IR 05000382/1988026
| ML20195H093 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 11/16/1988 |
| From: | Gagliardo J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20195H086 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-88-26, NUDOCS 8811300214 | |
| Download: ML20195H093 (11) | |
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APPENDIX
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r U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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NRC Inspection Report:
50-382/88-26 Operating License: NPF-38 L
Docket:
50-382
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Licensee: Louisiana Power & Light Company
317 Baronne Street
j New Orleans, Louisiana 70160 Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (kat-3)
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t Inspection At: Wat-3 Taft. Louisiana
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Inspection Conducted: October 24-28, 1988
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l Inspectors: Dorwin R. Hunter Senior Reactor Inspector, Operational Programs l
Section, Division of Reactor Safety
Robert C. Stewart, Reactor Inspector, Materials and Quality Programs
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Section Division of Reactor Safety t
l Tom O. McKernon, Reactor Inspector, Test Programs Section, Division of Reactor Safety I
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Approved by:
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James E. Gagliardo, Chief, Operational Programs Date Section, Divitier of Reactor Safety
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Inspection Sumary J
Inspection Conducted October 24-78, 1988 (Report 50-382/88-26)
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t Areas inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of folicwup to previous
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inspection findings, licensee event reports, steam generator noise, and the
replacement of a valve in the letdown flow system.
j Results: Within the four areas inspected, no violations or deviations were f
identified.
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8811300214 881117
PDR ADOCK 05000392 (
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted LP&L
- N. S. Carns, Manager, Waterford D. F. Packer, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations and Maintenance
- S. A. Alleman, Manager, Quality Assurance
- M. J. Weisner, Manager, Licensing -
R. G. Azzarillo, Manager, Modifications Control
- R. F. Burski, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs D. E. Baker, Manager, Nuclear Support and Assessments
- L. Laughlin, Supervisor, Site Licensing F. Bumgardner, Shift Operations Supervisor
- C. R. Gaines, Supervisor. Events Analysis D. Vince, Supervisor, Maintenance N. LaBlanc, Maintenance Engineer A. Larsen, Assistant Superintendent. Electrical D. Schultz, Supervisor, Shift Technical Advisor
- J. C. Goode, Licensing Engineer G. Fay, Quality Assurance (QA) Representative
- D. Grubric, Licensing Engineer NRC A. B. Beach Deputy Director, Division of Projects W. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview on October 28, 1988.
2.
Followup of Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
2.1 Violations The following violations were reviewed to ensure that the licensee had completed the corrective actions and the corrective measures taken were adequate to prevent recurrence.
2.1.1 (0 pen) Violation (382/8531-03):
Failure to report a defect in a GE AKR-50 circuit breaker. The inspector reviewed the licensee documentation associated with the breakers, including the procedure upgrades to ensure adequate contact wiper tension atid the fastening of locking nuts with sealant. Documentation reviews and personnel interviews revealed that the high usage breakers, all 10 Technical Specification (TS) related breakers, and about 70 percent of all the breakers (31 of 4%), had been checked with no similar problems note,
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Additionally, the remaining GE AKR breakers were scheduled to be completed prior to the end of the next refueling outage - Summer 1989.
The hardware aspects of this violation have been adequately addressed.
NRR's review of the specific reporting requirements associated with the breaker failure is still pending.
2.1.2 (0 pen) Violation (382/8813 01): This violation involved the performance of maintenance activities without the appropriate instructions related to cleanliness control.
During the inspection, the NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the violation.
The licensee had committed, in part, to revising the administrative control procedure for cleanliness control.
UNT-7-005, to include responsibilities for establishing and maintaining adequate cleanliness controls when performing maintenance activities on instrument and control tubing.
In review of Procedure UNT-7-005, Revision 2, the NRC inspector noted specific incongruities in the procedure.
Section 5.2.4 of tbs procedure states, in part, that when a safety-related system is to be opened, the following measures shall be observed:
5.2.4.3, "An inspection shall be conducted immediately prior to the final closure of any system which has been open for maintenance to assure the cleanliness of the system..." However, Step 5.6.7 of Section 5.6, "Inspection Requirements" states, "Whenever maintenance activities that involve the opening or disconnection of instrument or control tubing occur, cleanliness inspection of the tubing is not mandatory if the necessary steps have been taken to ensure that the premaintE ance cleanliness of the tubing or instrument had not been compromised by the maintenance activity." This instruction was misleading and incongruen6 with the first procedural requirement.
(Step 5.2.4.3).
This revision to the cleanliness control procedure did not resolve and complete the required corrective actions to close this violation.
This violation will remain open pending completion of additional corrective action implementation by the licensee and future NRC inspection review.
This subject was discussed with the licensee during the exit interview.
This violation is considered open.
2.1.3 (0 pen) Violation (382/8813-02):
Failure to implement QA procedures and issue quality notices (QNs) for adverse conditions.
The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions associated with this violation and noted that two QNs had been issued on June 17, 1988.
Corrective actions noted in QN-QA-88-075 were that eperations QA needed to receive additional training and corrective actions noted in QN-QA-88-080 were that nuclear operations and construction engineering required program /pr3cedure upgrades to prevent recurrence.
The
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h review revealed that the corrective actions associated with QN-QA-88-075 had been completed, however, the corr #ctive actions associated with
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QN-QA-88-080 had not been completed.
The licensee was asked to review this area.
This violation will remain open pending completion of corrective actions by the licensee end NRC review of the actions.
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2.1.4 (0 pen) Violation (382/8819-01):
Four examples where the licensee failed to issue an LER.
F The NRC inspector reviewed three LERs issued by the licensee (LER 87-029, dated April 18, 1988; LER 88-030/1 and tER 88-031/1,
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dated September 30,1988).
These LERs were issued addressing the Notice of Violation Item A.4 and this LER was reviewed and closed in
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NRC Inspection Report 50-382/88-19 l
The NRC inspector has no futher questions regarding the reporting of the identified conditions; however, this violation will remain open pending further review by the NRC ef the licensee's actions to
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prevent recurrence.
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2.1.5 (Closed) Violation (382/8717-02): This violation involved a failure to follow maintenance procedures in that maintenance personnel failed to install backing nuts on safety related pipe supports.
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During the followup inspection, the NRL inspector verified through i
review of documentation Condition Identification (CI)/ Work Authorizations (WAs) 250892 and CI/WA 028549 to verify that the cited locknuts were installed.
Further, the NRC inspector verified by sample walkdown inspection that locknuts were installed on rigid pipe supports.
In addition, a review of training records verified i
personnel training had been completed with regard to pipe hanger i
support, installation, fabrication and removal, Procedure MM-12-001.
This violation is considered closed.
2.1.6 (Closed) Violation (382/8722-04): This violation involved the I
failure of the licensee to meet TS action statements.
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the failure of personnel to take grab samples at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of the main condenser noble gas evacuation system within the
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i required period and to properly perforrn hydrogen and oxygen trab (
samples on the waste gas holdup system when required, l
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During the followup inspection, the NRC inspector verified the
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licensee had implemented those corrective measures as delineated in r
the licensee's response to the above cited violation in NRC Inspection
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Report 50-382/8722 LP&L Letter W3P87-2243 dated December 23, 1987.
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(1) Operating Instruction 01-014-00 Department Action Statement Notification Instructions (DASN) revised to require hand carrying ccepleted DASN to the control room, l
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(2) Training of responsible personnel, HP, and chemistry technicians.
(3) Development of HP watch station turnover sheets for monitoring sample requests.
(4) Chemistry Procedure CE-1-003, revised to establish watch station chemistry log and surveillance check sheet.
(5) Chemistry Procedure CE-3-305, Sampling of Ventilation and Gaseous Waste Management revised for verifying on-service gas decay tank request to notify SS/CRS of sampling activities prior to sampling and analysis.
This violation is considered closed.
2.1.7 (Closed) Violation (382/8819-03):
This violation involved the failure of maintenance personnel to follow procedures while performing reassembly of the motor-driven firewater pump in accordance with WA-01020904.
During the followup inspection, the NRC inspector reviewed documentation which verified that the appropriate personnel received counseling / training on the importance of adherence to procedures. Other documentation reviewed by the inspector verified that the planners had been briefed on this violation and implications discussed.
This violation is considered closed.
2.2 Open items 2.2.1 (Closed) Open Item (382/8628-02): This open item involved the implementation of plant wide trending analysis program relative to i
maintenance problems and procedural control to ensure consistency in
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maintenance documents transferred to storage.
During the inspection, the NRC inspector verified that the licensee I
had implemented a comprehensive program for performing and analyzing event /significant occurrence root causes. Furthermore, the licensee
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was performing trending analysis for both maintenance problems and i
plant-wide problem trends.
In addition, procedures were reviewed
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which delineated WA package review responsibilities and requirements necessary for WA closure.
This open item is considered closed.
2.2.2 (Closed) Open Item (382/8628-03):
This open item addressed concerns related to the licensee's instrumentation maintenance program. The concerns included: (1) procedures not being followed (2) procedures in error, and (3) equivalent instruments inadequately identifie. _ _ _ _. _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
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l During the followup inspection, the NRC inspector verifie that d
Procedures MI-5-160 and MI-3-350 were revised to correct errors cited in IR 50-382/86-28.
Further, the NRC inspector verified that procedural
controls via Procedures MI-1-120 or ME-1-006 have been established to designate alternate M&TE instrumentation when the specified M&TE is unavailable.
During a sampling of recently completed !&C CIWAs, the NRC inspector noted that the licensee was pro >erly implementing the program revisions and effectively following tie written procedures.
This open item is considered closed.
2.2.3 (Closed) Open Item (382/8710-03):
Holst seismic qualification and
addition of instructions.
The NRC inspector verified that the drawing (GE-67300500) referenced in the work package had been provided i
to document control as required.
l This open item is considered closed.
2.2.4 (Closed) Open Item (382/8725-04):
This open item involved numerous specific concerns related to an engineered safety feature (ESF)
system walkdown inspection.
During the followup inspection, the NRC inspector conducted a walkdown inspection. Based on a sampling of the finding, the walkdown inspection verified the licensee had taken corrective action.
This open item is considered closed.
2.3.5 (Closed) Open Item (382/8803-02):
Licensed operator requalification program did not include simulated loss of instrument air.
The inspector verified loss of instrument air was now included in simulator training. The NRC inspector reviewed training records associated with licensed personnel training conducted on the simulator.
This open item is considered closed.
2.3.6 (Closed) 0 en Item (382/8804-02):
Maintenance Procedure (ME-007-008 Revision 6 deficiencies.
The NRC inspector reviewed a revised proceduce and the review of the revised procedure by the plant operation review committee (PORC).
The deficient steps identified had been addressed.
This open item is considered closed.
2.3.7 (Closed) Open Item (382/8808-05):
Revision to Maintenance Procedure (M-003-372).
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The NRC inspector reviewed the changes to the procedure and another
procedure (MI-003-358) determined by the licensee to need revision to correct a similar situation. The procedure revisions were acceptable.
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This open item is considered closed, i
2.3.8 (Closed) Observation (382/88200-07):
PORC Reviews.
The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee documentation regarding this item, including a memorandum (October 24,1988) provided by the PORC Chairman (Acting Chairman), and corrective action procedures (NOP-005, Revision 1. QAP-012. Revision 7 and UNT-6-010, Revision 5). The
document reviews and personnel interviews revealed that all potentially
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reportable events (PRES) were routinely provided to PORC members and j
discussed at a PORC meeting.
f.rther, plans to review conditions documented on QNs, which have u en receiving a review by the events
and analysis group upon completion, were being pursued for "up-front"
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l review of the QNs by the events and analysis group.
This observation is considered closed.
3.
Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
The following LERs were reviewed to ensure that the licensee had taken the
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stated corrective actions and that the actions were adequate to prevent recurrence.
3.1 (Closed) LER 87-029: This LER reported the failure to meet electrical l
separation required by Regulatory Guide 1.75.
The NRC inspector reviewed the special report (PRE 87-039) completed by the licensee which documented the review of all nonsafety-related q
(nonclass 1E) loads connected to 1E buses to ensure that adequate
i electrical isolation was provided. The report was reviewed by the PORC and approved by the Chairman (meeting 87-61). The generic aspects of this
matter are being followed as part of NRC Violation 382/8819-01.
This LER is considered closed.
3.2 (Closed) LER 87-030-01:
This LER reported a missed delay gas tank sample
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due to a plugged sample injection syringe.
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The inspector reviewed the licensee documentation of the apparent violation j
of the TS.
The generic aspects of this matter are being followed as part of hRC Violation 382/8819-01.
j This LER is considered closed.
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3.3 (Closed)LER87-031:
This LER reported the failure to perform a valve stroke test surveillance.
The inspector reviewed the licensee documentation of the apparent violation of the TS. The generic aspects of this matter are being followed as part of NRC Violation 382/8819-01.
This LER is considered closed.
3.4 (Closed)LER88-001:
This LER reported a reactor trip from out of range axial shape index (ASI) due to inadequate procedures.
The inspector reviewed the program improvements and completion of training for operations personnel to better control this plant condition.
This LER is considered closed.
3.5 (Closed)LER88-003B:
This LER reported spurious ESF control room ventilation actuations.
The inspector reviewed the work package, data, and maintenance procedure revisions regarding the adjustment of the breaker "racking interlock screw." Additionally, the licensee had performed checks of almost all similar breakers and noted no unacceptable conditions.
The preventive maintenance on all of the breakers should be co.npleted prior to the end of the next refueling outage.
This LER is considered closed.
3.6 (Closed)LER88-006:
This LER reported a degraded fire barrier due to inadequate administrative control.
It was apparent that inadequate guidance was provided for repair and preventive maintenance of doors.
LPAL Procedures. UNT-5-002. "Administration Procedure Condition Identification." Revision 8. has been revised to require a fire impairment to be issued when a discrepancy is identified with a fire appliance / fire rated assembly / seal assembly.
In addition, a new Maintenance Prccedure.
Wi-06-106. "Plant Door / Plant Door Equipment Maintenance." has been developed and issued to ensure plant doors and equipment are operable to maintain fire barriers, health physics boundaries and plant security.
This LER is considered closed.
3.7 (Closed)LER88-007:
This LER reported the failure to obtain a chemistry sample.
The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee corrective actions which included procedure changes, procedure and TS reviews to prevent recurrence in other areas, and improved turnovers and notifications, j
This LER is considered closed.
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3.8 (Closed) LER 88-011A:
This LER reported a penetration fire seal impaired due to error in initial construction.
The irregular seal was discovered by utility electricians performing fire seal inspections.
The utility determined that the seal did not conform to a itandard design nor was it constructed of the proper material.
It was observed by the NRC inspector tt.at the existing seal (VIA0179)
was not compatibic with the high temperature 2-inch drain line penetrating the RAB 446 concrete roof.
A station modiiicition, issued under Design Change No. 3042, replaced Seal Type M-9 with "ype RB-8, which was a qualified 5-hour fire seal.
This LER is considered closed.
3.9 (Closed) LER 88-014:
This LER involved a violation of TS 3.3.3.6 in that the licensee operated the plant in Mode 3 with both channels of the reactor vessel level monitoring system (RVLMS) inoperable for 29 minutes beyond the TS's requirement.
During the fwiowup inspection, the NRC inspector verified the licensee had revised the controlling surveillance procedure to include the appropriate acceptance criteria into Attachment 10.3 of the procedure.
This LER is considered closed.
3.10 (Closed) LER 88-20: This LER involved the f ailure of a licensee contractor to perform diesel fuel oil sartples in accordance with TS requirements.
Durino the followup inspection, the NRC inspector verified that the licensee had corresponded with the contractor on this matter.
Furthemore, the licensee perfomed the required analysis in accordance with the specified ASTM procedure.
In addition, the licensee had submitted a request for TS Amendment TSCR-88-15 to update the TS.
This LER is considered closed.
3.11(Closed)LER88-021: This LER involved the failure of licensee personnel to perform TS Surveillance OP-903. 066 within the required time limit when one EDG was removrd from service.
The root cause of this event was characterized as cognitive personnel error.
During the followup inspection, the NRC inspector was infortred by the operations superintendent that those key personnel responsible had received additional training. The operations superintendent indicated that the natter had been discussed and reviewed with tne shift supervisor and the control room supervisor.
NRC inspector followup included records review and discussions with licensee personnel.
The NRC inspector had no additional questions.
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Noise in Steam Generator B During this inspection the NRC inspector assisted the NRC SRI in conducting an overview of the licensee's 1ctivities involved in locating a vibrAtton
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noise emitting from steam generator B at power levels ibove 90 percent,
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and first identified August 30, 1988.
Details regarding the NRC inspecti6n
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results are contained in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/88-25.
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Let Down Heat Exchangnr - Containment isolation Valve (CVC-109)
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During this inspection, the NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's
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activities associated with the replacement of the 2-inch let down heat
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exchanger inlet header containment isolation valve, CVC-109.
At the conclusion of a plant cold shutdown on October 23, 1988, a routine, full-stroke exercise was being perfonned on the 2-inch Containrent Isolation Valve CVC-109 in accordance with ASME Code,Section XI, i
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Requirements.
The valve failed to close upon a control Inservice Testing (We particular valve is a WKM manufactured, slide gate, room actuation.
reverse action, air solenoid, fail-close design identical tc the Main S'eam Isolation Valves H5-124A and B; see NRC Inspection Report 50-382/88-08,
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June 3, 1988.) Durinc discussions with the cognizant licensee representatives, the NRC inspector was informed that because of the prit r
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history of problems associated with this particular valve design, replacement was scheduled for the next refueling outage.
It was noted
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that the companion isolation valve, CVC-103, infide the containment was replaced with a Masoneilan globe valve approximately 2 years earlier.
In addition to discussions held with licensee personnel, the NRC inspector
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reviewed WA Packages, which included WA-01026194 and WA-99000232, along
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with the associated CI Tasks, 258818 and C1 258902, involved with the i
replacement of CVC-109.
No violations or deviations were identified during this review.
A review of inservice testing (functional full stroke time trends) records
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reflect that Valve CVC-109 required internal rework during the last refueling outage.
The rework was required due to excessive leakage during
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the local leak rate testing, May 21, 1988, which ray have contributed to the current binding problem. However, functional testing during normal plant operations, since the refueling outage, appear to have been trouble t
free, i
Significant design change rodifie.ations were made to the WKM manufactured main steam isolation valves MS-128A and B, however, the licensee.tated that a review is currently in process to identify similar WKN designed (
valves in other safety related systems, and if found, they too will be l
replaced. At the close of this inspection, only one other WKM vc.lve was I
located, it being in a nonsafety related system.
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Past history surrcunding the WKM valves may have dictated more prudent I
corrective action in the past.
Since the valves are being replaced, the I
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Exit Interview
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The inspection scope and findings were sumarized with those persons
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identified in paragraph 1.
The licensee did not identify any proprietary information provided to or reviewed by the NRC inspectors.
The inspectinn results were again provided to the licensee on November 2,
1988, by telephone.
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