PNO-IV-99-032A, on 990801,Waterford 3 Operators Manually Tripped Reactor from 100% Power in Response to Indications of Failure of RCP 2B Seal.Pump Was Secured Immediately Following Plant Sd.New Baffle & Seal Assembly Was Installed

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PNO-IV-99-032A:on 990801,Waterford 3 Operators Manually Tripped Reactor from 100% Power in Response to Indications of Failure of RCP 2B Seal.Pump Was Secured Immediately Following Plant Sd.New Baffle & Seal Assembly Was Installed
ML20210Q211
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/12/1999
From: Thomas Farnholtz, Kennedy K
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
References
PNO-IV-99-032A, NUDOCS 9908130177
Download: ML20210Q211 (1)


p j August 12,1999 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-IV-99-032A

_ ,This p,reliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by Region IV staff in Arlington, Texas on this date.

Facility Licensee Emernency Classification Entergy Operations, Inc. Notification of Unusual Event i Waterford 3 Alert Killona, Louisiana f Site Area Emergency Dockets: 50-382 General Emergency

, X Not Applicable

Subject:

' PLANT STARTUP FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF REPAIRS TO REACTOR

- COOLANT PUMP SEAL This is an update to Preliminary Notification (PN) issued on August 3,1999.

On August 1 at 9:49 p.m. (CDT), Waterford 3 operators manually tripped the reactor from 100 percent power in response to indications of a failure of the Reactor Coolant Pump 2B seal. Operators observed a loss of Reactor Coolant Pump 2B controlled bleed off flow which resulted in a high seal temperature. Plant procedures required that the reactor be manually tripped in response to the failed seal. The pump was secured immediately following the plant shutdown. The senior resident inspector responded to the site and verified that operator actions were appropriate and that plant equipment functioned as expected following the reactor trip.

The licensee cooled down the plant to Mode 5, cold shutdown, and drained the reactor coolant system to reduced inventory conditions to investigate the cause of the seal failure and perform repairs. The cause was identified as a cracked seal water heat exchanger baffle. A preliminary determination of fatigue failure was made, and further investigation will be pe formed by the licensee. A new bafne and seal assembly was installed and Reactor Coolant Pump 2B was retumed to service satisfactorily.

A reactor startup was commenced and criticality was achieved at 6:50 a.m. on August 10.

The main generator was connected to the grid, and the plant reached 100 percent power at 1:25 a.m. on August 11.

This information has been discussed with the licensee and is current as of August 12, 1999, at 8 a.m (CDT).

Contact:

Tom Famholtz _ Kriss Kennedy (504)783-6253 (817)860-8140 9908130177 990812

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