IR 05000382/1986008

Insp Rept 50-382/86-08 on 860401-30.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Potential Generic Problems,Plant Status,Ler Followup,Monthly Maint & Surveillance & IE Circulars

ML20199E286
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	06/09/1986
From:	Bundy H, Constable G, Luehman J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20199E259	List: IR 05000382/1986008 ML20199E254
References
50-382-86-08, 50-382-86-8, IEC-78-02, IEC-78-2, NUDOCS 8606230252
Download: ML20199E286 (8)

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s APPENDIX U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-382/86-08 License: NPF-38 Docket: 50-382 Licensee: Louisiana Power & Light Company (LP&L)

317 Baronne Street P. O. Box 60340 New Orleans, Louisiana 70160 Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (W3 SES)

Inspection At: Taft, Louisiana Inspection Conducted: April 1-30, 1986 Inspectors: ,_

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. Gn6ehman,7enior Resident Inspector Date

ms II.~ F. Bundy, Project 11ispector, Project Section C, Reactor Projects Branch m

Date Accompanying Personnel: T. R. Staker, Resident Inspector I

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G. C Constable, Chief, Project Section C, Date Reactor Projects Branch l

Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted April 1-30, 1986 (Report 50-382/86-08)

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Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of: (1) Potential Generic Problems, (2) Plant Status, (3) Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup, l

8606230252 860617 PDR ADOCK 05000382 O PDR l

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(4) Monthly Maintenance, (5) Monthly Surveillance, (6) Routine Inspection,' and

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(7) Inspection & Enforcement (I&E) Circulars'.

Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

Principal Licensee Employees G. W. Muench, Acting Director, Nuclear Operations

• R. P. Barkhurst, Plant Manager, Nuclear T. F. Gerrets, Corporate QA Manager ,

S. A. Alleman, Assistant Plant Manager, Plant Technical Services N. S. Carns, Assistant Plant Manager, Nuclear, Operations and Maintenance J. N. Woods, QC Manager A. S. Lockhart, Site Quality Manager

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R. F. Burski, Engineering and Nuclear Safety Manager

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K. L. Brewster, Onsite Licensir.g Engineer

, G. E. Wuller, Onsite Licensing Coordinator T. H. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent, Nuclear

• Present at exit interviews.

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In addition to the_above personnel, the NRC inspectors held discussions with various operations, engineering, technical support, maintenance, and

. administrative members of the licensee's staff.

t Unresolved /0 pen Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection. One open item 8608-01 is, identified in paragraph . Plant Status-

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At the beginning of the inspection period, the plant was in a normal power-escalation following a maintenance outage. The plant operated at or near full power for most of the month with one unplanned power transient. On the morning of A 18, 1986, an inadvertent dilution of the reactor I coolant system (prilRCS) occurred. RCS average temperature increased and high

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linear power pre-trips were received on the core protection calculator l (CPC) channels. The control room operator began boration and turbine load was reduced. At first, efforts to borate the RCS. appeared to have little effect. The initiating event was finally determined to be a valve lineup

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error. - An auxiliary operator had mistakenly operated the primary makeup

- Water flush valve to the "A" Charging Pump (PMU-124A) while attempting to adjust seal water flow to the pump. After the valve lineup was corrected, the plant power level was quickly stabilized and subsequently returned to full power. The apparent reason that boration efforts initially had little

! effect (besides normal mixing delay time) was that the makeup water had backed up in the suction piping. When boration was commenced, the initial amount of water reaching the RCS was primarily makeup water. The NRC

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inspector recommended to the licensee that consideration be given to placing this makeup valve and the corresponding valves on the other pumps under administrative control (on the locked valve list).

No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup The.following LERs were reviewed and closed. The NRC inspectors verified that reporting requirements had been met, that causes had been identified, that corrective actions appeared appropriate, that generic applicability had been considered, and that the LER forms were complete. Additionally, the NRC inspectors confirmed that_no unreviewed safety questions were involved and that violations of regulations or Technical Specification (TS) conditions had been identifie (Closed) LER 382/85-13 - Automatic Actuation of RP Some of the events described in this report were the subject of Violation 382/8516-02 which was closed in NRC Inspection Report 382/86-02. The possibility of an unreviewed safety question regarding the discharge of steam generator blowdown discussed in the report was identified as an unresolved item in NRC Inspection Report 382/85-14. This item was subsequently closed in NRC Inspection Report 382/85-18. The reactor trip discussed in this report has been reviewed by the NRC inspector using the documentation assembled for the licensee's Potentially Reportable Events (PRES)85-078 and 85-07 (Closed) LER 382/85-45 - Control Room Isolation. This event is one of several similar events the licensee has reporte The conditions described and the action taken were very similar to those of LER 382/85-48 which was closed in NRC Inspection Report 382/86-0 (Closed) LER 382/85-56 - Reactor Trip Resulting from Condenser Level Perturbatio No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Station maintenance activities affecting safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards and in conformance with T Observation of maintenance activities this month included a preventive maintenance activity involving calibration of overcurrent relays as well as a corrective maintenance activity involving replacement of packing on

"A" Charging Pum No violations or deviations were identified.

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5 Monthly Surveillance The NRC inspectors observed / reviewed TS required testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation (LCD)

were met, and any deficiencies identified were properly reviewed and resolve An instrumentation loop check and calibration required by TS 4.3.3.10, Table 4.3-8, Item 3b, and performed in accordance with Procedure MI-3-425, Revision 4, was observed. This work involved liquid effluent monitor LWM-IF-064 On April 16, 1986, the NRC inspector witnessed the performance of Surveillance Procedure MI-3-101, "NI Linear Power Channel Calibration,"

for Safety Channel C. In addition to verifying the requirements outlined above, the NRC inspector discussed portions of the procedure with the technicians to verify their understanding of and familiarity with the work in progres TS 3.3.1, Table 4.3-1, requires in part that a channel functional test be performed on each channel of the logarithmic power level - high reactor trip at least monthl A review of the licensee's surveillance procedures-showsthatthesefuncQonaltestsareonlyperformedmonthlywhenreactor power is less than 10 % power. Testing on such a frequency did not appear to the NRC inspector to be consistent with the TS requirement which makes no reference to power level. The licensee explained that the

, position they had taken on this testing was based on the following:

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. The trip may be manually bypassed above 10 % power [TS 3.3.1, Table I

3.3-1(a)]. Therefore, it need not be tested at power since it was (. procedurally disabled, and inoperable equipment need not be tested.

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' The functional test of the channels could not be easily accomplished at power and, though possible, it was not desirable to perform the testing from the standpoint of equipment degradation (disconnecting l the input cabling).

After consulting with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), the NRC inspector informed the licensee that the matter was being evaluate (0 pen Item 86-08-01)

l No violations or deviations were identifie . Routine Inspection l

By observation during the inspection period, the NRC inspectors verified that the control room manning requirements were being me In addition, the NRC inspectors observed shift turnover to verify that continuity of

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> system status.was maintaine The NRC_ inspectors periodically. questioned

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shift personnel relative to their awareness of the plant' condition '

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,Through log review and plant tours, the NRC inspectors verified compliance with selected TS and limiting conditions for operation D'u ring the course of the inspection, observations relative to protected and vital area security were made including access controls, boundary

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integrity, search, escort, and badgin .

b On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWPs) were reviewed and the specific work activity was monitored to assure the activities were being conducted per the RWP Selected radiation protection instruments were

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periodically checked and equipment operability and calibration frequency

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were verified.

I The NRC inspectors kept informed on a daily basis of overall status of plant and any significant safety matter related to plant operation Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the operations staff on a regular basi Selected portions of operating logs

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and data sheets were reviewad dail The NRC inspectors conducted.Various~ plant tours and made frequent visits

!- to the control room. Observations included: witnessing work activities

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in progress; verifying the status of operating and standby safety systems

! and equipment; confirming valve positions and instrument and recorder

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readings; annunciator alarms; and housekeeping.

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At approximately 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> on April 2, 1986, the NRC inspector observed

. that Annunciator D11 (LOCAL PWR DENSITY /DNBR BY-PASS) on Control Room

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Cabinet _K was' actuated with the plant _at_100% power. Annunciator Response Procedure OP-500-009, Revision 1, Attachment 8.31, indicated that this annunciator should not be actuated when power level is above 10 4% powe The NRC inspector pointed this fact out to the control. room supervisor who then consulted the shift supervisor. Neither appeared to be cognizant of this anomaly. They decided to issue a Condition Identification Work Authorization (CIWA) to troubleshoot the circuitr Shortly thereafter, I the operations superintendent entered the control room and the NRC inspector discussed the annunciator problem with him. He stated that he was aware of the problem and had discussed corrective action with the assistant plant manager, operations and maintenance (APM, 0&M) and a plant operator. He was under the impression that a CIWA had already been

, issued.. The NRC inspector confirmed occurrence of the discussion with the APM, O&M. 'Apparently, no corrective action had been initiated, nor had existence'of the problem been promulgated to all other operations personnel. The NRC inspector expressed concerns regarding timely initiation.of corrective actions and adequate communications of problems to other operations personnel with the APM, O&M, who indicated he would address these concerns. This is another example of the annunciator

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problems-discussed in the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance

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(SALP)BoardReport(382/85-30), Section B, and consnunications problems discussed in NRC Inspection Report 382/86-02, Section 14, " Inoperable Containment Spray Pump." The licensee should consider this example in

formulating the required corrective action PPEs86-029 and 86-031 document plant stack releases that occurred when the volume control tank (VCT) was vented on April 5 and 10,1986, respec-tively. A similar problem of a smaller .nagnitude occurred on April 9, 1986, when leakage through the VCT vent caused a rise in reactor auxiliary building (RAB) and plant stack gaseous radioactivity level Gases vented from the VCT are normally directed through a piping header

into a surge _ tank, through compressors into waste gas decay tanks, where they are held up to allow radioactive decay prior to release. In these instances, the licensee determined that some of the gases from the VCT were released directly to the plant stack through the vent gas heade This flow path was made possible because of modifications made, in part, to correct problems identified in LER 85-13 and NRC Violation 50-382/8516-02 in which radioactive contamination from the boric acid concentrators was introduced into the condensate system. The boric acid concentrators can now be aligned to either the vent gas or gas surge headers. Because procedures and drawings have not yet been updated to reflect the changes made as part of a station modification (SM), the VCT vent was inadvertently cross-connected to the gas surge header when the boric acid concentrator valves to the gas surge header were placed in the open position (required by the system standby valve lineup) with the valves on the vent gas header (added by the SM) already open. As an interim measure, the licensee has eliminated this cross-connect by danger tagging shut the valves to the gas surge header. This problem is the-subject of Quality Notice (QN) SQ-86-023 which has been reviewed by the

- NRC inspector. Because the licensee identified this violation and initiated appropriate corrective action, no NRC enforcement action is planned. LP&L corrective actions will be reviewed during a subsequent inspectio No violations or deviations were identifie . Inspection & Enforcement (IE) Circulars

. The licensee's actions on the following IE Circular have been reviewed and the IE Circular is considered close (Closed) IEC 78-02 - Proper Lubricating 011 for Terry Turbines. The licensee has now changed the lubricating oil in the emergency feedwater (EFW) pump Terry Turbine to Mobil RL-851 "Vaportec Light." Additionally, the NRC inspector has verified that the plant lubrication manual has been updated to reflect this chang No violations or deviations were identifie __ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ . . _ _

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- 9 .' Potential Generic Problems The NRC inspector providedithe licensee with a copy of.the applicable

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section of_ NRC I&E Vendor Report 99900053/86-01 concerning pneumatic check valves manufactured by Parker-Hannifin and supplied by Anchor Darling Valve Company (AD). It has been identified that these particular valves

'do not seat reliably under a gradual loss of air supply and AD has recommended that an alternate pneumatic check valve be used for this application. ~AD records did not indicate that LP&L has ordered replacement valves for W3 SES.-

Other potential problems have been identified concerning swing chec valves. The NRC inspector briefed the assistant plant manager.for operations and maintenance as' well as the. maintenance superintendent on-the problem of improperly secured cap screws on swing check valves at a number of plants. The NRC _ inspector was informed.by the licensee that this problem has been the. subject of a letter from AD and that the few valves checked thus far at W3 SES have had no problem No violations'or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview The irispection scope and findings were summarized on May 1,1986, wit those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the NRC inspectors' findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the NRC'

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