Text

Insp Rept 50-382/98-05 on 980202-12.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Physical Security Program
	ML20216E599
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	03/12/1998
From:	; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20216E562	List: ML20216E558; ML20216E584; ML20216E599;
References
	50-382-98-05, 50-382-98-5, NUDOCS 9803180096
	Download: ML20216E599 (19)
	v • d • e

.

ENCLOSURE 2

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.: -50-382

License No.: NPF-38

Report No.: 50-382/98-05

Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3

Location: Hwy.18

Killona, Louisiana

Dates: February 2-6 and February 10-12,1998

Inspector: Thomas W. Dexter, Senior Physical Security Specialist

Plant Support Branch

Approved By: Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch

Division Reactor Safety

Attachment: Supplemental Information

9903100096 980312

PDR ADOCK 05000382

G PDR -

.

-2-

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3

NRC Inspection Report 50-382/98-05

This was an announced inspection of the licensee's physical security program. The areas

inspected included access authorization, alarm stations, communications, protected area access

control of personnel, packages and vehicles, testing and maintenance, detection aids,

assessment aids, protected area physical barriers, security program plans and procedures,

security event logs, security training and qualification, management support, management

effectiveness, audits, onsite review of event reports, and followup of open items. Overall

performance in the security area was adequate with no improvement trend.

Plant Sucoort

Performance in the physical security area continued to be adequate with no improvement

trend. Several positive attributes were noted. Alarm stations were redundant and well

protected. Good radio and telephone communication systems were maintained. An

adequate number of radios were available for security force members. Assessment aids

provided effective assessment of the perimeter detection zones. Changes to the

security program and plans were reported within the required time frame. A good

security event reporting program was in place. A good training program for security

contingency drills had been implemented. Changes to the security program and plans

were reported within the required time frame A good security event reporting program

was in place. A good training program for security contingency drills had been ,

implemented. Senior management support for the security organization was good. The

security program was adequately managed. Due to a shortage of security officers and -

equipment problems overtime hours worked by security officers averaged over 20

percent per month fer the past seven months (Sections S1.1,1.2,1.3,2.3,3.1,3.2,5.1,

6.1, and 6.2)

-

The individual conducting equipment testing had an excellent knowledge of testing

procedures. All access control equipment functioned as required. Testing and l

maintenance r./f the security equipment was a program strength. The audit of the j

security program was thorough and of very good quality (Sections 2.1 and 7.1). l

-

A noncited violation involving the failure to effectively control unescorted access into a

vital area was identified. A noncited violation involving the failure to search emergency

vehicles and personnel responding to a drill was identified. A marginally adequate

program for searching personnel packages and vehicles was maintained (Section S1.4).

-

A violation involving the failure to have a railroad derailer in place in accordance with the

security plan was identified by the inspector. Good protected area barriers and detection

systems were generally maintained. During performance testing of the detection system,

all attempts to intrude into the protected area were detected (Section S2.2).

1

I

i

.

-3-

Report Details

IV. Plant Sucoort

S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities

SI.I Access Authorization-

a. Insoection Scoce (81700-02.01)

The Access Authorization Program was inspected to determine compliance with the

requirements of the security plan. The areas inspected included the review of

background investigation files for individuals presently granted unescorted acce% and

for individuals that have been denied unescorted access.

b. Observations and Findinas

The inspector reviewed records and conducted interviews to determine the adequacy of l

the program. The inspector also reviewed information concerning the licensee's

verification of identity, employment history, educational history, credit history, criminal

history, military service, and the character and reputation of the applicants before

granting individuals unescorted access to protected and vital areas.

The inspector reviewed six background investigation files. The files were coinplete and

thorough. The iicensee's program for denying or revoking unescorted access

authorization was good. The inspector reviewed the rationale used by the licensee in its

decision making for denial of unescorted access. The persons denied access were

notified of the denial of access and of their right to review and reply to anything in the

records used as a reason for the access denial. These persons were also provided with

information on the appeal process that was available to them.

The licensee had recently hired a new manager for the access authorization program.

The new manager was in the process of reviewing and revising procedures during this

inspection.

1

'

c. C_onclusions

Background investigation screening files were complete and thorough. A good program i

hed been established for denying, revoking, and appealing unescorted access

authorization.

I

l

.

-4-

S1.2 Alarm stations

a. Insoection Scooe (81700-02.01)

The alarm stations were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of the

security plan. The areas inspected included the requirements and capabilities of the

alarm stations, redundancy and diversity of stations, protection of the alarm stations, and

systems security,

b. Observations and Findinas

The inspector verified the redundancy and diversity of the alarm ciations. Action by one

alarm station opeiator could not reduce the effectiveness of the security systems without

the knowledge of the other alarm station operators. The central alarm station and

secondary alarm station were bullet resistant. The inspector questioned the station

operators and determined that they were properly trained and knowledgeable of their

duties.

The licensee had app.oved the installation of a new security computer system. This new

system to be installed in early 1998 should improve the overall security program.

c. Conclusions ]

The alarm stations were redundant and well protected. Alarm station operators were

alert and effectively trained. A new security computer system scheduled to be installed l

in 1998 should improve the security program.

S1.3 Communications

)

a. Inspftetion Scoce (81700-02.01)

The communication capabilities were inspected to determine compliance with the

requirements of the security plan. The areas inspected included the operability of radio

and telephone systems and the capability to effectively communicate with the local law

enforcement agencies through both of the systems.

b. Qhigrvations and Findinas

i

The inspector verified that the licensee had good radio and telephone systems capable

of meeting all communication requirements of the security organization. The licensee

had 40 portable radios with two batteries each assigned. The licensee maintained an

adequate number of portable radios for use by members of the security organization. A i

'

review of records determined 16 radios were in maintenance. However, eight radios in

maintenance for repairs could not be located. Adequate control of portable radios was a

concern.

.

~

-5-

The licensee had a maintenance program to insure that the batteries for the portable

radios remained at maximum operating power.

!

c. Conclusions d

i

Good radio and telephone communication systems were maintained. An adequate !

number of portable radios with batteries were available for members of the security

organization. i

S1.4 Protected Area Access Control of Personnel. Packages. and Vehicles

a. Insoection Scooe (81700-02.01)

The access control program for personnel packages and vehicles was inspected to

determine compliance with the requirements of the security plan. ]

l

b. Observations and Findinas l

During the inspection Licensee Event Report 97-S03, " Potential for Undetected Entry

into a Vital Area,"was reviewed.

On July 4,1997, security personnel discovered scaffolding had been erected by

outage contractors that permitted undetected access to the reactor auxiliary

building roof, a vital area. The contractor contacted by security did have

unescorted to the vital area. Once the vulnerability was discovered, security

personnel immediately implemented compensatory measures and searched the

area for unauthorized personnel and evidence of tampering or possible sabotage.

No problems were identified. The door to the vital area was not accessible to

personnel unless scaffolding was in place.

-

Paragraph 5.2.1 of the licensee's physical secuiity plan states, in part, " Personnel

access to designated vital areas is controlled by the use of a key card system

and/or mechanical key and lock.

+ Licensee Security Procedure PS-011-102," Personnel Access and Exit,"

Revision 14, Change 1, paragraph 5.2.4 states, in part, " Access control to a vital

area is accomplished by use of card readers, keys, or security personnel."

The licensee's corrective actions were:

- The licensee posted the door providing access with a notice that security must be

contacted to open the door.

= A security directive was de'. eloped providing specific instructions for personnel to

follow during outages for access requirements.

J

. !

-6-

Individuals involved in the event were briefed by security management on the ;

correct access requirements for the area. i

The failure of the licensee to effectively control uneccerted access into a vital area is l

considered a violation of Section 5 of the licensee's physical security plan. The violation j

was licensee identified, nonrepetitive, and corrected within a reasonable period of time. l

Accordingly, the violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with

Section Vil.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (382/98-05-01)

Licensee Event Report 97-S05," Emergency Vehicles Entry into the Protected Area l

Without a Proper Security Search," was reviewed.

On December 10,1997, personnel and vehicles from two local fire departments were

allowed access to the plant protected area during an emergercy drill without being

searched as required by the security plan.

Paragraph 5.7.1 of the licensee's physical security plan states, in part, "Except under

emergency conditions and special situations requiring delivery by rail or that oreclude l

processing at the Access Control Facility, vehicles that enter the protected ama are !

processed at the vehicular gate adjacent to the Access Control Facility. . " l

1

Security Procedure PS-011-012, " Personnel Access and Exit," Revision 14,

paragraph 5.3.10, Note 2, states, in part, that fire and medical personnel (th& equipment i

and vehicles) summoned to the plant site by the emergency coordinator or the shift l

supervisor are exempt from entry searches.

]

l

The licensee's investigation determined that the cause of this event was a 1

misinterpretation of a plant security procedure by the security shift supervisor. The I

licensee also determined that although the fire department's vehicles and personnel !

entered the protected area unsearched, they were escorted at all times by armed

security personnel.

The licensee implemented the following corrective actions: !

1

= Security Procedure PS-011-102. Revision 15, " Personnel Access Control and

Exit," was revised to state that search requirements of responding personnel and

vehicles during drills can only be waived with varification of prior NRC notification. ;

!

-

Procedure NTP-202, Revision 7, " Fire Protection Training," was revised to require I

that security management receive prior notification of scheduled drills. ;

I

Procedure EP-003-020, " Emergency Preparedness Drills and Exercises, I

Revision 9, was revised to add responsibilities and requirements for prior security

notification when drills / exercise involve response of offsite emergency vehicles or ;

personnel. i

!

.

!

i

-7-

The failure of the licensee to search fire department personnel and vehicles responding

to a drillis considered a violation of Section 5 of the licensee's physical security plan. i

The vioiation was licensee identified, nonrepetitive, and corrected within a reasonable !

period of time. Accordingly, the violation is being treated as a noncited violation,

'

consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (382/9805-02)

{

The inspector determined through observations at the primary access facility and at the

vehicle sallyport that the licensee generally properly controlled personnel, package, and

vehicle access to the protected area. The protected area access control equipment was

inspected and found to be functional and effectively maintained. The inspector alto 1

observed use of the X-ray machine and search of packages and material at the primary 1

access facility. The operators demonstrated good knowledge of their duties,

c. Conclusioria

A noncited violation for failure to effectively control unescorted access into a vital area

was identified. A noncited violation for failure to search emergency vehic! and

personnel responding to a drill was also identified. A marginally adequate program for

searching personnel packages and vehicles was maintained.

'S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment I

S2.1 Testino and Maintenance (81700-02.07)

a. ID.SPElion Scoce

The inspector requested testing of access control equipment to determine compliance

with the requirements of the security plan.

b. Observations and Findinos

't he inspector requested and observed the licensee conducted testing of the explosive

and metal detectors at the protected area primary access facility. The individual

conducting the tesb was knowledgeable of the testing procedures and conducted the

tests in a manner that challenged the equipment. All equipment tested satisfactorily.

Testing and maintenance of the access control equipment was a program strength.

l

c. Cpnclusions

The individual conducting equipment testing had an excellent knowledge of testing ;

procedures. All access control equipment functioned es required. Testing and ;

maintenance of the security equipment was a prcgram strength.

l

I

.

e

-8-

S2.2 Protected Area Barrier and Detection Aids

a. Insoection Scoce (7175( 2d 81Z00)

The inspector reviewed the protected area barrier and detection aids to determine

compliance with the requirements of the physical security plan. The areas inspected

included the protected area barrie~and the design and capabilities of the detection aids j

system. ,

b. Observations and Findinas

l

The inspector conducted a walkdown inspection of the protected area barrier and l

dete, ~nined that the protected area barrier was installed and maintained as described in j

the ,aysical secunty plan. Additionally, the inspector determined that the protected area 'l

barrier provided penetration resistance to both forced and surreptitious entry and was I

adequate to ansure delay of a potential adversary with the following exception:

During a review of condition identification records, the inspector discovered that on 1

November 11,1997. the licensee identified in a conditian identification report that the {

derailer inside the service yard had become unutached from the track, and no j

compensatory measures were implemented. This degraded condition existed until '

February 11,1998, when it was identified by the MRC security inspector. Security

procedures did not provide adequate guidance for security officers if they found the

derailer degraded. Once it was reported in the condition identification report security

officers waited for maintenance to repair it.

Waterford 3 Physical Security Plan, Revision 17, dated March 1996, Chapter 3,

paragrapn 3.2.6, ' Vehicle Denial," states, in part, " Railroad derailers are installed inside ;

the protected area on the railroad spurs that enter the site."

Plant Security Procedure PS-011-103," Vehicle Access Control," Revision 8, Section 5,

paragraph 5.1.3.2.C, states, in part, " Railroad derailers are installed inside the protected

area on rail spurs that allow entry into the protected area."

Plant Security Procedure PS-012-101, "Parimeter Barriers," Revision 9, Section 5.6,

paragraph 5.6.1, states, " Security Officers will inspect the derailers to ensure that they

are locked in the derail configuration. This check will be made twice each shift."

The failure to ensure that the derailer was locked in the derail configuration from

November 11,1997, to February 11,1998, is a violation of the security plan

(382/9805-03).

The inspector observed the licensee test the perimeter microwave system at several

locations around the protected area. The detection system was well designed and

maintained. All attempts to intrude into the protected area were detected. The licensee's

tests of the system were performance based to ensure that system failures were

discovered and corrected.

-

.

9

Additionally, the inspector verified that an alarm annunciated in the ccntinuously manned

security alarm stations.

c. Conclusions

The licensee's failure to maintain a derailer inside the protected area is a violation of

paragraph 3.2.6 of the security plan. Good protected area barriers and detection

systems were maintained. During performance testing of the detection system, all

attempts to intrude into the protected area were detected.

S2.3 Assessment Aids

a. Insoection Scone (81700-02.02)

The inspector reviewed the assessment aids to determine compliance with the physical

security plan. The areas inspected included the closed-circuit television monitors located

in the alarm stations.

b. Obseryations and Findinas

The inspector observed the assessment aids during the hours of daylight and inclement

weather on February 11,1998, and determined that the licensee's overall assessment

aids system was adequate. The inspector verified through observation that the fixed

closed-circuit television cameras were positioned to ensure proper coverage of the

perimeter security alarm zones. The camera resolution was generally acceptable. The

inspector questioned the picture resolution on one camera, and the licensee immediately

implemented compensatory measures. Instrumentation and Controls technicians later

replaced the camera. The inspector determined through interviews that licensee

instrumentation and controls technicians provided excellent service support.

c. Conclusions

Assessment aids provided effective assessment of the perimeter detection zones.

S3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation

S3.1 Security Proaram Plans and Procedures

a. Insoection Scoce (81700-02.03)

The physical security plan and the implementing procedures were inspected to

determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and the physical

security plan.

.

-10-

b. Observations and Findinos

1

The inspector determined that previous plan changes were subn.itted within the required

time frame and changes submitted did not reduce the effectiveness of the plan. The

inspector reviewed implementing procedures for adequacy, ensured that the licensee

maintained an effective management system for the development and administration of

procedures, and that changes to the procedures did not reduce the effectiveness of the !

licensee's security program. I

c. Conclusions

Changes to security programs and plans were reported within the required time frame.

Overali, implementing procedures met the performance requirements in the physical

security plan.

S3.2 Security Event Loas

a. Insoection Scone (81700-02.03)

The inspector reviewed safeguards event logs and security incident reports to determine

compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21(b) and (c),10 CFR 26.73, and the

physical security plan.

b. Observatioris and Findinas

The inspector reviewed the security event logs from July 1 through December 31,1997.

The records were available for review and maintained for the time required by

regulations. The inspector determined that the licensee conformed to the regulatory

requirements regarding the rer orting of security events. The inspector also reviewed

security incident reports and licensee security condition reports. The logs and supporting

reports were neat and contained sufficient detail for the reviewer to determine root cause,

reportability, and corrective action taken.

c. Conclusions

A good security event reporting program was in place. The security staff was correctly

reporting security events.

SS Security and Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification

S5.1 Security Trainina and Qualification

a. Insoection Scooe (81700-02.05)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's security training and qualification program to

determine adequacy and compliance with the requirements of the security, training, and

qualification plan and the contingency plan.

._ _

.

-11-

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector verified that the security organization conducted security training in

accordance with its approved security, training, and contingency plans. The inspector

confirmed by a review of the security training records that contingency drills were

conducted on shift. Documentation of the shift drills was maintained on file.

The inspector interviewed the security training instructor and determined that the

licensee's initial training had been very thorough and met all requirements of the

approved security plans. Additionally, the inspector observed security officers during the

performance of their duties. All security officers displayed good conduct and knowledge

of the procedural requirements,

c. Conclusions

A good training program for security officers had been implemented. Documentation by

the security shifts and training section was good.

SS Security Organization and Administration

S6.1 Management Sucoort

a. Inspection Scoce (81700-02.06)

The affectiveness and adequacy of management support were inspected to determine

the degree of management support for the physical security program.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector determined by discussions with security force personnel that the security

program received very good support from senior management. The inspector

determined that the security program was implemented by a trained and qualified

security staff.

c. C_Qnclusions

Senior management support for the security organization was good. The security

program was implerr ented by a trained and qualified staff. ,

l

S6.2 Manaoement Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scoce (81700-02.06 j

The e'fectiveness and adequacy of the security management staffs administration of the

security program were evaluated.

l

!

.-

.

-12-

]

b. Discussion

The security program was managed by a trained and qualified security staff.

Management effectiveness of the security crganization was adequate. The inspector ;

determined that overtime hours worked by security officers averaged over 2u percent a l

month for the past 7 months. The overtime was caused by a shortage of security l

officers and compensatory posting for equipment repairs. Tne security contractor had {

seven new security officers preparing to be assigned to shifts during this inspection. j

c. Conclusion

The security program was adequately managed. Due to a shortage of security cfficers

and equipment problems, overtime hours worked by security officers averaged over

20 percent a month for the past 7 months.

S7 Quality Assurance in Security and Safeauards Activities

S7.1 Security Proaram Audits

a. Insoection Scoce (81700-02.QZ)

The audits of the security program were inspected to determine compliance with the

requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and the physical security plan.

b. Observations and Findinas

The inspector verified that security program audits had been conducted at least every

12 months as required. The inspector reviewed Quality Assurance Audit SA-97-030.1.

The inspecto confirmed that audit personnel was independent of plant security j

management and plant security management supervision. The inspector determined ]

tl'at the audit was thorough and very good quality. i

l

c. Conclusions

The audit of the security program was thorough and very good quality.

i

S8 Followup - Plant Support (92904) !

i

S8.1 (Closed) Insoection Followun item 382/9719-02: Openino Vehicle Gates in Emeraency

During a previous security inspectico, it was noted that the licensee did not have a

procedure for the operation of the vehicle barrier gates in the event of a loss of power to

them. l

During this inspection, the inspector reviewed Licensee Procedure 11-103A, * Manual

> Operation of VBS Gates 1 and 2," Revision O February 12,1998, that included j

step-by step directions on how to operate gaiu No.1 and 2 manually.

.

!

-13-

S8.2 (Closed) Violation 382/9709-01: Failure to Terminate Active Kev Cards for Terminated !

Empj91 :

On April 18,1997, the licensee determined that its Waterford 3 security superintendent

had not been notified prior to or concurrently with the termination of approximately

10 contract employees. Active badge / key cards were available to those employees who

no longer had a need for unescorted access into the protected area. In scme cases,

those active badges / key cards were on file at the badge issue station 30 days or more

after the contract employee's termination.

During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's procedure chaLge and

interviewed access authorization personnel on the procedure changes. The licensee's

corrective actions vere considered effective.

S8.3 (Closed) Violation 382/9709-02: Inadeauate 31-Day Access Review

On April 23,1997, the NRC inspector identified that on April 1,1997, a contractor !

supervisor signed a 31-day access review record indicating he had reviewed the record

and signed a memorandum stating that no updates were required. However, that record

had approximately four individuals listed who had not used their unescorted access in

excess of 30 days, and two individuals who had been terminated several days prior to

the required review. None of these individuals continued to require unescorted access

into the protected area.

During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions to ensure i

supervisors complied with the reverification process for continued unescorted access.

The licensee's corrective actions appeared to be effective.

S8.4 (Closed) Violation 382/9709-03: Temocrary Jnescorted Access Granted Without i

'

Backaround investiaation Screenina Comoleted

On April 23,1997, the NRC inspector identified that on March 25,1997, a photo

badge / key card had been assigned to a cortactor employee who had been terminated

4 days earlier, March 21,1997, by the ccntrutor. The licensee had deleted the badge

from the computer system en April 21,1997.

During this inspection, the inspector determined the licensee's corrective actions

included revision of the access authorization request form, counseling of the supervisor,

and ensuring all supervisors have a copy of the site processing procedure.

S8.5 (Closed) Violation 382/9709-04: Inattentive Security Officer at Vital Area Door

On April 23,1997, an NRC inspector, accompanied by a licensee employee, found a

security officer posted as a compensatory measure at the open vital area doors

inattentive to his duties such that he could not provide positive access control of a vital

area used to support the refueling outage. The licensee replaced the officer on the post

and began investigative actions.

.

-14- I

During this inspection, the inspector determined that the licensee disciplined the officer

and revised the " Handbook for Security Officers" on actions to take when feeling tired or

ill, directed supervisors to conduct more frequent checks of posted officers, and directed

the alarm stations to conduct more frequent radio checks. ,

1

S8.6 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort 382/95-S02: Derogatorv Informa"..'on on Badaed

Emolovee

On October 10,1995, a contract employee's fingerprint record was received from the

FBI. The record indicated a pending felony charge against the individual. The contract .

employee admitted that the charge was currently pending against him. The licensee

revoked his temporary unescorted access and the information entered into the Integrated

Nuclear Data Exchange (INDEX) System. All of the licensee's actions were correct.

S8.7 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort 382/95-S03 Deroaatorv information on Badaed

Emotoveg

On October 7,1995, a contract employee's fingerprint record was received from the FBI.

The record indicated a pending felony charge and other arrest to include convictions for

alcohol related offenses. The licensee revoked his temporary unescorted access and

the information was entered into the INDEX System. All of the licensee's actions were

correct.

S8.8 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort 382/97-S03: Potential for Undetected Entrv Into a Vital

LT9B

On July 4,1997, security personnel discovered scaffolding had been erected by outage

contractors that permitted undetected access to the reactor auxiliary building roof, a vital

area. The contractor contacted by security did have unescorted to the vital area. Once

the vulnerability was discovered, security personnel immediately implemented

compensatory measures and searched the area for unauthorized personnel and

evidence of tampering or possible sabotage. No problems were identified. The door to

the vital area was not accessible to personnel unless scaffolding was in place. This

Licensee Event Report was dispositioned as a noncited violation (382/9805-01). (See

Section S1.4.)

S8.9 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort 382/97-S05: Emeraency Vehicle: Entrv Into Protected

Area Without Being Searched

On December 10,1997, personnel and vehicles from two local fire departments were

allowed access to the plant protected area during an emergency drill without being

searched as required by the security plan. This Licensee 5 Event Report was

dispositioned as a noncited violation (382/9805-02). (See Section S1.4.)

.

m

.

-15-

V. Manaaement Meetinas

XI Exit Meeting Summary

The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the

conclusion of the inspection on February 12,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings

presented.

1

,

j

.

,

l

)

l

1

i

.

A

'

ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

R. Allen, Manager, Operational Experience Engineering

E. Aviles, Coordinator, Nuclear Security

E. Beckendorf, Superintendent, Plant Security

R. Burski, Director, Plant Modifications and Construction

D. Childress, Supervisor, Security Access Authorization and Fitness-for-Duty

H. Cooper, Manager, Corporate Security

F. Drummond, Director, Site Support

C_. Dugger, Vice President, Operations

E. Ewing, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs

C. Hayes, Technical Coordinator, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs

T. Leonard, General Manager, Plant Operations

J. O'Hern, Director, Training

G. Pierce, Director, Quality

D. Pintado, Coordinator, Nuclear Security

O. Pipkins, Licensing Engineer

G. Scott, Licensing Engineer

C. Thomas, Licensing Supervisor

G. Zetsch, Supervisor, Security Operations

Contractor

R. Bitner, Project Manager, The Wackenhut Corporation

T Duet, Security Training Coordinator, The Wackenhut Corporation

R Rodriquez, Security Equipment Testing Specialist, The Wackenhut Corporation

T. Shannon, Director, The Wackenhut Corporation

NBG

J. Keaton, Resident inspector

(NSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 81700 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors

IP 92700 Onsite Review of Licensee Event Reports

IP 92904 Foliowup

o

.

O

-2-

ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED ,

Ooened

50-382/9805-01 NCV Failure to Control Access into a Vital Area

50-382/9805-02 NCV Failure to Search Emergency Personnel and Vehicles

Entering the Protected Area During a Drill

50-382/9805-03 VIO Railroad Derailer removed.

Closed

50-382/9719-02 IFl Opening Vehicle Gate in Emergency

50-382/9805-02 NCV Failure to Control Access into a Vital Area

50-382/9805-03 NCV Failure to Search Emergency Personnel and Vehicles

Entering the Protected Area During a Drill

50-382/9709-01 VIO Failure to Terminate Active Key Cards for Terminated

Employees

50-382/9709-02 VIO Inadequate 31~ Day Access List Review

50-382/9709-03 VIO Temporary Unescorted Access Granted without

Background Investigation Screening Completed

50-382/9709-04 VIO Inattentive Security Officer at Vital Area Door

50-382/95-S O2 LER Derogatory Information on Badged Contract Employee

50-382/95-S O3 LER Derogatory Information on Badged Contract Employee

50-382/97-S O3 LER Potential for Undetected Entry ir.to Plant Vital Area

50-382/97-S O5 LER Emergency Vehicles Entry lato Protected Area Without

Being Searched

-

o

."

,

-3-

PARTIAL LIST OF LICENSEE DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Waterford 3 Physical Security Plan, Revision 17, dated August 1996

Selected Condition Reports for 1997

,

Security Equipment Testing and Maintenance Records from July through December 1997 on

perimeter intrusion detection aids, cameras, vital area doors, access control equipment, radios, !

and vehicle barriers.

ML20216E599

Text

Navigation menu

Search