ML20207S908

Ack Receipt of FEMA & Final Exercise Evaluation on Offsite Emergency Preparedness Exercise Conducted on 860826

ML20207S908
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	03/17/1987
From:	Shafer W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Reed C COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
References
NUDOCS 8703200392
Download: ML20207S908 (2)

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NAR 1719872 Docket No. 50-254 Docket No. 50-265 Comonwealth Edison Company ATTN: Mr. Cordell Reed Vice President Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Gentlemen:

We have received the enclosed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) letter-dated January 21, 1987, and the associated final exercise evaluation'on the offsite emergency preparedness exercise conducted on August 26, 1986, for the State of Illinois, Whiteside, and Rock Island Counties in Illinois. Although this final evaluation listed no deficiencies, there were eight areas for which corrective actions were deemed necessary by FEMA. FEMA has concluded that the proposed corrective actions are acceptable, and that nothing observed in the exercise would adversely impact its approval of the Illinois offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for the Quad Cities Station.

We fully recognize that any remedial actions to be implemented may involve other parties and political institutions which are not under your direct control.

-Nonetheless, we would expect the subject of offsite preparedness for the area around the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station to be addressed by you as well as others.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.

Sincerely, 8'Origir31 ciy.od. by W.D. Sh"Av" 8703200392 870317 4 PDR ADOCK 0500 W. D. Shafer, Chief F Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch

Enclosure:

As stated See Attached Distribution e1g Ploski/md e1 hg ell y Rin eu g b

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'Cammonwealth Edison' Company . 2 MAR 171987.

Distribution cc w/ enclosure:

'D. L. Farrar,. Director of Nuclear Licensing V. I. Schlosser, Project Manager Gunner Sorensen Site Project

. Superintendent R. E. Querio, Plant Manager .

DCS/RSB (RIDS)

. Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Byron Resident Inspector, RIII

'Braidwood Phyllis Dunton, Attorney .

General's Office, Environmental Control Division D. W. Cassel, Jr., Esq.

Diane Chavez, DAARE/ SAFE

, Steve Lewis, 0GC 4 L..01shan, NRR LPM H.'S. Taylor, Quality Assurance Division cc w/o enclosure:

D. Matthews, EPB,'01E

, W. Weaver, FEMA, Region IV I

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[. j' [, P 4 Federal Emergency Management Agency f Washington, D.C. 20472 JAN 21 1987 MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward L. Jordan Dimctor Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatot,f Counission FBOM: R Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs

Subject:

Exercise Repott of the August 26, 1986, Exercise of the Illinois Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans for the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.

His is to transmit a copy of the Exercise Report of the August 26, 1986, joint exercise of the Illinois offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, near Cordova, Rock Island County, Illinois. Patticipants included the State of Illinois (partial patticipation), Rock Island County (full participation), Whiteside County (full) and Camonwealth Edison Co. (full). Rese two counties are inpacted by the Quad Cities plume exposure 10-inile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).

The date of the final report prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region V was December 29, 1986. On December 18, 1986, FEMA transmitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) the FEMA Region VII report on the portion of the August 26, 1986, exercise concern-ing the Iowa Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans for the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.

In the August 26, 1986 exercise, for the Illinois portion of the EPZ con-ducted by FEMA Region V, there were no Deficiencies observed; however, there were eight areas observed as requiring corrective action. %e State of Illinois has received a copy of the exercise report and responded November 26, 1986 to the areas cited by FEMA as requiring corrective action. The FEMA Region V memorandum of December 30, 1986 reviewing the Illinois response is attached. n e proposed corrective actions contained in the memorandum are acceptable to FEMA and will be evaluated at the next biennial exercise.

There was nothing observed in this exercise that would adversely affect the FEMA approval of the Illinois Offsite Radiological Emeroency Prepared-ness Plans site-specific to the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station under 44 CFR 350.

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If you have'any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilket s , Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2861.

Attachment As Stated

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@ ' Federal Emergency Management Agency

)b Region V 300 South Wacker,24ih Floor,' Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 353-1500 DEC 3 01986 s

MEMORAND(E EVP: Assistant Associate Director Office of Natpral and Technological Hazards ATTENTION: Ken Green, ' SL-NT-TH 1, ..

FRCN: L ilace J. Neaver, Chairman Regional Assistance Connittee

SUBJECT:

Quad Cities Final Exercise Ibport and the State of Illinois Schedule of Corrective Action Diciosed is a copy of the r.chedule of currective action fran the State of Illinois for the exercise weaknesses identified during the August 26, 1986 Quad Cities REP joint exercise. '1he sched'11e of corrective action has been reviewed by the office and found to be adeqmte to correct the waknesses identified during the exercise. A copy of our response to tha State of Illinois is also enclosed. ' \

'1he draft exercise report was revised to reflect ccanents received from various sources during the consultation and review proces. A copy of'the final exercice report is enclosed. He reemmend that you transnit the final exercise report and schedule of corrective action to NRC.

i Enclosures -

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1 DEC 30 986 Mr. David L. Smith Otlef, Field Services Illinois energency Services and Disaatar Agency 118 East Adams Street S;tingfield, Illinois 62796 Dear 7t. anithe We have reviewed the schedule of corrective action dated Noveber 26, 1986 for the exercise weaknesses identified during the August 26, 1986 Quad Cities FEP joint exercise. Char evaluation of the propossd corrective action is discussed below.

state of Illinois: F.1 The installation of the new instrumentation for the Rock Island Cbunty EOC laRS line would appear to have corrected the problan observed during the.

exercise. We will evaluate the reliability of the Rock Island Canty EOC l&RS line during future exercises.

State of Illinois: E Your proposal to demonstrate notification procedures as appropriate during the next biennial exercise is acceptable. %e appropriate sections of the '

final' exercise report have been amended to further clarify the FDIA Pegion v ;osition with respect to this issue. mis office will continue to work with you, the State of Iom and FEMA Pcgion VII to resolve this situation to everyone's satisfaction. Our strramry of the situation is discussed below. l The difference in Illinois arx1 Iowa procedures for County notification is the cause of the problen. mis difference in procedures results in the Iowe Counties receiving notification concurrent with the State of Iowa. In Illinois, the notification is relayed to the Illinois Counties by the State. 21s provides the State of Illinois with a reasonable period of assessment which can be almost when begins instantaneous the Counties or several receiveminutes. Se "15-minute notification clock" the notification. Sus shen Iom waits for Illinois, the Iowa Counties are using part of their 15-einutes. Se Illinois Counties " clock" has not yet started. Ze criteria is being applied uniformly but the variation in procedures causes the Counties to receive their notifica-tion at different tirnes. Our position is that the procedures demonstrated during the exercises rnust be those fr'entified in the plan and vice versa.

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'# -2 Rock Island County: F.1 (2) n see coment under State of Illinois F.1 for evaluation of the first part ,

of these two exercise weaknesses. '1he proposed corrective action for the second part is acceptable. When the transfer of responsibility to the Rock

'o Island County Sheriff's Departcent is coglete, please forward copies of a the plan revision for review by this office. He will evaluate the new procedures during the next biennial exercise.

Rock Island County: G.3.a (2)

' The proposed corrective actions for these tte exercise weaknesses are n '

, acceptable. ' W will evaluate these activities during the next biennial exercise.

e Whiteside County: J.19.1 The proposed corrective action is acceptable. tae,will work with you to -

ensure that the scenario for the next biennial exercise will _ provide an opportunity for Whiteside County to deconstrate access control for evalue-tion by the federal observers. ,

hhiteside County: E.5 The proposed corrective action is acceptable. He will evaluate this recovery /

reentry activity during the next biennial exercise.

< A copy of the final exercise report is enclosed. Only the cover page, title page and State of Illinois Public Alerting and Instruction section have been s,ignificantly amended. Please distribute this final exercise report to all noldcrs of the draft exercise report provided to you in October.

The final exercise report and your schedule of corrective action are being provided to Fu% !!Q for transnittal to the 13C. We will notify you of T NTs HQ action with respect to the 44 CTR 350 approval.

Sincerely, Is/

Wallace J. tenver, 0: airman Hegional Assistance Comittee

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, EXERCISE REPORT QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY JOINT EXERCISE Location of the Plant: Located in the State of Illinois, Rock Island

. County near the Village of Cordova, Illinois.

Exercise Date: August 26, 1986 Date of Draft Report: October 20, 1986 Date of Final Report: December 29, 1986 Participants Included: The State of ' Illinois (partial), Rock Island County (full), Whiteside County (full) and Commonwealth Edison Co. (full). FEMA Region VII is preparing a separate report on their evaluation of the State of Iowa and Scott County and Clinton County.

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PREPARED BY THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, REGION V NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS DIVISION TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS BRANCH 300 SOUTH WACKER DRIVE, 25TH FLOOR CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60606 4

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- l TABLE OF CONTENTS -

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

l State of Illinois Page 1 l Rock Island County Page 2 Whiteside County Page -3 EXERCISE REPORT Introduction Page 4

1. Exercise Background Page 4

2. Part<lcipating and Non-Participating Page 4 State and Local Governments

3. List of Evaluators Page 5

4. Evaluation Criteria Page 5

5. Summary of Exercise Objectives Page 5

6. Summary of the Scenario Page 7

7. Description of State and Local Resources Page 9 Planned To Be Used in the Exercise

8. Findings Noted in Past Exercises Page 10

9. Exercises Objectives Still To Be Effectively Achievec Page 10 Narrative i

l 1. State of Illinois Page 11

! 2. Rock Island County Page 14

3. Whiteside County Page 18

SUMMARY

LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS l State of Illinois l'

1. Deficiencies Page 23

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action Page 24 l

3. Areas Recommended for Improvement Paga 25

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. Rock Island County

1. Deficiencies Page 26

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action Page 27

3. Areas Recommended for Improvement Page 28 Uhite' side County

1. Deficiencies Page 29

4. neas Requiring Corrective Action Page 30

3. Areas Recommended for Improvement Page 31 l

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

State of Illinois The Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (ESDA) participated at l' the partial participation level during the August 26, 1986, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Exercise.

- The State ESDA demonstrated the mobilizing of staff in the Energency Operations Center-(EOC) in Springfield. The emergency response staff took up their positions in a prompt manner. Decisions were made with staff involvement and emergency activities were seriously coordinated.

The EOC. facility in support of emergency operations was demonstrated.

Displays, maps, communications equipment and furnishings were in place and utilized.

The State ESDA demonstrated the ability to communicate with the several emergency response organizations, both in Illinois and Iowa. During the exercise, the NARS (Nuclear Accident Reporting System) did not function as it was designed. Some of the instruments did not work.

A great deal of coordination took place between the Illinois and Iowa State Directors _for alerting and notifying the public. The Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) collected data and issued projections from their Radiological Energency Assessment Center (REAC) in the IDNS i

headquarters in. Springfield. The projected dosage was based on simulated

, power station and field data. From the data, recommended protective actions were given. The ability to alert the public within the 10 mile EPZ and .

dissemination of the initial message was demonstrated at the State EOC. Due to the variation in the two States' procedures for implementation of the alert and notification to the public, a special " informational" message was issued by the State ESDA to Illinois Counties. The intent was only to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification System in preparation for the forthcoming " instructional" message. That message followed so close behind the first that the Illinois Counties were uncertain as to their timing of ac tions. The outcome was that those populations at risk were notified of l protective actions. i Through the combined efforts of the ESDA and the IDNS, there was a demonstration of the ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.

The IDNS simulated the monitoring of emergency worker exposure. Exposure and contamination of one of IDNS field team members was simulated to have taken place in Iowa.

The demonstration of issuance of potassium iodide to emergency workers l and/or the general public was not observed.

The preparations were made but a demonstration was not given to brief the media.

The State Director did demonstrate the ability to provide advance coordination of information for release. Continuous communications was 1 l l

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established between the State EOC in Springfield and the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) in Morrison.

The State ESDA demonstrated the need for and requested assistance from several Federal agencies.

The IDNS developed the total population exposure based on data collected in the field and analyzed in the IDNS REAC. They also evaluated the data provided by the utility in reaching their decision.. The State implemented appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

l The JPIC was adequately staffed with appropriate PIOS and sufficient clerical assistance. The 24-hour staffing capabilities were evident and communications links were effective.

The PIOS were articulate in their presentations and expressed a keen sensitivity to the accuracy and timeliness in briefing the media.

Coordination and cooperation was evident and exhibited in advance of all press briefings and press releases.

In regards to the inadequacies of the JPIC facility, the condition continues to exist.

ROCK ISLAND COUNTY .

Rock Island County activated their EOC upon being notified of the " Alert" classification at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. The EOC staff responded "real time" to the calls initiated by RICOM (Rock Island, Cordova, Moline Cooperative Communication Center). The staff demonstrated 24-hour capability by a complete shift change. There were frequent briefings and the staff participated in making decisions as they coordinated their separate agency activities. The EOC building was designed and built for the

-purpose of being an EOC and was furnished with all required maps and charts. Telephone was the primary means of ' communications used during the exercise; radio was available as back-up. The Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) telephone was inoperative most of the day. There was a period of time when RICOM did not forward information to Cordova and Port Byron.

When protective actions were ordered by the State, RICOM sounded the sirens l and the EOC staff activated the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) station, WHBF, to give instructions to the public. The information given over the EBS should have been provided to the JPIC.

Functions related to managing the evacuation of the designated areas within Rock Island County were discussed among the staff and reflected their ability to care for the people affected. The staff indicated sufficient resources were available to accomplish their tasks. This included a supply of Potassium Iodide (KI), which was simulated issued to emergency workers.

A briefing room for the media was designated within the EOC building, but was not used.

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Whiteside County

' The'Whiteside County EOC was activated and staffed af ter notification of the

" Unusual Event" classification. Facilities were operational and all equipment and displays were in place. Twenty-four hour staffing capability

.was demonstrated by a call up roster with a full set of alternates, shift changes during the exercise by numerous groups and by double staffing in a few positions.

The EOC Coordinator was knowledgeable and displayed capability and the awareness of coordination for decision making. The EOC Staff was acquainted with their responsibilities and had copies of the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), checklists and other material for reference. : The Public Information Officer (PIO) coordinated with the JPIC using telephone and hard copy.

The EOC staff should continue the round table type briefings that began with the initial status reports but trailed off toward the end of the day. Long lapses between briefings caused delays in sharing some key information.

Space and facilities at this EOC were good. Telephones, displays, maps, etc., were good. ,

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The EOC had individual telephones for each staffer, with hard-copy capability and the extensive police radio network was available.

Consunications with IESDA, the JPIC and the Village of Albany were demonstrated.

The Whiteside County EOC staff demonstrated the ability to alert the public and disseminate an initial " instructional" message (advising of the incident at the power station and suggesting that the public remain tuned to the EBS) within the fifteen minutes time allotted by activation of the public notification system.

The staff, by use of prescripted messages, simulated distribution of the appropriate initial " instructional" message and later in the exercise, a sheltering message was issued which affected sector "C" in Whiteside Co un ty. The distribution of the appropriate messages corrects a weakness noted during the previous exercise.

The EOC staff demonstrated the organizational ability necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of part of the plume EPZ. The staff was prepared to conduct an evacuation of that portion of Whiteside County that was affected by the plume had conditions warranted an evacuation.

The staff did not demonstrate the organizational ability to control access to an evacuated area. The County Sheriff and the County ESDA Coordinator 3

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ande the decision not to demonstrate the objective in the EOC because the protective action recommendation from the State to the County was for sheltering of people and not evacuation. Their rationale was that the scenario did not-allow for demonstration of the objective.

.The EOC staff were ' issued dosimetry kits and a placebo (lemon drops) dose of KI to demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI once the decision was made to do so. Staff of the County Coroner's Office, the utility and

, IDNS are well versed on the use of KI.

The Whiteside County Coordinator explained media briefing procedures for evaluators, although no press briefings were held at the County EOC. The County was prepared to conduct briefings on an hourly basis had members of the media shown an interest in Whiteside County's involvement in the simulated incident at the power station. The staff was prepared to refer media'aembers to the JPIC for in depth reports on the incident.

The County EOC staff coordinated the release of information from the County to the EBS station, with the JPIC by telephone and use of the facsimile for

! hard copies.

The EOC staff conducted discussions on recovery and took into consideration t actions that should have been taken had there been an evacuation. However, the County did not prepare an EBS message for recovery and reentry instructions for the public.

EXERCISE REPORT Introduction

1. Exercise Background This was the fif th exercise for Rock Island and Whiteside Counties resulting from a simulated accident at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.

Following are the dates of previous exercises

May 20, 1981; August 24, 1982; May 11,1983 and; August 28, 1984. The exercises also included the municipalities of Albany, Cordova, and Port Byron.

! 2. Participating and Non-Participating State and Local Governments The -Energency Planning Zone of the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station impacts i

on Rock Island and Whiteside Counties and the municipalities of Albany, j' Cordova, and Port Byron. In addition, it also includes the Counties of i

Clinton and Scott in the State of Iowa. (Iowa will be reported on by FEMA Region VII.)

The following Illinois Counties, located in the 50-mile EPZ, did not actively participate in the exercise: Bureau, Carroll, Henry, Jo Davies, Knox, Lee, Mercer, Ogle, Stark, Stephenson, and Warren. It was not a part of the scenario for these counties to participate.

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3. List of Evaluators For this exercise there were seven Federal evaluators observing off-site

^ exercise activities. On-site activities were evaluated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III. Of the off-site evaluators, six, including the off-site Exercise Director,' were Federal Energency Management

- Agency'(FEMA) Region 7 staff and one was from Argonne National Laboratory (ANL). The evaluator assignments were as follows:

Offsite Exercise Director Wallace Weaver, FEMA State of Illinois Evaluation Team Gordon Wenger, FEMA, Team Leader, State EOC, Springfield .

Patricia Buckley, FEMA, Joint Public Information Center, Morrison -

Rock Island County Evaluation Team Rick Anthony, FENA, Team Leader, County EOC, Milan Dick Meyer, FEMA Whiteside County i

Woodie Curtis, FEMA, Team Leader, County EOC, Morrison Bill Chambers, Argonne National Laboratory

4. Evaluation Criteria The plans that were evaluated by this exercise were developed using the

" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0654/ FEMA i

REP-1, Revision 1). Therefore, the criteria and the modules, based on these criteria entitled, " Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluation," dated June 1983, were used for the exercise evaluation.

5. Summary of Exercise Objectives Objectives for this. exercise were selected from among the FEMA thirty-five (35) standard objectives listed in Tab "M" of the " Modular Format for i

i Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluations," dated June 1983. The objective numbers listed below correlate to Tab "M".

The State of Illinois selected the following fifteen objectives, including those applicable to the JPIC, to be demonstrated during the exercise:

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency i ac tivitie s.

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4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency ope ra tions.

5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate . locations, organizations and field personnel.

10. . Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures based on PAGs, available shelters, evacuation time estimates and all other appropriate factors.

13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional sessage, within 15 minutes.

14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate Lastructions to the public, in a timely fashion.

20. Demonstrate: ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.

21. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers and/or the general population.

22. Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once - the decision has been made to do so.

24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.

25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.

32. Demonstrate ability to identify need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance.

34.- Demonstrate ability to estimate total population exposure.

35. . Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

Rock Island County and Whiteside County selected the following thirteen objectives to be demonstrated during the exercise:

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.

3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency ac tivitie s.

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4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

5. Demonstrate chility to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.

14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.

15. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.

17. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.

22. Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so. .

24. Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.

25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.

35. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

6. Summary of the Scenario The Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station radiological emergency preparedness exercise objectives and scenario for the August 26, 1986, joint exercise were developed by exercise planners of the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, IESDA, and IDNS. The exercise planners served as controllers during the exercise and protected the scenario from the participants of the l exercise so they would not be aware of the scenario events. '

Submission of the scenario was according to guidelines outlined in NRC and FEMA guidance. Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Company, Incorporated, reviewed the onsite and offsite scenarios for FEMA so evaluation of the objectives l selected by the State of Illinois as well as Rock Island and Whiteside l

Counties could be accurately assessed. The exercise scenario was deemed sufficient to initiate the emergency response by the State of Illinois and Rock Island and Whiteside Counties. The scenario did allow for the demonstration and evaluation of the objectives selected for the August 26, l 1986 exercise of the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.

j Scenario

• Unit One is operating normally at full power and has been at full power

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is out of service and should be returned to service in two to three days.

Unit Two is operating normally at full power and is controlling load automatically in EGC. The unit has been on line all suaner without outage.

l The unit is in an LCO for the 1/2 diesel out of service. Unit Two RCIC is out of service for trip throttle valve repairs. The unit has been operating with a significant condenser tube leak for the last two weeks. Due to load demand, the unit has been kept on line requiring one or two condensate

^ filter desineralizers to be backwashed, precosted and returned to service per shift.

For the isst week there has been an Off Gas Systen leak in the turbine building. Personnel exiting through the trackway portals are found to have contaminated clothing af ter being in the turbine building for any extended period of time. A large amount of condensate filter desineralizer resin was recently delivered to the Station. One order of resin is contaminated with a powdered chemical cleaning agent known as Baxite 86. The contaminated resin will be used to precost three desineralizers and will cause chemical contamination of the reactor feedwater when the demineralizers are placed in service. The Baxite 86 will cause degradation of elastomer seals and a crud release in the reactor, which eventually leads to a release from the Station.

At 0555 2A condensate filter desineralizer, coated with Baxite, is placed in service. Unit Two chemistry parameters begin to diverge from normal due to chemical intrusion. At 0600, crud release begins in the Unit Two drywell.

Reactor building and main steam line radition levels begin to trend upward.

At 0645,1C condensate filter demineralizer, coated with Baxite, is placed I

in service. Unit One chemical intrusion begins. At 0650, reactor recirculation pump seals and reactor water clean up pump sechanical seals begin to degrade as a result of the chemical intrusion. At 0730, HI. seal leakage alara is received due to failure of the Unit Two reactor recirculation pump seal. Leakage is a 2 gpa and rapidly increasing.

Chemistry technician draws his daily Unit Two chemistry sample. At 0810, Unit Two offgas and main steam line radiation monitors begin to trend upward

due to fission release from fuel element failure.

UNUSUAL EVENT (0830-0920)

At 0830, loss of primary coolant greater than 25 gpa is calculated for the i

Unit Two drywell drain sump. Drywell pressure and temperature continue to

, increase. Unit Two begins po*wer reduction to prepare for shutdown. At j

0900, Unit one drywell equipment sump leakage exceeds 25 gps. Unit One l begins power reduction to prepare for shutdown.

ALERT (0920-1040) '

At 0920, a dramatic increase in Unit Two crud concentration causes drywell radiation levels to reach 200 R/hr. Airborne, main steam line, and offgas radiation levels continue to increase due to fuel element failure. At 0945,  ;

Unit One drywell radiation level reaches 200 R/hr. At 1000, Unit Two i

' isolates on high main steam line radiation levels as fuel element failure accelerates. HPCI is started to control reactor pressure. Steam leakage occurs around the HPCI turbine seals which significantly increases reactor building airborne levels. Reactor building ventilation system trips on high i

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4 radiation level. Control failure occurs allowing supply fans to continue to run and supply dampers to remain open. SBGT system starts and runs normally, but cannot control reactor building pressure increase resulting in overpressurization of the reactor building. At 1020, Unit One "A" filter desineralizer is inadvertently placed in service. Since the 1A filter

- desineralizer hold pump is out of the system and the isolation valves leak, athe large quantity of reactor coolant is released to the desinaralizer room as 1A is placed on line. This source also significantly increases reactor building airborne levels.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY (1040-1200)

At 1040 Unit Two drywell radiation level has reached 400 R/hr, and drywell pressure exceeds 2 lbs.

At 1045, failure of the reactor building over and under pressure protection system allows overpressurization of the reactor building to continue until the simultaneous rupture of blow out panel and the reactor building roof occurs. This results in a loss of secondary I containment and initiates an uncontrolled, unsonitored release from the reactor building. Security reports to the control room that debris from the reactor building is "all over the place". At 1050, rapid shutdown of Unit One commences. At 1100, Unit one drywell radiation level exceeds 400 R/hr.

At 1115, Unit One forced cool down begins by dumping steam to the main condenser. Unit Two cool down continues via RPCI. (Primary containment is undamaged.)

GENERAL EMERGENCY (1200-1400)

At 1200, Unit Two drywell average air temperature reaches 290 degrees due to continued RR pump seal leakage while drywell cooling remains isolated. At 1220, Unit One and Unit Two drywell radiation levels stabilize at 450 and 560 R/hr, respectively. At 1255, release rate begins to taper off. At 1300, a twenty-four hour time jump occurs. Shortly after the time jump,,

both Unit One and Unit Two successfully enter shutdown cooling. At 1320-1345 several RHR pump seals fail due to the ongoing chemical intrusion. A steady-state release of 1.0E+06 uci/sec is maintained.

RECOVERY'(1400-1430)

At 1400, the reactor building is temporarily repaired ending the uncontrolled release. The SBGT system is operating normally. At 1430 is the end of the scenario.

7. Description of State and Local Resources Planned To Be Used in the Exercise The State of Illinois planned to minimally staff and demonstrate response activity at the State EOC in Springfield; fully staffing the JPIC and the utility's EOF, located near Morrison.

Rock Island and Whiteside Counties planned to demonstrate their EOCs with full emergency staff participating. The Counties also chose to demonstrate their capability (simulated) to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification

' System, the Emergency Broadcast System and access control . Evacuation of the plume EPZ was to be laulated.

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8. Findings Noted in the August 28, 1984 Exercise State of Illinois l

NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev.1, Standard E, Element 6. It took 26 minutes from the time the State decided to activate the sirens to alert the j-public until the initial instructional message was provided to EBS. This deficiency was lifted because of the following two factors. First, the State of Illinois sucesssfully demonstrated the capability to order activation of the sirens concurrently with activstion of the EBS during the LaSalle exercise on August 28, 1984. Additionally, Illinois also auccessfully demonstrated its capability to order activation of the sirens concurrently with EBS activation during the Zion exercise on March 5,1985, and the Dresden exercise on April 23, 1985. Secondly, the State agreed, as part of their corrective actions, to meet the County Emergency Services and Disaster Agency coordinators to review local plans and procedures for EBS and siren activation. This meeting took place on January 18, 1985, and was held to ensure that County officials fully understand their role in public notification and that they will initiate EBS notification in conjunction with siren activation in the absence of a State directive. Also, on January 18, 1985, a training session was held for those personnel who have the responsibility to activate the alert and notification system.

Previously reported were catagory "B" deficiencies which the State was to respond to for corrective action. There were three such deficiencies which have been cleared during exercising at other nuclear power stations.

Rock Island County

There were no significant deficiencies.

Previously reported were catagory "B" deficiencies which the County was to correct.

There were four such deficiencies which have been cleared during this exercise.

Whiteside County There were no significant deficiencies.

Previously reported were catagory "B" deficiencies which the County was to correct.

exercise. There was one such deficiency which has been cleared during this

9. Exercise Objectives Still To Be Effectively Achieved in the Six Year Cycle.

State of Illinois This completes the six year cycle. All objectives have been completed.

Rock Island County This completes the six year cycle. All objectives have been completed.

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, Whiteside County This ccepletes the six year cycle. All objectives have been completed.

Narrative

1. 'Stati of Illinois Activation and Staffing The August 26, 1986 exercise was partial participation for the Illinois Energency Services and Disaster Agency (IESDA). Therefore staffing of the State EOC in Springfield was minimal. The staff did report in a timely amaner and effectively implemented the energency response. Consunications were established. Notifications were received and transmitted in a proper manner. Notifications were carried out using current call up lists.

Incoming notifications were verified by the staff.

Energency Operations Management The State ISDA Director was present in the State EOC from the beginning of the exercise to its termination. It was obvious he was in charge of the emergency response. He cosaands attention and exhibits good leadership. He held periodic briefings and kept the staff up to date. The staff took an active role in the decision making process.

A copy of- the State General Plan and the Quad Cities site specific plan were available for reference. Procedures and checklists were used by the staff i during the exercise. Message logs were used, reproduced and distributed to EOC st:ff. Message handling was efficient and has improved since the LaSalle exercise of April 1986.

The State EOC was notified of the " Alert" classification at 0935, " Site Area Emergency" 1036 and " General Emergency" 1154.

' Protective actions were issued by the State at 1036 (take shelter) and at 1154 to evacuate in Sectors M, N and P. Federal assistance was requested of FEMA RV via CDNAYS.

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! Facilities The EOC in Springfield is well furnished and equipped. All amenities are sa tisfactory. Noise was well within tolerabia levels.

j. can be handled quite well. Back up power was available. Extended operations tested. It has been tested and witnessed in previous exercises. It was not All emergency classifications were posted in an effective and timely manner. Status boards were kept current and are highly visible.

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Appropriate maps relating to.the emergency response were posted and kept "

, current to support the EOC staff.

Consunications Communications vers established and the primary system (telephones) was 4

I used. It became necessary to activate the backup system to the NARS for communications with Rock Island County EOC due to the failure of the phone to ring. The reception was poor which is generally a result af ter a rainfall. However, due to the design of the system, Rock Island Conaunications Command relayed NARS messages to the Rock Island County EOC.

ARRA REQUIRING CORRRCTIVR ACTION i~ In as such as the State was faced with an actual problem in communicating with Rock Island County, and although they were able to overcome the problem, it is necessary to initiate a repair or modification to the NARS telephone line in that geographic area. It is common to have poor reception in the NARS and commercial telephone following a downfall of rain. NUREG 0654, Standard F, Element 1.

The State Director did use the conferencing capability of the communications l system. He also periodically had conference calls with the Iowa State Director the public.to coordinate activities related to Illinois-Iowa notification of Telephone FAX was used in the State EOC and is established between

, Springfield and the JPIC in Morrison. It was fast and reliable.

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Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations

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This portion of the exercise was table-top in the IDNS REAC for staff

~ training. Expected doses were derived by IDNS from the plant release data (simulated) and field data (simulated). Calculaticus were made promptly and checked against the plant data. Monitor data was plotted on a map in the ESDA EOC.

i The IDNS was able to make adequate recommendations to protect the public based on the projected dosages, protective measures based on PAGs, '

available shelters, evacuation time estimates and other appropriate factors.

The plume pathway was defined and plotted. Protective actions decisions were reached guidelines werefor both the inhalation and ingestion pathways. EPZ exposure used.

The IDNS evaluated other factors in making their decision; such as weather, plant status and evacuation time estimates.

Protective action recommendations were made promptly and updated as conditions changed.

Protective actions were well demonstrated in coordination with Iowa. The use of KI for emergency workers was not recommended by the State.

Public Alerting and Instruction The State EOC coordinated the recommendation to activate the Prompt Alert

and Notification System, both in Iowa and in the two Illinois Counties. The initiating event to activate the system was at " Site Area Energency" (1036). In the activation of the system, the State Director of Illinois conferred with the State Director of Iowa. Because of the States' variation in the procedure for notifying the public, both State Directors agreed to issue an " informational" message over the EBS station following the simulated activation of the sirens, tone alert devices and route alerting.

Once Illinois confirmed data from the utility and made the decision to warn the public and issue protective actions, the two State Directors again conferred to coordinate the reactivation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System. Once again the sirens were simulated sounded and an

" instructional" message was issued (simulated announced) over the EBS station. The matter of the two States having different procedures for the notification of the public should be resolved by the States. The problem this particular exercise posed was the two Illinois Counties made their own Laterpretation of the back-to-back messages (" informational" and

" instructional") and one County issued instructions at the first notification and the other County did not find need to sound the sirens at receipt of the second notification. (See comments under each I111acis Coun ty.)

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION To assure coordinated notification of the public, the Illinois State Director developed this two phase unique procedure. Key decision-making officials in Illinois Counties must be apprised of the intent of NARS messages and act in accordance with the devised scheme.

Both States need to devise a mutually agreed upon procedure to comply with Draft FEMA GM AN-1. NUREG 0654, Standard E and Draft FEMA GM AN-1.

Protective Action No objectives selected for this section.

Exposure Control i

Dosimeters can be made available for personnel departing Springfield travelin'g into the EPZ. They were not observed in the field.

Media Relations (Joint Public Information Center)

In the EOC in Springfield, space is provided for addressing the public.

There was not the occasion to hold a briefing. Briefings have been held during previous exercises.

In Morrison, the JPIC was adequately staffed by Public Information Officers from Illinois ESDA, DNS, Iowa, the utility and sufficient clerical support.

Each person demonstrated professionalism and performed proficiently.

Twenty-four hour staffing capabilities were evident with the State PIO in Springfield, but were not demonstrated due to nature of the exercise.

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2 All appropriate maps were available, but not displayed. Only the utility maps and diagrams were prominent and used throughout the press briefings.

In regards to the inadequacies of the JPIC facility, the condition continues to exist.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT To more fully infore the visitors to the JPIC it is necessary the

' appropriate maps be displayed and utilized during briefings and that they remain available for use by the media to build their video presentations.

The communications systems consisting of commercial telephones and the State vide telephones were efficient. Coordination was displayed between all PIOS by holding " conferences" prior to the actual " press briefings", and all

" press releases" were reviewed prior to distribution. The JPIC's primary function to effectively coordinate and distribute information to the news media, was demonstrated. Rumor control was not an exercise objective.

Recovery and Reentry The staff and the State Director initiated the messages to implement the recovery actions and reentry.

Scenario The objectives and scenario for the exercise were realistic and did cause the implementing demonstration of the emergency response

2. Rock Island County Activation and Staffing The Rock Island County ESDA was notified by telephone from Rock Island City / County Milan Cooperative Consunications Center (RICOM) of " Unusual ,

Event" at 0905. The ESDA staff made the required notifications. The 20C building is the normal duty location for the County ESDA staff. Two volunteers, the IDNS, State ESDA, a local Red Cross and the utility representatives arrived prior to the " Alert". The Sheriff's representative and the Regional School representative arrived about 1115. The Coroner representative arrived at 1135. The ECC was operational at 1015. It was fully staffed at 1155. RICOM maintains a current call list and initiated calls according to their SOP.

Emergency Operations Management The County ESDA Coordinator was in charge until the arrival of the County Board Chairman. Periodic briefings were held throughout the day for the staff to coordinate their activities and to assist in decision making. The 14

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1 staff referred to the County plan and agency SOPS for guidance. Incoming messages were reproduced and distributed to all staff seabers to keep them informed of activities. The utility representative kept the staff informed of the plant status.

Security was established by uniformed ESDA volunteers on the only road leading into the EOC facility and at both doors of the EOC building. A

{ sign-in station was located inside the entrance to the EOC, well away from

. the Operations Room.

RICOM was n.'.:iffed at 0958 of the " Alert" classification, the message was

, passed to tt Cack Island County EOC at 1010. " Site Area Emergency" 1

occurred at S; and " General Emergency" at 1207.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Clocks in the Operations Room and the Message Center did not agree It is recommended all clocks be synchronized during the EOC activation.

Facilities The RICOM is located on the second floor of the Rock Island City Hall. The Operations Room is about 15' by 30' and has five operators on duty plus the Director. The RICOM operates on a 24-hour per day basis and handles the 911 system for the County. To insure that they would be able to handle the additional load of communications during the exercise, they had an additional operator on duty. A partial change of shif t was demonstrated.

Security for this room was excellent. The Federal exercise evaluator could

not get past the first floor until the RICOM Director case to the door and escorted him through several locked doors.

The County EOC building, located in Milan, was designed specifically as an Energency Operations Center. The operations room is about 30' by 30' and provided space, furniture and telephone for 18 staff persons. Ihere was space for additional staff. A separate press briefing room, approximately i

' 12' by 10' was located near the entrance to the building. ESDA offices, with radio communications, were also located near the front of the i

building. A generator, in a separate concrete block bu!.1 ding, was undergoing repair so an additional generator mounted on a truck was positioned to provide back-up power. The State ESDA Controller was provided a separate work area within the operations room to accommodate the datafax machine and two telephone lines at his disposal. All required maps were available and posted. A status board, at the front of the operations room, was kept posted, listing key events. The events were logged on the status board with the time the event occurred. This corrects a weakness noted

! during the previous exercise.

Conaunications i Consercial telephone is the primary means of communications within the EOC operations room. The State ESDA Controller in the operations room had

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6-datafax connected to telephone. The NARS telephone was inoperative and, for I

. a short time early in the exercise, the ESDA radio in the EOC was inoperative. .Information relayed by RICOM to the EOC was done by commercial telephone. At times during the day, RICOM would call by commercial telephone and instruct the message center operators to pick up the NARS telephone to receive a message. Sometimes this procedure worked, other times it did not.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION i-The NARS telephone link must be repaired and a reliable circuit established. NUREG 0654, Standard F, Element 1.

From 1042 until about 1415, there were no communications from RICOM to either Cordova or Port Byron. During this time, several actions, including

" General Emergency" occurred. Neither the County EOC nor RICOM notified the villages. At about 1415, the County EOC staff became aware of the lack of communications to the villages and began checking intermittently to ensure their getting information.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION f

Procedures must be developed and followed to ensure all information is communicated to all locations in the County. The County EOC aust be able to monitor and confirm that information is toing sent to and from the communities within the County. NUREG 0654 Standard F Element 1.

Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations Objectives related to Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations were not selected to be demonstrated by Rock Island County during this exercise.

Public Alerting and Instruction l

The EOC played an important role in public alerting. RICOM initiated the

event and the EOC staff made sure that sirens and EBS were ectivated. The Sheriff's office dispatched cars to the affected areas with blow horns informing people to evacuate. Emergency public instructions with clear appropriate messages were sent out via EBS on a routine basis. EBS messages were not transmitted to the JPIC.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

! Information with released over EBS should be transmitted to or coordinated the JPIC. NUREG 0654 Standard G, Element 3a. ,

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• Protective Act, ions-When the County was notified to implement evacuation, the EOC staff attended their functions. Traffic control points were established by the law enforcement personnel and barricades were provided by the County Highway Department. The Sheriff department was prepared to handle any stalled or wrecked vehicles. Civil Air Patrol flew missions to observe traffic flow and report bottlenecks to 'the EOC. FAA was contacted to reroute air traffic.

- Sheriff's Officers were dispatched to five homes to assist people requiring special care.

The Red Cross coordinated with the schools representative to evacuate eleven other.non-sabulatory persons. There were simulated 125 people in shelter at Rock Island High School, where there was

" plenty of room and no problems". There were sufficient personnel and resources to effect the evacuation. The Chief Executive actively coordinated the staff activities.

Radiological Exposure Control The Radiological Officer issued dosimetry and maintained exposure records.

These actions exceeded the objectives selected for demonstration during this exercise.

Potassium iodide is stored in State stock supplies and is available as requested. The emergency response organizations have a supply available for use by emergency workers.

The IDNS representative ' stationed in the county gave instructions on the dispensing and use of potassium iodide. Energency workers were directed to

. take simulated KI (lemon drops). ,

Media Relations A space was available for briefing news media persons. No briefings were given.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION The County must demonstrate their procedures for briefing news media during the next exercise. NUREG 0654 Standard G, Element 3a.

I Recovery and Reentry At 1440, the EOC staff received a message to go into the recovery and j reentry phase. The staff members again attended their individual functions, i.e. law enforcement handling traffic patterns; highway department removing i

barricades; Red Cross handling the closing of shelters. The Civil Air Patrol simulated flying observation missions and reported no traffic problems. The Sheriff tended to bringing back mobility impaired persons.

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The EBS radio station was notified of reentry activities.

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3. Whiteside County Activation and Staffing The Whiteside County EOC was activated by the County Coordinator and the County Sheriff af ter receipt of the " Unusual Event" notification from IESDA 0843. The notification was verified by the Sheriff's Dispatcher with IESDA.

The Albany Fire Department was notified of the " Unusual Event" by the County Sheriff's Dispatcher after the notification was verified and the information had been given to the Sheriff and County Coordinator. Staff call-up was initiated at 0957 and the EOC was operational at 1008, af ter receipt of notification of the " Alert" classification. The staff nob staff.

111:stion roster was current and is the system used for the call-up of The County EOC was staffed in accordance with the written plan. EOC staff were well versed .in their respective responsibilities and demonstrated knowledge of the plan. Twenty-four hour staffing capability was demonstrated by a shift change and/or double staffing and the presentation of a personnel roster for any subsequent shifts.

Energency Operations Management The Whiteside County EOC Coordinator was effectively in charge of facility.

Periodic briefings were initiated with staff activity reports. Later briefings were not as effective because of smaller contributions from the various staff functions. Each staffer had two notebooks, one with a plan and checklist of responsibilities for his area, and another more detailed book for more thorough understanding. All information was received from the IESDA and was verified and coordinated with them; with Albany being informed and conferred with as an information recipient. The PIO coordinated activities and releases with the JPIC, using both phone and hard-copy.

Message handling, reproduction and proper distribution was afficient.

Access to the EOC was controlled by use of security personnel, a sign-l in/ sign-out roster and the issuance of badges to be worn while in the EOC.

The County EOC staff was notified that the utility was in an " Alert" status at 0957, the " Site Area Emergency" at 1056 and the " General Emergency" at 1215.

The shelter order, for that affected. portion of Whiteside County was issued at 1319.

AREA RE00101 ENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Conduct regular briefings with more input from staff so that all participants get a better picture of the incident, their relation to it and the opportunities for better intra-staff coordination.

Facilities The EOC is located in the basement of the Whiteside County Law Enforcement Center. The facility is furnished, spacious and has good lighting.

The facility houses the County Jail in addition to the EOC and the Sheriff's Conaunication Center. There were sufficient telephones available for all organizations represented in the EOC. The facility is also equipped with 18

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bunks, showers, kitchen facilities and other amenities and is capable of supporting extended operations.- A status board was clearly visible in the EOC and was kept up to date on significant events. Esergency classification levels were posted as well as the required maps, depicting the plume EPZ, with sectors labeled, evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control points, radiological monitoring points and population by evacuation areas.

Consunications The Whiteside County E0C had individual phones for each station plus a telefax line to JPIC and another phone to the Sheriff's Dispatcher. All functioned well during the exercise, although minor problems were experienced with the telefax machine early in the exercise. County Police '

Dispatcher had the backup radio network consisting of a base transmitter, portable / mobile units in each car with mobile repeaters and with a 150' tower, 20' antenna adjacent to the building. Nine frequencies were available for providing multiple reception capability. Whiteside County demonstrated that it could communicate well with IESDA in Springfield, the JPIC in Morrison, and the Albany EOC.

Dose and Protective Action Recommendations

]

Dose assessment and protective action recommendations is the responsibility 1

of the State. The County is provided protective action recommendations by i

the State for implementation at the County level.

1 Public Alerting and Instruction The County, upon receipt of the " Site Area Energency" notification at 1056, initiated public alerting by simulation of activation of the alert and notification system (sirens) and the Energency Broadcast System. The initial EBS message advised persons, located within 10 miles of the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, of a radiological incident at the utility and recommended that all area residents should stay tuned to the EBS station for

' further information as it became available. The protective action recommendation from the State recommended in place sheltering of residents j

' in the 0-2 elle radius of the reactor and 2-5 miles in sectors N, N and P.

It did not affect areas in Whiteside County. The sirens were again activated at 1131 by Whiteside County at the recommendation of the ESDA i

Director. However, the County indicated no reason was provided by the State i

for the activation of the ' sirens the second time. The County was told by the State that they would be given an explanation later. No reason for the j

second unexplained sounding of the sirens were provided to the County. The Prompt Alert and Notification System (PANS) and EBS was activated a third time for the " General Emergency" notification to the County. The protective action recommendations for people remained the same; in place sheltering.

The addition of the protective action recommendation to place all milk producing animals on stored feed, 0-10 miles of the reactor, was initiated at the " General Emergency". At 1220, the County was requested to sound the

, sirens and activate EBS (for the fourth and third time respectively). At

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u lb 1319, the County simulated sounding the sirens (a fifth time) and activation of the EBS (a fourth time) as a result of a potential shift in wind direction, which would have caused the plume to affect part of Whiteside Co un ty. The State informed the County that the shift in wind direction would affect sector "C" within the County. The protective action recommendation was that "all persons in sector "C" should be prepared to seek shelter". The area encompassed within sector "C" is Albany Township, South of the city limits of Albany and North of Those Road. The EBS message

• contained these parameters and guidance on sheltering methods. The public within the affected area was alerted by siren and IBS activation. The County used prescripted messages for energency public instructions. The messages were generally clear and appropriate to the situation. Protective action areas were described in terms of familiar boundaries and landmarks.

The timing of public instructions was coordinated with the public alerting process, so that the activation of sirens were followed immediately by an

" instructional" message.

Protective Action The County did not demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area. The County Sheriff and County ESDA Coordinator made the decision not to demonstrate the objective La the EOC because the protective action reconsendation from the State had been for sheltering and not evacuation. Their rationale was that the scenario did not allow for the demonstration of the objective.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACfION Access control is called for during a sheltering protective action.

NUREG C554 Standard J, Element 10j.

There are adequate resources, in terms of available personnel, vehicles and equipment, to cover all traffic and access control functions 4

simultaneously. The EOC staff simulated the activation of reception and i congregate care centers at the Rock Island High School; Rock Island County, and the Savannah High School in Carroll County. County Health Department and Red Cross representatives discussed contingency plans for the housing of evacuees in case evacuation became necessary in Whiteside County. The two

, locations housed evacuees from Clinton Center and Rock Island.

l Exposure Control i

The Whiteside County EOC is well outside the 10-mile EPZ of the Quad Cities l

Nuclear Power Station. However, EOC staff were issued high range (0-200 R)

{ dosimeters, TLDs, record keeping cards and instructions, and placebo KI (lemon drops) for demonstration during the exercise. The EOC coordinator

! explained the use of the dosteetry, record keeping and instruction to the l staff. There was a supply of KI in the EOC. The EOC coordinator also explained to the staff the reason for issuance of KI and 20

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that workers would be instructed when it was to be taken. Representatives -

from the utility and IDNS are members of the EOC staff and are aware of proper procedures for the use of KI, the maximum dose allowed without authorization, and decontamination procedures.

Media Relations Space on the first floor of the County Building was designated for press i briefings. No briefings were held. Channel 4 film crew took a short video for use in preparing a news story. The County ESDA Coordinator explained press briefings procedures initiated by the County. Information provided to the media at the County would only pertain to the County. The media would be referred to the JPIC in Morrison for in depth information regarding a nuclear incident at the Quad Cities NPS. Maps and displays were available to augment briefings, which were held hourly. The participation of the representative from Commonwealth Edison Company in press briefings at the EOC were a point of concern by the County.

AREA RECONNENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT It is recommended that the County and Ceco clarify the role of the CECO representative in the EOC.

Recovery and Reentry The County was notified of the de-escalation of ' conditions at the Station (to an " Unusual Event") at 1413. The County ESDA Coordinator conducted a table top discussion on recovery and reentry. The discussion included the communications of recovery decisions to re;&onse organizations, safety precautions during recovery, possible healta effects of low level exposure, and the availability of compensation for financial losses sustained.

AREA REQUIRIEG CORRECTIVE ACTION There was no demonstration of disseminating recovery and reentry information to the public. 'NUREG 0654 Standard E, Element 5.

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SUMMARY

LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS I

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/a QUAD CITIES NUCLEA2' POWER, STATION ,, ,, -

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Summary Listing of Exercise 73ndinas_ .

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1. Deficiencies s' ~

Ifmis '

4 Occ55ar 20, 1986 '

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j REG ~ ::E cative Statement '

Corrective Action Scheduled Actual j en of Weakness Proposed

.I Date Date

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k-s QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION Summary Listing of Exercise Findings ,

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action Ilinois October 20, 1986 i tate

.lREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual

en of Weakness Proposed Date Date candcrd F In as much as the State was faced with an tenent I actual problem in communicating with Rock Island County, and although_they were able to overcome the problem, it is necessary to initiate a repair or modification to the NARS telephone Ifne in that geographic area.

• It is common to have poor reception in the NARS and commercial telephone following a downfall of rain.

candard E To assure coordinated notification of the

.id Draft public, the Illinois State Director developed .

JMA CM a unique two phase procedure. Key decision-4- 1 making officials in Illinois Counties must be apprised of the intent of NARS messages and 1 I

act in accordance with the devised scheme.

Both States need to devise a mutually agreed upon procedure to comply with draft FEMA GN-AN-1 I

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QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION Summary Listing of Exercise Findings

3. Areas Recommended For Improvement 111nois October 20, 1986 tata

.UREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual tem of Weakness Proposed Date Date To more fully inform the visitors to the JPIC, it is necessary the appropriate maps be dis-l played and utilized during briefings and that i they remain available for use by the media to l build their video presentations.- -

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QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION Summary Listing of Exercise Findings

1. Deficiencies i

llinois October 20, 1986 ock Island County UREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual j tera of Weakness Proposed Date Date l

None O

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QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION Summary Listing of Exercise Findings

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action I1Inois October 20, 1986

ock Island County

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UREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual tem of Weakness Proposed Date Date tandard F The NARS telephone link must be repaired and lement I a reliable circuit established.

tandard F Procedures must be developed and followed to tement I ensure all information is communicated to all locations in the County. The County EOC must be able to monitor and confirm that informa-tion is being sent to and received from the communities within the County

tandard C Information released over EBS should be trans-

lement 3a mitted to or cortdinated with the JPIC.

.tandard G The County must demonstrate their procedures tement 3a for briefing news media during the next exercise.

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QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION Summary Listing of Exercise Findings

3. Area Recommended for Improvement Illinois October 20, 1986 Rock Island County NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Iten of Weakness Proposed Date Date Clocks in the Operations Room and the Message Center did not agree. It is 1

recommended all clocks be synchronized

c. specially during the EOC activation.

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s QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION Summary Listing of Exercise Findings

1. Deficiencies 111nois October 20, 1986 thiteside County

.UR EG Narrative Statement o C'rrective Action Scheduled Actual

sten of Weakness Proposed Date Date l None il r

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QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION Summary Listing of Exercise Findings

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action

111nois October 20, 1986 hiteside County UREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual ten of Weakness Proposed Date Date

.tandard J Access control is called for during a learnt 10j sheltering protective action.

tandard E There was no demonstration of disseminating lesent 5 recovery and reentry information to the public.

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QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION Summary Listing of Exercise Findings

2. Areas Recommended for Improvement 111nois October 20, 1986

hiteside County 1

.IIR EG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual ten of Weakness Proposed Date Date' Conduct regular briefings with more input from staff so that all participants get a better picture of the incident, their rela-tion to it and the opportunities for better intra-staf f coordination.

It is recommended that the County and the utility clarify the role of the utility representative in the EOC.

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