004, 3/16/23 S&W Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation or Shop Assembly of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1, for Passive Containment Cooling System by Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV4-PCS-MJR-005, 3/29/23 S&W Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation or Shop Assembly of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1, for Passive Containment Cooling System by Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV4-PCS-MJR-006, 2/2/23 S&W Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation or Shop Assembly of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1, for Passive Containment Cooling System by Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV4-PCS-MJR-007, 2/1/23 S&W Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation or Shop Assembly of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1, for Passive Containment Cooling System by Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV4-PCS-MJR-008, 1/31/23 S&W Form N-5 Certificate Holder's Data Report for Installation or Shop Assembly of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Parts, Supports, and Appurtenances, As Required by the Provisions of the ASME Code,Section III, Division 1, for Passive Containment Cooling System by Certificate Holder's Serial No. SV4-PCS-MJR-099, 3/29/23 Section 1A07 2.2.02.05a.i-U4-EQRR-PCD001, Passive Containment Cooling System EQ Reconciliation Report, Revision 0 2.2.02.05a.i-U4-EQRR-PCD002, Passive Containment Cooling System EQ Reconciliation Report, Revision 0 2.2.02.05a.i-U4-EQRR-PCD003, Passive Containment Cooling System EQ Reconciliation Report, Revision 0 SV4-PV11-VBR-003, Equipment Qualification Summary Report for Air-Operated Tricentric Butterfly Valves for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 2 SV4-PV11-VBR-004, Equipment Qualification Data Package for Air-Operated Tricentric Butterfly Valves for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 2 SV4-JE52-VBR-005, Equipment Qualification Summary Report for NLI Differential Transmitters for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 1 SV4-JE52-VBR-006, Equipment Qualification Data Package for NLI Differential Transmitters for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 1 SV4-GW-VBR-006, Equipment Qualification Summary Report for TopWorx DXN Position Indication Switch for Use In the AP1000 Plant, Revision 0 SV4-GW-VBR-007, Equipment Qualification Data Package for TopWorx DXN Position Indication Switch for Use In the AP1000 Plant, Revision 0 SV4-GW-VPR-014, Environment Qualification Summary Report for EGS Generation 3 QDC Connectors for use in AP1000 Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 0 EQ Verification Checklist for Valve Actuator Tag No. PCS-PL-V001B EQ Verification Checklist for Solenoid AOV Butterfly Valve Tag No. PCS-PL-V001B EQ Verification Checklist for Valve Proximity Switch Tag No. PCS-PL-V001B 48

EQ Verification Checklist for Transmitter Harsh Cable for Tag No. PCS-JE-PT008 SV4-PCS-PLW-010, Passive Containment Cooling System Auxiliary Building RMS 12541/12701 Supply Line B To Distribution Bucket, Revision 0 SV4-PCS-PLW-01C, PCS Auxiliary Building Rm 12701 Supply Line to Distribution Bucket, Revision 0 SV4-PCS-PLK-802, PCS Containment Building 11400 Sensor to Transmitter PT007 & PT014, Revision 0 SV4-PCS-PLK-805, PCS Auxiliary Building Room 12341 Sensor to Transmitter PT008, Revision 0 SV4-PCS-JTW-104, PCS Auxiliary Building 12701 Instrumentation Line for LT010, Revision 1 Section 1A08 Report Number SV4-PCS-ITR-801138, Unit 4 Passive Containment Cooling (PCS) Inspection

- Coatings: ITAAC 2.2.02.07b.i, Item 7.b.ii) and iii) NRC Number 138, Revision 0 FD Thomas (FDT) Process Control Record (PCR) SV4-AX01-VXQ-811996, Prep and Coat affected areas of interior containment vessel 11500 and above, Revision 0 FDT PCR SV4-AX01-VXQ-812011, Prep and Coat affected areas of interior area 4 above stiffener ring to HVAC - TAC# FDT-SR-00047-026, Revision 0 FDT PCR SV4-AX01-VXQ-802273, Prep and Coat Carbon Steel Unit 4 for containment vessel top head (interior), Revision 0 FDT PCR SV4-AX01-VXQ-811999, Prep and Coat affected areas of interior containment vessel 11700, Revision 0 FDT PCR SV4-AX01-VXQ-800631, Prep and Coat/Touch-up affected areas from component installation - Unit 4 Interior Containment Vessel - Coating Task Authorization SV4-1000-SXY-851229, Revision 0 FDT PCR SV4-AX01-VXQ-800632, Prep and Coat Unit 4 Containment Vessel Middle Ring SPL-25 & 26 - Coating Task Authorization SV4-1000-SXY-851229, Revision 1 William Specialty Services (WSS) PCR SV4-AX01-VXQ-800633, Prep and Coat Unit 4 Containment Vessel Middle Ring - ITR 3090-331-001, Revision 0 WSS PCR SV4-AX01-VXQ-812056, Prep and Repair coatings above upper hatch and Personnel Air Lock to Baffles - TAC# FDT-SR-0046-009, Revision 0 FDT PCR SV4-AX01-VXQ-801829, Prep and Coat affected areas of exterior containment vessel Inorganic Zinc, Revision 0 FDT PCR SV4-AX01-VXQ-812018, Prep and Coat exterior vessel Personnel Air Lock - TAC#

FDT-SR-01272-001," Revision 0 FDT PCR SV4-AX01-VXQ-812019, Prep and Coat exterior vessel lower Personnel Air Lock -

TAC# FDT-SR-01272-002," Revision 0 FDT PCR SV4-AX01-VXQ-812056, Prep and Repair coatings on lift 1 exterior vessel - TAC#

FDT-SR-00046-007, Revision 0 Section 1A09 SV4-PXS-ITR-800158, "Unit 4 PXS Functional Arrangement Inspection: ITAAC 2.2.03.01 NRC Index Number 158," Revision 0 SV4-PXS-M6-001, "Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Passive Core Cooling System,"

Revision 8 SV4-PXS-M6-002, "Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Passive Core Cooling System,"

Revision 14 SV4-PXS-M6K-FA001, "SV4-PXS-M6-001 PXS ITAAC Functional Arrangement Sketch,"

Revision 0 SV4-PXS-M6K-FA002, "SV4-PXS-M6-002 PXS ITAAC Functional Arrangement Sketch,"

Revision 0 49

AP1000 Tier 1 Document, Section 2.2.3, "Passive Core Cooling System," Revision 19 VEGP 3&4 UFSAR, Section 6.3, "Passive Core Cooling System," Revision 10 Section 1A10 NCSP 03-77, "Construction Pressure Testing," Revision 8 WP SV4-PXS-P0W-1118131, ASME III - Remove/Reinstall Check Valve SV4-PXS-PL-V043 to Support Hydro Test # SV4-PXS-TH-H013A, Revision 0 WP SV4-PXS-THW-1043725, ASME III - PXS Hydrotest SV4-PXS-TH-H9001A for ISO(s)

SV4-PXS-PLW-01K/01L/01M/01V/01W/05A/010/011/050/053/66G/66Q/205/206/255/256/325/326/335/336/500/

501/510/511/512, Revision 0 WP SV4-PXS-THW-1043729, ASME III - PXS Hydrotest SV4-PXS-TH-H9003A for ISO(s)

SV4-PXS-PLW-01E/013/014/66G/66P/640/680/700/730/731.750/760/761/820, Revision 0 WP SV4-PXS-THW-1043731, ASME III - PXS Hydrotest SV4-PXS-TH-9017A for ISO(s) SV4-PXS-PLW-02P/02Q/02T/02V/02Y/020/021/060/063/66M/207/208/327/328/520/521/522/530/531/705/706/7 35/736, Revision 0 WP SV4-PXS-THW-1043734, ASME III - PXS Hydrotest SV4-PXS-TH-H9018A for ISO(s)

SV4-PXS-PLW-02F/023/024/66Z/620/670/690/720/721/740/770/821/907, Revision 0 WP SV4-PXS-THW-1043742, ASME III - PXS Hydrotest SV4-PXS-TH-H90013A for ISO(s)

SV4-PXS-PLW810/900, Revision 0 WP SV4-PXS-THW-1043750, ASME III - PXS Hydrotest SV4-PXS-TH-H9016A for ISO(s)

SV4-PXS-PLW-01B, Revision 0 WP SV4-PXS-THW-1115880, PXS-Hydrotest SV4-PXS-TH-H9015A for ISO(s) SV4-PXS-PLW-01S/01T/02N/02U/02X/015/016/017/46A/46B/283/285/286/410/411/430/431/440/441/450/451/4 60/461, Revision 0 WP SV4-PXS-THW-1115881, ASME III - PXS Hydrotest SV4-PXS-TH-H9019A/H9020A/H9021A/H9022A For ISO(s) SV4-PXS-JTW-205/206/207/208/255/256/325/326/328/335/336/705/706/735 & SV4-PXS-PLW-205/206/07/208/255/256/325/326/328/335/336/510/512/520/521/705/720/73-/735/736/760/770, Revision 0 WP SV4-PXS-THW-1115883, ASME III - PXS Hydrotest SV4-PXS-TH-H9026A for ISO(s)

SV4-PXS-PLW-02A, Revision 0 WP SV4-PXS-THW-1120763, ASME III - PXS Hydrotest SV4-PXS-TH-H9027A/H9028A/H9029A for ISO(s) SV4-PXS-JTW-77B/79B/79A & SV4-PXS-PLW-796/791, Revision 0 WP SV4-PXS-THW-1120765, ASME III - Perform PXS Hydrotest SV4-PXS-TH-H9030A/31A/33A, Revision 0 WP SV4-PXS-THW-1152145, ASME III - Perform PXS Hydrotest SV4-PXS-TH-H9101A, Revision 0 WP SV4-PXS-THW-1162451, ASME III - Perform PXS Hydrotest After Replacing Tubing SV4-PXS-JTW-1 IAW N&D SV4-PXS-GNR-000278, Revision 0 WP SV4-PXS-THW-1170546, ASME III - Perform Hydrotest SV4-PXS-TH-H9117A for Weld #

1 on ISO SV4-PXS-PLW-02P, Revision 0 WP SV4-PXS-THW-1171939, ASME III - Perform Hydrotest SV4-PXS-TH-H9035A on ISO SV4-PXS-PLW-530 After Repairs Complete, Revision 0 WP SV4-PXS-THW-1173317, ASME III - Perform Hydrotest For Piping SIO SV4-PXS-PLW-053 After Repairs Complete In Accordance With N&D SV4-PXS-GNR-000344, Revision 0 WP SV4-PXS-THW-1175420, ASME III - Perform Hydrotest SV4-PXS-TH-H9135A on ISO SV4-PXS-PLW-530 After Repairs Complete Reference Unsat IR M335-23-10988, Revision 0 50

Section 1A11 APP-MN02-Z0-001, "Mechanical Equipment and Piping Insulation Design Specification,"

Revision 5 APP-RCS-M6X-004, "RCS Pipe Line Designation Table," Revision 2 APP-RNS-M6X-004, "RNS Pipe Line Designation Table," Revision 2 APP-CVS-M6X-004, "CVS Pipe Line Designation Table," Revision 2 APP-PXS-M6X-004, "PXS Pipe Line Designation Table," Revision 1 AP1000 Design Control Document, Tier 2 Material, Chapter 6, "Engineered Safety Features,"

Section 6.3, "Passive Core Cooling System," Revision 19 SV4-PXS-ITR-800194, "Unit 4 PXS Insulation: ITAAC 2.2.03.0Bc.ix NRC Index Number 194,"

Revision 0 Section 1A12 SV4-PXS-M6K-900192, "PXS ITAAC 192 Cont. Recirc. Screens ITAAC Inspections/Field Measurements," Revision 0 2.2.03.08c.vii-U3-CP, "ITAAC Completion Package," Revision 0 Survey SWR 1299968, 5/25/2023 APP-GW-GLN-147, AP1000 Containment Recirculation and IRWST Screen Design, Revision 3

APP-MY03-Z0-001, Design Specification for IRWST & Containment Recirculation Screens for Passive Core Cooling System - Safety Related, Revision 6 VEGP 3&4 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Section 6.3.2.2.7, "IRWST and Containment Recirculation Screens," Revision 11.2 Westinghouse Drawing APP-MY03-V2-001 (SV4-MY03-V2-001), Containment Recirculation Screen Envelope Drawing, Revision 0 Westinghouse Drawing APP-MY03-V2-015 (SV4-MY03-V2-015), Containment Recirculation Screen Cartridge Envelope Drawing, Revision 0 Section 1A13 2.2.03.08c.viii-U4-CP, "ITAAC Completion Package," Revision 0 SV4-MY03-VDR-002, ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.viii Verification Report, Revision 0 SV4-PXS-FSK-900193, "PXS ITAAC 193 Containment Recirc. Screens & Weir Inspections/Field Measurements, Revision 0 SV4-PXS-FSK-901193, "Unit 4 PXS ITAAC 193 IRWST Recirc. Screens ITAAC Inspections/Feld Measurements," Revision 0 SVO-PXS-ITR-800193, "Units 3&4 Frontal Face Area Inspection: ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.viii NRC Index 193," Revision 0 Survey SWR 1299968 Survey SWR 1291439 APP-GW-GLN-147, AP1000 Containment Recirculation and IRWST Screen Design, Revision 3

APP-MY03-VDR-002, ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.viii Verification Report, Revision 0 APP-MY03-Z0-001, Design Specification for IRWST & Containment Recirculation Screens for Passive Core Cooling System - Safety Related, Revision 6 APP-GW-GLN-147, AP1000 Containment Recirculation and IRWST Screen Design, Revision 3

APP-MY03-V2R-015, Containment Recirculation Screen Cartridge Inspection Record, Revision 0 APP-MY03-V2R-110, IRWST Screens (APP-PXS-MY-Y01A/Y01B/Y01C) Cartridge Inspection Record, Revision 0 51

APP-MY03-Z0-001, Design Specification for IRWST & Containment Recirculation Screens for Passive Core Cooling System - Safety Related, Revision 6 Westinghouse Drawing APP-MY03-V2-100 (SV4-MY03-V2-100), IRWST Screen (APP-PXS-MY-Y01A) Envelope Drawing, Revision 0 Westinghouse Drawing APP-MY03-V2-130 (SV4-MY03-V2-130), IRWST Screen (APP-PXS-MY-Y01B) Envelope Drawing, Revision 0 Westinghouse Drawing APP-MY03-V2-135 (SV4-MY03-V2-135), IRWST Screen (APP-PXS-MY-Y01C) Envelope Drawing, Revision 0 Westinghouse Drawing APP-MY03-V2-110 (SV4-MY03-V2-110), IRWST Screens (APP-PXS-MY-Y01A/Y01B/Y01C) Cartridge Envelope Drawing, Revision 0 Westinghouse Drawing APP-MY03-V2-001 (SV4-MY03-V2-001), Containment Recirculation Screen Envelope Drawing, Revision 0 Westinghouse Drawing APP-MY03-V2-015 (SV4-MY03-V2-015), Containment Recirculation Screen Cartridge Envelope Drawing, Revision 0 Section 1A14 2.2.03.08c.viii-U4-CP, "ITAAC Completion Package," Revision 0 SV4-MY03-VDR-002, ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.viii Verification Report, Revision 0 SV4-PXS-FSK-900193, "PXS ITAAC 193 Containment Recirc. Screens & Weir Inspections/Field Measurements, Revision 0 SV4-PXS-FSK-901193, "Unit 4 PXS ITAAC 193 IRWST Recirc. Screens ITAAC Inspections/Feld Measurements," Revision 0 SVO-PXS-ITR-800193, "Units 3&4 Frontal Face Area Inspection: ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.viii NRC Index 193," Revision 0 Survey SWR 1299968 Survey SWR 1291439 APP-GW-GLN-147, AP1000 Containment Recirculation and IRWST Screen Design, Revision 3

APP-MY03-VDR-002, ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.viii Verification Report, Revision 0 APP-MY03-Z0-001, Design Specification for IRWST & Containment Recirculation Screens for Passive Core Cooling System - Safety Related, Revision 6 Section 1A15 SV4-GW-ITR-001, QADP Inspection Report Summary, Revision 1 SV4-PXS-ITR-801195, Unit 4 On-Site Coating Inspection in Containment, Revision 0 SV4-PXS-ITR-803195, Caulking Inspection Report, Unit 4 - PXS Non-Safety-Related Caulking and Coatings, Revision 0 SV4-1100-ITR-804195, Tag and Sign Inspection Report, Unit 4- PXS Non-Safety-Related Caulking and Coatings, Revision 0 SV4-PXS-ITR-805195, Unit 4 Ventilation Filter and Fire Barrier Inspection Report, Revision 0 SV4-AX01-GEC-80001, Unqualified Coatings Log for Unit 4, Revision 1 Condition Report (CR) 50175623, SV4-MHS-MH-09 Coatings Unit 4 Section 1A16 2.5.02.02.i-U4-EQRR-PCD001 Protective and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) EQ Reconciliation Report, Revision 0 CR 50175685, NRC Identified: PMS cabinet tie internal exceeding 12-inches" CR 50175705, NRC identified: PMS cabinet grounding Technical Evaluation (TE) 60049288, Perform ITAAC Maintenance screen - ITAAC 522 regarding CR 50175685 52

E&DCR No. SV4-PMS-GEF-000001 U4 Aux PMS Switchgear Anchor Material Substitution (ESR 50083892)

APP-JC01-V8-003 AP1000 Main Control Area OCS installation Consoles and Panels, Revision 3 APP-JC01-V8-005 AP1000 Main Control Area OCS Installation Consoles and Panels, Revision 3 APP-JC01-V8-016 AP1000 Emergency Escape Hallway OCS Installation MCR/RSR Transfer Panel, Revision 3 APP-PMS-JD-001 AP1000 Standard PMS Pentair Cabinet Outline and Installation Drawing Package, Revision 3 APP-PMS-J0M-003 AP1000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System - Technical Manual, Revision 4 APP-PMS-J4-020 AP1000 System Design Specification for the Protection and Safety Monitoring System, Revision 19 ND-RA-001-014, Equipment Qualification Walkdown ITAAC Guideline, Version 3.1 ND-RA-001-016, Equipment Qualification ITAAC As-Built Installation Documentation Guideline, Version 1.0 N&D No.: SV4-1232-GNR-000016, Conduits to SV4-OCS-JW-001 Not Installed per Design Drawing (ESR 50134052), Revision 0 SV4-OCS-VBR-006, Equipment Qualification Summary for PDSP, SDSP, and RO Consoles Line-up for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 3 SV4-OCS-VBR-008, Equipment Qualification Data Package for PDSP, SDSP, and RO Consoles Line-up for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 3 SV4-PMS-VBR-002, Equipment Qualification Data Package for PMS Cabinets and NIS Auxiliary Panels for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 3 SV4-PMS-VBR-003, Equipment Qualification Summary Report for PMS Cabinets and NIS Auxiliary Panels for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 2 SV4-JW03-VBR-001, Equipment Qualification Summary for the Main Control Room/Remote Shutdown Room Transfer Panel for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 2 SV4-JW03-VBR-002, Equipment Qualification Data Package for the Main Control Room/Remote Shutdown Room Transfer Panel, Revision 2 SV4-JW03-VPR-002, Environmental and Seismic Test Report for the AP1000 Main Control Room/Remote Shutdown Room Transfer Panel, Revision 0 Work Package SV4-OCS-JCW-1096908 4- AUX - Install Remote Shutdown Room Panels OCSJC 55 - EL 100' 0" - Room 12303 & MCR/RSR TRANSFER SWITCH SV4-OCS-JW-001 - Room 12S05 -Area Work Package SV4-PMS-JDW-1089246 U4 - AUX - Install Electrical Equipment - EL 117'6 -

Room 12422, 12423 - Area 3 Section 1A17 2.6.03.02.i-U4-EQRR-PCD001, Class 1E DC and Uninterruptable Power Supply System (IDS)

EQ Reconciliation Report (EQRR), Revision 0 2.6.03.02.i-U4-EQRR-PCD002, Class 1E DC and Uninterruptable Power Supply System (IDS)

EQ Reconciliation Report (EQRR), Revision 0 2.6.03.02.i-U4-EQRR-PCD003, Class 1E DC and Uninterruptable Power Supply System (IDS)

EQ Reconciliation Report (EQRR), Revision 0 SV4-E03-VBR-002, Equipment Qualification Data Package for the Class 1E Fuse Panels for IDS System (E03) for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 0 SV4-EA03-VBR-004, Equipment Qualification Data Package for the Class 1E Fuse Panels for IDS System (EA03-DV01) for Use in the Domestic AP1000 Plant, Revision 0 53

SV4-EA01-VBR-004, Equipment Qualification Data Package for Three-Phase AC Distribution Panel for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 0 SV4-IDS-VBR-002, Equipment Qualification Data Package for the Battery Charger (DC01),

Inverter (DU01), and Regulating Transformer (DT01) for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 0 SV4-DB01-VBR-002, Equipment Qualification Data Package for Class 1E 250 VDC for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 0 SV4-DK01-VBR-002, Equipment Qualification Data Package for the 250 VDC Motor Control Center (Commodity Code DK01) for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 4 SV4-DF01-VBR-002, Equipment Qualification Data Package for Fused Transfer Switch Box for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 2 SV4-DS01-VBR-002, Equipment Qualification Data Package for the 250 VDC Switchboard (Commodity Code DS01) For for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 0 Engineering and Design Coordination Report (E&DCR) SV4-IDS-GEF-001, Evaluation of EMC Seals on IDS Equipment at Vogtle, Revision 0 E&DCR APP-GW-GEF-2048, Updating Electrical Commodity EQSR/EQDP, Revision 0 E&DCR APP-DB01-GEF-500, Torquing of Cable Connections to IDS (DB01) Batteries (ESR 50147373), Revision 0 E&DCR SV0-IDS-GEF-001, Evaluation of EMC Seals on IDS-GEF-001, Revision 0 SV4-EA01-Z0-001, Design Specification for Class 1E AC Distribution Panels for IDS System, Revision 5 SV4-EA03-Z0-001, Design Specification for Class 1E Fuse Panels for IDS System, Revision 8 Section 1A18 SV4-1010-GCR-001, Vogtle Unit #4 As-Built Summary Report: Nuclear Island Basemat, Revision 1 SV4-1100-GCR-001, Vogtle Unit #4 As-Built Summary Report: Containment Internal Structures and Modules, Revision 0 Section 1A19 SV4-1000-ITR-800785, Unit 4 Inspections of Aux Bldg. Safety-Related Equipment Rooms Flood Prevention: ITAAC 3.3.00.05b, Revision 0 Westinghouse Quality Assurance Inspection Report (QAIR) E225-17-10280, Raceway Installation, Concealed/Embedded Conduit, 12/19/2017 Westinghouse QAIR E225-18-10038, Raceway Installation: Concealed/Embedded Conduit -

12306-ML-E01, 12306-ML-E03 Electrical, 2/24/2018 Work Package (WP) SV4-1232-C0W-800001, Placement of Auxiliary Slab SP-18 in Area 2 at El. 100-0, Revision 0 WP SV4-1252-EYW-800000, Install Electrical Floor Penetrations In the Unit 4 Aux. Area 3 EL.

135-3 Room 12501, Revision 0 WP SV4-1232-ERW-EL7206, Install Conduit Sleeves for Penetrations In Unit 4 AUX Building Floor Slabs, EL. 100-0 Area 2 RMS.1, Revision 1 SV4-1240-ADW-1124363, Post-Installed Expansion Anchors Inspection Record - U4 Aux. -

Area 4 - Door 12451-AD-D01, 3/28/2023 Condition Report (CR) 50159449, U4 MCR Inner Air Lock Door Frame Hinge Threads Damaged Technical Evaluation 60047192, U4 MCR Inner Air Lock Door Frame Hinge Threads Damaged CR 50088080, Unit 4 Aux. SP-41 Slab Thickness Out-of-Tolerance SV4-1250-C0W-1032953, Attachment K - Inspection Record for Reinforced Steel Bar Fabrication Request, 4/22/2022 WP SV4-VES-MLW-1033928, ASME III - Install Auxiliary Bldg. VES Pipe Penetrations SV4-12555-ML-P01 and SV4-12555-ML-P02, Revision 0 54

IR SV4-AB01-A7G-809787, Inspection of Penetration SV4-12501-ML-P19, 7/11/2022 WP SV4-PCS-MLW-800002, U4 Install ASME Penetration SV4-12406-ML-P20, Revision 0 WP SV4-ML05-MLW-10155569, Install Penetration Sleeves Aux. Bldg. Area 1 EL. 117-6 Precast Panel 1241-CP-S05, Revision 0 Section 1A20 SV4-1100-ITR-800786, Unit 4 Inspections of Accumulator Rooms and CVS Room Flood Prevention: ITAAC 3.3.00.05c, Revision 0 APP-1124-ER-102, Conduit Layout Containment Building 11206 PXS-A Room, Revision 12 APP-1030-AD-001, Doors, Windows, Hatches Numbering/Classification Nuclear Island Plan at EL 100-0/107-2, Revision 4 PCI SV4-AB01-A7G-811262, Inspection Record SV4-11300-ML-E36, Revision 0 PCI SV4-AB01-A7G-814723, Inspection Record SV4-11300-ML-I26, Revision 0 PCI SV4-AB01-A7G-814724, Inspection Record SV4-11300-ML-I84, Revision 0 PCI SV4-1123-EYW-1018628, Inspection Record SV4-11300-ML-E91, Revision 0 SV4-ML05-V2-305, AP1000 Standard Penetration Embedded Pipe Chart, Revision 3 SV4-ML05-V2-205, AP1000 Standard Penetration 11209-ML-P05/P06, Revision 1 SV4-AB01-AB-002, Blockouts and Barriers (Penetrations, Seals and Fire Stops) Details, Revision 4 SV4-AB01-AB-012, Blockouts and Barriers (Penetration, Seals and Fire Stops), Revision 4 SV4-CA37-S5-033, Containment Building Area 4 CA37 Floor EL.107-2 Penetration Attachment Details VII, Revision 1 SV4-CA37-S5-028, Containment Building Area 4 CA37 Floor EL. 107-2 Penetration Attachment Details II, Revision 1 SV4-CA37-S5-033, Containment Building Area 4 CA37 Floor EL. 107-2 Penetration Attachment VII, Revision 1 SV4-AB01-Z0X-001, Penetration Seal Schedule (PSS), Revision 5 SV4-ML05-MLX-002, ML05 Penetration Drawing and Calculation Index, Revision 2 SV4-ML05-MLX-001, AP1000 General Piping Penetrations, Containment, and Auxiliary Building - Technical Release Package, Revision 0 SV4-AB01-AB-003, Blockouts and Barriers (Penetration, Seals and Fire Stops), Revision 4 Work Package (WP) SV4-1124-EYW-1019943, Install ELEC. FLR. Sleeves in Module CA37, U4 CONT. Area 4, EL. 107-2, Room 11300, Revision 0 WP SV4-ML05-MLW-1154362, U4-CONT. - Modify and Complete Installation of Penetration SV4-11209-ML-I18 As noted in CR# 70001558, Revision 1 Nonconformance and Disposition Report (N&D) SV4-PSS-GNR-000075, Modification of Penetration SV4-11209-ML-I18 for repair of SV4-PSS-PLW-66N Tubing (ESR 50178227),

Revision 0 N&D SV4-CA00-GNR-000002, Unit 4, Containment Room 11206-11207-11208 Temporary Lifting Lugs (ESR 50160661), Revision 0 Condition Report (CR) 50125503, Need Clarification of Which Penetration Seals Details Have Been Replaced by New Details CR 70001558, U4 I&C 11207/PSS/JMSMSCR0-Field Engineering - Incomplete Penetration, 1/4/2022 CR 50137008, U4 CNMT - Hatch 11300-AD-H03 - Excessive Root Opening of Floor Hatch Frame, 4/27/22 CR 50130360, U4 Concrete Cracking at H11 Hatch in Containment, 3/16/22 Section 1A21 Rooms: 12101 (Division A Battery Room), 12204 (Division B Battery Room 2), 12207 (Division B DC Equipment Room), 12306 (Valve/Piping Penetration Room), 12312 (Division C RCP Trip 54

Switchgear Room), 12423 (Reactor Trip Switchgear 1), 12501 (VBS MCR/A&C Equipment Room), 12207 (Division B DC Equipment Room), 12312 (Division C RCP Trip Switchgear Room), 12201 (Division A DC Equipment Room), 12205 (Division D DC Equipment Room),

12301 (Division A I&C Room), 12302 (Division C I&C Room)

Drawings:

APP-1212-ER-001, CABLE TRAY ARRANGEMENT AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 2 PLAN AT ELEVATION 66' - 6, Revision 16 APP-1212-ER-101, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 2 CLASS 1E CONDUIT ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 66' - 6, Revision 16 APP-1212-ER-103, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 2 BATTERY MONITORING CONDUIT ARRANGEMENT ROOM 12101, Revision 4 APP-1221-ER-001, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 1 CABLE TRAY ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 82' - 6, Revision 13 APP-1221-ER-101, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 1 CLASS 1E CONDUIT ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 82' - 6, Revision 17 APP-1222-ER-001, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 2 CABLE TRAY ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 82' - 6, Revision 14 APP-1222-ER-101, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 2 CLASS 1E CONDUIT ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 82' - 6, Revision 20 APP-1222-ER-102, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 2 CONDUIT ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 82' - 6 SECTIONS AND DETAILS (SHEET 1), Revision 7 APP-1231-ER-001, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 1 CLASS 1E CABLE TRAY ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 100' - 0, Revision 13 APP-1231-ER-102, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 1 CLASS 1E CONDUIT ARRANGEMENT AT ELEVATION 100' - 0 ROOM 12306, Revision 7 APP-1232-ER-001, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 2 CABLE TRAY ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 100' - 0, Revision 16 APP-1232-ER-106, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 2 CLASS 1E CONDUIT ARRANGEMENT AT ELEVATION 100' - 0 ROOM 12311 & 12312, Revision 6 APP-1243-ER-002, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 3 CLASS 1E CABLE TRAY ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 117' - 6, Revision 8 APP-1243-ER-103, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 3 CLASS 1E CONDUIT ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 117' - 6, Revision 4 APP-1252-ER-101, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 2 CLASS 1E CONDUIT ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 135' - 3, Revision 9 SV4-ECS-E9-069, IEEE 384 SEPARATION BARRIERS BARRIER AND SUPPORTS DETAILS SHEET 1, Revision 3 SV4-1222-ER-601, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 82-6 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 1),

Revision 4 SV4-1222-ER-611, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 82-6 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 1),

Revision 5 SV4-1222-ER-627, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 82-6 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 17),

Revision 0 SV4-1222-ER-602, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 82-6 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 2),

Revision 5 SV4-1222-ER-604, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 82-6 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 4),

Revision 3 SV4-1222-SH-248, Auxiliary Building Area 2 El 82-6 Raceway Supports Details (Sheet 29),

Revision 1 SV4-1232-ER-602, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 100-0 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 2),

55

Revision 6 SV4-1232-ER-668, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 58),

Revision 0 SV4-1232-ER-614, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 4),

Revision 3 SV4-1232-ER-664, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 54),

Revision 0 SV4-1232-ER-604, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 100-0 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 4),

Revision 5 SV4-1232-ER-608, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 100-0 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 8),

Revision 4 Work Packages:

SV4-IDS-EWW-1135425, U4 - AUX BULK CABLE PULL SV4-ORC-0926, SV4-ORC-0927, SV4-ORC-0935, SV4-ORC-0936 FOR SYSTEM IDS-1 IN ROOMS 12113, 12203, 12204, 12207, Revision 0 SV4-1212-ERW-1124137, U4 - AUX - Install / Rework 1E Scheduled Conduit - EL 666 - RM 12101, 12102, 12103 - AREA 2, Revision 0 SV4-PMS-EWW-1135118, U4 - AUX BULK CABLE PULLS FOR PMS - 1 in ROOMS 12304, 12341, 12400, 12401, 12422, 12423, Revision 0 SV4-CVS-EJW-1052314 U4 - AUX - Fab Support / Install 1E CVS Junction Boxes & Support -

EL 100' 0" - Area 1 - Room 12306, Revision 0 SV4-1252-ERW-1118366, U4 AUX INSTALL AND LABEL IE CONDUITS AND PULL BOXES, ELEVATION 135' 3", AREA 2., Revision 0 SV4-1222-ERW-1165930, U4 AUX- FABRICATE/INSTALL/LABEL RACEWAY BARRIERS, AREA 1 & 2, ELEV. 82-6/100-0, ROOMS 12207, 12201 & 12306., Revision 0 SV4-1222-ERW-1006098, U4 Install and Label Class 1E Conduits, Aux Room 12207, Elev.,

82-6, Area 2, Revision 1 SV4-1222-SHW-1004495, U4 Fabricate and Install Conduit Supports for Auxiliary Building, Elev. 82-6, Area 2, Room 12207, Revision 1 General Notes:

SV4-ECS-E9-030, Conduit Notes and Supports Details General Notes Sheet 1 SV4-ECS-E9-100, Conduit Notes and Supports Details General Notes Sheet 2A SV4-ECS-E9-011, Conduit Notes and Supports Details General Notes Sheet 2 SV4-ECS-E9-101, Conduit Notes and Supports Details Conduit Cables SV4-ECS-E9-062, Cale Tray Notes and Details Sheet 1 SV4-ECS-E9-062, Cale Tray Notes and Details Sheet 12 Pull Tickets:

SV4-VBS-EW-MDD236AXN[PT], 600V 2/C-12 AWG W/GROUND, Revision 2 Condition Reports:

CR 50174652, NRC identified misaligned channel nut (spring nut) for battery rack in Division A Battery Room 12101, 5/3/2023 CR 50174701, NRC Observation of loose nut in Unit 4 Room 12207 for cable tray cover, 5/4/2023 Misc.:

E&DCR No. APP-1220-GEF-850090, Barrier design required in 1222-ER-NXT02AB(AA) (ESR 50041982), Revision 0 SV4-1222-GNR-000007, Removal of SV4-1222-ER-BXT01JB and SV4-1222-ER-CXT01GB 56

from Cable Routes (ESR 50115231), Revision 0 SV4-1200-ITR-800801, ITAAC Technical Report Unit 4 Electrical Report for ITAAC 795 and ITAAC 801, Non-Radiologically Controlled Area of the Auxiliary Building, Revision 0 SV4-GW-E1-001, "Electrical Systems Design Criteria," Revision 4 SV4-G1-V8-001, "AP1000 Electrical Installation Specification," Revision 12 SV4-GW-EOR-006, "IEEE384 Design Compliance Description," Revision 3 APP-FSAR-GEF-234, "Update IEEE 384-1981 Exceptions for Revised Cable and Raceway Separation Distances (NL-1491)," Revision 0 Section 1A22 Documents Reviewed:

Rooms: 11206 (PXS Valve/Accumulator Room A), 11301 (Steam Generator 1 Lower Manway Area), 11402 (Steam Generator 2 Tubesheet Area), 11703 (Upper ADS Valve Area 176'-10 1/2"), 11201 (Steam Generator Compartment 1), 11306 (Electrical Penetration Room), 11400 (Maintenance Floor/Mezzanine), 11500 (Operating Deck), 11202 (Steam Generator compartment 2), 11603 (ADS Valve Area Lower Tier), 11403 (Pressurizer Spray Valve Room),

and 11208 (RNS Valve Room)

Design Documents:

Engineering & Design Coordination Report (E&DCR) SV4-1120-GEF-000024 IEEE 384 Lesser Separation Distance for RCS-JE-TE213B/TE214B, Revision 0E&DCR APP-GW-GEF-2121 Reductions in Cable and Raceway Separation Distances, Revision 0 SV4-1100-ITR-800800 Unit 4 Containment Electrical Report for ITAAC 800, Revision 0 APP-GW-E0R-006 IEEE-384 Design Compliance Description, Revision 3 SV4-PMS-J4-020 PMS System Design Specification, Revision 11 APP-GW-E1R-004 AP1000 Cable and Raceway Separation Analysis Report, Revision 0 Work Packages:

SV4-1100-SHW-1004336, 4 - CT - Fabricate Scheduled Conduit Supports - ELEV. 107'2" -

Room 11301 - Area 1, Revision 0 SV4-1131-SHW-1013875, 4 - CT - Install Designed Conduit Supports - EL 107'-2"-

Room 11301 - Area 1, Revision 2 SV4-1152-SHW-1054865, U4 - CT - Install Scheduled Conduit Supports, EL 135'3" to 153'0"- Rm 11500 - Area 2, Revision 1 SV4-1160-SHW-1122557, U4 Cont Bldg, Fab & Install unscheduled Welded Lighting Supports, Room 11600, EL 166' 1-1/2" & 176' 10-1/2", Area 1 & 2, Revision 0 SV4-1133-ERW-1118268 REV 0 SV4 Containment - Install Class 1E Conduits and Pull Boxes Area 3 Elev. 1072-1186 Room 11300 SV4-1120-E0W-1172068 REV 0 U4 CT - Determ/Reterm Cable and Rework Conduit IAW SV4-1100-GNR-000008 SV4-RMS-EWW-1097999 REV 0 U4 - CT Bulk Cable Pulls Safety Class C Cables for RMS-1 (IRC-0063, IRC-0064, IRC-0065 & IRC-0066) in rooms 11306/11500 Area 1-4 SV4-1124-ERW-1058788 REV 0 U4 - CT - Install and Label Class 1E Conduits and Pull Boxes in PXS-A Room 11206, El. 84-6 to 107-2 SV4-RCS-EWW-1116566 REV 1 U4 CT to Aux Sys RCS-1A Terminate Cables/Test Thru EPA/Install Vendor Supplied Pigtail and Raceway Related to SV4-RCS-PL-V001B, SV4-RCS-PL-V002B and Associated Equipment Rooms 11603, 11306, 12304, 12305 SV4-1142-EJW-1052983 REV 0 U4 - CT - Install Safety Class 1E Junction Boxes El 1186 -

Area 2 - Rm 11403 SV4-1120-ERW-1166080 REV 0 U4 Cont. Raceway Labeling/Stenciling El.826, Conduit(s) 1120 57

SV4-1120-ERW-1008370 REV 1 U4 - CT - Install Class 1E Designed Conduit - El 846 Rm 11202 - Area 4 (Book 1)

Drawings:

APP-1152-ER-601, Containment Building Area 2 EL 135-3 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 1), Revision 5 APP-1150-ER-466, Conduit Support Fabrication Drawing, Revision 2 APP-1150-ER-153, Conduit Support Fabrication Drawing, Revision 1 APP-1140-ER-510, Containment Building Room 11402 SG2 EL 118-6 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 1), Revision 3 APP-1140-ER-111, Conduit Support Fabrication Drawing, Revision 0 APP-1140-ER-888, Conduit Support Fabrication Drawing, Revision 1 APP-1130-ER-520, Containment Building Room 11301 SG1 EL 107-2 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 1), Revision 2 APP-1130-ER-462, Conduit Support Fabrication Drawing, Revision 1 APP-1140-ER-931, Conduit Support Fabrication Drawing, Revision 1 APP-1120-ER-501, Containment Building 11208 RNS Valve Room EL 94-0 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 1), Revision 7 APP-1120-ER-960, Conduit Support Fabrication Drawing, Revision 1 APP-1120-ER-707, Conduit Support Fabrication Drawing, Revision 0 APP-1120-ER-715, Conduit Support Fabrication Drawing, Revision 1 APP-ECS-E9-030, Conduit Notes and Support Details General Notes Sheet 1, Revision 20 APP-1140-GEF-850033, Conduit Relocation Requested from Secondary Manway access (ESR 50056771), Revision 0 APP-PMS-J1-105 Functional Diagram Core Heat Removal Protection & RCP Trips, Revision 9 Specification:

APP-G1-V8-001 Electrical Installation Specification, Revision 12 Condition Reports:

CR 50176848 Two Labelling issues identified in Unit 4 Containment During NRC Inspection.

CR 50177583, NRC identified 4 supports without tags inside containment during inspection.

CR 50177240 During NRC inspection of i800 an IEEE 384 barrier violation was found in 11201 (Steam Generator Compartment 1).

CR 50177188 NRC Identified: i800_IEEE 384 Violation (conduit SV4-1133-ER-BZC05 crossing over and approximately 1/2" from the top of SV4-1133-ER-DXT02AB.)

CR 50177227 NRC Identified: i800_IEEE 384 Violation (Flex conduit from SV4-RCS-EJ-TE132C to TE132C was within 5' of SV4-1120-ER-NWT01D)

CR 50176848 Two Labelling issues identified in Unit 4 Containment During NRC Inspection (In Room 11402, Support SV4-1140-SH-E058 above SV4-RCS-EJ-PLV004D-1 is missing the identification tag. In Room 11301, SV4-RCS-EJ-TE161 is mislabeled as VS3-RCS-EJ-TE161.)

CR 50177336 NRC identified violation Room 11202 CR 50177337 NRC Identified _ Conduit bend radius CR 50177297 IEEE issue identified in the 11202.

CR 50177585 NRC-Identified Green Non-Cited Violation due to Cable/Raceway Separation Nonconformances in the Containment associated with ITAAC 800 CR 50177596 NRC identified conduit segregation nonconformance during inspection inside Containment CR 50177940 NRC Identified SV4-RCS-EWW-11165666 in ATV D2 missing 7.2 ITAAC Screening Checklist CR 50177386 NRC Identified - Conduit bend radius 58

Section 1A23 Rooms: 12101 (Division A Battery Room), 12204 (Division B Battery Room 2), 12207 (Division B DC Equipment Room), 12306 (Valve/Piping Penetration Room), 12312 (Division C RCP Trip Switchgear Room), 12423 (Reactor Trip Switchgear 1), 12501 (VBS MCR/A&C Equipment Room), 12207 (Division B DC Equipment Room), 12312 (Division C RCP Trip Switchgear Room), 12201 (Division A DC Equipment Room), 12205 (Division D DC Equipment Room),

12301 (Division A I&C Room), 12302 (Division C I&C Room)

Drawings:

APP-1212-ER-001, CABLE TRAY ARRANGEMENT AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 2 PLAN AT ELEVATION 66' - 6, Revision 16 APP-1212-ER-101, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 2 CLASS 1E CONDUIT ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 66' - 6, Revision 16 APP-1212-ER-103, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 2 BATTERY MONITORING CONDUIT ARRANGEMENT ROOM 12101, Revision 4 APP-1221-ER-001, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 1 CABLE TRAY ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 82' - 6, Revision 13 APP-1221-ER-101, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 1 CLASS 1E CONDUIT ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 82' - 6, Revision 17 APP-1222-ER-001, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 2 CABLE TRAY ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 82' - 6, Revision 14 APP-1222-ER-101, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 2 CLASS 1E CONDUIT ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 82' - 6, Revision 20 APP-1222-ER-102, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 2 CONDUIT ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 82' - 6 SECTIONS AND DETAILS (SHEET 1), Revision 7 APP-1231-ER-001, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 1 CLASS 1E CABLE TRAY ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 100' - 0, Revision 13 APP-1231-ER-102, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 1 CLASS 1E CONDUIT ARRANGEMENT AT ELEVATION 100' - 0 ROOM 12306, Revision 7 APP-1232-ER-001, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 2 CABLE TRAY ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 100' - 0, Revision 16 APP-1232-ER-106, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 2 CLASS 1E CONDUIT ARRANGEMENT AT ELEVATION 100' - 0 ROOM 12311 & 12312, Revision 6 APP-1243-ER-002, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 3 CLASS 1E CABLE TRAY ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 117' - 6, Revision 8 APP-1243-ER-103, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 3 CLASS 1E CONDUIT ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 117' - 6, Revision 4 APP-1252-ER-101, AUXILIARY BUILDING AREA 2 CLASS 1E CONDUIT ARRANGEMENT PLAN AT ELEVATION 135' - 3, Revision 9 SV4-ECS-E9-069, IEEE 384 SEPARATION BARRIERS BARRIER AND SUPPORTS DETAILS SHEET 1, Revision 3 SV4-1222-ER-601, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 82-6 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 1),

Revision 4 SV4-1222-ER-611, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 82-6 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 1),

Revision 5 SV4-1222-ER-627, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 82-6 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 17),

Revision 0 SV4-1222-ER-602, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 82-6 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 2),

Revision 5 SV4-1222-ER-604, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 82-6 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 4),

59

Revision 3 SV4-1222-SH-248, Auxiliary Building Area 2 El 82-6 Raceway Supports Details (Sheet 29),

Revision 1 SV4-1232-ER-602, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 100-0 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 2),

Revision 6 SV4-1232-ER-668, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 58),

Revision 0 SV4-1232-ER-614, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 4),

Revision 3 SV4-1232-ER-664, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 100-0 Conduit Supports Details (Sheet 54),

Revision 0 SV4-1232-ER-604, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 100-0 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 4),

Revision 5 SV4-1232-ER-608, Auxiliary Building Area 2 EL 100-0 Conduit Supports Plan View (Sheet 8),

Revision 4 Work Packages:

SV4-IDS-EWW-1135425, U4 - AUX BULK CABLE PULL SV4-ORC-0926, SV4-ORC-0927, SV4-ORC-0935, SV4-ORC-0936 FOR SYSTEM IDS-1 IN ROOMS 12113, 12203, 12204, 12207, Revision 0 SV4-1212-ERW-1124137, U4 - AUX - Install / Rework 1E Scheduled Conduit - EL 666 - RM 12101, 12102, 12103 - AREA 2, Revision 0 SV4-PMS-EWW-1135118, U4 - AUX BULK CABLE PULLS FOR PMS - 1 in ROOMS 12304, 12341, 12400, 12401, 12422, 12423, Revision 0 SV4-CVS-EJW-1052314 U4 - AUX - Fab Support / Install 1E CVS Junction Boxes & Support -

EL 100' 0" - Area 1 - Room 12306, Revision 0 SV4-1252-ERW-1118366, U4 AUX INSTALL AND LABEL IE CONDUITS AND PULL BOXES, ELEVATION 135' 3", AREA 2., Revision 0 SV4-1222-ERW-1165930, U4 AUX- FABRICATE/INSTALL/LABEL RACEWAY BARRIERS, AREA 1 & 2, ELEV. 82-6/100-0, ROOMS 12207, 12201 & 12306., Revision 0 SV4-1222-ERW-1006098, U4 Install and Label Class 1E Conduits, Aux Room 12207, Elev.,

82-6, Area 2, Revision 1 SV4-1222-SHW-1004495, U4 Fabricate and Install Conduit Supports for Auxiliary Building, Elev. 82-6, Area 2, Room 12207, Revision 1 General Notes:

SV4-ECS-E9-030, Conduit Notes and Supports Details General Notes Sheet 1 SV4-ECS-E9-100, Conduit Notes and Supports Details General Notes Sheet 2A SV4-ECS-E9-011, Conduit Notes and Supports Details General Notes Sheet 2 SV4-ECS-E9-101, Conduit Notes and Supports Details Conduit Cables SV4-ECS-E9-062, Cale Tray Notes and Details Sheet 1 SV4-ECS-E9-062, Cale Tray Notes and Details Sheet 12 Pull Tickets:

SV4-VBS-EW-MDD236AXN[PT], 600V 2/C-12 AWG W/GROUND, Revision 2 Condition Reports:

CR 50174652, NRC identified misaligned channel nut (spring nut) for battery rack in Division A Battery Room 12101, 5/3/2023 CR 50174701, NRC Observation of loose nut in Unit 4 Room 12207 for cable tray cover, 5/4/2023 60

Misc.:

E&DCR No. APP-1220-GEF-850090, Barrier design required in 1222-ER-NXT02AB(AA) (ESR 50041982), Revision 0 SV4-1222-GNR-000007, Removal of SV4-1222-ER-BXT01JB and SV4-1222-ER-CXT01GB from Cable Routes (ESR 50115231), Revision 0 SV4-1200-ITR-800801, ITAAC Technical Report Unit 4 Electrical Report for ITAAC 795 and ITAAC 801, Non-Radiologically Controlled Area of the Auxiliary Building, Revision 0 SV4-GW-E1-001, "Electrical Systems Design Criteria," Revision 4 SV4-G1-V8-001, "AP1000 Electrical Installation Specification," Revision 12 SV4-GW-EOR-006, "IEEE384 Design Compliance Description," Revision 3 APP-FSAR-GEF-234, "Update IEEE 384-1981 Exceptions for Revised Cable and Raceway Separation Distances (NL-1491)," Revision 0 Section 1A24 SV4-SES-ITR-800821 Walkdown Inspection for Secondary Security Power Supply Location:

ITAAC 3.3.00.16- Revision 0 SV4-SES-ITRp802661 Uninterruptable Power Supply Testing: ITAAC C.2.6.09.03b- R-0 SV4-SES-E3-001 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant- Plant Security System (SES) Security Power Distribution One Line Diagram- Revision 3 VEGP Physical Security Plan-R-18-VEGP-2 Section 1A25 SV4-SES-ITR-800822 Vital Area Portal Inspection- Revision 0 4-SES-ITAAC 670 VA INTR01 WO: SNC 1476416- VA Emergency Exit Alarm Test-Version 1.0 4-SES-ITAAC 655- 4SCP03 WO: SNC1473459- 4SCP03 Alarm & Circuit Supervision Test-Version 1.1 4-SES-ITAAC 655- 4SCP02 WO: SNC 1473013- 4SCP02 Alarm & Circuit Supervision Test-Version 1.0 VEGP Physical Security Plan-R-18-VEGP-2 Section 1A26 3.5.00.01.i-U4-EQRR-PCD001, Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) EQ Reconciliation Report, Revision 0 APP-RMS-VBR-002, Equipment Qualification Data Package for the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) Containment High Range Monitor (CHRM) and Field Cable Connections at the EPA Feedthroughs for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 0 APP-RMS-VBR-004, "Equipment Qualification Data Package for General Atomics Class 1E and Seismic Category I Radiation Monitoring System Skids for Use in the AP1000 Plant, Revision 0 Section 1P01 CR 50169074 - Incorrect Cable Routing and Termination in PMS Room 12305 (Cable Tray)

CR 50169086 - Incorrect Cable Routing and Termination in PMS Room 12305 (Free Air)

Section 1P02 CR 10968674 3-HDS-V012B has a broken stem CR 10958192 MFP C miniflow potential stem/actuator separation CR 10963631 Stem broke/separated from Plug CR 1095154 3-HDS-V012B potential stem/disk separation CAR 417576, Stem Broke/Separated from Plug Section 1P03 61

Calculations:

APP-SH25-S3C-002, AP1000 Seismic Category I Standard Conduit Supports, Revision 3 APP-1220-SHC-301, Structural Analysis of Cable Conduit Supports in Auxiliary Building, Areas and 2, El. 82-6, Revision 2 E&DCRs:

APP-1220-GEF-501, Single Support on Rigid 4 Conduit Lines APP-1222-ER-BXC03 and APP-1222-ER-BXC04, Revision 0 APP-1220-GEF-502, Single Support on Rigid 4 Conduit Lines APP-1222-ER-BXC03 and APP-1222-ER-BXC04, Revision 0 APP-1220-GEF-503, Single Support on Rigid 4 Conduit Lines APP-1222-ER-BXC03 and APP-1222-ER-BXC04, Revision 0 Miscellaneous:

APP-G1-V8-001, AP1000 Electrical Installation Specification, Revision 12 APP-GW-C1-001, AP1000 Civil/Structural Design Criteria, Revision 5 APP-GW-S1-006, AP1000 Design Guide for Raceway Systems, Revision 4 IEEE Std 628-2001 (R2006), IEEE Standard Criteria for the Design, Installation, and Qualification of Raceway Systems for Class 1E Circuits for Nuclear Power Generating Stations Section 1P04 APP-GW-GAP-420, "Engineering and Design Coordination Reports," Revision 22 APP-GW-GAP-428, "Nonconformance and Disposition Report," Revision 24 ND-AD-002-027, "Nonconforming Items," Version 12.0 ND-AD-002-028, "Corrective Action Program Instructions," Version 7.0 62

LIST OF ACRONYMS ADS Automatic Depressurization System AOV Air Operated Valve ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers CAP Corrective Action Program CNS Containment System COL Combined License COLR Core Operating Limits Report CR Condition Report CV Containment Vessel CVS Chemical and Volume Control System DWS Water Transfer and Storage System E&DCR Engineering & Design Coordination Report EQRR Equipment Qualification Reconciliation Report EPA Electrical Penetration Assemblies ICN ITAAC Closure Notice I&C Instrumentation and Control IDS Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers IOZ Inorganic Zinc IMC Inspection Manual Chapter IP Inspection Procedures IR Inspection Report IRWST In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank ITAAC Inspections, Tests, Analysis, and Inspection Criteria LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident M&TE Measuring and Test Equipment Control NCV Noncited Violation N&D Nonconformance and Disposition Report NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PAMS Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation System P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams PCCWST Passive Containment Cooling Water Storage Tank PCD Principal Closure Document PCS Passive Containment Cooling System PMS Protection and Safety Monitoring System PT Liquid Penetrant Examination PXS Passive Core Cooling System QA Quality Assurance QC Quality Control RCCA Rod Cluster Control Assemblies 63

RCP Reactor Coolant Pumps RCS Reactor Cooling System RSR Remote Shutdown Room RNS Normal Residual Heat Removal System SGS Steam Generator System SNC Southern Nuclear Company SSC Structure, System, and Component S&W Stone & Webster UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report VBS Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System VEGP Vogtle Electric Generating Plant VFS Containment Air Filtration System VT Visual Examination VWS Central Chilled Water System WEC Westinghouse Electric Company WLS Liquid Radioactive Waste System WP Work Package ZOI Zone of Influence 64

ITAAC INSPECTED No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis 13 2.1.02.02a 2.a) The components Inspection will be The ASME Code identified in Table conducted of the as- Section III design 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code built components and reports exist for the as-Section III are piping as documented built components and designed and in the ASME design piping identified in constructed in reports. Inspection of Tables 2.1.21 and accordance with ASME the as-built pressure 2.1.22 as ASME Code Code Section III boundary welds will be Section III. A report requirements. 2.b) performed in exists and concludes The piping identified in accordance with the that the ASME Code Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME ASME Code Section III.Section III Code Section III is A hydrostatic test will requirements are met designed and be performed on the for non-destructive constructed in components and piping examination of accordance with ASME required by the ASME pressure boundary Code Section III Code Section III to be welds. A report exists requirements. 3.a) hydrostatically tested. and concludes that the Pressure boundary Inspection will be results of the welds in components performed for the hydrostatic test of the identified in Table existence of a report components and 2.1.21 as ASME Code verifying that the as- piping identified in Section III meet ASME built piping meets the Table 2.1.21 and Code Section III requirements for Table 2.1.22 as requirements. 3.b) functional capability. ASME Code Section III Pressure boundary Inspection will be conform with the welds in piping performed for the requirements of the identified in Table existence of an LBB ASME Code Section 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code evaluation report or an III. A report existsSection III meet ASME evaluation report on the and concludes that Code Section III protection from dynamic each of the as-built requirements. 4.a) effects of a pipe break. lines identified in Table The components Section 3.3, Nuclear 2.1.2-2 for which identified in Table Island Buildings, functional capability is 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code contains the design required meets the Section III retain their descriptions and requirements for pressure boundary inspections, tests, functional capability.

integrity at their design analyses, and An LBB evaluation pressure. 4.b) The acceptance criteria for report exists and piping identified in protection from the concludes that the Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME dynamic effects of pipe LBB acceptance Code Section III retains rupture. criteria are met by the its pressure boundary as-built RCS piping integrity at its design and piping materials, pressure. 5.b) Each of or a pipe break the lines identified in evaluation report Table 2.1.2-2 for which exists and concludes functional capability is that protection from required is designed to the dynamic effects of 65

withstand combined a line break is provided.

normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability. 6.

Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.

88 2.1.03.13 13. The fuel An analysis is A report exists and assemblies and rod performed of the concludes that the fuel cluster control reactor core design. assemblies and rod assemblies intended for cluster control initial core load and assemblies intended for listed in Table 2.1.3-1 the initial core load and have been designed listed in Table 2.1.3-1 and constructed in have been designed and accordance with the constructed in established design accordance with the requirements. principal design requirements.

91 2.2.01.02a 2.a) The components Inspection will be The ASME Code Section identified in Table conducted of the as- III design reports exist 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code built components and for the as-built Section III are designed piping as documented components and piping and constructed in in the ASME design identified in Table 2.2.1-accordance with ASME reports. Inspection of 1 and 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III the as-built pressure Code Section III. A requirements. 2.b) The boundary welds will report exists and piping identified in be performed in concludes that the Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME accordance with the ASME Code Section III Code Section III is ASME Code Section requirements are met for designed and III. i) A hydrostatic or nondestructive constructed in pressure test will be examination of pressure accordance with ASME performed on the boundary welds. i) A Code Section III components required report exists and requirements. 3.a) by the ASME Code concludes that the Pressure boundary Section III to be results of the pressure welds in components tested. A hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table or pressure test will identified 2.2.1-1 as ASME be performed on the in Table 2.2.1-1 as piping required by the ASME Code Section 66

Code Section III meet III to be pressure ASME Code Section III ASME Code Section III tested. conform with the requirements. 3.b) requirements of the Pressure boundary ASME Code Section III.

welds in piping A report exists and identified in Table concludes that the 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code results of the pressure Section III meet ASME test of the piping Code Section III identified in Table 2.2.1-requirements. 4.a) The 2 as ASME Code components identified Section III conform with in Table 2.2.1-1 as the requirements of the ASME Code Section III ASME Code Section III.

retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

98 2.2.01.05.i 5. The seismic i) Inspection will be i) The seismic Category Category I equipment performed to verify I equipment identified in identified in Table that the seismic Table 2.2.11 is located 2.2.11 can withstand Category I equipment on the Nuclear Island.

seismic design basis and valves identified ii) A report exists and loads without loss of in Table 2.2.1-1 are concludes that the structural integrity and located on the seismic Category I safety function. 6.a) Nuclear Island. ii) equipment can withstand The Class 1E Type tests, analyses, seismic design basis equipment identified in or a combination of dynamic loads without Table 2.2.1-1 as being type tests and loss of structural integrity qualified for a harsh analyses of seismic and safety function. iii) environment can Category I equipment The as-built equipment withstand the will be performed. iii) including anchorage is environmental Inspection will be seismically bounded by conditions that would performed for the the tested or analyzed exist before, during, existence of a report conditions. i) A report and following a design verifying that the as- exists and concludes basis accident without built equipment that the Class 1E loss of safety function including anchorage equipment identified in for the time required to is seismically Table 2.2.1-1 as being perform the safety bounded by the tested qualified for a harsh function. 6.d) The non- or analyzed environment can Class 1E electrical conditions. i) Type withstand the penetrations identified tests, analyses, or a environmental conditions in Table 2.2.1-1 as combination of type that would exist before, being qualified for a tests and analyses during, and following a harsh environment can will be performed on design 67

withstand the Class 1E equipment basis accident without environmental located in a harsh loss of safety function conditions that would environment. ii) for the time required to exist before, during, Inspection will be perform the safety and following a design performed of the as- function. ii) A report basis accident without built Class 1E exists and concludes loss of containment equipment and the that the as-built Class pressure boundary associated wiring, 1E equipment and the integrity. cables, and associated wiring, terminations located in cables, and a harsh environment. terminations identified i) Type tests, analyses, in Table 2.2.1-1 as or a combination of being qualified for a type tests and analyses harsh environment are will be performed on bounded by type tests, nonClass 1E electrical analyses, or a penetrations located in combination of type a harsh environment. tests and analyses. i) ii) Inspection will be A report exists and performed of the as- concludes that the non-built non-Class 1E Class 1E electrical electrical penetrations penetrations identified located in a harsh in Table 2.2.11 as environment. being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity. ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

68

120 2.2.02.02a 8. Containment An analysis for the as- Analysis exists for the electrical penetration built containment as-built containment assemblies are electrical penetration electrical penetration protected against assemblies will be assemblies and currents that are performed to concludes that the greater than the demonstrate (1) that penetrations are continuous ratings. the maximum current of protected against the circuits does not currents which are exceed the continuous greater than their rating of the continuous ratings.

containment electrical penetration assembly, or (2) that the circuits have redundant protection devices in series and that the redundant current protection devices are coordinated with the containment electrical penetration assemblys rated short circuit thermal capacity data and prevent current from exceeding the continuous current rating of the containment electrical penetration assembly 120 2.2.02.02a 2.a) The components Inspection will be The ASME Code identified in Table conducted of the as- Section III design 2.2.2-1 as ASME built components and reports exist for the as-Code Section III are piping as documented built components and designed and in the ASME design piping identified in constructed in reports. Inspection of Table 2.2.2-1 and accordance with the as-built pressure 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code ASME Code Section III boundary welds will be Section III. A report requirements. 2.b) performed in exists and concludes The pipelines accordance with the that the ASME Code identified in Table ASME Code Section III.Section III 2.2.2-2 as ASME A hydrostatic test will requirements are met Code Section III are be performed on the for non-destructive designed and components and piping examination of constructed in required by the ASME pressure boundary accordance with Code Section III to be welds. A report ASME Code Section hydrostatically tested.

Inspection 69

126 2.2.02.05a.i III requirements. 3.a) will be performed for exists and concludes Pressure boundary the existence of a that the results of the welds in components report concluding that hydrostatic test of the identified in Table the as-built pipelines components and piping 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code meet the identified in Table Section III meet ASME requirements for 2.2.2-1 and 2.2.2-2 as Code Section III functional capability. ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) conform with the Pressure boundary requirements of the welds in the pipelines ASME Code Section identified in Table III. A report exists and 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code concludes that each of Section III meet ASME the as-built pipelines Code Section III identified in Table requirements. 4.a) 2.2.2-2 for which The components functional capability is identified in Table required meets the 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code requirements for Section III retain their functional capability.

pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. 4.b) The pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

5.b) Each of the pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

126 2.2.02.05a.i 5.a) The seismic i) Inspection will be i) The seismic Category I components performed to verify Category I components identified in Table that the seismic identified in Table 2.2.21 can withstand Category I 2.2.21 are located on seismic design basis components and the Nuclear Island. ii) loads without loss of valves identified in A report exists and safety function. 6.a) Table 2.2.2-1 are concludes that the The Class 1E located on the seismic Category I components identified Nuclear Island. ii) components can in Table Type tests, analyses, withstand seismic or a combination of 70

2.2.2-1 as being type tests and withstand seismic qualified for a harsh analyses of seismic design basis loads environment can Category I without loss of safety withstand the components will be function. iii) The environmental performed. iii) report exists and conditions that would Inspection will be concludes that the as-exist before, during, performed for the built components and following a design existence of a report including anchorage basis accident without verifying that the as- are seismically loss of safety function built components bounded by the tested for the time required to including anchorage or analyzed conditions.

perform the safety are seismically i) A report exists and function. bounded by the tested concludes that the or analyzed Class 1E components conditions. i) Type identified in Table tests or a combination 2.2.2-1 as being of type tests and qualified for a harsh analyses will be environment can performed on Class withstand the 1E components environmental located in a harsh conditions that would environment. ii) exist before, during, Inspection will be and following a design performed of the as- basis accident without built Class 1E loss of safety function components and the for the time required to associated wiring, perform the safety cables, and function. ii) A report terminations located exists and concludes in a harsh that the as-built Class environment. 1E components and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

138 2.2.02.07b.i 7.a) The PCS delivers i) Testing will be i) When tested, each water from the performed to measure one of the three flow PCCWST to the the PCCWST delivery paths delivers water at outside, top of the rate from each one of greater than or equal containment vessel. the three parallel flow to: - 469.1 gpm at a 7.b) The PCS wets the paths. ii) Testing and PCCWST water level outside surface of the or analysis will be of 27.4 ft + 0.2, - 0.0 ft containment performed to above the tank 71

vessel. The inside and demonstrate the floor - 226.6 gpm the outside of the PCCWST inventory when the PCCWST containment vessel provides 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of water level uncovers above the operating adequate water flow. the first (i.e. tallest) deck are coated with an i) Testing will be standpipe - 176.3 inorganic zinc material. performed to measure gpm when the 7.c) The PCS provides the outside wetted PCCWST water level air flow over the outside surface of the uncovers the second of the containment containment vessel tallest standpipe -

vessel by a natural with one of the three 144.2 gpm when the circulation air flow path parallel flow paths PCCWST water level from the air inlets to the delivering water to the uncovers the third air discharge structure. top of the containment tallest standpipe - or 7.d) The PCS drains vessel. ii) Inspection a report exists and the excess water from of the containment concludes that the as-the outside of the vessel exterior coating measured flow rates containment vessel will be conducted. iii) delivered by the through the two upper Inspection of the PCCWST to the annulus drains. 7.e) containment vessel containment vessel The PCS provides a interior coating will be provides sufficient flow path for long-term conducted. heat removal water makeup to the Inspections of the air capability such that PCCWST. 9. Safety- flow path segments the limiting related displays will be performed. containment pressure identified in Table 2.2.2- Testing will be and temperature 1 can be retrieved in the performed to verify the values are not MCR. 10.a) Controls upper annulus drain affected and the PCS exist in the MCR to flow performance. ii) is able to perform its cause the remotely Testing will be safety function to operated valves performed to measure remove heat from identified in Table 2.2.2- the delivery rate from containment to 1 to perform active the long-term makeup maintain plant safety.

functions. 10.b) The connection to the ii) When tested valves identified in PCCWST. Inspection and/or analyzed with Table 2.2.2-1 as having will be performed for all flow paths PMS control perform an retrievability of the delivering and an active safety function safety-related displays initial water level at after receiving a signal in the MCR. Stroke 27.4 + 0.2, 0.00 ft, from the PMS. 11.a) testing will be the PCCWST water The motor-operated performed on the inventory provides valves identified in remotely operated greater than or equal Table 2.2.2-1 perform valves identified in to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of flow, an active safety-related Table 2.2.2-1 using and the flow rate at 72 function to change the controls in the hours is greater than position as indicated in MCR. Testing will be or equal to 100.7 gpm the table. 11.b) After performed on the or a report exists and loss of motive power, remotely operated concludes that the as-the remotely operated valves in Table 2.2.2-1 measured flow rates valves identified in using real or simulated delivered by the Table 2.2.2-1 assume signals into the PMS. PCCWST to the iii) Tests of the motor- containment vessel 72

the indicated loss of operated valves will provides sufficient motive power position. be performed under heat removal preoperational flow, capability such that differential pressure, the limiting and temperature containment pressure conditions. Testing of and temperature the remotely operated values are not valves will be affected and the PCS performed under the is able to perform its conditions of loss of safety function to motive power. remove heat from containment to maintain plant safety.

i) A report exists and concludes that when the water in the PCCWST uncovers the standpipes at the following levels, the water delivered by one of the three parallel flow paths to the containment shell provides coverage measured at the spring line that is equal to or greater than the stated coverages. - 24.1 +/-

0.2 ft above the tank floor; at least 90% of the perimeter is wetted. - 20.3 +/- 0.2 ft above the tank floor; at least 72.9% of the perimeter is wetted. -

16.8 +/- 0.2 ft above the tank floor; at least 59.6% of the perimeter is wetted.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the containment vessel exterior surface is coated with an inorganic zinc coating above elevation 73

135'3". iii) A report exists and concludes that the containment vessel interior surface each PCS recirculation pump delivers greater than or equal to 100 gpm when tested separately. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.2.2-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to cause remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 to perform active functions. The remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as having PMS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from the PMS. iii)

Each motor-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.2-1 under preoperational test conditions. After loss of motive power, each remotely operated valve identified in Table 2.2.2-1 assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

158 2.2.03.01 1. The functional Inspection of the as- The as-built PXS arrangement of the built system will be conforms with the PXS is as described in performed. functional arrangement the Design Description as described in the of this Section 2.2.3. Design Description of this Section 2.2.3.

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159 2.2.03.02a 2.a) The components Inspection will be The ASME Code identified in Table conducted of the as- Section III design 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code built components and reports exist for the Section III are piping as documented asbuilt components designed and in the ASME design and piping identified in constructed in reports. Inspection of Table 2.2.31 and accordance with the as-built pressure 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code ASME Code Section III boundary welds will be Section III. A report requirements. 2.b) performed in exists and concludes The piping identified in accordance with the that the ASME Code Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section Section III ASME Code Section III III. A hydrostatic test requirements are met is designed and will be performed on for non-destructive constructed in the components and examination of accordance with piping required by the pressure boundary ASME Code Section III ASME Code Section III welds. A report exists requirements. 3.a) to be hydrostatically and concludes that the Pressure boundary tested. Inspection will results of the welds in components be performed for the hydrostatic test of the identified in Table existence of a report components and piping 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code verifying that the as- identified in Table Section III meet ASME built piping meets the 2.2.31 and 2.2.3-2 as Code Section III requirements for ASME Code Section III requirements. 3.b) functional capability. conform with the Pressure boundary Inspection will be requirements of the welds in piping performed for the ASME Code Section identified in Table existence of an LBB III. A report exists and 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code evaluation report or an concludes that each of Section III meet ASME evaluation report on the as-built lines Code Section III the protection from identified in Table requirements. 4.a) dynamic effects of a 2.2.3-2 for which The components pipe break. Section functional capability is identified in Table 3.3, Nuclear Island required meets the 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code Buildings, contains the requirements for Section III retain their design descriptions functional capability.

pressure boundary and inspections, tests, An LBB evaluation integrity at their design analyses, and report exists and pressure. 4.b) The acceptance criteria for concludes that the LBB piping identified in protection from the acceptance criteria are Table 2.2.3-2 as dynamic effects of pipe met by the as-built ASME Code Section III rupture. RCS piping and piping retains its pressure materials, or a pipe boundary integrity at break evaluation report its design pressure. exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of 75

5.b) Each of the a line break is provided.

lines identified in Table 2.2.3-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability. 6.

Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.

192 2.2.03.08c.vii 8.c) The PXS vii) Inspection of the vii) The plate located provides RCS as-built components above the containment makeup, boration, will be conducted for recirculation screen is and safety injection plates located above no more than 1 ft, 3in during design the containment above the top of the basis events. recirculation screens. face of the screens and extends at least 8 ft, 3 in perpendicular to the front and at least 7 ft to the side of the face of the screens.

193 2.2.03.08c.viii 8.c) The PXS viii) Inspections of the viii) Inspections of the provides RCS IRWST and IRWST and makeup, boration, containment containment and safety injection recirculation screens recirculation screens during design will be conducted. The will be conducted. The basis events. inspections will include inspections will include measurements of the measurements of the pockets and the pockets and the number of pockets number of pockets used in each screen. used in each screen.

The pocket frontal face The pocket frontal face area is based on a area is based on a width times a height. width times a height 76

194 2.2.03.08c.ix 8.c) The PXS The width is the mesh size of 0.0625 provides RCS distance between inch. IRWST Screen C makeup, boration, pocket centerlines for has a sufficient number and safety injection pockets located beside of pockets to provide a during design each other. The height frontal face area 50 basis events. is the distance between ft2, a screen surface pocket centerlines for area 1150 ft2, and a pockets located above screen mesh size each other. The pocket 0.0625 inch. Each screen area is the total containment area of perforated plate recirculation screen has inside each pocket; this a sufficient number of area will be determined pockets to provide a by inspection of the frontal face area 105 screen manufacturing ft2, a screen surface drawings. area 2500 ft2, and a screen mesh size 0.0625 inch. A debris curb exists in front of the containment recirculation screens which is 2 ft above the loop compartment floor. The bottoms of the IRWST screens are located 6 in above the bottom of the IRWST.

194 2.2.03.08c.ix 8.c) The PXS ix) Inspections will be ix) The type of provides RCS conducted of the insulation used on makeup, boration, insulation used inside these lines and and safety injection the containment on the equipment is a metal during design ASME Class 1 lines, reflective type or a basis events. reactor vessel, reactor suitable equivalent. If coolant pumps, an insulation other than pressurizer and steam metal reflective generators. insulation is used, a Inspections will be report must exist and conducted of other conclude that the insulation used inside insulation is a suitable the containment within equivalent. The type of the zone of influence insulation used on (ZOI). Inspection will be these lines and conducted of other equipment is a metal insulation below the reflective type or a maximum flood level of suitable equivalent. If a design basis loss-of- an insulation other than coolant accident metal reflective (LOCA). insulation is used, a report must exist and conclude that the 77

insulation is a suitable equivalent. The type of insulation used on these lines is metal reflective insulation, jacketed fiberglass, or a suitable equivalent.

If an insulation other than metal reflective or jacketed fiberglass insulation is used, a report must exist and conclude that the insulation is a suitable equivalent.

195 2.2.03.08c.x 8.c) The PXS provides x) Inspections will be x) A report exists and RCS makeup, boration, conducted of the as- concludes that the and safety injection built nonsafety- coatings used on during design basis related coatings or of these surfaces have a events. plant records of the dry film density of nonsafety-related 100 lb/ft3. If a coating coatings used inside is used that has a containment on lower dry film density, walls, floors, ceilings, a report must exist and structural steel and conclude that the except in the CVS coating will not room. Inspections transport. A report will be conducted of exists and concludes the as-built non- that inorganic zinc safety-related coatings used on coatings or of plant these surfaces are records of the non- Safety - Service safety-related Level I or have been coatings used on quantified and components below justified in a program the maximum flood for management of level of a design unqualified coatings basis LOCA or to demonstrate the located above the unqualified coatings maximum flood level are acceptable for and not inside use. A report exists cabinets or and concludes that enclosures. tags and signs used Inspections will be in these locations are conducted on made of steel or caulking, tags, and another metal with a signs used inside density 100 78

containment below lb/ft3. In addition, a the maximum flood report exists and level of a design concludes that basis LOCA or caulking used in located above the these locations or maximum flood level coatings used on and not inside these signs or tags cabinets or have a dry film enclosures. density of 100 lb/ft3.

Inspections will be If a material is used conducted of that has a lower ventilation filters and density, a report must fiber-producing fire exist and conclude barriers used inside that there is containment within insufficient water flow the ZOI or below the to transport maximum flood level lightweight caulking, of a design basis signs, or tags. A LOCA. report exists and concludes that the ventilation filters and fire barriers in these locations have a density of 100 lb/ft3.

522 2.5.02.02.i 2. The seismic Category i) Inspection will be i) The seismic I equipment, identified in performed to verify Category I equipment Table 2.5.2-1, can that the seismic identified in Table withstand seismic design Category I 2.5.21 is located on basis loads without loss equipment identified the Nuclear Island.

of safety function. 3. in Table 2.5.21 is ii) A report exists and The Class 1E located on the concludes that the equipment, identified in Nuclear Island. ii) seismic Category I Table 2.5.2-1, has Type tests, analyses, equipment can electrical surge or a combination of withstand seismic withstand capability type tests and design basis loads (SWC), and can analyses of seismic without loss of safety withstand the Category I function. iii) A report electromagnetic equipment will be exists and concludes interference (EMI), radio performed. iii) that the as-built frequency interference Inspection will be equipment including (RFI), and electrostatic performed for the anchorage is discharge (ESD) existence of a report seismically bounded conditions that would verifying that the as- by the tested or exist before, during, and built equipment analyzed conditions.

following a design basis including anchorage A report exists and accident without loss of is seismically concludes that the safety function for the bounded by the Class 1E equipment time required to perform tested or analyzed identified in Table the safety function. 4. conditions. Type 2.5.21 can withstand The Class 1E tests, analyses, or a the SWC, EMI, RFI, 79

equipment, identified in combination of type and ESD conditions that Table 2.5.2-1, can tests and analyses would exist before, withstand the room will be performed on during, and following a ambient temperature, the equipment. design basis accident humidity, pressure, and Type tests, without loss of safety mechanical vibration analyses, or a function for the time conditions that would combination of type required to perform the exist before, during, tests and analyses safety function. A and following a design will be performed on report exists and basis accident without the Class 1E concludes that the loss of safety function equipment identified Class 1E equipment for the time required to in Table 2.5.2-1. identified in Table 2.5.2-perform the safety 1 can withstand the function. room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

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801 3.3.00.07d.ii.b 7.d) Physical Refer to Unit 4 COL Refer to Unit 4 COL separation is for electrical for electrical maintained between separation ITAAC separation ITAAC Class 1E divisions consolidation consolidation and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables.

821 3.3.00.16 16. Secondary An inspection will be Secondary security security power supply performed to ensure power supply system for alarm that the location of the equipment for alarm annunciator secondary security annunciator equipment and non- power supply equipment and portable equipment for alarm nonportable communications annunciator communication equipment is located equipment and equipment is located within a vital area. nonportable within a vital area.

communications equipment is within a vital area.

822 3.3.00.17 17. Vital areas are An inspection of the Vital areas are locked and alarmed as-built vital areas, locked and alarmed with active intrusion and central and with active intrusion detection systems that secondary alarm detection systems annunciate in the stations are and intrusion is central and secondary performed. detected and alarm stations upon annunciated in both intrusion into a vital the central and area. 18. Deleted secondary alarm stations.

823 3.5.00.01.i 1. The seismic i) Inspection will be i) The seismic Category I equipment performed to verify Category I identified in Table that the seismic equipment identified 3.51 can withstand Category I equipment in Table 3.51 is seismic design basis identified in Table located on the loads without loss of 3.51 is located on the Nuclear Island. ii) A safety function. 2. Nuclear Island. ii) report exists and The Class 1E Type tests, analyses, concludes that the equipment identified in or a combination of seismic Category I Table 3.5-1 as being type tests and equipment can qualified for a harsh analyses of seismic withstand seismic environment can Category I equipment design basis loads withstand the will be performed. iii) without loss of safety environmental Inspection will be function. iii) A conditions that would performed for the report exists and exist before, during, existence of a report concludes that the and following a design verifying that the as- as-built equipment basis accident without built equipment including anchorage including anchorage is is seismically seismically bounded bounded by the by the tested or tested or analyzed 81

loss of safety function analyzed conditions. conditions. i) A for the time required i) Type tests, report exists and to perform the safety analyses, or a concludes that Class function. combination of type 1E equipment tests and analyses will identified in Table be performed on 3.5-1 as being Class 1E equipment located in a harsh located in a harsh environment can environment. ii) withstand the Inspection will be environmental performed of the as- conditions that would built Class 1E exist before, during, equipment and the and following a associated wiring, design basis cables, and accident without loss terminations located in of safety function for a harsh environment. the time required to perform the safety function. ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 3.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

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