IR 05000498/1989013
| ML20246D231 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1989 |
| From: | Holler E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246D142 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-89-13, 50-499-89-13, NUDOCS 8907110263 | |
| Download: ML20246D231 (18) | |
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APPENDIX
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U.5. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'
REGION IV'
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SNRCInspectionReport:
50-498/89-13 Operating Licenses:
NPF-76 50-499/89-13
.NPF-80 Dockets:
50-498
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.50-499 Licensee:
Houston' Lighting & Power, Company (HL&P)
P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001
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Facility Name:
South Texas Project'(STP), Units 1.and 2.
Inspection At:
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Inspection Conducted: May 1-31,.1989 Inspectors:
J. E. Bess, Senior Resident Inspector, Unit 1, Project Section D, Division of Reactor Projects J. I. Tapia,. Senior Resident Inspector, Unit 2, Froject Section D, Division of Reactor Projects R. J. Evans, Resident Inspector, Unit 1, Project Section D, Division of Reactor. Projects'
D. L Garrison, Resident Inspector, Unit 2, Project Section D, Division of Reactor Projects
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Approved:
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E. J. Holler, Chief, Project Section D Date Division of Reactor Projects Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted May 1-31, 1989 (Report 50-498/89-13; 50-499/89-13)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection included plant status, onsite followup of plant events, licensee action on previous inspection findings, engineered safety feature system walkdown, monthly maintenance observations, operational safety verification, monthly surveillance observations', balance of
- plant inspection, plant surveillance program, loss of offsite power test, and shutdown from outside the control room.
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8907110263 890703 PDR ADOCK 05000498 O
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-2-Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified. There were. discrepancies regarding procedural nomenclatures, equipment labeling,
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switches in incorrect positions, and instrumentation setpoints differing from j
the instrument setpoint index.
These discrepancies were identified to the licencee for inclusion in the licensee's plant operation procedure program (see paragraph 5).
There appeared to be absence of attention regarding housekeeping efforts in Diesel Generator Building Rooms 21 and 23 (see paragraph 5).
Weaknesses.were.noted in the implementation of electrical surveillance
. procedures (see paragraph 6).
There were numerous concerns regarding the condition of some balance of plant (BOP) systems (see paragraph 9).
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t DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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- P. H. Walker, Senior Licensing Engineer
- G. L. Parkey, Plant Superintendent, Unit 2
- G. E. Vaughn, Vice President, Nuclear Operat:ons
- R. W. Chewning, Vice President, Nuclear Assurance
- T. J. Jordan, Plant Engineering Manager
- A. W. Harrison, Supervising Licensing Engineer
- M. A. McBurnett, Licensing Manager
- A. C. McIntyre, Manager, Support Engineer
- J. R. Lovell, Technical Service Manager
- W. J. Jump, Maintenance Manager
- S. M. Head, Support Licensing Engineer
- S. M. Shropshire, Central Power & Light
- W. A. Randlett, Security Manager
- J. E. Geiger, General Manager, Nuclear Assurance
- W. H. Kinsey, Plant Manager In addition to the above, the NRC inspectors also held discussions with various licensee, architect engineer (AE), maintenance, and other contractor personnel during this inspection.
" Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview conducted on June 1, 1989.
2.
Plant Status Unit 1 began this inspection period at 100 percent reactor' power.
On May 12, 1989, the licensee identified primary system coolant leakage of approximately 6 gallons per minute.
The licensee reduced reactor power to approximately 15 percent, made a' containment entry, and repaired a leak in an alternate charging valve.
Tha unit was returned to 100 percent reactor thermal power on May 15, 1989.
At the end of this inspection period, Unit I was at 100 percent reactor thermal power.
Unit 2 began this inspection period with work continuing on the reassembly of the main turbine after successfully identifying and repairing the source of a noise near No. 8 bearing.
This noise caused the licensee to shut down Unit.2 toward the end of the previous inspection period.
During this inspection period, the licensee successfully completed power ascension testing through the 50 percent thermal power plateau.
At the end of this inspection period, Unit 2 was at 75 percent reactor thermal power, commencing power ascension testing at that power plateau.
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3.
Onsite. Followup of Plant' Events - Unit 2 (93702)
On May 12, 1989, at'2:25 p m., with'the reactor at 30 percent power, a Notification of an._ Unusual Event (NOUE) was declared in Unit 2 when two of the four pressurizer level indication channels were declared inoperable.'
Technical Specifications (TS) for the plant require that at least three.of -
l the four channels be in operation at all times.
Earlier in the week, one of the pressurizer level indication channels had failed.
Corrective maintenance was being performed on that channel.
A second channel started oscillating and drifted beyond the channel check range during a load swing test and was declared inoperable.
The loss of two chanels required an orderly shutdown of the plant. The plant was shut down and the NOUE was terminated at 7:54 p.m. on May 12, 1989.
Initial investigation indicated that an isolation valve associated with the line to the condensing pot of the pressurizer level indication reference leg had the valve disc stuck on the valve seat. The licensee rt'.urned to service the level indication channel that was out of service i
for maintenance.
On May 14, 1989, at approximately 9 p.m., with three of the four pressurizer level indication channels operable, Unit 2 was taken critical. The NRC inspectors monitored the licensee's actions during resolution of the technical issues and found that the licensee's evaluations exhibited careful planning and were consistent with good engineering practice. The resident inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's actions regarding repair of the malfunctioning pressurizer level indicator channel.
On May 17, 1989, during plant startup, water was induced into the suction of the condenser vacuum pumps.in Unit 2.
The reactor was shut down.
The licensee _ initiated an investigation to determine the cause of the water induction.
Subsequent investigation revealed that the reactor operators were using a tygon tube level indication on the condenser hotwell.
This fluidtlevel indicator showed an erroneous level of 6 feet because it was connected at a secondary sample return line.
The actual level was 12 feet.
The licensee determined that the operations department had installed the tygon tube without following the procedure requirements of the temporary modification program.
This led to the installation not being reviewed by the engineering department for technical adequacy nor subsequently being subjected to administrative controls.
Although this installation involved a nonsafety related system, the NRC inspectors expressed concern because of the lack of procedural adherence in the area of temporary modifications.
The licensee plans to conduct a review of operating practices that could cause them to operate without adequate depth of design verification, control, and acceptance criteria for determining that the prescribed activities have been performed properly.
This review will be addressed in future inspections as corrective actions are completed by the licensee.
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection findings (Closed) Open Item 498/8908-01:.The NRC identified a concern regarding oscillating analog meters on the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel in NRC i
Inspection Report 50-498/89-08; 50-499/89-08.
Licensee investigation revealed a problem with a data link board, which was replaced.
The problem was corrected using Maintenance Work Request (MWR) AM-45483 on May 7, 1989.
Open Item 498/8908-01 is considered closed.
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Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown - Unit 2 (71710)
A walkdown of two ESF systems -- the diesel generator building (DGB)
heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC). system, and the fuel handling building (FHB) HVAC system -- were performed to independently verify the status of the systems.
A complete walkdown of the two systems was performed to verify their operability.
The system operating procedures and system piping and instrument diagrams (P& ids) were used and compared to as-built conditions.
Specific areas inspected included:
system lineup in accordance.with drawings and procedures, adequacy of housekeeping, system components operability, instrumentation 7' settings, and operability of support systems equipment servicing and maintenance.
The DGB HVAC system was inspected using Procedure 2 POP 02-HG-0001, i
Revision 1, " Diesel Generator Building HVAC," and P&ID SV139V00015 #2,
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Revision 11, "HVAC Diesel Generator Building." Items noted during the inspection included:
l Procedure 2P0P02-HG-0001, Revision 1, was approved January 13, 1989, f
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and contained only one reference, which was Revi:, ion 9 of the system i
P&ID.
The NRC inspector found that Revision 10 of the P&ID was approved in March 1988, and Revision 11 of tne P&ID was approved in November 1988.
This procedure was approved with out-of-date references.
Additionally, the references should have included TS 3.7.13, " Area Temperature Monitoring," which includes maximum allowed temperatures for the standby diesel generator rooms.
Procedures approved with out-of-date references were noted to the licensee in NRC Inspection Report 50-498/89-04; 50-499/89-04, paragraph 4, which predated the issuance of Procedure 2 POP 02-H6-0001, Revision 1.
The NRC inspectors are following the licensee's efforts to address this issue.
Step 6.1.3 of Procedure 2 POP 02-HG-0001 instructed the operator to hold the exhaust, fan handswitch in stop until the exhaust damper indicates closed.
The step did not require verification that the fan actually stopped.
Section 7.1 provided instructions to realign the system to normal mode of operation following a diesel generator shutdown.
Section 7.1 did not require verification that the exhaust fan was running.
In the Electrical Lineup 2 POP 02-HG-0001-1, Circuit Breaker No. 2 of Distribution Panel (DP) 0571, was required to be on.
However, the
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't-6-B circuit breaker was noted to be in the tripped position.
The breaker l
supplied power to two nonsafety-related elect:ical unit heaters.
.i DP 0508 was' not labeled nor was there a list attached to the panel to identify which breakers were used or what equipment was supplied by which breaker.
Four electrical lineup panels were' incorrect because of typographical errors in the procedure.
DFB-435 and DPC-435 were both incorrectly identified as DPA-435 in the lineup.
Also Panels RR-1218 and RR-123C were incorrectly identified as RR-121A and RR-123A, respectively, in the lineup.
Controller and thermostat setpoints were inspected to verify if as-found settings were correct per the instrument setpoint index and a
instrument loop diagra'.ns.
Room Temperature Controllers TIC-9731 and l
TIC-9733 were found to be set at 70 F.
The instrument set point index stated that the controller should be set at 80 F.
Room Controller TIC-9732 was set at the lower limit of 78 F.
- Instrument PDISH-9750 (measures differential pressure across Filter FD002) was found set at 0.675 inches water column.
The required setpoint was 0.5 1 0.04 inches.
The instrument loop is nonsafety-related.
Area unit heater thermostats were inspected for proper settings.
The required setpoint is 55 F (no tolerance was given).
Of
.18 thermostats, 9 ~ ere found set at 55 F or within 5 F of 55 F, while w
9 were found set greater than 5 F from the required setpoint.
All instruments that were observed at incorrect setpoints were identified as nonsafety-related.
The needle on air supply gauge of FV-9746 on exhaust damper for DGB Room 21 had fallen off its mounting and was lying inside the bottom of the gauge.
Instrument PDIS-9739, Emergency Fan FN003 differential pressure, was missing its identification tag.
DGB Room 23 had a sign on the wall stating a fire extinguisher was located at that point, but there was no fire extinguisher in the immediate vicinity of the sign.
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Other observations were also noted:
a hose was found on the floor near diesel generator (DG) No. 23 with a startup department tag attached, the identification tag for Valve 2-LU-3140 was found on the floor, a large bag of rags was found behind Fan FN002, an empty soft drink can was found in DGB Room 21 control panel area (the area was in a Zone IV area, where no eating, drinking or use of tobacco is allowed), dirty rags used to soak up oil were located on the floor of DGB Rooms 21 and 23, and boxes of conduit / pipe clips were found on the floor of the DG No. 21 room.
The FHB HVAC system was inspected using Procedure 2 POP 02-HF-0002, Revision 3, "HVAC Fuel Handling Building," and P& ids 5V129V00012 #2, Revision 12, "HVAC FHB Supply System," and 3V129V00013 #2, Revision ll,
"HVAC FHB Exhaust System."
Items noted during the inspection included:
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Section'6.2 of the procedure provided instructions on how to place
exhaust and supply fans in service..The intent of Section'6.2 was.
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"similar to Steps 5.3 and.5.4, which also provided instructions on.
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starting the same: fans.. Steps 5.3 and'5.4 'provided more' instructions and information than Steps 6.2.1 and(6.2.2 provided.
It would seem Section'6.2 shmia b3 consistent with Section 5.0 regarding'the level
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Typographical errors were noted'in' Switch /8reaker Lineup
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Procedure.2 POP 02-HF-0001-2 and Instrumentation Checklist :
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u Procedure 2 POP 02-HF-0001-3.
In the. switch / breaker lineup, incorrect
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room. numbers were provided for Instruments TSH-9517, -9537, -9517A,-
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and -9537A.
In'the instrumentation checklist Instrument FY-9501C
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was incorrectly identified as FY-9501.
Five components were noted to be' incorrectly labelled at their power-supply breakers.. In each case, Component' Nos. 21A, --B, or -C were incorrectly identified as 11A, -B, or -C (Unit-1 designators) on the a
power' supply nameplates.
The components affected included Heaters'HX0008A, HX00088, and HX0008C; and' Supply Fans FN001 Land.
FN003.
Instrument FY-9501A, supply air flow control high limiter, -
'was missing its identification tag.
- Recorders'PDR-9341-(Cor; trol Room HVAC Filters OP) and PDR-9356 (FHB HVAC Exhaust: Filters DP) were missing engineering units'on their
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scales.. The meters measure a value,from 0 to'5 without identifying the! units (pounds per square inch or inches water column).
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- observation also applied to the same recorders in Unit 1.
Nonsafety-related Instrument PDIS-9570, main Exhaust Fan FN006 differential pressure, was found to be set-at 3.6 inches, a'value
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that was below the tolerance allowed for the'setpoint-(4.0 1 0.02-inches).
Nonsafety-related Controllers TIC-9523 and 9533, supply air heating coil temperature controllers, were found set at
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55 F.
The required setpoint was 50 F according=to,the instrument'
setpoint.index (no tolerance was provided).
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Controller FIC-9501, supply air fan inlet damper flow control, was observed to be oscillating between~setpoints.of 35-45,000 standard; cubic. feet / minute (scfm)-several times a minute.' This' oscillation
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resulted in rapid damper movement and caused actual supply air flow to vary between 28,000 and 38,000 scfm several times a minute (an MWR was written for the meter in March 1989).
This condition was reported to the' control room and the meter was reset to 50,000 scfm (maximum value).
The supply air flow then stabilized at 38,000. to 39,000 scfm.
Controller PDIC-9548, FHB i, side /outside damper
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control, was found to be incorrectly" set at 0.33 inches.
The required setpoint was0.2 i.01 inches'.
Four control switches were found to be incorrectly set in the field.
Nonsafety-related Duct Heaters HX001,,HX002' and HX003 control
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switches were found in the normal, after-trip position while the
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.i f uW required' position per Switch / Breaker' Lineup 2 POP 02-HF-0001-2 was normal after close. position. -The Post-Accident Sampling' System (PASS)
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b s control panel' room. air handling unit. controle switch was found in stop position, but was' supposed to.be in Auto position to maintain air temperature at'72 F.
Actual room temperature was observed to be above l72 F.
Procedure ~2 POP 02-HF-0001 did not provide instructions to sy
.repositi p ne four' switches.
The switches were repositioned by-opr e tions to their correct positions.
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EStep 6.1.2 of'the procedure provided instructions to,stop a supply m
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Lj fan by closing its respective inlet damper (fan automatically trips-off line).
On.the day of the inspection, Supply Fan 21B was found.in the OFF position,-but Inlet Damper'FV-9520.was fully open...
Apparently, operations personnel stopped the fan by.using the fan
' control switch, which-differed from requirements estab11shed byL-Step 6.1.2, When questioned abo,ut the open damper,'a unit supervisor said leaving the' damper open was preferable, because the fan would be allowed to autostart during certain plant evolutions (shutting relief
' supply dampers with the respective main exhaust fan running)..A tour
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of the Unit 1 control-room was performed.
It was noted that the-inlet damper was' shut for the supply fan-that was off, indicating Unit 1 compliance with Step 6.1.2 instructions.
Plant procedures should be.
consistent with actual operation of this nonsafety-related system.
/ Safety-related Controllers HIC-9507 and 9507A, exhaust air flow.
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controllers,,are required to be set at 29,400 scfm per Control Room-
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Switch ~ Lineup'2 POP 02-HF-0001-4 and Step 9.5.
The controllers were found to be. set at 28,000 cfm and 28,250 cfm in the Unit 2 control room. The required setpoint was 29,000 1 2900 scfm per TS 4.7.8.b.1
.and the system P&ID.
Procedure 2 POP 02-HF-0001 apparently.was performed by operations in November 1988._ Per copies of the completed'
procedure, Controllers HIC-9507 and 9507A were verified to have.been set at 29,400 scfm at that time.
The controllers had been adjusted since that verification.
However, the controllers were set within the i 10 percent tolerance allowed by TS.
A' licensee representative stated that Procedure 2 POP 02-HF-0001 will be revised to correct,the discrepancy.
The NRC inspector observed that the FHB was clean and well maintained.
However, electrical panels in the Electrical Auxiliary Building (Panels RR-132B, RR-138, RR-152, and RR-135) were noted to have a
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layer of dust on top of the components (wires, relays, fuses) in the panels.
A small. amount of wire, pieces of tape, plastic screws, metal screws, cable marker tags, and dirt were also. observed in the bottom
.of the panels (one' panel, RR-134C, was noted to be clean).
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspection.
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Monthly Maintenance Observations - Unit 1 (62703)
l Selected maintenance activities were observed to ascertain whether the l-activities were being conducted in accordance with approved procedures.
The performance of the following maintenance activities was observed:
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Preventive Maintenance Procedure (PM) EM-1-MB-89000587, Revision 0.d,
" Cleanup of Unit I Control Room Panels"'
Maintenance Work Order VM-75100, " Unit 2 High Head Safety Injection Pump C Vibration Monitor Troubleshooting" PM EM-2-PK-87016601, Revision 0.A, "Switchgear E20, Cubicle 3, Relay Calibration" 0PMP05-ZE-0033, Revision 1, " Calibration of ITE-GR-5 Relays" The NRC inspector verified that activities were being conducted in
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accordance with approved work instructions and prccedures, test equipment was within its current-calibration cycles, and housekeeping was being maintained in an acceptable manner.
During the performance of quarterly PM EM-1-MB-89000587, the NRC inspectors verified that the correct cleaning tools (nonmetallic brushes and vacuum hoses, lint free rags) were used.
A followup inspection was performed to verify that the work was accomplished in an acceptable manner.
In general, the panel's interiors were cleaned properly.
No equipment inside the panels-was found to be dirty.
Several pieces of equipment (one terminal board protective cover, one conduit elbow, and one cable connector) had missing bolts. These items were discussed with the licensee.
During the performance of PM EM-2-PK-87016601, a test of the 4.16KV ESF Switchgear E2C, Cubicle 3, 50N relay, was performed.
The relay was tested using Procedure OPMP05-ZE-0033. The relay could have been tested using any one of three test setups, as described in Addendums I, II, or III to Procedure OPMP05-ZE-0033.
The technicians decided to use Addendum II, which required use of one EPOCH I and one EPOCH IV test set.
The technicians connected the test equipment to the isolated relay per instructions provided in Addendum II.
When the technicians tried to perform the " pick-up amperes" test, unexpected test results occurred (the monitor light came on sooner than expected).
The test could not be completed using instructions provided by Addendum II.
The test was stopped and the foreman was consulted.
The foreman gave the technicians instructions to "de-bug" or troubleshoot the
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procedure to determine what actions were necessary to make the procedure work.
The technicians then proceeded to troubleshoot the procedure using the 50N relay, which was disconnected electrically from an energized ESF
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bus.
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-10-L. n The technicians determined that the wrong terminals of the relay were used p
in the procedure addendum. The procedure was returned to the procedure l
development group for revision.
Safety-related Procedure OPMP05-ZE-0033
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required revision for several reasons, including:
information provided by.
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the technicians needed to be incorporated to make Addendum II work correctly, results from an October 1988 biennial review had not been incorporated.
Comments on the procedure by the NRC inspector (incomplete'
' test equipment was referenced, several typographical errors were noted, and a field change request was incorrectly incorporated into the data package)
were provided to the licensee.
The licensee stated that the procedure would be revised extensively at the earliest practical time.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspection.
7.
Operational Safety Verification Unit 1 (71707)
The objectives of this inspection by the NRC inspectors were to review and observe selected activities to verify that the facility is being operated in conformance with NRC requirements and TS.
This inspection also included verifying that selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program were being implemented in accordance with approved procedure and in compliance with the licensee's approval physical security plan.
The NRC inspectors were in the control room on a daily basis and verified that:
The control room was free from distractions such as nonwork-related reading matter.
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Operators were adhering to approved procedures for ongoing activities.
Operators' behavior was commensurate with control room operations.
Proper control room staffing was maintained.
On May 13, 1989, the Essential Cooling Water (ECW) Ventilation Fan (3V151VFN006) Train "C" received extensive damage.
The damage in.luded broken rear motor mounts and sheared fan blades.
A Justification for Continuing Operation (JCO) was written on May 15, 1989.
The JC0 indicated that the ECW ventilation system for Train "1C" met its safety ventilation design basis with Fan 3V151VFN006 inoperable.
The NRC inspectors reviewed the design basis for the ECW system and the safety analysis performed by the licensee.
The results of these reviews indicated that one'ECW ventilation fan (there are two 50 percent capacity ventilation fans) is capable of providing support to Train "C" ECW equipment during normal and safe shutdown plant conditions.
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-11-Tours were conducted in various locations of the plant to observe work and operations in progress.
Proper radiological work practice and proper use of personnel dosimetry were observed.
The NRC inspectors verified, on a sampling basis, that the licensee's security force was functioning in compliance with the approved physical security plan.
Search equipment such as x-ray, machines, metal detectors, and explosive detectors were observed to be operational.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspection.
8.
Monthly Surveillance Observations - Unit 1 (61726)
Selected surveillance activities were observed to ascertain whether the surveillance of safety significant systems and components was being conducted in accordance with TS and other requirements.
The performance of the following procedures was observed:
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2 PSP 02-HC-0937, Revision 0, " Containment Pressure Set 1 ACOT (P-0937)"
2 PSP 02-RC-0455, Revision 0, " Pressurizer Pressure Set 1 ACOT (P-0455)"
The NRC inspectors verified that the procedures used were the most current available, test data taken was within acceptance criteria limits, test instrumentation used was within its current calibration cycles,'and technicians appeared competent and knowledgeable.. Additionally, a review of the procedures was performed, including.a comparison of the acceptance criteria limits to design basis documents.
No procedural or performance discrepancies were observed.
However, one meter in the control room, N2RC-TI-0412C, "0T/DT SP," was not' labelled by name.
The meter was labelled by identification number only.
The control room operator knew
the function of the meter.
i No violations or deviations were observed in this area of the irsspection.
9.
Balance of Plant (BOP) Inspection - Units 1 and 2 (71500)
The purpose of this inspection was to verify the effectiveness of the preventive maintenance programs for B0P systems, determine the adequacy of BOP operating procedures, and determine the effectiveness of management attention to correction of BOP problems.
a.
BOP Diesel Generators An inspection of the BOP diesel generator sets and a review of past work and' adequacy of procedures were performed in order to verify the effectiveness of the preventive and corrective maintenance programs l
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and to determine the. adequacy of operating procedure:i and effectiveness.of management attention to B0P areas.
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The B0P diesel generators (one per plant) are two-stroke,
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turbocharger V-12 Detroit diesels' rated'at 1000 hp and are coupled to'
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'Wankesha-Pearce 700 kw three phase, 60 cycle, 480 volt A.C. generators
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mounted on.a skid.
The. engine, generator, batteries and charger, ~
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fuel and oil tanks, cooling system, and~ control panel make up an i
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independent package.
The system is maintained. in standby Lin an
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automatic mode and is designed to start on plant loss of AC power.
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- Whenithe diesel. generator is at operating conditions, the' output U
ibreaker closes and energizes the turbine generator building (TGB).
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! emergency motor control center.
The'TGB supplies power to equipment
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the main ' generator and feedwater pumps.
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.(1) Fuel Oil
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The fuel oil'is D-2 grade,'which is a premium grade and is
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treated to prevent biological and chemical degradation in storage.
The licensee maintains applicable-procedures for
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receiving, testing, handling, and storage of fuel oil:
The following were reviewed:
POP 02-F0-0001 - Fuel oil storage and transfer PCP05-ZS-0005 - Sampling and treatment of the fuel oil system
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PCP05-ZS-0009 - Oil sampling in'the turbine generator building PCP01-ZA-0014 - Chemical laboratory sampling schedule i
It was found that the crankcase oil is sampled at regular intervals; however, no provision was made for sampling of the
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BOP fuel' oil-tank.
The chemical operations supervisor, in a
. discussion with the NRC inspectors, stated that the. tanks needed to be sampled.
Fuel oil samples were taken during the inspection.
Provisions to sample the fuel oil were added to the licensee fuel oil sampling plan.
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The NRC inspectors also noted a questionable. design feature. The fuel oil tank is 500 gallon capacity, cylindrical in shape and
. lying in a horizontal position.
The fuel-line to the engine is connected directly to the bottom of the tank.
There are no provisions to trap or separate water or prevent other contaminates from. entering the engine filters; also, the drain is
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not utilized to remove any undesirable fuel and is located at the l
opposite end of the tank.
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The.following-plant operating procedure was' reviewed:
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l POP 02-DB-0003, " Balance of Plant Diesel Generator;" IThis
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procedure was adequate in describing the' operators' functions in-
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' checkout, lineup, and' operation of the' unit when it is under T
'~; S their. control and in standby service.
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(3'). Per'formance Testing w>
'The NRC inspectors reviewed the applicable procedure, PEP 07-DB-0001, "B0P. Diesel Generator Performance Test."'LThisi procedure is:not complete.in its content la.s4far'as parameters-and indicated tests are concerned.
It was noted that the.
procedure ~in Step 5.6 states that.the generator should be-loaded'
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to 350-525 kilowatti(kw)'for the load: test.
The NRC: inspectors:
- determined that neither unit:has been load tested above 225 kw.
m zThe rated capacity of each generator is~700 kw. The reason'that
- the units have not been fully loaded is the absence of.a plant-
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load of that size.
Licensee consultants have recommended.that; a-
. portable load bank be constructed in order to fully test the a
DGs.
The performance and reliability testing is only performed quarterly and for approximately 30 minutes to an. hour.
This.
frequency and length of test may'not be adequate.as evidenced by.
several failures to start on demand or during less of_offsite power (LOOP) events.
Licensee engineering and the NRC. inspectors discussed this area. The licensee _ concluded that a weekly run of
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5 minutes unloaded and a quarterly run of 1 houp.at full load was appropriate and' that formal recommendations to do so would be
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generated and implemented:by the PM' group. -In the LOOP test'of
. May 16, 1989, the BOP diesel started and sequenced on as required, however, the engine had been run earlier in _ the-day by -
operations' personnel. The. starting of the engine was not considered a valid test because the engine was hot.
(4) Maintenance Procedure PMP05-08-0006, "B0P Diesel Maintenance," was reviewed for inclusion of manufacturer's recommendations and maintenance requirements and for documentation problem analysis.
The procedure appeared to be adequate, however, it was noted that several MWRs had been written against failed equipment but no
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action had been completed.
The list of failed equipment included a broken tachometer and questionable oil guage indications.
It was also indicated that the diesel would not start in manual.
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l (S) Preventive Maintenance (PM)
The PM program is addressed in PGP03-ZM-0002.
The PM program appears to be functioning as required.
A review of the records
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indicates that.the PM mechanical scheduling group is performing its required tasks on a regular basis.
However, the PM function only addressed routine greasing, checking of oil, water, batteries, and cleaning.
One concern noted in this area was excessive fuel oil accumulation on the exhaust manifolds and turbocharger which appears to be due to improper installation of
- the. exhaust system.
This problem, which could present a fire hazard, was discussed with fire protection and engineering by the NRC inspectors.
(6) Corrective Measures A licensee' task force has made recommendations which, if implemented, would resolve most of the problem areas and enhance the reliability factor for the B0P and other plant diesel generators.
Some of the recommendations were:
Investigate fuel tank problems.
' Install remote (manual) air shut off.
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Install explosion covers on the batteries.
- Provide a portable load bank.
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Revise performance test frequency.
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Remove and properly reinstall the turbocharger.
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. Implement corrective action for the emergency lighting, emergency operations center, and the technical support center diesel generator sets.
(7) Management It appears that adequate resources, in some instances, have not been allotted or priorities given to solve B0P component or system problems concerning the diesel generators and associated equipment.
Most personnel involved with the units have
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identified problem areas, however, the work is yet to be done.
(8) Conclusion BOP systems can challenge safety related systems or other systems that maintain safe plant operating conditions.
The B0P diesel generators should receive management attention to assure reliability and functioning of the equipment.
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Auxiliary Cooling Water System (ACWS)
The NRC inspectors also performed an inspection of the ACWS to determine if this BOP system could cause an adverse affect on safety-related components.
Du.ing this inspection, the NRC inspectors reviewed.the procedures listed below:
OPGP03-ZM-0002, Revision 17, "Nonsafety-Related Preventive Maintenance Program" OPEP07-ZE-0004, Revision 0, " Secondary Plant Monitoring and Routine Testing Program" 0PGP03-ZE-0004, Revision 0, " Lubrication Monitoring Program" A review of the above referenced procedures indicated that vendor and manufacturer recommendations were used i.1 the development of the PM programs.
The NRC inspectors performed a walkdown on portions of the closed loop ACWS.
Various components cooled by the ACWS system were inspected:
ACW Closed Loop Pumps ACW Instrument Air Emergency Cooling Water Pump Instrument Air Compressors Condenser Vacuum Pumps Surge and Chemical Addition Tank Maintenance history records were reviewed to ensure that preventive maintenance was performed in accordance with manufacturer recommendations.
The NRC inspectors verified that, in instances where manufacturer recommendations were not followed, justification was documented.
The following concerns were identified during this inspection:
The surge tank level controller (LC-6812) cover wts not locked.
The instrument, which is installed on the surge tank, is located at the 83-foot elevation of the turbine deck.
There is no protective covering on this elevation, therefore, the inside of the instrument had the potential to be exposed to the elements.
Excessive amounts of scaffolding were erected throughout the turbine building.
The steam generator blowdown flash tank level glass (LG-4182)
was leaking excessively.
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L Ladders were not secured in place.
- These findings were discussed with the licensee and the concerns were corrected prior to the end of'this' inspection period.'
The result of this inspection indicated that the B0P' area inspected is receiving adequate management attention.
Procedures and programs are in place that should ensure B0P equipment and systems will get adequate attention.
No violations or deviations were identified in t'. 3 area of the
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inspection.
10.
Plant Surveillance Program - Units 1 and 2 (61700)
Selected procedures and their contents were reviewed in order to assure that'the surveillance program requirements were established and that the licensee adhered to all aspects of the procedures. The NRC inspectors reviewed Procedures OPGP03-ZE-0004,< Revision 9, " Plant Surveillance Program," and OPGP03-ZA-0055, Revision 4, " Plant Surveillance Scheduling,"
for incorporation of basic requirements and responsibilities of plant-
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personnel that are responsible for-implementing the surveillance / test schedule.
The NRC inspectors reviewed the procedure responsibilities section in detail for establishment of site offices and personnel assigned to each function.
It was found that the scheduling is forthright and easily understood.
The surveillance package consists of only two documents.
One document, a working copy of the procedure and schedule sheet, which when completed is routed directly to the document control conter (OCC).
The other document is the Test Completion Notice (TCN),
which on completion is routed to the specific responsible scheduler for review and further routing to DCC.
Retrieval of the surveillance is based or, the procedure number and is relatively simple.
A computer tracking system maintained by the Plant Engineering Department tracks the entire program.
Surveillance are handled by technical services, engineering, maintenance, operations, offsite engineering, and construction.
The overall program, however, is monitored and managed by the plant engineering staff.
The NRC inspectors interviewed personnel and reviewed each functional area with the appropriate staff.
The NRC inspectors concluded that the procedures were adequate for their intended function and that the generated records were adequate and retrievable.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspection.
11.
Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) Test - Unit 2 (72582)
The NRC inspectors performed an inspection of the LOOP test to determine
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J whether the test was conducted consistent with TS.
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-17-The NRC inspectors reviewed Station Procedure 2 PEP 04-ZY-0034, Revision 1,
" Loss of Offsite Power Test," dated May 10, 1989.
The review determined that the procedure contained the following acceptance criteria:
verification that after a turbine and reactor trip, the emergency, power supplies provide adequate power to maintain the plant in a stable, hot standby condition for 30 minutes following a LOOP.
The procedure also required that personnel be positioned to monitor the status of emergency equipment and specific plant parameters.
The NRC inspectors observed the performance of the LOOP test for Unit 2 on May 16, 1989.
The test was performed by manually opening the switchyard breakers to isolate Unit 2 from offsite power sources and then manually opening the generator output breaker.
The NRC inspectors verified that
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the load transfers were accomplished, the emergency DGs started and loaded satisfactorily, and the plant pressure, pressurizer, and steam generator level controls operated satisfactorily.
Natural circulation was attained within 13 minutes.
Data was collected for the required 30 minutes and plant recovery was in accordance with procedures.
Although there were a number of minor equipment problems, the only significant problem encountered was the failure of an electrical breaker to open.
This breaker is a component related to Reactor Containment Fan Cooler 22A.
Preliminary indications were that the spring release coil on the breaker shorted out.
None of the problems encountered affected the test acceptance or the safe shutdown of the plant.
Overall crew performance was found to be correct and timcly during the performance of the test.
Adequate coordination was demonstrated.
Proper plant response to the test was successfully demonstrated.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspection.
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Shutdown from Outside the Control Room - Unit 2 (72583)
The NRC inspectors performed an inspection of the " Shutdown from Outside the Control Room Test" for Unit 2 to determine whether the test was consistent with regulatory requirements, license commitments, and TS.
The NRC inspectors reviewed Station Procedure 2 PEPO 4-ZY-00035, Revision 1,
" Shutdown from Outside the Control Room," dated May 12, 1989.
The review determined that the procedure contained the following acceptance criteria:
verification that the reactor trips, verification that the turbine generator trips, and verification that stable hot standby conditions are established and maintained by manipulation of controls at the auxiliary shutdown panel for at least 30 minutes, with no intervention required from the main control room.
The NRC inspectors observed the performance of the test on May 20, 1989.
The test was performed by simulating an evacuation of the main control j
room and dispatching the minimum required shift operating personnel to
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The reactor was tripped at the reacto'r trip
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switchgear.
The unit was then maintained in Hot Standby by manipulation l<
of controls on the auxiliary shutdown panel and other remote shutdown L
control locations for 45 minutes.
The test demonstrated the capability to shutdown the unit and to maintain it in a Hot Standby condition (Mode 3) from outside the main control room using the minimum number of. shift operating personnel.
Minimum crew requirements were met and test performance was found to be
. good. -Coordination between the various test locations was good.
The NRC inspectors'. observations verified that overall test acceptance criteria were met.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspection.
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Exit Interview-The NRC inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) on June 1, 1989.
The NRC inspectors summarized the scope and findings;of the inspection. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the information provided to, or reviewed by, the NRC inspectors.
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