W3P89-3090, Responds to Violations Noted in NRC Enforcement Action EA 89-069 & to Civil Penalty.Corrective Actions:Standing Instruction Issued to Provide Instructions to Operators on Testing Requirements for Appropriate Pumps W/Fixed Lines

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Responds to Violations Noted in NRC Enforcement Action EA 89-069 & to Civil Penalty.Corrective Actions:Standing Instruction Issued to Provide Instructions to Operators on Testing Requirements for Appropriate Pumps W/Fixed Lines
ML20247N659
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 07/28/1989
From: Burski R
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
EA-89-069, EA-89-69, W3P89-3090, NUDOCS 8908030098
Download: ML20247N659 (12)


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= P. O. BOX 60340 LOUIStAN POWER & L1GHT A / 317BARONNESTREET NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 70160 *

(504)595 3100 1 NE sYSW W3P89-3090 A4.05 QA July 28, 1989 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Cc,ntrol Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Waterford 3 SES Docket No. 50-382 License No. NPF-38 NRC Enforcement Action EA 89-69 Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10CFR2.201, Louisiana Power & Light submits in Attachment A the response to the violation identified in the subject Enforcement Action.

Additionally, pursuant to 10CFR2.205, LP&L in Attachment D responds to the civil penalty. Due to extenuating circumstances, LP&L requests mitigation of the civil penalty. LP&L has also reviewed the severity level classification-of the violation and consequently requests that the violation be re-classified as Severity Level IV.

If, notwithstanding the above request for mitigation, the staff determines to levy a civil penalty, LP&L requests that the fine be' mitigated in its entirety, with the amount of the mitigated fine being offset by payment by LP&L of an equal amount to Nicholls State University. The university is located in Thibodaux, Louisiana, about 25 miles from the Waterford 3 site.

The payment would be designated for use in Nicho11s' health physics curriculum to assist in the training of qualified radiological health and [

safety personnel. Because of the geographic proximity, such personnel may be likely to consider employment at Waterford 3. LP&L presently cooperates through its training staff with Nicholls State University.

Nicholls State University is a State supported university which serves the geographic area of southeastern Louisiana, an area which has been devasted by the worst economic depression in the last 50 years. Louisiana has the highest unemployment rate in the nation, and many of the parishes that Nicholls serves have the highest unemployment rate in the state. These same communities have a large minority and underprivileged population.

1908030098 890728 DR ADOCK 05000382 PDC "AN EQUAL OPPOR*, UNITY EMPLOYER" J'. \ \

W3P89-3090 NRC Enforcement Action EA 89-69  !

Page 2 A similar request was made by LP&L in its February 1, 1989 response to an NRC Order which imposed an earlier, unrelated fine. The fine had been paid when the request was made, however, and for that reason the NRC denied the j request in its February 28, 1989 letter to LP&L. In this instance, LP&L is I asking that the NRC accommodate the request by exercise of its authority under section 234.a. of the Atomic Energy Act of A954, as amended, 42 {

U.S.C. 2282(a), to " compromise, mitigate, or remit" civil penaltiess Such a payment-to Nicholls State University would serve nct only to penalize.

LP&L to the extent NRC deems appropriate, but also to contribute to the public health and safety in a related educational discip1(ne, consistent with the fundamental e atutory purposes and goals of the NnC.

1 If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact L.'W. Laughlin at (504) 464-3499.

Very truly yours, U

R.F. Burski Manager Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Affairs RFB/LWL/ssf Attachments cc: Messrs. R.D. Martin, NRC Region IV F J. Hebdon, NRC-NRR D.L. Wigginton, NRC-NRR E.L. Blake W.M. Stevenson NRC Resident Inspectors Office l

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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter of )

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Louisiana Power & Light Company ) Docket No. 50-382 Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station )

AFFIDAVIT R.F. Burski, being duly sworn, hereby deposes and says that he is Nuclear Safety and~ Regulatory Affairs Manager of Louisiana. Power & Light  !

Company; that he is duly authorized to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the attached response to NRC Enforcement Action EA 1 89-69; that he is familiar with the content thereof; and that the matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

G.yfJ R.F. Burski Manager Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Affairs STATE OF LOUISIANA)

) ss PARISH OF ORLEANS )

Subscribedandsworntobeforemeg~ Notary Public in and for the Parish and State above named this JL fi day of bM ,

1989. d i

// /

Notary Public l

My Commission expires M (, .

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Attachment A to W3P89-3090 Page 1 of 5 LP&L REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION IN ENFORCEMENT ACTION EA 89-69 Inoperable Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Subsystem Technical Specification 4.0.5 requires, in part, that inservice testing in accordance with'Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code i

shall be performed for the required pumps and that such testing shall be in addition to' other specified Surveillance Requirements.

Technical Specification 3.5.2 requires that two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised, in part, of one OPERABLE high-pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, Technical Specification 3.5.2 requires that the inoperable l subsystem'be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or at least be in HOT STANDBY (Mode 3) within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN (Mode 4) within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Contrary to the above, one ECCS subsystem became inoperable on November 22, 1988 at Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, was not placed in Hot Standby (Mode 3) and subsequently Hot Shutdown (Mode 4) as required by'T.S.

3.5.2. Specifically, the B HPSI pump became inoperable on November 22, 1988 when it did not meet the recirculation flow requirements of Article 3000 of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.

This is a Severity Level III violation. (Supplement 1)

RESPONSE TO VIOLATION INTRODUCTION Article IWP-3100, Inservice Test Procedure, states in part that "The resistance of the system shall be varied until either the measured j differential pressure or measured flowrate equals the corresponding reference value."

As discussed in Revision 1 to the Inservice Testing (IST) Program for Pumps and Valves (submitted to the NRC in September, 1984), and the Enforcement Conference on May 8, 1989, piping arrangements for several class 2 and 3 pumps were designed with minimum recirculation flow lites with installed flow restricting orifices which provide a fixed resistance flow path. This I condition necessitated a request for an exemption from varying measured )

flowrate as stated in IWP-3100. Therefore, as part of revision 1 to the J IST Program, LP&L filed Relief Request 2.1.3. Relief Request 2.1.3 proposed to test the applicable pumps using the fixed resistance recirculation flow path and measuring pump differential pressure to determine pump degradation. Pump differential pressure, coupled with pump vibration, would be used to determine test frequency and operability in accordance with Table IWP-3100-2, " Allowable Ranges of Test Quantities."

It was LP&L's position, and still is LP&L's position, that pump

, Attachment A to lj W3P89-3090 j Page 2 of 5 differential pressure (delta P), rather than recirculation flowrate, is a I better indication of pump 1.erformance.

This position is based on the characteristics of the pump curve at low flowrates (i.e., very large variations in delta P would be required to measure small changes in flowrate). Consequently, with a fixed resistance design and good engineering judgment, LP&L proposed to use pump delta P rather than flowrate to determine pump operability. (This is not to say that recirculation flow is unimportant. Even though the recirculation line resistance is fixed (i.e., flow is essentially constant), the IST Program required flow to be measured, recorded, and trended. It is important to note that some plants do not have the capability to measure recirculation flowrate. Therefore, for the technical reasons discussed above, pump delta P and vibration were determined to be an acceptable criteria for determining pump performance.) The IST Program at Waterford 3, therefore, established Alert, Required Action, and acceptable limits for HPSI pump delta P and vibration.

On May 20, 1988, LP&L received a letter from the NRC officially denying relief to "... measure only pump differential pressure..." for the High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI), Containment Spray (CS), and Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pumps. In addition, the NRC granted " relief from measuring flow" for the Boric Acid (BA) and Emergency Feedwater (EFW) pumps because the " recirculation lines are not instrumented for flow." This letter contained significant mistakes. The letter stated that in the case of the BA and EFW pumps, relief is granted because "the recirculation lines are not instrumented for flow". (For the details surrounding the review of Relief Request 2.1.3 please refer to Attachment B.) Although the desired relief was granted, this statement is incorrect. Not only does LP&L have instrumentation on the lines in question, but LP&L did not request relief for the reason stated in the May 20, 1988 NRC letter. LP&L requested relief for the BA and EFW pumps for the same reason relief was requested for the HPSI, LPSI, and CS pumps, i.e., the BA and EFW pumps have fixed resistance recirculation lines. In addition, LP&L misunderstood the wording of the letter relative to the HPSI, CS and LPSI pumps. LP&L never intended to " measure only pump differential pressure" and stated in the past that "all the parameters in Table IWP-3100-2" would be l " measured and recorded." More important, the physical design of Waterford 3 is such that LP&L cannot vary measured flow or delta P as required by IWP-3100. Therefore, denial of Relief Request 2.1.3 put LP6L in a  ;

precarious position (i.e., full compliance with IWP-3100 is physically impossible). For these reasons, LP&L felt there was a serious misunderstanding on the part of the consulting firm reviewing LP&L's IST Program.

LP&L placed a telephone call to the NRC/NRR in June, 1988, in the hopes of resolving these misunderstandings. LP&L again explained the piping design at Waterford 3 as well as the inaccuracies in the May 20, 1988 letter. The NRC agreed that the consultant probably misunderstood Waterford 3's design and relief request and stated that LP&L document and submit its position to the NRC for further review. While not officially stated, LP&L inferred from the discussion that this issue would continue to remain open. On July 8, 1988, LP&L provided the NRC with supplemental information on Relief Request 2.1.3.

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Attachment A to W3P89-3090 Page 3 of 5 On November 22, 1988 while performing IST on the B HPSI pump,'Waterford 3 operators observed a decrease in the recirculation flowrate (flowrate is i measured, recorded, and trended as part of the IST Program). An immediate operability determination was made by the on-shift Shift Technical Advisor (STA) in accordance with plant procedures. The STA, with the concurrence of the Shift Supervisor, determined the HPSI pump to be operable based on the acceptance criteria in the IST Program (delta P and vibration) and sound engineering judgment. (Since the HPSI system contains an installed spare pump, scheduling pressures played no role in the operability determination). Recognizing that an adverse trend existed, the STA initiated Condition Identification (CI) #259394 to inspect what he suspected was a partially clogged flow orifice.

LP&L engineers, as a result of concerns raised in NRC Bulletin 88-04, were in the process of discussing recirculation flow concerns and its effect on pump performance with the pump vendor.when the CI was generated. At the time the above decrease in recirculation flow was identified, the pump vendor, at the request of LP&L, was already performing an analysis to determine a minimum value of recirculation flow. Therefore, when the CI was forwarded to engineering, an evaluation was already in progress.

Engineering included the new pump data as part of this evaluation.

On January 31, 1989 the B HPSI pump was retested. Recirculation flow was measured at approximately 20 gpm, approximately 5 gpm below spec. During the test, technicians discovered the flow indicating orifice was reversed.

On February 1, 1989 the orifice was restored to its correct position and at 1920 hours0.0222 days <br />0.533 hours <br />0.00317 weeks <br />7.3056e-4 months <br /> the pump was retested. Recirculation flow was measured at approximately 24.5 gpm. The reversal of the flow orifice resulted in a drop in indicated flow of approximately 5 gpm. However, actual' flow remained at approximately 25 gpm as measured by the February 1, 1989 retest. Therefore, recirculation flow did not cause or exacerbate the deficiencies in the pump internals and motor as discussed in Inspection Report No. 89-09 and alluded to in the subject EA.

While performing the February 1 retest, plant operators and mechanics noted a whining noise emanating from the pump. Mechanics subsequently measured high vibration velocities and at 1926 hours0.0223 days <br />0.535 hours <br />0.00318 weeks <br />7.32843e-4 months <br /> plant operators secured the pump. Work Authorization (WA) #01031752 was written to replace the B HPSI pump thrust bearings. In the process of replacing the thrust bearings, mechanics noted problems with the setting of the Balance Drum / Sleeve clearances. Once the thrust bearings were replaced and the clearances reset, the pump was retested. High motor vibrations were measures which necessitated replacement fo the motor bearings as well. On February 28, 1989 plant operators retested the pump and recorded a satisfactory reading for vibration and approximately 22 gpm recirculation flow. Following the test, engineers, with the assistance of the pump vendor, performed an evaluation of the test results and determined the pump to be operable.

However, plant management deemed it appropriate to conduct additional investigations.

On March 1, 1989 WA 01033412 was written to measure recirculation flow with an ultrasonic flow detector. The pump was started and both the ultrasonic detector and the installed flow instrumentation measured approximately 22 gpm. On April 10, 1989 the recirculation line was radiographer and a small

Attachment A to W3P89-3090 Page 4 of 5 1

metallic object was observed in the flow restricting orifice. On May 2, 1989 plant personnel removed a 1/4 inch set screw which was lodged in the orifice. The set screw came from the fourth stage impeller wear-ring.

On May 27, 1989 the HPSI pump was retested and declared operable at 2055 hours0.0238 days <br />0.571 hours <br />0.0034 weeks <br />7.819275e-4 months <br />.

(1)'. Reason For The Violation LP&L admits to violating Technical Specification 4.0.5.a in that the IST Progran did not specify ranges for defining the fixed recirculation flowrate for HPSI pump B in accordance with the requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)

Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (Article IWP-3100).

The root cause of this violation is a misunderstanding by LP&L of the NRC's position on. Relief Request 2.1.3. Relief Request 2.1.3, submitted in September, 1984, requested relief from varying resistance as required by IWP-3100. LP&L assumed, based on verbal and written communications with the NRC, and industry experience (see Attachment B for details), that testing in accordance with Relief Request 2.1.3 was acceptable. Therefore, when HPSI pump B recirculation flowrate decreased to approximately 20 gpm the effect of this condition was evaluated and determined not to adversely affect pump operability based on acceptable delta P and vibration measurements in conjunction with sound engineering judgment.

(2) Corrective Steps That Have Been Taken And The Results Achieved Upon determining noncompliance with Technical Specification 4.0.5.a, Standing Instruction No. 89-05 was issued on May 4, 1989 to provide instructions to plant operators and Shift Technical Advisors (STA) on the testing requirements for the appropriate pumps with fixed resistance recirculation lines. This instruction provides a list of Alert, Required Action and Acceptable flow limits for the subject pumps. This instruction remained in effect until surveillance procedures OP-100-011, "Section XI Pump and Valve Reference Data Acceptance Criteria;" OP-903-030, " Safety Injection Pump Operability;"

OP-903-035, " Containment Spray Pump Operability;" OP-903-046,

" Emergency Feedwater Pump Operability" were revised on June 19, 1989.

In addition, Potential Reportable Event 89-061 was written to document and evaluate the noncompliance for deportability under 10CFR50.73. On June 9, 1989 LP&L submitted Licensee Event Report (LER)89-010.

(3) Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken To Avoid Further Violations The Trending, Compliance and Response Department, new responsible for the IST Program, has reevaluated the IST Program. The conclusion reached after this review indicates that LP&L is in compliance with the requirements of IWP-3100 and approved relie# thereto.

On May 9,1989 a presentation was given to the W terford 3 NRC Project Manager and a representative of the NRR Mechanical 2ngineering Branch.

e Attachmeat A to

- , W3P89-3090 Page 5 of 5 The purpose of this presentation, from LP&L's standpoint, was to outline in detail outstanding relief requests to ensure the technical issues were understood and that no misunderstandings existed. Each

. outstanding' relief request was discussed prior to closing the meeting.

The actions above ensure that the testing methods and criteria of the IST Program are consistent with IWP-3100.

(4) Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved LP&L is currently in full compliance, i

Attachment B to

, W3P89-3090 Page 1 of 4 LPJ~ FILING PURSUANT TO 10CFR2.205 Summary Enforcement Action 89-69 proposed imposition of a civil penalty on LP&L for violation of Technical Specification 4.0.5.a which requires, in part, that inservice testing in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code shall be performed for Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps.

Specifically,-in November, 1988, testing in accordance with the IST Program identified a recirculation ^10wrate of 19 gpm for HPSI pump B. The decrease in flow was eve ~aated, however, the HPSI pump was not declared inoperable because Als_.t and Required Action flowrates were not established in accordance with IRP-3100.

As noted in the violation response (see Attachment A to W3P89-3090), LP&L admits the violation. However, pursuant to 10CFR2.205, LP&L requests mitigation of the civil penalty and reduction in the severity level of the violation.

Circumstances to Support Mitigation Analysis of the occurrence against Section V.B of 10CFR Part 2, Appendix C, and the circumstances surrounding the violation supports substantial mitigation of.the civil penalty, as discussed below.

Past Performance Since the NRC has stated in EA 89-69 that LP&L's good past performance was considered in the imposition of the civil penalty, restatement of the facts to support such an argument is unnecessary. What is important, however, is LP&L's past performance, coupled with the extenuating circumstances surrounding the violation.

As stated in Attachment A to W3P89-3090, Response to EA 89-69, LP&L t!1ed Relief Request 2.1.3 in Revision 1 to the IST Program for Pumps and Valve:

in September, 1984. This request was filed, as also discussed in Attachment A, because recirculation flow for several class 2 and 3 pumps are fixed by connecting piping design.

For plants designed in the Waterford 3 timeframe it was not uncommon for minimuta recirculation flow piping to be designed with a fixed resistance.

In fact, some plants, unlike Waterford 3, have no flos instrumentation on the recirculation lines. This design necessitated using a testing procedure which used pump differential pressure rather than measured flow for operability determinations (see IWP-3100). Pump delta P, as opposed to recirculation flow, from a strictly engineering standpoint, is a better indication of pump performance. The IST procedures, therefore, were consistent with plant design and the technical considerations.

,_ Attachment B to W3P89-3090 Page 2 of 4 1 Following the submittal of Relief Request 2.1.3, LP&L sought NRC approval of its testing method. On several occasions, LP&L and the NRC 1 discussed the details surrounding the issue of fixed resistance piping designs. During a working meeting with the NRC in Bethesda in October, 1984, the_ question of pump recirculation was raised by the NRC and its contractor as part of the review of revisions 0 and 1 of the program. LP&L discussed the design factors which necessitated the relief request and explained that recirculation flowrate would be measured and recorded during each pump test. LP&L (at the request of the NRC) committed to provide additional information concerning the details of Waterford 3 design (see Revision 2). .However, at no time was the preposed method questioned.

Following commercial operation (September, 1985), plant personnel continued to express concern over testing with an unapproved IST Program.

Specifically, the concern centered around operating without approval of Relief Request 2.1.3. Since plant operators could not physically vary recirculation flow, LP&L essentially was forced to operate without an approved relief request. This concern, coupled with the prospect of a NRC inspection of the IST Program, and routine enquiries by a representative of the American Nuclear Insurers (ANI), prompted another phone call with the NRC/NRR in December, 1987. LP&L specifically raised the issue of a lack of written approval to the IST Program and its effect on Technical Specification 4.0.5. Ihe staff informed LP&L that any questions raised by NRC inspectors on this matter should be referred to NRR.

In February, 1988, LP&L again contacted the NRC/NRR to enqui*a on the status of the IST Program. LP&L was informed that a SER would be issued in May, 1988. On May 20, 1988, LP&L received a letter from the NRC officially denying relief to "... measure only pump differential pressure..." for the High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI), Containment Spray (CS), and Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pumps. In addition, the NRC granted

" relief from measuring flow" for the Boric Acid (BA) and Emergency Feedwater (EFW) pumps because the " recirculation lines are not instrumented for flow". LP&L was surprised by this letter because at no time did the NRC express any concern about the relief request, and secondly similar relief requests were granted by the NRC for at least one other utility.

This letter also contained significant mistakes. The letter stated that in the case of the BA and EFW pumps, relief is granted because "the i recirculation lines are not instrumented for flow." Although the desired relief was granted, this statement is incorrect. Not only does LP&L have instrumentation on the lines in question, but LP&L did not request relief for the reason stated in the May 20, 1988 letter. LP&L requested relief for the BA and EFW pumps for the same reason relief was requested for the HPSI, LPSI, and CS pumps, i.e., the pumps have fixed resistance recirculation lines, In addition, LP&L misunderstood the wording of the letter relative to the HPSI, CS and LPSI pumps. LP&L never intended to

" measure only pump differential pressure" and stated several times in the past that "all the parameters in Table IWP-3100-2" would be " measured and recorded." More important, as previously discussed, the physinal design of Waterford 3 is such that LP&L cannot vary measured flow or delta P as required by IWP-3100. Therefore, denial of Relief Request 2.1.3 put LP&L in a precarious position (i.e., full compliance with IWP-3100 is physically impossible). For these reasons, LP&L felt there was a serious misunderstanding on the part of the consulting firm reviewing LP&L's IST Program for the NRC.

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.,. Attachment B to W3P89-3090 Page 3 of 4

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LP&L placed a telephone call to the NRC/NRR in June, 1988, fa the hopes of resolving these misunderstandings. LP&L again explainee t' e piping design at Waterford 3 as well as the inaccuracies in the May 20, 1988 letter. The NRC agreed that the consultant probably misunderstood Waterford 3's design and relief request and stated that LP&L document its position and submit it j to the NRC for further review. While not officially stated, LP&L inferred from the discussions that this issue would continue to remain open. On July 8, 1988, LP&L provided the NRC with supplemental information on Relief Request 2.1.3.

I In the January / February 1989 Maintenance Inspection, NRC inspectors raised the concern of HPSI pump recirculation flow and pump operability as a result of a review of the data collected during the November, 1988 IST surveillance. LP&L stated its position and that the issue of the Relief l Request 2.1.3 was still under consideration. On February 7, 1989, the NRC issued a SER on the IST Program granting conditional relief for Relief Request 2.1.3. The SER, like the May 20, 1988 letter, contained essentially the same wording which LP&L found confusing. As a result of the June, 1988 conversation with the NRC, LP&L had assumed the testing criteria for the HPSI, CS, and LPSI pumps were satisfactory. It was not until inspection 89-09 (conducted during the period of March 8-19, 1989) and subsequent conversations with the NRC, that LP&L realized what the NRC intended in the May 20, 1988 letter.

It is important to again state that LP&L did not willfully or negligently fail to comply with the testing requirements of IWP-3100, It is hoped that the information provided above demonstrates what was truly a misunderstanding on the part of LP6L. It is also worth noting that there was no operational benefit to be gained by LP&L in avoiding a declaration of inoperability for HPSI Pump B. While Technical Specification 3.5.2 does provide for a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> shutdown, in reality, HPSI Purp B would simply have been taken out of service and replaced by the standby HPSI Pump, with no erfect on plant availability. In fact, this is precisely what happened following Inspection 89-09.

Prompt Identification and Reporting By the nature of this violation, LP&L did not have the opportunity to identify this violation. As discussed above, an extensive history exists of LP&L attempts to clarify the recirentation flow requirements of ASME Section XI. This issue has been self-identified and reported since the September, 1984 exemption request. Good faith efforts (albeit mistaken in interpretation) have been made since to clarify the recirculation flow requirements. LP&L feels that for the unique circumstances of this violation, full credit under the enforcement policy should be given for prompt identification and reporting.

Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence As discussed in Attachment A, LP&L identified the decrease in recirculation flow as a result of the IST surveillance. Although not considered an ove+ciding factor in determining operability, LP&L felt the decreasing  !

trend in recirculation flow important enough to warrant further evaluation.

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. Attachment B to

. W3P89-3090 Page 4 of 4 When the issue of compliance with Section XI was first understood, LP&L aggressively took steps to correct the testing criteria. As indicated in  !

Attachment A, Alert and Required Action ranges were immediately added to I the program via Standing Instruction 89-05. The noncompliance was i evaluated and reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73.

Basis for Reduction in Violation Severity Level The violation has been assigned a Severity Level III by the NRC. LP&L agrees that a technical violation has occurred, but disagrees with the severity level assigned.

10CFR2, Appendix C, Supplement 1, p-cvides certain examples of Severity Level III violations for reactor operations. It is LP&L's opinion that no example clearly fits the subject violation. C.1, for example, is reserved for "significant" violations of Technical Specifications. While a violation of Technical Specification 4.0.5.a did occur, LP&L agrees with the NRC (see EA) that this violation is a compliance issue rather than a failure of the B HPSI pump to perform its intended function (OPERABLE).

LP&L's past performance in the area of surveillance testing, the circumstances surrounding this issue, and the extent of the corrective actions taken leads to the conclusion that this violation is not a significant compliance issue.

The Severity Level IV example D.1 discusses less significant Technical Specification violations. LP&L feels the subject violation is appropriately classified as a Severity Level IV. Accordingly, LP&L requests that the Severity Level of the violation be reviewed and amended as appropriate.