IR 05000386/1986011

App to Insp Rept 50-386/86-11 on 860501-31.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Status,Ler Followup,Monthly Surveillance,License Conditions,Selected Safety Issues & Monthly Maint

ML20203D699
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford, 05000386
Issue date:	07/03/1986
From:	Breslau B, Bundy H, Constable G, Luehman J, Staker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203D678	List: IR 05000382/1986011 IR 05000386/1986011
References
50-382-86-11, NUDOCS 8607210270
Download: ML20203D699 (10)

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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-382/86-11 License: NPF-38 Docket: 50-382 Licensee: Louisiana Power & Light Company (LP&L)

317 Baronne Street P. O. Box 60340 New Orleans, Louisiana 70160 Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (W3 SES)

Inspection At: Taft, Louisiana Inspection Conducted: May 1-31, 1986

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Inspectors: # 7///44 J. G. Luehmarir, Senior Resident Inspector Date Project Section C, Reactor Projects Branch T. R. Staker, Resident inspector, Project 1b/ff Date Section C, Reactor Projects Branch I i

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/r/Si iff. F. Bundy, Project inspector, Project Date Section C, Reactor Projects Branch (Paragraphs 4, 6, 9, 10, 11)

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B.'A. Breslau, Pro;ect inspector, Project

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Section C, Reactor Projects Branch i (Paragraphs 9, 12)

0607210270 a60716 PDH ADOCK 05000302 O PDH

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Gr~E. ConstabTe, Chief, Project Section C, 1/IM[

Date Reactor Projects Branch Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted May 1-30, 1986 (Report 50-382/86-11)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of: (1) Plant Status; (2) Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup; (3) Monthly Surveillance; (4) Routine Inspection; (5) License Conditions; (6) Licensee's Response to Selected Safety Issues; (7) Licensee Followup on Previously Identified Items; (8) Rcport of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments; (9) Monthly Maintenance; (10) Surveillance Testing and Calibration Control Program; and (11) ESF System Walkdow Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. One unresolved item was identified in paragraph i

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DETAILS i Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees j G. W. Muench, Director, Nuclear Operations .

• R. P. Barkhurst, Plant Manager, Nuclear .

T. F. Gerrets, Corporate QA Manager S. A. Alleman, Assistant Plant Manager, Plant Technical Services

• N. S. Carns, Assistant Plant flanager, Nuclear, Operations and Maintenance J. N. Woods, QC Manager A. S. Lockhart Site Quality Manager R. F. Burski, Engineering and Nuclear Safety Manager K. L. Brewster Onsite Licensing Engineer G. E. Wuller, Onsite Licensing Coordinator T. H. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent, N. clear

• Present at exit interview In addition to the above personnel, the NRC inspectors held discussions

. with various operations, engineering, technical support, maintenance, and

administrative members of the licensee's staf . Unresolved Items An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or j deviatio One. unresolved item was identified during this inspection and is discussed in paragraph 5. Followup action on previously identified Unresolved Item 8606-01 is discussed in paragraph 13, Plant Status At the beginning of the inspection period the plant was operating at full power. On May 4,1986, an emergency feedwater actuation signal for Steam Generator 2 (EFAS-2) was generated due to operator error while performing d chdnnel functional test. All systems responded as required but no water Was injected into the steam generator as water level was actually in the normal operating band. The plant tripped from 100% power on a LO-DNBR reactor trip at 8:20 p.m. flay 9, 1986. The cause of the trip was ,

malfunctioning position indication on Control Element apparently(CEA) 3 Assembly With the plant in Mode 2 on May 10, 1986, another EFAS-2 signal was generated while performing a channel functional test'and again it was the result of an operator error. The syste(ns responded

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normally to the actuation signal and no water was injected into the steam I

generator which was in the normal operating level ban At 4:30 p.m. on May 26, 1986, an alarm was received indicating a timer problem on CEA 4 Power was reduced to 65% and the Subgroup 11'+

(Regulating Group 5) CEAs were placed on the hold bus and an attempt was made to replace the suspected faulty circuit car Removal of the card

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interrupted hold bus power and all four of the CEAs in the subgroup l dropped to the fully inserted positio The reactor operator reduced l turbine load to stabilize reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature. The CEAs were again fully withdrawn at 9:40 p.m. and the plant was returned to full power during the afternoon of May 27, 1986. Licensee followup of the event determined that, from the drawing used for the card replacement, technicians failed to recognize that hold bus power would be interrupte '

Additionally, it appears there was never any problem in the control element drive mechanism control system (CEDMCS), but rather the problem was in the circuitry that provided the alarm and indicatio The plant operated at or about full power for the remainder of the inspection perio No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup The following LERs were reviewed and close The NRC inspectors verified that reporting requirements had been met, that causes had been identified, that corrective actions appeared appropriate, that generic applicability had been considered, and that the LER forms were complete. Additionally, the NRC inspectors confirmed that no unreviewed safety questions were involved and that violations of regulations or Technical l Specification (TS) conditions had been identified.

l l (Closed) LER 382/86-01 - Reactor trip on dropped control element assembl l l

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The trip was apparently initiated by the incdvertent dropping of Control Element Assembly (CEA) 31. Although the trip was attributed to a faulty CEA control card, troubleshooting failed to detect any anomalies; therefore, the card has been sent to the vendor for further evaluation.

! (Closed) LER 382/86-07 - Misnumbered log page, along with failure to l perform computer check, resulted in a missed fire watch inspection. This i

is one of several reports of missed fire watches. The licensee has l implemented additional administrative controls to prevent recurrenc No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance The NRC inspectors observed / reviewed TS requirer testing and verified that l testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test l

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instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation (LCO) ~

r were met, and that any deficiencies identified were properly

reviewed and resolve The NRC inspector observed portions of OP-903-043, " Shield Building Ventilation Operability Check," for Train A. This procedure was performed to satisfy the requirements of 1S Surveillance 4.6.6.1.a.

l Step 8.2.9 of OP-903-043 requires the operator to verify that the I cperating filter train heater is energized by observing thag the temperature difference across the heater is greater than 15 F. (The temJerature difference is recorded on Attachment 10.1 of the procedure.)

In tgis case the operator had recorded a temperature difference of only 13.3 F, yet the procedure was signed off as satisfactory as neither the procedure acceptance criteria or TS 4.6.6.1.a specify a minimum temperature difference that must be obtained to be able to say the heater is "on." The only requirements of the procedure are acceptance and that .

the TS ventilation train runs for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> with the heater on. The NRC inspector questioned the operator about accepting a temperature difference of less than that specified in the procedure even if it was not part of the acceptance criteria. The NRC inspector was informed that the continued inability of the system to meet the specified difference had been fomarded sometime ago to plant technical services for evaluation, as it appears the system is operating normally and simply will not provide that temperature difference.

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The NRC inspector reviewed Section 6.2 of the Waterford 3 Steam Electric

! Station Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and the basis for TS 3/4 6. given in TS. The running of the shield building ventilation trains with the heaters on for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> at the required interval is to reduce the buildup of moisture on the absorbers and HEPA filters. Therefore, it appears implicit in the requirement to have the heaters on, that some minimum amount of heat is being added (a definition gf what having the heaters"on"means). The licensee has chosen the 15 F temperature difference to represent the desired heat input. Since this value is routinely not achieved, consideration needs to be given to lowering the specified temperature difference and/or if required, extending the surveillance run time to compensate for the lower than expected heat input. This item is considered unresolved pending licensee evaluation of the 15gF temperature difference specified in the procedur (50-382/8611-01)

No violations or deviations were identifie . Routine Inspection By observation during the inspection period, the NRC inspectors verified that the control room manning requirements were being met, in addition, the NRC inspectors observed shif t turnover to verify that continuity of system status was maintained. The NRC inspectors periodically questioned shif t personnel relative to their awareness of the plant condition _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ -

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Through log review and plant tours, the NRC inspectors verified compliance with selected TS and limiting conditions for operation During the course of the inspection, observations relative to protected and vital area security were made including access controls, boundary integrity,' search, escort, and badgin On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWPs) were reviewed and the specific work activity was monitored to assure the activities were being conducted per the RWP Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked and equipment operability and calibration frequency j were verifie The NRC inspectors kept informed on a daily basis of overall status of

plant and of any significant safety matter related to plant operation Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the

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operations staff on a regular basi Selected portions of operating logs

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and data sheets were reviewed dail .

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, The NRC inspectors conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the control room. Observations included: witnessing work activities in progress; verifying the status of operating and standby safety systems and equipment; confirming valve positions, instrument and recorder readings, annunciator alarms; and housekeepin On May 5, 1986, the NRC inspector observed a number of instances in which Condition Identification Work Authorization (CIWA) stickers were not properly used. In one instance CIWA 026702 had been issued for

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Annunciator C-10 on the M annunciator panel CP-8 but no sticker was i

affixed to the annunciator window. Further, the inspector observed j stickers relating to cleared CIWAs 023049 and 02416 o' ae plant protection system bistable cabinets. The NRC inspec' c emphasized the importance of timely placement and removal of infor* cional tags and stickers to plant management.

An annunciator status control log is now being utilized in the control room to log annunciator problems. Proper utilization of this log should

{ increase operator awareness of annunciator problem No violations or deviations were identifie . License Conditions

(Closed) 2.C.12, Confirmatory Tests of Depressurization Capability of the

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Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray System - In a letter dated April 26, 1986, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) concluded that the licensee

, submittals of June 13, 1985 and March 11, 1986, adequately demonstrate )

l that the system can perform the required depressurizatio ,

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l (Closed) 2.C.16.b, Supplement Existing QA Training Program - In a letter l - dated May 12, 1986, NRR stated that a review of the licensee's letter I

dated April 25, 1986, had been done and that licensee commitments were ,

adequate to satisfy this license conditio '

No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee's Response to Selected Safety Issues ]

l During this inspection period the NRC inspector examined portions of the ;

licensee's program for and actions taken to correct biofouling of safety-related equipmen The licensee regularly monitors for the presence of biofouling in accordance with Procedure CE-1-009, "Corbicula Infestation Evaluation of Safety-Related Systems." However, to date, no biofouling has been detected so no formal equipment monitoring or testing beyond that ,

commit +.ed to in response to IE 8ulletin 81-03 is in place to solely !

evaluate biofouling problems. Should biofouling occur the licensee does {

hdve in place instrumentation that could be of assistance in determining the e>'ent of the problem and training has been given to operators so they l could help in the same area, i i

In summary, the licensee monitors for biofouling but since none has been detected, no formal program for dealing with such a fairly slow developing ,

problem is in plac )

No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Followup on Previously Identified Items

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j (Closed)UnresolvedItem 50-382/8430-01 - This item involved completion of construction and design verification on a number of block masonry wall It was reflected as License Condition A.3 in Attachment I to License NPF-26, Construction completion verification was documented in ,

paragraph 7 of NRC Inspection Report 50-382/85-05. Acceptance of design I verification was implied by issuance of License NPF-38 which deleted the l previous license conditio (Closed) Violation 382/8528-01 - This violation dealt with improper l implementation of licensee procedures UNT-5-002, MM-6-003, and QP-10-001 l which were utilized in the performance of accomplishing work.59ecified in '

ConditionIdentificationWorkAuthorization(CIWA) 022713.and 022169. The licensee's corrective actions were reviewed; revised procedure UNT-5-002 appears to .:larify responsibilities and requirements for issuing and using CIWAs. A review of CIWAs completed af ter the issue of the revised procedure indicates the training administered on the new procedural requirements was effective. This violation is considered close No violations or deviations were identifie "

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10. Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments The NRC inspector reviewed the subject report covering the period from

, license issuance through December 31, 1985, for compliance with the l reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(b). The summaries of changes were also reviewed to determine general compliance with regulations, codes, standards, and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) requirements and to evaluate validity of licensee's conclusion '

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No violations or deviations were observed.

l l 11. Monthly Maintenance i

Station activities affecting safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with T The following were among the activities inspecte . Troubleshooting suspected problems with Steam Generator 2 water level Channel A reference le .

Inspecting boric acid makeup Pump A discharge check valve to ensure shaft set screw was tack welded as recommended in 10 CFR Part 21 repor All activities were performed competently and correctly per procedure However, the environmental qualification (EQ) of the replacement gasket for the check valve is procedurally to be determined by the engineering department subsequent to installation. This procedure applies to mechanical spare parts only because the mechanical EQ program is not fully implemented. The EQ for electrical spare parts is determined prior to installation per 10 CFR 50.4 No violations or deviations were observe . Surveillance Testing and Calibration Control Program During this inspection period the NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's programmatic controls for performing surveillance testing, calibration, inservice inspection, and testing as required by TS and 10 CFR 50.55a(g).

A review was conducted of the followin0 administrative procedurcs:

QP-012-001 Calibration and Control of Measuring and Test '

Equipment (M&TE) and Installed Instrumentation and Control (I&C) Devices .

QP-010-001 Inspection MI-1-004 Control Review and Revision of I&C Work Page Forms

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MI-1-005 Control of Calibration and Maintenance MI-1-006 Calibration and Loop Check Frequency for Process Instrumentation

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MD-1-004 Preventive Maintenance Scheduling -

MD-1-007 Preventive Maintenance Task Identification UNT-7-004 Technical Specification Surveillance Control l From this review the NRC inspector has determined that adequate l administrative instructions are in place, and if followed, should provide l satisfactory controls. Additionally, interviews were conducted with the lead planner, TS coordinator, planning and scheduling supervisor, data processing supervisor, planners, schedulers, and maintenance personnel; each displayed a comprehensive understanding of their respective jobs and of the surveillance testing and calibration control progra A review was conducted of the following operations QA audit reports:

SA-W3-QA-85-43 Inservice Inspection Program SA-W3-QA-86-10 Technical Specification Administration SA-W3-QA-85-45 Maintenance SA-W3-QA-86-06 Plant Operations These reports indicate detailed inspections have been conducted of the various elements of this program. The audit findings and observations did not reveal programmatic problems but did note several areas which require

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attention, e.g. , clarity is needed in the everyday use of logs, l

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surveillance procedures, and control work tags in the control roo The licensee is in the process of addressing the audit findings and observation No violations or deviations were noted.

l 13. ESF System Walkdown l The auxiliary component cooling water (ACCW) system was verified operable j

by performing a walkdown of the accessible and essential portions of the j system on May 20 and 21, 1986.

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The NRC inspectors used ACCW standby system valve lineup specified on

Attachment 8.1 of OP-2-001, Revision 4, in conjunction with the applicable l drawings. In addition, the NRC inspectors reviewed the monthly lineup l

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check (0P-903-049) done on ACCW and the locked valve list for the system (OP-2-001, Attachment 6.1).

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On completion of the walkdown the NRC inspectors had the following l comments:

! ACC-119A and 119B were not on Drawing LOV-1564-G-160, Sheet 2 of Additionally, ACC-119B had no label.

l ACC-1271, ACC-136A, ACC-137A, and ACC-138A had no label , Attachment 8.1.of OP-2-001 only requires valves such as ACC 101A & B, 110A & B, and 116A & B to be positioned open or closed as require However, Attachment 6.1 requires these valves to be locked in position. The valves are in fact locked in position, but the standby lineup should be revised to be consistent with Attachment Ebasco Services, Inc. (Ebasco) QC hold tags W37790, Tags 1 & 2, were found hunging in the component cooling water heat exchanger rooms on ACCW valves and Ebasco QC Hold Tag SQ-1636 was found hanging from an i ACCW valve near one of the wet tower The NRC inspectors verified l

that the conditions that the tags had been hung to identify have been correcte The licensee should remove the tag As documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/86-02, paragraph 8, the licensee has identified a program to upgrade all safety-related checklists and properly tag all plant valves. Similar deficiencies, which are being addressed by this program, are identified in this inspection and in IR 50-382/86-06 as Unresolved Item 8606-0 Licensee management stated that they expect to have this program completed by the end of the first refueling outage, which is currently scheduled to begin on approximately November 15, 198 The NRC inspectors have not identified any deficiencies directly impacting plant safety. The upgrading program completion and correction of the deficiencies identifiea in all three reports will be inspected a part of the followup to Unresolved l Item 8606-01.

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 2, 1986, with i

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged

the NRC inspectors findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary l any of the material provided to or reviewed by the NRC inspectors during this inspection.

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