IR 05000382/1986021
| ML20214F191 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 11/21/1986 |
| From: | Constable G, Luehman J, Staker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214F157 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-86-21, NUDOCS 8611250223 | |
| Download: ML20214F191 (6) | |
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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-382/86-21 License:
NPF-38 Docket:
50-382 Licensee:
Louisiana Power & Light Company (LP&L)
N-80 317 Baronne Street l
New Orleans, Louisiana 70160 l
Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (W3 SES)
l Inspection At:
Taft, Louisiana
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Inspection Conducted: October 1 through 31, 1986 Inspectors:
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J. G. Luehman, Senior Resident Inspector Date
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h/u/Sc T. R. Starer, Resident Inspector Date'
Approved:
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~G. T. Constable, Chief, Project Section C, Date'
Reactor Projects Branch Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted October 1 through 31, 1986 (Report 50-382/86-21)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of: (1) Offsite Review Committee activities, (2) Monthly Surveillance, (3) Monthly Maintenance, (4) Routine Operational Safety Inspection, and (5) Preparations for Ref ueling.
Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8611250223 861121 PDR ADOCK 05000382 G
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-2-DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees J. G. Dewease, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- R. P. Barkhurst, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- N. S. Carns, Plant Manager, Nuclear T. F. Gerrets, Corporate QA Manager S. A. Alleman, Assistant Plant Manager, Plant Technical Services J. R. McGaha, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations and Maintenance J. N. Woods, QC Manager A. S. Lockhart, Site Quality Manager R. F. Burski, Engineering and Nuclear Safety Manager K. L. Brewster, Onsite Licensing Engineer
- G. E. Wuller, Onsite Licensing Coordinator T. H. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent, Nuclear P. V. Prasankumar, Technical Support Superintendent
- Present at exit interviews.
In addition to the above personnel, the NRC inspectors held discussions with various operations, engineering, technical support, maintenance, and administrative members of the licensee's staff.
2.
Plant Status This inspection period began with the plant at full power.
A power reduction was commenced on October 16 at 10 p.m. (CDT) in order to perform surveillance testing. After completion of surveillance testing a power increase to full power commenced at 5:35 p.m. on October 18.
At 8:49 p.m. on October 20, a reactor trip from 100 percent power occured on LO-DNBR.
The reactor operator was controlling the axial shape index (ASI) with regulating group 6 rods when a " minor deviation" alarm occured. Control element assembly (CEA) 21 was found to be out of alignment within the group (4 inches below). While attempting to align CEA 21 using manual individual rod control, the CEA dropped to the fully inserted position generating the reactor trip.
The licensee determined that CEA 21 dropped due to a failed circuitry card. The reactor was taken critical again at 6:41 p.m. October 21.
On October 22 at 2:32 p.m.,
another reactor trip occured.
Prior to the trip, the plant was in Mode 2 at approximately three percent power with the reactor operator controlling steam generator levels.
While attempting to stabilize the No. 2 steam generator level using the steam bypass control system, a large enough cooldown of the reactor coolant system occured to cause reactor power to rise above the point at which the Core Protection Calculators (CPC) will calculate LO-DNBR and HI-LPD reactor trips.
The Axial Shape Index (ASI)
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-3-was outside the acceptable operating area for CPC calculations and so auxiliary trips of the LO-DNBR and HI-LPD bistables on channels C and D generated the reactor trip.
Reactor criticality was again achieved at 2:45 a.m. on October 23, 1986.
Reactor power was raised to 100 percent and remained there through the end of the inspection period.
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3.
Monthly Surveillance w
The NRC inspectors observed / reviewed TS required testing and verified testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation (LCO)
were met, and identified deficiencies were properly reviewed and resolved.
The NRC inspector observed a portion of MI-3-387, Revision 3, " Condenser Vacuum Pump Discharge Wide Range Noble Gas Radiation Monitor Channel Calibration PRM-IR-0002." The procedure was secured prior to completion when mid/high range sample flow could not be obtained.
Subsequently, the technicans continued the procedure after reading a note that followed the start of the sample pump in the procedure. The note indicated that the mid/high range flow control valve should be operated manually if required for establishing proper flow.
The licensee should consider placing this note prior to the associated action steps so that in the future technicians will be aware that such an initial lack of proper flow is not an unexpected condition.
The NRC inspector observed the performance of the at power portion of MI-3-316, Revision 4, " Pressurizer Pressure (Wide Range) Loop Check and Calibration," as performed on channel "A" on October 16.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Station activities affecting safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with TS.
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Portions of the following condition identification work authorizations (CIWAs)
were observed by the NRC inspectors.
CIWA 028773 - Replacement of "AB" Charging Pump shaft CIWA 027308 - Work on Waste Gas Compressor "B" CIWA 028878 - Work done on Log Power Channel "D" CIWA 028883 - Replacement of the timing module for the mid/high range grab sample controller for the condenser vacuum pump discharge wide range noble gas radiation monitor PRM-IR-000.
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.o-4-CIWA 029360 - Troubleshooting on the No. 2 Steam Generator feed control system.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Routine Operational Safety Inspection By observation during the inspection period, the NRC inspectors verified that the control room manning requirements were being met.
In addition, the NRC inspectors observed shift turnover to verify that continuity of system status was n;aintained. The NRC inspectors periodically questioned shift personnel relative to their awareness of the plant conditions.
Through log review and plant tours, the NRC inspectors verified compliance with selected TS and limiting conditions for operations.
During the course of the inspection, observations relative to protected and vital area security were made including access controls, boundary integrity, search, escort, and badging.
On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWPs) were reviewed and the specific work activity was monitored to assure the activities were being conducted per the RWPs.
Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked and equipment operability and calibration frequency were verified.
The NRC inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of overall status of plant and of any significant safety matter related to plant operations.
Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the operations staff on a regular basis.
Selected portions of operating logs and data sheets were reviewed daily.
The NRC inspectors conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the control room.
Observations included:
witnessing work activities in progress; verifying the status of operating and standby safety systems and equipment; confirming valve positions, instrument and recorder readings, annunciator alarms; and housekeeping.
During tours of the reactor auxiliary building (RAB) the NRC inspectors noted a number of conduit penetrations, some containing safety-related wire / cable, in the floor on the -35 foot elevation which showed evidence of seepage of ground water.
This condition was addressed as 1ssue 19 of the 23 prelicensing issues discussed in a report submitted to the NRC by the licensee and dated January 31, 1983.
These issues were reviewed by the NRC and were evaluated in NUREG-0787, " Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit No. 3," Supplement 9 (Waterford SSER 9).
In both the licensee's report and the
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-5-Waterford SSER 9 the sealing of such leaking penetrations was discussed.
The licensee sealed all penetrations that were identified as leaking at the time of the report.
Future seepage through these or other penetrations could be handled in a like manner.
The NRC inspectors questioned the licensee concerning their present criteria for sealing of leaking penetrations.
The licensee is evaluating what, if any present criteria they have and will evaluate the leaking penetrations identified by the NRC inspectors.
During this inspection period the NRC inspectors have noted that during a number of control room tours the indicating light for one of the reactor coolant. system valves would indicate the valve as open when the actual valve position was closed.
Licensee operations personnel explained to the NRC inspectors that the continuing leakage past the reactor coolant system safety valves has necessiated frequent fill / drain evolutions to reduce quench tank temperature and pressure. These evolutions apparently induce vibrations which are sensed by the safety valve acoustic monitoring system which generates the false open indication for the safety valve.
Section 1.9.23 of the Waterford Steam Electric Station No. 3 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) contains the licensee's response to NUREG 0737 item II.D.3 (which concerns safety valve indication) and states, "The system will ensure high reliability and testability and will discriminate against inadvertent actuation due to impact events, cross talk and background noises." At present the system is not continually meeting
/ these considerations.
Further, the backup methods of determining safety valve position discussed at the end of FSAR section 1.9.23 (safety valve discharge line temperature, quench tank temperature and water level) are not completely reliable because of the pre-existing safety valve leakage.
The licensee recognizes that both the spurious valve position indication and the degradation of the backup means of determining safety valve
position are ultimately due to leakage past the safety valves and therefore, repair of these valves will be accomplished during the first
refueling outage.
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No violations or deviations were identified, i
6.
Offsite Review Committee On October 9, 1986, the NRC inspector completed review of the activities
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of the Safety Review Committee (SRC) by attending the regularly scheduled meeting ~of the committee.
During the course of the meeting there were reports from review.and significant issues identification subcommittees, W.
an update on plant' status from a member of the plant operations staff, a i
report from the SRC chairman to the full committee on various issues, and
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briefings.from other licensee staff members on various topics of interest to the SRC members.
s The senior vice president of nuclear operations requested that, in the future, the SRC chairman provide him an executive summary of the SRC l
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-6-minutes as well as making the complete set of minutes available to him.
This request was made in order to allow him to act expeditiously on SRC recommendations.
Presently, such recommendations / suggestions are very hard to extract from the voluminous and detailed committee / subcommittee minutes which, in addition to these items, contain SRC tracking and action items.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Preparations for Refueling On October 20, 1986, the NRC inspectors observed the licensee's receipt of the new fuel deliveries that had begun to arrive to support the first refueling outage.
The initial stages of the receipt activities progressed very slowly and at times were very disorganized.
The NRC inspectors witnessed the receipt of fuel elements LAD 319 and 321 and then discussed their observations with licensee management.' Although the NRC inspectors evaluated the licensee's practices as at least minimally acceptable, continued disorganization could lead to problems.
On October 22, 1986, the NRC inspectors again witnessed the licensee'.s new fuel receipt activities.
On this second inspection the evolutions progressed much faster and were pre planned for better organization.
During the second period of observation fuel elements LAD 306,307,309, and 310 were receipt inspected by the licensee.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 3, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The licensee acknowledged the NRC inspectors findings.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the NRC inspectors during this inspection.
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