IR 05000498/1989007
| ML20245J543 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1989 |
| From: | Chamberlain D, Holler E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245J530 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-89-07, 50-498-89-7, 50-499-89-07, 50-499-89-7, NUDOCS 8905040160 | |
| Download: ML20245J543 (16) | |
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APPENDIX B U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
i NRC Inspection Report:
50-498/89-07 Operating License:
NPF-76 50-499/89-07 Operating License:
NPF-78 Dockets: -50-498 50-499 Licensee:
Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)
P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas -77001 Facility Name:. South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP)
Inspection At:
ETP, Matagorda County, Texas Inspection Coaducted:
March 13-17, 1989
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Team Leader:
4-2b'87
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D. M Chamberlain, Chief, Project Section A Cate Division of Reactor Projects Team Members:
B. Bartlett, Senior Resident Inspector, Wolf Creek Generating Station R. E. Farrell, Senior Resident Inspector, Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station E. J. Ford, Senior Resident Inspector, River Bend Station R. P. Mullikin, Project Engineer, Reactor Project Section B Division of Reactor Projects J. S. Wiebe, Senior Project Inspector, Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station M
6/G7 Approved:
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E. J.' Holler, Chief, Project Section D Dqte
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Division of Reactor Projects l
Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted March 13-17, 1989 (Report 50-498/89-07)
i Areas Inspected:
Special, announced team inspection to review the licensee's actions on previously identified findings.
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.Results: The' licensee has completed their short term commitments'to findings b
, from the NRC's Operational Readiness Review Inspection. However,:long term commitments which are part of the licensee's Plant Operation Procedure Upgrade Program were stillLin progress.
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r Inspection Conducted March 13-17, 1989 (Report-50-499/89-07)
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' Areas. Inspected:
Special announced inspection to review the licensee's actions n
on previously identified findings, control room observations, shift turnover
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' observations,~ plant tours, maintenance observations, surveillance observations,-
safety. system walkdowns, system punchlist reviews, operator staffing, and management oversight of operational activities.
Results: The~NRC's review of the performance of the licensee's operational'
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activities indicate that the licensee's operations' staff is ' staffed by
- professional and competent personnel. The NRC findings from this inspection-are not indicative of an overall. generic problem in any area.
It is.the team's conclusion that the licensee's performance was satisfactory to assume full power operation.
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A violation was identified, with three examples of failure to follow procedures'
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(paragraphs 5.j(2), 8.d(1), 8.b(5), and 8.d(2)) and one example of an inadequate /
. procedure (paragraph 8.d(2))
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The team identified strengths in the licensed operators' ability and
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professionalism as well as management's involvement and oversight off operational activities.
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Weaknesses were identified in the following areas:
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o Procedure compliance
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o; Control of temporary scaffolding'
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Control'of doors
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o Control of combust'{ble material 0-Steam and er leaks
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y'~/,A(uipment nomenclature inconsistencies with
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o Control.of compressed gas cylinders
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- 1. " Pers'ons Contacted
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?J.JGoldberg,LGroup Vice President Nuclear j
W. Kinsey, Plant Manager
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J.;Loesch, Plant Operations Manager:
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V.'Simonis', Plant Operations Support Manager
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G. Parke, Plant Superintendent - Unit 2 k<
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L M. McBu? nett, Licensi'ng Manager
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.S. Dew,"OperationsfSupport Manager.
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S.'Rosen, Vice. President -iNuclear Engineering and Construction R. Chewning, Chairman -. Nuclear Safety Review Board
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.R.;Hernandez,LPrincipal. Engineer - Support Engineering
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f W.-Jump, Maintenance Manager.
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D. Leazar,' Reactor Support Division Manager L. Giles, Unit 2 Op'erations. Manager-H M. Wisenburg, Unit 1 Plant Superintendent
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G..Midkiff, Director - Integrated Site Engineering Grou'p-
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G. 'Weldon, Manager.- Operations. Training
'J. Labuda,iFire Protection Coordinator E
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R. Ferguso'n, Licensing Engineer S. Head,. Supervisor'- Licensing' Engineering W..Mutz,-Scheduling Manager
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C. Walker, Public Information Coordinator W. Randlett, Security Manager
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T. Jordan, Nuclear Plant Operations Department Director
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J. Geiger, General Manager - Nuclear Assurance J. Lovell, Technical-Services Manager-Central Power and Light V. Crain, Supervisor Bechtel C. O'Neil, Project Engineering Manager NRC E. Holler, Chief, Reactor Project Section D, Region IV s
G. i Dick, Senior Project Manager, NRR J. Tapia, Senior Resident Inspector, STP D. Garrison, Resident Inspector, STP.
All personnel listed above attended the exit interview conducted on March.17, 1989.
The NRC inspectors also interviewed other personnel during the inspection.
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bicensee'sActiononPrevious' Inspection-Findings'(92701and92702)
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'(Closed) Severity Level IV Violation.499/8872-01:
Lack of sufficient j
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information on-instrument air drawings.
.J This violation involved the Unit 2 instrument air drawings which 'did not provide sufficient information to describe'the entire safety-related instrument air system adequately. These drawings.did.
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. not show all of. the components supplied by instrument air.
.j LThe NRC inspectors reviewed the following instrument ' air drawings:-
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6Z-01-02-Z-45043, Revision 1,." Diesel Generator Building" E
o 6Z-01-02-2-45044, Revision 1, " Isolation Valve Cubicle" E
o 6Z-01-02-Z-45045, Sheets 1-3,5(Revision 1)'andSheet4 (Revision 0), " Balance of Plant" o
6Z-01-02-Z-45046, Revision 1 " Turbine Generator Building"
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6Z-01-02-Z-45047, Revision 1, " Mechanical Electrical Auxiliary o
Building" o
6Z-01-02-Z-45048, Revision 1, " Reactor Containment Building" o
6Z-01-02-Z-45049,. Revision 1, " Fuel Handling Building" The NRC inspectors reviewed the drawings. listed above against Department. Procedure 2P0PO4-IA-0001, Revision 1. " Loss of. Instrument Air," to. determine whether all. components listed in the procedure were shown on the drawings. This'NRC review found two valves (RH-HCV-0866and~HE-FV-9697) missing'fromthedrawings. The licensee 7'
was' notified of the discrepancy and stated that both valves will be-
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added to the drawings. The corrective' action taken by the licensee appears adequate. This violation is. considered closed.
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(0 pen)OpenItem 498/8872-02;.499/8872-02: Review of revision to plant' operating procedures made as a result of procedure / system walkdowns.
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This item involved numerous examples that indicated that verbatim compliance with certain procedures would be difficult. The licensee
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has undertaken a Plant 0peration Procedure Upgrade Program to assure
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editorial adequacy of the procedures. This program is in progress and is scheduled for completion on both Units 1 and 2 by December 31, 1993. The HRC inspectors found several examples of procedure discrepancies as discussed later in this report. This item will remain open pending completion of the procedure upgrade program.
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(0 pen)OpenItem 498/8872-03; 499/8872-03:
Review of progress with correcting labeling / procedure inconsistencies.
This item involved numerous inconsistencies between the name or designation of components in a procedurr as opposed to labeling found in the field. The licensee performed a walkdown of off-normal procedures for Unit 2 to resolve labeling discrepancies. A similar walkdown for Unit 1 is scheduled for completion by December 31, 1989.
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The Plant Operation Procedure Upgrade' Program should help resolve remaining labeling discrepancies.
The NRC inspectors, during this
inspection, identified some labeling discrepancies as documented
later in this report.
This item will remain open pending completion of the procedure upgrade program.
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(0 pen)OpenItem 498/8872-04; 499/8872-04:
Review progress with revision of plant operating procedures to be consistent with the writer's guide.
This item will remain open pending completion of the licensee's Plant Operation Procedures Upgrade Program.
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Control Room Observations (71707)
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The NRC inspectors observed control room activities during both day and evening shifts. The activities were observed to be handled in a competent and professional manner.
Control room professionalism promoted safe operation of the plant. The operators were knowledgeable, attentive, and aware of plant conditions including the reasons for alarms. The operators appeared to have control of plant activities. Tagging, maintenance authorizations, and surveillance authorizations were in order. Effective operation's management involvement was evident. Operation's management was conscientious and knowledgeable of plant conditions and problems.
Management was also active with the planning of activities and resolution of problems.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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Shift Turnover Observations (71707)
The NRC inspectors witnessed both the morning and afternoon shift turnovers. The inspectors' observations of the shift turnovers indicated i
that the turnover process was excellent.
Shift briefings and review of logs and other records were performed such that the operators understood the condition of the plant prior to taking the watch. Adequate information
was disseminated at the turnover briefings to give the operators and shift supervisor knowledge about plant conditions, ongoing work, upcoming work j
and planned evolutions.
Input was also received from chemistry and health physics personnel.
No violations or deviations were identifiec in this area.
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Plant' Tours (71707)-
The NRC inspectors conducted plant tours during day and evening shifts to.
assess plant and equipment conditions.
The plant was toured to determine whether:
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General plant conditions were satisfactory.
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o Equipment was being maintained in proper condition, without excessive
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fluid leaks and excessiva vibration.
o Plant housekeeping and cleanliness practices, including fire hazards and the control of combustible material, were adequate.
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' Portable gas cylinders were properly stored to prevent possible missile hazards.
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. Tag-out of equipment was perfori.ed properly.
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During the tours of the plant, the NRC. inspectors noted the items listed below:
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The main steam and main feedwater line penetrations to the isolation valve cubicle (IVC) building contained trash and abandoned construction material, b.
Main Feedwater Line "C" had a loose bolt on a flange connection between the turbine building and the IVC building.
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A hoist being used to assist in the " hot torquing" of Main Feedwater Line "D" was attached to Main Steam Line "D."
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Steam traps which relieved steam outside of the turbine building at ground level could be a personnel hazard.
The licensee. subsequently installed steam diverters at this and other similar locations.
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The Emergency Diesel Generator 21 room did not appear to have the same state of cleanliness and equipment preservation as did the Emergency Diesel Generator 22 room, which was considered very good by the NRC inspectors.
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The emergency cooling water pump bays had standing water and algae growing on wet equipment (including electrical boxes).
Stains were noted on equipment where water had been left to dry.
A considerable amount of standing water was discovered on both elevations of two of the emergency cooling water pump rooms.
Also, conduit boxes mounted on the verticle wall (the wall is less than three feet high) between the elevations had standing water on them which apparently had overflowed off the upper elevation.
The problem had the appearance j
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-7-of being in place for quite awhile. The licensee was aware of the problem with water in these rooms and is planning to implement a program to alleviate the condition, g.
An isolation valve cubicle had standing water from apparently plugged or closed drain lines from the steam generator relief discharge lines. This area had several buckets to catch the water that were not adequate to prevent spillage.
The "A" Auxiliary Feedwater Pump room had water running down the wall. The NRC inspector could not determine the source.
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On February 16, 1989, duri a a tour of the emergency diesel generator rooms, the NRC inspectors noted that Emergency Diesel Generator 22 had one of the two associated diesel starting air systems tagged out (Clearance Order 2-89-540). The air receiver was depressurized, as indicated by its pressure indicator, and it was isolated from the diesel. This rendered it incapable of providing diesel starting air.
The NRC inspectors questioned whether the remaining air receiver was j
sufficient to start the diesel. Observations of the piping suggested
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that one air receiver supplied the diesel's left bank of cylinders and the other receiver supplied the right bank.
The inspectors discussed this concern with licensee personnel. The
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cognizant system engineer was able to show on a system drawing
(Drawing 14926-4041-00138-CCE, ' Control Diagram, Starting System and Alarms," Revision 2) that either bank of starting air was capable of driving all 20 cylinders of the diesel. Thus, one inoperable receiver (i.e. one of the two starting air systems) would not prevent i
a diesel start. Furthermore, the STP FSAR (Section 9.5.6.2) states that each receiver has a sufficient volume (83 cubic feet) and design pressure (275 psig) for five start attempts per receiver without recharging. The licensee also stated that preoperational testing had demonstrated the capability to start the diesel on one air start receiver. The NRC inspectors felt that this concern was adequately
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resolved, i.
During a tour of outside plant areas on March 16, 1989, the NRC inspectors noted a medium-sized, nonmetallic pipe marked as carrying hydrogen, which ran alongside lines carrying auxiliary steam.
Portions of the pipe were protected from accidental contact by vertical posts set in the ground, but the majority of the piping run lacks this protection. This condition was pointed out to the licensee.
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The NRC inspectors also looked at the control of transient combustible materials in the plant. The inspectors noted the following two examples where combustibles were not being adequately controlled:
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(1)
In the "C" Essential Chiller room, the NRC inspectors noted a full flammable liquid locker and two cans of flammable liquid
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located next to the locker. The locker and cans were located I
within 10 feet of the "C" Essential Cooler. The licensee had i
previously identified this concern and was in the process of correcting the problem.
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(2)
In the electrical auxiliary building, Room 301, the NRC inspectors discovered a combustible storage locker located in the northeast corner of the room. The door of the locker was found closed, but stored on top of the locker and on the floor next to the locker were mop handles, mop heads, plastic bags, and cleaning rags. Attached to the locker was Combustible Material Storage Authorization #88-071 which stated that storage is to be in metal storage lockers or cabinets with the door kept normally closed. The use of this authorization is delineated in Station Procedure OPGP03-ZF-0004, " Control of Transient Fire Loads." This improper storage of transient combustible material is the first example of failure to follow proctdures.
(Violation 499/8907-01)
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There were two examples found of improperly restrained compressed gas cylinders. Cylinder MRR #8902788 was found tied by a rope around the neck of the cylinder. A cylinder of argon gas was found outside of the plant adjacent to Door 202245 tied to a rail at a single point.
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The NRC inspectors found the following three examples of improper door control:
(1) The water tight door to Room 007A (Train A Spray Additive room)
was found open and unattended.
(2) Door 125 between the cable spreading room and switchgear room was found unlocked and with the safety chain unhooked. There is an approxir, 2e 12 foot drop from the cable spreading room to the switchgear room floor.
(3)
Fire Door 436 to Room 0158 (Sequencer Train C) was found not fully closed. The NRC inspector opened the door to its fullest extent, released it, and found that the door would not fully close.
It was apparent that the problem was in the door's closing mechanism. The inspector closed the door by hand and notified the licensee.
The exit sign in the electrical penetration room on the bottom level m.
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of the electrical auxiliary building (EAB) was obscured by piping.
The auxiliary feedwater tank overflow was flowing in what appeared to i
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be a continuing flow of water. The water running down the side of l
the tank was in a path marked by a growth of algae on the side of the tan. _ - - _
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o.. :There were many small steam leaks found around'the )lant.
In addition, there were many steam packing leaks and'slaft seal leaks,-
both large and small. The NRC' inspectors perceived an attitude of-acceptance or resignationLto these steam leaks on the part of-licensee personnel.
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The NRC inspectors found many instances where' leaks had been P
corrected but the boric acid residue had not been cleaned.up. This is poor. housekeeping'and inconsistent with the general plant appearance.
The above items, although numerous, were not considered to be significant-problems when considered with overall plant conditions. All of these issues were discussed with licensee personnel for continued improvement of plant conditions.
.6.
Maintenance Observations- (62703)
The NRC inspectors reviewed and observed selected station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components to' verify the maintenance was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory requirements, and the Technical Specifications.
The NRC inspectors reviewed and obse'rved the following maintenance
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a.
MaintenanceWorkRequest(MWR)D0-72907 was issued to perform the calibration check of Diesel Generator 21 fuel oil storage tank level transmitter.
Using field test instrumentation, the 1&C: technician
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inputted various pressures to the high side of the level transmitter and would compare output milliamps to~ required milliamps. The required output milliamps had been called out.in the procedure in even numbers (e.g. 4.0, 8.0, 12.0, etc.) which meant that required inputpressureswerenotevennumbers(e.g.266.75inchesH0,
o 315.87,364.99,etc.). The calibrated pressure gauge being used was
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a Heise 0-800 inches H,0 which had smallest divisions of 1 inch H 0.
This meant that the pressures required were significantly more precise than the I&C technician could read with the test instruments being utilized. However, this did not appear to affect the validity of the calibration.
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The NRC inspectors observed a maintenance activity on a system
containing boric acid..The maintenance activity was to stop leakage, MWR'RA-79269 was issued to perform troubleshooting on Mechanical c.
Auxiliary Building Vent Monitor SPIG. The channel of this vent
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radiation monitor was spuriously going into alert or high alarm status.
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MWR PF-89004479 was issued to troubleshoot the line voltage from Breaker 20 of AC Power Distribution Panel 8E172EPD1434 which was too
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This breaker' feeds Monitor N2RA-RI-8075 and
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- should be 'approximately 120 VAC.. The electrician' verified that the breaker was not the problem and got the ~ paperwork _ modified to
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authorize a test of the associated transformer.
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- e.:.MWR GM-68969_ performed the calibration for the main generator.
telemetering oscillator and tone equipment, p
The NRC inspectors found the selected maintenance activities to be
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performed; adequately and according to approved instructions.
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No violations or deviations were. identified in'this area.
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Surveillance Observations -(61726)
, The. NRC= inspectors observed the performance and documentation of-selected surveillance activities on safety-related systems and components. The following surveillance were observed:
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Test sequence for initial criticality and lower power testing
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(2 PEP 04-ZX-0001, Revision 1)
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Accumulator 2C Level' Group 3 ACOT (L-0954)'(2 PSP 02-SI-0954)-
Pressure transmitter o' differential pressure transmitter calibration r
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(OPMP08-ZI-0002)
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Vibration readings on "A" Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump e.
Calibration check on "A" Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Instrument
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Steam Generator 2D narrow ran f.
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4.16kV Class 1E tolerable degraded voltage coincident with safety-injection and sustained degraded voltage relay channel l calibration /TADOT-Channel 4 (2 PSP 06-PK-0008,-Revision 0)
The NRC inspectors found the above selected surveillance to be performed adequately and according to approved procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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Safety System Walkdowns (71710)
The NRC inspectors performed a walkdown of selected safety-related systems to determine whether as-built conditions matched drawings and procedures.
The NRC inspectors found that valves and electrical breakers observed were j
in the correct position for normal system operability. The following systems were inspected:
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- The following observations were made on the.AF system:
- (1) The AF storage tank for Units 1 and 2 were observed to be leaking a slight. continuous amount of water out of the overflow line.
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(2)' Numerous'small steam leaks from valves and flanges were identified by the NRC inspectors and reported to the shift
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(3) The NRC inspectors compared valve checklists to system process'
and. instrumentation diagrams (P& ids) and found the following
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discrepancies:
.(a) Valve ~2-AF-0208 was shown open on Checklist 2 POP 02-AF-0001-8 but was shown normally closed (N.C.) on Drawing SS199F00020 #2, Revision 13.
(b) "alve 2-AF-0360 was not on Drawing SS149F00024 #2, Rev'sion 11.
(c) Valve 2-AF-0277 was designated locked closed (L.C.) on Drawing SS197F00020 #2, Revision 13, but was drawn as a normally open valve.
(d) Valves 2-AF-0312, 0313, 0314, 0315, 0316, 0317, 0318, and 0319 were not shown on Drawing SS149F00024-#2, Revision 11.
b.
' Safety Injection (SI)
The following observations were made'on the SI system:
(1)' Valve 2-SI-0192(HighHeadSafetyInjection(HHSI) Pump 2A casing vent) had a loose bonnet nut.
(2) Pressure Indicator 2-PI-0817 (containment spray (CS) pump suction pressure) had a pipe cap missing from its manifold.
(3) Valve 2-51-0191 (Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) Pump 2C casing vent) had a loose bonnet nut.
(4) The following examples of slight system leakage in the form of j
dried boron were identified:
(a) HHSI Pump 2B had a shaft packing leak.
(b) Valve 2-SI-0138 (LHSI Pump 2B discharge test vent) had I
boric acid crystals attached.
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(c) LHSI Pump 2C discharge flange had boric acid crystals attached.
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PipecappastValve2-SI-0234(HHSIPump2Cdischarge)had.
boric acid crystals attached.
f The NRC' inspectors notified the shift supervisor of the leaks.
n The shi_ft supervisor stated that sometimes maintenance fixes a reported leak and fails to clean the area afterwards. The NRC inspectors feel that this practice increases the difficulty in identifying and correcting small leaks.
(5) The NRC inspectors found the following discrepancies between the valve checklist and the system P& ids:
(a) Valve 2-SI-0189 was on Checklist 2 POP 02-SI-0002-1 twice.
(b) Valve 2-SI-0240 was on Check 11st 2 POP 02-SI-0002-1 yet Drawing 5N129F05013 #2, Revision 10, showed that only Unit I had this valve.
(c) Valves'2-SI-0161, 0241, and 0242 were on Drawing SN129F05013 #2 but Checklist 2 POP 02-SI-0002-1 did not list them.
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l (d) Valves 2-SI-0243 and 0244 were on Drawing SN129F05013 #2 but not on Checklist 2P0P02-SI-0002.
l (e) Valve 2-SI-0121A (Low Head Safety Injection Pump 2A flush line isolation valve) was omitted from Checklist 2 POP 02-SI-0002-1 due to a field change request (FCR)notbeingincorporatedinthelatest procedure revision. Station Procedure OPGP03-IA-0002,
" Plant Procedures", requires that a procedure be verified
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that FCRs were incorporately correctly. This is another j
example of the failure to follow procedures.
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c.
Vital 125 Volt D.C. Distribution System The NRC inspectors requested an operator to assist in a dry-run walkthrough of system alignment Procedure 2 POP 02-EE-0001, Revision 1, l
"ESF (Class 1E) DC Distribution System" to determine its workability.
Although the operator was able to simulate a proper lineup of the equipment utilizing the procedure, a less knowledgeable or alert operator may have experienced difficulties due to nomenclature ambiguities between the procedure and the system components.
Specifically, the procedure used equipment identifiers which were not i
used on the individual component.
For example, Step 7.1 refers to Battery Charger E2B11-1, but the component labels refered to 3E232EBC047E and B2DJBC047E. This nomenclature mismatch was
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extensive throughout the procedure. Additionally, some equi xnent
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label plates indicated Unit 1 versus-Unit 2.
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' ambiguity.on the electrical lineup sheets (e.g. pa-Switchboard E2b11 - Channel III Electrical Lineup)ge 16 of 20,.
A misnomer
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hi existed there -in that a cubicle number was referred to versus the--
' breaker. it contains. The procedure referred to " Breaker #6" when, in
. fact, it; should have said " Cubicle #6"-(Cubicle #6 contains Breaker 08-4C).
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"B" Train of the Emergency Cooling' Wat' er (ECW) System The following observations were made during the walkdown of the'ECW l
system:
(1) The inspectors noted that scaffolding was erected high in the overhead of all three of the ECW pump bays. Safety-related:
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cable trays were located below the scaffolding and between the i
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scaffolding' supports. The NRC inspectors were concerned that'if the scaffolding fell during a seismic event,.the 15 to 20 foot.
i fall could damage safety-related equipment in all three of the bays and prevent the ECW system from performing its safety
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function. Licensee investigation revealed that the scaffolding
had not been evaluated in accordance.with procedures. Station
Procedure OPGP03-ZI-0002, Revision 2, " Erection and Use of l
Temporary Scaffolding",' states that project engineering shall l
inspect scaffolding built over and around Category 1
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' safety-related components. This inspection was not performed.
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This is another example of the failure to follow procedures.
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(Violation 499/8907-01)
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The licensee removed the scaffolding after being notified by the
NRC inspectors of this concern.
(2) The NRC inspectors noted that the essential chiller outlet
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valves were blocked open as required by a procedure change. The-l inspectors were concerned that the essential chiller operation-would be affected since the FSAR in Paragraph 9.2.1.2.2.4 indicates that the outlet valves lare automatically throttled to maintain essential chiller operation when the' ECW pond temperature drops below 53.3"F.
The < licensee provided the NRC inspectors with a copy of UnreviewedSafetyQuestionEvaluation(USQE)#88-0146which
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documented a temporary modification to disable the control circuit and block open the outlet valves because they were not operating properly. The licensee intends to obtain new valves to improve the system operation.
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USQE #88-0146 states that to properly operate the essential chillers below 53.3 F, the ECW flow rate must be adjusted to maintain the chiller condenser pressure at 8 to 10 psig.
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According to th'e vendor, this is necessary because if the condenser pressure is too. low, the. chiller motor is not properly-
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cooled and would trip on high motor temperature.
In addition,
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insufficient freon would flow to the evaporator and the chiller would trip on low evaporator pressure. The USQE required a procedure ' hange to instruct the operator concerning control of the chiller condenser pressure. The NRC inspectors noted that
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Surveillance Procedure 2 PSP 03-ZQ-0002 instructed the operator i
that when'ECW temperature is less than 54 F, the chillers are to j
be started and'the inlet valves throttled to maintain chiller l
condenser pressure at 10 to 20 psig. The inspectors questioned j
the difference between the USQE and the procedure. The a
' licensee, upon investigation, determined that a temporary change l
to tPe procedure (a field change request (FCR)) had been
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inadvertently left out of the next procedure revision. Station i
Procedure OPGP03-ZA-0002, " Plant Procedures," requires that a
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procedure revision be verified to assure that FCRs are j
incorporated correctly. This is another instance of the failure i
to follow the procedure for incorporation of FCRs.
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f (Violation 499/8907-01)
Control of the chiller at a higher condenser pressure could have resulted in a trip of the chiller on high condenser pressure i
(30 psig) sooner than the evaluation showed in the USQE. This was evaluated by the USQE because following a LOCA, as the ECW
. pond heats up, the condenser pressure will rise proportionally.
i The USQE also states that based nn the rate of ECW temperature
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increase and the chilled water cooling capacity requirement from normal and accident conditions, operator action can be accomplished within an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> period to manually adjust the ECW
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valves to maintain chiller operation. To support this, the USQE j
required an ECW emergency operating procedure revision to direct l
operator action to maintain chiller operation if ECW pond t
temperatures increase above 53 F following an accident. This procedure revision never took place. This is an example of the failure to provide adequate procedures.
(Violation.499/8907-01)
i The licensee committed to perform a review of temporary
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procedure changes to ensure that other procedure changes had not been inadvertently left out of the next version. Since the temperature of the ECW pond is unlikely to fall below 54 F until next winter and the licensee indicated that the ECW flow control l
system for the essential chillers will be repaired prior to that, the NRC inspectors do not consider this issue as a barrier to. full power licensing. The inspectors understand, however, that the Unit I control valves will not be repaired prior to
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next winter. This is considered an open item pending NRC j
verification of proper actions to maintain Unit 1 chiller operation during the 1989-1990 winter period.
(498/8907-02)
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The discrepancies.noted in this section between checklists, drawings,
and field conditi.ons were_ discussed with licensee personnel.for continued improvement of plant procedures:or drawings.
The-
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licensee's Plant Operation Procedure Upgrade Program should reduce
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w these type of findings. The conditions noted did not appear.'to affect: operability of any required safety systems.
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~9..
System Punchlist-Reviews-The NRC. inspectors reviewed the manner in which the licensee controlled
punchlist items. The licensee informed the inspectors that all items on their master completior, list (MCL)- had been converted to work requests.
Each MCL item was evaluated 'using a.MCL Milestone Justification / Evaluation Form which described each item and' assigned'a milestone. This milestone di indicated by which plant operating mode.the item needed to be completed.
The NRC. inspectors reviewed the MCL and selected eleven items-to determine whether they 'were' being adequately handled.
It was found that all the items were either completed by. the milestone required or were assigned a work' request and tracked through the licensee's work request tracking system..The MCL items reviewed were:
o MCL 165998'
o MCL 168074 o
'MCL 158633 o'
MCL'147859 o
MCL 163692 o
MCL 163498 o-MCL 167251 o-NCL 167106 o
MCL 167849 o
MCL 156815 o
MCL 164233
~No' violations or deviations'were identified in this area.
10. Operator Staffing
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The NRC inspectors reviewed the Unit 2 licensed operator complement to determine if staffing met technical specification requirements. STP uses a five crew rotation. The inspectors reviewed the Unit 2 shift scheduling report, experience comparison chart, and licensed operator vacation / absenteeism information.
The NRC' inspectors determined that each shift crew met TS requirements and were not accruing excessive overtime.
No violations or deviations were identified in this are _.
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-16-11. Management Oversight of Operational Activities Management oversight was evident for activities observed during this operational readiness assessment team (LOAT) inspection.
Plan of the day meetings were conducted each morning chaired by the plant manager where plant status and problems were openly discussed.
Senior level management also participated and management probing of issues and knowledge of problem areas were demonstrated during these meetings. Matters requiring
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I managenent interface and resolution were expeditiously addressed at these meetings.
The licensee also conducts work control center (WCC) meetings daily for each unit where plant staff and line managers discuss and status upcoming work activities. These meetings were chaired by the plant superintendent and effective oversight of activities was demonstrated.
During control room and shift turnover observations effective operation's management involvement was observed. Operation's nanagement was knowledgeable of plant conditions and problems, and was active with the planning of activities and resolution of problems.
Overall, the ORAT concluded that management oversight of operational activities was effective for the present level of activity at STP and for power ascension testing of Unit 2.
j No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
12.
Exit Interview (30703)
i The NRC inspectors met with the licensee personnel denoted in paragraph 1 on March 17, 1989. At this meeting, the NRC inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection and the findings.
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