IR 05000382/1998018
| ML20198H824 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198H822 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-98-18, NUDOCS 9812300030 | |
| Download: ML20198H824 (18) | |
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l-ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
50-382 License No.:
NPF-38 Report No.:
50-382/98 18 Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
l Facility:
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
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i Location:
Hwy.18 Killona, Louisiana Dates:
October 18 through November 28,1998 Inspectors:
T. R. Farnholtz, Senior Resident inspector j
J. M. Keeton, Resident inspector R. L. Nease, Reactor inspector
- Approved By:
P. H. Harrell, Chief, Project Branch D Attachment:
Supplemental Information 9812300030 981221 PDR ADOCK 05000382 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
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NRC Inspection Report 50-382/98-18
i This routine, announced inspection included aspects of operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support activities. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
Operations
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Three-part communications between control room operators and operators in the field
L were very good. Briefings for cuatainment entry were thorough and ALARA (as-low-as-reasonably-achievable) was highly stressed. Use of procedures by control room operators during the forced outage duration was very good. The licensee's conservative approach to the emerging problems during the forced outage was very good (Section 01.2).
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The licensee's decision to fill the spent fuel pool at a time when an increase in the reactor coolant system (RCS) leak rate had been identified was inappropriate. The fill operation required declaring Train B of the component cooling water system and cascading affected equipment inoperable at a time when the increased RCS leak rate was not fully understood. This action demonstrated a lack of recognition of current plant
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conditions as they relate to an ongoing event (Section O4.1).
Maintenance Good knowledge and ability were demonstrated by instrumentation and control L
technicians during replacement and calibration of a circuit board for the controlled ventilation area system exhaust fan (Section M1.1).
l ne maintenance technicians demonstrated good knowledge during disassembly and
assembly of the valve actuator. The work authorization had received less than adequate review and walkdown by the planners (Section M1.2).
The material condition of the reactor containment building and the components located
l inside the building were acceptable with some areas of concern noted. Surface rust and corrosion were observed on system components such as valves and junction boxes.
Dust and dirt accumulation was noted on surfaces and a significant amount of debris was retrieved from the building prior to power operation (Section M2.1).
Enaineerina l
An engineering evaluation for the installation and removal of a temporary alteration to
replace a failed nonsafety related temperature sensor output with a safety-related output was complete and sufficiently detailed. Relevant aspects of the alteration were addressed and well documented (Section E2.1).
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Plant Suooort.
. The performance of health physics personnel during the forced maintenance outage I
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was very good. Good awareness of changing plant conditions and routine use of
. ALARA techniques was observed (Section R4.1).
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Report Details Summary of Plant Status During this inspection period, the plant operated at essentially 100 percent power until November 18,1998, when a reactor shutdown was commenced due to an increase in RCS l
leakage. The plant remained shutdown for the remainder of the inspection period to perform
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repairs to a reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal assembly.
I. Operations
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Conduct of Operations (71707)
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01.1 General Comments (71707)
l The inspectors performed frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations, control room panel walkdowns, and _olant tours. Observed activities were performed in a manner consistent with safe operation of the facility. The inspectors also observed several shift turnovers and daily routine shift activities. The shift turnovers were conducted in an effective and thorough manner. The inspectors observed operators using self-checking i
and peer-checking techniques when manipulating plant equipment. Three-way communication was consistently used by operators in the control room and in external communications with equipment operators and maintenance personnel.
01.2 Forced Shutdown to Repair RCP Seal Leak a.
Inspection Scope (71707. 93702)
The inspectors evaluated licensee activities related to the forced shutdown. The inspectors reviewed procedures, observed control room operations, performed equipment walkdowns, and provided continuous coverage during periods of reduced inventory operations, b.
Observations and Findinos At 4:33 p.m. CST on November 17,1998, after performing Surveillance i.
Procedure OP-903-024, " Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance,"
Revision 13, the licensee entered Off-Normal Procedure OP-901-111," Reactor Coolant System Leak," Revision 1, upon determining that the RCS unidentified leak rate had increased from 0.135 gpm (calculated on November 16) to 0.519 gpm. At 8:50 p.m. on l
November 17, the licensee entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.5.2, " Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakago," for RCS leakage greater than 1 gpm. At 9:55 p.m. the licensee exited TS 3.4.5.2 after the more accurate 2-hour leak rate calculation performed in accordance with Surveillance Procedure OP-903-024 indicated
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that RCS unidentified leakage was below the TS limit of 1 gpm.
Prior to the first containment entry on November 17, the inspectors observed the prejob i
and containment entry authorization briefing performed by the health physics supervisor
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of operations at the west entrance to the radiation control area. The inspectors found the briefing to be thorough and well attended by representatives from operations, health
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-2-physics, and system engineering. During the containment walkdown, the inspectors i
observed good three-part communications between personnel in containment and the control room while monitoring the conversations remotely.
The licensee personnel entered containment and found water running down the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 2B shroud and spraying through a shroud access port onto the D-ring wall. Condition Report 98-1447 was initiated to document the increased RCS leakage from RCP 2B, Although not required by TS, at 4:34 a.m. on November 18 the l
licensee commenced power reduction in accordance with Procedure OP-010-001,
" General Operating Procedure," Revision 19. At 6:30 a.m. the licensee tripped the main turbine and reactor and entered Mode 3. All systems responded as expected. Another containment entry revealed that the leak appeared to be coming from the area of the upper O-ring on the RCP 2B low pressure seal package. At 5:03 p.m. on November 18, the plant entered Mode 4 and was in Mode 5, cold shutdown, at 7:08 a.m. on November 19.
The inspectors observed portions of the power reduction and the turbine and reactor trips. The inspectors noted that operators consistently used good three-part communications during the entire evolution. Operators had appropriate procedures open and referred to them often, in addition, the shift superintendent maintained strict control of all unnecessary personnel during the downpower and tnp.
The cause of the leak was identified to be a failed O-ring between the pump shaft and upper seal package on RCP 2.
Based on discussions with the pump vendor and the quantity of the leak, the licensee concluded that the leak could have starved the vapor seal of seal water flow causing face-to-face contact of the vapor seal with the pump shaft and damage to the seal. Therefore, the licensee elected to replace the entire seal package rather than only the O-ring. The inspectors found that the licensee was aggressive in identifying the source of the leak and investigated all courses of action prior to commencing with the repair.
On November 20 the inspectors observed RCS draindown below the top of the cold leg to accommodate RCP 2B seal replacement. During reduced inventory operations, the licensee maintained the RCS level at 14.5 feet rather than 13.5 feet of true midloop.
Also, both emergency diesel generators and both trains of high pressure safety injection were available for heat removal if both trains of shutdown cooling (SDC) had been lost, thus reducing the safety risk of reduced inventory operations. The seal package for RCP 2B was replaced with a new seal package in accordance with Work Authorization (WA) 01175692. The RCS was then filled and vented.
During inspection of the RCPs, damaged and heat discolored insulation was discovered on the discharge lines for RCPs 1 A,2A, and 2B. The insulation was removed and the piping was inspected. No damage to RCS piping was identified and the insulation was replaced with new insulation. The RCP motors were thoroughly inspected for evidence i
of oilleakage that could have affected the insulation. No leakage was foun.
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l An additional RCS leak of approximately 0.5 gpm had been identified on a test connection to Safety injection Tank (SIT) 1 A. The leak was determined to be from a cracked weld. SIT 1 A was drained and the cracked weld was repaired in accordance
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l with WA 01175714. The other three SIT tanks were inspected for leakage and the
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corresponding welds were dye penetrant tested with no indication of weld problems.
The SIT tank was refilled in preparation for reactor startup.
On November 22 preparation for reactor startup was initiated. Reactor heatup was commenced and Mode 4 was entered on November 23 at 9:24 a.m. following satisfactory completion of Surveillance Procedure OP-903-024, "RCS Water Inventory Balance." On November 24 at 9:28 a.m., Mode 3 was entered and heat up to normal operating temperature was continued to facilitate hot torquing and final systems inspections. At 5:20 p.m., approximately 500 F, and 2240 psia in the RCS, the system engineer for the RCPs reported that the RCP 2B seal appeared to have excessive leakage. The leakage was observed to be coming from a different area of the seal package, indicating a different failure mechanism than was experienced during the initial leak. Tha licensee determined that the leakage was unacceptable and commenced cooldown and depressurization to again replace the RCP 2B seal package and entered Mode 4 at 11:17 p.m.
On November 25 at 4:12 a.m., Mode 5 was entered and preparations were made for placing the plant in reduced inventory operation at 14.5 feet in the cold legs. The licensee planned to stay in reduced inventory fm the duration of the seal repair.
On November 26 at 8:47 a.m. during preparation for reduced inventory operation and RCP 2B seal replacement, the RCP 2B lift oil pump was started. Mechanical maintenance personnel working in the vicinity of RCP 2B reported oil spraying from the lif t oil system. The lift oil pump was secured and the system was inspected. A broken pipe was found at a nipple on the lift oilline. Approximately 100 gallons of oil were sprayed on insulation and into the sump. The fracture was determined to be caused by fatigue. The pipe was repaired and the insulation replaced. The corresponding piping on the other three RCPs was inspected using ultrasonic techniques and no pipe defeds were identified.
On November 26 at 8:30 p.m., the inspectors commenced round-the-clock coverage to observe operations during RCP 2B seal repair with the RCS in reduced inventory.
Again, the RCS was drained to 14.5 feet, just low enough to allow RCP seal removal.
During the entire reduced inventory operation, both trains of SDC, both emergency diesel generators, all three high pressure safety injection pumps, and both steam generators were available for heat removalif SDC problems had occurred.
On November 27 the seal package was removed from RCP 2B in accordance with l
WA 01175692. When the vapor seal was disassembled, the hardened rotating seal ring was found to be fractured at one of the three pin notches. The inspectors observed the l
broken seal ring and portions of the disassembly and reassembly process. Radiation
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protection precautions were very good and all personnel appeared to be ALARA conscious. The replacement seal ring was installed, the seal package was reassembled, and the seal package was reinstalled in RCP 28.
On November 28, commencing at 10:59 a.m., the inspectors observed fill and vent of
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the RCS,
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Conclusions Three-part communications between control room operators and operators in the field were very good. Briefings for containment entry were thorough and ALARA was highly stressed. Use of procedures by control room operators during the forced outage duration was very good. The licensee's conservative approach to the emerging l
problems during the forced outage was very good.
Operator Knowledge and Performance
04.1 Licensee Activities Followho an increase in RCS Leakaae Rate a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions following an apparent increase in the l
leak rate from the RCS. These actions were documented in the control room togs.
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Observations and Findinas As described in Section 01.2 of this report, the licensee began to receive indications of l
an increased RCS leak rate condition on November 17,1998.
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l At 9:35 p.m. on November 17 (45 minutes after the last leak rate data indicating greater than 1 gpm RCS leakage), the licensee commenced filling the spent fuel pool (SFP)
from the condensate storage pool. This required realigning Component Cooling Water (CCW) Makeup Water Pump B and declaring CCW Loop B inoperable. In l
addition, Procedure OP-100-014, " Technical Specification and Technical Requirements Compliance," Revision 9, Attachment 6.6, required cascading into other applicable TS
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l for affected systems. This resulted in declaring the following Train B systems l
inoperable:
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Essential Services Chilled Water (TS 3.7.12)
AC Sources (TS 3.8.1.1)
Containment Cooling System (TS 3.6.2.2)
Containment Spray (TS 3.6.2.1)
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protection precautions were very good and all personnel appeared to be ALARA conscious. The replacement seal ring was installed, the seal package was reassembled, and the seal package was reinstalled in RCP 28.
On November 28, commencing at 10:59 a.m., the inspectors observed fill and vent of the RCS.
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Conclusions
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Three-part communications between control room operators and operators in the field were very good. Briefings for containment entry were thorough and ALARA was highly stressed. Use of procedures by control room operators during the forced outage duration was very good. The licensee's conservative approach to the emerging problems during the forced outage was very good.
Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Licensee Activities Fol!owina an increase in RCS Leakaae Rate a.
Insoection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions following an apparent increase in the leak rate from the RCS. These actions were documented in the control room logs.
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Observations and Findinas As described in Section 01.2 of this report, the licensee began to receive indications of an increased RCS leak rate condition on November 17,1998.
At 9:35 p.m. on November 17 (45 minutes after the last leak rate data indicating greater than 1 gpm RCS leakage), the licensee commenced filling the spent fuel pool (SFP)
from the condensate storage pool. This required realigning Component Cooling Water (CCW) Makeup Water Pump B and declaring CCW Loop B inoperable. In addition, Procedure OP-100-014, " Technical Specification and Technical Requirements Compliance," Revision 9, Attachment 6.6, required cascading into other applicable TS for affected systems. This resulted in declaring the following Train B systems inoperable:
Essential Services Chilled Water (TS 3.7.12)
AC Sources (TS 3.8.1.1)
Containment Cooling System (TS 3.6.2.2)
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Containment Spray (TS 3.6.2.1)
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Control Room Emergency Filtration System (TS 3.7.6.1)
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Control Room Air Temperature (TS 3.7.6.3)
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Charging Pumps (TS 3.1.2.4)
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Emergency Feedwater System (TS 3.7.1.2)
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Emergency Core Cooling System (TS 3.5.2)
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The inspectors considered the decision to perform the SFP filling operation at a time when the RCS leak rate was increasing and the conditions were not fully understood to
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be inappropriate. The TS for unidentified RCS leak rate greater than 1 gpm had been entered and the source of the leakage had not been positively identified. The need to fill the SFP was not immediate and could have been done when plant conditions were better understood. Rendering the entire Train B of safety-related equipment inoperable at this time demonstrated a lack of recognition of current plant conditions as they relate to an ongoing event.
The licensee stated that this decision was based on an assumption that a plant shutdown would soon be commenced and there was a desire to perform the SFP fill operation at this time to allow operators to be available to shut down the plant.
However, a plant shutdown was not commenced until 4:34 a.m. on November 18
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(approximately 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> later). By this time, the nature and location of the RCS leak had been identified and subsequent calculations indicated the leak rate had stabilized at less
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I than 1 gpm.
The inspectors recognized that the safety significance of this action was minimized by the fact that only the CCW makeup water pump was realigned and that the Train B CCW system and other affected systems would have functioned if called upon to do so until CCW makeup was required..However, the inspectors considered, given these
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plant conditions, that maximizing the availability of safety-related equipment was more
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important than performing an SFP fill operation.
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Conclusions
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The licensee's decision to fill the SFP at a time when an increase in the RCS leak rate
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had been identified was inappropriate. The fill operation required declaring Train B of
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L the CCW system and cascading affected equipment inoperable at a time when the increased RCS leak rate was not fully understood. This action demonstrated a lack of
recognition of current plant conditions as they relate to an ongoing event.
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The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance and surveillance activities, as specified by the referenced WA:
OP-903-024 RCS Water inventory Balance
M1-003-464 Functional Surveillance on CPC A
WA 01175692 RCP 28 Seal Replacement
' WA 01175714 SIT 1 A Weld Repair
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WA 01172472 Controlled Ventilation Area System (CVAS) Exhaust Fan A Loop Isolator Card Replacement WA 01155042 Inspect Valve Operator and Replace All Elastomers
M1.1 CVAS Exhaust Fan A Temperature Looo isolator Circuit Breaker Replacement and Calibration a.
inspection Scoce (62707)
The inspectors observed instrumentation and control (l&C) technicians replace and calibrate the temperature loop isolator NPL circuit board. The inspectors also reviewed the background documentation and the completed work package.
b.
Observations and Findinas On October 27,1998, the inspectors observed the l&C technicians perform replacement and calibration of the NPL circuit board for the CVAS Exhaust Fan A controller. The replacement was performed in accordance with WA 01172472. The faulty circuit board had a history of causing blown fuses and was identified for replacement as part of corrective actions associated with Condition Report (CR) 97-0240. This circuit board was not on the specific list of designated " Critical Cards" associated with the generic concerns expressed by the Plant Operations Review Committee during their review of License Event Report (LER)97-003; however, it was exhibiting the same undesirable behavior as the circuit boards on that list.
The inspectors verified that the work was performed in accordance with the procedure.
The circuit board was identical to the original part. The procedure included appropriate independent verification steps. The technicians were obsewed performing
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-7-self-verification and independent verification at the appropriate steps in the procedure.
All test equipment calibrations were verified to be current. Equipment was restored and appropriately returned to service. The inspecters noted that the technicians were very knowledgeable about the equipment and test procedures, c.
Conclusions Good knowledge and ability were demonstrated by l&C technicians during replacement and calibration of a circuit board for the CVAS exhaust fan.
M1.2 Insoect and Replace Elastomers on CCW Valve Operator for CC-126A a.
Insoection Scoce (62707)
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The inspectors observed preparations for valve operator removal and disassembly of the valve operator in the shop. The inspectors also reviewed the work package and discussed the valve operator removal with operators and mechanics.
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Observations and Findinas On October 27,1998, the inspectors observed the preparation for removal of the valve actuator from CC-126A. The inspectors noted that the electricallimit switches had been removed from the butterfly valve stem on ihe opposite side of the valve from the valve actuator in accordance with WA 01155042. The valve actuator was removed and transported to the mechanical maintenance shop for disassembly.
Disassembly of the valve operator was performed in accordance with Technical Manual 4570023909. Replacement seals were identical to the original seals. All small parts were laid out on white paper to track the part removal and replacement. The mechanics demonstrated good knowledge of the valves and disassembly and assembly procedures.
The valve actuator was reinstalled with no problems. However, testing of the system and return to service was delayed because of difficulties encountered in reinstallation and calibration of the limit switches. The inspectors could see no value in requiring removal of the limit switches. It appeared that these steps were left in the procedure because the job had not been adequately reviewed and walked down by the planner.
This lack of attention to detail could result in negatively impacting the availability of a safety system, c.
Conclusions l
The maintenance technicians demonstrated good knowledge during disassembly and l
assembly of the valve actuator. The WA had received less than adequate review and i
walkdown by the planner '
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M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Material Condition of the Reactor Containment Bu!!dina a.
Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors assessed the material condition of the reactor containment building and the equipment located within the building.
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Ob::ervatLons and Findinas o
During this inspection period, the inspectors toured all levels and all areas of the reactor containment building. These tours took place during the maintenance outage to repair the RCP 28 seat assembly. The inspectors toured the building while work was in progress and again when the licensee was preparing the building for final closecut after work was nearing completion.
During the tours, the inspectors made several observations concerning the material condition of the building and the components located inside the building. The general condition of the reactor containment building was acceptable with some areas of concern noted. Specifically, several components located in the reactor building showed signs of corrosion and poor material condition. Numerous valves had signs of past leakage and corrosion in the area of the packing glands and junction box mounting hardware exhibited surface rust. Two small areas of peeling paint were observed but were not large enough to cause concern for the paint chips to potentially clog the sump strainers. General discoloration of concrete and painted surfaces was noted. Some dust and dirt was observed on surfaces and floor areas. Two valves (SI-401 A and SI-4018) had significant accumulation of boric acid crystals in the area of the packing indicating current,or past leakage. The licensee indicated that these two conditions had been previously identified and placed in the condition identification system for repair.
The inspectors accompanied operations personnel during a containment inspection in preparation to close out the building and commence power operations. A significant amount of material, including pieces of tape, tie wraps, and other items, was found in i
various areas of the building. These items taken together could potentially clog the sump strainers and interfere with the proper operation of safety-related equipment.
Some of these items could have been left in the area following the maintenance
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conducted during this maintenance outage, but much of what was identified was not located in the areas where work was performed. For example, several pieces of tape were identified in the area of the pressurizer safety valves. No work was performed in this area during this outage, but work was performed in this area during the previous maintenance outage. All the identified items were retrieved and the inspectors considered the as-left condition of the building to be acceptable.
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The material condition of the reactor containment building and the components located inside the building were acceptable with some areas of concern noted. Surface rust and corrosion were observed on system components such as valves and junction boxes.
Dust and dirt accumulation was noted on surfaces and a significant amount of debris was retrieved from the building prior to power operation.
Ill. Enaineerina E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E2.1 Review of Enaineerina Evaluation to Install a Temocrarv Alteration to Replace a Failed Temperature Sensor a.
Inspection Scope (37551)
The inspectors reviewed an engineering evaluation (ER-W3-98-1211-00-00) that was written to support a temporary alteration to replace a failed temperature sensor in the Loop 2 hot leg. The temporary alteration was not implemented because the failed resistance temperature detector (RTD) was replaced during an unscheduled maintenance outage.
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Observations and Findinas During this inspection period, an RTD temperature element failed on the Loop 2 hot leg.
The function of this element was to sense the hot leg temperature and provide a signal for the associated instrument loop. The signal associated with this failed sensor provided outputs for the reactor regulating system and the plant monitoring computer, which included the core operating limit supervisory system function. These functions are not considered safety-related but are used extensively by plant operators to determine current plant operating conditions.
The licensee planned to replace the failed nonsafety-related temperature sensor output with another sensor with a safety-related output. This change would take place by performing a wiring change in associated cabinets rather than a physical replacement of the failed RTD in containment. The engineering evaluation recognized the need for and specified a requirement to add an iolator/ amplifier in the circuit to ensure that any malfunction in the nonsafety-related portion could not affect the safety-related portion.
Aspects of the additional isolator / amplifier, cuch as accuracy, power requirements, and calibration requirements, were addressed in detailin the evaluation. A detailed, step-by-step procedure was included in the evaluation to address the installation and removal of the isolator / amplifier.
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engineering work had been completed. The evaluation was well written and addressed the relevant aspects of the installation and removal of the temporary alteration.
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Conclusions j
i An engineering evaluation for the installation and removal of a temporary alteration to l
replace a failed nonsafety-related temperature sensor output with a safety-related output was complete and sufficiently detailed. Relevant aspects of the alteration were addressed and well documented.
E8-Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)
j E8.1. (Closed) LER 50-382/97-003: Process Analog Computer Card Failed on Essential Services Chilled Water Train B On January 30,1997, a process analog control card had failed on Essential Chilled Water Train B, causing it to be inoperable. This failure had necessitated entry into cascading TS for Train B components. Containment Spray Pump A had previously been taken out of service for scheduled maintenance, which had forced the operators to enter TS 3.0.3. The card had been replaced and calibrated, Train B equipment had been returned to service, and TS 3.0.3 had been exited.
Because of the potential for random failure of these cards and other e'ectronic circuit boards used at Waterford 3, Condition Report 97-0240 had been written to establish and track corrective actions generically for systems that had safety significance. A review of criteria used for designating critical cards had been conducted. Also, spare cards in the warehouse had been reworked to replace components that had identified high failure rates.
Critical cards have been identified and marked. All critical cards identified in Category 1-1 have been scheduled to be changed by the end of Re, fuel Outage 9. The remainder of the critical cards, identified as having lower priority, have been scheduled to be changed prior to the end of Refuel Outage 10. Based on this ongoing process, this issue is closed.
IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls
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During routine tours, the inspectors observed posted radiation survey measurements, which were required by licensee procedures and NRC regulations. A sample of doors were found locked for the purpose of radiation protection. Licensee personnel working in radiologically controlled areas were observed following applicable procedures for radiation protectio.
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R3 RP&C Procedures and Documentation On October 29,1998, the inspectors observed a chemistry technician following j
procedures during performance of an effluent sample. The inspectors also reviewed the primary chemistry logs. Procedure adherence by technicians was very good. No
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discrepancies were identified during the primary chemistry log review.
R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in RP&C R4.1 Health Physics (Ho) Personnel Performance Durina Forced Maintenance Outaae a.
Inspection Scope (71750)
The inspectors observed the licensee's activities with regard to HP during the forced maintenance outage.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed HP personnel performance during the forced maintenance outage to replace the RCP 2B seal. The inspecurs observed postings and barrier placement inside the containment building and rev:ewed radiation survey maps for various areas throughout the plant. Also, low dose waiting areas, radiation work permits, and electronic dosimeter alarm setpoints were reviewed.
The inspectors considered the performance of HP personnel during this time to be very good. The routine use of ALARA techniques by all plant personnel were observed.
Personnel maintained a good awareness of changing plant conditions. Briefings of maintenance personnel by HP emphasized ALARA concerns and current plant radiological conditions. The inspectors did not identify any concerns in this area.
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Conclusions The performance of HP personnel during the forced maintenance outage was very good. Good awareness of changing plant conditions and routine use of ALARA techniques were observed.
S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment
~ At 2:55 a.m. on November 28,1998, the inspectors toured the perimeter of the protected area during a period of heavy fog. The inspectors determined that the lighting was adequate to sufficiently illuminate the isolation zones and areas within the protected area.' The inspectors observed security officers maintaining cognizance of security cameras, monitors, and alarm systems inside the central alarm station. Officers were found to be alert to conditions and alarms.
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-12-V. Manaaement Meetinas
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X1 Exit Meeting Summary l
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management on December 7,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
l The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the l
inspection siiould be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee '
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R. F. Burski, Director Site Support
~ C. M. Dugger, Vice-President, Operations
^ E. C. Ewing, Director, Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Affairs C. Fugate, Operations Superintendent i
T.'J. Gaudet Manager, Licensing J. G. Hoffpauir, Manager, Operations
T. R. Leonard, General Manager, Plant Operations l
- D. C. Matheny, Manager, Operations G. D. Pierce, Director of Quality D. W.- Vinci,' Superintendent, System Engineering
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A. J. Wrape, Director, Design Engineering
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 37551 Onsite Engineering 61726 Surveillance Observations 62707 Maintenance Observations 71707 Plant Operations 71750 Plant Support Activities 92700 Onsite LER Review 92902 Followup-Maintenance j
92903 Followup-Engineering
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. Followup-Plant Support 93702 Prompt Onsite Response to Events ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Closed 50-382/97-003 LER Process Analog Computer Card Failed on Essential Services
l Chilled Water Train B (Section E8.1)
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
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- ALARA as low as reasonably achievable CCW component cooling water CFR Code of Federal Regulations
'CVAS controlled ventilation area system
- gom gallons per minute -
l&C instrumentation and control LER.
licensee event report NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
PDR Public Document Room RCP reactor coolant pump -
RCS reactor coolant system RP&C radiological protection and chemistry
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SDC shutdown cooling SIT safety injection tank
SFP.
spent fuel pool
TS Technical Specification WA work authorization l'
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