ML20235M756
| ML20235M756 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 02/16/1989 |
| From: | Chamberlain D, Will Smith, Staker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235M746 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-89-03, 50-382-89-3, IEB-87-002, IEB-87-2, NUDOCS 8902280410 | |
| Download: ML20235M756 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000382/1989003
Text
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '
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- REGION IV-
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NRC Inspection' Report: 50-382/89-03
Operating License:
. Docket: 50-382-
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' Licensee: 'LouisianaPower&LightCompany~(LP&L)~
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142 Delaronde Street-'
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New Orleans ~,< Louisiana.
70174
Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Stat' ion, Unit 3
Inspection At: Taft, Louisiana.
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' Inspection Conducted: January 1-31, 1989
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'I'spectors:
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.W. F. Smith, _ Senior Resident Inspector
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.T. RT Staker,Jesident Inspector
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Approved:
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D. DFChamberlain, Chief, Project Section A
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LnnestLon1uau
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Ins ection Conducted Januar
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1-31 1989
Re
Areas Ins
surve
ected:
Routine
ort 50-382/89-03
verificationance o servation,,onsite followuunannounced inspection of:
monthly maintenance observatioNRC Bull
quality assur,ance
operational safetyplant statu
p of events
identified items,,and license
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Ticensee:'s failure to correct aOne violation was id
Results
, foll
uel oil
resulted in the operators being
procedural deficiency on the fin paragraph
surveillance procedure for several
s
unable to fully comply with a weekl
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poor administrative support f
e
inspectors pointed out to li
weeks
re pumps.
This
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and perhaps several months
or the opera, tors is not typical
ensuring procedure compliance
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censee management that this is no;t
however. Such
related to the fire protectionParagraph 4 of this repor
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, the NRC
conducive to
e ers to problems the licensee h
actuator tubing
inspectors appra.
area and safety-related air operat d
The licensee identified these i
as addressed
ised of progress on a routine b
to seek out and correct defi ito these issues
ssue
e valve
asis. s and has kept the NRC
c encies, and to assess generic improv
without NRC prompting.
The licensee's approach
e self-crit
The control element assembly d
implications,ical,
described in paragraph 4 were h
rop and spray valve failure incidandle
procedural compliance and excell
during night and weekend hou
ents also
ent management participation
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During a plant tour
with good
on January 5
, particularly
January 26was described in paragraph S. pumps may not
ec rculation flow when there is1989, the
1989
describes a fire pump failure bNRC Information Notice 89
the W3 fire pumps are protectThe license,e was, alerted
at the fire
no demand.
This
, published on
s possible problem and reecause of low flow conditions
ed from low flow conditions. quested to describe how
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' Inspection' Summary
Inspection Cbnducted January 1-31, 1989 (Report 50-382/89-03)
AreasInspectedi Routine, unannounced inspection of: plant status . monthly
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- surveillance observation, onsite followup of events, operational safety
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verification,- monthly maintenance observation, diesel generator fuel oil
' quality. assurance, NRC= Bulletin 87-02 followup, followup of previously
' identified items, and licensee event report followup.
Results: One violation was identified in paragraph 3 pertaining to the
licensee's failure to correct a' procedural deficiency on the fire pumps. This
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resulted in the operators being unable to fully comply with a weekly
surveillance procedure for several weeks, and perhaps several months. Such
poor administrative support for the operators is not typical; however, the NRC
inspectors pointed out to licensee management that this is nat conducive to
ensuring procedure compliance.
Paragraph 4 of this ' report refers to problems the. licensee has addressed
related to the fire protection area and safety-related air operated valve
actuator tubing. The licensee identified these issues and has kept the NRC
inspectors appraised of progress on a routine basis. The licensee's approach
to these issues demonstrated improvements in the-ability to be self-critical,
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~ to-seek out and correct deficiencies, and to assess generic implications,
.without.NRC prompting.
The control. element assembly drop and spray valve failure incidents also
' described in paragraph 4 were handled well by operating personnel with good
procedural compliance and excellent management participation, particularly
during night and weekend hours.
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During a' plant tour on January 5,1989, the NRC inspectors noted that the' fire
pumps may not.have sufficient recirculation flow when there is no demand. This
was. described in paragraph 5.
NRC Information Notice 89-08, published on
January 26, 1989, describes a fire pump failure because of low flow conditions.
The licensee was alerted to this possible problem and requested to describe how
the W3 fire pumps are protected from low flow conditions.
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DETAILS
_P_e,rsons Contacted
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Principal Licensee Employees
R. P. Barkhurst, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- N. S. Carns, Plant Manager, Nuclear
S. A. Alleman, Nuclear Quality Assurance Manager
P. V. PrasanPumar, Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Support
D. F. Packer, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations and Maintenance
J. J. Zabritski, Quality Assurance Manager
D. E. Baker, Manager of Nuclear Operations Support and Assessments
- J. R. McGaha, Manager of Nuclear Operations Engineering
W. T. Labonte, Radiation Protection Superintendent
- G. M. Davis, Manager of Events Analysis Reporting & Responses
- L. W. Laughlin, Onsite Licensing Coordinator
D. W. Vinci, Maintenance Superintendent
A. F. Burski, ifanager of Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs
R. S. Starkey, Operations Superintendent
- C. R. Gaines, Event Analysis Supervisor
- Present at exit interview.
In addition to the above personnel, the NRC inspectors held discussions
with various operations, engineering, technical support, maintenance, and
administrative members of the licensee's staff.
2.
Plant Status (71707)
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At the beginning of this inspection period, the plant was at 70 percunt
power because of reduced power demand over the holiday weekend. The plant
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was restored to full power by January 3,1989, and remained at that level
through January 26, 1989.
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On January 26, 1989, power was reduced to 80 percent when a control
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element assembly (CEA) dropped during corrective maintenance on the CEA
control system. A few hours after a failed sequencing card was replaced,
full power was restored.
On January 27, 1989, the plant was shut down to hot standby (Mode 3)
because of a pressurizer spray valve failing to fully close.
Repairs were
completed on the valve and the plant was returned to full power on
January 30, 1989, where it remained until the end of this inspection
period.
Details on the two problems identified above are discussed in paragraph 3
below.
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3.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The NRC inspectors observed the surveillance testing of safety-related
systems and components listed below to verify that the activities were
being performed in accordance with the Technical Specifications. The
applicable procedures were reviewed for adequacy, test instrumentation was
verified to be in calibration, and test data was reviewed for accuracy and
completeness.
a.
Procedure OP-903-053, Revision 5. " Fire Protection System Pump
Operability Test." On January 5, 1989, the NRC inspectors witnessed
the weekly operability test of the fire pumps. The surveillance was
observed previously by the NRC inspectors on December 8,1988, with
no problems observed except that Step 7.1.8 of the procedure could
not be performed in sequence. The step required the operator to
secure the motor driven pump while the diesel driven pump was
running, but upon pressing the stop button, the motor would not stop.
Since the header pressure was being maintained (by procedure) below
the motor driven pump starting pressure setpoint, there appeared to
be a logical explanation as to why the pump would not stop. The
operator was given permission from the shift supervisor to proceed
and secure the motor driven purrp after the testing of the diesel
driven pumps was complete. The action appeared appropriate on the
basis that the licensee would resolve the procedure problem after the
test.
On January 5, 1989, the NRC inspectors noted that the procedure had
not been changed. Upon witnessing the test on January 5,1989, the
same problem occurred again, but this time, a different operator
proceeded on his own to complete the procedure out of sequence,
without shift supervisor concurrence.
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Except for the problem of being unable to comply with Step 7.1.8 in
sequence, the operator followed the procedure and ran the equipment
in accordance with the operating procedure as required by the
surveillance procedure. All prerequisites and precautions were
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complied with. The surveillance test acceptance criteria were met
and the operator recorded the data in a neat and professional manner.
On January 5,1989, the NRC inspector expressed concern to licensee
management that failure to correct either the procedure or the motor
driven fire pump setpoint (or both) is not conducive to the
licensee's efforts to instill procedure compliance among operators.
On January 26, 1989, the NRC inspector observed the test to verify
corrective actions. The motor driven fire pump setpoint had been
reportedly corrected, and in addition, a problem with the motor
starting relay was found and corrected shortly after January 5,1989.
Again, the procedure did not work in that Step 7.1.8 could not be
followed. This procedure was apparently conducted on a weekly basis
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for many weeks 'and, as of this reporting period, three times in the
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presence of NRC inspectors without the licensee having corrected:the
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problem with the procedure.
Failure to provide an adequate procedure;
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is'in violation of NRC' regulations (382/8903-01)
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b.
Procedure OP-903-068, Revision 6. " Emergency Diesel. Generator
Operability Verification." On January 3,1989, the NRC: inspector
observed performance of the monthly operational test of Emergency
Diesel Generator A. 'In addition, the biannuals" fast loading" of the
diesel-was performed. The surveillance test was conducted in a
professional manner in accordance with the procedure.
4.
Onsite Followup of-Events (93702)
a.
Discovery of Excessive Number of Impaired Fire Rated Assiemblies
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NRC Inspection Reports 50-382/88-28 and 50-382/88-31 discussed the
licensee's actions to address an excessive number of impaired fire
rated ~ assemblies which have been identified. During this inspection
period, the licensee' continued to evaluate nonconforming condition
identification reports (NCIs). Of the 2,014 fire seals inspected,
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401' required an NCI for evaluation'. As'of the end of this -inspection
period, 307 NCIs were dispositioned; Of these,187~ ~ seals have been
declared operable and 201 required some form of rework.
In addition,
the licensee had 58 seals on hold pending removal of material so that
a detailed in'spection could be. performed in response to.NRC Information
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Notice 88-56, " Potential Problems with Silicone Foam Fire Barrier
Penetration Seals." The Notice referred to a 10.CFR 21 report on
nonconformances found on fire seals at Wolf Creek Generating Station.
The licensee plans to inspect seals similar to those found at Wolf
Creek Generating Station to ensure that similar nonconforming conditions
do not exist at W3. The licensee continues to target May 1989 for
completion. The:NRC inspectors will continue to monitor licensee
activity in this area and provide updates in future inspection
reports.
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b.
Air Operated Valve Actuator Tubing Deficiencies
During the performance of a safety system functional inspection
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conducted by the licensee on the component cooling system, the
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licensee identified a possible problem with the tubing on the air
operators for Valves SI-602A and -B.
These valves serve as the safety
injection system recirculation sump outlet valves and, thus, have a
safety function. ~ The drawings associated with the operator tubing
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installation called for Class ~P7 (nonsafety-related).
Initial field
inspections revealed that the tubing had the appearance of P3 tubing,
in'that it had weld identification numbers, and had what appeared to
be seismic supports. The licensee found that documentation existed
showing that the tubing and fittings used on W3 were drawn from the
same qualified stock as those used for ASME Section III
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installations.- The,weldors were qualified'for;P3, the weld filler
material'was correct, and the supports were adequate.
Parallel.to the evaluations, the' licensee performed dye penetrant
tests on' the welds to complete the requirements for P3 tubing.
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Within approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovery. the licensee made an
. operability. determination with a supporting engineering evaluation. .
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The NRC inspectors reviewed the evaluation and found.no problems with
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it. - At the exit interview, the licensee indicated that this will be
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reportediin accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.
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The licensee identified a similar problem with Valve CC-620 in the
component cooling water system and was performing a review and
inspection of 26. additional valves which have a potential for the .
same problem. From all indications, it appears. thatithis problem.
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will have minor' safety- significance .due to' the generic use of
qualified tubing and fittings for such applications where'P7 may have'
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been erroneously specified in lieu of T3. The NRC inspectors will
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continue to monitor licensee activities in this area.
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Control Element Assembly (CEA) Drop Incident .
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On January 26,1989, at 5:07 p.m. ,' part-length CEA 28- dropped due to
failure of: the' automatic control timing. module (ACTM) card. The
plant was operating at full power at the time.
Prior to the CEA
drop, maintenance personnel had corrected a voltage problem
associated with the control element drive mechanism grippers. The
ACTM card failed just as the licensee transferred CEA 28 from the
hold bus to the ACTM. The NRC inspector was on site and observed
operator actions.during most.of the' event. The operators promptly
entered the off-normal procedure and took the actions required by the
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procedure and the plant Technical Specifications. 'The ACTM was
promptly replaced and the CEA~ withdrawn in a controlled manner.
Power distribution limits were not' exceeded.- Reactor power was
reduced to about 80. percent as required by procedure before the.CEA
could be withdrawn and power remained 'at 80 percent for at least
2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to allow-the core to stabilize. To preclude another CEA
drop, the shift supervisor elected to place CEA-28 back on the hold
bus until the exact cause of the ACTM failure was determined and
corrected.
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The NRC-inspectors will monitor the licensee's' actions to determine
the cause of the failure.
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d.
Failure of Pressurizer Spray Valve to Close
On January 27, 1989, at 2:40 a.m., the operators noted a slow
decrease in reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure equal to about
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containment entry was made to check for leaks and to ascertain
whether or not the pressurizer spray valves were closed.
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experiences with Spray Valve RC-301A positioner adjustment prompted a
check of the valve for the closed position. By 3:33 a.m., it was
' determined that RC-301A was again not fully seated, but this time it
could not be~ adjusted. A plant power reduction was commenced.in.
anticipation of a plant shutdown.- At 5:50 a.m., RCS pressure had
reached 2025 psia. Technical Specification 3.2.8 required
restoration of pressure within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or a reduction in power to
less than 5 percent in the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. At 6:43 a.m., the main
turbine was taken off the grid and, at 6:46.a.m., the reactor was
shut down. -By that time ~ RCS pressure had stabilized at 1900 psia.
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The NRC inspector noted that plant procedures were followed during-
the shutdown.
During the next-2 days, the licensee attempted to determine why.
RC-301A would not seat.- It appeared that the valve operator was
reaching a mechanical stop before the valve seated, and that this was
possibly caused by operator-to-stem. coupling slippage. The exact
failure mode could not be determined without disassembling the valve,
which could not be done while the plant was in hot standby-(Mode 3).
The licensee was hesitant to cool down, thus placing the plant
through a thermal cycle, unless there was no alternative. A
temporary alteration was made on the valve operator to preclude
further slippage of the coupling. This was appropriately reviewed
and~ approved by the Plant l0perations Review Committee. The NRC
inspectors reviewed the safety evaluation and found no problems. The
valve operator was adjusted to ensure plenty of clearance.thus
allowing the valve to seal. The plant was returned to full . power at-
6:40 a.m. on January 30, 1989, after having tested the spray valve
for several hours. The NRC inspectors requested the licensee to
-provide the records showing the manner in which the valve was
assembled during the fall of 1988 when the body to bonnet gasket and
valve stem were replaced. The NRC inspector will review these
records to establish confidence that the valve was properly
assembled. The licensee also committed to disassemble RC-301A during
the next' cold shutdown as required to determine and correct the cause
of failure. This shall be tracked as Open Item 382/8903-02.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The objectives of this inspection were:
(1) to ensure that this facility
was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements,
(2) to ensure that the licensee's management controls were effectively
discharging the licensee's responsibilities for continued safe operation,
(3) to assure that selected activities of the licensee's radiological
protection programs were implemented in confonnance with plant policies
and procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirements, and (4) to
inspect the licensee's compliance with the approved physical security
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plan.
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The NRC inspectors verified that proper control room staffing and operator
behavior was consistent with NRC regulations. Operators were observed to
be adhering to approved procedures as the NRC inspectors witnessed the
various operations that were conducted in the control room.
On a daily basis, when on site, the NRC inspectors verified the status of
selected control room annunciators and confirmed that the operators
understood the reasons why the annunciators were illuminated.
The NRC inspectors selectively reviewed emergency core cooling system
lineups using control room indication each day the control room was
visited and found no problem.
Tours were conducted in the plant on a rotating basis to maximize the
number of areas inspected.
Equipment condition was found to be
satisfactory. During a tour on January 26, 1989, the NRC inspector noted
that the motor driven fire pump did not appear to have a recirculation
line and could be left running for an undetermined amount of time with no
demand which could lead to pump damage. This fire pump does not secure
automatically when the jockey pump becomes sufficient to maintain fire
header pressure. Once the pump is automatically started by reduced fire
header pressure, it continues to run until an operator goes to the fire
pump building and manually shuts the pump off. The licensee was requested
to explain how this pump is protected from damage due to extended
operation at shutoff head. As of the end of this inspection period, a
satisfactory answer has not been provided.
This shall be tracked under
Open Item 382/8903-03.
At least once per week, a shift turnover was observed. The meetings were
conducted in a professional manner, and there was a clear exchange of
pertinent information.
The NRC inspectors monitored the licensee's chemistry sampling program.
No problems were found. At the daily plan-of-the-day meeting, the
chemistry department alerted plant management of adverse trends and
conditions, if any, and what actions were being taken.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The below listed station maintenance activities affecting safety-related
systems and components were observed and documentation reviewed to
ascertain that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved
procedures, Technical Specifications, and appropriate industry codes or
standards.
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a.
Work Authorization 01027406. The NRC inspector observed the coupling
alignment check per Procedure MM-06-004, Revision 4, " Shaft Coupling
Alignment and Belt Tensioning Procedure," and reassembly during the
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l performance of routin' e preventive maintenance on Emergency Feedwater
. Pump A.
No problems were identified.
b.
Work Authorization 01030621. After having failed functional testing,
a power supply for the Safety: Channel C nuclear instrument was
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replaced.. The NRC inspector witnessed the subsequent. retest'as-
performed per Procedure'0P-903-102, Revision 4, " Safety Channel
' Nuclear Instrument Functional.. Test, Safety Channel C,"; prior. to
returning the instrument to service. The NRC inspector observed that
all acceptance criteria were met.
c.
Work Authorization 01027914. -The NRC inspector observed portions of
the reinsta11ation of dry cooling tower (DCT) fan motor 3A. The fan
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motor had been removed for bearing replacement. . The NRC inspector
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noted.that repairs were.made to the high speed power ' supply leads. ..
One of the leads had apparently overheated. The licensee determined
that the overheating originated at the crimp = on the high . speed motor
- supply lug. The high speed power supply lugs were replaced with
an improved type. The licensee commented that the DCT fan motors not
- yet worked'on since construction have the old type lugs-and would be
replaced. .The: licensee-committed to establishing a program for
replacement of all. dry cooling tower fan motor high speed power
supply ' l ugs.'
Followup on the licensee's lug- replacement program
shall be an open item (382/8903-04).
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Fuel Oil Quality Assurance (25593)
~The objective of this inspection was to . verify that the licensee has
included EDG fuel oil in its quality assurance (QA) program to complete
inspection requirements for NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/93.
The NRC inspector. reviewed Procedure OP-03-009, Revision' 5, " Fuel Oil
Receipt," and noted that QA receipt inspection is required for EDG fuel
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oil. The laboratory performing fuel oil analyses for the licensee was on
the licensee's QA approved vendors' list. NRC Temporary
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Instruction 2515/93 is closed.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
NRC Bulletin 87-02 Followup (25025)
The purpose of this inspection was to complete the inspection requirements
for NRC Bulletin 87-02, " Fastener Testing to Determine Conformance With
< Applicable Material Specifications." This inspection was implemented in
accordance with NRC Temporary Instruction 2500/26. The first half of this
inspection was conducted during the period November 30 through December 4,
1987. Details were documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/87-29,
dated January 8,1988.
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During the week of January 16, 1989, the NRC inspector reviewed the
licensee's files related to their response to Bulletin 87-02. On
January 18, 1988, the licensee responded to the bulletin and on July 25,
1988, the licensee provided the additional information requested by
Supplements 1 and 2 to Bulletin 87-02. The responses appeared to provide
all of the information requested.
The NRC inspectors confirmed, through examination of the information on
the Fastener Testing Data Sheets (Attachment 1 to 8ulletin 87-02), that
the sample fasteners were properly tagged.
Information provided to the
independent testing laboratory reflected the requirements associated with
the relevant specification, grade, and class of the fasteners.
In the enclosure to the licensee's response, the NRC inspectors noted that
all tests were satisfactory with some listed exceptions. This was
supported by the certified documents provided by the testing laboratory.
The exceptions included marginally low carbon content in a number of
Type A194, Grade 2H nuts according to the test results from Partek
Laboratories. This had no adverse impact on the mechanical properties of
the nuts, since the actual hardness valves were within specification
limits. However, the samples were retested by Materials Evaluation
Laboratory using what the licensee considered a more accurate process.
The results were at or above the minimum carbon content. The NRC
inspectors examined the certification sheets and found no problems.
The inspection requirements of Temporary Instruction 2500/26 are completed
for W3.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Followup of Previously Identified Items
(92701 & 92702)
a.
(Closed) Open Item 382/8417-01:
Followup on possible use of
commercial solenoid valves manufactured by Automatic Switch
Company (ASCO) in safety-related applications. During the week of
April 16, 1984, the NRC inspector was unable to verify whether or not
all ASCO solenoid valves installed in safety-related applications
were certified as safety-related (Class 1E).
In November 1988, the NRC inspector obtained a data printout and
found 33 of 249 ASCO valves listed as commercial in lieu of Class 1E.
This was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/88-28.
There was
also some discussion on this open item with regard to the ASCO valves
installed on the emergency diesel generator in NRC Inspection
Report 50-382/89-02.
Since then, the licensee completed walkdowns of
all the ASCO valves installed in safety-related applications. The
NRC inspector also field inspected all of the readily accessible
valves which represented about a 10 percent sampling. The licensee
identified errors in the database and 11 valves possibly requiring
replacement.
The first was a comercial ASCO valve installed, by
design change, on ACC-1398. The licensee could not justify the
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design change. The ASCO valve had a commercial body and a Class 1E
solenoid coil, and its function was to close ACC-1398.
Since the
safety function of this fail-as-is valve was to open, there was no
safety significance to this item. The licensee conservatively
replaced the solenoid valve with a Class IE valve on January 7,1989.
The remaining ASCO valves had no label plates, but they appeared to
be of the proper type based on the shape of the solenoid coil
enclosure. The licensee was able to verify this through procurement
and installation records. This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Violation 382/8725-01: The NRC inspector performed a review
of work records and determined that the licensee has verified that
fully threaded bolts were installed in all dry cooling tower fan
hubs. The NRC inspector verified that the fan technical manual has
been upgraded appropriately to ensure that only fully threaded bolts
are used. The licensee also installed lock washers on the dry
cooling tower fan hub bolts as recommended by the fan vendor. The
fan technical manual has been upgraded to include the lock washer
installation and to add bolt torque requirements as recommended by
the vendor. This violation is closed.
c.
(Closed) Violation 382/8804-01:
Failure to adhere to fire protection
procedures. The licensee revised Procedure FP-01-017. " Transient
Combustibles and Hazardous Materials," to strengthen controls over
transient combustibles. The licensee also conducted training to
ensure that personnel were fully aware of requirements regarding
transient combustibles. No further problems in the control of
combustibles have been identified. This violation is closed.
d.
(Closed) Violation 382/8813-02:
The licensee's corrective actions
for this failure to implement quality assurance procedures and issue
quality notices for conditions adverse to quality were previously
reviewed in NRC In section Repcrt 50-382/88-26. The NRC inspector
performed additional reviews and determined that Quality
Notice QN-QA-88-80, which documented the problem and specified
permanent corrective action, was closed, Licensee identified
corrective action appeared appropriate. This violation is closed,
e.
(Closed) Violation 382/8825-02:
Failure to follow procedures. The
licensee failed to have a lock installed as required on
Valve SI-2421. The licensee promptly installed the lock and
discussed this failure to follow procedures with the operations
staff. No further problems with the control of locked valves have
since been identified. This violation is closed.
No violations or daviations were identified.
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10.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (92712)
The following LERs were reviewed and closed. The NRC inspectors verified
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that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified,
corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been
considered, and that the LER forms were complete. The NRC inspectors
confirmed that unreviewed safety questions and violations of Technical
Specifications, license conditions, or other regulatory requirements had
been adequately described.
(Closed)LER 382/88-005, " Blown Undervoltage Circuit Fuse Replacement
Results in Technical Specification 3.0.3 Entry"
(Closed)LER 382/88-018, " Fire Protection Valve Float Locked Open Due
to Personnel Error"
(Closed)LER 382/88-024, " Missed Sealed Source Leak Test Due to
Procedural Inadequacy"
(Closed)LER 382/88-028, " Containment Radiation Monitors Declared Out
of Service Due to Discrepancy in Technical Specification Range"
(Closed)LER 382/88-031, " Valid Actuation of Control Room Emergency
Filtration Unit Due to Cognitive Personnel Error"
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were sumarized on February 1,1989,
with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The licensee
acknowledged the NRC inspectors' findings. The licensee did not identify
as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the NRC
inspectors during this inspection.
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