05000272/LER-1982-040, Forwards LER 82-040/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-040/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20055A659
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	06/30/1982
From:	Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20055A660	List: 05000272/LER-1982-040, Forwards LER 82-040/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8207190294
Download: ML20055A659 (3)

LER-2082-040, Forwards LER 82-040/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2722082040R00 - NRC Website

text

s O >SEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station June 30, 1982 Mr. R. C. Haynes Regional Administrator-USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-040/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-040/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, l

$fW*

H. J. Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RF:ks CC: Distribution 8207190294 820630 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR lg 1')-

The Energy People

% 2 f M) (20*A) 11 B1 m_

s Report Number: 82-040/03L Report Date: 06-30-82 Occurrence Date: 06-16-82 Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Containment-Plant Vent Radioactivity Monitor - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-148.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100% - Unit Load 1120 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1215 hours0.0141 days <br />0.338 hours <br />0.00201 weeks <br />4.623075e-4 months <br />, June 16, 1982, during routine operation, the Control Room Operator discovered a filter failure alarm on the Containment-Plant Vent Radioactivity Monitor (Channels 1RllA, 1R12A, and 1R12B).

The monitor was declared inoperable, and Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.1.b Actions 20 and 22 were entered.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation into the cause of the filter failure alarm revealed that the filter paper supply roll was exhausted. The roll had been replaced during weekly preventive maintenance, and sufficient paper existed on the roll at that time for one week of operation at the average rate of consumption. Increased use of paper from clearing the filter in the fast mode of operation resulted in the supply roll running out. Past experience has indicated that weekly replacement of the filter paper is adequate to insure uninterrupted operation, and it may be assumed the occurrence was an isolated one.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The containment-plant vent radioactivity monitor provides indication of the concentration of radioactive gas and particulate in containment for the purpose of detecting Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage.

It is also used to ensure that the release rate during purging or pressure relief is maintained below limits specified by the Technical Specifications; a high radioactivity level initiates automatic closure of the containment purge duct and pressure relief isolation valves. Redundant RCS leak detection capability is provided by the containment sump monitoring system.

• LER 82-040/03L ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

Backup for the containment purge and pressure relief functions is provided by the Plant Vent Effluent Monitor 1R16, and relies on operator action to isolate the vent path. Failure of the contain-ment-plant vent monitor, therefore, constitutes operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b. Due to the backup monitoring capability, the event resulted in no risk to the health or safety of t'he general public.

Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.1.b Action 20 requires:

With only two of the RCS leakage detection systems operable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when the required gaseous and/or particulate monitoring system is inoperable; otherwise, be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Action 22 requires:

With the Containment-Purge and Pressure-Vacuum Relief Isolation System inoperable, close each of the purge and pressure-relief penetrations providing direct access from the containment to the outside atmosphere.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The containment purge duct and pressure relief isolation valves were j being maintained closed in accordance with operating instructions, l in compliance with the limiting condition for operation. A new roll of filter paper was installed in the monitor and it was returned to service. The unit was declared operable, and at 1401 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00232 weeks <br />5.330805e-4 months <br />, June 16, 1982, Limiting Condition for Operation Actions 20 and 22 were terminated. Personnel responsible for operation of the monitor will be counseled to use fast speed operation only when required.

In view of the isolated nature of the occurrence, no further corrective action was deemed necessary.

FAILURE DATA:

l Not Applicable l

l l

Prepared By R. Frahm General / Manager -

Salem Operations l

SORC Meeting No. 82-65 l

l l

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