ML20247A510
| ML20247A510 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 03/14/1989 |
| From: | Andrea Johnson, Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247A477 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-89-05, 50-382-89-5, IEIN-86-003, IEIN-86-3, NUDOCS 8903290136 | |
| Download: ML20247A510 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000382/1989005
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APPENDIX
- U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I\\
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NRC Inspection Report:
50-382/89-05
Operating License:
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Docket: -50-382-
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Licensee: LouisianaPower&LightCompany(LP&L)
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317 Baronne Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70160
Facility Name:: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
Inspection At: . .Taft,": Louisiana
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. Inspection-Conducted:
February 13-17, 1989
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i Inspector:
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. Johnso , Reactor Inspector, Plant Systems
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ection, ivision of Reactor Safety
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T. FJ Sretka, Chief, Plant Systems Section
Division of Reactor Safety
Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted February 13-17, 1989 (Report 50-382/89-05)
Areas Inspected- Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee's action on
previously identified violations and unresolved items regarding eculpment
qualification (EQ) of electric equipment for compliance with 10 CFR 50.49.
Results: Within the areas inspected, one apparent violation was identified.
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'The apparent violation involves a failure of the licensee to fully establish
__ qualification of Okonite T95/35 splice tape assemblies. The splice tape
assemblies are for safety-related (SR) cable located below the postulated
submergence level inside containment. The potentially submerged SR cable
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splices relate to some 16 electrical terminations of installed instrument and
. control (I&C) devices.
8903290136 890317
PDR ADOCK 05000382
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DETAILS
1.
! Persons Co'ntacted
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LP&L
- P.; V. Prasankumar, Assistant Plant Manager
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- M. J. Meisner,-Licensing Manager
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- J. J. Zabritski Operations Quality Assurance' Manager
- L. L. Bass, Nuclear Operations Engineering Supervisor
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- G. M. Davis, Event Analysis & Reporting Manager
- R. J.'.Murillo Licensing Engineer
- C, R. Gaines, Event Analysis Supervisor
- J. E. Howard, Procurement / Programs Engineering Manager
Nuclear Regulatory Comi<. ' ion
- T. F. Stetka, Chief, Plant Systems Section, Region IV
- W. F. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector
- Denotes attendance at the exit meeting on February 17, 1989.
.TheNRCinspectoralsocontactedotherpersonnh1fromtheLP&Lstaff
during the inspection.
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2.
Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items
2.1.(C1csed)tJnresolvedItem(382/8632-02): This urresolved' item involved
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the potential submergence of ITT Barton pressure transmitters._ The NRC:
inspector reviewed EQ file (EQF) 8.2, "ITT Barton Model 763 Gage Pressure-
Electronic Transmitter,"Section IV of this EOF contained an LP&L EQ
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assessment on the use of ITT Barton Model 764' differential pressure
transndtters wnich are used at Waterford Unit 3 (W3).
In addition,
Section IV included Report No. LPL-EQA-8.2.c, Revision.0, dated April 27,
1987, which stated that the W3 containment sump level transmitters (narrw
range) (Tag No.'s SP-ILT-6705A and B) were ori$ ally intended to be
qualified for submergence conditions. This report further states that
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this requirement was deleted because of redundantly installed (wide range)
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transmitters were available that measured the level in the safety
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injection (SI) rump and have overlapping ranges (Tag No.'s SI-ILTe7145A
and-B). The narrow range transmitter safety functions will be substituted
by the wide range transmitters once the narrow range transmitters.become
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submerged. The postulated submerged conditions were analyzed in LP&L
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letter W3B87-0218 dated January P9, 1987, ar.d discussed during L'P&L's
summary of information presented at the enforcement conference held in NRC
Region IV on October 4, 1E38.
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The NRC inspector determined that the LP&L analysis demonstrates the use
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of the narrow range transmitters until the postulated flood level is
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reached. The qualified SI sump instrumentation with overlapping readout
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ranges would be used as the primary indicators beyond the point of
submergence.
This unresolved item is closed.
2.2 (Closed) Violation (382/8827-02): This violation involved qualification
of RTV silicone rubber sealant used to seal Rosemount transmitters. The
NRC inspector reviewed the EQF EEQD 8.1/8.1A for the required documentation
to establish use of General Electric (GE) RTV silicone rubber sealant,
Type 106/116/8262, in lieu of electrical seal assemblies on Rosemount
transmitters. The NRC inspector reviewed (1) LP&L's S20, 1985; (2) pare Parts E
Evaluation Report 85-162, dated February
Digital Engineering
Incorporated Test Report No. DEI-TR-850100-18 for Borg Warner Actuators;
and (3) an EBASCO Thennal Lag Analysis, Report No. LPL-EQA-8.1, Revision 2.
These documents were contained in, or referenced, in the EEQD 8.1/8.1A
file. The thermal lag analysis document is used to establish qualification
of the GE RTV applied to Rosemount transmitters for the projected 414*F
temperatures that would occur during the postulated 120-day accident
duration period at W3. The analysis /calculat. ions demonstrated that
although the GE RTV sealant has only been tested to a maximum temperature
of 350 F, it was capable of withstanding brief temperature peaks above
350*F for short periods. The duration of these periods are in agreement
and within the LP&L W3 accident profile for the location of the Rosemount
electrical seal assemblies.
This violation is considered closed.
2.3 (Closed) Unresolved Item (382/8632-05): This unresolved item involved
qualification of internal wiring on Limitorque motor operators. LP&L
inspections of Limitorque motor operators for internal wiring qualification
requirements in accordance with NRC Information Notice (IN) 86-03, was
completed at W3 on June 19, 1986. The inspection program was initiated by
LP&L on January 15, 1986, during which 64 motor operators were scheduled
for inspection. When LP&L identified indeterminate internal wiring in
these motor operators, the wiring was immediately replaced with fully
qualified Rockbestos SIS wire. This wire replacement is documented in
Equipment Qualification Assessment (EQA) 6.3/6.3A.
This item is considered closed.
2.4
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (382/8831-01): This unresolved item involved
submergence qualification of Okonite T95/35 spliced tape assemblies. LP&L
identified in Condition Identification Report No. 260306, dated December 5,
1988, that Okonite T95 (insulation)/35 (jacket) spliced tape assemblies,
related to some 16 SR instal k d I&C devices, are potentially located below
the postulated flooding level inside containment.
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A revision to EQA No. 6.2/16.2 for Okonite T95/35 splice tapes (EQF-45
dated January 18,1989) did not adequately establish submergence
qualification. The EQF-45 documentation described a brief dielectric high
potential withstand test.
The NRC has determined that this test is
insufficient to establish qualification for submergence during the design
basis accident (DBA) and post DBA periods. The NRC inspector also noted
that the withstand test was performed at the end of the full scale LOCA
tests only to demonstrate ink ity of the tested cable splice. To
determine the licensee's qua~
ication basis, the NRC inspector reviewed
three test reports contained in EQF-45 as follows:
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" Final Test Report on Okonite Tape Splice Insulation for Power and
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Control cables and Rockbestos Pyrotrol III and Firewall III Cables";
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Patel Engineers Report No. PEI-TR-842900-1, May 24, 1985, for New
York Power Authority
" Final Report on the Qualification of Parallel Splice Insulation
Systems Used on Power and Control Cables in the James A. Fitzpatrick
Nuclear Power Plant"; Patel Engineers Report No. PEI-TR-840704-1,
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July 11, 1984, for New York Power Authority
" Qualification Test Program on Splices Fabricated with 3M Scotch
Super 33 Vinyl Plastic Electrical Tape and Okonite Splicing Tapes
No. 35 and T-95 for the Alabama Power Company for use in the Farley
Nuclear Generating Station"; Wyle Report No. 17947-01, October 1987
Patel Report PET-TR-842900-1 represents a full LOCA test and includes a
high voltage withstand (high potential dielectric) test after the accifent
exposure. This type test was mandated by IEEE Standard 383 and included:
(1) straightening; (2) inspection and rebending of each cable splice
assembly; and (3) immersion of each cable splice assembly in tap water
while being subjected to a high potential test in excess of its rated
voltage. The immersion test is nominally a 5-minute test performed on a
steel mandrel for the purpose of verifying the integrity of the cable
jacket. The NRC has not accepted this immersing testing sequence as
sufficient to demonstrate the capability of the splice assembly to
withstand submergence successfully during LOCA exposure for the
postulated 120 days.
The NRC inspector also noted that Patel Report PEI-TR-840704-1, which used
heat rise equations as consideration to determine thermal aging, was only
partially used by LP&L to establish the qualified life aging requirements
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for the test specimens prior to LOCA accident testing. Although a high
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potential integrity test was performed at the conclusion of this testing,
there was no documented evidence to demonstrate submergence of the cable
splice assemblies in tap water.
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The NRC inspector also noted that Wyle Report 17947-01 was used'to extend
the qualification of the in-line splice configuration of the Patel
PEI-TR-842900-1 testing to other configurations, including the "V" type.
Tne similarity of measurements during the Patel and Wyle tests was used by
LP&L to demonstrate qualification of alternate splice configurations. No
' dielectric high potential or tap water submergence integrity tests were
documented in the Wyle report.
The NRC inspector determined that the above three reports involved LOCA
testing of T95/35 tape splice assemblies on 600 volt Rockbestos Firewall III
XLPE and 1000 volt Rockbestos Pyrotrol III instrument and control cable.
The licensee uses other applications of the T95/35 tape splice assemblies,
that are below the postulated flood levels, on cables manufactured by
Samuel Moore, Anaconda, and ITT Barton (Tefzel).
LP&L has not analyzed
the material compatibilities of these splice configurations to other cable
- manufacturer's jacket and insulation materials. Therefore, these
. configurations are not considered to be qualified.
The SR installed I&C equipment associated with the T95/35 tape splice
- assemblies located below the postulated submergence level are as follows:
Tag No.
Equipment
CCS-IDPT-5153B
Containment Fan Cooler:
Rosemount
CCS-IDPT-51588
Model 1153 Series A, Differential
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Pressure Transmitter
RC-IPT-106A
Saturation Margin Monitor, Reactor
RC-IPT-106B
Coolant System (RCS) Hot Leg:
ITT Barton Model 763, Pressure
Transmitter
SG-ILT-1115A
Steam Generator Level Transmitters
SG-ILT-1115B
(Wide Range):
ITT Barton Model 764
SG-ILT-1124A
SG-ILT-1125B
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SI-ISV-343
Containment Isolation Solenoid
SI-IZS-343-1
Operated Valve, Safety Injection
SI-12S-343-2
Tank (SIT) Drain Line to Reactor
Water Storage Pool (RWSP): ASCO
Solenoid Model NP831664E, Namco
Position Switches Model EA18021302
BM-ISV-109
Containment Isolation Solenoid
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BM-IZS-109-1
Operated Valve, Reactor Drain
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BM-IZS-109-2
Tank (RDT) Drain: ASCO Solenoid
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.Model NP831665E, Nan.co Position
Switches Model EA18015302
SI-ILT-7145A
SI Sump Level Transmitters (Wide
SI-ILT-71458
Range):
ITT Barton Model 764
Failure to quilify the T95/35 splices for submergence during the
postulated strident is considered to be contrary to the requirements of
10 CFR 50.40 if) and (k). This is considered to be an apparent violation.
3.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 17, 1989,
with the licensee personnel indicated in paragraph 1.
The licensee did
not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to, or reviewed
by, the NRC inspector during the inspection.
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