IR 05000382/1999009

Insp Rept 50-382/99-09 on 990411-0522.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20207G358
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	06/03/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207G350	List: IR 05000382/1999009 ML20207G344
References
50-382-99-09, 50-382-99-9, NUDOCS 9906110121
Download: ML20207G358 (14)

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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION )

REGION IV

I l Docket No.: 50-382 License No.: NPF-38 l Report No.: 50-382/99-09 Licensee: Entergy Operations, In j l

l Facility: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Location: Hwy.18 l Killona, Louisiana l

Dates: April 11 through May 22,1999 l Inspectors: T. R. Farnholtz, Senior Resident inspector J. M. Keeton, Resident inspector

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Approved By: P. H. Harrell, Chief, Project Branch D i l

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l ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information i l

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9906110121 990603 '

gDR ADOCK 05000382 PDR C .

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CXECUTIVE SUMMARY Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 j NRC Inspection Report 50-382/99-09 1 i

This routine, announced 9spection included aspects of operations, maintenance, engineenng, and plant support activities. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspectio l l

Operations

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A lack of concern for equipment inadequacies was identified when the remote position indication for the Containment Spray Pump A suction valve indicated closed, when the actual position of this valve was open. The mechanical counter indicated zero (closed)

when it should have indicated 270 (full open). This condition had been identified on three previous occasions (Section O1.2).

Operator actions during two events involving failed servovalves associated with the main turbine governor valves were effective. Actions taken for both the planned and unplanned plant transients were adequate. The failure of all four servovalves was being investigated by the licensee (Section O2.1).

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A violation was identified for the failure to perforrn required testing following completion of modifications to t'uo safety-related component cooling water valves. Testing these valves required entering Technical Specification 3.0.3 and invoking the provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.3. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-0546 (Section O4.1).

Emergency declarations and crew briefings were good during an emergency preparedness drill. Weaknesses were identified in emergency operating procedure usage. Communications in the simulator control room during the drill were not in accordance with operations management expectations. Conduct of the site-wide emergency preparedness drill was gaod. Some drill objectives and actions were modified because of adverse weather conditions (Sections O5.1 and o4.1).

Maintenance

In general, material condition of the emergency feedwater system was good. Valve alignment was in accordance with procedures and appropriate for the plant conditions (Section M2.1).

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Enaineerina

Entry into Technical Specifications 3.0.3 and 4.0.3 was appropriate to determine the response times for the missed surveillance. The engineering evaluation to support continued operation was good (Section E1.1).

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Plant Suooort

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Chemistry technicians demonstrated a good level of knowledge on the use of the analysis equipment and applicable procedures when analyzing safety injection tank

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srmples to determine boron concentration. All four samples were within the required range (Section R4.1).

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The site security organization response was very good to a potential threat posed by a trespasser outside the protected area. The individual was apprehended and held for questioning by Federal Pureau of Inves.tigation agents and local law enforcement ;

officials. Following questioning, it was concluded that the threat was not credible ]

(Section S4.1).

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' Report Details Summarv of Plant Status At the beginning of this incpection period, the plant was operating at 100 percent power. On April 25,1999, a turbine governor valve closed unexpectedly and caused a plant power j reduction to 94 percent. Repairs were completed and power was restored to 100 percent later that day. A power reduction to 90 percent was performed on May 17 to allow additional repairs to the turbine governor valves. The plant was restored to full power later that day and remained at that level for the remainder of this inspection perio l. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations (71707)-

O1.1 General Comments (71707)  ;

The inspectors performed frequent reviews and observations of ongoing plant operations, control panel walkdowns, and plant tours. Observed activities were q performed in a manner consistent with safe operation of the facility. The inspectors observed operators utilize good self-checking and peer-checking techniques when manipulating plant equipment. Operators generally used good commun' cation techniques, j 01.2 Inaccurate Valve Position Indication a .- Inspection Scope (71707)

i The inspectors conducted routine plant tours to observe the condition and operation of {

plant eouipmen Observations and Findinas During a routine tour of the plant, the inspectors noted the remote valve position indication for the Containment Spray Pump A suction valve indicated that this valve was closed. _ The plant conditions at the time required that this valve be open. The inspectors questioned this indication and the licensee verified that the valve was open, but the remote valve posiFon indication was not correct. This indicator consisted of a mechanical counter, which counted the number of turns of the remote handwheel. A full open valve would indicate 270 turns, but the actual reading was zero turn The inspectors were concerned about this condition because a false or inaccurate indication could be interpreted as correct under some circumstances such as tagging this valve in the closed position. This could result in a personnel hazard or potential equipment damage if work was commenced on associated equipment with this valve in an incorrect position. Also, this observation demonstrated a lack of concern for equipment inadequacies on the part of plant operators. This conclusion was further

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A lack of concern for equipment inadequacies was identified when the remote position indication for the Containment Spray Pump A suction valve indicated closed, when the l actual position of this valve was open. The mechanical counter indicated zero (closed)

when it should have indicated 270 (full open). This condition had been identified on three previous occasion i 02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Turbine Governor Valve Hydraulic Control Failures Insoection Scoce (71707)

The inspectors observed the operators' actions and reviewed the circumstances surrounding several apparent failures of the hydraulic servovalves associated with the :

main turbine governor valve Observations and Findinas On April 25,1999, while the plant was operating at 100 percent power, the hydraulic servovalve (manufactured by Moog) for Turbine Governor Valve 3 failed and the governor valve went closed. This resulted in a plant transient and an unexpected downpower to approximately 94 percent. Operators in the control room reacted in an appropriate manner and maintained the plant in a safe condition. The failed servovalve was replaced and the plant was returned to 100 percent later that same da Following this event, it' was r. .ed that the electrohydraulic system flow rate had increased from about 15 liters per minute to about 60 liters per minute. The licensee concluded that the most likely cause of this increase was internal system leakage in the servovalve that had been installed on Turbine Governor Valve 3. A plan was formulated l to conduct a plant downpower to 90 percent and replace the servovalve.

l l On May 17, plant power was reduced to 90 percent to allow repair of tha Valve 3

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servovalve. During this downpower, it was noted that the electrohydraulic system flow rate decreased from 60 to 17 liters per minute when Turbine Governor Valve 4 was closed. This was not expected and caused the licensee to question which servovalve was leaking. It was determined that the Valve 4 servovalve was the most likely leaking component and this servovalve was replaced. The licensee then started to conduct turbine valve testing while at reduced power. During testing, Turbine Govemor Valve 2 began to oscillate in an uncontrolled manner. A plant transient was experienced for approximately 5 minutes with maximum power swings of 200 megawatts. The licensee

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successfully isolated hydraulics to this valve and the valve went closed to end the plant i transient. The cause of the oscillation was determined to be a failed servovalve associated with Turbine Governor Valve 2. This servovalve was replaced. Also during this time, it was noted that Turbine Governor Valve 1 was oscillating at a high frequenc l The cause of this oscillation was a failed servovalve. The licensee replaced the servovalve for this valve. Following this maintenance, operators completed turbine valve testing arv1 returned the plant to 100 percent power. Upon completion of this activity, the servrualves associated with Turbine Governor Valves 1,2, and 4 had been replaced. The servovalve associated with Turbine Governor Valve 3 had been replaced on April 25, as described abov Operator actions during these events were appropriate. Actions taken for both the planned and unplanned plant transients were adequate. The licensee was examining the four failed servovalves to determine the cause of the failure l Conclusions j

Operator actions during two events involving failed servovalves associated with the main turbine governor valves were effective. Actions taken for both the planned and unplanned plant transients were adequate. The fai!ure of all four servovalves was being investigated by the license Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Failure to Perform an Adeauate Postmodification Test a. Insoection Scope (71707)

The inspectors reviewed an event in which the plant operators entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 and invoked the provisions of TS 4.0.3 to perform surveillance testing. This action was taken when it was discovered that two safety-related valves had not been adequately tested following a modificatio ;

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On April 29,1999, the plant operators entered TS 3.0.3. and invoked the provisions of '

TS 4.0.3. This was done to allow the licensee to perform testing to determine new reference stroke time values for safety-related Component Cooling Water (CCW)

Valves CC-963A and -963B, which had been modified during Refueling Outage 9. This modification consisted of installing quick exhaust shuttle valves to the valve operators to . j allow the valves to open faste Engineering personnel developed Modification Package DC-3493 and specified the testing requirements. The modification package specified that these valves should have i

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been tested using Operations Procedure OP-903-118, " Primary Auxiliaries Ouarterly IST Va!ve Tests," Revision 4. Operations personnel failed to conduct this test following completion of the modification Upon entering TS 3.0.3 and TS 4.0.3, action was taken to conduct the testing. The stroke time acceptance cr i teria in the test procedure was not changed prior to the tes ,

The licensee completed the postmodification testing and, as expected, the test results j fell outside the acceptance criteria. The results were then evaluated under an ;

engineering request and accepted as the new baseline values. The stroke time values !

were considered acceptable, the valves were declared operable, and TS 3.0.3 and TS 4.0.3 were exite I

Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion XI, " Test Control," states, in part, that a test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that '

structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the ,

requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable documents. In this case, the licensee failed to assure that all testing was performed in accordance with the )

applicable document The inspectors were concerned that operations personnel did not effectively track these testing requirements to completion during the modification process. In addition, engineering personnelinvolved in the modification process did not question why the postmodification testing had not been performed by the end of Refueling Outage The failure to perform required testing following completion of modifications to two l safety-related CCW valves is identified as a violation. This Soverity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as CR 99-0546 (50-382/9909-01). >

c. Conclusions A violation was identified for the failure to perform required testing following completion of modifications to two safety-related component cooling water valves. Testing these valves required entering Technical Specification 3.0.3 and invoking the provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.3. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This

violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as CR 99-054 ,

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05 Operator Training and Qualifice.ica 05.1 Observation of Operator Performance in Simulator Durina Emeraency i Preparedness (EP) Drill i Insoection Scope (71750. 9290_1)

The inspectors observed operator performance in the simulator during a planned EP l dril Observations and Findinas ,

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On May 12,1999, the inspectors observed operators in the simulator control room during a complex scenario involving escalating plant degradation to a final state in which a General Emergency was declared. The operators appropriately identified each emerging classificrtion in a timely manner. Crew briefings were held following ;

evolutions and events at appropriate timos after plant stabilization. The briefings were I very good. Operator response to changing plant conditions was generally good with the i following exceptions:

During use of the emergency operating procedures, the reactor operators provided the control room supervisor more information than was necessary to ;

satisfy stsot. in the procedure. This resulted in some confusion and appeared to )

delay progression through the emergency operating procedure *

Communications tended to degrade as the scenario progressed. Initially,

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three-way communication and reporting of all alarms were evident. As the scenario progressed, three-way communications became less evident. Also, I conversations among the operators tended to become quieter such that j evaluators and controllers needed to be very close to the participants to hear the conversations. Also, many of the annunciators were not announced as the scenario progresse The observations were discussed with the simulator evaluator and operations management. The Operations Superintendent stated that training would focus on the observed weaknesse Conclusions I Emergency declarations and crew briefings were good during an emergency l preparedness drill. Weaknesses were identified in emergency operating procedure uLge. Cornmunications in the simulator control room during the drill were not in accordance with operations management expectations.

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During this inspection period, the inspectors completed the Y2K checklist contained in Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/14, " Review of Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants." The review addressed aspects of Y2K management phnning, documentation, implementation planning, initial assessment, detailed assessment, remediation activities, Y2K testing and validation, notification activities, and contingency planning. The reviewers used NEl/NUSMG 97-07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Re.idiness," and NEl/NUSMG 98-07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness Contingency Planning," as the bases for this revie Conclusions regarding the Y2K readiness of this facility are not included in this ,

summary. The results of this review will be combined with reviews of Y2K programs at j other plants in a summary teport to be issued by July 31,1999, i 11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance (61726,62707)

The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance and surveillance activities, as specified by the referenced procedure numbers and Maintenance Action f item (mal) numbers:

• 401782 Lubricate fan bearing and coupling, replace filters, and inspect coils and drain lines l

= OP-903-068 Emergency Diesel Generator B surveillance run

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= OP-903-007 Main turbine governor valve testing l

In general, the inspectors considered the observed work activities to have been performed in an acceptable and effective manner. The technicians were knowledgeable and conducted the work, as required by applicable procedures. Appropriate support personnel, including health physics, quality control, supervisory, and system engineering personnel were at the work site when require ,

M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Emeraency Feedwater (EFW) System Walkdown Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors performed a detailed walkdown of EFW Trains A, B, and A/B. The standby valve lineup procedure and system drawing were reviewed for accuracy and completenes F .

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. b. Observations and Findinos l From April 8 through April 11, the inspectors performed a detailed walkdown and review i of the EFW systems. In general, material conditions of the EFW systems, procedures, l' and drawing were good. A detailed list of discrepancies was identified as follows:

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• EFW A: (1) Pump inboard bearing Resistance Temperature Detector TO-8323AS cable sleeve was damaged. (2) Pump oilers and sight l glass on outboard motor bearing showed signs of leakage. (3) Areas of rust and -

peeling paint were noted on Pump skid.

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• EFW B: (1) Oilleak was noted on the outboard pump bearing oile (2) Valve EFW 206B indicator showed closed, but valve was open as required by procedure. (3) Verified engineering evaluation of scaffolding built in room b support painting effor * EFW A/B: (1) Large amount of oil pooled on pump skid coming from leak on servo actuator. (2) Improperly stored tygon tubing and miscellaneous items in pump area. (3) Peeling paint noted on pump ski The list of discrepancies was given to the shift superintendent who took appropriate i actions to resolve the issues. Those items that were deemed to need immediate l resolution were attended. The longer-term items were identified as MAls and j appropriate tags were issued.

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The inspectors performed a detailed review of Operating Procedure OP-009-03, .

" Emergency Feedwater," Revision 11; Attachment 11.1," Emergency Feedwater System Standby Valve Lineup;" and Drawing LOU-1564G-153, Sheet 4 of 6, " Flow Diagram l

Feedwater, Condensate, & Air Evacuation Systems." No discrepancies were identified.

j c. Conclusions in general, material condition of the emergency feedwater system was good. Valve alignment was in accordance with procedures and appropriate for the plant conditions.

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E1 Conduct of Engineering (37551)

E1,1 Missed Surveillance Due to incomplete Time Response Testina for the Containment Coolina Enaineerina Safety Features Actuation System Features Function Inmection Scope (37551)

The inspectors reviewed the conditions related to the TS 3.0.3 entry, the justification for entering TS 4.0.3, and the operability determinatio .

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8 Observations and Findinas On April 15,- 1999, during a corrective action followup on CR 98-0537, a licensee

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_ engineer determined that the CCW pumps' and containment fan coolers' discharge dampers had not been tested appropriately to verify response times required in the test procedures by the Technical Requirements Manual Table 3.3-5. The method of testing .

the circuit response times masked the component response time of the SIX8 relays for Trains A and B of the CCW system and the containment fan cooler discharge damper Response times for the SIX8 relays had not been verified. . Because of the missed -

surveillances, the operators entered TS 3.0.3 for both trains of CCW and invoked TS 4.0.3 to perform the missed surveillanc .The SIX8 relays in both trains were tested using MAls 403498 and 403497. The relay response time for both trains was found to be less than 5 seconds. This was within the j required time and both trains of CCW were declared operab!e.

The engineering evaluation performed to support the operability call was good. Each l segment of the engineering safety features actuation system circuitry was uniquely l

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identified and maximum response times were assigned for overall actuation time acceptance. Digital point connections were identified for ribtaining the missing SIX8 relay actuation dat . Conclusions i Entry into TS 3.0.3 and TS 4.0.3 was appropriate to determine the response times for l the missed surveillance. The engineering evaluation to support continued operation was l goo IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls During routine tours, the inspectors observed posted radiatiou ,urvey measurements, which were required by licensee procedures and NRC regulations. A sample of doors were found locked as required for the purpose of radiation protection. Licensee personnel working in radiologically controlled areas were observed following applicable procedures for radiation protectio R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in RP&C R4.1. Chemical Analysis of the Contents of Safety Iniection Tanks (SIT)

a/ Insoection Scope (71750)

The inspectors observed chemistry department personnel perform an analysis of the contents of all four SIT =

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l I -9-b. Observations and Findinos On May 17,1999, the inspectors observed the performance of a chemical analysis of the contents of SIT 2A, which was done because the level in that tank had increased 1 percent since the last sample. This action is required because of the potential of diluting the boron concentration of the tank due to system valve leakage, in addition, the licensee performed routine analysis of the other three SITS since the monthly required sample would have been due in a matter of days. To obtain the samples, the chemistry technicians were required to make a containment entry. The analysis was conducted in accordance with Chemistry Procedure CE-002-010, " Maintaining Safety Injection Tank Chemistry," Revision 9. This procedure specifies a boron concentration of between 2050 and 2900 ppm in each operable SI The inspectors observed the technicians processing the samples using a Mettler DL40 i Memotitrator. This device performed an automatic titration based on the weight of the I sample and pH. The chemicals used were observed to be labeled and current with regard to their specified shelf life. The results were printed out, recorded, and reported I to the control room operators. The technicians demonstrated a good level of knowledge j J

on the use of the equipment and an awareness of the procedural requirements. The results of the samples indicated that all four SITS were within the required range. No concerns were identifie Conclusions Chemistry techn!cians demonstrated a good level of knowledge on the use of the analysis equipment and applicable procedures when analyzing safety injection tank 1 samples to determine boron concentration. All four samples were within the required i rang I P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in EP P4.1 Conduct of Site Wide EP Drill 1 Insoection Scope (71750)

i The inspectors observed conduct of a site-wide EP drill in the simulator and emergency i l operations facility.

l Observations and Findinas On May 12,1999, the inspectors observed portions of a site-wide EP drillin the simulator control room and emergency operations facility. Tha drill was designed to tra',n in the areas of radiological control, security, communications both onsite and offsite, medical emergencies, and augmentatio L

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l Conduct of the drill was good. The drill was delayed for approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> because of inclement weather conditions. Even though the flow was interrupted, all facilities were appropriately staffed in a timely manner. However, because of the weather, protected ,

area evacuation was canceled.

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! Conduct of the site-wide emergency preparedness drill was good. Some drill objectives l and actions were modified because of adverse weather condition S4 Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance S4.1 Security Event involvina Trespasser insoection Scope (71750)

l The inspectors reviewed the circumstances of a security event in which an unknown person trespassed onto the owner controlled are Observations and Findinas i

On April 12,1999, security personnel received a report from licensee personnel working

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unknown individual was in tnat area and did not appear to belong there. Two officers were dispatched tra the area to investigate. The individual was located and questioned by the officers. The individual stated that he was waiting for President Clinton because the nuclear plant was going to be bombed that night. During this questioning, the subject approached a duffle bag. The officers did not know the contents of this bag and so perceived a threat and apprehended the individual. St. Charles Parish law enforcement and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were notified and responded. The

individual was taken to a security building to be questioned further. Also, a search of l the area was made and no additional personnel, weapons, or unidentified packages were locate The individual was questioned by the Federal Bureau of Inustigation agents to determine if this person represented a credible threat. Following questionir'g, it was concluded that this individual did not present a credible threat. He was turned over to the St. Charles Parish Sheriff officials and taken to the local jail to be charged with trespassin During this event, site security personnel went to security condition yellow until the ( nature and extent of the threat were better understood. The inspectors considered this to be an appropriate action. This event was handled appropriately with adequate support provided as required. The inspectors considered the overall response of site security personnel to this threat to have been very goo e

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l Conclusions The site security organization response was very good to a potential threat posed by a

. trespasser outside the protected area. The individual was apprehended and held for questioning by Federal Bureau of Investigation agents and local law enforcement officials. Following questioning, it was concluded that the threat was not credibl V. Manaaement Meetinas l

l X1 Exit Meeting Summary l The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management on May 20,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the

inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

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.h ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee l

R. F. Burski, Director Site Support C. M. Dugger, Vice-President, Operations E. C. Ewing, Director, Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Affairs C. Fugate, Operations Superintendent A. Harris, Acting Superintendent, System Engineering J. G. Hoffpauir, Manager, Operations T. R. Leonard, General Manager, Plant Operations D. C. Matheny, Refuel 9 Coordinator E. Perkins, Jr., Manager, Licensing G. D. Pierce, Director of Quality B. Thigpen, Director, Plann;ng and Scheduling A. J. Wrape, Director, Design Engineering INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 37551 Onsite Engineering 61726 Surveillance Observations 62707 Maintenance Observations 71707 Plant Operations 71750 Plant Support Activities l 92700 Onsite LER Review

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92901 Followup-Plant Operations l 92902 Followup-Maintenance 92903 Followup-Engineering 92904 Followup-Plant Support i l

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ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED l

Opened 50-382/9909-01 NCV Failure to perform required testing following completion of modifications to safety-related COW valves (Section O4.1). ,

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2-Closed 50-382/9909-01 NCV Failure to perform required testing following completion of modifications to safety related CCW valves (Section 04.1).

Discussed None LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CCW component cooling water

'CF Code of Federal Regulations CR condition report EFW emergency feedwater l EP emergency preparedness l mal - maintenance action item NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission l l l PDR Public Document Room ppm parts per million SIT safety injection tank Tl temporary instruction TS Technical Specifications Y2K Year 2000

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