ML20235L684

Responds to Requesting Meeting to Review Certain Technical Issues Re NRC Emergency Planning Regulations. Suggests That Es Christenbury to SW Perry (FEMA) Should Be Reviewed Fully

ML20235L684
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	07/02/1987
From:	Murley T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Derrickson W PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
References
NUDOCS 8707160782
Download: ML20235L684 (3)

Text

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DISTRIBUTION Docket File 50-443/444 NRC PDR e ;7 Local PDR PD I-3 RF

!dUL2.1987 SAVarga BABoger William B. Derrickson MRushbrook Senior Vice President Nuclear Energy VNerses Public Service of New Hampshire OGC-DETH New Hampshire Yankee Division EJordan P.O. Box 300 JPartlow Seabrook, NH 03874 ACRS (10)

PD I-3 Gray File

Dear Mr,

Derrickson: FMiraglia

' TMurley/JSniezek In response to your June 10, 1987 letter requesting a meeting to review certain technical issues regarding the NRC's emergency planning regulations, I suggest that you review fully the letter from Edward S. Christenbury (NRC) to Spence W. Perry (FEMAI dated June 18, 1986. I believe that letter clearly states the NRC staff position on the issues you have raised. It is my understanding that the aforementioned letter, initially brought about by your legal counsel's cuestions on understanding and interpretations of the emergency planning regulations, had been made available to you and the other parties to the Seabrook proceedings. A copy of this letter is also enclosed for your convenience. It must be emphasized, however, that the interpretation of NRC regulations involved in licensing proceedings, is a matter to be determined by the Commission's adjudicatory Boards and ultimately by the Commission itself.

In any event, we would be willing to meet to discuss the New Hampshire Yankee schedule for future submittals so that we can allocate our resources accordingly. I suggest you contact Victor Nerses, Seabrook Project Manager, (301)-492-8535, to make arrangements for an open meeting.

Sincerely, Original signed by Themas E. hrley Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Reculation

Enclosure:

Letter dated June 18, 1986 from S. Christenbury to S. Perry

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCUPPENCF:

0FFICE: DRPR:PDI-3 DPPR:ADRI DRPR: DIP ADPR SURNAME: *VNerses *BABoger *SAVarga *FJMira gl ia DATE: 06/26/87 06/ /87 06/ /87 06/ /87 0FFICE: p RR kRP SURNAME: V gzek TMurlev DATE: /87 07/M87 G7071607DD 070~702 PDR AD(K K 05000443 F PDR

Public Service Company of Seabrook Nuclear Power Station Naw Hampshire ,

cc:

Mr. Calvin A. Canney, City Manager Mr. Alfred V. Sargent, City Hall Chairman 126 Daniel Street Board of Selectmen Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801 Town of Salisbury, MA 01950 Ms. Letty Hett Senator Gordon J. Humphrey i Town of Brentwood ATTN: Tom Burack '

RFD Dalton Road U.S. Senate Brentwood, New Hampshire 03833 Washington, D.C. 20510 Ms. Roberta C. Pevear Mr. Owen B. Durgin, Chairman Town of Hampton Falls, New Hampshire Durham Board of Selectmen Drinkwater Road Tcwn of Durham Hampton Falls, New Hampshire 03844 Durham, New Hampshire 03824 Ms. Sandra Gavutis Charles Cross, Esq.

Town of Kensington, New Hampshire Shaines, Mardrigan and RDF 1 McEaschern .

East Kingston, New Hampshire 03827 25 Maplewood Avenue l Post Office Box 366 l Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801 Chairman, Board of Selectmen l RFD 2 i South Hampton, New Hampshire 03827 Mr. Guy Chichester, Chaiman Rye Nuclear Intervention Mr. Angie Machiros, Chairman Committee Board of Selectmen c/o Rye Town Hall for the Tcrn of Newbury 10 Central Road Newbury, Massachusetts 01950 Rye, New Hampshire 03870 Ms. Cashman, Chairman Jane Spector Board of Selectmen Federal Energy Regulatory Town of Amesbury Comission Town Hall 825 North Capital Street, NE Amesbury, Massachusetts 01913 Room 8105 l Washington, D. C. 20426 l i Honorable Peter J. Matthews Mayor, City of Newburyport Mr. R. Sweeney Office of the Mayor New Hampshire Yankee Division City Hall Public Service of New Hampshire Newburyport, Massachusetts 01950 Company 7910 Woodmont Avenue Mr. Donald E. Chick, Town Manager Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Town of Exeter 10 Front Street )'

Exeter, New Hampshire 03823 Mr. Richard Strome, Director State Civil Defense Agency j i

State Office Park South 107 Pleasant Street l Concord, New Hampshire 03301 t

Public Service Company of New Hampshire Seabrook Nuclear Power Station cc: i Thomas Dignan, Esq. E. Tupper Kinder, Esq.  !

John A. Ritscher, Esq. G. Dana Bisbee, Esq. l Ropes and Gray Assistart Attorney General 225 Franklin Street Office of Attorney General Boston, Massachusetts 02110 208 State Hosue Annex Concord, New Hampshire 03301 Mr. Bruce B. Beckley, Project Manager Public Service Company of New Hampshire Resident Inspector Post Office Box 330 Us Nuclear Regulatory Commission Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Post Office Box 1149 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Dr. Mauray Tye, President Sun Valley Association ,

209 Summer Street Mr. John DeVincentis, Director Haverhill, Massachusetts 01839 Engineering and Licensing l

i Yankee Atomic Electric Company l l

Robert A. Backus, Esq. 1671 Worchester Road O'Neil, Backus and Spielman Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 116 Lowell Street Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Mr. A. M. Ebner, Project Manager United Engineers & Constructors William S. Jordan, III 30 South 17th Street Diane Curran Post Office Box 8223 Harmon, Weiss & Jordan Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 ,

20001 S Street, NW Suite 430 Mr. Robert J. Harrison i Washington, D.C. 20009 President & Chief Executive Officer Public Service Company of New Hampshire Mr. Philip Ahrens, Esq. Post Office Box 330 Assistant Attorney General Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 State House, Station #6 Augusta, Maine 04333 Carol S. Sneider, Esq.

Office of the Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Mr. Warren Hall One Ashburton Place Public Service Company of Boston, Massachusetts 02108 New Hampshire Post Office Box 330 D. Pierre G. Cameron, Jr. , Esq.

Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 General Counsel Public Service Company of New Hampshire Seacoast Anti-Pollution League Post Office Box 330 Ms. Jane Doughty Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 5 Market Street Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801 Regional Administrator, Pegion I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Diana P. Randall 631 Park Avenue 70 Collins Street King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Richard Hampe, Esq.

New Hampshire Civil Defense Agency 107 Pleasant Street Concord, New Hampshire 03301

.\,

((go,,(ne, UMTE D STATES a

NI) CLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N g jf W ADWoToN. o. c. 30 set k, June 18, itse cc: J. Allan J. Gutierrez Spence W. Perry, Acting General R. Starostecki Counsel -

B. Kane i Federal Emergency Management Agency S. Ebneter Room 840 B. Johnston 500 C Street, 5.W. T. M n Washington, D.C. 20472 R. Bellamy B. l.azarus 6/24/86-TEM In the Matter of I Public Service Company of New Hampshire, el al.  !

(Seabrook Station Units 1 and 2)

Docket Nos. 50-443 OL and 50-444 OL '

Dear Mr. Perry:

)

In response to a request made by Edward Thomas of FEMA Region I, we have evaluated, in conjunction with Joseph Flynn of your office, an undated memorandum prepared by Thomas Dignan of Ropes and Gray on behalf of the applicants for the Seabrook nuclear plant ("Dignan Memorandum", a copy of which is attached evaluation is set forth in the following discussion.gs Attachment A). Our l

.e {

The Dignan Memorandum addresses what are described as "three misconcep tion s" pertaining to offsite emergency planning for the Seabrook nuclear plant , and concludes that they are " false as matter of law" (Dignan )

Memorandum at 1). These purported " misconceptions" are as fouows:

(

A. That the plans must be shown to guarantee that no I i

adverse effects on the public bealth and safety will occur Seabrook.

no matter what kind of accident occurs at I

B. That it must be demonstrated that the plans wiD assure that all persons located in the Emergency P1*adag tone or some certain portion of it can be evacuated in some certain time. .

I

& 7 3 ,

In' particular, there have been assertions that the F U;-

plans must assure the sheltering or evnenation of persons from the beaches in approximately 1/2

. I 1

It should be noted, however, that under the Commission's regulations, 10 CFR l 50.3, only written regulatory interpretations prwided by the General Counsel will be recognised as binding upon the Commission.

ATTACHMLMT

Spence Perry, Esq. . .

C. That the plans must be designed, and shown to be able , to cope with a particular type of accident -- in ,

particular, one involving an early release of radioactivity off-site.

For the reasons set forth below, it is ou'r opinion that, with minor clari-fication, Mr. Dirnan's conclusions are essentially correct as to items (A) and (B) above; however, his discussion of item (C) appears to contain an error which requires correction.

DISCUSSION A. Absolute Assurance of Perfect Safety.

As set forth above, item (A) concerns the question of whether an emergency response plan must be shown to guarantee that no adverse health and safety effects will occur, regardless of what kind of accident may occur at the plant . In our opinion, Mr. Dignan correctly concludes that "[nleither the -

1 Atomic Energy Act nor any regulation of NRC, whether dealing with emergency planning or not, requires absolute assurance of perfect safety" (Dignan Memorandum, at 1-2). l As you know, prior to issuance of a full power operating license, NRC regu-lations require a finding "that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective emergency."measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological 10 C. F.R . I 50. 4 7(a)(1) . With respect to offsite matters, the NRC will base its finding on a review of the FEMA findings and determinations "as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable assurance that they can be implemented."

Id., 5 50.47(e)(2). These regulations plainly do not require any demonstration of " absolute assurance" that the ,

will be totally '

protected in the event of a radiological emergency. public Rather, the intent of the Commission's emergency planning regulations is to reduce the impact of an accident and achieve " dose savings" through protective actions that take into consideration plant conditions, evacuation times, shelter factors, and other conditions that may exist at the time of the accident. NUREG-0654 /

FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 states as follows (at 6):

The overall objective of emergency response plans is to provide dose savings (and in some cases immediate life saving) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doces in excess of Protective Action Guides (PAGs). ,

The Appeal planning is . Board has sicularly stated, "[t]he basic goal of emergency emergency."

. the achievement of maximum dose savings in a radiological Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit No.1) ALAB-72',17 NRC 760, 770 (1983).

• l Spence Perry. Esq. -

in Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.

Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 533 (1983), the Commission summarized its rationale for selecting an emergency planning basis as folkws:

The underlying assumption of the NRC's emergency planning regulations in 10 CFR I 50.47 is that, despite application of stringent safety measures, a serious nu-clear accident may occur. This presumes that offsite individuals may become contaminated with radioactive material or may be exposed to dangerous levels of radi-ation or perhaps both. Planning for emergencies is required as a prudent risk reduction measure for those individuals. Since a range of accidents with widely differing offsite consequences can be postulated, the regulation does not depend on the assumption that a  !

particular type of accident may or will occur. In fact l no specif5c accident sequences should be specified be- j cause each accident could have different consequences '

both in nature and degree. Although the emergency planning basis is independent of specific accident se-quences, a number of accident descriptions were con-sidered in development of the Commission's regulations, including the core melt accident release categories of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400). 3 These statements demonstrate that the goal of emergency planning is to reduce the impact and achieve dose savings for a spectrum of accidents, and that emergency planning mar satisfy NRC regulations even though the ,

potential for adverse health effects in an emergency has not been totally elininated. '

1 Notwithstanding our opinion that Mr. Dignan is essentially correct in his conclusion as to item (A), two statements contained in this portion of his memorandum require clarification. First , he goes too far in asserting that "it has been recognized from the outset . . . that if one assumes a major accident with offsite releases , some adverse effect on the public will, by definition, occur" (Dignan Memorandum at 2; emphasis added). Contrary to this assertion, the occurrence of a ma}or accident accompanied by offsite re-leases will not necessarily lead to adverse health effects. Rather, in some circumstances, emergency planning may serve to avert the occurrence of any adverse health effects. Fu rt he r , whether any such health effects occur, and the extent of any such effects, will depend upon a host of factors, such as the type and quantity of release, the plume direction, meteorological conditions, exposure dura tions , and the timely implementation of an appropriate protective response.

Se condly, his memorandum states that emergency planning is intended to limit any adverse health effects to as low a level as reasonably possibl,e.

"given the facilities at h and" (Id.), possibly implying that additional

.cpance Perry. Esq. . tseilities will never be required to be built or installed to satisfy NRC emergency planning regulations. In support of this statement, Mr. Dignan cites the San Onofre decision, supra. However, that decision provides only limited support for this conclusion. There, the Commission addressed only the issue of whether additional hospital construction should be undertaken, and concluded that such extraordinary meas'ures are not required.

B. Evacuation Within A Specific Time Period.

The second item addressed by Mr. Dignan is whether the Applicants must demonstrate that all or part of the plume exposure pathway EPZ can be evacuated in some specified time; in. particular, this item addresses the question of whether the beaches in the Seabrook vicinity must be evacuated within approximately one-half (1/2) hour. It is Mr. Dignan's conclusion that NRC regulations do not require that an evacuation be assured within any l particular time (Dignan Memorandum at 2). We concur with Mr. Dignan's )

I conclusion as to this item.

fu support of his conclusion on this matter, Mr. Dignan cites two decisions:

Cincinnati Gas a Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station. Unit No. 1), ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760, 770 (1983), and Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant. Unit 2), ALAB-730, 17 NRC 1057, 1069 n.13 (1983). In Zimmer, the Appeal Board stated as follows:

The applicants are . .

. correct in their insistence that the Commission's emergency planning requirements do not prescribe specific time limits governing the evacua-tion of plume EPZs. The matter of the time in which l evacuation can be accomplished is left to be determined I

on a case-by-case basis upon consideration of all rele-vant conditions prevailing in the specific locality. But l it does not follow, as the applicants would have it, that '

a particular evacuation plan need not be concerned with i the efficiency with which evacution might be accom-p11shed given the conditions under which it must take  !

place (n. 16) . Indeed, the Commission guidelines sug-gest the contrary. . . . If the responsible govern-mental officials are to make an informed decision respecting what is appropriate protective action in a given radiological emergency, they must have available to them time estimates which are realistic appraisals of the minimum period in which, in light of existing local conditions, evacuation could reasonably be accom-plished. 'And, the nearer to the plant the area that might have to be evacuated, the greater the importance of accurate time estimates,

n. 16/ Those conditions include, for example, the size .

and nature of the population , the available

Spence Porry, Esq. . transportation faellities , the existing road network, topographical features and political boundaries. . . .

Zimmer, supra,17 NRC at 770-71. Sim!!arly, in the Fermi decision the Ap-peal Board stated: .

. . . [T]he Commission's emergency planning regula-tions do not specify the time within which the plume EPZ must be evacusted in the event of a nuclear emer-gency. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E. I IV, requires only that applicants provide "an analysis of the time required to evacuate and for taking other protective actions for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and perma-nent populations."

Fermi, supra,17 NRC at 1069 n.13. Thus, there is no requirement that an evacuation be accomplished within 30 minutes. While some other functions must be capable of being accomplished within that time frame, those functions generally involve the notification of appropriate governmental officials and notification of the public. See 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix M.

I IV.D.

I C. Planr.ing for A Particular Type of Accident. '

1 The third issue addressed by Mr. Dignan is whether a facility's emergency plans must be designed to cope with a particular type of accident and, f.n particular, an accident involving an "early release of radioactivity off-site." j Two conclusions appear to be reached by Mr. Dignan in this regard: (1) that while emergency plans must be designed to cope with a spectrum of accidents, they need not be designed to cope with a specific accident or "any worst case accident" (DiFnan Memorandum at 4), and (2) that l emergency ple.ns are not required to be designed to cope with an early  ;

release of radioactivity (Id. , at '-3). While we agree with the first of these conclusions , the second Tonclusion is incorrect and requires clarification.

First, Mr. Dignan is correct in stating that the emergency plans must be de- I signed to cope with a spectrum of accidents, but are not required to address any particular accident sequence or a " worst case accident . " The .

Commission has decided , on a generic b asis , that compliance with ita  !

emergency planning regulations provides the reasonable assurance required 1 by 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(a); accordingly, offsite emergency plans are not  !

reoufred to address particular accident sequences. In the Statement of Consideration published upon adoption of the Commission's final emergency planning regulations, the Commission stated as follows:

The Commission recognizes that no single accident... 1 scenario should form the basis for choice of notification '

capability requirements for offsite authorities and for i

Spence Perry, Esq. -

the public. Emergency plans must be developed that will have the flexibility to ensure response to a wide spectrum of accidents. This wide spectrum of potential accidents also reflects on the appropriate use of the offsite notification capability. . . ..

Any accident involving severe fuel degradation or core melt that results in significant inventories of fission products in the containment would warrant immediate public notiScation and consideration, based on the particular circumstances , of appropriate protective action because of the potential for leakage of the con-tainment building. In addition, the warning time avail-able for the pubile to take action may be substantially less than the total time between the original initiating event and the time at which signiSeent radioactive re- -

leanes take place. . . . The reduction of notiScation times from , the several hours required for street-by-street notiScation to minutes will algniScantly increase the options available as protective actions un-der severe accident conditions. These actions could include staying Indoors in the case of a release that has already occurred or a precautionary evacuation in the case of a potential release thought to be a few hours away. Accidents that do not result in core melt may also cause relatively quick releases for which protective actions, at least for the public in the immediate plant vicinity, are desirable.

45 Fed. Reg. 55402 (1980). Similarly. NUREG-0654/ FEMA Rep.1, Rev. 1, provides as follows (at C-7)- {

l l

No single specific accident sequence should be isolated as the one for which to plan because each accident could have different consequences, both in nature and degree. Further, the range of possible selection for a ,

l planning basis is very large, starting with a zero point of requiring no planning at all because significant off-site radiological accident consequences are unlikely to occur, to planning for the worst possible accident, re-gardless of its extremely low likelihood. The NRC/ EPA Task Force did not attempt to define a single accident sequence or even a limited number of sequences. Rath-er, it identitled the bounds of the parameters for which planning is recommended, based upon knowledge of the potentini consequences, timing, and release characterfs-J ties of a spectrum of accidents. Although the selected planning banis is independent of specific accident se-quences, a number of accident descriptions were con- -

sidered in the development of the guidance, including

Spence Perry, Esq. . I the core melt accident release categories of the Reactor Safety Study [ WASH-1400).

Accord , San Onofre, supra , 17 NRC at 533. In Long Island Lighting Co.

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 603, 888 (1985) (cited In Dignan f.lemorandum at 4), the Licensing Board dismissed a contention as-serting that the emergency plans must be capable of coping with any worst esse accident (there involving the possible loss of offsite power); the Board stated, "NUREC-0654 does not require an adequate response for the ' worst possible accident' at Shoreham. "

In sum, these regulatory pronouncements and decisions clearly demonstrate that emergency planning for a nuclear plant is not required to be designed to cope with any particular accident sequence or a " worst case accident." In this respect, we concur with Mr. Dignan's memorandum.

The Dignan Memorandum is incorrect, however, in its conclusion that the emergoney plans are not required to be designed to cope with an early release of radioactivity (Dignan Memorandum at 2-3). This error appears to have resulted by confusing the " worst possible accident" for any accidant involving an early release. While the " worst possible accident" could involve an early release of radioactivity, other less severe accidents might also result in early releases and were included within the parameters which l established the Commission's emergency planning basis. The Statement of Consideration , quoted above, clearly recognizes that "early releases" may occur; it is for this reason, in part, that the ifcensee is required to notif-offsite authorities within 15 minutes after the licensee has declared cae emergency, and that responsible offsite authorities have a espability tv netify the public within 15 minutes after they have received notification from the ifcensee of an emergency condition.

The following guidance is provided in NUREG-0654/ FEMA Rep.1 Rev.1 (at 13-14):

The range of times between the onset of accident cond!-

tions and the start of a major release is of the order of one-half hour to several hours. The subsequent time period over which radioactive material may be expected to be released is of the order of one-half hour (short-term release) to a few days (continuous release). ...

[G]uldance on the time of release . .. . has been used in developing the criteria for notification espabilities . .

. . (Other reasons for requiring prompt notification capabilities include faster moderate releases for which protective. actions are desirable and the need for sub-stantial lead times to carry out certain protective mea-sures, such as evacuation, when this is indicated by

. plant conditions. )

It should be noted that the responsible offsite authorities are not necessarily required, in all cases, to notify the public within 15 minutes after they have l

l l

l 4

Spence Perrv, Esq. -

received notification by the licensee. Rather, the time in which the public is notified will range from immediate notification (within 15 minutes after state and local officials are notifled that a situation exists which requires urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial time availtble for them to make a judgment as to whether or not to activate the public notification system. Also, it should be noted that the 15 minute criterion refers only to the time in which the public is to receive notification, and does not refer to the time in which protective actions are to be completed.

In sum, responsible offsite authorities must have received notification of the emergency situation within 15 minutes after the licensee has declared an euergency, and the offsite authorities must have the capability to notify the public within 15 minutes after they have received notification from the licensee. Emergency planning for accidents involving 'early releases" is required -- although the protective action recommendations may be issued before, during or after the occurrence of an offatte release of radioactivity.

There is no requirement that protective actions be completed within 30 minutes after the licensee has declared an emergency.

CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above the following conclusions are offered as to  !

the matters referred to in the Dignan Memorandum:

1. The basic goal of emergency planning is to reduce the impact of and achieve dose savings for a spectrum of accidents; however, there is no requirement that absolute assurance be provided that adverse radiological effects will not occur.

2. The Commission's energency planning regula-tions do not require that the evacuation of all or part of a plume exposure pathway EPZ be completed within any particular time.

3. The emergency plans must comply with the Commission's emergency planning regulations and there-

, by should be capable of responding to a wide spectrum I

of accidents; however, the plane are not required to be designed for any specific accident sequence or a " worst case accident."

l

l

- Epence Perry, Esq.

4. Accidents involving early releases are within the Commisalon's emergency planning basis, however, the regulations do not specify a time within which the recommended protective actions are R be completed.

Sincerely,

& Edward S. Christenb[

Director and Chief Hearing Counsel i

Enclosure cc: J. Taylor E. Jordan T. Murley

MEMORANDUM This memerandum addresses three misconceptions wh:ch have arisen as to the standards to,which state and mun:cipal emergency plans will be held in an NRC licensing proceeding.

These misconceptions are:

A. That the plans must be shown to guarantee that no adverse effects on the public health and safety will occur no matter what kind of accident occura at Seabrook. ,'

B. That it must be demonstrated that the plans will l assure that all persons located in the Emergancy Planning Zone or some certain portion of it can be evacuated in some certain time.

In part:cular, there have been assertiens that the plar.s must assure the sheltering or 4 evacuation of persons from the beaches in I

approximately 1/2 hour.

I C. That the plans must be designed, and shown to be I able, to cope with a particular type of accident --

- -. ~ .. .. .

in particular, one involving an early release of l

radioactivity off-site. I Each of these prepositions is false as a matter of law. I First, the issue of absolute safety: Neither the Atomic Energy Act ner any re .;at:e. of NRC, whether deall..g with emergency plar.ning or ..ct. requires absolute assurance of -

l l

I l

perfe-t safet..

Indeed, it has been recognized from the outset of the formulation of the current emergency planning regulations that if one assumes a major accident with effsite releases. some adverse effect on the public will, by def*nition, cecur.

The purpose of emergency planning is to _

have in place means and methods of coping with such an event  ;

in order to keep those effects to as low a level as )

reasonably pessible given the facilities at hand. Southern $

California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 533 (1983).

Second, as to the proposition that the plans must be demonstrated to be capable of assuring evacuation of certain areas within a certain time: This simply is not the law.

The Appeal Boards of the Commission have so held - flatly and without equivocation.

Cincinnati Cas & Electric Comeanv

( W.- H.

mmer Nuclear Power Statien, Unit No. 1, ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760, 770 (1983); The Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Ferm:

Atemic Power ?lant, Unit 2). ALA3-730, 17 NRC 1057, 1069 n.13 (1983). Indeed, the only activity which the j

regulati:ns specifically require to be capable of 1 accomplishment in one-half hour is public notification. And it is in that context the 1/2 hour rule is discussed in NUREC-0654, the NRC emergency planning guidance document. i l

Third the proposition that the plans will be judged as te adequacy against a certa:n type of accident and in particular ene :nvolving a release as soon as 1/2 hour: .

)

That prepos;t en as not only bad law, at as directly contrary to the theory of the NRC emergency planning criter:a.

The theery upon which the regulations were based was that the planners should consider a spectrum of accidents.

The key is that the plan be shown to be flexible and capable cf reducing the adverse effects to the greatest extent reasonably possible.

The Commission itself has stated:

"Since a range of accidents with widely dif fering offsite consequences can be postulated, the regulation does not i depend on the assumption that a i particular type of accident may or will occur. In fact, no specific accident sequences should be specified because each accident could have different consequences both in nature and degree.

Although the amergency planning basis is independent of specific accident sequences, a number of accident descriptions were considered in development of the Commise:cn's regulations, :ncluding the core melt i accident release categories of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).

"It was never the intent of the 1 regulation to require directly or  !

indirectly that state and local governments adopt extraordinary measures, such as construction of additional hospitals or recruitment of substantial additional medical personnel, just to deal with nuclear plant accidents. The emphasis is on .

prudent risk reduction measures. The  !

regulation does not require dedication of resources to handle every possible accident that can be imagined."

CLI-83-10, 17 NRC at 533.

9

. Fur-hermere. there is no requirement that :: be demonstrated that a plan will cope with any worst case acc: dent. NURIG-0654 simply does not require an adequate response for the worst possible accident. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), LBP-85-12, i

21 NRC 603, 666 (1905). I In short, the standard by which any emergency plan is to 1 1

de judged is whether or not it represents the best efforts of knowledgeab"e . people through the use of reasonably available fae:11 ties to reduce to the maximum extent reasonably possible the adverse effects on the public health and safety which will result from off-site releases resulting from a spectrum of accident scenarios. The  :

guiding prine:p'es, . as recently stated by an NRC Licensing ee Beard are:

"The purpcse cf emergency planning is to achieve dose savings to the general pub':c

. in the event that radioactive material is accidentally released off site. There is no minimum standard cf publ;c radiation dose which must be met in emergency planning.

"Absciute protection of the public against all radiation doses cannot be guaranteed and is not required for all possible accident scenarios.

"The emergency response plan should not be developed for any specific precence1ved accident sequence. It should instead be framed to cope with a spectrum of accident possibilities inc

• uding the wcrs- accidents.

t k >R *i C o

+ 6, UNITED STATES l'

5*

efi # E NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION W ASHINGTON, D. C,70555 o%'"',b[,l g' m - *

...* JUL 2 1987 l

William B. Derrickson ,

Senior Vice Presider.t Nuclear Energy '

Public Service of New Hampshire New Hampshire Yankee Division P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874 i

Dear Mr. Derrickson:

in response to your June 10, 1987 letter reouesting a meeting to review certain technical issues regardina the NRC's emergency planning regulations, I suggest that ynu review fully the letter from Edward S. Christenbury (NRCi to Spence W. Perry (FEMAi dated June 18, 1986. I believe that letter clearly states the NRC staff position on the issues you have raised. It is my understanding that the aforementioned letter, initially brought about by your legal counsel's questions on understanding and interpretations of the emergency planning regulations, had been made available to you and the other parties to the Seabrook proceedings. A copy of this letter is also enclosed for your convenience. It must be emphasized, however, that the interpretation of NRC regulations involved in licensing proceedings, is a matter to be determined by the Comission's adjudicatory Boards and ultimately by the Comission itself.

In any event, we would be willing to meet to discuss the New Hampshire Yankee schedule for future submittals so that we can allocate our resources accordingly. I suggest you contact Victor Nerses, Seabrook Pro,iect Manager, (301)-492-8535, to make arrangements for en open meeting.

Sincerely, 1

/ -

Thomas E. Murley, Dir t:r l Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation j l Enclosure. I Letter dated June 18, 1986 l

from S. Christenbury to S. Perry

_.7 // /

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Public Service Company of Seabrook Nuclear Power Station New Hampshire CC:

Mr. Calvin A. Canney, City Manager Mr. Alfred V. Sargent.

City Hall Chairman 126 Daniel Street Board of Selectmen Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801 Town of Salisbury, MA 01950 Ps. l.etty Hett Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Town of Brentwood ATTN: Tom Burack RFD Dalton Road U.S. Senate Brentwood, New Hampshire 03833 Washington, D.C. 20510 Ms. Roberta C. Pevear Mr. Owen B. Durgin, Chairman Town of Hampton Falls, New Hampshire Durham Board of Selectmen Drinkwater Road Town of Durham Hampton Falls, New Hampshire 03844 Durham, New Hampshire 03824 Ms. Sandra Gavutis Charles Cross, Esq.

Town of Kensington, New Hampshire Shaines, Mardrigan and RDF 1 McEaschern East Kingston, New Hampshire 03827 25 Maplewood Avenue Post Office Box 366 Chairman, Board of Selectmen Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801 RFD 2 South Hampton, New Hampshire 03827 Mr. Guy Chichester, Chaiman Rye Nuclear Intervention Mr. Angie Machiros, Chairman Committee Board of Selectmen c/o Rye Town Hall for the Town of Newbury 10 Central Road Newbury, Massachusetts 01950 Rye, New Hampshire 03870 Ms. Cashman, Chairman Jane Spector Board of Selectmen Town of Amesbury Federal Energy Regulatory Conmission Town Hall Amesbury, Massachusetts 01913 825 North Capital Street, NE Room 8105 Washington, D. C. 20426 Honorable Peter J. Matthews Mayor, City of Newburyport Mr. R. Sweeney Office of the Mayor New Hampshire Yankee Division City Hall Newburyport, Massachusetts 01950 Public Service of New Hampshire Company 7910 Woodmont Avenue Mr. Donald E. Chick, Town Manager Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Town of Exeter 10 Front Street Exeter, New Hampshire 03823 Mr. Richard Strome, Director State Civil Defense Agency State Office Park South 107 Pleasant Street Concord, New Hampshire 03301

Public Service Company of New Hampshire Seabrook Nuclear Power Station cc:

Thomas Dignan, Esq. E. Tupper Kinder, Esq.

John A. Ritscher, Esq. G. Dana Bisbee, Esq.

Ropes and Gray Assistant Attorney General P25 Franklin Street Office of Attorney General Boston, Massachusetts 02110 208 State Hosue Annex Concord, New Hampsnire 03301 Mr. Bruce B. Beckley, Proiect Manager Public Service Company of New Hampshire Pesident Inspector Post Office Box 330 Us Nuclear Regulatory Commission Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Post Office Box 1149 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Dr. Mauray Tye, President Sun Valley Association 209 Summer Street Mr. John DeVincentis, Director Haverhill, Massachusetts 01839 Engineering and Licensing Yankee Atomic Electric Company Robert A. Backus, Esq. 1671 Worchester Road O'Neil, Backus and Spielman Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 116 Lowell Street Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Mr. A. M. Ebner, Project Manager United Engineers & Constructors William S. Jordan, III 30 South 17th Street Diane Curran Post Office Box 8223 Harmon, Weiss & Jordan Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 20001 S 5treet, NW Suite 430 Mr. Robert J. Harrison Washington, D.C. 20009 President & Chief Executive Officer Public Service Company of New Hampshire Mr. Philip Ahrens, Esq. Post Office Box 330 Assistant Attorney General Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 State House, Station #6 Augusta, Maine 04333 Carol S. Sneider, Esq.

Office of the Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Mr. Warren Hall One Ashburton Place Public Service Company of Boston, Massachusetts 02108 New Hampshire Post Office Box 330 D. Pierre G. Cameron, Jr. , Esq.

Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 General Counsel Public Service Company of New Hampshire Seacoast Anti-Pollution League Post Office Bnx 330 l Ms. Jane Doughty Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 5 Market Street Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801 Regional Administrator, Pegion I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Diana P. Randall 631 Park Avenue 70 Collins Street King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Richard Hampe, Esq.

New Hampshire Civil Defense Agency 107 Pleasant Street Concord, New Hampshire 03301

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. UMTED STATE &

3 Nt/ CLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g wasmaeotoav. o. c. sonas

% June 18,1986 cc: J. Allan J. Gutierrez Spence W. Perry, Acting General R. Starostecki Counsel -

8. Kane Federal Emergency Management Agency S. Ebneter Room 840 8. Johnston 500 C Street, S.W. T. M n Washington, D.C. 20472 R. Bellamy B. 1.azarus 6/24/86-TEM In the Matter of Public Service Company of New Hampshire, gt,t al,.

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)

Dc.eket Nos. 50-443 OL and 50-444 OL l

4

Dear Mr. Perry:

1 In response to a request made by Edward Thomas of FEMA Region I, we have evaluated, in conjunction with Joseph Flynn of your offlee, an undated memorandum prepared by Thomas Dignan of Ropes and Grey on behalf of the applicants for the Seabrook nuclear plant ("Dignan Memoran dum", a copy of which is attached Attachment A). Our i evaluation is set forth in the following discussion.gs

.e i

' The Dignan Memorandum addresses what are described as "three misconcep tions" pertaining to offsite emergency planning for the Seabrook nuclear plant, and concludes that they are " false as matter of law" (Dignan Memoranduct at 1). These purported " misconceptions" are as follows:

A. That the plans must be shown to guarantee that no l

' adverse effects on the public health and safety will occur no matter what kind of accident occurs at Seabrook.

B. That it must be demonstrated that the plans will assure that all persons located in the Emergency Planaia Zone or some certain portion of it can be evacuated in some certain time. -

In' particular, there have been assertions that the plans must assure the sheltering or evacuation of persons from the beaches in approdmately 1/2 hour. Q i rh [

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l7 I ,/ PQ It should be noted, however, that under the Commission a regulations, 10 CFR I 50.3. only written regulatory interpretations prwided by the General Counsel will be recognised as binding upon the Commission.

ATTACHMEMT

. l Spence Perry, Esq. . .

C. That the plans must be designed , and shown to be l able, to cope with a particular type of accident -- in particular, one involving an early release of radioactivity off-site.

For the reasons set forth below, it is ou'r opinion that, with minor clari-fication, Mr. D!rnan's conclusions are essentially correct as to items (A) and (B) above; however, his discussion of item (C) appears to contain an error whleh requires correction.

DISCUSSION A. Absolute Assurance of Perfect Safety.

As set forth above, item (A) concerns the question of whether an emergency response plan must be shown to guarantee that no adverse health and safety effects will occur, regardless of what kind of accident may occur at the plant. In our opinion, Mr. Dignan correctly concludes that "[n]aither the Atomic Energy Act nor any regulation of NRC, whether dealing with emergency planning oratnot, (Dignan Memorandum, 1-2).requires absolute assurance of perfect safety" As you know, prior to issuance of a full power operating license, NRC regu-lations require a finding "that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency."

NRC will base its in C.F.R. I 50.47(a)(1). With respect to offsite matters, the finding on a review of the FEMA findings and determinations "as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable assurance that they can be implemented."

Id., 5 50.47(e)(2). These regulations plainly do not require any demonstration of " absolute arsurance" that the will be totally protected in the event of a radiological emergency. public Rather, the intent of {

i the Commission's emergency planning regulations is to reduce the impact of  ;

an accident and achieve " dose savings" through protective actions that take l Into considaretien plant conditions, evacuation times, shelter factors, and other conditions that may exist at the time of the accident. NOREG-0654 /

FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 states as follows (at 6):

The overall objective of emergency response plans is to provide dose savings (and in some cases immediate life saving) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doces in excess of Protective Action Guides (PAGs). ,

The Appeal Doard has simDarly stated, "[t]he basic goal of ec:ergency planning is . . . the achievement of maximum dose savings in a radiological emergency." Cincinnati Gas n Electric Co. (Wm. H.

Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit No.1) ALAB-72~,17 NRC 760, 770 (19A3). .

j

Spence Perry, Esq. -

i in Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.

Units 2 and 3), CLI-63-10, 17 NRC 528, 533 (1983), the Commission summarized its rationale for selecting an emergency planning basis as fol)ows:

The underlying assumption of the NRC's emergency planning regulations in 10 CFR I 50.47 is that, despite [

application of stringent safety measures, a serious nu-  !

clear accident may occur. This presumes that offsite individuals may become contaminated with radioactive material or may be exposed to dangerous levels of radi-ation or perhaps both. Planning for emergencies is required as a prudent risk reduction measure for those individuals. Since a range of accidents with widely differing offsite consequences can be postulated, the regulation does not depend on the assumption that a particular type of accident may or will occur. In fact no specific accident sequences should be specified be-cause each accident could have different consequences both in nature and degree. Although the emergency planning basis is independent of specific accident se-quences, a number of accident descriptions were con-sidered in development of the Commission's regulations, including the core melt accident release categories of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).

(

l These statements demonstrate that the goal of emergency planning is to reduce the impact and achieve dose savings for a spectrum of accidents, and that emergency planning me!' satisfy NRC regulations even though the i i

potential for adverse health effects in an emergency has not been totally l elirtinated.

Notwithstanding our opinion that Mr. Dignan is essentially correct in his l mnclusion as to item (A), two statements contained in this portion of his l l memorandum require clarification. First , he goes too far in asserting that l

"it has been recognized from the outset . . . that if one assumes a major accident with offsite releases, come adverse effect on the public will, by '

definition, occur" (Dignan Memorandum at 2; emphasis added). Contrary to this assertion, the occurrence of a ma}or accident accompanied by offsite re-leases will not necessarily lead to adverse health effects. Rather, in some circumstances, emergency planning may serve to avert the occurrence of any adverse health effects. Further, whether any such health effects occur, and the extent of any such effects, will depend upon a host of factors, such as the type and quantity of release, the plume direction , meteorological conditions, exposure durations , and the timely implementation of an appropriate protective response.

Se condly , his memorandum states that emergency planning is intended to limit any adverse health effects to as low a level as reasonably possibl,e, "given the facilities at h and" (!d.), possibly implying that additional 1

.cponce Perry, Esq. .

facilities wiD never be required to be built or insta!!ed to satisfy NRC emergency planning regulations. In support of this statement, Pir. Dignan cites the San Onofre decision, supra. However, that decision provides only limited support for this conclusion. There, the Commission addressed only the issue of whether additional hospital construction should be undertaken, and concluded that such extraordinary meas'ures are not required.

B. Evacuation Within A Specific Time Period.

The second item addressed by Mr. Dignan is whether the Applicants must demonstrate that all or part of the plume exposure pathway EPZ can be evacuated in some specifled time; in particular, this item addresses the question of whether the beaches in the Seabrook vicinity must be evacuated within approximately one-half (1/2) hour. It is Mr. Dignan's conclusion that imC regulations do not require that an evacuation be assured within any l particular time (Dignan Memorandum at 2). We concur with Mr. Dignan's I conclusion as to this item.

In support of his conclusion on this matter, Mr. Dignan cites two decisions: l Cincinnati Gas 6 Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit I No. 1), ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760, 770 (1983), and Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant. Unit 2), ALAB-730, 17 NRC 1057, 1069 n.13 I (1983). In Zimmer, the Appeal Board stated as follows:

1 The applicants are . . . correct in their insistence that the Commission's emergency planning requirements do not prescribe specific time limits governing the evacua-tion of plume EPZs. The matter of the time in which i evacuation can be accomplished is left to be determir.ed I on a case-by-case basis upon consideration of all rele-vant conditions prevailing in the specific locality. But it does not follow, as the spp!! cants would have it, that a particular evacuation plan need not be concerned with the efficiency with which evacution might be accom-plished given the conditions under which it must take place [n. 16). Indeed, the Commission guidelines sug-gest the contrary. . . . If the responsible govern-mental officials are to make an informed decision respecting what is appropriate protective action in a given radiological emergency, they must have available to them time estimates which are realistic appraisals of the minimum period in which, in light of existing local con dition s ,. evacuation could reasonably be accom-plished. 'And, the nearer to the plant the area that udght have to be evacuated, the greater the importance of accurate time estimates.

n. 16/ Those conditions include, for example, the size .

and nature of the population , the available

4

! pence Porry, Esq. . '.

transportation facilities , the existing road net work, topographical features and politica] boundaries. . . .

Zimmer, supra,17 NRC at 770-71. Similarly, in the Fermi decision the Ap-peal Board stated: .

. . . [T]he Commission's emergency planning regula-tions do not specify the time within which the plume EPZ must be evacuated in the event of a nuclear emer-gency. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, 8 IV requires l only that applicants provide "an analysis of the time I required to evacuate and for taking other protective actions for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and perma-nent populations."

Fermi, supra,17 NRC at 1069 n.13. Thus, there is no requirement that an evacuation be accomplished within 30 minutes. While some other functions must be capable of being accomplished within that time frame, those functions generally involve the notification of appropriate governmental officials ar.d notification of the public. See 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, I l\* , D .

C. Planning for A Particular Type of Accident.

The third issue addressed by Mr. Dignan is whether a facility's emergency plans must be designed to cope with a particular type of accident and, in particular, an accident involving an "early release of radioactivity off-site."

Two conclusions appear to be reached by Mr. Dignan in this regard: (1) that while emergency plans must be designed to cope with a spectrum of accidents, they need not be designed to cope with a specific accident or "any worst case accident" (Dignan Memorandum at 4), and (2) that emergency ple.ns are not required to be designed to cope with an early Id.. et '-3).

release of radioactivity conclusions, the second(%nclusion is incorrectWhile andwe agree clarification.

requires with the first of these First, Mr. Dignan is correct in stating that the emergency plans must be de-signed to cope with a crectrum of accidents, but are not required to address any particular accident sequence or a " worst case accident. " The Commission has decided , on a generic basis , that compliance with its emergency planning regulations provides the reasonable assurance required by 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(a); accordingly, offsite emergency plans are not recuired to address particular accident sequences . In the Statement of Consideration published upon adoption of the Commission's final emergency planning regulations, the Commission stated as follows:

The Commission recognizes that no single accident...

scenario should form the basis for choice of notification -

capability requirements for offsite authorities and for J

1 I

. j Spence Perry, Esq. - i l

the public. Tmergency plans must be developed that will have the flexibility to ensure response to a wide j spectrum of accidents. This wide spectrum of potential accidents also reflects on the appropriate use of the offsite notification capability. . . ..

Any accident involving severe fuel degradation or core melt that results in significant inventories of fission products in the containment would warrant immediate public notifiestion and consideration, based on the .

particular circumstances, of appropriate protective action because of the potential for leakage of the oon-tainment building. In addition, the warning time avail-able for the public to take action may be substantially less than the total time between the original initiating event and the time at which significant radioactive re- -

leases take place. . . . The reduction of noti 6 cation times from . the several hours required for street-by-street notification to minutes will signiScantly increase the options available as protective actions un-der severe accident conditions. These actions could include staying indoors in the case of a release that has already occurred or a precautionary evacuation in the case of a potential release thought to be a few hours away. Accidents that do not result in core melt may also cause relatively quick releases for which protective actions , at least for the public in the immediate plant vicinity, are desirable.

45 Fed. Reg 55402 (1980). Similarly. NUREG-0654/ FEMA Rep.1, Rev. 1, provides as follows (at 6-7)- I l

No single specific accident sequence. should be isolated l as the one for which to plan because each accident i could have different consequences, both in nature and i degree. Further, the range of possible selection for a planning basis is very large, starting with a sero point of requiring no planning at all because significant off-site radiological accident consequences are unlikely to occur, to planning for the worst possible accident, re-gardless of its extremely low likelihood. The NRC/ EPA Task Force did not attempt to define a single accident sequence or even a limited number of sequences. Esth-er, it identified the bounds of the parameters for which planning is recommended, based upon knowledge of the potentia.! consequences, timing, and release characteris-tics of a spectrum of accidents. Although the selected planninF bar.is is independent of specific accident se-quences, a number of accident descriptions were con- .

sidered in the development of the guidance, including

Spence Perry, Esq. . the core cielt accident release categories of the Reactor Safety Study [ WASH-1400).

Accord . San Onofre, supra , 17 NRC at 533. In Lon r Island Lighting Co.

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 003, 888 (1985) (cited in Dignan f.lemorandum at 4), the Licensing Board dismissed a contention as-serting that the emergency plans must be capable of coping with any worst esse accident (there involving the possible loss of offsite power); the Board stated, "NUREC-0654 does not require an adequate response for the ' worst {

possible accident' at Shoreham. " ]

In sum, these regulatory j pronouncements and decisions clearly demonstrate that emergency planning '

for a nuclear plant is not required to be designed to cope with any particular accident sequence or a " worst case accident." In this respect, we concur with Mr. Dignan's memorandum.

The Dignan Memorandum is ir correct, however, in its conclusion that the emergency plans are not required to be designed to cope with an early release of radioactivity (Dignan Memorandum at 2-3). This error appears to have resulted by confusing the " worst possible accident" for any accident involving an early release. While the " worst possible accident" could involve an early release of radioactivity, other less severe accidents might also result in early releases and were included within the parameters which established the Commission's emergency planning basis. The Statement of Consideration, quoted above, clearly recognizes that "early releases" may l

occur; it is for this reason, in part, that the licensee is required to noti'-

offsite authorities within 15 minutes after the ifcensee has declared ne emergency , and that responsible offsite authorities have a capability tu netify the public within 15 minutes after they have received notification from the licensee of an emergency condition. j l

The following guidance is provided in NUREG-0654/ FEMA Rep.1, Rev.1 (at 13-14): {

1 The range of times between the onset of accident condi-tions and the start of a ma}or release is of the order of one-half hour to several hours. The subsequent time period over which radioactive material may be expected to be released is of the order of one-half hour (short-term release) to a few days (continuous release). ...

[G]uldence on the time of release . . . has been used in developing the criteria for notification capabilities . . l

. . (Other reasons for requiring prompt notification capabilities include faster moderate releases for which protective. actions are desirable and the need for sub- j stantial lead times to carry out certain protective mea- I sures, such as evacuation, when this is indicated by plant conditions.)

It should be noted that the responsible offsite authorities are not necessari,1y required, in all cases, to notify the public within 15 minutes after they have

Spence Perrv, Esq. -

received notification by the licensee. Rather, the time in which the public is notifled will range from immediate notiScation (within 15 minutes after state and local officials are notified that a situation exists which requires urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial time availtble for them to make a judgment as to whether or not to activate the public noticcation system. Also, it should be noted that the 15 minute criterion refers only to the time in which the public is to receive notification, and does not refer to the time in which protective actions are to be completed.

In sum, responsible offsite authorities must have recalved notiScation of the emergency situation within 15 minutes after the licensee has declared an euergency, and the offsite authorities must have the capability to notify the public within 15 minutes after they have received notification frocs the licensee. Emergency planning for accidents involving 'early releases" is required --

although the protective action recommendations may be issued before, during or after the occurrence of an offaite release of radioactivity.

There is no requirement that protective actions be completed within 30 minutes after the !!censee has declared an emergency.

CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the following conclusions are offered as to the matters referred to in the Dignan Memorandum:

1. The basic goal of emergency planning is to reduce the impact of and achieve dose savings for a spectrum of accidents; however, there is no requirement that absolute assurance be provided that adverse radiological effects will not occur.

2. The Commission's energency planning regula-tions do not require that the evacuation of all or part of a plume exposure pathway EPZ be completed within any particular time.

3. The emergency plans must comply with the Commission's emergency planning regulations and there-by should be capable of responding to a wide spectrum of accidents; however, the plane are not required to be designed for any specific accident sequence or a " worst case accident."

e l

Epence Perry. Esq.

4. Accidents involving early releases are within the Commission's emergency planning basis, however, the regulations do not specify a time within which the recommended protective actions are to be completed.

Sincerely ,

Edward S. Christenb[

Director and Chief Hearing Counsel y

i Enclosure cc: J. Taylor E. Jordan T. Blurley

My RANDUM This memerandum addresses three misconceptions which have arisen as to the standards to.which state and mun:cipal emergency plans will be held in an NRC licensing proceeding.

These misconceptions are:

A.

That the plans must be shown to guarantee that no adverse effects on the public health and safety i

will occur no matter what kind of accident occurs at Seabrook.

B.

That it must be demonstrated that the plans will assure that all persons located in the Emergency Planning Zone or some certain portion of it can be evacuated in some certain time.

In parti:ular, there have been assertiens that the plans must assure the sheltering or evacuation of persons from the beaches in approximately 1/2 hour.

C.

That the plans must be designed, and shown to be able, to cope with a particu5a'r type of accident --

in particular, one involving an early release of radioactivity off-site.

Each of these prepositions is false as a matter of law.

First, the I'ssue of absolute safety: Neither the Atomic Energy Act ner any regs;at:en of NRC, whether dealing with emergency planning or net, requires absolute assurance of -

t

perfect safe-..

Indeed, it has been recognized from the outset of the formulation of the current emergency planning regulations that if one assumes a major accident with effsite releases,

_ some' adverse effect on the public will, by def nition, eccur.

The purpose of emergency planning is to _

have in place means and methods of coping with such an event in order to keep those effects to as low a level as reasonably pessible given the facilities at hand. Southern California Ed: son Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 533 (1983).

Second, as to the proposition that the plans must be demonstrated to be capable of assuring evacuation of certain areas within a certain time: This simply is not the law.

The Appeal Boards of the Comm:ssion have so held - flatly and v thcut equivocation.

Cincinnati Cas & Electric Comeanv

( W. . H.

~;m er Nuclear Power Statien, Unit No. 1, ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760 770 (1983): The Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Ferm:

Atem c Power Plant, Unit 2), ALA3-730, 17 NRC 1057, 1069 n.13 (1983). Indeed, the only activity which the regulati:ns specifically require to be capable of accomplishment in one-half hour is public notification. And

is in that context the 1/2 hour rule is discussed in NUREC-0654, the NRC emergency planning guidance document.

Third , the proposition that the plans will be judged as te adequacy against a certa:n type of accident and in particular ene involv;ng a release as soon as 1/2 hour: ,

l That pr: position is not only bad law, it is directly contrary to the theory of the NRC emergency planning criteria. The theory upon which the regulations were based was that the planners should consider a spectrum of accidents. The key is that the plan be shown to be flexible l

and capable cf reducing the adverse effects to the greatest extent reasonably possible.

I The Commission itself has stated:

"Since a range of accidents with widely dif fering offsite consequences can be postulated, the regulation does not depend on the assumption that a particular occur.

type of accident may or will In fact, no specific accident sequences should be specified because each accident could have different consequences both in nature and degree.

Although the emergency planning basis is independent of specific accident sequences, a number of accident descriptions were considered in development of the Commissien's regulations, including the core melt l accident release categories of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).

"It was never the intent of the regulation to require directly or indirectly that state and local governments adopt extraordinary measures, such as construction of additional hospitals or recruitment of substantial additional medical personnel, just to deal with nuclear plant accidents. The emphasis is on prudent risk reduction measures. The regulation does not require dedication of resources to handle every possible accident that can be imagined."

CLI-83-10, 17 NRC at 533.

9 i

1

i Furthermore, there is no requirement that :: be .

demonstrated that a plan will cope with any worst case accident. NURIG-0654 simply does not require an adequate f

response for the worst possible accident. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 603, 888 (1985).

In short, the standard by which any emergency plan is to be judged is whether or not it represents the best efforts of knowledgeab'e . people through the use of reasonably l l

available fac:lities to reduce to the maximum extent I reasonably possible the adverse effects on the public health and safety which will result from off-site releases l

resulting from a spectrum of accident scenarios. The guiding prine:p'es, as recently stated by an NRC Licensing 6

Beard are:

"The purpcse cf emergency planning :s to l achieve dose savings to the general pub'. c in the event that radioactive mater:al is accidentally released off l site. There is no minimum standard cf pub';c radiation dose which must be met in emergency planning.

"Absciute protection of the public against all radiation doses cannot be guaranteed and is not required for all possible accident scenarios.

"The emergency response plan should not be developed for any specific preconceived acc: dent s e qu e nc e . It should instead be framed to cope with a spectrum of accident possibilities ine'uding the wcrs- accidents.

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,3f; k UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

,7#.l s ,y}M wAssiNoTON, D. C. 20555 V'..... / JUL 2 1987 William B. Derrickson Senior Vice President Nuclear Energy Public Service of New Hampshire New Hampshire Yankee Division i

P.O. Box 300 '

Seabrook, NH 03874 l

Dear Mr. Derrickson:

in response to your June 10, 1987 letter reouesting a meeting to review certain technical issues regardino the NRC'.c emergency planning regulations, i I suggest that you review fully the letter from Edward S. Christenbury (NRC) to Spence W. Perry (FEMAT dated June 18, 1986. I believe that letter clearly i states the NRC staff position on the issues you have raised. It is my  !

understanding that the aforementioned letter, initially brought about by l your legal counsel's questions on understanding and interpretations of the emergency planning regulations, had been made available to.you and the other parties to the Seabrook proceedings. A copy of this letter is also enclosed for your convenience. It must be emphasized, however, that the interpretation <

of NRC regulations involved in licensing proceedings, is a matter to be '

determined by the Comission's adjudicatory Boards and ultimately by the Comission itself. l In any event, we would be willing to meet to discuss the New Hampshire Yankee schedule for future submittals so that we can allocate our resources accordingly. I suggest you contact Victor Nerses, Seabrook Project Manager, (301)-492-8535, to make arrangements for an open meeting.

Sincerely,

/ -

Thomas E. Murley, Dir_tr Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

Letter dated June 18, 1986 1#*

from S. Christenbury to f~

S. Perry L)

/6 j

4 Public Service Company of Seabrook Nuclear Power Station New Hampshire CC:

Mr. Calvin A. Canney, City Manager Mr. Al fred V. Sargent, City Hall Chairman 126 Daniel Street Board of Selectmen Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801 Town of Salisbury, MA 01950 Ms. Letty Hett Senator Gordon J. Hurrphrey 1

Town of Brentwood ATTN: Tom Burack

, RFD Dalton Road U.S. Senate l Brentwood, New Hampshire 03833 Washington, D.C. 20510 Ms. Roberta C. Pevear Mr. Owen B. Durgin, Chairman l Town of Hampton Falls, New Hampshire Durham Board of Selectmen Drinkwater Road Town of Durham l Hampton Falls, New Hampshire 03844 Durham, New Hampshire 03824  !

Ms. Sandra Gavutis Charles Cross, Esq.

Town of Kensington, New Hampshire Shaines, Mardrigan and RDF 1 McEaschern East Kingston, New Hampshire 03827 25 Maplewood Avenue Post Office Box 366 Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801 Chairman, Board of Selectmen RFD 2 South Hampton, New Hampshire 03827 Mr. Guy Chichester, Chaiman Rye Nuclear Intervention Mr. Angie Machiros, Chairman Committee Board of Selectmen c/o Rye Town Hall i for the Town of Newbury 10 Central Road j Newbury, Massachusetts 01950 Rye, New Hampshire 03870 j Ms. Cashman, Chairman Jane Spector  !

Board of Selectmen Federal Energy Regulatory i Town of Amesbury Comission Town Hall  !

825 North Capital Street, NE Amesbury, Massachusetts 01913 Room 8105 l

1 Washington, D. C. 20426 l Honorable Peter J. Matthews '

Mayor, City of Newburyport Mr. R. Sweeney Office of the Mayor  !

New Hampshire Yankee Division City Hall Public Service of New Hampshire Newburyport, Massachusetts 01950 Company 7910 Woodmont Avenue Mr. Donald E. Chick, Town Manager Bethesda, Maryland 20814 1 Town of Exeter j

10 Front Street Exeter, New Hampshire 03823 l Mr. Richard Strome, Director State Civil Defense Agency i State Office Park South j

107 Pleasant Street Concord, New Hampshire 03301 i i

l l

Public Service Company of New Hampshire Seabrook Nuclear Power Station

]

cc:

Thomas Dignar., Esq. E. Tupper Kinder, Esq.

John A. Ritscher, Esq. G. Dana Bisbee, Esq.

Ropes and Gray Assistant Attorney General 225 Franklin Street Office of Attorney General Boston, Massachusetts 02110 208 State Hosue Annex Concord, New Hampshire 03301 Mr. Bruce B. Beckley, Project Manager Public Service Company of New Hampshire Resident Inspector Post Office Box 330 Us Nucleer Regulatory Commission Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Post Office Box 1149 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Dr. Mauray Tye, President Sun Valley Association 209 Summer Street Mr. John DeVincentis, Director Haverhill, Massachusetts 01839 Engineering and Licensing Yankee Atomic Electric Company Robert A. Backus, Esq. 1671 Worchester Road O'Neil, Backus and Spielman Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 116 Lowell Street Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Mr. A. M. Ebner, Project Manager United Engineers & Constructors William S. Jordan, III 30 South 17th Street Diane Curran Post Office Box 8223 Hannon, Weiss & Jordan Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 20001 S Street, NW Suite 430 Mr. Robert J. Harrison Washington, D.C. 20009 President & Chief Executive Officer Public Service Company of New Hampshire Mr. Philip Ahrens, Esq. Post Office Box 330 Assistant Attorney General Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 State House, Station #6 Augusta, Maine 04333 Carol S. Sneider, Esq. l Office of the Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Mr. Warren Hall One Ashburton Place Public Service Company of Boston, Massachusetts 02108 New Hampshire Post Office Box 330 D. Pierre G. Cameron, Jr., Esq.

Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 General Counsel Public Service Company of New Hampshire Seacoast Anti-Pollution League Post Office Box 330 Ms. Jane Doughty Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 5 Market Street Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801 Regional Administrator, Pegion I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Mr. Diana P. Randall 631 Park Avenue 70 Collins Street King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Richard Hampe, Esq.

New Hampshire Civil Defense Agency 107 Pleasant Street Concord, New Hampshire 03301

((po tte,\

UNITIO STATES

,,-(

• Nt/ CLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION W ASHHvo To*d, D. C. Deses I

% June 18,1986 cc: J. Allan J. Gutierrez Spence W. Perry, Acting General R. Starostecki Counsel -

5. Kane Federal Emergency Management Agency . tr Roon: 840 ,

500 C Street, S.W. T. M n Washington, D.C. 20472 R. BeM amy l

B. Lazarus l

' 6/24/86-TEM in the Matter of 1 Public Service Company of New Hampshire, el al. ~

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)

Docket Nos. 50-443 OL and 50-444 OL

Dear Mr. Perry:

In response have to a request made by Edward Thomas of FEMA Region I, we evaluated, undated in conjunction with Joseph Flynn of your office, an memorandum prepared by Thomas Dignan of Eopes and Gray on beh61f of the applicants for the Seabrook nuclear Memoran dum", a copy of which is attached plant ("Dignan evaluation is set forth in the following discussion.gs Attachment A). Our

.e The Dignan Memorandum addresses what are described as "three misconcep tions" pertaining to offsite emergency planning for the Seabrook nuclear .

plant , and concludes that they are " false as matter of law" (Dignan Memorandum at 1). These purported " misconceptions" are as follows:

l A. That the plans must be shown to guarantee that no adverse effects on the public health and safety will occur Seabrook.

no matter what kind of accident occurs at B. That it must be demonstrated that the plana wiB assure that all pe.rsons located in the Emergency Phnning Zone

~

or some certain portion of it can be evacuated in some certain time.

In' particular, there have been assertions that the plans must assure the sheltering or evacuation of persons from the beaches in 1/2 hour. approdmately/ 3 _,

p .- ] r)

~

)

I lt should be noted, however, that under the Commission's reguldtio'ns, 10 CFR S 50.3, only written regulatory interpretations provided by the General Counsel will be recognized as binding upon the Commisslan.

ATTACHMfMT

Spence Perry, Esq. . .

C. That the plans must be designed, and shown to be able , to cope with a particular type of accident -- in particular, one involving an early release of radioactivity off-rite.

For the reasons set forth below, it is ou'r opinion that, with minor clari-fication, Mr. Dirnan's conclusions are essentially correct as to items (A) and (B) above; however, his discuarton of item (C) appears to contain an error which requires correction.

I DISCUSSION A. Absolute Assurance of Perfect Safety.  !

J As set forth above, item (A) concerns the question of whether an emergency response plan must be shown to guarantee that no adverse health and safety effects will occur, regardless of what kind of accident may occur at the plant. In our opinion, Mr. Dignan correctly concludes that "[njeither the Atomic Energy Act nor any regulation of NRC, whether dealing with emergency planning or not, requires absolute assurance of perfect safety" (Dignan Memorandum, at 1-2).

As you know, prior to issuance of a full power operating license, NRC regu-lations require a finding "that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and emergency." 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(a)(1). will be taken in the event of a radiological i NRC will base its finding on a review With respect to offsite matters, the of the FEMA findings and i determinations "as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate '

and whether there is reasonable assurance that they can be implemented."

Id., t 50.47(e)(2). These regulations plainly do not require any .

l demonstration of " absolute arsurance" that the public will be totally protected in the event of a radiological emergency. Rather, the intent of the Commission's emergency planning regulations is to reduce the impact of an accident and achieve " dose savings" through protective actions that take into consideration plant conditions, evacuation times, shelter factors, and other conditions that may exist at the time of the accident. NUREG-0654 /

FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 states as follows (at 6):

The overall objective of. emergency response plans is to provide dose savings (and in some cases immediate life sa ting) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doces in excess of Protective Action Guides (PAGs). ,

The Appeal Board has simDarly stated, "[t]he basic goal of emergency planning is . . . the achievement of maximum dose savings in a radiological emergency." Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (Wm. H.

Station, Unit No.1) ALAB-72; 17 NRC 760, 770 (1983).Zimmer Nuclear Power '

i cponce Perry, Esq. -

l l

l in Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.

Unit s 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 533 (1983), the Commission summarized its rationale for selecting an emergency planning basis as fol)ows :

The underlying assumption of the NRC's emergency planning regulations in 10 CFR I 50.47 is that, despite application of stringent safety measures, a serious nu-clear accident may occur. This presumes that offsite individuals may become contaminated with radioactive material or may be exposed to dangerous levels of radi-ation or perhaps both. Planning for emergencies is '

required as a prudent r!ak reduction measure for those individuals. Since a range of accidents with widely differing offsite consequences can be postuhted, the regulation does not depend on the assumption that a particular type of accident may or will occur. In fact j no specific accident sequences should be speciSed be-cause each accident could have different consequences both in nature and degree. Although the emergency planning basis is independent of specific accident se-quences, a number of accident descriptions were con-sidered in development of the Commission's regulations,  !

including the core melt accident release categories of '

the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).

These statements demonstrate that the goal of emergency planning is to reduce the impact and achieve dose savings for a spectrum of accidents, and

' that emergency planning me' satisfy NRC regulations even though the potential for adverse health effects in an emergency has not been totally eliminated.

Notwithstanding our opinion that Mr. Dignan is essentially correct in his conclusion as to item (A), two statements contained in this portion of his meciorandum require clarification. First , he goes too far in asserting that "it has been recognized from the outset . . . that if one assumes a major accident with offsite releases, some adverse effect on the public will, by definition, occur" (Dignan Memorandum at 2; emphasis added). Contrary to 4 this assertion, the occurrence of a ms}or accident accompanied by offsite re-leases will not necessarily lead to adverse health effects. Rather, in some l circumstances, emergency planning may serve to avert the occurrence of any adverse health effects. Further , whether any such health effects occur, and the extent of any such effects, wiD depend upon a host of factors, such as the type and quantity of release, the plume direction , meteorological conditions , exposure durations , and the timely implementation of an appropriate protective response.

Se condly , his memorandum states that emergency planning is intended to limit any adverse health effects to as low a level as reasonsbly possible.

"given the facilities at hand" (Id.), possibly implying that additional

I

.cponce Perry. Esq. .

l l

facilities will never be required to be built or installed to satisfy NRC emergency planning regulations. In support of this statement, Pir. Dignan cites the San Onofre decision, supra. However, that decision provides only limited support for this conclusion. There, the Commission addressed only the issue of whether additional hospital construction should be undertaken, and concluded that such extraordinary meas'ures are not required.

B. Evacuation Within A Specific Time Period.

The second item addressed by Mr. Dignan is whether the Applicants must demonstrate that au or part of the plume erposure pathway EPZ can be evacuated in some specified time; in particular, this item addresses the question of whether the beaches in the Seabrook vicinity must be evacuated within approximately one-half (1/2) hour. It is Mr. Dignan's conclusion that 11RC regulations do not require that an evacuation be assured within any particular time (Dignan Memorandum at 2). We concur with Mr. Dignan's I conclusion as to this item.

In support of his conclusion on this matter, Mr. Dignan cites two decisions:

Cincinnati Gas n Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1), ALA B -T27, 17 HRC 760, 770 (1983), and Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-730, 17 NRC 1057, 1069 n.13 (1983). In Zimmer, the Appeal Board stated as foDows:

The applicants are . . . correct in their insistence that the Commission's emergency planning requirements do not prescribe specific time limits governing the evacua-l tion of plume EPZs. The matter of the time in which i evacuation can be accomplished is left to be determined on a case-by-case basis upon consideration of all rele-vant conditions prevailing in the specific locality. But it does not follow, as the applicants would have it, that a particular evacuation plan need not be concerned with the efilciency with which evacution might be accom-p11shed given the conditions under which it must take place [n. 16]. Indeed, the Commission guidelines sug-gest the contrary. . . . If the responsible govern-mental officials are to make an informed decision respecting what is appropriate protective action in a given radiological emergency, they must have available to them time estimates which are realistic appraisals of the minimum period in which, in Ught of existing local conditions, evacuation could reasonably be accom-plished. 'And, the nearer to the plant the area that might have to be evacuated, the greater the importance of accurate time estimates, n_. 16/ Those conditions include, for example, the size .

and nature of the population , the available

Epence Porry, Esq. .

\

transportation facilities , the erfsting road network, )

topographical features and political boundaries. . . .

Zimmer, supra,17 NRC at 770-71. Similarly, in the Fermi decision the Ap-peal Board stated:

. . . [T]he Commission's emergency planning regula-tions do not specify the time within which the plume i EPZ must be evacuated in the event of a nuc! car emer- '

gency. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendir E, I IV, requires only that applicants provide "an analysis of the time required to evacuate and for taldng other protective ,

actions for various sectors and distances within the  !

plume exposure pathwsy EPZ for transient and perma-nent populations."

Fermi, supra,17 NRC at 1069 n.13. Thus, there is no requirement that an evacuation be accomplished within 30 minutes. While some other functions must be capable of being accomplished within that time frame, those functionc generally involve the notification of appropriate governmental officials and notification of the public. See 10 C.F.R. Part 50 Appendix E, 5!Y.D.

C. Planr.ing for A Particular Type of Accident.

The third issue addressed by Mr. Dignan is whether a facility's emergency plans must be designed to cope with a particular type of accident and, in particular, an accident involving an "early release of radioactivity off-site."

Two conclusions appear to be reached by Mr. Dignan in this regard: (1) that while emergency plans must be designed to cope with a spectrum of accidents , they need not be designed to cope with a specific accident or "any worst case accident" (Dignan Memorandum at 4),

and (2) that emergency ple.ns are not required to be designed to cope with an early Id., at '-3). While we agree with the first of these release of radioactivity conclusions , the second (Mnclu.*lon la incorrect and requires clarification.

Mrst, Mr. Dignan is correct in stating that the emergency plans must be de-signed to cope with a spectrun of accidents, but are not required to address any particular accident sequence or a " worst case accident. " The Commission has decided , on a generic b asis , that compliance with its emergency planning regulations provides the reasonable assurance required by 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(a): accordingly, offsite emergency plans are not reoutred to address particular accident sequences. In the Statement of Consideration published upon adoption of the Commission's final emergency planning regulations, the Commission stated as follows:

The Commission recognizes that no single accident-t scenario should form the basis for choice of notification -

capability requirements for offsite authorities and for

r Spence Perry, Esq. -

the public. F.mergency plans must be developed that will have the flexibility to ensure response to a wide spectrum of accidents. This wide spectrum of potential accidents also reflects on the appropriate use of the offsite notification capability. . . ..

Any accident involving severe fuel degradation or core melt that results in significant inventories of f!ssion products in the containment would warrant immediate public notification and consideration, based on the particular circumstances, of appropriate protective action because of tbc potential for leakage of the con-tainment building. In addition, the warning time avail-able for the public to take action may be substantially less than the total time between the original initiating event and the time at which significant radioactive re- -

leases take place. . . . The reduction of notification times from . the several hours required for street-by-street notification to minutes will afgniflet.ntly increase the options available as protective actions un-der severe accident conditions. These actions could ,

include staying indoors in the case of a release that has already occurred or a precautionary evacuation in the case of a potential release thought to be a few hours away. Accidents that do not result in core melt may also cause actions, relatively quick releases for which protective at least vicinity, are for the public in the immediste plant desirable.

45 Fed. Reg. 55402 (1980). Similarly, NUREG-0654/ FEMA Rep.1, Rev. 1, provides as follows (at 6-7):

No single specific accident sequence should be isolated as the one for which to plan because each accident could have different consequences, both in nature and degree. Further, the range of possible selection for a planning basis is very large, starting with a zero point of requiring no planning at all because significant off-site radiological accident consequences are unlikely to l occur, to planning for the worst possible accident, re-gardless of its extremely low likelihood. The NRC/ EPA Task Force did not attempt to define a single accident sequence or even a limited number of sequences. Rath-er, it identified the bounda of the parameters for which planning is recommended, based upon knowledge of the potentia] consequences, timing, and release characteris-tics of a spectrum of seeidents. Although the selected planning banis is independent of specific accident se-quences, a number of accident descriptions were con- .

sidered in the development of the guidance, including l

f Spence Perry, Esq. . ,

the core melt accident release estegories of the Reactor Safety Study [ WASH-1400).

l A ccord . San Onofre, supra , 17 NRC at 533. In Ion r Island Lighting Co.

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 603, 888 (1985) (cited in Dignan facmorandum at 4), the Licensing Board dismissed a contention as-serting that the emergency plans must be espable of coping with any worst case accident (there involving the possible loss of offsite power); the Board stated, "NURFC-0654 does not require an adequate response for the ' worst possible accident' at Shoreham. "

In sum, these regulatory pronouncements and decisions clearly demonstrate that emergency planning for a nuclear plant is not required to be designed to cope with any particular accident sequence or a " worst case accident." In this respect, we l concur with Mr. Dignan's memorandum.

The Dignan Memorandum is incorrect, however, in its conclusion that the emergency plans are not required to be designed to cope with an early release of radioactivity (Dignan Memorandum at 2-3). This error appears to have ;csulted by confusing the " worst possible accident" for any accident i involving an early release. While the " worst possible accident" could involve l

an early release of radioactivity, other less severe accidents might also {

result in early releases and were included within the parameters which established the Commission's emergency planning basis. The Statement of Consideration, quoted above, clearly recognizes that "early releases" may )

occur; it is for this reason, in part, that the Ifeensee is required to notif-offsite authorities within 15 minutes after the licensee has declared ue i emergency, and that responsible offsite authorities have a capability tv notify the public within 15 minutes after they have received notification from j the licensee of an emergency condition.

The following guidance is provided in NUREG-0654/ FEMA Rep.1, Rev.,1 (at 13-14):

I

' The range of times between the onset of accident condi-tions and the start of a ma}or release is of the order of 3 one-half hour to several hours. The subsequent time l period over which radioactive material may be expected to be released is of the order of one-half hour (short-term release) to a few days (continuous release). ...

[Gluidance on the time of release . . . has been used in developing the criteria for notification capabilities . .

(Other reasons for requiring prompt notification  !

capabilities include faster moderate releases for which j protective. actions are desirable and the need for sub- 1 stantial lead times to carry out certain protective mes-sures, such as evacuation, when this is indicated by l

. plant conditions.)  ;

i It should be noted that the responsible offcHe authorities are not necessarily 1 required, in all cases, to notify the public within 15 minutes after they have  !

1 i l

l 1  !

l _____ _ . _

a

Spence Perrv. Esq. -

received notification by the licensee. Rather, the time in which the public is notifled will range from immediate notification (within 15 minutes after state and local officials are notified that a attuation exists which requires urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial time availtble for theci to make a judgment as to whether or not to activate the l public notification system. Also, it should be noted that the 15 minute l criterion refers only to the time in which the public is to receive j notification, and does not refer to the time in which protective actions are to be completed.

In sum, responsible offsite authorities must have received notification of the energency situation within 15 minutes after the licensee has declared an euergency, and the offsite authorities must have the capability to notify the i public within 15 minutes after they have received notification froci the i licensee. Emergency planning for accidents involving 'early releases" is required -- although the protective action recommendations may be issued before, during or after the occurrence of an offaite release of radioactivity. ,

There is no requirement that protective actions be completed within 30 minutes after the licensee has declared an emergency.

CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the following conclusions are offered as to the matters referred to in the D'gnan Memorandum: i

1. The basic goal of emergency planning is to reduce the impact of and achieve dose savings for a spectrum of accidents; however, there is no requirement that absolute assurance be provided that adverse radiological effects will not occur.

2. The Commission's energency planning regula-tions do not require that the evacuation of all or part of a plume exposure pathway EPZ be completed within any particular tims.

3. The emergency plans must comply with the Commission's emergency planning regulations and there-by should be capable of responding to a wide spectrum of accidents; however, the plans are not required to be designed for any specific accident sequence or a " worst case accident."

o

_________--__________a

(___

l Epence Perry. Esq.

4. Accidents involving early releares are within however, the Commission's emergency planning basis, the regulations do not specify a time to within which the be completed.

recommended protec,tive actions are Sincerely.

Edward S. Christenb[

Director and Chief Hearing Counsel Enclosure cc: J. Taylor E. Jordan T. Murley

'l e

MEMORANDUM This memcrandum addresses threc misconceptions wh:ch have arisen as to the standards to,which state and mun:cipal emergency plans will be held in an NRC licensing proceeding.

These misconceptions are:

A.

That the plans must be shown to guarantee that no adverse effects on the public health and safety will occur no matter what kind of accident occurs at Seabrook.

B.

That it must be demonstrated tant the plans will assure that all persons located in the Emergency Planning Zone or some certain portion of it can be evacuated in seme certain time.

In part:cular, there have been assertiens that the plans must assure the sheltering or evacuation of persons from the beaches an approximately 1/2 hour.

C.

That the plans must be designed, and shown to be able, to cope with a particular type of accident --

. ~ . ~ . .

in particular, one involving an early release of radioactivity off-site.

Each of these prepositions is false as a matter of law.

First, the issue of absolute safety: Neither the Atomic Energy Act ner any rera;at en of NRC, whether deal;ng with emergency planning or net, requires absolute assurance of -

l' .

t perie : safet.. Indeed, it has been recognized from the outset of the formulation of the current emergency planning regulations that if one assumes a ma]or accident with effsite releases, some adverse effect on the public will, by def nition, cccur. _

The purpose of emergency planning is to have in place means and methods of coping with such an event in order to keep those effects to as low a level as reasonab]/ pessible given the facilities at hand.

_Sou the rn_

California Ed: son Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 533 (1983).

Second, as to the proposition that the plans must be demonstrated to be capable of assuring evacuation of certain areas within a certain time: This simply is not the law.

The Appeal Boards of the Commission have so held - flatly ano w;thout equivocation.

Cincinnati Cas & Electric Comeanv (We H.

0;.- er Nuclear Power Sta len, Unit No. 1, ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760, 770 (1983); ~h A e Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Ferm:

Atem:c Power Flant, Unit 2), A _* A3 - 7 3 0, 17 NRC 1057, 1069 n.13 (1983). Indeed, the only activity which the regula:: ens specifically require to be capable of accomplishment in one-half hour is public notification. And it is in that context the 1/2 hour rule is discussed in NUREC-0654, the NRC emergency planning guidance document.

Third ,

the proposition that the plans will be judged at te adequacy a ainst a certain type of accident and in particular ene :nvolving a re." ease as soon as 1/2 hour: ,

That preposition is not only bad law, at is directly contrary to the theory of the NRC emergency planning ,

criteria. I The theery upon which the regulations were based  !

l was that the planners should consider a spectrum of f

accidents. The key is that the plan be shown to be flexible and capable cf reducing the adverse effects to the greatest extent reasonably possible.

The Commission itself has stated: I J

"Since a range of accidents with widely dif fering offsite consequences can be postulated, the regulation does not depend on the assumption that a particular occur.

type of accident may or will In fact, no specific accident sequences should be specifisd because each accident could have different consequences both in nature and degree.

tilthough the emergency planning basis is independent of specific accident  !

sequences, a number of accident descriptions were considered in development of the Commissien's regulations, including the core melt accident release categories of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).

"It was never the intent of the regulation to require directly or indirectly that state and local governments adopt extraordinary measures, such as construction of additional hospitals or recruitment of substantial additional medical personnel, just to deal with nuclear plant accidents. The emphasis is on prudent risk reduction measures. The regulation does not require dedicatien of resources to handle every possible accident that can be imagined." )'

CLI-83-10, 17 NRC at 533.

t

Furthermore, there is no requirement that it be demonstrated that a plan will cope sith any worst case accident. NURIC-0654 simply does not require an adequate response for the worst possible accident. Long Island Lichting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 603, 888 (1985).

In short, the standard by which any emergency plan is to be judged is whether or not it represents the best efforts of knowledgeab'e people through the use of reasonsbly available facilities to reduce to the maximum extent reasonably possible the adverse effects on the public health and safety which will result from off-site releases resulting from a spectrum of accident scenarios. The guiding princip:es, as recently stated by an NRC Licensing eB Beard are: .

I "The purpcse cf emergency planning is to -

achieve dose savings to the general p ub ".1 : in the event that radioactive material is accidentally released off site. There is no minimum standard cf pub'ic radiation dose which must be met in emergency planning.

"Absciute protection of the public against all radiation doses cannet be guaranteed and is not required for all possible accident scenarios.

"The emergency response plan should not be developed for any specific preconceived ace: dent s e qu e nc e . It should instead be framed to cope with a spectrum of accident possibilities

- inc'uding the wers- accidents.