IR 05000382/1988021

Insp Rept 50-382/88-21 on 880801-0916.Violation & Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Status,Onsite Followup of Events,Followup of Previously Identified Items,Operational Safety Verification & Monthly Maint Observation

ML20204F493
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	10/12/1988
From:	Chamberlain D, Will Smith, Staker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20204F442	List: IR 05000382/1988021 ML20204F439 ML20204F453 ML20204F476
References
50-382-88-21, IEB-88-001, IEB-88-1, NUDOCS 8810210590
Download: ML20204F493 (12)

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APPENDIX B U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-382/88-21 Operating License: NPF-38 Docket: 50-382 Licensee: Louisiana Power & Light Company (!.P&L)

142 Delaronde Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70174 Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Inspection At: Taft, Louisiana Inspection Conducted: August 1 through September 16, 1988 -

Inspectors: 9[2J[IT W. F. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector Date //

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T' R/Stakkf , Resident Inspector T -/6 -8f Date Approved: -

/ LwN  !'M" F 0. ChwFe'rfain, Sdction Chief, Projects Date Section A, Divisiorr of Reactor Projects i

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8810210590 G81013 PDR ADOCK 0500 .2

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Inspection Sunnary Inspection Conducted August 1 through September 16, 1988 (Report 50-382/88-21)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced ins (1) plant status, (2) onsite followup of events, (3)pection consisting of: followup of previously iderti

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items, (4) operational safety verification, (5) monthly maintenance observation, (6) monthly surveillance observations, (7) licensee event report followup, and (8) engineered safety feature walkdow ;

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Results: In general, the licensee has shown significant improvement in the area of housekeeping and maintenance of equipnent operability, particularly in radiation process monitors. Replacements and repairs made during the recent refueling outage combined with technician training appears to have improved ,

plant reliabilit In addition, the bimonthly ESF System Walkdown of the :

containment spray system was conducted with no deficiencies identified. This is the first time in over a year that there has been no deficiencies identified during an ESF system walkdow There are a number of examples in this report that reflect weaknesses in the licensee's corrective action program. The inspectors had discussions with

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plant management expressing concern over delays in taking prompt and effective actions to resolve safety related material or equipment problems which do not necessarily threaten a plant shutdown. It was recommended that the licensee review this potential area of weaknes There was one violation identified in this report. The violation involved operation of the plant in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4 without operable containment penetration backup overcurrent protection for pressurizer backup heater banks 3 and4,aconditionprohibitedbytechnicalspecifications(Section3.c).

One deviation was identified in Section 4d. The licensee failed to complete corrective action in response to a previous violation by the dato committed to ,

the NRC, anj did not inform the NRC until a week ofter the date had passe ;

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- A new unresolved item was identified in Section 6b, referring to the panding '

failure analysis of Dry Cooling Tower Fan 6A motor. This is 3 matter about

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which more information is required to ascertain whetber it it an acceptable '

item. a deviation, or a violatio l i

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DETAILS t

. Persons Contacted ,

Principal Licensen Employees l

• R. P. Barkhurst, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• N. S. Carns, Plant Manager, Nuclear -

S. A. Alleman, Nuclear Quality Assurance Manager P. Y. Prasankumar, Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Support ,

D. P. Packer, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations and Maintenance ,

J. J. Zabritski, Operations Quality Assurance Manager '

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• D. E. Baker, Manager of Nuclear Operations Support and Assessments J. R. McGaha, Manager of Nuclear Operations Engineering  ;

W. T. Labonte,. Radiation Protection Superintendent

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G..M. Davis, Manager of Events Analysis Reporting & Responses

• L. W. Laughlin, Onsite Licensing Coordinator ,

D. W. Vinci, Maintenance Superintendent A. F. Burski, Manager of Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs

R. S. Starkey, Operations Superintendent '

• C. R. Gaines, Events Analysis Supervisor

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• Present at exit intervie '

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. In addition to the above personnel, the NRC inspectors held discussions i 4 with various operations, engineering, technical support, maintenance, and ,

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administrative merrbers of the licensee's staff.

l Plant Status M1707) '

At the beginning of this -inspection period on August 1,1988, the plant

was operating at full power. Due to continuing vibration problems with i l

Main feed Pump A after recovering from pump failure in July 1988 (See NRC l Inspectica Report 50-382/88-19, Section 10.a), it became ne:essary to reduce the flow through Feed Purrp A to about 4000 gallons per minute less

, than Feed Pump B to reduce vibratinn to a more acceptable level. The '

4 pumps have been running in that flow configuration for the entire ,

inspection perio ;

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The plant was operated at full power until Septerrber 7,1988, when power was reduced to just above 90 percent to climinate a metallic knocking ;

sound in No. 2 Steam Generator. This problem is discussed in detail in *

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Section 3b belo [

At the end of this reporting period, the plant was operating at 90 percent l

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power, pending further investigation into the noise in No. 2 Steam Generato ,

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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t 4 nsite Followup of Events (93762)

_ Excessive Unidentified Reactor Coolent System Leakage On Monday, August 15, 1988, the licensee conducted a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) water inventory balance pursuant to Technical 1 Specification (TS) 4.4.5.2. The results were 1.34 gallons per ;

minute (GPM) which exceeded the TS limit of 1.0 G?M for unident'fied leakage. At 7:16 a.m., the licensee entered TS 3.4.5.2 action i statement b which requires the excessive leakage to be corrected i within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be shut down from the current full power condition in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The leak was found at the body to bonnet seal .

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on RC-301A, the A Train pressurizer spray valve. The licensee *

applied a high pressure temporary seal to the valve, thus reducing RCS unidentified leakage to about 0.5 GPM. Discussion with the licensee revealed the fact that the operators had conducted the water inventory balance on Friday, August 12, 1988, and obtained a reading *

of 0.9 GPM. Senior plant management was not notified of this a,qproaching limit, apparently because 'in the past it has not been i unusual to see leakage rate in the range of 0,7 to 0.9 GPM for several days. The NRC inspectors expressed concern that when close to the limit, the licensee did not consider the potential of exceeding the TS limit by observing the RCS water inventory more frequently. Subsequently, the licensee made more frequent checks i when appropriat ,

On August 16, 1988, the temporary seal failed, and RCS unidentified leakage again increased to 1.26 GPM. The licensee quantified the !

leak rate by measuring condensed leakage from RC-301A, thus identifying the leakage and reducing the uridentified leak rate to less than 1.0 GPH. This allowed time to plan and complete the repair on RC-301A. By 1:58 p.m., RCS unidentified leakage was reduced to 0.84 GP Curing the week of August 22, 1988, the licensee changed the techn1gue used in applying the high pressura seal such that it would be less likely to fail. As a result, the leak rate from RC-301A was reduced to less than 0.01 GP The needed parts are available and ,

the licensee has indicated that the valve will be repaired curing the ,

next shutdown and cooldown. Work associated with this leak has ,

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consumed approximately 10 Man Rem since the first indication of leakage on May 26, 1988, as the plant went into hot standby (Mode 3) :

from the second refueling outage. This represents about 5 percent of the total plant Man Rem expenditures to dat :

l I Indeterminate Metallic Noise in Steam Generator No. 2

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On August 30, 198s, an operator on rounds identified a metallic noise f r

coming from the feed piping in the vicinity of the main feed isolation valve, on the +46 elevation. The plant was at full powe l The loose parts monitor was not alarming. The inspectors heard the f l

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noise, which sounded like a loose met 9 part in the flow si. ream, hitting against the piping or structure. The noise had no particular rhythm, and the pitch was about 2500 Hertz. By September 2, the licensee enga Corporation TEC),

(ged atocontractor, Technology locate and identify for Energy the noise. On September 3, the licensee reduced power below 90 percent for other reasons and found that the noise disappeared when operating at 90 percent or less. TEC initially located the noise 20 feet inside containment, near an elbow which turns the feed piping upward into an expansion loo During the next two weeks, the licensee obtained assistance from Combustion Engineering and, except when taking noise data, the plant was operated at 90 percent power to minimize possible damage. By S etember 16, the licensee had concluded that the noise was coming from Steam Generator No. 2. On September 15, the licensee informed the NRC that when the threat of Hurricane Gilbert passed and the grid became stable, the plant would be shut down and Steam Generator No. 2 instrumented to find the exact location of the noise. Corrective actions would be implemented as a function of the additional noise testing. The resident inspectors, NRR, and NRC Region IV will continue to monitor licensee actions on this matte Containment Penetration Backup Overcurrent Protection inoperable On August 1, 1988, the licensee issued Licensee Event Report 382/88-019 which described the discove,'y that backup overcurrent protection had not been provided for pressurizer heater backup banks (PHBs) 3 and 4 since initial startup. The inspectors conducted a review of the licensee's identification, reporting, and correction of the deficiency to determine whether or not the five criteria in 10 CFR 2 Appendix C were 3atisfied such that a Notice of Violation need not be issued by the NR The inspectors noted that on May 21, 1988, while the plant was shut down for refueling, the licensee discovered that the output contacts of the PHB 3 and PHB 4 supply breaker transfer trip relays were reversed. As a result, the wrong feeder breaker would have been tripped should backup overcurrent protection be csiled upon for PHB 3 or PHB The licensee failed to identify and formally r2 port to the NRC that the plant had been operating in a condition prohibited by Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.4.1 since inftial startup, until

!.ER 382/88-019 was issued on August 1,1988, over three months late After correcting the wiring error Work Authorization 01018451 required the trip transfer function to ba retested per Procedure HE-07-300, Revision 0, "480 VAC Overcurrent Protective Device Functional Test," which was the procedure in use when the output contacts were found reversed on May 21, 1988. The step was signed off as completed with reference to the test results of ME-07-300. However, only the B train (PHB 4, 5, & 6) was teste As a result, only half of the work done was retested. There was no

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post-maintenance confirmation of Train A (PHB 1, 2, 3) operability prior to entering the plant operational modes for which the backup overcurrent protection was required. The licensee offered no explanation other than the scope of Work Authorization 01018451 did not include Train A. On May 25, 1988, the plant entered Mode '

Train A was not tested satisfactorily until September 14, 1988. This additional period of time could have been prevented by proper ,

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retesting after the corrective maintenanc Operating of the plant in a condition prohibited by TS is a violation ,

of NRC regulations (382/8821-01).

There are issues not addressed in LER 382/88-019 that the licensee should discuss in the response to the Notice of Violation. First, what degree of confidence did the licensee have that other equipment presumed operable to satisfy the TSs on the basis of startup testing was in fact tested? Second, why was Train A transfer trip circuit !

no+ etested prior to declaring it operable after corrective

- intenance on May 2 and what measures were taken to prevent similar problems in the future? Third, why wasn't the discovery of the reversed output contact on the P 3 3 and PHB 4 transfer trip relays reported within 30 days of May 22, 1988, as required by 10CFR50.73(a)(2)? Followup of Previously Identified items (92701) (Closed) Open Item 382/8701-06: Issuance of an effluent monitoring program policy to satisfy compliance with Technical Specifications 6.8.1,k and 6.8.2. The NRC inspector verified that the licensea has approved and issued a program for effluent monitoring. The program is defined in Section IV, Chapter 2, of the licensee's Nuclear Operations Manage:ent Manua (Closed) Open Item 382/8731-01: Procedure changes to prevent j painting in the control roon envelope and other areas serviced by engineered safety features (E5f) filtration units during operatio The NRC inspector verified that precautions on painting during system operation have been added to ESF filtration unit ope: rating and surveillance procedures, (0 pen) Unresolved Item 382/8829-04: Determination of the causes for the delay in replacing and the safety significance of the undersized l wiring for shield building ventilation system heaters. As documented in Condition Identification Work Authorization (CIWA) 016612 in March i 1985, the licensee determined that the shield building ventilation l system heater wiring was undersized and not in conformance with the l National Electrical Code. The shield building ventilation train "B" heater wires were replaced in January 198 The train "A" heaters were not replaced until July 1988, over three years after discovery i of this condition. The licensee could not provide any documentation that supported the delay in correcting the identified deficienc r

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After this issue was raised by the NRC inspectors, the licensee d ttermined i; hat these wires were not size 12 AWG as originally tnought but were size 10 AWG. An analysis was then performed, and the licensee determined that these wires would meet operability requirements. The inspectors had discussions with licensee personnel knowledgeable of this problem.. From these discussions and by review of documents presented, it appeared that the licensee was aware of the deficiency in March 1985 but apparently failed to replace the wiring until it became convenient to do so, without documented justification for operating the plant with a safety related system outside of its design basis. Since the technical specification surveillance requirements were met, there apparently was no sense of urgency to keep the system in its proper design configuration so that when called upon would not be subject to premature failure. The safety significance of this issue was mitigated by a subsequent analysis, but the licensee's corrective action programs appeared to be in need of review in the area of prompt identification and correction of conditions adverse to qualit Failure to promptly correct the wiring deficiencies described above, or as an alternative, to document justification for continued plant l operation with this condition would normally be cited as a violation  ;

of NRC regulations. However, recent enforcement action (EA 88-144) l and proposed imposition of Civil penalty for inadequate corrective actions is awaiting licensee response. This item will remain open pending licensee response to this previous corrective action violatio (0 pen) 'liolation 382/8808 07: Failure to estatli;h an adequate procedura to control the nperatinn of thre fuel handling building ventilaticn system. In the response 1.0 'liolation Letter W3P88-1234, dated July 1,1988, the licensee comitted to review ESF ventilation sy-tcm operating procedures by September 5,1988. This action wa!,

cutpleted on time, The licensee also comitted to complete reviews of veatilation system and nonventilation ESF systen documentation for l root valve discrepancies by August 1.1988. This was not completed by August 1, 1988. On August 9, 1998, the licensee informed the NRC

} by letter W3F68-1262 th.>t these Wo projects had been rescheduled for August 12, 1988, and November ".0,10Cd, respectively. Failure to inform the NRC of a change of orMitment date was unacceptat,l Failure to meet the date of August 1, 19S8, is a deviation from commitment to the NRC (382/8821-03). (Closed)NRCBulletin88-01: Defects in Westinghouse Circuit Breakers. The bulletin required addressees who do not have Westinghouse Series 05 circuit breakers to provide a leder to the NRC stating this fact within 50 days upon receipt of the bulleti The licensee responded by Letter W3P88-0051, dated March 29, 1988, that W35ES does not utilize Westinghouse Series DS circuit breakers and is therefore not subject to the inspections requested or the safety concerns of Bulletin 88-01. On September 9, 1988, NRR

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acknowledged the letter and stated that the response above was satisfactory, and no further reply is necessary. This bulletin is close . Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71709 And 71881)

The objectives of this inspection were: (1) to ensure that this facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements, (2) to ensure that the licensee's managemen1 concrols were effectively discharging the licensee's responsibilities for continued safe operation, (3) to assure that selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection programs were implemented in conformance with plant policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirements, and (4) to

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inspect the licensee's compliance with the approved physical security pla During a routine tour of the Reactor Auxiliary Building, the inspector noted Fire Door 166 at the -35 feet elevation was jammed wide open. The bottom of the door interfered with the painted surface of the floor as the door position approached full open. There was no way of determining how many employees, if any, passed through the open fire door. Licensee efforts in response to Notice of Violation 382/8722-02, dated December 23, 1987, appeared to have been effective in preventing such unauthorized fire impairments. This may be an isolated case. The inspector closed the door and informed the Shift Supervisor so that the problem with the door could be corrected. On the next tour, the inspector found the door corrected and closed. No other unauthorized fire impairments were found during this inspection perio On Septiember 9,1988, at 8:13 a.m., an unusual event was declared when a hurriesne warning went into effect for the site and surrounding area While the NRC inspectors monitored the licensee's prepar a tion for the l

stonn, the NRC inspectors observed that Procedure OP-901-045, Revision 4,

"Severe Weather ano flooding," required verification of the operability of the emergency diesel generators and diesel-driven fire pumps in accordance I with their respective surveillance procedure The Shift Supervi,or en watch and Operattert management interpreted this a:i a requirement to verify that survoillances for this equipment had been conaleted within the nonnal period. This was questionable to the inspectors aecause plant technical specifications required surveillances to be current during normal plant operations anyway. The NRC inspectors questioned this interpretation because the referenced procedures required the diesels to be run to confirm operability. Plant managerrent later decided to start the diesels to verify operability but not complete the entire surveillante requirement per the monthly operability checks. The procedure was changed, and the diesels were run with no problems. Later that evening, hurricane Florence struck the Louisiana coast and passed near the sit i Wind speeds neasured at the site were in the 35-40 mph rang During the week of September 12, 1988, Hurricane Gilbert entered the Gulf of Mexico as a Category 5 storm with 175 mph winds. The licens9e

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initiated planning for this severe storm by holding meetings with assigned

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Emergency Plan )ersonnel. Due to the instability of other non-nuclear power plants, tie licensee made plans to remain at power until winds capable of damaging the power distribution towers became eminent within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The towers were subject to failure at a lower wind velocity than the power plant. As it turned out, the storm remained southward and had no significant effects on the plant other than some severe rains, which caused no damag The inspectors conducted tours of the plant when on site and found the licensee's housekeeping efforts to be excellent. The daily control room

visits yielded satisfactory results. The operators appeared alert to their responsibilities, log keeping was adequate, and the number of lighted annunciators were fe Fire impairments were being actively kept to a mininum. Flammables were apparently being properly stowed, as none were found in unauthorized

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area l There were no problems noted in the plant security area. All necessary

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stations appeared adequately manned, compensatory measures were properly taken where appropriate, and equipment at the primary accass point was maintained operabl i No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

The below listed station maintenance activities affecting safety-related systens and components were observed cad documentction reviewed to dscertain that the activities were conducted in accordance with approvea '

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procedures, technical specifications, and appropriate industry codes or standard [

- Work Authorization 01021241. The NRC inspector observed the under i voltage clearance, pickup, and drepout voltage vid trip shaft torque l measurements as performed por Procedure ME-04155, Revision 7,

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"Reactor Trip Switchgear Breakers." The uadar voltage clearance, F

pickup voltage, and dropout voltages ware out of tolerance but were '

adjusted to meet procedural requirements accordirigly. Acceptable breaker opening time was measured and insulation testing was !

perforned satisfactorily. A bracket mounting screw was not installed on the L,nder voltage device. Work Authorization 01022870 was written, and a new screw was installed. The NRC inspector observed

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that procedures were adhered to, test equipment calibrations were current, and acceptance criteria were met.

. Work Authorization 01023531. The inspector observed the electrical ,

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portions of replacement of the motor for Dry Cooling Tower Fan 6 Similar work was observed on December 30, 1987, when the motor for r

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Dry Cooling Tower Fan 4B was replace At that time, the inspector j

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noted discrepancies between the work done, the drawing, and the procedu re. A Notice of Violation was issued (NRC Inspection Report item 50-38?/8731-03) against the licensee's failure to comply with the drawing. In response, the licensee took exception to a violation of procedure, but the licensee did find a discrepancy between the drawing detail and the general notes and thus coccitted to review and clarify the sheets. On September 1, 1988, the inspecto . viewed the documentation for the Fan 6A motor replace ant. Drawing LOU-1564-B-288, Revision 3," Cable and Conduit List Installation Detail" had since been changed, as was Maintenance Procedure ME-04-809, Revision 4, "Low Voltage (600 Volts and less)

Power and Control Cable /Canductor Terminations and Splices." The drawing details and notes more clearly indicated what must be done, with one added exception. General Note 6A required application of nuclear splice cement on lugs, bolts, and metal parts in addition to the conductor insulation in "wet locations." The electrician decided, instead of receiving direction from the work authorization, that Fan 6A motos was in a wet location because he could not explain what the definition of "wet location" wa Even though the splices were sealed in a gasketed connection box, the motor was exposed to the elements. Section 8.5.2 of the procedure did not Oddress application of cement in "wet locations," but it applied the cement to the insulation in a reversed sequenc After observing the installation, the inspector concluded that the splice was performed in a correct .1anner and in accordance with the drawing. However, Procedure ME-04 309 was inadequate in that it had obsolete instructions in Section 8.6.2 which were superseded by the dething. Ib2 iicensee committed to correct the conflicts. The inspectors :nll document completion of this action when violation 382/8731-03 is cicse '

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1he electricians noted that the motor had sluller gage motor leads than normally seen. Tne inspector requested the licensee to explain i why the motor failed, because it appeared that the failure vas renw '.o the motor leads. As of the end of this inspection, the licensee had not yet perfomed a failure analysir, and as such, this

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issue will be tracked as an unresolved item (382/88?l-04).

" Work Authorization 01023887. The NRC inspector observed portions of

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the Containment Spray Pump "B" shaft seal pecking replacement. The i packing is a backup for the pump shaft mechanical seal. Conponent

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cooling (water second three is supplied rings to a rings total) packing lantern ring betweenSeveral for lubricatio the first and attempts were made to replace the packing. After the first attempt, when the pump was started for packing adjustment, smoke came from the packing. The pump was secured. During the second attempt, the

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mechanics could not fit the three packing rings into the stuffing box. Af ter cleaning the stuffing box, the packing was replaced a third time and adjustments were made but component cooling water leakage through the packing could not be reduced to an acceptable

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level. Approximately 4 gallens per hour of CCW was leaking out of !

the packing. This leakage could be reduced by throttling the CCW !

supply valve but because of uncertainties of the effect on the l o>erability cf the pump, the valve was lef t in the open position and !

. tie spray pump returned to operable status. Later t1e licensee '

determined that component cooling water was leaking from the spray i j pump packing through the mechanical seal into the pump at a rate of i 1 gallon per minute. This leakage resulted in dilution of the i borated water in the "B" train safety injection / containment spray

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suction piping. The boron concentration had decreased from about l j 1900 PPM to 1066 PPM in the containment spray pump suction. An  !

analysis was performed to ensure that this dilution did not create an unreviewed safety question. The results indicated that it did no ;

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The licensee also determined that the corrosion inhibitors in the ,

component cooling water would not have an adverse effect on the !

l containment spray or safety _ inspection system piping and component The licensee contacted the pump seal vendor and determined that the i CCW supply to the packing could be throttled to reduce the leakage ;

i without affecting pump cperability. The CCW supply valve has since '

{ been temporarily throttled and leakage reduced. Followup on the j ifcensee's permanent corrective actions on the shaft packing leakage

problemarebeingtrackedasanopenitem(382/3821-05). p No violations or deviations were identifie , ,

' Monthly Surveillance Observatioc (61726)  !

i t l' The NRC inspectors observed the below listed surveillance testing of i safety-related systems and components to verify that the activities were i

being performed in accordance with the technical specifications. The  ;

! applicable procedures were reviewed for adequacy, test instrumrntation was j

! verif'ed to be in calibration, and test data was reviewed for accuracy and !

l compktteness. The inspectors ascertained that any deficiencies identified t

were properly reviewed and resolve !

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l Procedure OP-903-068 Revision S. "Emergency Dieul Generater ,

j Operability Verification." On August 9, 1988, the NRC inspector  ;

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witnessed the monthly operability run of Emergency Diesel  :

l Generator D. The NRC inspector observed that the diesel ran  !

smoothly, and procedural and technical specification requirements l wcre me t

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i Procedure OP-903-032, Revision 6, "Quarterly ISI Valve Tests." On i August 9,1988, the NRC inspector observed the operability  ;

j verification of the emergency diesel generator fuel transfer sump "A" !

discharge check valve (EGF-109A). Valve operability was chec(ed by f

! verifying that the flow rate of greater than 30 GPM was obtained when l l transferring fuel to the feed tank with transfer pump No problems }

were note Ne violations or deviations were identifie f

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12 Licensee Eveat Report (LER) Followup (90712)

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The following LERs were reviewed and close The NRC inspectors verified that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and that the LER forms were complet The NRC inspectors confirmed that unreviewed safety questions and violations of technical specifications, license conditions, or other regulatory requirements had been adequately describe (Closed)LER 382/85-034, "Automatic Actuation of Reactor Protective System Due to feed Trip (Revision 1)."

(Closed)LER 382/86-024. "Inadvertent Discharge of a Boric Acid Condenser Tank due to Procedure Noncompliance."

(Closed)LER 382/87-023 "Invalid Condenser Vacuum Pump Samples Due to Loss of Demister Loop Seal."

(Closed)LER 382/87-025, "Missed Samples Due to Inadequate Administrative Controls."

No violations or deviations were identifie . Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Walkdown (71710)

The NRC inspectors conducted a walkdown of the accessible portions of the containment spray system to verify system operability. The licensee's operating procedure and system drawing were reviewed and compared with the as-built configuration. Equipment condition, valve and breaker positions, housekeeping, labelino, permanent instrwent indication. and apparent operability of support systems essential to activation of v.he ESF system

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were all noted et appropriate. The 'iRC inspnctors found rio significant l problems that would prtclude the systtra from performirg its intended l safety functions, ha violations or deviations were identified.

l i 1 Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summari: J on September 23, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The licensee acknowledged the NRC inspectors' findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary cny of the material provided to ' .' reviewed by the NRC inspectors during this inspection, l

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