IR 05000498/1989017: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML20245L574
| number = ML20248G202
| issue date = 07/26/1989
| issue date = 09/29/1989
| title = Insp Repts 50-498/89-17 & 50-499/89-17 on 890601-30. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Status,Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Operational Safety Verification & Monthly Maint & Surveillance Observations
| title = Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-498/89-17 & 50-499/89-17
| author name = Holler E
| author name = Milhoan J
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
| addressee name =  
| addressee name = Vaughn G
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation = HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
| docket = 05000498, 05000499
| docket = 05000498, 05000499
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = 50-498-89-17, 50-499-89-17, NUDOCS 8908220164
| document report number = NUDOCS 8910100129
| package number = ML20245L549
| title reference date = 09-14-1989
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, NRC TO UTILITY, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
| page count = 12
| page count = 2
}}
}}


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APPENDIX B U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 
==REGION IV==
NRC Inspection Report: 50-498/89-17  Operating Licenses: NPF-76 50-499/89-17'  NPF-80 Dockets: 50-498 50-499 Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)
P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Facility Name: South Texas Project (STP), Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: STP, Matagorda County, Texas Inspection Conducted: June 1-30, 1989 Inspectors: J. E. Bess, Senior Resident Inspector, Unit 1 Project Section D, Division of Reactor Projects J. I. Tapia, Senior Resident Inspector Unit 2, Project Section D, Division of Reactor Projects R. J. Evans, Resident Inspector, Unit 1 Project Section D, Division of Reactor Projects D. L. Garrison, Resident Inspector, Unit 2 Project Section D, Division of Reactor Projects Approved: . A "
d T. Jp Holler, Chief. Project Section D Date Division of Reactor Projects I
Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted June 1-30, 1989 (Report 50-498/89-17; 50-499/89-17)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of plant status, licensee action on previous inspection findings, operational safety verification, i monthly maintenance observations, power ascension test, monthly surveillance observations, and startup test witnessing and observation,
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Results: Within the areas ins fire watches (see paragraph 3)pected,
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    . Weaknessesonewere violation noted was in theidentified  licensee's regarding piping and. instrument diagrams (P& ids) of the Unit I standby diesel generator (DG)
--In Reply Refer To:     1 Dockets: 50-498/89-17    (
support. systems. The P& ids did not correctly reflect the as-built configuration of the support systems. Other Unit 1 DG support system weaknesses included identification tags missing from components, valves missing from the operating procedures and P& ids, and valve positions different between P&lD aad operating
50-499/89-17 Houston Lighting & Power Company
  ;  procedures (see paragraph 5). Licensee strengths were that all Unit 1 DG support system valves and power supplies were in their correct position to support DG operation despite the procedure /P&lD weaknesses and the fact that the licensee had previously identified the deficiencies and implemented a program to correct them. Also, maintenance and surveillance activities were observed to be performed carefully and in accordance with procedures. Unit 2 successfully completed its startup testing progra _ _ _ _ -    __ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .. -
' ATTN: 'G. E. Vaughn, Group
 
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Vice President, Nuclear P,0. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483-Gentlemen:    j Thank you for your letter of September 14, 1989, in response.to our
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letter and Notice of Violation dated August 5,1989. We have' reviewed your.-
reply'and . find it responsive to the concerns raised in our Notice of Violatio We will review the implementation of your corrective actions. during a future inspection to detennine that full compliance has been achieved 'and will be maintaine Sincerel Original Signed By:
James L Milhoan James L. Milhoan, Director Division of Reactor Projects cc:
Central Power & Light Company ATTN: R. L. Range /R. P. Verret P.O. Box 2121 Corpus Christi, Texas 78403 City of Austin Electric Utility ATTN: R. J. Miner, Chief Operating  i Officer (2 copies)
721 Barton Springs Road Austin, Texas 78704
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DETAILS Persons Contacted
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  *C. Ayala, Supervising Licensing Engineer
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  *S. M. Dew, Manager, Nuclear Purchasing
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  *A. C. McIntyre. Manager, Support Engineering
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  *J. R. Lovell, Technical Service Manager
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  *D. R. Keating, Quality Engineering Manager
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  *J. W. Loesch, Plant Operations Manager  ,
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  * A. Simons, Plant Opera-tions Support Manager
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  * J. Jordan, Plant Engineering Manager
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  * W. Dannbardt, Lead Operations Specialist
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  * Khosla, Senior Licensing Engineer In addition to the above, the inspectors also held discussions with various licensee, architect engineer (AE), maintenance, and other contractor personnel during this inspectio * Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview cenducted on July 6, 198 . Plant Status Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent reactor thermal power and remained at 100 percent until June 22, 1989. The reactor thermal power level was decreased to 90 percent for maintenance and surveillance testing of the turbine throttle and main steam isolation valves. The reactor. thermal power level was increased to 100 percent power on June 24, 1989. The unit remained at 100 percent reactor thermal power through the end of the inspection perio Unit 2 began this inspection period at 75 percent reactor thermal power, ,
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continuing with power ascension testing at that power plateau. On June 2 j 1989, a Unit 2 reactor / generator trip occurred. This unplanned trip is j discussed in paragraph 3 of this report. On June 10, 1989, Unit 2 ;
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achieved 100 percent reactor thermal power. The 100-hour nuclear steam ;
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supply system (NSSS) acceptance test at that power level was successfully -)
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completed on June 16, 1989. Unit 2 was declared to be in commercial '
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operation on June 19, 1989. At the end of this inspection period, Unit 2 '
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remained at 100 percent reactor thermal powe . Onsite Followup of Plant' Events (93702)
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l During the month of June, the boron concentration in Unit l's reactor coolant system was slowly decreased to maintain reactor power at 100 percent. The unit is scheduled for a refueling outage to begin August 4, 198 Several activities were performed during the inspection period to prepare the unit for the outage. A dummy fuel element with L __ -_ - -
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dimensions corresponding to a fuel element was used to verify the alignment of the cell walls for the new spent fuel racks'. The dummy fuel element was fully inserted and withdrawn from each fuel element storage cell in the new spent fuel racks to assure that irradiated fuel elements could be properly inserted into their designated storage positions. Also, the spent fuel pool was filled and boric acid was added to increase boron concentration to greater than 2500 pp On June 2, 1989, Unit 2 tripped while in Mode 1 at 76 percent powe Turbine inlet Throttle Valve TV-1 was closed during performance of the Main Turbine Steam inlet Valve Operability Test. The valve was opened in accordance with the procedure. The valve position was verified locally and on the main control board. The operator did not notice the " TURBINE STM STOP VLV RX PRETRIP" alarm, which actuated when the valve was closed and that the bistable indication did not clear. This indicated that the closed inlet valve input was still present at the solid state protection system (SSPS) reactor trip logic. The test procedure did not specify a check of this alarm or the bistable status after completing the valve cycl Turbine inlet Throttle Valve TV-3 was closed per procedure. This completed the two of four turbine inlet throttle valve closed logic at the SSPS and generated a reactor turbine trip. The control rods inserted normally following the trip. No unexpected posttrip transients were noted. One steam generator power operated relief valve (PORV) was used to control RCS temperature and pressur The licensee identified two causes of this event: (1) the test procedure did not require the operator to verify that the bistable had cleared following completion of the valve cycle, and (2) a defective limit switch on Valve TV-1 stuck in the valve-closed position after the valve was opened. The licensee replaced the defective switch and revised applicable test procedure Each steam inlet throttle valve has a safety-related and a nonsafety-related limit switch that is activated in the closed positio The safety-related switch provides input to the reactor pretrip annunciator and the SSPS bistable. The nonsafety-related switch provides valve position indication on the main control board. When Valve TV-1 was opened, the safety-related limit switch remained in the valve-closed position and prevented the SSPS bistable from clearing. The nonsafety-related limit switch operated normally and gave the proper <
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indication of the valve position to the operato On June 6,1989, the licensee provided the inspector with a station problem report regarding falsification of a fire watch log. The licensee had briefed the inspector regarding the incident and immediate corrective actions when the licensee first identified the issue in late April 198 The station problem report, completed on May 31, 1989, provided details regarding the event and long-term corrective action . _ _
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Briefly, the event involved a contractor fire watchman who, after discovering thd another contractor fire watchman on duty at the same time l had apparently falsified an entry time on a fire watch log, reported the matter to the general foreman who, in turn, escalated the matter to the licensee's management. The licensee determined through an initial investigation on the same day the matter was reported that a false entry had been made and relieved the suspected fire watchman of duties. The suspected fire watchman was terminated a week later. The licensee's detailed investigation of the matter determined that the falsification had been limited to the terminated fire watchma The safety significance of the missed fire watch round was relatively lo The watches were provided to monitor affected areas where a fire barrier was breached. The automatic fire detection and suppression systems were operable in the affected areas. Because of a previous event involving falsified fire watch log entries, the licensee had established procedures whereby three fire watchmen were assigned to make a specified round in succession. This was to ensure that an individual did not miss successive rounds in the same area. In this case, the time to detect a possible fire missed by the automatic fire detection system in the area where the terminated fire watchman falsified making his round was extended from 1 to 2 hour The licensee determined that dereliction of duty by the terminated fire watchman was the primary root cause. The licensee determined that the practice of leaving a blank space on the fire watch log to highlight a missed round was a contributing cause. Among its corrective actions, the licensee emphasized the consequences, including potential criminal prosecution, of falsifying documentation, stopped the practice of leaving a blank space to highlight a missed round, and emphasized the requirement to report a missed fire watch round to the shift supervisor or fire watch coordinato Failure to perform fire watch rounds as required by licensee procedure is an apparent violation. HRC, by provision of its enforcement polic CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section V.G. 1, may refrain from issuing a notice of violation for violations of relatively low safety significance that are self-identified and corrected by a licensee. The provisions do not apply to willful violations. For this reason, this apparent violation will be cited (498/8917-01). The licensee's station problem report regarding the falsified fire watch log adequately discusses the event causes and corrective action On June 8, 1989, the Unit 1 No. 13 Standby Diesel Generator (DG) was started for testing in preparation for maintenance on a transformer. The DG immediately tripped. The licensee found that the "high temp main and conn rod brg or gen brg" alarm had actuated. This alarm had previously actuated on May 24, 1989, but the indication was not valid. The licensee could' not identify an actual problem that would have initiated either of these alarms. The licensee performed troubleshooting to determine the
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    ?ATTNf R; J. Costello/M. T. Hard P.O.' Box 17711
    . San; Antonio, Texas 78296
  .. p  Houston' Lighting & Power' Company
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cause of the DG trip. The licensee determined that the trips occurred
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'because.of a trip signal which is bypassed in the emergency mod Inadequate air flow to' the shutdown air header prevented the pneumatic trip switch from resetting before the electric trips were unblocked. The licensee replaced the air filter, Jir regulating valve, and the pressure switch in the--shutdown air header, and tested the DG successfully. These events were classified as nonvalid failures in accordance with criteria in Regulatory Guide 1.108. The test interval.for No.13 DG remained ac 31 days. The licensee determined that the DG would have performed the required safety functions without tripping, should any have occurre There have been no valid failures of the No. 13 D The primary meteorological tower was declared out of service on June 19, 1989, and was returned to service on June 29, 1989. Since the tower was out of service more than 7 days, a special report regarding an inoperable primary meteorological tower was required to be submitted to the NRC (report was submitted July 6, 1989). Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
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(Closed) Open Item (498/8902-01): Essential Chiller Temperature Control Switch - In NRC Inspection Report 50-498/89-02; 50-499/89-02, the Unit 1 essential chilled water system was inspected. A temperature control point switch was identified in the local chiller panels, but this switch was not discussed in the operating procedur Since the inspection, Procedure 1 POP 02-CH-0001, " Essential Chilled Water System," was revised to Revision 6. The updated procedure contained Step 8.1.5 that instructed operations department personnel to adjust the temperature control switch to the operating temperature rang . Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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Operation safety verification inspections were performed to ensure the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with licensee and regulatory requirements. Items inspected on a routine basis included:
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control room staffing, control room logbooks, plant housekeeping, plant security, health physics, system and control board lineups, and general plant / equipment condition . Itsms noted and reported to the ' licensee during plant tours included:
  , ; Houston Lighting. & Power' Company .
ATTN: ;Rufus'S. Scott,LAssociate General Counsel-
  ,   "P.O. Box'1700!
    ? Houston, Texas;,77001 INP0 ' ^  <
  , Records Center'.. . .
11100 Circle.75: Parkway TAtlanta, Georgia- 30339-3064
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    ' Dr. Jo'seph M. ' Hendrie -
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The cable guards on two flexible conduit were noted to be pulled loose from endpoint connections. The loose conduit (AIXG1CRX003 and N1DGBDXC0051) required rework to protect the cables inside the conduit. Both were located in DG Room 1 A seal (yellow ty-rap) was noted not to be sealing on an " Emergency Use Only" storage box. The licensee replaced all seals with metal 1ocks.
50 Be11 port Lane-Bellport, New York. 11713: .
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flouston Lightingk Power September 14, 1989 ST-HL-AE-3232 File No.G02.04
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10CFR2.201 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 Reply to Notice of Violation 8917-01 Regarding Falsification of Fire Watch Loe Houston Lighting & Power Company has reviewed the Notice of Violation issued as a result of NRC Inspection Report 89-17 dated August 5, 1989 and submits the attached response pursuant to 10CFR2.20 If you should have any questions on this matter, please contact Mr. C. A. Ayala at (512) 972-862 ,
R. W. Chewning  /
Vice President  j Nuclear Operations !
RWC/AKK/n1 Attachment: Reply to Notice of Violation 8917,-01


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Two drain valves (1-PD-0378 and.1-PD-0379) were required to be locked shut per the locked valve program. The valves were locked shut in
_m the interest of good engineering practice and not for. reasons of reactor safety. The locking devices were noted to be improperly attached to the valves. This condition was reported to the Unit 1 i
control room. ;0perations removed the cables and seals, then tagged the valves in the shut position using the tag out procedur *
Inspections;of housekeeping were performed on a routine basis, including.the Unit.1 mechanical auxiliary building (MAB). In the MAB,' the floor of Room 327, 54-foot elevation, was noted to be unusually dirty. - Trash, nails, bits of wood and sawdust, and other
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  : items were noted throughout the room, which was used as temporary storage. The room has since been cleaned.-
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  'As part of the operational safety verification portion of the inspection, the standby DG No.-11 support systems were inspected. The support systems were compared to the electrical, valve, and instrument lineups
  . (Procedure IPOP02-DG-0001. " Emergency Diesel Generator No.11,"
Revision 6) and Loth the Bechtel and vendor (Cooper Energy Services)
supplied P& ids. The diesel generator support systems inspected included:
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Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System (system designator F0)
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Lube Oil System (LO)
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Jacket Water. System (JW)
Cooling Water System (DG)
Starting Air System (SD)
Air Intake and Exhaust System (DI)
Observations made during the system walkdowns included:
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Ten valves and one pressure indicator were missing identification tag One nonsafety-related temperature indicator (DG No.12 L0 temperature) was reading 4*F less than the minimum value allowed by Procedure IPOP02-DG-0002, Step 5.2 This was reported to the shift i supervisor who initiated corrective action * Local Level Indicator LI-9109A (fuel oil storage tank level) was missingitsengineeringunits(%). The indicator was located on local Control Panel ZLP10 *
Twodifferentvalveshadthesameidentificationnumber(1-LU-3012). ;
  * The wrong cubicle was listed as power supply for Distribution Panel DPA135 in the electrical lineup and on the local panel !
nameplate (the lineup was corrected in Revision 7 of  d l
Procedure IP0P02-DG-0001, which was approved June 27,1989).


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Five valves shown on the P& ids were not listed in Revision 6 of the procedure lineup. One valve was subsequently added to the lineup by Revision 7 to the procedure, two valves apparently did not exist, and two valves (nonsafety-related vent valves) were added to the procedure by recent field change requests (FCRs).
 
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Five valves were found to be in different positions in the valve lineup than the position shown on the P&lDs. The P& ids were apparently incorrect in all five cases. One valve, 1-JW-0031, was shown locked shut on one drawing and open on anothe Valve 1-JW-0031 was in the correct position for system operatio *
Several valves were found that were not shown on any P&ID, not labelled, or not listed in the valve lineups. The valves included several safety-related instrument root' valves, one L0 filter drain valve, and two L0 strainer drain valve Walkdowns of the support systems were performed using both vendor and Bechtel P& ids. For the SD and F0 systems, the Bechtel P&ID showed only the Bechtel supplied items in detail, while the vendor P&ID showed only vendor supplied items in detail. All SD and F0 P& ids were noted to have minor errors, including missing valves and wrong valve positions. For the JW, LO, and DG systems, Bechtel P& ids were drawn from vendor P& id Numerous errors in the vendor P& ids were simply carried over onto the Bechtel drawings. In the JW P& ids, the basic flowpaths were correct, but many components were 'shown in the wrong locations. Instrumentation root j valves were not shown on the JW P& ids. In the DG P& ids, the flowpaths for the intercoolers and fuel oil coolers, a major portion of the vendor and Bechtel P& ids, were incorrectly drawn. The L0 P& ids drawn by Bechtel contained the most errors. Flowpaths were incorrectly drawn, valve numbers were incorrect for about 20 valves, equipment was shown in the wrong location, and at least one root valve was missin All valves and power supplies were noted to be in the correct position needed to support DG No.11 operation. The details of the inspection were presented to the licensee for corrective actions. The licensee was aware of the problem with the diesel generator support systems P& ids. In January 1988, plant engineering sent support engineering an engineering ];
support request, which identified the problem. In April 1989, support
  - engineering generated an action item, which was a plan of action. At the end of the inspection period, the action item was still in the review process and system walkdowns were still in progress. The inspectors discussed with the licensee a concern that corrective actions needed to correct the drawing errors were not prompt. The licensee stated that .
manpower resources were being used to upgrade the vendor manuals, l illegible vendor drawings, and design basis documents, which had priorities over the P& ids. The licensee also stated that the work to upgrade the P& ids would be completed by the end of the year. The work scope would include completion of walkdowns, revision of drawings, and tagging vendor supplied equipmen j
 
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11ouston Lighting & Ibwer Onnpany      ,'
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
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Selected maintenance activities were observed to ascertain whether the activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures. The activities included:
ST-HL- AE- 3232 File No.: CO2.04    j Page 2
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OPMP08-SI-0904, Revision 0, "HHSI Pump A Discharge Pressure
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  . Regional Administrator Region IV Rufus S. Scott Nuclear Regulatory Commission Associate Ceneral Counsel p 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite.1000 Houston Lighting & Power Company-Arlington, TX 76011  P. O. Box 1700-Houston, TX 77001 Ctorge Dick . Project Manager U..S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission INPO Washington, DC 20555  Records Center
Calibration (P-0904)"
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1100 circle 75 Parkway Jack E. Bess  Atlanta, CA 30339-3064 t
PreventiveMaintenance(PM)IC-1-SI-86003948 Revision 2.C, "HHSI Pump A Discharge Calibration"
Senior Resident Inspector - Unit I c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. Joseph M. Hendrie P. O. Box 910 50 Be11 port Lane Bay City, TX 77414  Be11 port, NY 11713 J. I. Tapia  D. R. Lacker Senior Resident Inspector - Unit 2 Eureau of Radiation Control c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Texas Department of Health P. O. Box 910  1100 West 89th Street Bay City, TX 77414 Austin, TX 78756-3189 J. R. Newman, Esquire Newman & Holtzinger, P. ;
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1615 L Street, N. Washington, DC 20036 R. L. Range /R. P. Verret Central Power & Light Company f'o  P. O. Box 2121 Corpus Christi, TX 78403 R. John Miner (2 Copies)
PM MM-1-HF-89000869, Revision 0.B. " Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Fan 11C Discharge Damper' Lube / Inspection" The' inspectors determined through observations and procedure reviews that approved procedures were being used, replacement parts were properly certified. the equipment was properly returned to service, and
,  Chief Operating Officer l-  City of Austin Electric Utility 721 Barton Springs Road
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  ' Austin, TX 78704      .
housekeeping was being maintained. The inspectors also determined that the technicians were familiar and knowledgeable of the work process and the documentation was adequate to cover the proces No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio . Monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)
l R. J. Costello/M. T. Hardt City Public Service Board P. O. Box 1771 San Antonio, TX 78296 l
Selected surveillance activities were observed to ascertain whether the surveillance of safety significant systems and components were being conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS) and other requirements. The following surveillance tests were observed and reviewed:
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1 PSP 06-PK-0004, Revision 5, "4.16KV Class 1E Undervoltage Relay Channel Calibration /TADOT-Channel 4," performed on 4.16KV Bus EIA
* 2 PSP 06-DJ0001, Revision 1, "125 Volt Class lE Battery 7 Day Surveillance Test," performed on Battery E2C11 The inspectors verified that testing was performed using approved procedures, final test data was within acceptance criteria limits, housekeeping was maintained by the technicians, and test equipment was within required calibration cycles. A technical review of the procedures
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was also performed, with no concerns being identified.
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Revised 06/16/89 A1/NL.DISR4
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ATTACHMENT ST HL-AE JN
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspection.
ST-HL-AE-3232 Attachment Page 1 of 2 South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 Reply to Notice of Violation 8917-01 Regarding Falsification of Fire Watch Lon Statement of Violation 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R specifies fire protection requirements for
 
  , nuclear power plants. South Texas Project (STP) Station Procedures (SP)
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establish a program and specific implementing instructions to satisfy Appendix R requirements. In particular, STP SP OPGP03-ZF-0013. " Fire Watch Program," Revision 2, dated October 24, 1988, paragraph 5.5, requires that personnel assigned to act as hourly fire watches shall pass through the required areas at least once every 60 minute reriod checking for signs of fir Contrary to the above, on April 23, 1989, an STP fire watchman assigned STP fire protection compensatory hourly fire watches initialed a fire watch log indicating that he had passed through the required area checking for signs of fire when, in fact, he had not passed through the required areas within the required time interva I Houston Lighting & Power PositiRD HL&P concurs that the cited violation occurre l III. Reason for Violation The root causes of the failure to perform fire watches and the falsification of the fire watch logs are as follows: Dereliction of duty by the fire watc . A contributing factor was the established practice of leaving a blank space on the fire watch log sheet to highlight that a fire watch round had been misse I Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved An investigation was conducted to determine the extent of the irregularities in the fire watch program. No other findings, involving other personnel, were identified during this investigatio The individual identified as having falsified the fire watch logs, a fire watch foreman, was removed from fire watch dut A1/014.NL6
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  ^ Startup Test Witnessing and Observation (72302)
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Selected Unit 2 startup tests were witnessed to ascertain conformance by the licensee to procedural requirements, observe staff performance, and
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  . ascertain the adequacy of test program records. The tests that were observed included:
L    ST-HL-- AE-3232 - I
  * 2 PEP 04-ZG0002, Revision 0, " Loose Parts Monitoring System Baseline Data"
!'     Attachment  1 Page 2 of 2 H South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499
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2 PEPO 4-ZY-0070, Revision 1 " Test Sequence at 75% Power"
Reply to Notice of Violation 8917-01 Regarding Falsification of Fire Watch Img
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    . Corrective Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence Remaining fire watch personnel have been reinstructed on the consequences.of falsifying records. 'New personnel receive this s training throt.gh Ger.eral Employee Training Category I and all personnel through the GET Requalification program. As an additional reminder a plant bulletin will be issued by September 22, 1989 to further reinforce this polic . The' fire watch personnel have also received written instruction to make all entries on the fire watch logs consecutively and that no lines are to be " skipped".
2 PEP 04-ZY-0072, Revision 0, "Incore-Excore Detector Calibration" The inspectors monitored portions of the performance of the vibration and loose parts monitoring system at the 90 percent reactor thermal power level utilizing Procedure 2 PEPO 4-ZG-0002. The baseline data procedure required data to be recorded for a minimum of 10 minutes at the 30-; 50 ,
75 , and 100 percent power plateaus, however, other plateaus were included. The data were then used to produce power spectral density signatures at center frequencies of 25 , 250 , 2500 , and 25,000Hz. The procedure and signoffs were reviewed during and after the testing, as was the calibration and setup of the equipmen The data sheets and plots of each channel and frequency were reviewed and found to'contain the required data. It was noted that two sensors had become uncoupled from the reactor vessel and had been addressed in Problem Report 89-11 The inspectors continued the inspection of progressive testing of equipment at various power levels in order to verify that the licensee was correctly implementing the power ascension testing progra The incore/excore cross calibration was performed at 75 percent reactor power as specified in Procedure 2 PEP 04-ZY-0070 and as detailed in Procedure 2 PEP 04-2Y-0072 and Field Change Request (FCR) 89-1510. The purpose of the test was to determine the relationship between incore and
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excore axial offset, provide data for calibration of the excore axial flux difference (AFD) amplifiers,andprovidedatatocalibratetheflux (Delta = I) penalty to the over temperature, delta temperature protective setpoints. The test method was as follows:
  '*' Obtain a full core flux and thermocouple map with rods ou Dilute Control Bank D inward and obtain quarter core flux map and thermocouple map at each 2 percent decrease in AF * Obtain full core flux and thermocouple map at 90 percent of axial offset negative limi . - - _ - _ - -  - - __ __ ___-_____ - __ _ _ _ _ _ _
 
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Borate Control Bank D outward and obtain quarter core flux map and thermocouple map at each 2 percent increase in AF Obtain a full core flux and thermocouple map with AFD at its most positive valu On completion of the mapping, the data was reduced by computer to yield incore/excore detector calibration value The inspectors witnessed the test preparation and the data acquisitio The flux mapping used the standard Westinghouse data collection system with the six channels recording simultaneously. Each flux det3ctor was fully inserted and withdrawn. The detectors mapped the full leagth of the core for each insertion. Each chart was stamped and identified and the data sheets completed. All data were entered into the plant Proteus Ccmputer from which further calculations were made for final data reduction and comparison with test dat On completion of the test and acquisition, the inspector reviewed the test procedure for completeness through the step in the procedure that ended the data collection (Step 6.30). The generated chart data were found to be adequate in content and reflected the correct flux patterns that were expecte No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio . Power Ascension Test - Plant Trip From 100% Power (72580)
The licensee performed a full load rejection test to demonstrate the ability of Unit 2 to sustain a trip of the main generator from 100 percent reactor thermal power. The test was performed using Procedure 2 PEP 04-ZY-0102, " Plant Trip from 100% Power," Revision 0. The inspectors witnessed performance of the procedure by the licensee. The procedure provided instructions to record initial data prior to the plant trip, to trip the plant, to record post trip data, and to perform a posttrip revie l Pertinent plant parameters were recorded to determine control system response to the transient. A review of the posttrip data revealed all acceptance criteria were met. However, two test criteria were not met:
the maximum pressurizer pressure recorded was higher than the initial value by 41 psig (pressurizer pressure was expected to drop below the initial value of 2235 psig), and the steam generator level for each loop failed to drop out of the narrow range band. Subsequent evaluation and feedback from Westinghouse disclosed that these two criteria had no impact on the overall acceptability of the tes i
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Other observations made during the test included: the reactor coolant system (RCS) cooled down to SEB*F. 9'F-lower than the no-load value of
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567'F, because of the slow. closure time of the moisture separator reheater
  ~ .temocrature control volves; an auxiliary feedwater regulating valve
,s ... indicated partially open while fully closed; and the digital rod position
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  ' indication (DRPI) gave an erroneous flashing. general warning light for a control' rod.that was full in.following the reactor trip. The licensee and
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c . Westinghouse reviewed and analyzed the cooldown from 567"F to 558"F. The
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cooldown was greater.than anticipated, but within the acceptance limits for the tes The effect of the Unit 2 trip'was noticed in the Unit 1' control room. A variation in electrical grid frequency was recorded. Frequency dropped
  :from 60 to 59.7Hz, then returned to 60Hz. Several alarms were momentarily received in the Unit I control room, including inverter trouble, annunciator ground detected, and plant computer inverter failure alarm A review of Procedure 2 PEP 04-ZY-0102 was performed. The procedure was compared to licensee commitments, including Final Safety Analysis Report Section 14.2.12.3.23, " Full Load Rejection Test."


No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio . Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
V Date of Full Comoliance HIAP is in full compliance at this tim I o
on July 6, 1989. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The' licensee did not identify, as proprietary, any of the information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors. _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ .
A1/014.NL6 2
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Latest revision as of 17:29, 30 January 2022

Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-498/89-17 & 50-499/89-17
ML20248G202
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 09/29/1989
From: Milhoan J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To: Vaughn G
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 8910100129
Download: ML20248G202 (2)
v • d • e


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--In Reply Refer To: 1 Dockets: 50-498/89-17 (

50-499/89-17 Houston Lighting & Power Company

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Vice President, Nuclear P,0. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483-Gentlemen: j Thank you for your letter of September 14, 1989, in response.to our

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letter and Notice of Violation dated August 5,1989. We have' reviewed your.-

reply'and . find it responsive to the concerns raised in our Notice of Violatio We will review the implementation of your corrective actions. during a future inspection to detennine that full compliance has been achieved 'and will be maintaine Sincerel Original Signed By:

James L Milhoan James L. Milhoan, Director Division of Reactor Projects cc:

Central Power & Light Company ATTN: R. L. Range /R. P. Verret P.O. Box 2121 Corpus Christi, Texas 78403 City of Austin Electric Utility ATTN: R. J. Miner, Chief Operating i Officer (2 copies)

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10CFR2.201 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 Reply to Notice of Violation 8917-01 Regarding Falsification of Fire Watch Loe Houston Lighting & Power Company has reviewed the Notice of Violation issued as a result of NRC Inspection Report 89-17 dated August 5, 1989 and submits the attached response pursuant to 10CFR2.20 If you should have any questions on this matter, please contact Mr. C. A. Ayala at (512) 972-862 ,

R. W. Chewning /

Vice President j Nuclear Operations  !

RWC/AKK/n1 Attachment: Reply to Notice of Violation 8917,-01

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. Regional Administrator Region IV Rufus S. Scott Nuclear Regulatory Commission Associate Ceneral Counsel p 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite.1000 Houston Lighting & Power Company-Arlington, TX 76011 P. O. Box 1700-Houston, TX 77001 Ctorge Dick . Project Manager U..S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission INPO Washington, DC 20555 Records Center

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1100 circle 75 Parkway Jack E. Bess Atlanta, CA 30339-3064 t

Senior Resident Inspector - Unit I c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. Joseph M. Hendrie P. O. Box 910 50 Be11 port Lane Bay City, TX 77414 Be11 port, NY 11713 J. I. Tapia D. R. Lacker Senior Resident Inspector - Unit 2 Eureau of Radiation Control c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Texas Department of Health P. O. Box 910 1100 West 89th Street Bay City, TX 77414 Austin, TX 78756-3189 J. R. Newman, Esquire Newman & Holtzinger, P. ;

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Revised 06/16/89 A1/NL.DISR4

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ATTACHMENT ST HL-AE JN

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ST-HL-AE-3232 Attachment Page 1 of 2 South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 Reply to Notice of Violation 8917-01 Regarding Falsification of Fire Watch Lon Statement of Violation 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R specifies fire protection requirements for

, nuclear power plants. South Texas Project (STP) Station Procedures (SP)

establish a program and specific implementing instructions to satisfy Appendix R requirements. In particular, STP SP OPGP03-ZF-0013. " Fire Watch Program," Revision 2, dated October 24, 1988, paragraph 5.5, requires that personnel assigned to act as hourly fire watches shall pass through the required areas at least once every 60 minute reriod checking for signs of fir Contrary to the above, on April 23, 1989, an STP fire watchman assigned STP fire protection compensatory hourly fire watches initialed a fire watch log indicating that he had passed through the required area checking for signs of fire when, in fact, he had not passed through the required areas within the required time interva I Houston Lighting & Power PositiRD HL&P concurs that the cited violation occurre l III. Reason for Violation The root causes of the failure to perform fire watches and the falsification of the fire watch logs are as follows: Dereliction of duty by the fire watc . A contributing factor was the established practice of leaving a blank space on the fire watch log sheet to highlight that a fire watch round had been misse I Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved An investigation was conducted to determine the extent of the irregularities in the fire watch program. No other findings, involving other personnel, were identified during this investigatio The individual identified as having falsified the fire watch logs, a fire watch foreman, was removed from fire watch dut A1/014.NL6

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!' Attachment 1 Page 2 of 2 H South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499

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Reply to Notice of Violation 8917-01 Regarding Falsification of Fire Watch Img

. Corrective Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence Remaining fire watch personnel have been reinstructed on the consequences.of falsifying records. 'New personnel receive this s training throt.gh Ger.eral Employee Training Category I and all personnel through the GET Requalification program. As an additional reminder a plant bulletin will be issued by September 22, 1989 to further reinforce this polic . The' fire watch personnel have also received written instruction to make all entries on the fire watch logs consecutively and that no lines are to be " skipped".

V Date of Full Comoliance HIAP is in full compliance at this tim I o

A1/014.NL6 2

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