IR 05000498/1989004
| ML20245C575 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1989 |
| From: | Holler E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245C572 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-89-04, 50-498-89-4, 50-499-89-04, 50-499-89-4, NUDOCS 8904270246 | |
| Download: ML20245C575 (13) | |
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APPENDIX B U. S. NUCLEAR. REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-498/89-04 Operating License:
NPF-76 50-499/89-04 NPF-78 Dockets:
50-498 50-499 Licensee:
Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)
P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Facility Name:
South Texas Project (STP), Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
STP, Matagorda County, Texas Inspection Conducte.d: February 1-28, 1989 Inspectors:
J. E. Bess, Senior Resident Inspector, Unit 1, Project Section D, Division of. Reactor Projects J. I. Tapia, Senior Resident Inspector, Unit 2, Project Section D, Division of Reactor Projects R. J. Evans, Resident Inspector, Project Section D, Division of Reactor Projects D. L. Garrison, Resident Inspector, Project Section D, Division of Reactor Projects Approved:
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Holler, Chief, Project Section D Dfate Division of Reactor Projects 8904270D46 090419 l
DR ADDCK 05000498 l
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l Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted February 1-P8,1989 (Report 50-498/89-04)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection included plant status, engineered safety feature system walkdown, monthly maintenance observations, monthly surveillance observations, and operational safety verification.
'Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified (operating without taking 4-hour grab samples while the Gaseous Waste Processing System Oxygen Analyzer was inoperable, paragraph 6). The licensee successfully completed the disassembly and inspection of the main generator. A hydrogen fire associated with the generator had caused the licensee to manually trip the turbine. See NRC Inspection Report 50-498/89-02; 50-499/89-02. The Bottom Mounted Instrumentation (BMI) inspection scheduled to start in late February 1989, was completed in conjunction with the generator inspection. A number of discrepancies regarding procedure steps and equipment labeling were identified -
for inclusion in the licensee's plant operations procedure programs (see paragraph 4). Weaknesses were noted in the licensee's attention to detail regarding required entries in the Control Room Logbook (see paragraph 7). The failure of various alarms to function correctly during the exercise of an i
emergency drill was noted. The licensee inspection and repair of the main generator and the completion of +he BMI inspections indicated that the maintenance program is functioning as required.
Inspection Conducted February 1-28, 1989 (Report 50-499/89-04)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection included plant status and review of startup testing activities and procedures.
I Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. The licensee went from Mode 5 to Mode 3 for the first time during this inspection period. Hot precritical testing has been ongoing with moderate success. Mode 3 was achieved 1 day ahead of the licensee's schedule. Since starting hot precritical testing, the licensee has replaced seals on two residual heat removal (RHR) and one reactor coolant system (RCS) pump. At the end of this inspection period, the licensee was repairing the steam supply valve and governor to the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) turbine driven pump.
j These components were causing an overspeed trip each time the pump was started, j
Observation of the 11censee's preparation for achieving initial criticality
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indicates a planned program that reflects management attention.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- P. L. Walker,- Senior Licensing Engineer
- W. H. Kinsey, Plant Manager
- W. Harrison, Supervisor Engineer
- J. 'J. Nesrsta, Plant Engineering Departmental Manager
- W. S. Blair,- Maintenance
- J. W. Loesch, Plant Operations
- A. C. McIntyre Manager, Support Engineering
- W. L. Mutz, Manager, Integrated Planning Schedule R._ Lovel, Technical Service
- M. H. Carnley, I&C Maintenance
- J. R. Fast, I&C Maintenance
- M. R. Wisenburg, Plant Superintendent, Unit 1
- J. E. Geiger, General Manager Nuclear Assurance
- T. Mitchell, Plant Operations
- S. Head Supervisor, Licensing Engineering T. A. Godsey, Initial Startup Test Director G. lL. Parkey, Plant Superintendent, Unit 2 In addition to the above, the NRC inspectors also held discussions with various licensee, architect engineer (AE), maintenance, and other contractor personnel during this inspection.
- Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview conducted on March 2, 1989.
2.
-Plant Status STP, Unit 1, remained in Mode 5 (cold shutdown) throughout most of this inspection period. The plant was shut down on January 20, 1989, when there were indications of a fire in the main generator (see NRC Inspection-Report 50-498/89-02; 50-499/89-02). The generator was disassembled and inspected to determine the root cause of the fire. An investigation was completed and the cause and corrective action will be documented in Licensee Event Report (LER)89-005. Also in conjunction with the repair of the generator, the bottom mounted instrumentation (BMI) inspection scheduled to start in late February 1989, was completed. The
~ modifications to the BMI included installation of Magnetic Ball Check Valves, repositioning 21 thimbles, removing the caps (previously capped)
on 4 thimbles, and capping and repositioning 6 thimbles.
At the end of this inspection period, STP, Unit 1, was in Mode 3.
l The licensee began this inspection period with Unit 2 in Mode 5, concluding cold precritical testing activities. Mode 4 was achieved on February 14, 1989, and Mode 3 on February 21, 1989. The major activities u
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witnessed during this time were ongoing hot precritical tests, such as thermal expansion monitoring, pressurizer spray and heater capability, and reactor. coolant system flow measurement at hot standby.
Major maintenance activities occurring during this inspection period included completion of the'No. 1 seal changeout on the "A" reactor coolant pump, seal changeout on the "C"'RHR pump, and repair of the steam supply valve and governor to the AFW steam turbine.
The unit remained in Mode 3 at the end of the inspection period.
3.
Licensee Act. ion on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Open Item.(498/8867-01).
Containment Spray Train B Instrumentation Calibration - In NRC Inrpection Report 50-498/88-67; 50-499/88-67, the calibration history of instruments in the Train B containment spray system was inspected.
Discrepancies in calibration frequencies were identified and reported to the licensee.
Since the previous inspection, Procedure OPGP03-ZM-0016, Revision 1,
" Installed Plant Instrumentation Calibration Verification Program," was revised to include all containment spray instrumentation noted by the NRC inspector.
A calibration frequency was clearly established per revised Procedure OPGP03-ZM-0016.
Instrument calibrations have been checked or are scheduled for a calibration check under the licensee's preventive maintenance program.
4.
Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown - Unit 1 (71710,)_
W'dlkdoWns Were performed on Train C of the Safety Injection (SI) system to independently verify the status of the ESF system.
A review of the system was performed to confirm that the licensee's system lineup procedure matched plant drawings and the as-built configuration.
Equipment condition, valve positions, breaker positions, housekeeping, labelling, instrument calibration history, and operability of essential support systems were observed.
A review of Procedure 1 POP 02-SI-0002, " Safety Injection System Initial Lineup," Revision 8, was performed, including a comparison of the procedure to the current system piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID).
The procedure was also compared to as-built conditions during a plant walkdown.
The following observations were presented to licensee management:
Mep 2.1.1 listed the SI system P& ids used as references.
The revision number on two of the P& ids (5N129F05013 No. 1 and SN129F05015 No. 1) was Revision 9.
Revision 10 of the drawings was issued in August 1988.
The procedure was approved in November 1988.
This indicates the procedure was approved with out of date references.
However, changes between Revision 9 and 10 did not have an effect on system operabilit,
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1 The discrepancies identified above were presented to the licensee.for inclusion in its plant operations procedure update program which the licensee has undertaken to assure technical and editorial adequacy of procedures. All valves and power supplies were found to be in the position required for Mode 5 operation. Housekeeping was considered adequate inside and outside containment during the inspection.
Additionally, equipment condition overall was considered acceptable. No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspection.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observations - Unit 1 (62703)
Portions of selected maintenance activities were observed to ascertain whether the activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures. The activities included:
Preventive Maintenance (PM) Procedure EM-1-CH-88008222, Revision IB,
" Essential Chiller 12C Inspection" Maintenance Work Request (MWR) CH-71140 on Essential Chiller 12C (investigate and repair cause of chiller trip on low oil pressure)
Procedure OPMP05-CH-0001, Revision 1, " York Chiller Inspection and Maintenance" The NRC inspector determined through observations that redundant components were operable, the correct replacement parts were used, and the completed data packages were acceptable. The technicians performing the maintenance appeared competent and knowledgeable. Additionally, postmaintenance inspections for housekeeping was performed and no cleanliness concerns were identified.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspection.
6.
Monthly Surveillance Observations - Unit 1 (61726)
An inspection of licensee surveillance activities was performed to ascertain whether the surveillance of safety significant systems and components was being conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS)andotherrequirements. The following surveillance tests were observed and reviewed:
IPSP02-RC-0403, "RCS COMS T HOT Set 2 ACOT," Revision 2 1 PSP 02-RC-0404, "RCS COMS T COLD Set 3 ACOT," Revision 2
The NRC inspector verified that testing was performed using approved procedures, measuring and test equipment was properly calibrated, and final test data was within acceptance criteria limits. Specific items noted during the review and observations of the procedure included (due to I
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5 Valve 1-SI-0126C was shown on P&ID 5N129F05015 No. 1, Revision 10, as a normally closed valve, not a locked closed valve. The licensee's locked valve program required the valve to be locked. The same valves in the Trains A and B were identified on P& ids as locked closed valves. The P&ID needs to be revised to identify 1-SI-0126C
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as a locked closed valve.
Labelling inconsistencies were observed in the procedure. For
example, in the Train C initial lineup (IPOP02-SI-0002-9),
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Valve 1-SI-M0V-0016C was identified as Emergency Sump IC Suction Valve, but was identified as CNTMT Sump To SI SUCT HDR on Panel 1-CP001.
Valve 1-SI-FV-3962 was identified as HHSI Pump Cold Leg Test Line Isolation Valve in the lineup, but was identified as
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HHSI Tc UPSTREAM on Panel 1-CP001.
In lineup (-13),
Valve 1-SI-FV-3983 was identified as Common N2 Supply Isolation j
Valve, but was identified as HDR OCIV on Panel 1-CP001.
Valve locations for Valves 1-SI-00720,1-SI-00700, and 1-SI-0229 were either missing or incorrect on the initial lineup (-9).
Valves elevation of the valves on lineup (-9)g the room location and located inside containment were missin Additionally,
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Valve 1-SI-0121C was identified on lineup (-9) as an isolation valve, but should have been identified as a vent valve.
In lineup (-9), the electrical lineup location for 3-SI-M0V-0006C was identified as E1C, but should have been identified as MCC E1C1 to agree with as-built plant conditions. Additionally, in lineup (-10),
the electrical lineup location for the C Train Room Fan Cooler SWGR was E1C, but should have been identified as MCC E1C2.
In the accumulators initial lineup (-13), a typographical error was
noted in the name column for 1-SI-0043C. The valve was incorrectly identified as a PT-0065 isolation valve. This valve should have been
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I identified as PT-0965 isolation valve. Also, Valve 1-SI-0237 was identified as a locked closed valve in lineup (-13). The last valve lineup using Revision 7 of this procedure was performed on May 12, 1988, and the valve was checked as locked closed. The valve was not locked in the field. However, the appropriate procedure governing the locked valve program, which is consistent with the P&ID, does not require the valve to be locked closed. The required position for Valve 1-SI-0237 in the current revision of the procedure should be CLOSED, not LOCKED CLOSED. A typographical error was noted on the local nameplate for Instrument Isolation Valve 1-SI-0043C.
Instrument PT965 was incorrectly identified as PT0695 on the nameplate.
The system vent lineup (-16) was noted to be missing three vent points at Valves 1-SI-01010, 1-SI-0147, and 1-SI-0239. The system instrument vent checklist (-17) was noted to be missing instruments i
l associated with the accumulators (1-SI-PT-964, PT-965, LT-954, and LT-955).
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the similarity between the two procedures, all comments apply to both
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procedures unless specifically noted):
Labelling discrepancies were noted in the procedures.
For example,
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in Step 6.3, the red pen of recorder NIRC-TR-0413 was called RCS Temp i
W/R Th Loop 1.
The red pen was identified as LP1 HOT LG W-RNG TEMP
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in the control. room. Also, Annunciator Panel SM02 (as labelled in the control room) was identified as 1-05M-2 in Steps 6.4, 7.4.7, and 7.8.8.
In Step 7.4.3, the titles for Annunciator 1-21M-1 Windows 1A and 3A
were reversed.
In Step 7.4.3, Annunciator Panel 21M01 (as labelled in the control room) was identified as 1-21M-1.
During the performance of IPSP02-RC-0403, Step 7.7.3, the as-found trip value for Circuit 1 of Card P02-0830 was out of acceptance criteria limits. The technicians stopped the test and informed the shift supervisor (actions required by Step 7.3).
An MWR (BS-71196)
was written to readjust a second card, P02-0534.
Following completion of the MWR, the surveillance test was reperformed and all values were left within acceptance criteria limits.
Section 8.0 of 1 PSP 02-RC-0403 lists the surveillance test acceptance criteria. Step 8.2 states, "AS FOUND values shall be within Technical Specification Allowable Values." However, there were no TS allowable values in either 1 PSP 02-RC-0403 or IPSP02-RC-0404. Data Package IPSP02-RC-0403-1 does list a TS allowable setpoint, which was different from an allowable value.
This wording resulted in the technicians stopping the test, although it was not required, which was a conservative action.
Per discussions with I&C Supervisors, the wording of the sections that caused some confusion will be revised to clarify the intent of the procedure.
In conclusion, the as-left values were within acceptance criteria limits and a technical review of the procedures did not indicate any discrepancies.
On February 8,1989, during the review of the Overdue Surveillance Report, licensee personnel discovered that the monthly Analog Channel Operational Test for the Gaseous Waste Processing System Oxygen Analyzer exceeded its allowed surveillance interval. The grace period for this surveillance test terminated on February 5,1989. The Limiting Condition for Operations for TS 3.3.3.11 was not satisfied by taking grab samples of the Gaseous Waste Processing System every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for the period of February 5-8, 1989. This is an apparent violation of TS 3.3.3.11.
The licensee issued LER 89-007 to discuss the event, causes, and corrective action. No written response to this violation is required.
Followup and closeout of this violation will be performed in conjunction with LER 89-007 (Violation 498/8904-01).
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7.
Operational Safety Verification - Unit 1 (71707)
The objectives of this inspection by the NRC inspectors were to conduct reviews and observe selected activities to verify that the facility is being operated in conformance with NRC requirements and the TS. This inspection also included verifying that selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program were being implemented in accordance with approved procedures, and that the licensee was in compliance with its approved physical security plan.
The NRC inspector was in the control room on a daily basis and verified that:
Operations personnel decorum was appropriate.
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The control room was free from distractions such as nonwork-related reading materials.
Operators were adhering to approved procedures for ongoing activities.
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I Proper control room str.ffing was maintained.
On February 9,1989, while reviewing the Control Room Logbook, the NRC inspector acted that an offsite notification made to NRC Headquarters on February 8,1989, had not been entered into the Control Room Logbook. The NRC inspector brought this to the attention of the shift supervisor. The NRC inspector noted that Plant Operation Procedure OPOP01-ZQ-0030, Revision 5, Step 6.2.3.6, states in part, that any official off-site notification of potential reportable occurrences is a required entry in the Control Room Logbook. The shift supervisor indicated that this was an oversight and would be corrected imediately. The NRC inspector informed the shift supervisor that even though this matter did not appear to have any direct safety significance, it indicated a lack of attention to details as well as the failure to follow procedures. Previous inspections by the NRC inspector had not identified this type of concern and the inspector concluded that' this incident was an isolated case. The NRC inspector will continue to monitor entries in the control room logbook to ensure entries are made in accordance with written procedures.
Tours were conducted in various locations of the plant to observe work and operations in progress. Radiological work practices, posting of barriers, and proper use of personnel dosimetry were observed.
The NRC inspector verified, on a sampling basis, that the licensee's security force was functioning in compliance with the approved physical security plan. Search equipment such as X-ray machines, metal detectors, and explosive detectors were observed to be operational.
The licensee conducted an emergency drill on February 15, 1989. Region IV NRC personnel participated in the dHil on a limited basis. The drill
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simulated events that placed the plant into a General Emergency situation.
Procedure OEPP01-ZA-0002, Revision 4. " Emergency Direction,"'provided instructions to sound the station alarm prior to reading energency instructions to onsite personnel. When the emergency director (position was filled by shift supervisor at that time) tried to actuate the site evacuation alarm as part of the drill scenario, the alarm failed to actuate twice.
Instead of the site evacuation alarm, the containment evacuation alarm sounded twice. When a third attempt was made to sound the site evacuation alarm by actuating the fire alarm, the fire alarm sounded.
The licensee performed followup testing from other consoles onsite. Each test resulted in the same alarm disfunction. Subsequently, the licensee found a wiring error in the alarm panel, located in the communications room. Modifications had been made to the alarm system prior to the test.
Licensee personnel maintain that the alarms were successfully tested twice after the modifications -- once immediately after the modifications and once during a weekly test 2 days before the drill.
If an actual emergency had occurred and operations were unable to sound the alarm, the plant public address (PA) system could have been used to ensure plant personnel were adequately informed of the situation.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspection.
8.
Startup Procedure Review - Unit 2 (72300)
An inspection was conducted of selected startup test procedures to determine their technical and administrative adequacy. The following attributes, as applicable, were specifically addressed:
Management approval is indicated.
- Procedure format is consistent with ANSI N18.7 and Regulatory Guide 1.68.
Test objectives are clearly stated.
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Pertinent prerequisites are identified, e.g.:
I Required plant systems are specified.
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Proper facility procedures are specified.
Completion of calibration checks, limit switch settings and c.
protective device settings are included where applicable.
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Special supplies and test equipment are specified.
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Initial test conditions are specified, e.g.:
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Valve lineups.
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Electrical power and control requirements.
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Temporary installations (instrumentation, electrical, and piping).
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Temperatures, pressures, flows.
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Water chemistry.
The procedure includes a section listing references to appropriate
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) sections, technical
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specifications, drawings, specifications, codes, and other requirements.
Step-by-step instructions for the performance of the procedure are
- complete to the extent necessary to ensure that test objectives are met.
Spaces are provided for initiating that all ite e, including
prerequisites, are verified as having been perfom 3.
Provision is made for recording details of the condu;t of the test,
including observed deficiencies, their resolution, and retest.
Procedure requires that temporary connections, disconnections, or
jumpers be restored to normal.
Procedure provides-for identification of personnel conducting the testing and evaluating the test data.
Procedure provides for quality control verification of critical steps or parameters.
The procedure, as issued, is consistent with the test description provided in the FSAR.
Special precautions for personnel and equipment safety are specified.
- Detailed instructions specify testing over the full operating range
and under the maximum anticipated load change of the system / component, i
Provision is made for the data taker to indicate the acceptability of
the data.
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The following specific procedures were reviewed:
Station Procedure 2 PEP 04-ZA-0001,. Revision 0, " Initial Startup Test
Program Sequence and Administration" Station Procedure.2 PEPO 4-ZA-0002, Revision 0, " Qualification' and Certification of Initial Startup. Test Personnel"
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Station Procedure 2 PEP 04-ZA-0003 Revision 0, " Documentation of Initial Startup Test Results"-
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Station Procedure 2 PEPO 4-ZG-0007, Revision 1, " Reactor Coolant System Flow Measurement at Power" Station Procedure 2 PEP 04-ZG-0008, Revision 1, " Thermal Expansion
Monitoring Test" Station Procedure.2 PEPO 4-ZL-0050, Revision 1, " Test Sequence for
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Precritical Testing" Station Procedure 2 PEP 04-ZL-0053, Revision 0, " Control of Margin of Saturation" Station Procedure 2 PEP 04-ZL-0054,~ Revision 1, " Reactor Coolant System
Flow Measurement at Hot Standby" Station Procedure 2 PEP 04-ZL-0057, Revision 0, " Rod Position IndicationSystemTest(HOT)"
Stetion Procedure 2 PEP 04-ZL-0062, Revision 0, "RCS Flow Coastdown
Measurement" Station Procedure 2 PEP 04-ZL-0063, Revision 0, " Precritical Alignment
of Process Temperature Instrumentation" Station Procedure 2 PEP 04-ZL-0064, Revision 0, " Pre-Critical
Calibration Check of Feedwater and Steam Flow Instrumentation" Station Procedure 2 PEP 04-ZX-0001, Revision 0, " Test Sequence for
Initial Criticality and Low Power Testing" Station Procedure 2 PEP 04-ZX-0002, Revision 0, " Initial Criticality" The ' procedures reviewed indicated consistent evidence of prior planning and the steps for the control of activities were well stated and explicit.
These startup test procedures were not reviewed for adequacy with respect to previously identified labeling problems, but rather, they were subject i... _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___
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i to review primarily with technical adequacy in mind. As such these
procedures were found to provide a clear understanding of the technical requirements for startup testing.
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No violations or deviations were identified during this portion of the inspection.
9.
Startup Test Witnessing and Observation - Unit 2 (70302)
The NRC inspector observed the performance of portions of five startup tests in order to ascertain whether the licensee was correctly implementing the startup testing program.
Several of these startup tests were conducted over a period in excess of one week. The following specific activities were observed:
The thermal expansion monitoring test, conducted per Station Procedure 2 PEP 04-ZG-0008 Revision 1.
This test provided verification that the piping, supports, and associated components are not restrained from moving due to themal expansion. The acquired thermal expansion data is to be used by Bechtel Engineering to verify that the observed piping movements conform with applicable Piping Design Criteria stated in the FSAR. This test also provided for measurement of the thermal movement of safety-related snubbers. As a result of this test, ten snubbers on the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) system, which did not exhibit the resistance that they should have, were replaced.
The concrete temperature measurements, conducted per Station
Procedure 2 PEP 04-ZG-0009, Revision 0.
This test provided the required data necessary to perform an evaluation of concrete temperatures in proximity to hot containment mechanical penetrations.
The NRC inspector selected the primary sample lines that penetrate the containment wall at Elevation 30 feet and azimuth 27 degrees for witnessing. This penetration consisted of (6) 1-inch pipes at penetration No. M85. The procedure requires that the penetration wall concrete / sleeve not exceed 200 F when the systems are operating in their hotest service mode. Measurements were made using a calibrated hand held surface pyrometer and the test results were recorded on specific data sheets. A comitment in the response to fdAR Question 640.08n.5w concerned the provision for a preoperational test description of containment penetration coolers and a provision
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for a startup test description that would demonstrate that concrete around certain penetrations does not exceed design limits. The licensee committed to a heat transfer analysis for piping penetrations having operating temperature above 200 F which would be mechanically cooled. This design criteria was incorporated into the test procedure. The NRC inspector witnessed the temperature measurements that were taken on three primary sample lines and Penetration Sleeve M85 and it was found that this and other data noted on the test data sheet was in accordance with the test criteria.
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The determination of the heatup factor during the hot precritical
test sequence for use in determining the signal to noise ratio of the plant source range channels, accomplished using Station
Procedure 2 PEPO 4-ZL-0050, Revision 1.
The acquisition of the data used to calculate the heatup factor was monitored by the NRC inspector.
The determination of the pressurizer spray and heater capability
utilizing Station Procedure 2 PEP 04-ZL-0052, Revision 0.
This test also served to establish an optimum setting for the pressurizer spray manual bypass valves and to verify the spray line low temperature alans setpoints. The pressurizer spray effectiveness was determined by monitoring the pressure transient that occurs by turning off all pressurizer heaters and fully opening both pressurizer power operated spray valves.
Conversely, the pressurizer heater effectiveness was determined by monitoring the pressure transient that occurs by turning on all pressurizer heaters.
During the conduct of this test, the NRC inspector witnessed the licensee's quality assurance department surveillance implementation. The surveillance being l
implemented demonstrated the licensee's ability to effectively perform self-assessment of work in progress.
Reactor coolant system flow measurement at hot standby utilizing
Station Procedure 2 PEPO 4-ZL-0054, Revision 1.
This. test utilizes data obtained from installed elbow tap differential pressure instrumentation to calculate the flowrate.
The licensee's performance of the witnessed startup tests indicated that there is consistent evidence of good prior planning and adherence to procedures. The licensee's activities included independent verifications of adherence tn procedures and also manage.nent involvement in the overview l
of the startup program. Necessary corrective action was effected in a l
technically sound manner. The NRC inspector noted that the licensee's performance was professional and resulted in a technically sound l
implementation of the startup program.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspection.
10. Exit Interview The NRC inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) March 2,1989. The NRC inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee did not identify as proprietary
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any of the information provided to, or reviewed by, the NRC inspectors.
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