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Insp Rept 50-382/89-03 on 890101-31.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Status,Monthly Surveillance Operation, Onsite Followup of Events,Diesel Generator Fuel Oil QA & NRC Bulletin 87-002 & LER Followup
	ML20235M756
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	02/16/1989
From:	Chamberlain D, Will Smith, Staker T; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20235M746	List: ML20235M743; ML20235M751; ML20235M756;
References
	50-382-89-03, 50-382-89-3, IEB-87-002, IEB-87-2, NUDOCS 8902280410
	Download: ML20235M756 (12)
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '

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c , NRC Inspection' Report

50-382/89-03 Operating License: NPF-38

, . Docket: 50-382- ,

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' Licensee: 'LouisianaPower&LightCompany~(LP&L)~

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142 Delaronde Street-'

c- New Orleans ~,< Louisiana. 70174

Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Stat' ion, Unit 3

s, Inspection At: Taft, Louisiana.

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' Inspection Conducted: January 1-31, 1989

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'I'spectors:

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.W. F. Smith, _ Senior Resident Inspector

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RT Staker,Jesident Inspector 244(

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D. DFChamberlain, Chief, Project Section A Date

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Ins ection Conducted

Areas Ins ected:

Januar

1-31 1989 Re

surve Routine ort 50-382/89-03

verificationance o servation,,onsite followuunannounced inspection of:

quality assur,ance p of events

identified items,,and monthlylicense maintenance n

observatioNRC

operational Bull

safetyplant statu

Results , foll

uel oil

Ticensee:'s failure to correct aOne violation was id

s resulted in the operators being

procedural

} surveillance

poor administrative supportunable

procedure for several deficiency pumps.

f weeks to fully complyrewith

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inspectors pointed out to li y

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weekl

ensuring procedure compliance or the opera,andtors

perhaps

is notseveral

typical months

censee management that

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however. isSuchno;t

NRC

related to the fire

actuator tubing

protectionParagraph

e ers to problems the licensee h

conducive4 to of this repor

inspectors appra.

The area and safety-related air operat d

of licensee

progress onidentified b these i

as addressed

ised a routine

ssue e valve

to seek out and

without NRC prompting. correct defi ito

asis. s and has kept the NRC

The licensee's

c encies, and to assess generic improve

these

approach issues

e self-crit

The control element assembly d implications,ical,

described in paragraph 4 were h

procedural compliance and excell

during night and weekend rs.

rop and

hou spray valve

ent management participation

failure incidandle

ents also

e

During a plant tour with good

on January 5 , particularly

January 26was described

1989 ec rculation in paragraph

flow when S.there

pumps may not

is1989, the

at the fire

the W3 describes a fire

fire pumps are protectThe pump failure bNRC

license,e Information Notice 89

on This was, alerted

no demand.

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s possible problem and reecause of low flow conditions

ed from low flow conditions. quested to describe how .

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' Inspection' Summary

Inspection Cbnducted January 1-31, 1989 (Report 50-382/89-03)

AreasInspectedi Routine, unannounced inspection of: plant status . monthly

1 - surveillance observation, onsite followup of events, operational safety

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verification,- monthly maintenance observation, diesel generator fuel oil

' quality. assurance, NRC= Bulletin 87-02 followup, followup of previously

' identified items, and licensee event report followup.

Results: One violation was identified in paragraph 3 pertaining to the

licensee's failure to correct a' procedural deficiency on the fire pumps. This ,

resulted in the operators being unable to fully comply with a weekly

surveillance procedure for several weeks, and perhaps several months. Such

poor administrative support for the operators is not typical; however, the NRC

inspectors pointed out to licensee management that this is nat conducive to

ensuring procedure compliance.

Paragraph 4 of this ' report refers to problems the. licensee has addressed

related to the fire protection area and safety-related air operated valve

actuator tubing. The licensee identified these issues and has kept the NRC

inspectors appraised of progress on a routine basis. The licensee's approach

to these issues demonstrated improvements in the-ability to be self-critical,

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~ to-seek out and correct deficiencies, and to assess generic implications,

.without.NRC prompting.

The control. element assembly drop and spray valve failure incidents also

' described in paragraph 4 were handled well by operating personnel with good

procedural compliance and excellent management participation, particularly

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during night and weekend hours.

During a' plant tour on January 5,1989, the NRC inspectors noted that the' fire

pumps may not.have sufficient recirculation flow when there is no demand. This

was. described in paragraph 5. NRC Information Notice 89-08, published on

January 26, 1989, describes a fire pump failure because of low flow conditions.

The licensee was alerted to this possible problem and requested to describe how

the W3 fire pumps are protected from low flow conditions.

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DETAILS

1. _P_e,rsons

e Contacted

Principal Licensee Employees

R. P. Barkhurst, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

N. S. Carns, Plant Manager, Nuclear

S. A. Alleman, Nuclear Quality Assurance Manager

P. V. PrasanPumar, Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Support

D. F. Packer, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations and Maintenance

J. J. Zabritski, Quality Assurance Manager

D. E. Baker, Manager of Nuclear Operations Support and Assessments

J. R. McGaha, Manager of Nuclear Operations Engineering

W. T. Labonte, Radiation Protection Superintendent

G. M. Davis, Manager of Events Analysis Reporting & Responses

L. W. Laughlin, Onsite Licensing Coordinator

D. W. Vinci, Maintenance Superintendent

A. F. Burski, ifanager of Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs

R. S. Starkey, Operations Superintendent

C. R. Gaines, Event Analysis Supervisor

Present at exit interview.

In addition to the above personnel, the NRC inspectors held discussions

with various operations, engineering, technical support, maintenance, and

administrative members of the licensee's staff.

2. Plant Status (71707)

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At the beginning of this inspection period, the plant was at 70 percunt

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power because of reduced power demand over the holiday weekend. The plant

was restored to full power by January 3,1989, and remained at that level

through January 26, 1989.

l On January 26, 1989, power was reduced to 80 percent when a control

l element assembly (CEA) dropped during corrective maintenance on the CEA

control system. A few hours after a failed sequencing card was replaced,

full power was restored.

On January 27, 1989, the plant was shut down to hot standby (Mode 3)

because of a pressurizer spray valve failing to fully close. Repairs were

completed on the valve and the plant was returned to full power on

January 30, 1989, where it remained until the end of this inspection

period.

Details on the two problems identified above are discussed in paragraph 3

below.

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3. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The NRC inspectors observed the surveillance testing of safety-related

systems and components listed below to verify that the activities were

being performed in accordance with the Technical Specifications. The

applicable procedures were reviewed for adequacy, test instrumentation was

verified to be in calibration, and test data was reviewed for accuracy and

completeness.

a. Procedure OP-903-053, Revision 5. " Fire Protection System Pump

Operability Test." On January 5, 1989, the NRC inspectors witnessed

the weekly operability test of the fire pumps. The surveillance was

observed previously by the NRC inspectors on December 8,1988, with

no problems observed except that Step 7.1.8 of the procedure could

not be performed in sequence. The step required the operator to

secure the motor driven pump while the diesel driven pump was

running, but upon pressing the stop button, the motor would not stop.

Since the header pressure was being maintained (by procedure) below

the motor driven pump starting pressure setpoint, there appeared to

be a logical explanation as to why the pump would not stop. The

operator was given permission from the shift supervisor to proceed

and secure the motor driven purrp after the testing of the diesel

driven pumps was complete. The action appeared appropriate on the

basis that the licensee would resolve the procedure problem after the

test.

On January 5, 1989, the NRC inspectors noted that the procedure had

not been changed. Upon witnessing the test on January 5,1989, the

same problem occurred again, but this time, a different operator

proceeded on his own to complete the procedure out of sequence,

without shift supervisor concurrence.

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Except for the problem of being unable to comply with Step 7.1.8 in

sequence, the operator followed the procedure and ran the equipment

in accordance with the operating procedure as required by the

surveillance procedure. All prerequisites and precautions were l

complied with. The surveillance test acceptance criteria were met

and the operator recorded the data in a neat and professional manner.

On January 5,1989, the NRC inspector expressed concern to licensee

management that failure to correct either the procedure or the motor

driven fire pump setpoint (or both) is not conducive to the

licensee's efforts to instill procedure compliance among operators.

On January 26, 1989, the NRC inspector observed the test to verify

corrective actions. The motor driven fire pump setpoint had been

reportedly corrected, and in addition, a problem with the motor

starting relay was found and corrected shortly after January 5,1989.

Again, the procedure did not work in that Step 7.1.8 could not be

followed. This procedure was apparently conducted on a weekly basis

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for many weeks 'and, as of this reporting period, three times in the

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presence of NRC inspectors without the licensee having corrected:the

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problem with the procedure. Failure to provide an adequate procedure;

is'in violation of NRC' regulations (382/8903-01)

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b. Procedure OP-903-068, Revision 6. " Emergency Diesel. Generator

Operability Verification." On January 3,1989, the NRC: inspector

observed performance of the monthly operational test of Emergency

Diesel Generator A. 'In addition, the biannuals" fast loading" of the

diesel-was performed. The surveillance test was conducted in a

professional manner in accordance with the procedure.

4. Onsite Followup of-Events (93702)

a. Discovery of Excessive Number of Impaired Fire Rated Assiemblies .

NRC Inspection Reports 50-382/88-28 and 50-382/88-31 discussed the

licensee's actions to address an excessive number of impaired fire

rated ~ assemblies which have been identified. During this inspection

period, the licensee' continued to evaluate nonconforming condition

" identification reports (NCIs). Of the 2,014 fire seals inspected,

401' required an NCI for evaluation'. As'of the end of this -inspection

period, 307 NCIs were dispositioned; Of these,187~ ~ seals have been

declared operable and 201 required some form of rework. In addition,

the licensee had 58 seals on hold pending removal of material so that

a detailed in'spection could be. performed in response to.NRC Information

W Notice 88-56, " Potential Problems with Silicone Foam Fire Barrier

Penetration Seals." The Notice referred to a 10.CFR 21 report on

nonconformances found on fire seals at Wolf Creek Generating Station.

The licensee plans to inspect seals similar to those found at Wolf

Creek Generating Station to ensure that similar nonconforming conditions

do not exist at W3. The licensee continues to target May 1989 for

completion. The:NRC inspectors will continue to monitor licensee

activity in this area and provide updates in future inspection

reports. '

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b. Air Operated Valve Actuator Tubing Deficiencies

During the performance of a safety system functional inspection

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W conducted by the licensee on the component cooling system, the

licensee identified a possible problem with the tubing on the air

operators for Valves SI-602A and -B. These valves serve as the safety

injection system recirculation sump outlet valves and, thus, have a

+ safety function. ~ The drawings associated with the operator tubing

installation called for Class ~P7 (nonsafety-related). Initial field

inspections revealed that the tubing had the appearance of P3 tubing,

in'that it had weld identification numbers, and had what appeared to

be seismic supports. The licensee found that documentation existed

showing that the tubing and fittings used on W3 were drawn from the

same qualified stock as those used for ASME Section III

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installations.- The,weldors were qualified'for;P3, the weld filler

material'was correct, and the supports were adequate.

Parallel.to the evaluations, the' licensee performed dye penetrant

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tests on' the welds to complete the requirements for P3 tubing.

i Within approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of discovery. the licensee made an

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. operability. determination with a supporting engineering evaluation. .

J The NRC inspectors reviewed the evaluation and found.no problems with

it. - At the exit interview, the licensee indicated that this will be

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reportediin accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. t

The licensee identified a similar problem with Valve CC-620 in the

component cooling water system and was performing a review and

inspection of 26. additional valves which have a potential for the .

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same problem. From all indications, it appears. thatithis problem.

will have minor' safety- significance .due to' the generic use of

qualified tubing and fittings for such applications where'P7 may have' 'q

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been erroneously specified in lieu of T3. The NRC inspectors will i

continue to monitor licensee activities in this area.

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c. Control Element Assembly (CEA) Drop Incident . !

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On January 26,1989, at 5:07 p.m. ,' part-length CEA 28- dropped due to

failure of: the' automatic control timing. module (ACTM) card. The

plant was operating at full power at the time. Prior to the CEA

drop, maintenance personnel had corrected a voltage problem

associated with the control element drive mechanism grippers. The

ACTM card failed just as the licensee transferred CEA 28 from the

hold bus to the ACTM. The NRC inspector was on site and observed

operator actions.during most.of the' event. The operators promptly

entered the off-normal procedure and took the actions required by the 3

procedure and the plant Technical Specifications. 'The ACTM was

promptly replaced and the CEA~ withdrawn in a controlled manner.

Power distribution limits were not' exceeded.- Reactor power was

reduced to about 80. percent as required by procedure before the.CEA

could be withdrawn and power remained 'at 80 percent for at least

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to allow-the core to stabilize. To preclude another CEA

drop, the shift supervisor elected to place CEA-28 back on the hold

bus until the exact cause of the ACTM failure was determined and

corrected. j

The NRC-inspectors will monitor the licensee's' actions to determine i

the cause of the failure. ;

d. Failure of Pressurizer Spray Valve to Close 1

On January 27, 1989, at 2:40 a.m., the operators noted a slow

decrease in reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure equal to about i

I psi per minute. The plant was operating at full power. A l

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containment entry was made to check for leaks and to ascertain

whether or not the pressurizer spray valves were closed. Previous

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experiences with Spray Valve RC-301A positioner adjustment prompted a

check of the valve for the closed position. By 3:33 a.m., it was

' determined that RC-301A was again not fully seated, but this time it

could not be~ adjusted. A plant power reduction was commenced.in.

anticipation of a plant shutdown.- At 5:50 a.m., RCS pressure had

reached 2025 psia. Technical Specification 3.2.8 required

restoration of pressure within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or a reduction in power to

less than 5 percent in the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . At 6:43 a.m., the main

turbine was taken off the grid and, at 6:46.a.m., the reactor was

shut down. -By that time ~ RCS pressure had stabilized at 1900 psia.

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The NRC inspector noted that plant procedures were followed during-

the shutdown.

During the next-2 days, the licensee attempted to determine why.

RC-301A would not seat.- It appeared that the valve operator was

reaching a mechanical stop before the valve seated, and that this was

possibly caused by operator-to-stem. coupling slippage. The exact

failure mode could not be determined without disassembling the valve,

which could not be done while the plant was in hot standby-(Mode 3).

The licensee was hesitant to cool down, thus placing the plant

through a thermal cycle, unless there was no alternative. A

temporary alteration was made on the valve operator to preclude

further slippage of the coupling. This was appropriately reviewed

and~ approved by the Plant l0perations Review Committee. The NRC

inspectors reviewed the safety evaluation and found no problems. The

valve operator was adjusted to ensure plenty of clearance.thus

allowing the valve to seal. The plant was returned to full . power at-

6:40 a.m. on January 30, 1989, after having tested the spray valve

for several hours. The NRC inspectors requested the licensee to

-provide the records showing the manner in which the valve was

assembled during the fall of 1988 when the body to bonnet gasket and

valve stem were replaced. The NRC inspector will review these

records to establish confidence that the valve was properly

assembled. The licensee also committed to disassemble RC-301A during

the next' cold shutdown as required to determine and correct the cause

of failure. This shall be tracked as Open Item 382/8903-02.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The objectives of this inspection were: (1) to ensure that this facility

was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements,

(2) to ensure that the licensee's management controls were effectively

discharging the licensee's responsibilities for continued safe operation,

(3) to assure that selected activities of the licensee's radiological

protection programs were implemented in confonnance with plant policies

and procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirements, and (4) to

inspect the licensee's compliance with the approved physical security l

plan.

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The NRC inspectors verified that proper control room staffing and operator

behavior was consistent with NRC regulations. Operators were observed to

be adhering to approved procedures as the NRC inspectors witnessed the

various operations that were conducted in the control room.

On a daily basis, when on site, the NRC inspectors verified the status of

selected control room annunciators and confirmed that the operators

understood the reasons why the annunciators were illuminated.

The NRC inspectors selectively reviewed emergency core cooling system

lineups using control room indication each day the control room was

visited and found no problem.

Tours were conducted in the plant on a rotating basis to maximize the

number of areas inspected. Equipment condition was found to be

satisfactory. During a tour on January 26, 1989, the NRC inspector noted

that the motor driven fire pump did not appear to have a recirculation

line and could be left running for an undetermined amount of time with no

demand which could lead to pump damage. This fire pump does not secure

automatically when the jockey pump becomes sufficient to maintain fire

header pressure. Once the pump is automatically started by reduced fire

header pressure, it continues to run until an operator goes to the fire

pump building and manually shuts the pump off. The licensee was requested

to explain how this pump is protected from damage due to extended

operation at shutoff head. As of the end of this inspection period, a

satisfactory answer has not been provided. This shall be tracked under

Open Item 382/8903-03.

At least once per week, a shift turnover was observed. The meetings were

conducted in a professional manner, and there was a clear exchange of

pertinent information.

The NRC inspectors monitored the licensee's chemistry sampling program.

No problems were found. At the daily plan-of-the-day meeting, the

chemistry department alerted plant management of adverse trends and

conditions, if any, and what actions were being taken.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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6. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

The below listed station maintenance activities affecting safety-related

systems and components were observed and documentation reviewed to

ascertain that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved

procedures, Technical Specifications, and appropriate industry codes or

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standards.

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a. Work Authorization 01027406. The NRC inspector observed the coupling

alignment check per Procedure MM-06-004, Revision 4, " Shaft Coupling

Alignment and Belt Tensioning Procedure," and reassembly during the

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l performance of routin' e preventive maintenance on Emergency Feedwater

. Pump A. No problems were identified.

b. Work Authorization 01030621. After having failed functional testing,

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a power supply for the Safety: Channel C nuclear instrument was

replaced.. The NRC inspector witnessed the subsequent. retest'as-

performed per Procedure'0P-903-102, Revision 4, " Safety Channel

' Nuclear Instrument Functional.. Test, Safety Channel C,"; prior. to

returning the instrument to service. The NRC inspector observed that

all acceptance criteria were met.

c. Work Authorization 01027914. -The NRC inspector observed portions of

the reinsta11ation of dry cooling tower (DCT) fan motor 3A. The fan !

motor had been removed for bearing replacement. . The NRC inspector !

noted.that repairs were.made to the high speed power ' supply leads. ..

One of the leads had apparently overheated. The licensee determined

that the overheating originated at the crimp = on the high . speed motor

supply lug. The high speed power supply lugs were replaced with

an improved type. The licensee commented that the DCT fan motors not

yet worked'on since construction have the old type lugs-and would be

replaced. .The: licensee-committed to establishing a program for

replacement of all. dry cooling tower fan motor high speed power

supply ' l ugs.' Followup on the licensee's lug- replacement program

shall be an open item (382/8903-04).

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Fuel Oil Quality Assurance (25593)

~The objective of this inspection was to . verify that the licensee has

included EDG fuel oil in its quality assurance (QA) program to complete

inspection requirements for NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/93.

The NRC inspector. reviewed Procedure OP-03-009, Revision' 5, " Fuel Oil

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Receipt," and noted that QA receipt inspection is required for EDG fuel

oil. The laboratory performing fuel oil analyses for the licensee was on

the licensee's QA approved vendors' list. NRC Temporary ,

Instruction 2515/93 is closed. j

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. NRC Bulletin 87-02 Followup (25025)

The purpose of this inspection was to complete the inspection requirements

for NRC Bulletin 87-02, " Fastener Testing to Determine Conformance With

< Applicable Material Specifications." This inspection was implemented in

accordance with NRC Temporary Instruction 2500/26. The first half of this

inspection was conducted during the period November 30 through December 4,

1987. Details were documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/87-29,

dated January 8,1988.

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During the week of January 16, 1989, the NRC inspector reviewed the

licensee's files related to their response to Bulletin 87-02. On

January 18, 1988, the licensee responded to the bulletin and on July 25,

1988, the licensee provided the additional information requested by

Supplements 1 and 2 to Bulletin 87-02. The responses appeared to provide

all of the information requested.

The NRC inspectors confirmed, through examination of the information on

the Fastener Testing Data Sheets (Attachment 1 to 8ulletin 87-02), that

the sample fasteners were properly tagged. Information provided to the

independent testing laboratory reflected the requirements associated with

the relevant specification, grade, and class of the fasteners.

In the enclosure to the licensee's response, the NRC inspectors noted that

all tests were satisfactory with some listed exceptions. This was

supported by the certified documents provided by the testing laboratory.

The exceptions included marginally low carbon content in a number of

Type A194, Grade 2H nuts according to the test results from Partek

Laboratories. This had no adverse impact on the mechanical properties of

the nuts, since the actual hardness valves were within specification

limits. However, the samples were retested by Materials Evaluation

Laboratory using what the licensee considered a more accurate process.

The results were at or above the minimum carbon content. The NRC

inspectors examined the certification sheets and found no problems.

The inspection requirements of Temporary Instruction 2500/26 are completed

for W3.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Followup of Previously Identified Items (92701 & 92702)

a. (Closed) Open Item 382/8417-01: Followup on possible use of

commercial solenoid valves manufactured by Automatic Switch

Company (ASCO) in safety-related applications. During the week of

April 16, 1984, the NRC inspector was unable to verify whether or not

all ASCO solenoid valves installed in safety-related applications

were certified as safety-related (Class 1E).

In November 1988, the NRC inspector obtained a data printout and

found 33 of 249 ASCO valves listed as commercial in lieu of Class 1E.

This was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/88-28. There was

also some discussion on this open item with regard to the ASCO valves

installed on the emergency diesel generator in NRC Inspection

Report 50-382/89-02. Since then, the licensee completed walkdowns of

all the ASCO valves installed in safety-related applications. The

NRC inspector also field inspected all of the readily accessible

valves which represented about a 10 percent sampling. The licensee

identified errors in the database and 11 valves possibly requiring

replacement. The first was a comercial ASCO valve installed, by

design change, on ACC-1398. The licensee could not justify the

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design change. The ASCO valve had a commercial body and a Class 1E

solenoid coil, and its function was to close ACC-1398. Since the

safety function of this fail-as-is valve was to open, there was no

safety significance to this item. The licensee conservatively

replaced the solenoid valve with a Class IE valve on January 7,1989.

The remaining ASCO valves had no label plates, but they appeared to

be of the proper type based on the shape of the solenoid coil

enclosure. The licensee was able to verify this through procurement

and installation records. This item is closed.

b. (Closed) Violation 382/8725-01: The NRC inspector performed a review

of work records and determined that the licensee has verified that

fully threaded bolts were installed in all dry cooling tower fan

hubs. The NRC inspector verified that the fan technical manual has

been upgraded appropriately to ensure that only fully threaded bolts

are used. The licensee also installed lock washers on the dry

cooling tower fan hub bolts as recommended by the fan vendor. The

fan technical manual has been upgraded to include the lock washer

installation and to add bolt torque requirements as recommended by

the vendor. This violation is closed.

c. (Closed) Violation 382/8804-01: Failure to adhere to fire protection

procedures. The licensee revised Procedure FP-01-017. " Transient

Combustibles and Hazardous Materials," to strengthen controls over

transient combustibles. The licensee also conducted training to

ensure that personnel were fully aware of requirements regarding

transient combustibles. No further problems in the control of

combustibles have been identified. This violation is closed.

d. (Closed) Violation 382/8813-02: The licensee's corrective actions

for this failure to implement quality assurance procedures and issue

quality notices for conditions adverse to quality were previously

reviewed in NRC In section Repcrt 50-382/88-26. The NRC inspector

performed additional reviews and determined that Quality

Notice QN-QA-88-80, which documented the problem and specified

permanent corrective action, was closed, Licensee identified

corrective action appeared appropriate. This violation is closed,

e. (Closed) Violation 382/8825-02: Failure to follow procedures. The

licensee failed to have a lock installed as required on

Valve SI-2421. The licensee promptly installed the lock and

discussed this failure to follow procedures with the operations

staff. No further problems with the control of locked valves have

since been identified. This violation is closed.

No violations or daviations were identified.

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I

10. Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (92712) l

The following LERs were reviewed and closed. The NRC inspectors verified I

that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified,

corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been

considered, and that the LER forms were complete. The NRC inspectors

confirmed that unreviewed safety questions and violations of Technical

Specifications, license conditions, or other regulatory requirements had

been adequately described.

(Closed)LER 382/88-005, " Blown Undervoltage Circuit Fuse Replacement

Results in Technical Specification 3.0.3 Entry"

(Closed)LER 382/88-018, " Fire Protection Valve Float Locked Open Due

to Personnel Error"

(Closed)LER 382/88-024, " Missed Sealed Source Leak Test Due to

Procedural Inadequacy"

(Closed)LER 382/88-028, " Containment Radiation Monitors Declared Out

of Service Due to Discrepancy in Technical Specification Range"

(Closed)LER 382/88-031, " Valid Actuation of Control Room Emergency

Filtration Unit Due to Cognitive Personnel Error"

No violations or deviations were identified.

11. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were sumarized on February 1,1989,

with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The licensee

acknowledged the NRC inspectors' findings. The licensee did not identify

as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the NRC

inspectors during this inspection.

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ML20235M756

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