IR 05000382/1986022

Insp Rept 50-382/86-22 on 861013-17.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Performance & Capabilities During Emergency Plan & Procedures Exercise

ML20214P305
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	11/25/1986
From:	Hackney C, Yandell L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214P302	List: IR 05000382/1986022 ML20214P299
References
50-382-86-22, NUDOCS 8612040153
Download: ML20214P305 (16)

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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-382/86-22 License: NPF-38 Docket: 50-382 Licensee: Louisiana Power & Light Company 317 Baronne Street P. O. Box 60340 New Orleans, Louisiana 70160 Facility Name: Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station (SES)

Inspection At: Waterford 3 SES site near Killona, Louisiana Inspection Conducted: October 13-17, 1986 Inspector: d .M ad c3 //- AM - @ le_

C. A. Hackney, Emergency @reparedness Analyst Date Accompanying Personnel: G. Sanborn, NRC, RIV N. Terc, NRC, RIV J. Baird, NRC, RIV D. Perrotti, NRC, I&E T. Lynch, Battelle K. Loposer, Comex

Approved: h/h it ,2fNb L. A. Yandell, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Dat6 '

and Safeguards Section Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted October 13-17, 1986(Report 50-382/86-22)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's performance and capabilities during an exercise of the emergency plan and procedure Results: Within the emergency response areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. One unresolved item (technical support center adequacy paragraph 5) and one deficiency (poor emergency operations facility information flow paragraph 8) were identifie '

8612040153 861126 PDR ADOCK 05000382 G PDR

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-2-DETAILS Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Personnel

• J. Dewease, Senior - Vice President Nuclear Operations

• F. Drummond, Nuclear Services Manager

• P. Backes, Operations Quality Assurance Manager

• J. Sleger, Jr. , Executive Assistant

• F. Englebrach, Plant Administration Manager

• R. Azzarello, Erergency Planning Manager

• K. Cook, Nuclear Support and Licensing Manager

• J. Lewis, Onsite Emergency Planning Coordinator D. Dufrene, Radwaste Helper D. Hoel, Health Physics Supervisor M. Mason, Shift Control Technician W. Perry, Training Instructor B. Crawley, Training Instructor D. Landeche, Health Physics Supervisor Coordinator S. Lubinski, Emergency Planner W. Favaloro, Training Instructor State of Louisiana W. Spell, Administrator, Nuclear Energy Division St. Ch' aries Parish J. Lucas, Emergency Preparedness Director NRC

• J. Leuhman, Senior Resident Inspector

• T. Staker, Resident Inspector Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

G. Jones, Emergency Management Programs Specialist The NRC inspectors also held discussions with other station and corporate personnel in the areas of health physics, operations, and emergency response organizatio * Denotes those present at the exit intervie . _ Licensee Action On Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-01): This item was reported completed by the licensee as of April 4, 1984. Procedures EP-1-010, " Unusual Event;"

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-3-EP-1-020, Alert; and EP-1-040, General Emergency; all contained box-notes specifying that the alarm is to be sounded prior to'the public address announcement incident to the annual exercise conducted on October 15, 198 It was observed that this practice was correctly followed. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-02): This item was reported completed by the licensee as of May 23, 1984. During the exercise conducted on October 15, 1986, it was observed that the volume of the site announcing system in the shift supervisor and communicator station areas was adequate; the level of the volume in the main area of the control room appeared low. This volume can be adjusted higher, but was set at the level preferred by the operators. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-03): The licensee reported this item completed as of November 28, 198 Incident to the annual exercise conducted on October 15, 1986, a check of procedures in use in the control room was made. All procedures checked were noted to be controlled copie This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-04): The licensee reported this item completed as of October 25, 1984. During the annual exercise conducted on October 15, 1986, the NRC inspector observed the communicator prepare and insert alert tapes, and shift to an information tape directing callers to the technical support center, after the technical support center was activated. The escalation to site area emergency occurred after technical support center activatinn, thus no observation of a shift of tapes from alert to site area emergency was available. The operation, as observed, was performed correctly. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-05): The licensee reported this item completed as of November 28, 1984. During the course of the annual exercise conducted on October 15, 1986, the shift supervisor / emergency coordinator conducted sufficient status briefings of his personnel to assure they were adequately informed. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-06): The emergency coordinator provided frequent status updates to the technical support center staff throughout the course of the exercise. Discussions with the technical support center control center coordinators and public address (PA) system announcements kept the technical support center staff well informe This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-07): Procedure EP-2-100 was revised and now requires parallel announcements over the sound powered phone. During the exercise, the operations communicator cbserved that PA announcements were heard and understood at the various facilities or he provided a parallel announcemen This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-09): Proceaures EP-1-010 through 040 have been revised to require a sounding of the plant alarm prior to the public address announcement for declaration, escalation, or de escalation of an

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-4-emergenc During the exercise, public address announcements of an emergency declaration and escalation were preceded by the plant alar All alarms and announcenents were repeated. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-10): The emergency coordinator was supported throughout the exercise by the operations coordinator, technical support center supervisor, and health physics group to a great degree and by the engineering group to a. lesser degree. Assessments were made and potential problems were identified. A dose projection was done early on to estimate the consequences of major fuel damage for two postulated occurrences, loss of coolant accident and steam line atmospheric dump valve failure. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-11): The security guard in the emergency operational facility had an authorized personnel access list and maintained the list during the exercise. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-12): The emergency operations facility director has been assigned the authority to grant access to the emergency operations facility. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-13): This item is closed and incorporated into deficiency 8622-01. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-14): This item is closed and incorporated into deficiency 8622-01. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-15): Personnel were observed to adequately provide dose assessments based on core / containment conditions. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-16): The emergency coordinator and the technical support center staff had input into the protective actions recommendations. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-17): This item is closed and incorporated into deficiency 8622-01. This item is close ,

(Closed) Open Item (382/8410-18): Personnel were requested to check their dosimeters and personnel were observed checking the dosimeter during the exercise. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-19): Announcements were made prior to and during the release that no smoking, eating, or drinking was allowe This item is close l l

(Closed) Open Item (382/8410-20): The new emergency operations facility ;

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-5-(Closed) Open Item (382/8410-21): Adequate space had been provided in the emergency operations facility for operations / engineering / technical services staf This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-23): Accountability personnel were stationed at the technical support center, emergency operations facility, and operations support center for accountability purposes. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-24): The NRC inspector noted that Procedure EP-2-101 specified the +7 foot elevation as the assembly point for the fire brigade and the emergency first aid team. It was noted during the exercise that the search and rescue team assembled in the operational support center and the emergency first aid team assembled at-the +7 foot elevation. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-25): The NRC inspector noted that" Procedure EP-2-101 instructed both the operations personnel and the Radiological Controls Coordinator to ensure that health physics coverage

, was provided for the fire brigade. Briefings given to the search and rescue team in the operational support center included having them report to the health physics access control point at the -4 foot elevation, which they did. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-26): The NRC inspector noted that status l board drawings of the +7 foot elevation and several other locations in both the reactor auxiliary building and the reactor containment building were available in the operational support center. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-27): The NRC inspector noted that Procedure EP-2-060 includes an equipment inventory sheet. Kits were inventoried during the exercise using the checklist to account for the equipment. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-28): The NRC inspector noted that the security / accountability desk was located near the entrance to the operational support center during the exercise. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-29): The NRC inspector noted that the operational support center roster board has been divided into several sections which include electrical, mechanical, health physics, instrumentation and control, operations, chemistry, and other. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (382/8410-30): The NRC inspector noted that Procedure'EP-2-034 requires surveys of. occupied areas onsite such as the operational support center and emergency operations center. The operational support center locker contained equipment and instrumentation needed for measuring dose rates, taking of air samples, and analyzing air sample This item is close ._

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-6-h (Closed) Open Item'(50-382/8410-31): The NRC inspector noted that Attachment 7.2-to Procedure EP-2-060 had been revised to include backup portable radios on th2-list. These radios were observed to be used during-the exercise. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (50-382/8410-32): The NRC inspector noted that guidance on the use of protective devices (including protective clothing, respiratory protection, and potassium iodine) had been provided in Procedure EP-2-060. This item is close (Closed) 0 pen Item-(50-382/8410-33): The NRC inspector noted that Procedure EP-2-060 included instructions to identify the side of the particulate filter to be' counted and which side of the silver zeolite cartridge to place near the detector. During the exercise, it was observed that this procedure was followed. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (50-382/8410-34): The licensee conducted an unannounced drill on December 14, 1984, and had conducted additional drills prior-to the annual exercis This item is close (Closed) Open Item (50-382/8410-35): During this exercise, a media representative from St. Charles Parish, Louisiana Nuclear. Energy Division, Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness, and the Governor's Press Secretary were dispatched to the LP&L news center. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (50-382/8410-36): The importance of briefing the medical person accompanying the injured person to the hospital had been included in the first responder's training. ' This item is . close (Closed) Deficiency (382/8525-01): The licensee reported that corrective action for this item had been completed as of December 30, 1985. During the annual exercise conducted on October 15, 1985, the NRC inspector noted that this requirement was supported in each of the procedures for the four l emergency classifications, specifically, EP-1-010, 020, 030, and 040. It was further observed during the exercise that notification of NRC Headquarters was completed (for the notification of unusual event) at 8:21 a.m., 31 minutes following the declaration of the notification of unusual event at 7:41 a.m. No further notifications were made (per NRC-HQ request) until exercise terminatio This item is close (Closed) Deficiency (382/8525-02): The licensee reported that corrective

! action (procedure revisions) would.be completed as of March 3, 1986. A

, review of the four emergency classification procedures, EP-1-010, 020, f' 030, and 040, confirmed that these procedures now reflect adequate support

for providing periodic updates to state and local agencies at regular r intervals; nominally 30 minutes. Observations during the annual exercise conducted on October 15, 1986, substantiated that periodic updates were provided. This item is close (Closed) Deficiency (382/8525-03)

Notification of Unusual Event was made to NRC in a timely manner and according to 10 CFR 50.72. Information on

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I-7-reactor conditions and dose assessment was provided to the NRC site team during the exercise. Notifications of the alert, site area emergency, and general emergencies and follow-up notifications were made available to NRC

! Headquarters. This item is close (Closed) Deficiency (382/8525-04): This item is closed and is considered to be an unresolved item with response due from the NRC to Louisiana Power l

& Light Company. The adequacy of technical support center working space L is to be addressed in the emergency response facility review that will be conducted in the future. This item is close Improvement items listed.in Report 50-382/85-25 were reviewed with the following observations:

The communicator's telephone was located in an area accessible to him. However, there was not a dedicated instrument for the hot lin Rather, the hot line was one of six lines available on that instrumen 'The shift supervisor was observed using station personnel to fill out forms, etc. It appeared that such duties did not inhibit him from performing his primary dutie The resource book was reviewed and found to contain a note alerting communicators that the Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division (LNED)

telephone number shown is for normal working hours, with supplementary information regarding off-hours notification of LNED to be done by the Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness. A discussion with the assigned communicator confirmed his understanding of this arrangemen The communicator assigned in the control room to make the state and local notifications also performed the 10 CFR 50.72 communication requirement. This kept him very busy, but in this instance he was able to complete all required notifications as specified.

l 3. Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario was reviewed to determine if provisions had been made to exercise the licensce's emergency preparedness organization in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, Section F, and the guidance contained in NUREG 0654 Section 11.n. The review included an evaluation of the adequacy of both the operational and radiological aspects of the scenario. Specific areas reviewed included the objectives, controller messages, plant parameter data, sequence of events, and onsite and offsite radiological data. The results of the review are as follows:

The scenario contained a narrative summary of events which occurred and the rationale behind the events; Scenario messages were adequate to maintain the scenario timeline;

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-8-The plant parameter data and radiological data were adequate to support the sequence of events;

The scenario challenged the operations personnel capability for emergency detection, classification, and subsequent notification . Control Room Initial conditions were provided to the control room staff assigned as exercise participants at 6:45 a.m., and included the following: The plant had been operating at an almost constant 100 percent power for the past 30 days after a refueling outag The "A/B" charging pump was out-of-service due to severe packing gland leaks. Packing on orde The "A/B" High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pump was out-of-service due to bearing failure. Expect replacement parts by October 16, 198 The "B" emergency diesel generator was out-of-service due to a turbocharger bearing failur The "A" emergency feedwater pump was operable but operating in the

" alert" range for vibration The "B" Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pump was out-of-service for oil change and lubricatio The surveillance test is expected to be complete by about 9:30 The exercise began at 7:35 a.m. when a seismic event was felt in the plant and corroborated by a seismic event alarm actuation and by the strong motion accelerograph system showing the yellow event alarm illuminate The licensee declared o notification of unusual event and made the appropriate notifications, while at tha same time initiating a plant walkdown for damage assessment. The walkdown revealed, at about 8:20 a.m., that the discharge piping on the "A" LPSI pump had been cracked and the leakage had sprayed onto the pump moto A weld repair was required, and in the interim both LPSI pumps would be out-of-servic As a result, the licensee declared an alert at 8:38 a.m. and the required notifications were mad Another casualty of the earthquake, but not observable during the walkdown, was the containment vacuum relief isolation valve, CVR 201, which moved off its seat but continued to indicate closed on the reactor control panel. The breach of containment did not become evident until later in the exercis The technical support center was activated and the shift supervisor was relieved by the emergency coordinator at 9:05 _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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-9-The "B" LPSI pump was returned to service at 9:25 a.m., but at 9:40 a.m. a i total icss of AC power occurred,-commencing with a loss of offsite power and compounded by the failure of the "A" emergency diesel generator output

- breaker to close after the diesel started. ' A station blackout resulted and at 9:50 a.m. the licensee declared a site area emergenc At 10:11 a.m. the "A" emergency diesel generator output breaker was closed, which restored power to some systems and component At 10:18 a.m. the emergency feedwater (EFW) pump "A" was reported inoperable; at 10:54 a.m. the "A/B" EFW pump oversped and tripped. With levels dropping in both steam generators, the licensee declared a general emergency at 11:03 a.m. based on a degrading core condition and loss of all feedwater capability. Subsequently, both steam generators boiled dry about 12:16 p.m. and reactor coolant system pressure commenced increasing. ,

AT 12:25 p.m., almost simultaneously with restoration and restart of the l

"A" EFW pump, the pressurizer relief valve lifted, then failed to resea At approximately 12:30 p.m., the quench tank rupture disk ruptured, relieving the quench tank contents to atmosphere, through the' failed l containment vacuum relief. valve and the shield building ventilation l system. This release continued until the containment vacuum relief valve

was closed at 14

33 With the "A" EFW pump operating and feeding a steam generator, a controlled cool down was initiate At approximately 1:05 p.m. , a medical emergency occurred; a simulated heart attack and subsequent contamination. The injured victim was administered emergency first aid and evacuated to West Jefferson General Hospital where he was treated and decontaminate With the release terminated, the basic exercise was terminated at

'3:24 p.m. A 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time jump was simulated.and recovery planning was conducte The NRC inspectors observed that control room personnel consulted appropriate (Controlled Copy) procedures for the events. Initial notifications to the Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness and to both Parishes were made within 15 minutes after the events were classified. Subsequent follow-up notifications were made as specified in the procedures. Initial notification to NRC Headquarters was at 8:12 a.m., 31 minutes after notification of unusual event classificatio Control room operators exhibited professionalism, an excellent attitude, and good foresight in responding to situations. Bound logs were used and were well-kep The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's attention. These observations are neither violations nor unresolved item These items were recommended for licensee consideration for improvescnt, but they have no specific regulatory requirement:

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-10-When notifications are made to Parishes and state agencies, the communicator should exercise care to differentiate between the pre-established call back numbers and a number which can be used for obtaining amplifying information in the event that the dedicated hot line is lost or additional information is require Communicators should be instructed not to refer to a number provided as a

" verification" or " validation" call back number. If an agency--

desires to validate a suspected bogus call, they should use the number previously provided to the Make procedural provisions for establishing a radiological check point at the entrance to the control room / technical support center area to guard against contamination of those areas by persons entering who may have become contaminated enrout An arrangement similar to that used at the emergency operations facility would appear adequat No violations or deviations were identifie . Technical Support Center The technical support center was staffed and declared operational within approximately 40 minutes from the declaration of the alert. Technical support center personnel appeared to be knowledgeable of their duties and were observed using controlled copies of emergency plan implementing procedures. Command and control of the technical support center by the emergency coordinator throughout the exercise was excellent. The use of a

" goals" status board by the emergency coordinator was very effective in focusing the efforts of the technical support center on major items for mitigation. The goals were initially prioritized, then adjusted / modified as accident conditions warranted. The general conduct of the technical support center staff during the exercise was good. For example, there was no pre-staging of individuals, and personnel followed instructions regarding no eating, drinking, or smoking, checking self-reading dosimeters ceriodically, and accountability checks when departing the technical support cente Accident assessment and classification, communication with the other facilities (i.e., emergency operations facility, operational support center), protective action recommendations and notifications to offsite i

authorities, dose assessment, and engineering support functions in the technical support center were adequately demonstrate The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's attention. These observations are neither violations nor unresolved items. These items were recommended for licensee consideration for improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requirement:

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Status boards should be utilized to their fullest extent (e.g., dose assessment was not trended and onsite-(out-of plant) radiation levels information was not shown on the site map).

The technical support center should continue to perform dose assessment for offsite areas'as a backup comparison after this function has been transferred to the emergency operations facilit <

Feedback should be obtained and posted on the status board regarding protective actions actually implemented by state / local authoritie *

Coordination with and support to the emergency operations facility should be enhanced regarding de-esollation from a general emergency (per procedure) prior to termination of an exercis *

The public address speaker system / announcement process used in the technical support center control ; center should be improved so that -

announcements made from the technical support center over the public address system can be heard and understood in all areas of th control cente In addition to the items addressed by the' licensee and closed by this exercise, as discussed in paragraph 2'of this report, the licensee also addressed an. improvement item pertaining to control and accountability of the technical support center that was identified by the inspection. team during last year's exercise. EP-2-100 was revised and now requires the technical support center supervisor toiappoint a facility accountability coordinator to provide for continuous accountability. During the exercise, the emergency coordinator instructed the technical support center staff to be ccgnizant of accountability and to log in/out when entering / departing the-technical support center area. In addition, a manned log station was provided to keep track of persons leaving and entering the technical support center are The layout of the technical support center has been inodified to provide a workspace for three NRC site personnel. However, space limitations continue to be a general problem in the -technical support center control center. For example, one NRC workspace was assigned to a desk with two other technical support center staff personnel that had sufficient space for only one person, two at the most. Also, the technical support center was very crowded during the exercise, noise became a problem at times, and the overcrowded conditions led to higher than normal. ambient temperatur Final determination of the adequacy of this facility will be made during the NRC emergency response facility appraisal to be performed at a future date. This remains an unresolved item pending the results of that appraisal (382/8622-01).

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-12-6. Operational Support Center The operational support center was activated in a timely manne Solutions to problems in the plant were pursued aggressively, and effective use of the operational support center resources was demonstrated. Status boards were maintained with the current condition Communications with the control room and. the technical support center were very good; however, the noise level during station announcements was excessive. Personnel accountability in the operational support center was effectively maintained. Reentry teams were briefed on the radiological conditions that could be anticipate The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's attention. These observations are neither violations nor unresolved items. These items were recommended for licensee consideration for improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requirement:

The inplant radiological conditions encountered by the majority of the reentry teams did not challenge the health physics staff's ability to pre plan for an activity where personnel could receive a significant dose. Future health physics drill scenarios should contain radiological conditions that will challenge the health physics staf The emergency team briefing sheets should allow for an approval signature by either the operational support center supervisor or the radiological controls coordinator. Training should be provided for operational support center personnel to ensure the forms are filled out completel _The telephones in the operational support center should have indicating lights to facilitate identifying which telephone is ringin The use of headsets by communicators and reducing the volume of the public address system in the operational support center supervisor's office are recommended due to the noise level during public address announcements in the operational support cente The criterion for operational support center activation contained in EP-2-101 should be modified to reflect the minimum staffing levels contained in table 5-1 of the emergency pla A checklist should be developed for use by the operational support center supervisor during activation of the operational support cente A continuous air monitor should be placed in operation in the operational support cente No violations or deviations were identifie . .-

-13-7. Offsite Monitoring The NRC inspector observed the formation and dispatch of the offsite field monitoring teams, and accompanied one team (team alpha) in the-field throughout the exercise. Three teams were formed at the -4 control point following the declaration of an alert classification. The teams were dispatched to the backup operational support center, where the field monitoring kit' equipment was obtained, inventoried, and checked in accordance with emergency' plan implementing procedure EP-2-060,

" Radiological Field Monitoring." The teams were then deployed to the field at approximately 9:30 The NRC inspector noted that the team was apprised of the emergency and plant conditions prior to dispatch by a public address announcement, and l

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of radiological and meteorological conditions by radio when they arrived at the designated monitoring stations. After arrival at the designated monitoring station, the radiological control technician discovered that his Eberline R02 dose rate instrument (HP-DR-040) calibration had expired October 7,1986. This had not been discovered during the initial checkout at the backup operational support center because EP-2-060 did not specifically require a check of the calibration date. The technician reported this to the dose assessment coordinator and was directed to return to the plant and pick up a calibrated instrument. Upon return to the field, the technician also found that his'Ludlum 12 count rate instrument (HP-CR-067) calibration had expired October 2, 1986. This instrument was used for contamination control only and was not replaced during the exercise. This deficiency was identified by both the NRC inspector and the licensee exercise monitor. After the exercise, the NRC inspector reviewed Procedure EP-3-040, " Emergency Equipment Inventury,"

and inventory records for 1986. The inventory records showed that the procedure had been followed; however, the NRC inspector noted that the procedure did not require the same degree of control for instruments exchanged between the quarterly inventory dates, and the allowable time to the next instrument calibration was not explicitly provide During the field monitoring activities observed, the NRC inspector noted that the technician frequently consulted procedures and demonstrated good sampling and radiological control techniques. Radio transmissions of sample data and instructions to and from the technical support center and emergency operations facility were generally well done; however, radio interference was experienced at times which required relay of messages between teams and the use of land line to complete communications with the emergency operations facility at one monitoring location. Each team collected several air samples and monitored direct radiation at multiple locations, b4t appeared to be standing by and waiting for direction most of the time. %The teams were kept aware of the emergency conditions except for a period of about one hour beginning at approximately 10 a.m., and they were not notified when a site area emergency was declared. The NRC inspector noted that two field monitoring teams were called in to the emergency operations facility to pickup lunches during the early stages of general emergency and then directed into the plume to make field

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measurement It was also noted that specific directions were not given to the teams on how to enter the emergency operations facility and obtain the lunches; this resulted in delays for one team and the use of an exercise monitor to get lunches for the other tea The following are observations the NRC inspector called to the licensee's attention. These observations are neither violations nor unresolved items. These items were recommended for licensee consideration for improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requiremen *

Emergency preparedness implementing procedure EP-2-060 should be i revised to require that a check of the instruments calibration date be conducted prior to field munitoring team deployment. Also., the procedure should be revised to require reporting the air sample initiation time with the sample counting data transmitted back to the technical support center / emergency operations facilit *

Future exercise scenarios should provide for more field monitoring (

team activities so that the teams are fully drilled during the exercis Provisions for lunches for field teams should be made that do not impact offsite field monitoring coverag Emergency Support Procedure EP-3-040 should be revised to require documentation of instrument replacement which occurs between inventory checks and provide more specific calibration date requirements.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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8. Emergency Operations Facility The emergency operations facility director failed to establish himself clearly as the person overall responsible for the direction and coordination of the emergency response organization. Clear announcements to that effect were not made. As a consequence, the NRC inspectors noted that various members of the emergency operations facility organization were not aware of the emergency operations facility director's overall authority and some perceived that command and overall direction stemmed from the control room or the technical support center. The inspectors f also noted that, at times, the emergency operations facility director had difficulty in obtaining information from his staf Moreover, the inspectors noted that the operation coordinator was occupied with lengthy telephone conversations with his technical support center counterpart In a similar manner, the radiological assessment coordinator was occupying a large portion of his time updating the plume exposure pathway on status boards and walking into the dose assessment room outside of the command center to retrieve updated information on offsite condition As a consequence, these key personnel were not allowed a sufficient amount of

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-15-detachment from immediate routine tasks to be able to evaluate and summarize information in a manner that would be useful to the emergency operations facility directo The NRC inspectors did not observe simultaneous and frequent meetings of

,the radiological and operations coordinators with the emergency operations facility directo Such meetings should have been conducted to provide the emergency operations facility director with simultaneous radiological and plant status required for making effective decisions. Specific tasks should have been assigned to ensure that a convergent flow of information moves along the organizational structure so that key personnel in operations and radiological assessment areas can detach themselves from immediate routine tasks and provide syntheses of distilled information to the emergency operations facility thereby facilitating organizational command and control and decisionmaking processe Training modules should be modified to reflect revisions made in the internal. organization of the emergency operations facility. In particular, key emergency operations facility personnel, e.g., emergency op! rations facility director and operations and radiological assessment coordinators, must become familiar with their interfaces during an emergency and aware of the demands made on their staff to ensure that information flow is efficient. Data needs ,to be collected, promptly analyzed, evaluated, and synthesized before it is passed on to the emergency operations facility directo Based on the above observations by the NRC inspectors, the following item is considered to be an emergency preparedness deficiency:

The internal organization of the emergency operations facility was not conducive to information flow patterns that would support organizational command and control and decision making processes (382/8622-02). Media The NRC inspector noted that the emergency news center was activated in a timely manner. The licensee's exercise objectives were to demonstrate the ability to develop, coordinate, and disseminate timely and accurate public information bulletins. Although there was a problem in one instance with timeliness, the licensee met these objectives. The NRC inspector was able to determine that an effective system existed for gathering information, ensuring its accuracy, and disseminating it to the news media and the public. In addition, there was ample demonstration of coordination among spokespersons for all of the organizations represented at the news cente Representatives from Louisiana Power & Light Company, the Louisiana Office of Energency Preparedness, the Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division, the Governors office, St. Charles Parish and Federal Emergency Management Agency Region VI served as spokesperson There was one delay in disseminating information to the media concerning the release of radioactivity from the plant. Approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and

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-16-20 minutes elapsed from the time the radiological release began at Waterford 3 to the time the news media were notified. Although some delay is justified in disseminating this type of information (e.g. , decision making, radiological release calculations, and notifications), the information should be given to the news media in a more timely manne No violations or deviations were identifie . Exercise Critique The NRC inspectors attended the post-exercise critique by the licensee's staff on Octcher 16, 1986, to evaluate the licensee's identification of deficiencies and weaknesses as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and Appendix E of Part 50, paragraph IV.F.5. The licensee staff identified the deficiency listed belo Corrective action for identified deficiencies and weaknesses will be examined during a future NRC inspectio Two portable radiation detection instruments in field monitoring kit

"A" were past due for calibratio No violations or deviations were identifie . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more inforr.ation is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations. An unresolved item identified during the inspection is discussed in paragraph . Exit Meeting The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in

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paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on October 17, 1986. The inspector summarized the purpose and the scope of the inspection and the findings. Additionally, the licensee representatives were informed that additional findings may result following a briefing from the NRC site team. The licensee's actions during the exercise were found to be adequate to protect the health and safety of the public.

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