IR 05000382/1986017

Insp Rept 50-382/86-17 on 860901-30.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Ler Followup,Monthly Surveillance,Routine Operational Safety,Ie Bulletins & Offsite Review Committee

ML20211F424
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	10/23/1986
From:	Bundy H, Constable G, Luehman J, Staker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20211F409	List: IR 05000382/1986017 ML20211F405
References
TASK-1.C.1, TASK-TM 50-382-86-17, IEB-85-001, IEB-85-1, IEIN-86-007, IEIN-86-012, IEIN-86-12, IEIN-86-7, NUDOCS 8610310157
Download: ML20211F424 (11)

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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-382/86-17 License: .NPF-38 Docket: 50-382 .

Licensee: Louisiana Power & Light Company (LP&L)

317 Baronne Street P. O. Box 60340 New Orleans, Louisiana 70160 Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station , Unit 3 (W3 SES)

Inspection At: Taft, Louisiana

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Inspection Conducted: September 1-30, 1986

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Inspectors: a .- _ ,- - /0/z rd J. G. Lu6hman, Senior Resident Inspector Date 7 ,? 3

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. j) /C/25/5C pT.R.Staker,ResidentInspector Date w;O

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W2/6 H. F. ~ Bundy, Project Inspector Da~te '

(paragraph 11)

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/c/w/6 G. L. Constable, Chief, Project Section C, Date Reactor Projects Branch Inspection Sunnary Inspection Conducted September 1-30, 1986 (Report 50-382/86-17)

Areas Inspected _: Routine, unannounced inspection of: (1)PlantStatus, (2) Licensee Event Report Followup, (3) Monthly Surveillance, (4) Monthly Maintenance, (5) P.m tine Operational Safety Inspection, (6) Followup of Previous Inspection Items, (7) IE Bulletins, (8) Followup on THI Action Plan Requirements, (9) Offsite Review Connittee, (10) ESF System Walkdown, and (11)

IE Information Notice Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000302 O PDR

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees J. G. Dewease, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• R. P. Barkhurst, Plant Manager, Nuclear T. F. Gerrets, Corporate QA Manager S. A. Alleman, Assistant Plant Manager, Plant Technical Services N. S. Carns, Assistant Plant Manager, Nuclear, Operations and Maintenance J. N. Woods, QC Manager A. S. Lockhart, Site Quality Manager R. F. Burski, Engineering and Nuclear Safety Manager K. L. Brewster, Onsite Licensing Engineer G. E. Wuller, Onsite Licensing Coordinator T. H. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent, Nuclear P. V. Prasankumar, Technical Support Superintendent

• Present at exit interview In addition to the above personnel, the NRC inspectors held discussions with various operations, engineer.ing, technical support, maintenance, and administrative members of the licensee's staf . Unresolved Items An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviatio No unresolved items were identified during this inspection, however a previously identified unresolved item is discussed in paragraph . Plant Status The inspection period began with the plant at 100 percent power. At 8:20 p.m. (CDT) on September 9, 1986, while at 100 percent power, a reactor trip occurred due to a turbine tri The turbine trip was due to a high-high level signal for the moisture separator reheater (MSR) shell drain tank (2A) concurrent with a high level signal for the MSR shell (2A). The plant was returned to critical at 7:57 a.m. on September 11, 198 . Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup The following LERs were reviewe The NRC inspectors verified reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and the

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LER forms were complete. Additionally, the NRC inspectors confirmed no unreviewed safety questions were involved and violations of regulations

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or Technical Specification (TS) conditions had been identifie (0 pen) LER 86-15, " Simultaneously Using Two Methods of Draining Reactor Coolant System Results in Loss of Shutdown Cooling." The NRC inspectors questioned the licensee concerning the analysis that has been done on boiling in core with the reactor in Mode 5. In a letter from Combustion Engineering, Inc. (CE) dated September 19, 1986, it was stated that,

"While this situation is not one which is specifically analyzed in detail, it is bounded by other situations that are analyzed. With fluid level above the core and relatively low heat flux from decay heat, the fluid, clad, and fuel temperature would all be predicted to be less than those seen under normal operating conditions at 100 percent power." The NRC inspectors requested that the licensee explain exactly how this Mode 5 event was bounded by the referenced analyzed situations. The licensee responded with the following analysi Simply stated, the fuel temperatures during this event remained well below those of normal operating conditions. As long as the core remained covered, sufficient heat transfer would occur at the relatively low heat flux seen in the core (decay heat of .2 percent power) to prevent damag These conclusions were confirmed by performing a number of pool boiling calculations. Based on a realistic reconstruction of the event, the heat flux in the core was estimated to be a factor of about 300 below the critical value. Using a higher decay heat value and the most limiting power peaking factors, the margin to the critical heat flux value was determined to be a factor of 6 No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance The NRC inspectors observed / reviewed TS required testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation (LCO) were met, and that any deficiencies identified were properly reviewed and resolve The NRC inspector observed the performance of OP-903-024, " Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance," on the morning of September 24, 198 This procedure was performed to meet the requirements of TS 4.4.5.2. No violations or deviations were identified.

t Monthly Maintenance Station activities affecting safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with TS.

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Repair of the switch for valve NG-1628 (N2 Inlet to 2B Safety Injection Tank) was observed by the NRC inspecto The work was accomplished under Condition Identification Work Authorization (CIWA) 02831 A portion of the troubleshooting and repair of Security Door 49 was observed. The NRC inspector verified that proper security measures were taken at the door and at the normally locked cabinet containing the door control and alarm circuitr On September 23, 1986, the NRC inspector observed the reverification of the jumper wiring in the motor operator for Valve SBV-101B (shield building ventilation Train B filter inlet isolation). The reinspection of this valve was part of an effort undertaken by the licensee after a quality assurance (QA) audit found that at least one valve motor operator, previously inspected as part of licensee's equipment qualification program, and deemed satisfactory, still had potentially improper jumper wirin During the inspection of the SBV-101B motor operator, the electricians not only verified that all jumper wiring was approved Rockbestos SIS wire, but also recorded the terminal connections for all jumper wiring. This inspection was verified by a quality control (QC) inspecto l The motor operator originally discovered by QA, as well as 11 others (three of which had some wire replaced following the initial inspections)

subsequently identified by the licensee maintenance personnel, contained wire that was not of the required type and it may be unqualified. The licensee is presently evaluating the suspect wire and has prepared a justification for continued operation covering the fect that six valves I inside the containment have not been reinspecte Apparently during the original inspection of the wiring in motor operators, the inspection merely documented the operators as satisfactory or unsatisfactory (20 of the 64 motor operators in the licensee's program had wiring changed as a result of the initial inspection). The inspectors did not go into each operator knowing exactly how many jumpers should be in a particular operator in order to call it satisfactory. Additionally, the inspectors were not required to specifically document the number of jumpers inspected in a given operator or the terminal connection points of the wires inspected. Consequently, some indeterminate wire was apparently overlooked and, as discussed above, was subsequently discovere The

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resolution of motor operator wiring problems is being tracked as Unresolved Item 382/8615-04.

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i Also, the NRC inspector observed the annual shaft alignment check that was

performed on the "A" component cooling water (CCW) pump.

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7. Routine Operational Safety Inspection By observation during the inspection period, the NRC inspectors verified that the control room manning requirements were being me In addition, the NRC inspectors observed shift turnover to verify that continuity of system status was maintained. The NRC inspectors periodically questioned shift personnel relative to their awareness of the plant conditions.

Through log review and plant tours, the NRC inspectors verified compliance with selected TS and limiting conditions for operation '

During the course of the inspection, observations relative to protected l and vital area security were made including access controls, boundary integrity, search, escort, and badgin On a regular basis radiation work permits (RWPs) were reviewed and the specific work activity was monitored to assure the activities were being conducted per the RWPs. Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked and equipment operability and calibration frequency were verifie The NRC inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of overall status of the plant and of any significant safety matters related to plant operations. Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the operations staff on a regular basis. Selected portions of operating logs and data sheets were reviewed dail The NRC inspectors conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the control room. Observations included: witnessing work activities in progress; verifying the status of operating and standby safety systems and equipment; confirming valve positions, instrument and recorder readings, annunciator alarms; and housekeepin During a control room tour, the NRC inspector noted that the ZERO SPEED lights for three of the four reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) were continuously illuminated with the RCPs'in operation. The Waterford 3 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), paragraph 5.4.1.5.6.2 states, "A speed switch on each reactor coolant pump provides a light indication in the main control room when the shaft speed reaches zero." OP-1-002, i

Revision 4, " Reactor Coolant Pump Operation," Step 6.2.3, requires the use of the ZER0 SPEED lights to verify the RCPs have stoppe The indicators have no safety function but since they are called to be used in an approved procedure they should be restored to operable status or 0P-1-002 should be changed to use another method to verify RCPs have stopped. The NRC inspectors have discussed this problem with licensee operations personnel and they have indicated that since the ZERO SPEED indicators are unreliable, procedures will be revised to include alternate methods of determining when the RCP shafts have stopped rotatin . _ . . . . . - - _ - . - _ - _ _ - _ - - . _ . - - - - _ _ _ - - - . . . - -

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During an audit of the active danger tags, caution tags, and operator aids in effect in the plant, the NRC inspectors noted the following items: Danger Tag 86-1096-2 hung on the breaker for the A pump associated with the new radioactive waste storage tank did not indicate the required position of the breake (The breaker was actually open/off and that that was the required position, though not specifically indicated on the tag.) A sticker posted on the post accident sampling system (PASS) control

,nanel states, "P , press >300 psi do not open PAS-114" (V55007). If t

this is a necessary precaution then it should be formally issued as an operator aid or posted as a caution tag or included in the operating procedures.

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. The above items were pointed out to licensee operations personnel and the

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tag problem was promptly corrected while the PASS sticker was to be referred to the plant chemistry departmen , No violations or deviations were identifie . ESF System Walkdown The low pressure safety injection (LPSI) and containment spray (CS)

systems were verified operable by performing a walkdown of the accessible and essential portions of these systems on September 3, 4, and 5, 198 The NRC inspector used the LPSI standby system valve lineups specified on Attachments 8.1 and 8.2 and the breaker lineup specified on Attachment of Procedure OP-9-008, Revision 5, and the CS standby system valve lineup specified on Attachment 8.1 and the breaker lineup specified on Attachment 8.2 of Procedure OP-9-001, Revision 4, in conjunction with the referenced drawings. In addition, the NRC inspector reviewed the monthly lineup check (0P-903-026) performed on LPS While performing the CS system walkdown, the NRC inspector observed that the CS riser level pump breakers (CS-EBRR-213A-2M and CS-EBRR-213B-2M)

were not danger tagged as required by Procedure OP-9-00 The NRC

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inspector notified the shift supervisor and the tags were promptly hung.

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The NRC inspector reviewed TS 3.6.2.1 and Section 6.2 of the Waterford 3 FSAR and verified that the tagging of these breakers was not specifically required by those documents and had been included in the procedure by the licensee for equipment protectio On completion of the walkdown the NRC inspector had the following comments: There were several errors in the grid location references in both valve lincup procedures.

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l The CS header B riser check valve bypass breaker was improperly labele Valves CS-101A and CS-410A were in the open position as required, but the position indications at the remote valve operators indicated that these valves were shut. The remote position indicators for these valves are digital odometers"with reset abilit The breaker for the shutdown heat exchanger trend recorder (CS-EBRR-90A-285) was not labele Attachment 8.1 of OP-9-001 requires valves such as CS-118A and B and CS-101A and B to be positioned open or' closed as required. These valves were found to be locked in the required position, though locking was not required.by the lineu As documented in NRC Inspection Report (IR) 50-382/86-02, paragraph 8, and updated as Unresolved Item 382/8606-01 in IRr 50-382/86-06, 50-382/86-11, and 50-382/86-15, the licensee has identified a program to upgrade all safety-related checklists, properly tag all plant valves, and label electrical breakers. The upgrading program is scheduled to be completed by the end of the first refueling outage, which is currently scheduled to be completed by December 31, 198 The upgrading program completion and correction of the deficiencies identified in all five reports will be inspected as part of the followup to Unresolved Item 382/8606-0 No violations or deviations were identifie . Followup on Previous Inspection Items (Closed) Open Item 382/8520-01, Large Backlog of Station Modification Packages - As the licensee indicated in the May 1, 1986, response to NRC IR 50-382/85-30 (SALP Board Report) it appears substantial progress is being made in closing out station modification packages. The more specific issue of drawing updates remains open and will be looked at as part of the review of the licensee's corrective actions for Violation-382/8613-0 (Closed) Violation 382/8533-02, Failure to Follow Procedures for Control of Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) - The licensee responded to the violation in a letter dated February 21, 198 The NRC inspectors have reviewed the response and have inspected the implementatio There no longer appears to be a specific problem with the control of potentially contaminated M&T However, Violation 382/8615-01 identified continuing problems with the control of M&TE in general. Violation 382/8533-02 is considered closed and future followup of the licensee's M&TE program will be done as part of the followup to Violation 382/8615-0 No violations or deviations were identifie .. - . . -

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10. 0,ffsite Review Connittee During this inspection period the NRC inspectors continued the review of the safety review committee (SRC) activities. In general, the SRC and its designated subcommittees appear to perform indepth reviews / audits of plant ac^1vities. The results of these reviews are consistently well documented as are the minutes of the SRC and SRC subcommittee meeting Following this inspection the NRC inspectors had one concern and that was the timely resolution of TR-85-035. In a letter dated June 18, 1985, the ,

SRC chairnen was informed of an apparent inconsistency regarding the TS for emergency feedwater (EFW) valve control (Item 7.g, TS Table 3.3-4).

The TS specifies two "EFW Control Valve Logic" setpoints. One with safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) present at 36.3 percent steam generator level. Apparently, the actuation of the control valves at the 36.3 percent setpoint will only occur if the valves are in " automatic."

If the control valves were in " manual" the full open signal to the valves may not occur until 30.0 percent steam generator level even with SIAS present. The letter went on to describe a scenario where this situation could occu This issue was subsequently discussed by the SRC review subcommittee and presented to the full SRC at Meeting 86-03 (March 20, 1986). At that meeting the engineering and nuclear safety manager was assigned responsibility for initiating an engineering review of the problem and proposing corrective actions to the SR The results of the engineering review were presented to the SRC at Meeting 86-06 (August 14,1986). The analysis presented to the SRC assumed system operation in the " automatic" mode as required by plant procedures even though the original letter pointed out that the FSAR allows system operation in " manual."

Some concern with the proposed corrective actions was raised at the SRC meeting and the issue was again referred to engineering and plant operation This issue has remained unresolved over a year after it was identified to the SRC. Additionally, the plant operations department has recently revised the annunciator response procedures concerned with steam generator level (0P-500-011 K-1 and OP-500-012 K-11) to indicate only one setpoint of 30 percent. This action is contrary to the above referenced, unapproved recommendation which was to make the setpoint 36.3 percent under all conditions. The NRC inspector indicated to licensee management

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The original concern of the operatior. in " manual" should be addresse ; Timely resolution of the whole issue should take place.

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The licensee responded that it now appears that the hardware involved in the valve position control is actually not designed for the dual setpoint actuation described in the TS. A TS change has been drafted and, when issued, the chanage, along with the accompanying safety analysis, will close the issu No violations or' deviations were identifie ,

1 Followup on TMI Action Plan Requirements The NRC inspector closed TMI Action Plan Items I.C.1, Short Term Accident and Procedure Review, and I.C.8, Pilot Monitoring of Selected Emergency Procedures, based on information contained in NUREG-0787, Supplement 8, and specific direction provided by the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) technical reviewer on September 22, 1986. Also, Items II.K.3.9, II.K.3.10, and II.K.3.12.B were listed as not applicable to W3 SES because they apply only to plants of Westinghouse desig No violations or deviations were identifie . IE Bulletins (Closed) IEB 85-01, " Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps" - NRC Inspection Report 50-382/86-16 closed Deviation 382/8613-03 which concerned s the licensee failure'to properly implement commitments made in response to this builetin. With those problems now corrected, the licensee has in s place a program that meets the requirements of the bulletin and Temporary Instruction 2515/6 No violations or deviations were identifie . IE Information Notices During this inspection period the NRC inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for evaluation of IE Information Notices (IN). Onsite licensing is responsible for the receipt, distribution, and tracking of in Notices received are reviewed and sent to the appropriate department for evaluation. Upon being -ent for evaluation, a given IN is assigned a

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tracking item number and a due date. If the assigned department indicates corrective action is required, then a revised due date is assigne Presently, the licensee has approximately 15 pre-1985 ins that have not been close For 1985, approximately one third of the issued ins have not been closed out; this number includes those yet to be reviewed and those with some action pending. The licensee has recently assigned an engineer full time responsibility for reducing the IN backlog and it is expected that this effort will be completed within the next three month The NRC inspector selected a number of ins for followup in order to audit the licensee's system. Notices dealing with refueling / fuel handling

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problems were of particular interest with Waterford 3 approaching its initial refueling outage. The licensee's dispositioning of the following ins was reviewed:

IN 80-01 - Fuel Handling Events IN 81-23 - Fuel Assembly Damaged Due to Improper Positioning of Handling Equipment IN 85-12 - Recent Fuel Handling Events IN 86-05 - Main Steam Safety Valve Test Failures and Ring Setting Adjustment IN 86-06 - Failure of Lifting Rig Attachment While Lifting the Upper Guide Structure at St. Lucie Unit 1 IN 86-07 - Lack of Detailed Instructions and Inadequate Observances of Precautions During Testing of Diesel Generator Woodward Governors IN 86-12 - Target Rock Two-Stage SRV Setpoint Drift IN 86-14 - PWR Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Control Problems IN 86-56 - Reliability of Main Steam Safety Valves IN 86-58 - Dropped Fuel Assembly IN 86-79 - Degradation or loss of Charging Systems at PWR Nuclear Power Plants Using Swing-Pump Designs Of the ins selected, five (86-07, 14, 56, 58, and 79) were still being reviewed by the assigned department with two of those reviews (86-14 and 56) overdu The remaining review ins are considered closed by the license Though IN 86-07 was still in review, some corrective action had already been determined necessary by the licensee. That included the upgrading of the fill / vent instructions for the emergency diesel generator (EDG)

governors. The licensee's maintenance department formulated a list of necessary actions to ensure proper filling of the governors. This checklist was provided to the maintenance planner for inclusion in the work instructions of subsequent CIWAs on the EDG governors. After discussion with the NRC inspector, licensee maintenance personnel agreed that the above practice relied on the planner's memory to include the necessary steps and this was not the best method to ensure proper filling of the governor. The licensee is presently revising the maintenance procedure for EDG engine inspection / repair and plans to incorporate governor filling / venting instructions in that procedur __ _

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, IN 86-12, which had been closed by the licensee, discussed an event that occurred at Monticello, in which a spent fuel bundle was damaged due to improper seating of the bundle in the storage cask. This event was considered as not applicable to Waterford 3 because the licensee has not implemented procedures for transportation of spent fuel. While this is true, it was unclear to the NRC inspector how this information will be tracked for possible applicability to the procedures when writte The NRC inspector independently reviewed IN 86-06 and the applicable maintenance procedures to verify that the specified checks of the lifting rig appeared adequate.

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This review of the licensee's handling of IE Notices fulfills the NRC requirement for annual review of the progra No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 1, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the NRC inspectors findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the NRC inspectors during this inspection.

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