05000272/LER-1982-039, Forwards LER 82-039/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-039/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20054L665
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	06/23/1982
From:	Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20054L666	List: 05000272/LER-1982-039, Forwards LER 82-039/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8207080344
Download: ML20054L665 (3)

LER-2082-039, Forwards LER 82-039/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2722082039R00 - NRC Website

text

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O PSI 4G Potehe Serviat 0W.tric and Gas Cornpany P.O. Box E lhncuis Br idje, New Jermy 08038 Salem Generating Station June 23, 1982 Mr. R. C. Ilaynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Ilaynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-039/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-039/03L. This report is regttired within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

, DhhItc d II . J. Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RF:ks d[

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l Report Number: 82-039/03L Report Date: 06-23-82 Occurrence Date: 06-08-82 Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company llancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Primary Containment - Missed Surveillance.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-144.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100% - Unit Load 1130 MWo.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1330 hours0.0154 days <br />0.369 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.06065e-4 months <br />, June 8, 1982, a review of Surveillance Procedure SP (O) 4. 6.1.lAl by the Shif t Technical Advisor revealed several valves which were missing from the procedure; the review was prompted by a recent incident of a similar nature at Salem Generating Station Unit 2. The valves were of a type required to be tested in accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4. 6.1.1. The valves were immediately checked; all were found to be in the closed position, and they were locked and tagged as found. A review of valve lineups in the appropriate operating instructions showed the valves were required to be closed in the modes for which the surveillance was applicable.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The valves were apparently omitted from the surveillance due to oversight at the time the procedure was written. The fact that the valves were missing subsequently escaped the attention of individuals performing the tests.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1.a requires:

In order to demonstrate primary containment integrity, at least once per 31 days all penetrations not capable of being closed by operable containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions shall be verified closed by valves, blind flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their positions.

_ _ _ - - - . _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ __ . ._ _ _ _ . ._m ___m _ - - - . . . _ ____ _

LER 82-039/03L ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued) i Vents, drains, test connections, etc. which are: 1) one inch nominal pipe diameter or less, 2) located inside I containment, and 3) locked, scaled, or otherwise secured in the closed position, shall be verified closed at least j once por 92 days.

i i The valves were typically isolation valves, in 3/4 inch vents and i

drains from sections of piping immediately adjacent to containment l penetrations, and included Valves 1RH58, 1RH72, and 1RH73.

The omission of the valves from the surveillance resulted in entering i Technical Specification Action Statement 3.6.1.1, due to failure to satisfactorily demonstrate containment integrity. As such, the

occurrence involved events leading to operation in a degraded mode i

permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b. Because the l valves had never been included in the surveillance, the time of

! entry into Action Statement 3.6.1.1 dates back to initial plant operation.

Containment integrity was maintained, however, as shown by the as j found valve positions, and results of the study of the operating i instructions. Penetrations of the type involved are capped, provi. ding i a boundary in addition to the closed valves. Finally, no leakage from the systems involved was observed, substantiating the conclusion that no degradation of the containment boundary occurred. Consequently, i

the occurrence in no way involved a risk to the health or safety of

! the general public.

]

Action Statement 3.6.1.1 requires:

! Without primary containment integrity, restore integrity

within one hour, or be in at least hot standby within

]- the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: -

As demonstrated, the primary containment integrity was maintained,

( in compliance with Action Statement 3.6.1.1. An on-the-spot change l

has been incorporated into the surveillance to include the missing

valves. In-depth investigation of piping systems for additional i valves missing from Surveillances SP(0)4. 6.1.lAl and 2 is in progress.

[ A Supplemental Report will be submitted upon final correction of the

! problem.

i ,

FAILURE DATA:

r l

Not Applicable Prepared By R. Frahm /r Manager -

Gener/l pC Salem Operations SORC Meeting No. 82-63 n -.-..,__.,.-,-----,,-.-,-,,,,w ,n, - - - - - __- -,