IR 05000382/1999004
| ML20205M062 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 04/09/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205M060 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-99-04, 50-382-99-4, NUDOCS 9904150078 | |
| Download: ML20205M062 (17) | |
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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
50-382 License No.:
NPF-38 Report No.:
50-382/99-04 Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Location:
Hwy.18 Killona, Louisiana Dates:
March 1 to 19,1999 Inspector:
Claude E. Johnson, Senior Reactor inspector Engineering and Maintenance Branch Approved By:
Dr. Dale A. Powers, Chief, Engineering and Maintenance Brai ch Division of Reactor Safety ATTACHMENTS:
Attachment 1 SupplementalInformation Attachment 2 Reactor Coolant System Piping and Pressurizer Repair Schematics l
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9904150078 990409 PDR ADOCK 05000382 G
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-2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 NRC inspection Report No. 50-382/99-04 This inspection consisted of (1) a review of the licensee's implementation of the facility inservice inspection program, and (2) followup review of reactor trip breaker performance and the reactor coolant system piping and pressurizer instrumentation nozzle repairs. The inspection report covers a 2-week period onsite by a region-based inspector.
Maintenance j
Overall, the licensee had established a well defined inservice inspection program plan
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(Section M1.1).
The observed material condition of the reviewed structures, electrical equipment, and
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mechanical systems was generally adequate. The licensee was in the process of improving the existing material condition by repairing instrumentation nozzles (Section M2).
The nondestructive examination procedures revi1wed were in compliance with l
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l regulatory and ASME code requirements, and were adequate to perform the intended l
work activities (Section M3).
I The inspector found that licensee personnel were effective in oversight and controlling l
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l contractor inservice inspection activities, with one exception of an inspector-identified l
procedural violation. The violation was the failure of a nondestructive examiner to l
establish a distance-amplitude curve on the ultrasonic monitoring screen. The licensee re-examined the weld in question and no indications were identified. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy. This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-1999-0272 (Section M4).
An unresolved item was identified. The item related to the operability of degraded
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hydraulic snubbers (Section M4).
Deficiencies identified in self-assessments and quality assurance audits were tracked
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appropriately by the licensee via the corrective action process (Section M7.1).
Reactor coolant system piping and pressurizer instrument nozzle repairs and
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replacements were performed by the licensee's contractors in a well planned and professional manner (Section M8.1).
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Enaineerina The licensee did not effectively evaluate and implement vendor information regarding
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the reactor trip breaker failures to close as recommended by Combustion Engineering, Inc., Technical Advisory Letter 83-13," Update Regarding Undervoltage Trip Device Armature Pickup On Reactor Trip Switchgear," Supplement 1, dated January 27,1984, in a timely manner. Had the licensee appropriately utilized this information, one problem regarding the minimization of an air gap on an undervoltage device might have been precluded (Section E8.1).
The use of a high speed camera during Refueling Outage RF-9 was a proactive effort
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by the licensee to resolve the reactor trip breaker closure problems that had occurrey (Section E8.1).
The licensee's immediate corrective actions for the reactor trip breaker undervoltage
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device failures to open, which were (1) install newly tested undervoltage devices, and (2) ship the defective undervoltage devices to a vendor for analysis, were appropriate efforts to resolve these failures. The licensee's long-term corrective actions to monitor
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and trend undervoltage device failures during surveillance and preventive maintenance testing were appropriate (Section E8.1).
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-4-Report Details Summarv of Plant Status
' The plant was shutdown for Refueling Outage RF-9.
II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Inservice inspection (73753)
a.
Insoection Scope (73753)
The inspector performed a limited review of the licensee's "Second Ten-Year Interval inservice Inspection Program Plan and Schedule," Revision 1, dated March 25,1998, and code cases implemented. In addition, the inspector reviewed correspondence from the licensee to the NRC about the first and second 10-year intervals to determine if the licensee had subrutted renef requests for those Code Class 1,2, and 3 weld examinations where 100 percent full examination coverage could not be achieved.
b.
Observations and Findinas During the inspection, the inspector found that the inservice inspection program at Waterford 3 was well defined and that the licensee had implemented the requirements of the 1992 Edition,1993 Addendum,Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure
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Vessel Code. The licensee had been granted explicit approval by NRC to use the 1992 Edition of the Code. The inspector found that program changes were documented appropriately. The program plan clearly delineated by component identification the components to be examined, the period to be inspected, the augmented inspections, the nondestructive examination methods, and the applicable ASME code cases. The licensee had also submitted relief requests in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a requirements for welds that did not receive 100 percent examination coverage.
c.
Conclusions Overall, the licensee had established a well defined inservice inspection program plan.
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment a.
Inspection Scope (73753)
While verifying the implementation of the inservice inspection program and following un
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on the reactor coolant system piping and pressurizer nozzle repairs, the inspector J
observed 'he external material condition of the following structures and systems:
Reactor coolant system piping
Pressurizer
Reactor trip breakers and cabinets (TCB-1 thru TCB-9)
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Reactor building chiller (AH-13D-FB)
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Observations and Findinas The inspector generally found that the reactor coolant system piping and pressurizer were in adequate condition, with the exception of some leaking instrumentation nozzles. The licensee was in the process of improving the existing material condition by repairing instrumentation nozzles. The inspected reactor trip breakers appeared to be free of corroded or dirty contacts and terminals. There were no indications of crimped or frayed wiring in the cabinets, and they were appropriately locked and controlled. The inspector observed the breaker cabinets to be well maintained, and in a clean environment free of any oil leaks, water leaks, rust, or degraded components.
With respect to observations on the reactor building chillers, the inspector noted catch drains attached to the system, thereby, indicating several places of leakage.
c.
Conclusions The inspector generally found that the observed material condition of the reviewed structures, electrical equipment, and mechanical systems was adequate. Deficiencies included cracked reactor coolant system piping and pressurizer instrumentation nozzles and leaking reactor building chillers.
M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation a.
Inspection Scope (73753)
The inspector reviewed nondestructive examination procedures to determine if they agreed with regulatory and applicable ASME code requirements. The procedures reviewed are listed in Attachment 1.
b.
Qbservations and Findinas The inspector found that nondestructive examination procedures reviewed contained appropriate detail and inspection criteria, and were in compliance with regulatory and I
ASME code requirements. The procedures were adequate to perform the intended work activities.
c.
Conclusions The nondestructive examination procedures were in compliance with regulatory and ASME code requirements.
l M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance l
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a.
Inspection Scope (73753)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's and its contractor's (Raytheon) nondestructive examination personnel certification records for Level 11 and 111 examiners, and also assessed personnel knowledge and performance through observation of work i
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activities. The inspector also assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's controls as
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-6-they related to inservice inspection activities (i.e., scheduling examinations and oversight of inservice inspection contractors).
b.
Observations and Findinas b.1 Qualification and Certification The inspector found that personnel certification records contained appropriate documentation, such as annual vision acuity examination, work experience, education, training records, and examination results for each nondestructive examination method they were certified to perform. The certification records were current and legible, and the inspector found that the personnel were properly certified and qualified in
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accordance with ASME code requirements and the a,np'i~able supplement of SNT-TC-1 A, " Requirements for the Qualification of Nondestructive dxa nination Personnel," 1984. Minor errors were identified during the review of records, and these errors were immediately corrected by the licensee's inservice inspection supervisor.
b.2 Performance The inspector observed the performance of various methods of nondestructive
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examinations, such as visual, magnetic particle, liquid penetrant, and ultrasonic examinat'.ons. The nondestructive examinations observed are listed in Attachment 1.
The inspector found the equipment used to be within calibration. The inspector noted during the examinations that nondestructive examination personnel (1) were knowledgeable of nondestructive examination techniques and processes used, (2)
were knowledgeable of procedural requirements, (3) were experienced with the instrumMetion and equipment used, and (4) adhered to procedural requirements, with one excepuon discussed below.
The inspector identified one pracedural violation during the ultrasonic examination of Steam Generator 2 Weld 04-026 (intermediate shell-to-conical shell). The inspector found that the Leveill examiner performing the ultrasonic exnmination who did not have a distance-amplitude curve (DAC) established on the screen of the ultrasonic instrument. Procedure QAP-393, * Manual Ultrasonic Examination Of Welds in Vessels," Revision 2, requires establishment of a DAC on the ultrasonic monitoring screen. The purpose of the DAC is to assist the examinerin determining when an l
indication exceeds the examination acceptance criteria. The inspector questioned the
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examiner why the DAC was not plotted on the ultrasonic monitoring screen. The examiner informed the inspector that the DAC had been inadvertently erased while removing couplant from the instrument, and that because of time restraints, he did not
re-establish the DAC. The inspector informed licensee management that a failure to j
establish a DAC during the examination was in violation of Procedure QAP-393 This l
Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy (50-382/9904-01). This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-1999-0272.
The licensee re-examined the weld in question, and no indications were identified.
l There were no other problems identified during the remaining ultrasonic examinations observed l
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e-7-The inspector was informed that one hydraulic snubber (RC-MSNB-251-1 A) for Reactor Coolant Pump 1 A, and three hydraulic snubbers (SG-MSNB-734-1 A, SG-MSNB-735-1 A, cnd SG-MSNB-736-1 A) for Steam Generators A and B, were found deficient of lubrication oil during a visual inspection by the licensee's staff, Upon
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further review by the licensee, Snubber RC-MSNB-251-1A was declared operable, however, Snubbers SG-MSNB-734-1 A, SG-MSNB-735-1 A, and SG-MSNB-736-1 A were declared inoperable. Condition Reports CR-WF3-1999-0213 and -0212 were initiated to track and resolve these deficiencies. The inspector found that the surveillance requirement for these snubbers had been changed from once every refueling outage (18 months) to once every 48 months. The inspector questioned the validity of changing the inspection periodicity. The inspector was informed by the
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licensee's representative that Technical Specification 3.7.8, which addresses snubber j
operability, allowed the licensee to change the periodicity. The inspector also asked the following:
Did the vendor provide snubber lubrication requirements?
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At what loss of lubrication oil does a hydraulic snubber become degraded?
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What is the root cause for the insufficient amount of lubrication oil in the
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Licensee personnel were unable to answer these questions. Pending the licensee's completion of their evaluation of the snubber operability status during required plant operational modes and formulation of responses to the questions, the inspector considered this an unresolved item (50-382/9904-02).
b.3 Effectiveness of Licensee Control The inspector found that licensee personnel were effective in oversight and controlling contractor inservice inspection activities, such as scheduling of examinations, with one exception identified in Section M4b.2.
c.
Conclusions The nondestructive examination personnel were properly certified in accordance with the applicable supplement of SNT-TC-1 A, and in general, performed the nondestructive examine 40ns in accordance with procedures and the ASME code.
The inspector identified a procedural violation regarding the failure of a Level ll examiner to establish a DAC on the ultrasonic monitoring screen. The licensee re-examined the weld in question and no indications were identified. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy (50-382/9904-01). This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condtion Report CR-WF3-1999-0272.
With the one exception, the licensee was effective in controlling contractor inservice inspection examination activities.
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An unresolved item (50-382/9904-02) was identified. The item related to the operability of degraded hydraulic snubbers.
M7 Quality Assurance in Maintenance M7.1 Licensee Self-Assessment Activities a.
Inspection Scope (73753)
l The inspector reviewed the licensee's inservice inspection self-assessments and quality
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l assurance audits, b.
Ot'servations and Findinas The inspector observed that deficiencies identified in the self-assessments and quality assurance audits were documented in condition reports and were tracked by the licensee's corrective action program. Corrective actions sampled appeared satisfactory. Self-assessments and audits reviewed were adequate.
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Conclusions
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Deficiencies identified in self-assessments and quality assurance audits were tracked appropriately by the licensee via the corrective action process. The corrective actions, self-assessments, and audits reviewed were adequate.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues l
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M8.1 Reactor Coolant System Pipina and Pressurizer Instrument Nozzle Leaks (92902)
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Backaround l
The reactor coolant system at Waterford 3 contains numerous nozzles that penetrate the reactor vessel, pressurizer, steam generators and system piping that are fabricated l
from inconel 600. The inconel 600 nozzles penetrate the vessel or piping and attach to
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the inner wall with a J-groove weld (see Attachment 2 for the design specifics). The
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heat affected zona of these nozzles is subject to primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC). These cracks are typically axially oriented, and usually initiated on the inside diameter of nozzles. These cracks were recently discovered by licensee visual inspections for evidence of boric acid accumulation and leakage.
i The licensee performed detailed inspections during this outage (RF-9), and as a result identified pressure boundary leakage in the following:
Pressurizer Top Head instrument Tap C (RC-310)
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Pressurizer Top Head instrument Tap A (RC-311)
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RCS Hot Leg 1 RTD Nozzle at RC-ITE-112HC1
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RCS Hot Leg 1 Sampling Line (RC-104)
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RCS Hot Leg 2 D/P instrument Nozzle (RC-DPT-9126-SMA)
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-9-I b.
Inspection Followup The inspector found that the licensee's corrective actions were to (1) perform an approved ASME code replacement and repair for the two top pressurizer head instrument nozzles, and (2) install a mechanical nozzle seal assembly (MNSA) on the three remaining instrument nozzles located in the hot legs. The latter repair process (see Attachment 2) was dosirable because the piping was filled with reactor coolant.
Welding Services incorporated performed the welding on the two pressurizer head instrument nozzles, and Combustion Engineering installed the MNSA on the remaining three hot leg instrument nozzles. The MNSA clamps were developed by Combustion Engineering and were considered to be temporary (one refueling cycle). The licensee's long-term proposed plan was to replace these nozzles with inconel 690 nozzles, similar to the pressurizer head instrument nozzles.
The inspector observed the drilling of the hole for Instrument Nozzle C replacement, and determined that contractor maintenance personnel were appropriately following the instructions included in the work package. The work instructions appeared to be clear and easy to follow. The inspector verified through documentation review that the replacement nozzle was manufactured from inconel 690. The inspector also verified that welding activities associated with the installation of Instrument Nozzle C were performed in accordance with the approved weld procedure, and that the welders were certified to perform the work. No deficiencies or poor work practices were observed.'
The inspector observed the installation of the MNSA drilling rig and the subsequent installation of the MNSA clamp assembly for the RCS Hot Leg 1 RTD Nozzle. The bolt
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holes were drilled and tapped in accordance with the work instructions, and verified by
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quality control. Upon completion of the tapping, the MNSA was installed and bolts were torqued in accordance with work instructions.
Based on the inspector's review and observation of the reactor coolant system piping and pressurizer instrument nozzle repairs, the work was being performed in accordance with approved procedures in a well planned and professional manner by the licensee's j
contractors.
c.
Conclusions Reactor coolant system piping and pressurizer instrument nozzle repairs and replacements were performed by the licensee's contractors in a well planned and
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professional manner in accordance with approved procedures and instructions.
Ill. Enoineerino E8.1 Reactor Trio Breaker Performance (92903)
a.
Backaround The inspector reviewed the licensee's root cause analyses pertaining to the reactor trip breaker problems, and the proposed corrective actions. Waterford 3 has GE Type AK 2-25-2 reactor trip breakers, which had experienced problems when closing
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-10-(not a safety-related function) from approximately 1996-1998. The licensee had also identified reactor trip breaker problems when opening (a safety-related function) during
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preventive maintenance activities. Although new breakers of the same type were l
installed during Refueling Outage 8, the closing problems continued. Several condition reports have documented these protoms. The licensee developed a fault tree analysis that identified potential roc Juses that could be responsible for the reactor trip beakers failure to close. The licensee also shipped the two undervoltage devices (UVDs) that failed to open during preventive maintenance testing to a vendor for analysis.
b.
Inspection Followup The inspector found through discussions with licensee component engineers, that several issues were identified with the reactor trip breakers which are:
(1)
One potential root cause of closing failures was determined to be a UVD on Reactor Trip Breaker TCB-1. The licensee, witn assistance from General Electric, addressed and resolved this problem by inserting steps in plant procedures to close any UVD air gap befcre closing the breakers (see Figure 1).
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-11-However, closing failures continued to occur on breakers that have no air gap, therefore, another root cause exists.
The licensee had recently purchased a high speed camera to continue troubleshooting for any abnormalities in the reactor trip breaker cabinet. The licensee, with the use of the high speed camera, verified that a suspect UVD was functioning properly.
The licensee informed the inspector that ancDer potential root cause for a reactor trip breaker failing to close was movement of the breaker both '.orizontally and vertically as a result of dimensional mismatches between Combustion Engineering switchgear and the General Electric breakers. The licensee based this determination on the following:
Breakers that fail to close while installed in switchgear never fail to close when
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taken to the electric shop for troubleshooting.
The fully racked-in breakers have been observed to be positioned to one side
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of the cubicles.
The breakers jump approximately 1/10 inch when closing.
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Specific breakers that operated successfully at Arkansas Nuclear One (utilizes
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General Electric switchgear) have failed to close at Waterford 3 and subsequently operated successfully at Arkansas Nuclear One.
The purchase of new breakers has not resolved the closing problems.
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The licensee was continuing to troubleshoot potential root causes. This analysis is documented in Root Cause Analysis 97-1877, " Reactor Trip Breakers Fail to Close."
The licensee has also analyzed each potential root cause and concluded that none of these causes would prevent the reactor trip breakers from tripping, which is a safety-related function.
The inspector found that Combustion Engineering, Inc., sent to the licensee Technical Advisory Letter 83-13, Supplement 1, on January 27,1984. This supplemental information updated air gap adjustment information regarding UVD armature pickup on reactor trip switchgear, specifically AK-2-25 circuit breakers. This information specifically addressed one of the reactor trip breaker closing problems that Waterford 3 has experienced. Had the licensee appropriately utilized this information, one of the problems regarding the minimization of an air gap on a UVD might have been prec!aded. This was an example where the licensee did not effectively evaluate and implement vendor information in a timely manner.
(2)
While performing the annual preventive maintenance on reactor trip breakers (CEDEBKR3917-A and CEDEBKER3918-B) to verify the operability of the UVD and i
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-12-the shunt trip device, the UVD on both breakers failed to open (safety-related function)
as required.
The inspector found that the licensee, upon discovery of the defective UVDs, replaced them with new UVDs that were tested satisfactorily. Condition Reports CR-WF3-1998-1222 and -1312 documented these failures. The defective UVDs were sent to a vendor for analysis. Subsequently, Nuclear Logistics Inc., Failure Analysis Report R-020022-1, ' Failure Analysis Report of a GE UV Trip Device for Waterford 3 Nuclear Power Station," Revision 0, listed the root causes as (1) the UVD for Breaker CEDEBKR3917-A failed as a result of the front bracket being bent, and (2) the UVD for Breaker CEDEBKER3918-B failed as a result of the moving arm.sture to rivet gap not being adjusted properly. The report recommended that the two UVDs not be reinstalled in safety-related breakers.
The inspector discussed the results of the analysis regarding the two UVD failures with
the licensee's staff. The licensee's representative informed the inspector that it could i
not determine how the one aforementioned UVD bracket had been bent. The licensee assumed that it could have been damaged during installation, removal, or during shipment. The licensee had also determined that it had adjusted the second UVD in accordance with approved vendor (General Electric) procedures. The licensee was not able to conclusively determine (1) how and where the UVD was damaged, and (2)
why the second UVD was out of adjustment. The inspector verified that the licensee and its vendor were using the same General Electric procedures for adjustments.
The inspector determined that the immediate corrective actions to installed newly tested UVDs, and to ship the defective UVDs off for analysis was an appropriate effort to resolve these failures The licensee's long-term corrective actions to monitor and trend UVD failures during surveillance and preventive maintenance testing were appropriate.
c.
Conclusion The use of a high speed camera was a proactive effort by the licensee to resolve the remaining reactor trip breaker closure problems. The inspector reviewed the licensee's ongoing root cause determination and the corrective actions implemented thus far, and determined that the licensee has conducted an extensive resolution process to determine the extent of the problems.
The licensee did not effectively evaluate and implement vendor information regarding the reactor trip breaker failure to close as recommended by Combustion Engineering, Inc.,
Technical Advisory Letter 83-13 " Update Regarding Undervoltage Trip Device Armature Pickup On Reactor Trip Switchgear," Supplement 1, dated January 27,1984 in a timely manner. Had the licensee appropriately utilized this information, one problem regarding the minimization of an air gap on a UDV might have been peclude e
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-13-The inspector determined that the licensee's immediate corrective actions in regard to the reactor trip breaker UVD failures to open, which were (1) install newly tested UVDs, and (2)
ship the defective UVDs to a vendor for analysis, were appropriate efforts to resolve these failures. The licensee's long-term corrective actions to monitor and trend UVD failures during surveillance and preventive maintenance testing were appropriate.
V. Manaaement Meetinos X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on March 19,1999. The licensee representatives acknowledgs the findings presented.
The inspector asked the licensee representatives whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT 1 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PAP.TIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee M. Brandon, Licensing Supervisor, Nuc!enr Safety & Regulatory Affairs E. Brauner, Superintendent, Electrical / instrumentation and Controls, System Engineering
l C. DeDeaux, Supervisor, Regulatory Licensing R. Douet, Maintenance Manager E. Ewing, Director, Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Affairs l
G. Fey, Supervisor, in-House Events Analysis i
A. Harris, Acting Superintendent, System Engineering J. Howard, Programs Engineering Manager, Procurement E. Lemke, Licensing Engineer i
l C. Lindsey, Component Engineer i
T. Leonard, General Manager, Plant Operations D. Marpe, Design Engineer, Mechanical E. Perkins, Jr., Manager, Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Affairs
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J. Perez, Design Engineer, Mechanical l
G. Pierce, Director of Quality G. Robin, Supervisor, Engineering Programs A. Wrape, Director, Design Engineering S. Wolfe, Senior Reactor Operator, Operations NRC L. Ellershaw, Senior Reactor inspector (participated in exit meeting by telephone)
l lNSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 73753 Inservice inspection IP 92903 Followup-Engineering ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened 50-382/9904-01 NCV Failure to establish a distance-amplitude curve during
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ultrasonic examination of a Class 2 weld.
50-382/9904-02 URI Degraded steam generator hydraulic snubbers.
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-2-l Closed 50-382/9904-01 NCV Failure to establish a distance-amplitude curve during ultrasonic examination of a Class 2 weld.
LICENSEE DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Procedures Number Title NDE9.23
" Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Piping Welds (ASME Section XI),"
Revision 1 NDE10.03
"VT-3 Inspections," Revision 0 QAP-392
" Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Vessel Nozzle inside Radius," Revision 2.0 NDE9.04
" Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping (ASME Section XI)," Revision 1 NDE9.19
" Ultrasonic Instrument Linearity Verification," Revision 2 NDE9.31
" Magnetic Particle Examination (MT)," Revision 0 NDE9.41
" Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT) Solvent Removable
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(Visible / Fluorescent) Water Washable (Fluorescent)," Revision 0 l
WPS-30-03-T-601
" Weld Procedure Specification," Revision 0 (Machine)
j WPS-43-43-T-001
" Weld Procedure Specification,' Revision 0 (Manual, Machine)
QAP-393
" Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Welds in Vessels," Revision 2
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Nondestructive Examination Welds Observed Weld Identification Type of Weld Method of Examination 04-026 No. 2 SG intermediate shell-to-conical shell Ultrasonic MS-124-L 40-inch gate valve lower body weld Magnetic Particle 05-002 Pressurizer bottom head-to-shell weld Ultrasonic 48-001 Containment penetration to 20-inch pipe weld UPsonic and Magnetic
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3-Audit / Assessment Reports SA-97-010.1 Special Process Control June 24 through August 20,1997 SA-98-005.1/011.1/015.1 W3 Quality Assurance January 19-22,1998 SA-98-032.1 Inservice Inspection Program March 25 through June 18,1998 Assessment No.97-006 Assessment of the W-3 October 27-30,1997 Quality Assurance Organization Conditicia Reports CR-WF3=1996-1258 CR-WF3=1999-0212 CR-WF3=1997-1877 CR-WF3=1999-0213 CR-WF3=1998-0182 CR-WF3=1999-0232 CR-WF3=1998-1222 CR-WF3=1999-0234 CR-WF3=1998-1312 CR WF3=1999-0272 CR-WF3=1998-1313
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ATTACHMENT 2 l
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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PIPING AND PRESSURlZER REPAIRS SCHEMATICS i
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Weld Repair: Top of old nozzle is removed and new Alloy 690 nozzle is inserted in penetration. Nozzle is welded to
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inconel pad, which is welded to the head using special temper-bead techniques (Pressure boundary weld is moved from the ID to the OD of the pressurizer.)
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Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly (MNSA) Schematic: Old leaking nozzle is left in p; ace and the seal assembly is bolted directly to the reactor coolant piping, using a gasket to prevent leakage. An anti-ejection device is also attached to the head to hold the nozzle in place.
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