IR 05000382/1998012
| ML20237D758 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237D756 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-98-12, NUDOCS 9808270206 | |
| Download: ML20237D758 (18) | |
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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
50-382 License No.:
NPF-38 Report No.:
50-382/98-12 Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Location:
Hwy.18 Killona, Louisiana Dates:
June 14 through July 25,1998 Inspector (s):
T. R. Farnholtz, Senior Resident inspector J. M. Keeton, Resident inspector Approved By:
P. H. Harrell, Chief, Project Branch D Attachment:
Supplemental Information
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9008270206 980821
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PDR ADOCK 05000382 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 NRC Inspection Report 50-382/98-12 This routine, announced inspection included aspects of operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support activities. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
Operations The operators performed very well following a manually initiated reactor trip. Rapidly
changing plant conditions were monitored effectively. An unexpected emergency feedwater system response was promptly identified and appropriately corrected by taking manual control of feedwater flow to the steam generators. Appropriate actions were taken to correct the cause of the trip and the unexpected plant responses. The subsequent reactor startup was conducted in accordance with appropriate procedures with a slow and deliberate approach to criticality. Operator performance during the conduct of the startup was very good (Section 01.2).
The control room operators' performance during a rapid down power event was very
good. Upon noting a decrease in feedwater flow, the operators quickly reduced reactor power to below the point that could result in an automatic transient. All evolutions were conducted in accordance with the appropriate procedures (Section 01.3).
A noncited violation of Technical Specification 4.3.1.1, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of
the NRC Enforcement Policy, was identified pertaining to the failure of licensed operators to perform channel checks of the Channel A reactor coolant low flow. The licensee attributed the decision to stop taking the readings as inattention to detail. Even though the control panel instrument used to take the readings was inoperable, operators had faiied to review all the facts related to the use of a computer point for the readings prior to discontinuing its use (Section 08.2).
Maintenance A poor work practice and the lack of a questioning attitude were identified concerning
work performed on an open lube oil system and drilling in the power frame of the charging pump. These two jobs were performed simultaneously, which resulted in several particles being introduced into the lube oil reservoir (Section M1.1).
External material condition of all systems and components observed during routine tours
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was very good (Section M2.1).
i Enaineerina Following questioning by the inspectors, the licensee fabricated and staged jumpers and
identified the terminals for installation of the jumpers required as a contingency action to close Valves SI-602A(B), safety injection system containment sump isolation valves, with a recirculation actuation signal present (Section E2.1).
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l The system engineer assigned to the emergency diesel generators and associated
support systems demonstrated a good level of knowledge during a routine walkdown of the systems. A systematic approach was employed to ensure allimportant compcoents were inspected. The material condition of the emergency diesel generators was considered good (Section E2.2).
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Plant Support s
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A poor radiological work practice was identified concerning the radiological posting of
l the area. Potentially contaminated metal particles produced during the drilling were deposited in a clean area without first being monitored for radiation (Section M1.1).
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A meeting of an ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) committee to discuss a plant
j modification to rerack the spent fuel pool was considered an excellent example of preplanning to minimize radiation exposure to workers. The discussions were highly
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l detailed and lessons learned from similar jobs at other facilities were fully incorporated (Section R4.1).
l In general, the conduct of an emergency preparedness exercise was very good. Minor
l weaknesses observed in communications between plant operators were identified to the licensee for resolution (Section P4.1).
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Followup by the system engineer of the inadvertent fire system actuation was
appropriate. The integrity of the fire system was not compromised (Section F1.1).
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Report Details
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Summarv of Plant Status The plant operated at essentially 100 percent power from the beginning of this inspection period until July 16,1998, when operators reduced power to 92 percent to perform turbine governor valve maintenance. Approximately 30 minutes later, a manual plant trip was initiated because of rapidly lowering levels in both steam generators. A plant startup was conducted on July 18.
By the following day, power had been returned to 100 percent and remained at that level until July 22 when a rapid down power was performed to approximately 60 percent when a main feedwater pump malfunctioned. Full power operations were resumed the following day.
Operators reduced power to approximately 93 percent on July 25, to perform moderator temperature coefficient testing. Full power operation was resumed later that day and remained at that level for the remainder of this inspection period.
l. Operations
Conduct of Operations (71707)
O1.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors performed frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations, control room panel walkdowns, and plant tours. Observed activities were performed in a manner i
consistent with safe operation of the facility. The inspectors observed operators using self-checking and peer-checking techniques when manipulating plant equipment.
Operators used three-way communication techniques in the control room and in External communications with auxiliary operators and maintenance personnel.
O1.2 Manual Reactor Trio Followina a Malfunction of Main Feedwater Pumo (MFP) A i
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Insoection Scope (71707)
The inspectors observed the actions of control room operators immediately following a reactor trip from 92 percent power that occurred on July 16,1998. The operators performed the actions specified in Procedure OP-902-001, " Uncomplicated Reactor Trip Recovery Procedure," Revision 7. In addition, the inspectors observed the reactor startup, conducted on July 18, using Procedure OP-010-001, " General Plant Operations," Revision 19, Attachment 8.4, " Plant Startup to 10% Power (Mode 3 to Mode 1)."
b.
Observations and Findinas l
At 11:02 a.m. (CDT) on July 16, the control room operators initiated a manual reactor i
trip when a rapidly lowering level in both steam generators was observed. The lowering water level was caused by the MFP A speed decreasing, which resulted in an inability to supply the required water inventory for continued power operation. The operators'
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actions to initiate a manual reactor trip were appropriate under these conditions rather
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than to allow an automatic trip to occur on low steam generator water level.
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-2-All control element assemblies fully inserted, as expected. The control room operators implemented Procedure OP-902-001 to place the plant in a stable condition in Mode 3.
All three emergency feedwater (EFW) pumps started automatically because of the low level condition in the steam generators and an additional charging pump started because of low pressurizer level. All plant equipment functioned, as required, with the exception of greater than expected EFW flow to Steam Generator 1. The operators promptly identified an 800 gpm flow rate to Steam Generator 1 when the controller for Valve EFW-223A, emergency feedwater to Steam Generator 1 control valve, rose to 60 percent. This was not expected for the conditions in Steam Generator 1 (wide-range leve! at 62 percent). The operators took manual control of the EFW system to lower the rate of feeding and maintained the levels in the steam generators between 50 and 70 percent narrow range. In addition, reactor coolant system temperatures in both the hot and cold legs were less than normal during the event because of excessive feeding of the steam generators but remained within Technical Specification (TS) and design limits.
The inspectors observed the actions of the control room operators immediately following the trip and considered the response to be very good. Appropriate procedures were utilized and clear direction was provided from the control room supervisor to the nuclear plant operators. Rapidly changing plant conditions were closely monitored throughout the event.
The MFP A failure resulted from a loss of speed signal because of moisture on the control circuit boards. This moisture intrusion caused the MFP A turbine governor valve to go closed, which decreased the pump speed. The licensee replaced the damaged circuit boards and satisfactorily tested the speed control system. The cause of the EFW system malfunction was not definitively determined. The licensee replaced several cards containing mercury relays in the automatic control system. A failure in one of these relays would account for the actions observed during the event. However, no such failure could be replicated during troubleshooting. Postmaintenance testing of the EFW automatic control circuit did not reveal any further problems. The inspectors
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considered these actions to restore the EFW system to operable status to be adequate with no concerns identified.
The inspectors observed the plant startup on July 18. The operators conducted a prestartup brief to review all aspects of the evolution. Several questions and concerns were addressed. The licensee calculated an estimated critical configuration based on a control element assembly position of 75 inches on Group 6. The critical boron concentration was calculated every 30 minutes because of the changing conditions of
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l xenon worth in the core. The inspectors reviewed these calculations and determined
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that they were performed as required by procedure.
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Operators withdrew the control element assembly groups in accordance with Procedure OP-010-001 with proper overlap observed. The operator stopped the control element assembly withdrawal every 25 inches to monitor plant conditions. Every 50 inches of control element assembly withdrawal, reactor engineering personnel performed a plot to monitor the approach to criticality. The reactor was declared critical N___-__________ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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-3-at 3:13 a.m. with Group 6 control element assemblies at approximately 25 inches. This was within acceptable agreement with the estimated critical configuration.
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Conclusions The operators performed very well following a manually initiated reactor trip. Rapidly changing plant conditions were monitored effectively. An unexpected EFW system response was promptly identified and appropriately corrected by taking manual control of feedwater flow to the steam generators. Appropriate actions were taken to correct the cause of the trip and the unexpected plant responses. The inspectors considered the performance of the reactor startup to be very good. The approach to criticality was slow and deliberate with plant conditions closely monitored throughout the evolution.
Appropriate procedures were used.
01.3 Rapid Down Power Because of a MFP A Malfunction a.
inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors observed control room operators rapidly decrease power to less than 60 percent power so that MFP A could be removed from service.
b.
Observations and Findinas On July 22,1998, MFP A experienced large flow oscillations. At 10:50 a.m. (CDT), the shift superintendent directed operators to inject boron and reduce reactor power to less than 60 percent at a rate of 20 MW/ minute, in accordance with Procedure OP-901-212,
" Rapid Plant Power Reduction," Revision 0. The operators reduced power to prevent a reactor power cutback when removing MFP A from service. Operators stopped the reactor power reduction at 62 percent power because the reactor power cutback circuit had deactivated and required feedwater flow was within the capability of MFP B. MFP A was removed from service to investigate the cause of the oscillations. Observed operator performance during the down power was good.
Investigation revealed that the MFP A oil reservoir contained a high water content. The servo-controller for the low-pressure governor valve was not responding correctly, which was an indication of the bad oil from the reservoir. The water had been inadvertently introduced to the ch nervoir when the MFP A was shutdown following the reactor trip j
on July 16. Excess ceai water leakage onto the bearing cap was pulled into the bearing f
oil because of the slight negative pressure maintained by the vapor extractor.
l The oil was cleaned and the servo-controller was replaced. The low-pressure governor
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valve was found to be binding in the turbine chest area. The licensee decided to
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operate MFP A on the high-pressure steam valve until an outage occurred that f
I supported complete overhaul of the low-pressure governor valve. The reactor was returned to 100 percent power without further incident.
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Conclusions The control room operators' performance during a rapid down power event was very good. Upon noting a decrease in feedwater flow, the operators quickly reduced reactor power to below the point that could result in an automatic transient. All evolutions were conducted in accordance with the appropriate procedures.
O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)
08.1 (Closed) Violation 50-382/9711-01: Clearance Procedure Improperly implemented in that Tags Were Added to Clearance 97-0864 Without Adequate Review An event review team identified the root cause as personnel inattention to detail in that tags added to an original clearance did not ensure the same level of protection as the original clearance. The corrective actions included emphasizing management expectations for appropriate on-shift reviews when adding tags to a clearance. The Operations Manager counseled the operations department personnel concerning this incident. The planning and scheduling manager reviewed the expectations for preparing tagout requests with the planners. Procedure UNT-005-003, " Clearance, Request, Approval, and Release," was revised to include recommended enhancements. An item was added to the Performance Improvement Plan that identified generic actions for improving human performance. The inspectors found these corrective actions to be appropriate.
08.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-382/98-012: Missed Channel Check for TS 4.3.1.1
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Inspection Scope (92700)
The inspectors evaluated the circumstances related to this licensee event report and verified implementation of the corrective actions.
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Observations and Findinas j
On June 9,1998, licensed operators discovered that the channel check for Reactor Coolant Flow-Low Channel A had not been performed, as required by TS 4.3.1.1, and initiated Condition Report 98-0802. On May 23, it had been determined that the instrument normally used for the TS channel check was not functioning correctly. An alternate indication from Computer Point A11121 had been identified as appropriate to satisfy the TS channel check requirement. However, on June 7, the operators had
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l discontinued logging the computer point reading.
The licensee attributed the root cause to human error. Several operators erred in l
judgment when they decided to stop taking the readings without reviewing the facts. A
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contributing cause was inadequate understanding of the basis for recording Computer i
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-S-Point A11121 by licensed operators. The licensee reviewed the computer point history values and found the values to be acceptable c'uring the time that the reading had not been logged.
As corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence, the Operations Superintendent discussed the event with all licensed operators. The sessions included discussions of channel check requirements, different methods of performing channel checks, management expectations, and reinforcement of need for verification and validation. The operators involved were counseled in accordance with corporate discipline policy. Training was performed to emphasize channel checks.
The failure to perform a TS-required channel check demonstrated a lack of attention to detail on the part of the licensed operators. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Specifically, the violation was identified by the licensee, it was not willful, actions taken as a result of a previous violation should not have corrected this problem, and appropriate corrective actions were completed by the licensee (50-382/9812-01).
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Conclusions A noncited violation of TS 4.3.1.1, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC
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Enforcement Policy, was identified related to failure of licensed operators to perform channel checks of the Channel A reactor coolant low flow. The licensee attributed the decision to stop taking the readings as inattention to detail. Even though the control panel instrument used to take the readings was inoperable, operators had failed to review all the facts related to the use of a computer point for the readings prior to discontinuing its use.
II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance (61726,62707)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance and surveillance activities, as specified by the referenced Work Authorization or surveillance procedure
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numbers:
l OP-903-068 * Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) B and Subgroup Relay
Operability Verification" i
01167101 Replace Tubing and Base Cover Gasket on Oil Pump and
l Regulating Valve for Charging Pump B 01170943 Remove an Original Plunger Adapter from Charging Pump B and
Perform Lab Inspection f
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Preventive Maintenance 01171697 Variable Average Temperature Testing
in general, the inspectors considered the observed work activities to have been performed in an acceptable and effective manner. The technicians were knowledgeable and conducted the work as required by the applicable procedures. Appropriate support personnel including health physics, quality control, and supervisory personnel were at the work site when required.
M1.1 Charoina Pumo B Maintenance a.
Insoection Scope (62707)
The inspectors observed the conduct of Work Authorization 01136462 to drill and tap existing holes in the power frame of Charging Pump B. The purpose of this work was to installlarger threaded fittings in place of smaller ones.
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Observations and Findinas On June 30,1998, maintenance personnel enlarged two existing holes in the side of the power frame of Charging Pump B using a portable drill.
In addition to the drilling and tapping work, personnel performed maintenance on the lube oil system. The crankcase cover of the pump had been removed to allow access to this area. Tile holes to be drilled were within 12-18 inches of the open oil reservoir.
When the drilling began, the technicians immediately stopped the drilling upon noting that metal shavings flew into the oil reservoir and took steps to retrieve the metal particles. The particles were retrieved to the satisfaction of the quality control personnel and the crankcase cover was reinstalled before drilling operations resumed.
The inspectors considered the simultaneous conduct of tube oil system work and drilling operations to be inappropriate because of the close proximity (12-18 inches). The inspectors discussed this event with licensee management. Management personnel stated that this was not in accordance with their expectations and that foreign material exclusion control was considered important to the reliability and availability of systems and components. Procedure UNT-007-005," Cleanliness Control," Revision 6, specified that it is the responsibility of all personnel to take the necessary action to prevent introduction of foreign material into any system or component when performing work activities involving open components. Although actions were not taken prior to beginning work in this instance, which could have resulted in a degraded or damaged component, the personnel recognized the error and implemented appropriate corrective actions. The inspectors were not concerned with the as-left condition of Charging Pump B following this maintenance because the personnel had corrected the deficiency prior to completing the maintenance, which resulted in this incident having minor safety significance. The inspectors concluded that the working of these two jobs at the same
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Also, the inspectors identified an additional concern with the radiological barrier used in the Charging Pump B room during this maintenance. Health physics personnel divided the room such that the lube oil system work occurred on the clean side and the pump work on the potentially contaminated side of the barrier, This was done to facilitate the work associated with the oil system, which was not contaminated. However, the drilling conducted on the potentially contaminated side of the barrier deposited a significant amount of metal particles on the pump base on the clean side of the barrier. Health physics personnel collected a sample of the metal particles at the beginning of the drilling and determined no contamination was present. Based on this, the technicians continued drilling, which continued to deposit metal particles on the clean side of the barrier. After the technicians completed drilling, health physics personnel extended the radiological barrier, which included the clean area that the metal particles landed in, to aid the technicians in the tapping of the two holes.
The inspectors considered the unmonitored removal of potentially contaminated metal particles from a posted area (particles landing in a clean area) to be a poor radiological work practice. The normal procedure used to remove material from a potentially contaminated area was to monitor all the material, equipment, and personnel exiting the area, not just a sample to prevent the unmonitored spread of contamination. This example had minor safety consequences since the particles were not contaminated.
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Conclusions
' A poor work practice and the lack of a questioning attitude were identified concerning work performed on an open lube oil system and drilling in the power frame of the charging pump. These two jobs were performed simultaneously, which resulted in several particles being introduced into the lube oil reservoir. A poor radiological work practice was identified concerning the radiological posting of the area. Potentially contaminated metal particles produced during the drilling were deposited in a clean area without first being monitored for radiation.
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Plant Conditions Observed Durina Walkdowns a.
inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors performed routine plant tours and assessed the material condition of the components and systems observed.
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Observations and Findinas During rcutine walkdowns, the inspectors observed the reactor auxiliary building air intake structure at the roof elevation. Damper HRV-MVAAA-402, normal air intake, had a heavy buildup of dirt such that ability for the damper to operate was questionable. The inspectors informed the shift superintendent of the damper condition. This normally open damper was found open and did not affect the operability of the reactor auxiliary building ventilation.
In general, plant equipment observed during a component cooling water system walkdown was in excellent external material condition. The inspectors noted no change in the condition of components exposed to the elements. No system leakage was noted on any of the valves or flanges inspected. All associated equipment was in service or in a standby condition with no operational restrictions.
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Conclusions External material condition of all systems and components observed during routine tours was very good.
111. Enaineerina E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E2.1 Followuo on Contingency Actions for Closina Specific Containment isolation Valves Durina an Event with a Recirculation Actuation Sianal Present a.
Inspection Scoce (37551)
The inspectors reviewed procedures and performed a walk through to determine if the issues involving Valves SI-602A(B), safety injection system sump isolation valves, had been appropriately resolved.
b, Observations and Findinas On July 10,1998, the inspectors asked the shift superintendent on duty to demonstrate how Valves SI-602 A(B) could be closed if necessary during an event following a recirculation actuation signal. The shift superintendent was knowledgeable of the evolution and referenced Procedure EP-002-100, " Post Accident Contingencies and Concerns Checklist," Revision 26, Step 5.2. This step described the location of the l
terminals that required one lead to be lifted and a jumper to be installed for each valve.
l The inspectors accompanied a licensed operator to observe the accessibility of the I
terminal boards. The inspectors noted that jumpers had not been specifically fabricated for this application nor had the terminals been uniquely identified to aid the individual sent to perform the task.
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-9-Following discussions between the inspectors and the engineering staff, appropriate jumpers were fabricated along with photos identifying the terminallocations. The jumpers and photos were appropriately staged in the key locker in the shift superintendent's office. The use of jumpers was a temporary measure. The final resolution involved a plant modification to install control board switches during Refueling Outage 9.
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Conclusions Following questioning by the inspectors, the licensee fabricated and staged jumpers and identified the terminals for the jumpers required as a contingency action to close Valves SI-602A(B) with a recirculation actuation signal present.
E2.2 System Enaineer Walkdown of EDG a.
Insoection Scoce (37551)
The inspectors accompanied the system engineer assigned to the EDGs and supporting systems during an inspection walkdown to assess the engineer's knowledge of the system and thoroughness of the routine walkdowns performed by the engineer.
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Observations and Findinas
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On July 20,1998, the inspectors accompanied the system engineer for the EDGs during a routine walkdown to inspect the current condition of the equipment. System engineers are required to periodically walkdown their assigned systems to monitor material condition, operating parameters, and standby status. These walkdowns sente to provide direct, first-hand observations and data that can be used to track and trend plant equipment conditions.-
The inspectors considered the EDG system engineer very knowledgeable of the system.
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The method used to perform the walkdown was systematic such that all important components and parameters were inspected. The engineer was knowledgeable of the historical aspects of the EDG system, which aided in monitoring those components that
~ had presented problems in the past.
l The engineer reviewed the condition identification tags that were attached to various components in the EDG systems. These tags identified a potential problem with the associated component. The inspectors noted that some condition identification tags j
l were not specific as to the exact location and nature of the potential problem. For
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l-example, condition identification tags attached to the starting air compressors described the existence of an oil leak. However, the exact location of the leak was not specified in some cases, which made it difficult to inspect and assess the leaks for any possible j
changes over time.
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l-10-l The system engineer routinely wiped up residual lube oil, fuel oil, and water from around the EDG components so as to allow for effective assessment of system and material condition. All accessible areas of the EDGs and support systems were inspected including inside electrical cabinets and fuel oil storage tank rooms. The inspectors
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considered the overall material condition of the EDGs to be very good.
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Conclusions The system engineer assigned to the EDGs and associated support systems demonstrated a very good level of knowledge during a routine walkdown of the systems.
A systematic approach was employed to ensure all important components were j
inspected. The material condition of the EDGs was considered good.
i E8 Miscellaneous Eng8^ wring lasues (92903)
E8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-382/9708-06: Preventive Maintenance Procedures to Ensure Proper Operation of Safety-Related Breakers LTN-EBKR-311 AB-6FL and -6FR Were improperly Deleted This violation was the result of inadequate review of design information that should have classified these breakers as safety-related. Justification for deletion of the procedure did not properly consider the breaker function. Corrective actions taken included a review of completed breaker task activities (380 breakers) over the past 2 years.
Sixty-four additional breakers were found with the preventive maintenance task inappropriately deleted or lacking rigor and detail. The deleted tasks were appropriately restored. In addition, a review of the overall objective of the preventive maintenance program was conducted by plant engineering and task planners. The review
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emphasized the maintenance rule, need to review all available configuration
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documentation, and responsibilities of reviewers. The inspectors found thece corrective actions to be appropriate.
IV. Plant Support R1-Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls During routine plant tours, the inspectors observed appropriate radiation protection measures being utilized as required by station procedures. Radiation protection postings and devices such as locked doors were verified to be employed as required.
Radiation measurements and survey results were posted in accordance with licensee procedures and NRC regulations.
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R4.1 ALARA Committee Meetina a.
Insoection Scope (71750)
The inspectors attended an ALARA committee meeting on July 2,1998. At the meeting personnel reviewed radiological measures to be taken during the planned spent fuel I
pool rerack modification, which will increase the storage capacity of tha spent fuel pool.
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Observations and Findinas The ALARA committee discussed the planned modification to the spent fuel pool to
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increase storage capacity from 1088 to 2104 fuel assemblies. A total of 3 man-rem was planned for the performance of this modification. A detailed discussion was conducted
concerning the work to be performed, which included: cleaning the cask storage pit and spent fuel pool, transferring fuel bundles, removing the old racks, and installing the new racks.. Radiological protection measures to be used during the performance of each phase of the work were described and questions were addressed. Extensive use of robots with television cameras was planned for much of the cleanup and inspection work. Personnel performing the diving operations in tne pool were able to supply
additional information and insights based on their previous experience with this type of
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work.
Much of the discussions centered around minimizing radiological exposures to the divers in the pool. The licensee planned to use lanyards to limit the location at the spent fuel pool that divers could enter into and exit from to limit the divers' exposure to higher dose rates. In addition, the use of buoys and rope was planned to clearly mark areas to be avoided during the dives.
The inspectors considered this meeting to be an excellent example of preplanning to minimize radiation exposure to workers. The discussions were open and frank with all concerns being addressed. Lessons learned from similar work done at other plants had been fully incorporated into the plan.
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Conclusions A meeting of an ALARA committee to discuss a plant modification to rerack the spent fuel pool was considered an excellent example of preplanning to minimize radiation l
exposure to workers. The discussions were highly detailed and lessons learned from similar jobs at other facilities were fully incorporated.
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P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Planning P4.1 Emeraency Plan Exercise a.
Insoection Scope (71750)
l The inspectors observed the performance of the licensee during a site-wide emergency plan exercise.
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b.
Observations and Findinas On July 15,1998, the inspectors observed a site-wide emergency exercise.
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Observations were conducted in the control room simulator and the Technical Support Center. The inspectors noted the operators used old versions of the emergency operating procedures. Although the licensed operators had been training on the new emergency operating procedures and had not practiced with the old emergency operating procedures for several months, operators performed wellin their use of the old emergency operating procedures while mitigating the complex scenario event.
Implementation of the new emergency operating procedures had been scheduled prior to this exercise, but delays in engineering reviews precluded scheduled implementation.
The inspectors also observed some minor lapses in the formality of the repeat backs in control room communications in the simulator. The problems observed were passed on to the licensee for resolution.
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Conclusions In general, the conduct of an emergency preparedness exercise was very good. Minor weaknesses observed in communications between plant operators were identified to the licensee for resolution.
F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities F1.1 Inadvertent Actuation of Automatic Deluae Valve a.
inspection Scope (71750)
The inspectors reviewed the potential consequences of an inadvertent fire system actuation. The inspectors interviewed the fire protection system engineer and performed a detailed review of the system drawings.
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Observations and Findinas I
l On July 7,1998, the turbine-driven EFW pump was started for a surveillance test.
l Steem from the moisture trap in the reactor auxiliary building minus 35-foot level activated Fire Detector FPD-EDET3904. This resulted in actuation of Fire Header
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Deluge Valve FPM-23, filling the dry pipe, and starting the motor-driven fire pump to l
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-13-restore fire main pressure. The system was immediately restored to normal standby condition. Condition Report 98-0913 was written to determine why the fire detector actuated.
Because of recent industry experience involving a parallel event that resulted in flooding caused by an inadvertent actuation of the fire system, the inspectors questioned whether the licensee had verified that the fire system had not been damaged by the inadvertent actuation.' The inspectors interviewed the shift superintendent and the fire protection system engineer. The shift superintendent stated that when the motor-driven fire pump started no water hammer was observed or reported. Fire system integrity was verified after the event and no degradation was noted. A motor-driven jockey pump maintains fire system pressure at 150 psig. The start frequency (about 5 minutes every 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />) had not changed significantly following the event.
c.
Conclusions Followup by the fire protection system engineer of an inadvertent fire system actuation was appropriate. The integrity of the fire system was not compromised.
X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management on August 6,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R. F. Burski, Director Site Suppoit C. M. Dugger, Vice-President, Operations E. C. Ewing, Director, Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Affairs
- C. Fugate, Operations Superintendent T. J. Gaudet, Manager, Licensing J. G. Hoffpauir, Manager, Operations i
T. R. Leonard, General Manager, Plant Operations D. C. Matheny, Manager, Operations G. D. Pierce, Director of Quality
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D. W. Vinci, Superintendent, System Engineering A. J. Wrape, Director, Design Engineering i
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:
Engineering j
IP 61726:
Surveillance 09aervations
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l lP 62707:
Maintenance Observations
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IP 71707:
Operations
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IP 71750:
Plant Support IP 92901:
Followup - Operations IP 92903:
Followup - Engineering ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Ooened
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50-382/9812-01 NCV Failure to perform a TS-required channel check demonstrated a i
lack of attention tc detail (Section 08.2).
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50-382/9711-01 VIO Procedure UNT-005-003 was not implemented in that tags were added to Clearance 97-0864 without adequate review I
(Section 08.1).
50-382/98-012 LER Missed Channel Check for TS Surveillance 4.3.1.1 (Section 08.2).
50 382/9812-01 NCV Failure to perform a TS-required channel check demonstrated a lack of attention to detail (Section 08.2).
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t 2-50-382/9708-06 VIO Preventive maintenance procedures to ensure proper operation of safety related Breakers LTN-EBKR-311 AB-6FL and -6FR were improperly deleted (Section E8.1).
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ALARA as low as reasonably achievable CFR Code of Federal Regulations EDG emergency diesel generator EFW emergency feedwater gpm gallons per minute MFP main feedwater pump MW megawatt NCV noncited violation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission psig pounds per square inch gauge rem roentgen equivalent man TS Technical Specification i
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