ML20205G581

Advises of Completion of Plant Performance Review on 990201 to Develop Integrated Understanding of Safety Performance. Overall Performance of Plant Acceptable.Plant Issues Matrix & Insp Plan Encl

ML20205G581
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	03/26/1999
From:	Grant G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Kingsley O COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
References
AL-98-07, AL-98-7, NUDOCS 9904070295
Download: ML20205G581 (56)

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UNITED STATES 4pmu49'o. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION kj REGION lli g 601 WARRENvlLLE ROAD

. e lisle, ILLINOIS 60532-4351 I

/ March 26, 1999 1

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Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley President, Nuclear Generation Group Commonwealth Edison Company ATTN: Regulatory Services Executive Towers West til 1400 Opus Place, Suite 500 .

Downers Grove, IL 60515 l l

SUBJECT:

PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW - QUAD CITIES i

Dear Mr. Kingsley:

On February 1,1999, the NRC staff completed a Plant Performance Review (PPR) of l Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance. The results are l used by NRC management to facilitate planning and allocation of inspection resources. Plant I Performance Reviews provide NRC management with a current summary of licensee performance and serve as inputs to the NRC's senior management meeting ,(SMM) reviews.

Plant Performance Reviews examine information since the last assessment of licensee performance to evaluate long term trends, but emphasize the last 6 months to ensure that  ;

assessments reflect current performance. The PPR for Quad Cities involved the participation  !

of all technical divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance information for the period of April 1,1998, through January 31,1999. The NRC's most recent summary of licensee performance was provided in a letter of January 30,1998, and was discussed in a public meeting with you on February 17,1998. l As discussed in the NRC's Administrative Letter 98-07 of October 2,1998, the PPR provides an i assessment of licensee performance during an interim period that the NRC h'as suspended its l Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program. The NRC suspended its 4 SALP program to complete a review of its processes for assessing performance at nuclear i power plants. At the end of the review period, the NRC will decide whether to resume the SALP program or terminate it in favcr of an improved process. Your facility was selected to be a pilot plant for the new reactor oversight process. We will noHfy you of any associated changes to planned inspections by separate correspondence in the near future.

During this period, both units were in cold shutdown from 1997 until May 23,1998, due to concerns with the ability to meet 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, safe shutdown requirements.

Following implementation of Appendix R compensatory and corrective actions, operators commenced startup of the Unit 2 reactor on May 23,1998, and synchronized the unit to the electrical grid on May 26,1998. Operators synchronized Unit 1 to the grid on June 2,1998.

The Unit 1 turbine generator was removed from operation on June 4,1998, to repair pipe supports and several welds on the 1 A moisture separator drain tank. The unit was 9904070295 99032624 PDR ADOCK 050 G

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O. Kingsley synchronized back to the grid on June 5,1998. The unit was operated at full power until June 27,1998, when a reactor trip from full power occurred due to a failed scram discharge volume level transmitter coincident with a surveillance test. The unit was restarted and synchronized to the grid on June 30,1998. Operations at or near full power continued with short downpower maneuvers until September 30,1998, when an automatic reactor trip occurred during feedwater system maintenance. The reactor was restarted on October 1, 1998, and maintained at full power until it was shut down on November 7,1998, for refueling.

The refueling outage was completed in a Comed record 28 days and the Unit was restarted on December 5,1998. Unit 1 was operated near full power for the remainder of the period, with a restriction on recirculation flow due to a crack identified on a jet pump riser during the refuel outage.

On June 5,1998, the Unit 2 turbine generator was removed from service to repair a combined intercept valve and again on June 14 to repair a turbine electrohydraulic control system leak.

On June 28, Unit 2 tripped from full power due to a main generator trip. Operators returned Unit 2 to service on July 1. Operations at or near full power continued with short downpower maneuvers until October 1, when the Unit experienced erratic operation of the 2B feedwater regulating valve. The licensee reduced power and returned Unit 2 to full power with only the 2A feedwater regulating valve in service until October 8, when a short maintenance outage was conducted to repair a degrading 2B recirculation pump seal and the 28 feedwater regulating valve. The Unit returned to full power operations on October 12. Operators maintained Unit 2 at full power operation until November 8,1998, when operators removed the Unit 2 main turbine from operation to repair a turbine control system hydraulic oilleak. The Unit was returned to operation and remained at power through the remainder of the period.

Overall, performance at Quad Cities was acceptable. Reactor operations, following restart of both units in May 1998, were conducted well, with an adequate safety focus. Subsequently, both units incurred scrams within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> of each other on June 27 and 28,1998. The related Unit restarts and all subsequent Unit startups were performed well with good communications and attention to operator activities. Response to plant transients resulting from equipment problems was also good. Areas of weakness continued to be configuration control problems, equipment failures, and out-of-service problems. A refueling outage for Unit 1 was completed December 5,1998, in 28 days. This was the shortest refueling outage in Comed history, and subsequent good operating performance by Unit 1 indicates the outage work was performed successfully.

Performance in operations was improving. There were a large number of challenges, including the startup of both units after extended outages, three automatic reactor scrams, several operational transients, numerous equipment problems, and a Unit 1 refueling outage.

Operators, plant equipment, and plant personnel performed well in response to these challenges. However, operator errors, particularly related to configuration control problems, continued to occur at a relatively high rate and remained a station concern. Operator knowledge was generally high, although a deficiency in understanding the feedwater flow transmitter contribution to the reactor level control system resulted in a reactor scram.

Improvement in execution of the surveillance test program was noted with no missed surveillance since February 1998. The station improved in the coordination of major evolutions,

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O. Kingsley I as evidenced by the recent 28 day refueling outage on Unit 1. By assigning key people to a revamped outage organization and emphasizing teamwork and communications, the cutage  ;

was completed 2 days under the goal. Self-imposed safety and radiological goals were also l met for the outage. Weak areas in the conduct of operations included the continued high  ;

number of operational challenges as a result of deficient equipment and personnel errors. The  ;

region will perform the core inspection program in operations with regional initiative inspection  !

focused on out-of-service errors, operator errors, configuration control concerns, and  !

evaluations and actions for equipment problems. A specific operations assessment inspection j to focus on configuration control problems, which was postponed from the previous PPR, is l planned for June or July.

Performance in maintenance was improving. The licensee experienced numerous equipment l problems which resulted in challenges to operators and affected system operations. Problem i equipment included an erratic feedwater regulation valve, erratic intermediate range monitors, a  !

degraded recirculation pump seal, and various turbine equipment problems. Problems also i surfaced with failure to apply vendor manual information for the scram discharge volume level transmitters and the feedwater regulating valve hydraulic controller. A loss of an offsite power source and various turbine generator equipment problems were the result of poor quality of maintenance activities. The quality of maintenance activities also caused an increase in radiation dose to workers, and added to a low work completion rate. In contrast, licensee efforts to reduce the maintenance backlog were successful and resulted in a decrease from over 1000 work items in June 1998 to less than 500 at year end. The licensee restructured the -

outage organization, and emphasized teamwork and communications during the Unit 1 outage l which resulted in completing the refueling outage in 28 days. Other positive findings included effective corrective actions to address missed surveillance and improvements in implementation of the Maintenance Rule. Implementation of corrective actions to address past problems had improved, but some longstanding problems continued. Augmented core inspection is planned to include a breaker maintenance inspection due to issues that occurred during the previous period. Regional initiative inspections will focus on maintenance errors, repetitive equipment problems, and material condition issues.

Performance in engineering was consistent. A lack of licensee understanding regarding the Appendix R safe shutdown methodology was identified in late 1997. As of May 1998, ,

engineering efforts to address the issues resulteri in a minimally acceptable analysis, with substantial NRC involvement required. Subsequent licensee efforts to better understand plant capabilities and cable routing have resulted in substantial improvement and a significant decrease in the plant risk associated with fire. Implementation of the modification process and the 10 CFR 50.59 process, since re-start of the units after the extended shutdown, had shown improvement. Since restart, the program at Quad Cities for identifying, resolving, and preventing problems had become much more effective than during the previous period.

Numerous problems with the original plant design were identified by the Architect / Engineer (A/E) inspection during the last PPR period and addressed by the follow up inspection during this period.' The follow up inspection identified three no-response violations in the areas of: test control and the ability to demonstrate that the involved systems would perform satisfactorily in service, inadequate corrective action for a nonconforming condition on the residual heat

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l removal heat exchangers that had been identified in 1993, but not corrected until 1998, and 1 inadequate design control, including work recently completed. . Instances were identified where' j

' engineering did not properly address emergency diesel generator start failures and qualification 1 of commercial grade relays. The Region will perform the core inspection program in engineering and work to schedule an Appendix R follow up inspection to evaluate licensee

actions. Regional initiative inspection is planned to focus on licensee identification and treatment of design problems and engineering support to operations and maintenance. A -

specific initiative in;pection is planned for follow up on Generic Letter 96-01, " Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits."

Performance in plant support was consistent. Overall, plant support performance remained effective, although radiation protection and security performance issues were identified l Radiation protection' and chemistry programs were effectively implemented; however, some

performance and housekeeping deficiencies were noted. As-low-as-reasonably-achievable L ,

planning and ' radiological work controls were good for outage and non-outage activities. The emergency preparedness program had been effectively maintained in a state of operational readiness. Overall performance during the 1998 biennial emergency preparedness exercise -

was effective. Post-exercise critiques were self-critical, and identified appropriate strengths and  !

weaknesses. Security force performance and equipment were generally effective and i fundamentally sound, although vulnerabilities in vital area barrier and response capabilities . )

were identified. Management controls, while generally effective in identifying and resolving .

l problems, were not totally effective in resolving previous problems involving vehicle control and maintenance support, barrier integrity, and response requirements. No fire protection core inspections were performed during the assessment period. Minor documentation deficiencies -

were noted for fire watches. The region will perform the core inspection program in the area of-plant support and regional initiative efforts will focus on dose reduction, radiological controls, and implementation of fire protection compensatory measures.

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Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at an integrated view of j licensee performance trends. The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Comed. The NRC does not atternpt to i document all aspects of licensee programs and performance that may be functioning l- appropriately. Rather, the NRC only documents issues that the NRC believes warrant 3

- management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance. In addition, the PPR L may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the L attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the ,

1 last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration.

This material will be placed in the Public Document Room as part of the normal issuance of NRC inspection reports and other correspondence. ,

1 This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Quad Cities PPR review. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling i conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite.  !

Enclosure 2 details our inspection plan for the next 6 months. The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the reason

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- l O. Kingsley for emphasis in these program areas. Resident inspections are not !!sted due to their ongoing and continuous nature.

The inspection schedule is subject to revision because of anticipated changes to the NRC's inspection program. We will promptly notify you of any changes to the inspection plan. If you have any questions, please contact Mark Ring at (630) 829-9703.

Sincerely,

)

original signed by Geoffrey E. Grant, Director  !

Division of Reactor Projects l Docket Nos. 50-254,50-265 I License Nos. NPF-29, NPF-30

Enclosures:

1. Plant issues Matrix

2. Inspection Plan l

See Attached Distribution I

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\ QUAD \lNSPPLN8.QUA To receive a copy cf this document indicate in the box: "C" = Copy w/o attach / encl'E" = Copy w/ attach / encl *N" = No copy OFFICE Rlil:DRP p. Rill:DRP l6 Rill:DRP l l NAME Lerch:dp/co//kic// Ringr/ML Grant CW DATE 03/14/99' M/n 03tM/99 03/k/9W L/

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

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l O. Kingsley cc w/encis: D. Helwig, Senior Vice President H. Stanley, PWR Vice President C. Crane, BWR Vice President R. Krich, Vice President, Regulatory Services DCD - Licensing J. Dimmette, Jr., Site Vice President W. Pearce, Quad Cities Station Manager C. Peterson, Regulatory Affairs Manager j M. Aguilar, Assistant Attorney General  ;

State Liaison Officer, State of Illinois l State Liaison Officer, State of Iowa Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission ,

W. Leech, Manager of Nuclear

. MidAmerican Energy Company W. Armstrong, Chairman, Rock Island i

. County Board l M. Grchan, Rock Island County Sheriff D. DeBarre, Emergency Services and  ;

Disaster Coordinator T. Arduini, Chairman, Whiteside County Board R. Schipper, Whiteside County Sheriff C. Korvirik, Emergency Service Coordinator L. Todtz, Chairman, Clinton Board of Supervisors G. Mulholland, Clinton County Sheriff W. Henry, Director, Emergency Management E. Winborn, Chairman, Scott County Board of Supervisors M. Bladel, Scott County Sheriff R. Bergen, Coordinator, Emergency Management The Honorable Rick Dettman The Honorable Marj Dolan A. Leonard, President, Village of Port Byron J. Piatt, President, Village of Cordova The Honorable Robert Schuler The Honorable LaMetta Wynn G. Langmack, Clinton City Administrator The Honorable Richard Meiland The Honorable Vernon Spring E. N. Choate, LeClaire City Administrator The Honorable James Darnell The Honorable Steve Brohmer INPO

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O. Kingsley Distribution:

. SAR (E-Mail)

RPC (E-Mail)

G. Tracy, OEDO w/encls i Chief, NRR/ DISP /PIPB w/encis T. Boyce, NRR w/encls Project Director, NRR w/encls Project Mgr., NRR w/encls J. Caldwell, Rlll w/encls l B. Clayton, Rlli w/encls  ;

R. Lickus, Rlli w/encls l SRI Quad Cities w/encls l DRP w/encls  !

DRS (2) w/encls

. Rlll PRR w/encis PUBOC'IE-01 w/encls l

Docket File w/encls GREENS

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Poge: 1 of 14 - Dole: 03/25/1999 Unit;d Stat s Nuclear R;gulatory Comm. .ission nme:Omm iregion m PLANT ISSUE MATRIX QUAD CITIES By Primary Functional Area Functiono! Templote Date Source Area ID Type Codes item Description 01/20/1999 1998023 Prt OPS NRC MISC Prt 2A Feedwater flow control problems continued on both units and have caused significont reactor water level 3, ,- 3 . -

transients. Problems with feedwater regulating volve control were similar to October 1908 failures Ucensee root cause investigations into problems with feedwater flow circuitry foilures were continuing (Section O2.1).

Tec 01/20/1999 1998023 Pri: OPS NRC NEG Pri: 1 A The failure to recognize the increased risk condition ond implement the required compensatory measures for

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the Unit 2 station blockout diesel generotor maintenance was a notable weckness in risk monogement of '

on-line maintenance (Section 01.2).

Tec 01/20/1999 1998023 Prt OPS NRC NEG Pri: 1 A Poor risk monogement of the Unit 2 stativn blockout diesel generator maintenance was not odequately Se - Sec. Oddressed initiolfy by the corrective action process (Section O12).

Tec 01/20/1999 1998023 Prt OPS NRC NEG Prt 1A Unit 2 licensed core thermal power was exceeded by approximately 0.4 percent when power was Sec*- Sec. -

increased, while o computer problem caused the core thermo! power display to be inaccurate. Operators did not detect the computer problem for 3-1/2 hours. Identificotton and corrective actions for the problem Tec centered on the computer program problems and did not address control room licensed operator panel monitoring deficiencies (Section O4.1).

01/20/1999 1998023 Prt OPS NRC NEG Prt 1A Operator log deficiencies regarding the troversing in-core probe surveillonce and local power range monitor Sec- Sec.

adjustment were noted (Section M2.1).

Tec 01/20/1999 1998023 Prt CPS NRC NEG Prt1C Scheduling chonges to put the main generator on-line prior to high pressure coolant injection system 3,c.* Sec.

• operobility testing required by Technical Specifications extended the time spent in the 12-hour limiting condition for operation (Section O1.3).

Tec 01/20/1999 1998023 Prt OPS NRC NEG Pri: 1C During stor'up from refueling outage Q1R15, senior monogement oversight in the control room become Sec-* Sec. -

involved in turbine generator procedures and did not function in the independent oversight role os intended ,

(Section O1.3).

Tec 01/20/1999 1998023 Prt OPS NRC NEG Prt5A Nuclear Oversight, although present at the time. did not identify certain inspector concerns with high 3,c.' Sec.

• presswe coolmt Won @m Mng cmMm for operch mmagemt md W mmogemt oversight in the Nuclear Oversight stortup assessment from refueling outoge Q1R15 (Section 01.3).

Ter 01/20/1999 1998023 Prt OPS NRC POS Pri: IB Generally. Unit 1 startup activities offer refueling outoge Q1R15 went weII. (O1.3)

Sec: See:

Ten item Type (Compliance, Followup,Other) To 03/11/2000

m Page: 2 of 14 Date: 03/2S/1999 -

Unit d Stat:s Nuclear R;gulatory Comm. .ission ume:0mem ireston iii PLANT ISSUE MATRIX QUAD CITIES By Primary Functional Area Functional Temptote Date Source Areo ID Type Codes item Description 01/20/1999 1998023-01 Prt OPS NRC VIO lV Pri: On January 4.1999. workers perforn eed work specified by Nuclear Work Request 980123898 on the Unit 1 Sec, emergency diesel generator cooling water heat exchanger prior to the out-of-service fogout being hung.

Sec-Ter:

12/01/1998 1998020 Prk OPS NRC POS Prt 2A Operators detected and responded appropriately to a leak in the Unit 2 electrohydraulic control system.

The leak resulted in operators removing the turbine from service for o short time and reducing reactor power Sec-~ Sec-

• to opprox!motely 30 percent of rated power. which was on unnecessary challenge to the operations stoff.

Tec Licensee review indicated a maintenance error during a previous reassembly of the manifold may have caused the leck. Mointenance personnel repaired the teok.

12/01/1998 1998020-02 Pri: OPS NRC NCV Prt 28 Operators continued to identify equipment configuration errors, such as o stond by gas treatment switch in the wrong position and a diesel generator volve not in the proper configu ofion. In one instance, the S - '

Sec M licensee did not establish the necessary administrative controls to oddress the Technical Specification Ten surveillance requirement for equipment inoperobility. This resulted in a noncited violation. The other configuration control events did not result in equipment inoperability.

12/01/1998 1998020-03 Prt OPS NRC NCV Pri: 3A Operators on the refuel bridge generally odhered to established practices for moving fuel However, problems with operator control of system configuration occurred, in two instonces, the some refuel bridge crew foiled to place o fuel bundie in the proper coordinates in the spent fuel pool. This was on indication Ter: that corrective actions were not properly implemented by the crew. The Ecensee's subsequent corrective actions for these events were oppropriate.

10/14/1998 1998017 Prt OPS NRC NEG Prt IB The inspectors concluded that poor practices in maintenance and out-of-service activities were the primary '

causes of the Unit I reactor trip. Poor review of the consequences of the maintenance octivity, poor review Sec,*

Sec*

• of the out-of-service for the feedwater flow transmitter, use of operators vice instrument technicions for  !

Ten transmitter out-of-service activities. and limited understanding of feedwater flow controllog!c were ,

contributors to the event 10/14/1998 1998017 Prt OPS NRC NEG Prt SC Peer group initiatives had been distributed to the sites and loaded into site wide planning datoboses.

However, the departments generolly did not use the Site Wide integrated Operational Pion as o tool to 3,c.' 3,c.

occomplish and track specific peer group initiatives. While much progress had been mode, severo!

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Ten deportments had foiled to meet the site deodlines to ensure the deportment specific ploas were in ploce.  !

One initiative involving implementation of a new temporary modifications procedure was implemented without sufficient pionning 10/14/19c8 1998017 Prt CPS NRC WK Prh 3A Operators performed well at the controls during a number of operationc! transients. However, operator sensitivity to equipment problems and poor performance in taking a flow transmitter out-of-service were 3 ,c; 3 considered weaknesses Ten 01/20/1999 1998023 Pri: MAINT NRC MISC Prt 2A The licensee determined that the root cause for the "2A" controi rod drive pump bearing fo!!ure was rondom.

even though the *2A" pump had experienced higher than overage failure rates. Sorne potential reliability Sec-' Sec-

• concerns remained (Section M2.2).

Ten itern Type (Compliance. Followup.Other). To 03/11/2000

4 Page: 3 of 14 Dofe: 03/2S/1999 Unitsd Stat s Nuclear R;gulatory Comm. .ission Time:Omom negion m PLANT ISSUE MATRIX QUAD CITIES By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Date Source Areo ID Type Codes item Description 01/20/1999 1998023 Pri* MAINT NRC MISC Prt2B The licensee shifted many normal outoge maintenance and surveillance activities to periods with the reactor perating. The licensee restructured the outoge organization, and emphasized teamwork and Sec-- Sec. '

communications during the outoge. This resulted in the licensee completing the Unit I refueling outoge in 28 Ten days. This time was 2 days less than the station goat. A successful stortup was followed by sustained reactor operation (Section M1.3). '

01/20/1999 1998023 Pri: MAINT NRC NEG Pri: 2A An unusually large number of pump performance issues developed during the period. Plont performance .

Sec, was not adversely oftected by these problems. In the cose of the *lB" condensate pump, foreign materid  !

Sec'-

• intrusion into the system was likely a result of not properly implementing the station policy for foreign materiot Tec exclusion (Section M4.1).

01/20/1999 1998023 Prt MAINT NRC NEG Prt 3A Several iterations of repair and re-identification occurred before the licensee corrected the ground on the  :

2 ect current cabling. In addition. the licensee did not initiofly consider the additional repair efforts Sec- ' Sec.

• os a rework issue (Section Ml.2).

Tet 01/20/1999 1998023 Prt MAINT NRC NEG Pri: 3A Both the workers and the job supervisor on the 480 VAC Bus 18 breaker replacement failed to recognize the requirement to use the prescribed administrative controts during two procedure steps that were Sec* Sec-'

re-performed (Section M3.1).

Tec ,

01/20/1999 1998023 Prt MAINT C NEG Prt 3B The initial improper alignment of the "2A" control rod drive pump seal mechonism required rework and indicated that some technicions did not have odequate skills necessary to successfully execute the more 3 ,c.' Sec. '

complex tasks required on some plant equipment (Section M2.2).

Tec 01/20/1999 1998023 Prt MAINT NRC POS Pri: 2A The station was taking oppropnote octions to identify the cause of recent locol power range monitor failures of both Quod Cities and Dresden. The overoll materiol condition of the local power range monitor and Sec- Sec'.

traversing in-core probe systems was acceptobie, with oil identified deficiencies property entered into the Ter* corrective action process (Section M2.1).

01/20/1999 1998023 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 2B Efforts to reduce the maintenance backlog were successful. The 1998 year-end goal for the number of 3, , 3, .-

non-outoge corrective work requests was 499, and the station ended the year at 461; o significont decrease from over 1000 in June 1998 (Section M1.1).

Tet 01/20/1999 1998023 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 3A Workers replaced the breaker on 480 VAC Bus 18 safely and in occordance with procedures. Coordination Sec~,

between electrical maintenance workers and operators was effective. The job supervisor provided good Sec'-

oversight of most work octivities.

Ter:

01/20/1999 1998023 02 Prt MAINT NRC NCV Prt Instrument maintenance technicions foiled to ensure on isolation volve to o pressure detector was property 3, .

rep sitioned. This resulted in the Unit I high pressure coolant injection system being in a half-tripped Sec.~

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condition for 17 days. A questioning ottitude by on operator resulted in discovering the deficient condition Tec (Section M4.2).

item Type (Compliance. Followup.Other), To 03/11/2000

Page: 4 of 14 Dole: 03/25/1999 Unit:d Stat:s Nuclear Ragulatory Comm. .ission ume: 0m0 Oi Region ill PLANT ISSUE MATRIX QUAD CITIES By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Date Source Areo ID Type  ; odes item Description 12/18/1998 1998021 Prt MAINT NRC NEG Prt 29 Aggressive self-assessments of the ISI function effectively identified a number of issues. Implementation of Corrective actions were slow, resulting in o significont omount of work yet to be occomplished. (Section Sec- Sec.

M6.1)

Tet 12/18/199B 1998021 Prl: MAINT NRC POS Prt 3B The personnel performing the NDE during RFO15 inspections were found to have proper qualificottorn which 3 ,c. 3,c.

had been reviewed by the licensee staff and the AN!!. (Section M5.1)

Tet 12/18/1998 1998021-01 Prt MAINT NRC VIO IV Prt SC A violation pertaining to the failure to request Code relief for multiple Unit 1 and Unit 2 weld examinations with limited coverage was identified. Timeliness of corrective actions for this issue, originolly identifed in 1997, Sec' Sec' ,

was considered poor. In generol, the informal and poorly controlled relief request process contributed to '

Tet several ISI Program related problems. (Section M4.1) l 12/01/1998 1998020 Prt MAINT NRC NEG Prt 2A Ucensee review of a forced turbine generator shutdown identified that o maintenance error during previous Sec: See: 2B e e o e n c@oWem mWoWo Ner 4 control volve to occur Tet 12/01/1998 1998020 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 2B The work activities observed were being performed in occordance with procedures. The workers were usuolty knowledgeoble and applied proper measures to prevent foreign materiots from entering equipment.

Sec- Sec*.

Outoge work control was effective in ensuring timely completion of work requests. Poor understanding and ,

Tet coordiration of reactor recirculation pump seol work by maintenance workers resulted in a spread of contamination and personnel contamination 12/01/1998 1998020 Prt MAINT NRC POS Pri: 28 The inspectors concluded that three ditteent isolation and injection logic test procedures were oppropriately reviewed. and the tests wE 3 executed without notiCeoble errors Sec- Sec-Tet 12/01/1998 1998020 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt SC The licensee addressed four snubber test foilures appropriately. The licensee's long term corrective actions to oddress snubbers exhibiting a shortened service life were planned for the next Unit I refueling outoge.

Sec*- Sec.

The plans included the performance of a modificotton to replace mechonicol snubbers with hydroutic Tec snubbers 12/01/1998 199802001 Prt MAINT NRC NCV Prt 2B The weekly Technical Specification surveillonce test to verify the position of the reactor building to suppression chamber vacuum breakers was not odequate because only orv of the two volves in each line Sec- Sec'-

was checked. Once the station identified the discreponcy, the volve positions were immediately verified.

Tet and the verification was added to the surveillonCe test program.

10/14/1998 1998017 Prt MAINT NRC NEG Pri: 2A Equipment problems resulted in challenges to operators and/or offected system opvotions. Prob' ems Included o degroded recirculation pump seal, on errotic feedwater regulating volve, problematic Sec* Sec.

• intermedicte ronge monitors and others. The licensee had not completed corrective actions for some Tet recurring equipment problems including hydrogen water chemistry system tripping during condenser flow reversol and offgos system c ambustion outside of the recorrbiner on Unit 2 Itern Type (Compliance. Followup,Other), To 03/11/2000

Page: 5 of 14 Date: 03/25/1999 Unit d Stat s Muclear Regulatory Comm.ission Time: 07:ict0i Region til PLANT ISSUE MATRIX QUAD Cli1ES By Primary Functional Area Functional Temptote -

Date Source Areo ID Type Codes item Description 10/14/1998 1998017 Prt MAINT NRC NEG Pri: 2A Feedwater seguichng volve problems caused significant operational transients on Unit 2 ond were o Contributor to the need for a unit shutdown to repair the system. Some problems discovered included failure  ;

Sec' SE.

to perform preventive maintenance on the frequency recommended by the vendor, failure to update the Ten vendor monuo!s for the volves. use of oil other than that specified by the vendor, and presence of foreign materiot in the system. Investigotive techniques were shallow of first, then improved offer the fifth failure of the "2B" feedwater regulating vo:ve to respond

• 10/14/1998 1998017 Prt MAINT NRC NEG Pri: 2B Emergency light pocks, insto!!ed to meet 10 CFR Port 50. Appendix R. requirements under the licensee's temporary offerations program, were not odded to reference documents. This resulted in inodvertent Sec'* Sec*. '

bottery pack discharge and failure to include the emergency light pocks in the electrical maintenance Ten quarterly inspection 10/14/1998 1998017 Prt MAINT NRC NEG Pri:3B Maintenance errors, due in port to personnel not familiar with the assigned task adverselv offected plant Sec,'

operations. An trnproperly revised procedure, idenhfied during testing, required operators to enter into o Sec-*

12-hour hot shutdown limihng condition for operation. Doto obtained by instrument maintenance Tec technicians during a control room ventaction surveillonce test was incorrect. Mochonics disassembled the incorrect gouge glosses on the spent fuel pool demineralizers 01/20/1999 1998023 Prt ENG NRC MISC Prt 4A The licensee determined that a design change to the *1C" reactor feed pump flow transmitter resulted in o more occurate indication of feedwoter flow and subsequently more occurate indication of core thermal t Sec: Set. ower. As o result. Unit I reactor power level was raised higher following the refueling outoge. but could not ,

Tec reach full-roted power due to turbinegenerator limitotions. Planning for the design change did not anticipate the full effects on the turbine generator (Section E1.1).

01/20/1999 1998023 Prt ENG NRC NEG Pri' 5A The licensee identified on undocumented jumper installed on a rodwoste system relay. Initial corrective ochon was hodequoM because o problem identification form was not promptly initiated. The licensee was '

Sec: Sec.

• unoble to determine how the undocumented jumper was insto!!ed (Section E2.1).

Ter:

12/18/1998 1998021 Prt ENG NRC MISC Pri:4C The ISI NDE procedures reviewed by the inspectors. were found to be in occordonce with the ASME Code Sec,~

requirements. The inspectors observed three examples where ancillory plant procedural guidance did not Sec

fully support ISI Program octivities. (Section M3.1)

Ter:

12/18/1998 1998021 Prt ENG NRC NEG Prt 4C Lock of uniformity and sufficient detail in the documentation of previous exominations hompered efforts to determine crack growth. Examination efforts from RF014 failed to chorocterize the full extent of flows in two Sec Sec. -

recirculation system welds. (Section M1)

Tec ,

i 12/18/1998 1998021 Prt ENG NRC POS Prt 4B The inspectors concluded that the Unit 1 RF015 octivities reviewed for the main steam and reactor vessel 3,c.

internal inservice inspections were implemented in on effective manner and that contract NDE octivities ,

3,c, * '

were properly performed in accordance with the opplicable ASME or industry standard requirements. The Tec inspectors also concluded that the licensee had implemented the oppropriate actions to mitigate the consequences of a crocked jet pump riser brace by training control room operators and implementing  ;

odditional survei!! onces. The licensee demonstrated a good safety focus by limiting core flow during >

operation to minimize the growth rate of exishng jet pump crouks. (Section M1.2 ond M1.3)

Item Type (Compliance, Followup.Other). To 03/11/2000

Pogo: 6 of 14 Date: 03/25/1999 Unit;d Statas Nuclear R gulatory Comm. .ission Time: Omi negion in PLANT ISSUE MATRIX ,

QUAD CITIES By Primory Functional Area Functional ' Template Dale Source Area ID Type Codes item Description 12/18/1998 1998021 Prt ENG NRC POS Prt 4C inservice inspection activities for Unit l's refueling outage 15 were adequately implemented and properly r Sec, perf rmed. However, the identification of odcstionalintergranular stress corrosion crocking in recirculation Sec*- '

system piping provided further evidence that previous induction heat stress irnprovement efforts were Ter: ineffective. (Section M1.1) 12/18/1998 1998021 Prt ENG NRC WK Prt 4C The self-assessment for the " inservice inspection restoration effort" was considered on oggressive ottempt to identify additional program problems, in response to problems previously identified by the NRC. However, Sec-* Sec'.

corrective actions to oddress these loservice inspection program deficiencies have been delayed. The slow Ter: progress in resoMng both NRC and self-identified problems indicated a lock of focus by ticensee monogement.

11/06/1998 1998019 Prt ENG NRC MISC Prt 4C Service bottery procedures o!! owed tightening of intercell connectors prior to testing, which potentialty g 3 ,c.

constituted pre-conditioning of the test; however, the team found no evidence that it had bees. done previously ,

Tec 11/06/1998 1998019 Prt ENG NRC MISC Prt SC in response to the team's concern with respect to potential pre-conditioning of reactor core isolation cooling p r to survei!!ance testing. the Scensee took thorough corrective actions to ensure no pre-conditioning due See: Sec:

to venting would take place Ter:

1I/06/1998 1998019 Prt ENG NRC NEG Prt 3C Several individuals were concerned with punitive actions that resulted from PIFs and did not support the process: however, this did not oppear to impact the overoll effectiveness of the corrective action process.

Sec' Sec.

The licensee corrective actions for this issue were prompt and comprehensive.

Ter-11/06/1998 1998019 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Pri: SA Honagement expectotion for Problem idenhfication Form (PIF) indiction was not being met by some stoft

g. members. The use of computers to initiate PiFs contributed to some individuals not generating PIFs. Other Sec.

individucts did not have o clear understonding of monogement expectations of when a PIF should be Tec written 11/06/1998 1998019 Prt ENG NRC NEG Pri: SC The h Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) crankcase over pressure indicotion issue and elevuted water and 3,c, sediment concentrations in the Unit 1 EDG fuel oil tank both posed potential problems for the EDGs. Tracking 3,c, '

and prioritiziry of these issues until some leve! of resolution was warified appeared wook Ten 11/06/1998 1998019 Prt ENG NRC POS Prt 4C The 24 modifications reviewed by the team were adequately designed instotled, and tested. Justifications f r del ying and conceting modifications were acceptoble Sec- Sec.

Tec 11/06/1998 1998019 Pri: ENG NRC POS Prt 4C The 10 temporary modifications reviewed were well controlled of good technical quality, and demonstrated eng neering's responsiveness to plant issues; however, some temporary mod;ficotions were installed Sec- Sec'-

obnormally long (for four years or longer with one temporary c4erotion originally installed in 1992).

Ter:

t Item Type (Compliance, Followup,Other). To 03/11/2000

Page: 7 of 14 Date: 03/25/1999 Unit d Stat 3s Nucisar Rsgulatory Comm. .ission vme: 07:e Region til PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area

( ,

QUAD CITIES Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes item Description l 11/06/1998 1998019 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: 4C The 50.59 screenings and evoluoNons were determined to be complete and comprehensive.  !

Sec: See:

Tet 11/06/1998 1998019 Prt ENG NRC POS Pri: 4C Recent 10 CFR 50 59 screenings (26) and safety evoluotions (23) were reviewed and found to be of good quality except fc some minor errors. The program for ensuring that trained and qualified personnel Sec- Sec-'

prepored and reviewed 50.59 screenings and safety evoluotions was acceptable Tec 11/rL/1998 1998019 Prk ENG NRC POS Prt SA For personnel involved in writing PIFs. specific feedback provided to individucts encouraged the corrective oction process. In addition. the genero! feedbnck of PIFs and industry events to work groups appeared to Sec- Sw'. ,

heighten the groups oworeness of potentio' problems and how to cvoid them Tec i

11/06/1998 1998019 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: SA The oudit and assessment progrorr was acceptoble. The audit and assessments conducted by Nuclear Oversight oppeared to be efte' .five in identihing and correctog significant issues 3,c. Sec.

Ter: i i1/06/1998 1998019 Pri: ENG NRC POS Prt 5A Tl.e System Heo!th Indicator Progrom was on excellent assessment process for evoluoting system status and identifying problem creas to monogement. The reports were informative and provided good information to Sec-* Sec. l management on the status and ovailability of plant systems and components Ter 11/06/1998 1998019 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: 58 The PORC was functioning well. PORC commen's contnbuted to the technical quality of temporary modificatiort TA 98-2-028 - Lecking Reactor Recirculation Sample Line Relief Volve Reviews of items were ec: Sec:

thorough and additional corrective actions were required prior to ccmmittee opproval for rejected Tet packages ,

l 11/06/1998 1998019 Pri: ENG NRC POS Prt SB The team concluded that previous reviews. Os evidenced in the off-site review committee quarterly trend reports and monthly committee review reports. Indicated good performance by off- site review in the Sec- Sec.'

identification of problems, weaknesses and trends. However, since the quarterly trend reports and the ,

Ter: monthly committee review reports had been discontinued sirce April,1998. the team was unable to ossess current performance 11/06/1998 1998019 Prt ENG NRC POS Pri: SC The team concluded that the licensee had made adequate progress in the implementation of selected strotegic reform initiatives Sec- Sec.

Tec i 11/06/1998 1998019 Prt ENG NRC POS Pri: SC The corrective action methods in ploce were good ond. in most cases, were effective in addressing corrective action issues. The Events Screening Committee and the Corrective Action Review Boord 1 Sec- Sec. '

• ~

functioned well and octions were thorough and effective.

Ten i

[

ltem Type (Compliance, Followup.Other), To 03/11/2000

Page: 8 of 14 Dole: 03/25/1999 Un.ted i Stobs Nuclear R gulatory Comm. .ission Time: 07:m0i negron in PLANT ISSUE MATRIX QUAD CITIES By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes item Description I

11/06/1998 1998019 Prt ENG NRC STR Prt SB The team considered the acensee's systematic approach to locating DC grounds to be o strength Sec: $ec:

Ter:

11/06/1998 1996019 Pri: ENG NRC WK Prt 4C The 10 colcu!ations reviewed were acceptoble; however, the team considered chonQing the instoIIed p siti n f thermol overloods without o design revew o weakness Sec- Sec-Ter: l 11/06/1998 1998019-01 Prt ENG NRC VIO IV Pri: 4C The Unit 2B reactor building floor drain sump pump was instotted as o TA 92-2-140 issued on October 23.1992.

in ccordance with procedure No. OAP 0300-12, " System Temporary Alterations." Revision 33. The TA Sec- SE -

required verification that the sump pump stort on high sump level and trip on low level. which were specified Tec in UFSAR, Section 9.3.3.4: however, no testing was performed to verify these functions.

I1/06/1998 1998019-02 Prt ENG NRC NCV Pri: SC Further examples of on earlier escolotad violation related to inadequate design control resulted in a violation being identified. However. far this violation, the NRC exercised discretion in accordonce with the Sec: See:

Enforcement Policy and refroiried from issuing a c7 liion Ter:

11/06/1998 19o8019-03 Pri: ENG NRC NCV Pri: SC A non-cited violation was identified for three cases of licensee identified, non-repetitive, and corrected errors in the loss of coo! ant occident onalysis Sec- Sec-Ter: ,

11/06/1998 1998019 44 Pri: ENG NRC VIO IV Pri: 4B A no response violation was identified for failure to promptly evoluote a previously identified concern with the heot removal rate of the RHR heat exchangers and to take corrective oCtions in a timely manner S Sec-Ter .

i 11/06/1998 1998019 4 5 Prt: ENG NRC VIO IV Pri: 4A A no response violation was identified for foilure to odequately translate or verify design information into design documents in that, documentation of design bases information wcuconsistent with octual plant Sec"- Sx.

design. and failure to verify ond check the odequocy of design Ter:

i 11/06/1998 1998019-06 Prt ENG NRC NCV Pri: 5A A non-cited violaton was identified for licensee identified. non-repetitive, and corrected errors in the EDG lo ding on lysis Sec- Sec K Ten 11/06/1998 1998019 4 7 Pri: ENG NRC VIO IV Pri: 4A Discrepancies between plant os-found condtions and the plant licensing basis resulted in o violation being identified. However. for this violation the NRC exorcised discretion in occordance with the Enforcement

• Policy and refroined from issuing a citation Tec item Type (Cornpliance. Followup.Other). To 03/11/2000

Page- 9 of 14 . Dole: 03/25/1999 Unitsd Statss Nuclear Rsgulatory Comm.ission nme:Onm0 Region 111 PLANT ISSUE MATRIX QUAD CITIE3 By Primary Functiorel Area Functional Templote Dole Source Area ID Type Codes item Description IC/14/1998 1998017 Prt ENG NRC NEG Pri: SC The inspectors found that certain deficiencies with Appendix R procedures were temporarily corrected by the licensee in o manner that could adversety offect operation of sofety equipment 3 3 Tec 10/14/1998 1998017 Prt ENG NRC POS Prt 4C The modification to the reactor vessellevelinstrumentation system to provide continuous bockfill was installed in accordonce wi++1 design documents and met the requirements of NRC Bulletin 9303. Procedures Sec- Se' for the operation and testing of the system were properly implemented i Tec 10/14/1998 1998017 Prt ENG NRC WK Prt 4C Implementation of the new temporary modifications procedure to repioce tb 'd temporary alterations 3,c*. 3,q.'

procedure was weak. There was inadequate review to ensure that supportii >cedures were screer'ed and revised to coordinate with the requirements of the new procedure. Insufficent time and attention was TeC given io trcin or erotors prior to the implementation of the new procedure 02/05/1999 1999004 Prt PLTSUP NRC MISC Prt1C The licensee's 1997 and 1998 EP program cudits satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR SC 54(t). (Section P7)

Sec: Sec:

Tec 02/05/1999 1999004 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS PrtIC Reviewed sections of the emergency pion and implementing procedures were adequately detoiled.

Sec- Sec: (Section P3)

Ten 02/05/1999 1999004 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: IC The EP training program was effective. Selected key emergency response organization (ERO; cersonnel demonstrated competent knowledge of emergency responsibilities and procedures. The site training motrix Sec- Sec'.

differed from the corporate motrix, odding a requirement for training of nuclear engineers. This training had Tec inodvertentfy been missed in 1998. Procedure changes rectified the discrepancy. AB other personnel reviewed were qualified for their emergency response positions. Significant efforts had been expended in procedurolizing and providing the Severe Accident Monogement (SAM) training modules. (Section PS) 02/05/1999 1999004 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Prt 2A The inspected emergency response facilities. equipment. and supplies were well-mointained. Equipment performed very well when demonstrated. (Section P2.1)

See: See:

Tec 02/05/1999 199G004 Prt PLTSUP NRC STR Pri: IC Overoll. the EP program had been effectrvely maintained in a state of operational readiness. Interviewtd key emergency response personnel demonstrated competent knowledge of responsibilities and emergency Sec- Sec.

procedures. (X1)

Tec 01/29/1999 1999002 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: 1C The radiological environmental monitoring program was wellimplemented. Environmental sample results did n t indicate any discernable environmental effects from plant operations (Section RI.2).

Sec- Se Tec Item Type (Comphance. Followup.Other). To 03/11/2000

a.

Pogo: 10 of 14 Date: 03/25/1999 -

United Statris Nuclear R:gulatory Commission Time:omoi Region III PLANT ISSUE MATRIX ,

QUAD CITIES By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Dole Source Area 3D Type Codes item Description

. 01/29/1999 1999002 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt IC Surveillance and calibrations of the meteorological tower were property performed. The meteorological 3,e. 3, ,

equipment was maintained in good condition (Section R2.1).-

Ter:

01/29/1999 1999002 Prt PLTSUP 'NRC POS Pri: IC The instrument quality control program was we!I implemented. with evaluations and corrective actions performed when worronted. The station performance was good regarding the inter-loborofory cross check S ' Sec*'

progroms and effective evoluotions were performed for analysis discrepancies (Section R7.1).

Tec 01/29/1999 1999002 Prk PLTSUP NRC POS Prt IC The audits and self-assessments were of sufficient depth to identify deficiencies and areos where improvements could be mode. and that corrective actions were oppropriate (Section R7.2).

3 Tec 01/29/1999 1999002 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt SB Chemistry technicions were knowledgeoble regarding sompting and onofysis procedures and demonstrated Sec', good sompiing techniques. The chemistry technicion training program wUs well implemented (Section R4.1 and Section R5.1).

Tec 01/29/1999 1999002 Prt PLTSUP NRC STR PrtIC The stoff's control of plant water chemistry continued to be good and was effective in reducing corrosive Sec, impurities in reactor water. In addition, the licensee was planning to implement sole metalinjection to Sec*' '

enhance corrosion control and lower station dose rates (Section R t.1).

Tec 12/18/1998 1998024 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt 1C The inspector determined that two security plan changes that were implemented by the licensee since December 1997 did not decrease the effectiveness of the security plan, Sec- Sec.

Tec 12/18/1998 1998024 Prt PLTSUP NRC .POS Prt IC Iecurity training octivities were occurately documented and conducted in on oppropriate and sound

• U"""

Sec: See:

Tec 12/18/1998 1998024 Prt PLTSS NRC POS Pri: IC Licensee audit and self-ossessment activihes regarding De security program were properly implemented.

The licensee's plant wide problem idenhfication and corrective action trocking program was generally 3 " ,

3 ,'.

effective. However. discrepancies were identified in the security creo regarding the documentation of Ten security equipment failures. Licensee action was initiated to oddress this issue. The licensee's security department's internal corrective action trocking system was effective.

12/18/1998 1998024-02 Prt PLTSUP NRC VIO IV Prt 1C The inspector identified a violation in which armed response force personnel were routinely assigned fire watch duties that prevented them from immecEctely responding to secunty events. Ucensee security Sec-* Sec-

• monogement's effectiveness and centrols were not effective in this cose because they did not recognize Ten that response capabihties had been reduced. Effectin vi timely corrective action was implemented. ,

I ltem Type (Compliance, Followup.Other), To 03/11/2000

Poge: 11 of 14 Date: 03/25/1999 '

United Stat:s Nuclear Regulatory Comm. .ission time:0 mom Region lii PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

~

QUAD CITIES By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes item Description 12/04/1998 1998022 Pri: PLTSUP NRO POS Pri: IC The fodio+ ion protection staff effectively evoluoted planned work octivities successfully hiegrated post 3, , 3,c.

performance to prepare dose estimates and goals for the Unit I refueling outoge and effectively monttored outoge dose ALARA plans were detoiled and included lessons learned from previous evolutions Ter-t 12/04/1998 1998022 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Prl: IC The inspector concluded that tne station was effectively planning and coordinating work to reduce the source term and overoll station dose Se Sec, Tet 12/04/1998 1998022 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: IC Rodiotion protection stoff p ovided effective oversight and control of the drywellinsulation activities.

Rodiction worker practices were good 3 3 Tec ,

12/04/1998 1908022 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: IC The Qualifications of the new hooith physics supe.-intendent exceeded the requirements of Technical Specification 6.3 for education and work experience Sec- Sec.

Ter:

12/04/1998 1998022 41 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NCV Pri: IC The radiation protection staff improperty removed the postings for two high radiation creas in the Unit 1  !

Reactor Building basement which resulted in o Non-Cited Violation. Specifically, the stoff foiled to barricade

• C 'C '

and post the bosement entronces to the rc;iduol heat removal rooms os high radiction oreos in occordance Ter: with Technical Specifications 12/04/1998 1998022 42 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NCV Pri: IC A Non<ited Violation was identified for on individuol exceeding the occumutoted doi!y dose limit of the reccior head disassembly /ossembly radiation work permit. The failure of rodiction protection technicians to Sec- Sec-*

provide effective oversight of work OCtivities and ineffective communications between involved parties .

Tec contributed to this incident 12/01/1908 1998020 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NEG Pri: IC One event involving poor maintenance worker knowledge that a line being cut contained reoctor coolont w msu pe o contodnah W o pow cWhh See: Sec: 3B Ter:

I 10/14/1998 1998017 Prt: PLTSUP NRC NEG Pri: IC The inspectors identified severo! instances where hoses that crossed contominated boundaries were not taped of the boundary. The inspectors also identified on instance where the calibrotion dote displayed on Sec-

• Sec- '

o Geiger-Mu!!er detector in use, had expired Tec j 09/18/1998 1998018 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: IC Secury equipr%nt was maintained in on effective manner and performed its designed function (Sections S1 and S2} bcurity force personnel demonstrated proper knowledge of security responsibilities and Sec*- W* performed their duties in on effective manner. (Section S4.1)

Tec item Type (Compliance. Followup.Other). To 03/11/2000

Poge: 12 of 14 Dole: 03/25/1999 Unit d Statas Nucinar Regulatory Comm. .ission Time: Om0i  ;

negion m PLANT ISSUE MATRIX '. :

QUAD CITIES By Primary Functional Area l l

Functional Template Dole Source Area ID Type Codes item Description l 09/18/1998 1998016-01 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NCV Pri: IC The hcensee demonstrated aggressive action concerning problem identification and timely implementation

$,c'_ cf corrective actions related to three different types of licensee-identified errors committed by plant Sec-'

personnel that involved the failure to deactivate security bodges in timely manner. Each failure was Tet determined to be o non-cited violation. (Section S4.2) 09/18/1998 1998018 4 2 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NCV Pri: IC The licensee demonstrated aggressive action concerning problem identification and timely implementation

- of corrective actions related to three different types of licensee-identified errors committed by plant

• personnel that involved the failure to deoctivate security bodges in trnely manner. Each failure was Tec determined to be o non-cited violation. (Section 54.2) 09/18/1998 1998018-03 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NCV Pri: IC The licensee demonstrated aggressive action concerning problem identification and timely implementation of corrective actions related to three different types of licensee-identified errors committed by plant Sec*- Sec.* .

personnel that involved the failure to deoctivate security bodges in trne!y manner. Eoch foilure was Tec determined to be o non-cited violation. (Section S4.2) ,

09/18/1998 1998018-04 Pri: PLTSUP NRC VIO IV Pri: 1C Inadequote vital crea barrier. NRC*S review of on issue identified in February 1997, resulted in o violation that f a barrier, of the point of penetration to o vital creo does not meet licensee security plon commitments Sec*- Sec'.

concerning barrier integrity and bullet-resistance. Compensofory measures were implemented but the Tet licensee contended that security plan commitments regarding barrier effectiveness were property implemented. (Sechon S8.1) 08/14/1998 1998016 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: IC Overoil the external exposure control program was being effectively implemented in occordance with station procedures and regulatory requirements. Radiation Protection (RP) staff were knowledgeable of Sec-' Sec'*

procedures and processes. However, several minor deficiencies regarding procedure odherence and Tet record keeping were ident fied. These deficiencies were being evoluoted and corrected by RP monogement 08/14/1998 1998016 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: IC In-vitro and in-vivo onolyses were being performed properly and were consistent with industry stondords.

However, the inspectors questioned whether o decrease in the frequency of qua!zty control checks for the Sec-* Sec.' '

whole body counter would provide sufficient QC dato to obtain on occurate indication of detector Ter: performance. This was being evoluoted by the licensee 08/14/1998 1998015 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: IC Air sompting was conducted consistent with NRC regulations and industry practice. Air samplers were wet m int ned nd w rkers were observed correctly performing air sompting actMties. However, there were Sec- Sec.

severa,1 minor examples identified where procedural guidance needed odditionot clarification and wtiere

~

Tec mistokes in air sampling records had not been idenhfied through licensee supervisory reviews 08/14/1998 1998016 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: 1C The routine contomination ond dose rote survey progrom was effectively implemented. Smteys were performed as required and oppropriately documented. A technicion observed during the u tspection was Sec~- Sec~.

knowledgeable of the procedure and the creo to be surveyed, and demonstrated good survey techniques Ter:  ;

i 08/14/1998 173016 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: IC High and locked high rodiotion oreos were well controlled and were maintained in good condition with only l minor housekeeping problems observed. Workers were famitior with access control requirements and RP Sec~- Sec. '

stoff was observed reinforcing these expectations in work creos l Ten  !

Item Type (Compliance. Followup.Other), To 03/11/2000

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Page: 14 of 14 Date:03/25/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm. .ission nm.: omo.oi PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Legend Type Codes: Templote Codes: Functional Areas:

BU Buuetin IA Normal Operations OPS Operations CDR Construction IB Operations During Transients MAINT Maintenance DEV Deviction 1C Programs and Processes ENG Engineering eel Escolated Enforcement item 2A Equipment Condition PLTSUP Plant Support til inspector follow-up item 2B Programs and Processes OTHER Other LER Ucensee Event Report 3A Work Performance UC Licensing issue 3B KSA MISC Miscellaneous 3C Work Environment MV Minor Violation 4A Design NCV NonCited Violation 4B Engineering Support NEG Negative 4C Programs and Processes NOED Notice of Enforcement Discretion SA Wification NON Notice of Non-Conformance 58 Anofysis P21 Port 21 SC Resolution POS Positive ID Codes:

SGI Sofeguard Event Report NRC

[sRC '

SIR Strength Sett Self4evected URI Unresolved item Ucensee Licensee VIO Violation WK Weakness ,

i EEis are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escdoted enforcement action in accordonce with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action"(Enforcement Policy). NUREG-1600. However. the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the Eels and the PIM entries may be modified when the Not decisions are mode.

URis are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is on acceptable iterrt a deviatiort a nonconformance, or o violation. A URI may otso be a potentiot victo* ion that is not likely to be considered for escatated enforcement action. However, the NRC hos not reached its final conclusions on the issues. and the PIM entries may be modified when the finot conclusions are mode. ,

item Type (Compliance. Followup,Other), To 03/11/2000  ;

' 4' SSS PLANT ISSUES MATRIX '

Quad Cities -

Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Colurnn = "SALP* . SALP Area = *All/Multipte' ; Beginning Date = *12/21/1997* , Ending Date = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY ! SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 1 '9/30/1998 moming report Self- All/ Multiple 1B Unit 1 scrammed at 2:06 a.m. CDT on September 30,1998 due to low Revealed reactor water level. Previously, equipment operators were in the process of removing the "A" reactor feed pump from service, ("B" and "C" reactor feed pumps were providing feedwater). While performing the out-of-service tagout, the equipment operators valved out the "A" reactor feedwater flow transmitter. The transmitter apparently generated a full flow indication signal for the" A" feedwater pump which was provided to the feedwater control system, causing an indicated feedwater flow much higher than steam flow. With the reactor feed system in three-element control, the feedwater control system began reducing actual flow. A computer alarm alerted control room operators to the decrease in feedwater flow. The reactor scrammed automatically on low reactor water level. The reactor feed system was taken to single element control and feedwater regulating valves opened in response. Reactor water level decreased as low as -20 inches (108 inches above top of active fuel, normal level is 30 inches) before rebounding. / reactor feedwater pump trip occurred at on high reactor water level (about 48 inches). Reactor water level increased above 60 inches before retuming to normal.

2 1/30/1998 Misc IR 97001.SLP NRC All/Multip!e The functional areas of Operations and Plant Support were rated as IR 97001.SLP Category 2. The areas of Maintenance and Engineering were rated as Category 3. Although the ratings were the same as in SALP 13, it is my view that conduct of nuclear activities in connection with the Quad Cities facility declined from the previous assessment period.

Page 1 of 2

3/24M999 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF P1M TABLE LABELS . .

1. A counter number used for NRC intemal editing.

The date of the event or significant issue. For those items that have a clear date of occurrence use the actual date. If the actual date is not known, use the date DATE the issue was identified. For issues that do not have an actual date or a date of ident.fication, use the LER or inspection report date.

TYPE The categorization of the issue - see the TYPE ITEM CODE table.

SOURCE The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.

ID BY Identification of who discovered the issue - see table.

SALP SALP Functional Area Codes - Engineering Maintenance. Operations, Plant Support and All/ Multiple (i.e., more than one SALP area affected).

SMM CODES Senior Manager Meeting Codes - see table.

DESCRIPTION Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.

TYPE ITEM CODE NOTES SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING CODES DEV Deviation from NRC Requirements

• Eels are apparent violations of NRC 1 Operational Performance:

ED Escalated Discretion - No Civil Penalty requirements that at9 being considered for I. Normal EEP Escalated Enforcement Isrue - Waiting Final NRC Action escalated enforcement action in accordance B - During Transients License Event Report to the NRC with the " General Statement of Policy and C - Programs and Processes LER Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action Lic nsing Licensing issue from NRR (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. 2 Material Condition:

Mi?c Miscellaneous (Emeroency Preparedness Finding, etc.) However, the NRC has not reached its final A - Equipment Condition NCV Non Cited Violation enforcement decision on the issues B - Programs and Processes Negative Individual Poor Licensee Performance identified by the Eels and the PIM entries 3 Human Perf( nance:

Prsitive Individual Good Licensee Performance may be modified when the final decisions A - Work Pei armance  !

Strength Overall Strong Licensee Performance are made. Before the NRC makes its B - Knowledge Skills, and Abilities enforcement decision, the licensee will be C - Work Environtr ent URP* Unresolved inspection item provided with an opportunity to either VIO/SL-1 Notice of Violation - Severity Level I (1) respond to the apparent violation or 4 Engineering / Design:

VIO/SL-Il Notice of Violation - Severity Level II (_, equest a predecisional enforcement A - Design VIO/SL-ill Notice of Violation - Severity Level 1:! conference. B - Engineering Support VIO/SL-IV Notice of Violation - Severity Level IV ** URis are unresolved items about which C - Programs and Processes

• ore inf ion required t determine p W:ekness Overall Weak Licensee Performance h

RMM acceptable item, a deviation, a A - Identification nonconformance, cr a violation. However, B- Analysis ID BY C - Resolution the NRC has not reached its final l Licensee The licensed utilr# conclusions on the issues, and the PIM NRC The Nuclear Regulatory Commission entries may be modified when the final Self-R:vealed identification by an event (e.g., equipment breakdown) conclusions are made.

Other identification uriknown .

Page 2 of 2

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 3'24/19 ?

Quad Cities -

Search Sorted by Date (Descending) arx! SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP' ; SALP Area = " Operations * , Beginning Date = *12/21/1997* . Ending Data = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 1 9/1/1998 NCV IR 98013 Licensee Operations 1A An event involving miscommunication between operators caused the control room emergency ventilation system to trip and become inoperable. A non-cited violation was issued for the improperly implemented surveillance procedure (Section O8.2).

2 8/16/1998 NCV IR 98013 Licensee Operations 3A Operators discovered four high pressure coolant injection system and reactor core isolation cooling system vent valves in the wrong position.

Procedure usage by the oparator and independent verification problems were contributors to the erro. This was considered a non-cited violation (Section O2.1).

C 7/16/1998 IR98012 NRC Operations 1A Due to recurrent maintenance problems and an inability to determine a cause of valve failure, operators were required to increase the frequency of cycling with the Unit 2 recirculation system sample valves. A failure on the recirculation system sample line resulted in operators needing to vent primary containment to atmosphere to avoid an engineered safety features actuation. However, the inspectors concluded the licensee met Technical Specification requirements (Section O2.4).

4 7/16/1998 Negative IR 98012 NRC Operations 1A Poor communication led to an operator error which resulted in the trip of the control room ventilation system. A confusing procedure and inappropriate procedure usage also contributed to the error (Section 01.3).

5 7/16/1998 F ottive IR 98012 NRC Operations 1B During Unit 1 startup, the inspectors observed good heightened level of awareness briefings and overall good operator performance (Section 01.2).

6 7/16/1998 Positive IR 98012 NRC Operations 1B Three events during the period, caused by turbine generator equipment problems, required operators to remove the turbine generator from operation. The inspectors concluded that the operators responded to the events appropriately. However, the operators continued to be challenged by equipment problems (Section M2.1).

Page 1 of 6

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 3/2p1999 Quad Cities Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Coturnn = *SALP" , SALP Area = " Operations" . Beginning Date = *12/21/1997* , Ending oate = *10/1/1998*

y

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 7 7/16/1998 IR 98012 NRC Operations 1B Concurrent startups of Unit 1 and Unit 2 were completed without any significant problems. However, several equipment failures occurred and required reactor protection system or containment isolation system channels to be tripped and Unit 1 to be in a Technical Specification shutdown action statement. Additionally, control rcds were extremely difficult to withdraw which became a significant distraction to normal operator performance and resulted in rods being moved past the intended positions several times (Section O2.3).

8 7/16/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98012 NRC Operations 1C The inspectors identified errors associated with operations surveillance i tests that involved different and diverse operations subdisciplines including staff, supervisory, and management positions. One of these resulted in a violation. The inspectors were concemed that attributes of 1 quality established and supported by management were not being implemented by the operations organization (Section O4.1).

9 6/27/1998 IR 98012 Self- Operations 1B The Unit 1 reactor tripped on June 27 from full power due to a failed Revealed scram discharge volume level transmitter coincident with a surveillance test of the average power range monitor. All systems functioned properly and operator response to the transient was good. The licensee's investigation failed to accurately determine the cause of the scram

• discharge volume transmitter failure, and several weeks later another spurious signal occurred shortly before a scheduled reactor protection system test (Section O2.1).

10 6/14/1998 Negative IR 98012 NRC Ope 4ations 1C Equipment problems resur ting from electrical storms affected various plant systems. Operations management decisions on degraded control rod drive accumulators did not use formal operability determination mechanisms, did not fully take into account Updated Final Safety Analysis Report requirements, and did not use engineering assistance to determine operability when design criteria were not met (Section O2.5).

11 5/29/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98009 NRC Operations 1A The inspectors and licensee both identified a negative trend in out-of-service performance. The licensee's evaluation of a failure to prott -

divers during a pump start was downgraded to an apparent cause evaluation, and the quality of the apparent cause evaluation and '

subsequent corrective action was poor. Operations management did not initially consider the event significant even though personnel safety and system performance could have been adversely affected (Section 04.1). .

Page 2 of 6

3/24/1999 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX .

Quad Cities Search Sorted by oate (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* , SALP Area = " Operations * . Beginning Da'e = *12/21/1997* , Ending Date = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 12 5/29/1998 Positive IR 98009 NRC Operations 1B The control rod hydraulic and air systems were in good material condition, and were in the appropriate configuration for the current plant conditions (Section O2.2).

13 5/29/1998 Positive IR 98009 NRC Operations 1B Operators carefully controlled Unit 2 startup activities. Operator performance was good although the different operating crews exhibited different standards with respect to communications. A number of equipment problems occurred and operators responded appropriately (Section O2.1).

14 5/29/1998 Positive IR 93009 NRC Operations 1B Control room operator actions in response to the loss of an offsite power supply were in accordance with procedures and were accomplished using both self-check and peer-check techniques (Section M1.1).

15 5/29/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98009 NRC Operations 3B An individual operated out-of-service equipment in violation of plant orocedures and Technical Specifications (TS). The out-of-service hung on the refuel bridge was insufficient to ensure the refuel bridge would not move when operation was attempted from the bridge control pendant.

This event was also significant because the out-of-service was being used as an equivalent method of reactivity controls forinterlocks that did not meet Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) requirements ,

(Section 04.2).

16 4/1/1998 Negative IR 98303 OL NRC Operations 1C Administration of the examination revealed one applicant performance IR 98303 OL issue needing additional review by the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Training and Operations Departments. On two occasions during simulator transients, license applicants reached setpoints, imposed by an ;

admmistrative procedure, that required a specified action such as a reactor scram or emergency depressurization. The applicants executed those actions even though they had been informed that the action was unnecessaiy and the plant was being adequately controlled by crew members. Although the simulated reactor was placed in a safe condition in each of the two cases, the transient initiated on the plant was unnecessary and could have been avoided. (Section 05.5.b)

Page 3 of 6

3/2,4/M9 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX .

Quad Cities

• Search Sorted by Date (Deccending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Colurnn = *SALP" : SALP Area =

• Operations

• Beginning Date = *12/21/1997* - Ending Date = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 17 4/1/1998 " * * * * * * * *

• IR 98303 OL NRC Operations 1C An NRC developed initial operator licensing examination was administered to three license applicants [two Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) applicants, and one Senior Reactor Operator Limited to Fuel Handling (LSRO) applicant]. All three applicants passed all portions of their respective examinations. The LSRO was issued a license. The two SRO applicants were not issued operating licenses as they have not completed all requirements to be issued a license. Licenses will be issued upon completion of all Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station training program requirements; ie, one additional month of responsible power plant experience at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. (Section 05.1) 18 3/31/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98004 Licensee Operations 1A Non-licensed operators improperly retumed a safety-related breaker to service and logged the equipment as being available for five days before detecting the deficient condition. The failure to properly retum the component to service was considered a violation of procedures (Section 01.2).

19 3/31/1998 Negative IR 98004 Licensee Operations 3A Non-licensed operators injected incorrect grease into the station blackout diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump, which could have made the pump inoperable due to grease incompatibility. Initial corrective actions did not address extended operation of the pumps with incompatible grease and were considered weak (Section 01.2).

20 3/20/1998 Positive IR 98303 OL NRC Operations 1C The training and operations departments staff provided significant assistance in preparing the examination for administration to the applicants. (Sections 05.1,05.2,05.3 and 05.4) 21 3/20/1998 Positive IR 98303 OL NRC Operations 38 The applicants appeared well prepared to take the examination.

(Sections 05.2,05.3 and 05.4) 22 2/13/1998 Positive IR 97022 NRC Operations 1C 3B The level of knowledge of two operators interviewed conceming the HPCI  !

system was good.

23 2/13/1998 VIO/SL-IV 1R 97022 NRC Operations 1C 5A Some problems with HPCI system procedures were identified. One procedure, concemed with local operation of the HPCI system, was inadequate. This was considered a violation of NRC requirements.

24 2/6/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 97028 NRC Operations 1A 4C The licensee did not complete a 10 CFF t 0.59 evaluation for the change in the status of the normal ventilation fan to the shared EDG room. This was considered a failure to maintain the plant configuration in accordance with the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)

Page 4 of 6

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 394SSS Quad Cities '

search Sorted by Date (Descending) and sMM Codes (Ascending): Search Coiumn = "SALP" ; sALP Area =

• Operations" Beginning Date = *12/21/1S97* , Ending Date = *10/1/199B*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 25 2/6/1998 Negative IR 97028 NRC Operations 1C The licensee did not proactively prepare for the effects of cold weather on equipment deemed important to safety.

26 2/6/1998 Negative IR 97028 NRC Operations 1C 3A Two operators, using the licensee's independent verification methods, failed to establish correct cooling water valve position for the Unit 2 EDG, rendering it inoperable during some of the time that the Unit 1 EDG was also inoperable (Section 01.3). In addition, two individuals preparing a retum to service package caused a Unit 2 EDG air start valve to be out of the required position. These events were indicative of a weakness in independent verification.

27 2/6/1998 Negative IR 97028 NRC Operations 3A 1A Technician error, inadequate communication and the misinterpretation of a procedure led to the unexpected start of the Unit 1 emergency diesel generator (EDG). Licensee :nvestigation of operator performance duririg the event was insightful.

28 1/13/1998 Positive IR 97024.0L NRC Operations 1C The examination materials used to examine the operators provided an effective evaluation tool for evaluating operator skills; however, the Category B (classroom written examination) examination was considered weak.

29 1/13/1998 Positive IR 97024.0L NRC Operations 3A 1C Control room operators were found to be professional and businesslike in the execution of their operator responsibilities.

30 1/13/1998 Positive IR 97024.0L NRC Operations 3B 1C The licensed operator requalification program was providing operators with the skills necessary to property fulfill their job functions.

31 1/5/1998 LER LER 254/98001 Self- Operations 1A Unit 1 EDG receivtid an inadvertent start signal when a relay was bumped Revealed during testing, the EDG failed to start as would be expected on receipt of this signal, and the EDG was inadvertantly started 15 minutes later due to an error by an operator who was responding to the failure to start.

Page 5 of 6

_ _ _ . ___-_________________-_______________________-_____-__-_J

3/24/1999 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLE LABELS , ,

1. A counter number used for NRC intemal editing. ,

The date of the event or significant issue. For those items that have a clear date of occurrence use the actual date. If the actual date is not known, use the date DATE the issue was identified. For issues that do not have an actual date or a date of identification, use the LER or inspection report date.

TYPE The categorization of the issue - see the TYPE ITEM CODE table.

SOURCE The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.

ID GY Identification of who discovered the issue - see table.

SALP SALP Functional Area Codes - Engineering, Maintenance, Operations, Plant Support and All/Mult!ple (i.e., more than one SALP area affected).

SMM CODES Senior Manager Meeting Codes - see table.

DESCRIPTION Details of the issue from the LER text or from the !R Executive Summaries. s TYPE ITEM CODE NOTES SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING CODES DEV Deviation from NRC Requirements

• Eels are apparent violations of NRC 1 Operational Performance:

ED Escalated Discretion - No Civil Penalty requirements that are being considered for A - Normal Escalated Enforcement issue - Waiting Final NRC Action escalated enforcement action in accordance B - During Transients EEI' with the " General Statement of Policy and C - Programs and Processes LER License Event Report to the NRC Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action Liccn:ing Licensing issue from NRR 2 Material Condition:

Mi?c Miscellaneous (Emergency Preparedness Finding etc.) ) (Enforcement However, the NRC Policy), NUREG-1600.

has not reached its final A - Equipment Condition Non-Cited Violation anforcement decision on the issues B - Programs and Processes NCV - -~

Negative Individual Poor Licensee Performance identified by the Eels and the PIM entries 3 Human Performance: '

may be modified when the final decisions A - Work Performance Po:itiva Individual Good Licensee Performance are made. Before the NRC makes its B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities t Str:ngth Overall Strong Licensee Performance enforcement decision, the licensee will be C - Work Environment URl" Unresolved Inspection item provided with an opportunity to either VIO/SL-l Notice of Violation - Severity Level I (1) respond to the apparent violation or 4 Engineering / Design:

VIO/SL-Il Notice of Violation - Severity Level 11 (2) request a predecisional enforcement A - Design VIO/SL-Ill Nctice of Violation - Severity Level lit conference. B - Engineering Support

• • UR!s are unresolved items about which C - Programs and Processes VIO/SL-IV Notice of Violation - Severity Leve! IV W skness Overall Weak Licensee Performance ue n quest on s a 5 Problem Identification and Resolution:

wh her A - Identification acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. However, B - Analysis ID BY C - Resolution the NRC h:2s not reached its final Lic nsee IThe licensed utility conclusions on the issues, and the PIM NRC The Nuclear Regulatory Commission entries may be modified when the final Self-Rrvealed identification by an event (e.g., equipment breakdown) conclusions are mcde.

Other Identification unknown Page 6 of 6

/24/1999 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX '

Quad Cities E Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP" . SALP Area = " Maintenance * . Beginning Date = '12/21/1997* . Ending Data = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 1 9/1/1998 NCV IR 98013 Licensee Maintenance 2B The licensee's identification of additional missed surveillance tests in response to a previous notice of violation was noteworthy. Corrective actions have been effective and no missed surveillance tests have been identified in over 6 months. The additional missed surveillance tests were considered to be a non-cited violation (Section M8.2).

2 9/1/1998 NCV IR 98013 Licensee Maintenance 2B The licensee ultimately determined the root cause of the scram discharge instrument volume transmitter failure after incorrectly identifying two other causes. Maintenance personnel failed to correctly reference the vendor manual when interchanging electronic boards between transmitters. The parts evaluation process also missed this error which resulted in the scram discharge instrument volume transmitter being inoperable for 18 days. This condition resulted in a non-cited violation (Section M2.4).

3 9/1/1998 NCV IR 98013 NRC Maintenance 2B Three separate maintenance errors delayed work or affected plant ,

conditions, but did not jeopardize operability of safety systems.

Configuration control problems occurred which were not prevented by ,

second checks. One non-cited violation was issued for the failure to properly implement a maintenance work package (Section M2.1).

4 9/1/1998 Negative IR 98013 NRC Maintenance 2B One of the observed priority maintenance activities was completed successfully, but completed 5 days later than originally scheduled, with no major scope changes to the work. Weaknesses in work package preparation and coordination, communication between departments, knowledge of environmentally qualified splice techniques, parts qualification, and engineering and operations department support were evident. These types of problems were partial contributore to a 30 percent completion rate of corrective maintenance (Sectbn M;.4).

5 9/1/1998 Positive IR 98013 NRC Maintenance 2B The licensee continued to reduce the corrective maintenance non-outage backlog. Although some of the reported reduction was due to cancellation of work requests, the inspectors did not identify any inappropriate cancellations (Section M1.3).

6 9/1/1998 Negative IR 98013 Licensee Maintenance 3A Poor maintenance package records resulted in an additional entry of maintenance workers into a locked high radiation area to plan corrective maintenance (Section M1.4).

7 9/1/1998 Positive IR 98013 NRC Maintenance 3A Condensate pump maintenance activities observed were performed correctly and in accordance with procedures. For most of the activities L observed, supervisors visited the work site on a limited basis.

Page 1 of 8

/24/im PLANT ISSUES MATRIX '

Quad Cities Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = SALP* . SALP Area =

• Maintenance

• Beginning Data = *12f21/1997* . Ending Date = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 8 9/1/1998 NCV LER 254/97013- Self- Maintenance 3A Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Area High Temperature Switch Would not 00, IR 98013 Revealed Actuate Due to Excess Sealing Varnish Applied by Technician. During channel functional testing, instrument technicians found that the 1-1360-14D temperature switch would not actuate due to a previous technician error. Excess sealing varnish had been applied after the previous calibration.

9 9/1/1998 Negative IR 98913 NRC Maintenance SA The 2A 125 Vdc battery charger failed a 4-hour load test when the feed breaker to the charger tripped. This was a repetitive problem, and no root cause was determined. The test was rerun satisfactorily and further actions were planned to determine the root cause. The test procedure initially allowed for preconditioning of the equipment prior to the test (Section M2.2).

10 9/1/1998 Positive IR 98013 Licensee Maintenance SC The licensee successfully resolved a repetitive problem with control rod drive hydraulic control unit annunciators. Operator re=ponse to the most recent occurrence was improved over the response to a previous event (Section M2.3).

11 7/16/1998 *"""""

1R98012 NRC Maintenance 2A Three events during the period, caused by turbine generator equipment problems, required operators to remove the turbine generator from operation to repair the defective conditions. The inspectors concluded that the maintenance activities and prompt investigation reports were timely and appropriate. However, the operators continued to be challenged by equipment problems (Section M2.1).

12 7/16/1998 Negative IR 98012 Licensee Maintenance 2B Four average power range monitors were declared inoperable due to the failure to complete the required surveillance tests within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of entering Mode 3. Technical Specification 3.1.A.1 was entered and required the channels to be in the trip condition within one hour. The surveillance tests were completed shortly after and the average power range monitors were again operable (Section M1.1).

13 7/16/1998 Negative IR 98012 Self- Maintenance SC The licensee's investigation failed to accurately determine the cause of Revealed the scram discharge volume transmitter failure and later another scram discharge volume spurious trip signal occurred (Section M1.1).

Page 2 of 8

3/24/1999 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX .

Quad Cities Search sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP" . SALP Area = " Maintenance * , Beginning Date = *12/21/1997* . Ending Date = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 14 5/29/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98009 Licensee Maintenance 1C During work on traversing incore probe components in April 1998, instrument Maintenance personnel did not comply with the out-of-service program and personnel protection controls. The failure to conduct work on this system in a safe and controlled manner was a violation of out-of-service procedures and TS requirements. Due to certain radiation protection requirements, and due to the low dose rate of the detector at the time of the evolution, there was no substantial potential for a radiological overexposure (Section M1.4).

15 5/29/1998 Positive IR 98009 NRC Maintenance 2B The licensee was effectively tracking the numerous problems encountered with electrical circuit breakers, and was repairing these problems in a timely manner (Section M2.1).

16 5/29/1998 Negative IR 98009 NRC Maintenance 2B Poor quality maintenance resulted in the loss of one of two sources of offsite power. The investigation of this event was both timely and thorough. The inspectors also identified that the rework aspects of this event had not been identified by the licensee (Section M1.1).

17 5/29/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98009 NRC Maintenance 3B Maintenance workers failed to perform steps in an approved procedure and failed to change the procedure prior to continuing the maintenance actions. Maintenance supervision guidance contributed to the conclusion that this violation of TS requirements was acceptable (Section M1.3).

18 4/17/1998 Positive IR 98008 NRC Maintenance 2B Performance criteria established to demonstrate the effectiveness of preventive maintenance of (a)(2) systems and functions had been extensively revised, were appropriate, and were properly justified.

19 4/17/1998 Strength IR98008 NRC Maintenance 2B Scoping of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) was considered acceptable. A complete rescoping effort properly identified structures, systems, and components, and functions required to be in the maintenance rule program scope; no omissions were identified.

20 4/17/1998 Strength IR 98008 NRC Maintenance 2B Based on reviews of the licensee's risk ranking methodology and resuits, the inspectors concluded that the licensee's approach to establishing the risk ranking for SSCs within the scope of the maintenance rule was good. Two functions, identified during the basehne inspection as improperly classified as low safety significance, were now correctly classified. ,

Page 3 of 8

_____.__.__.__-.___-__m__.._-_____-____________m __sru_ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ __ __-__---_______c. - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . - _ . . - _ _ _ _ _ _

' #SS PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Quad Cities Saarch Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Co!urnn = "SALP' , SALP Area = " Maintenance * , Beginning Date = '12/21/1997* , Ending Date = "10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 21 4/17/1998 Positive IF 98008 NRC Maintenance 2B The process for evaluating events and problems for functional failures and maintenance preventable functional failures had been revised and strengthened. Guidance for assessing events and problems was strengthened and a monthly requirement to evaluate maintenance rule  ;

system performance was instituted.  :

22 4/17/1998 Positive IR 58008 NRC Maintenance 2B Implementation of goals and monitoring for systems and functions classified (a)(1) was improved. Inappropriate goals, identified during the '

September 1997 baseline inspection, had been corrected. Adequate goals had been dem:oped for those functions noted in the baseline report as having goals and corrective action plans under development. Goals and corrective action plans for all SSCs and functions classified as (a)(1) were considered acceptable.

23 4/17/19D8 Negative IR 98008 NRC Maintenance 2B The inspectors noted many SSCs and functions were classified as (a)(1) and observed that a significant portion of SSCs and functions modeled in the Individual Plant Examination had exceeded performance criteria. This led the inspectors to question whether the current baseline core damage frequency estimate was valid and whether the licensee understood the underlying cause for so many systems not performing up to station expectations.

24 4/17/1998 Positive IR 98008 NRC Maintenance SA SC Two 1998 corporate self-assessments of the Quad Cities maintenance rule program implementation were thorough and provided good information for the station's maintenance rule staff. In tum, the maintenance rule staff adequately responded to the issues raised in a timely manner.

25 3/31/1998 Positive IR 98004 Self- Maintenance 2A Reactor bottom head drain piping failed an in-service pressure test. The Revealed licensee conservatively used a reactor drain plug and a freeze seal to isolate the piping for repair (Section M1.2).

26 3/31/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98004 Licensee Maintenance 2B Ouad Cities was overdue on completion of a number of surveillance and preventive maintenance items. The licensee was scheduling surveillances and preventive maintenance items to be performed past the due date for the items. A violation was issued for failure to perform snubber surveillances in the appropriate periodicity Section M1.5).

Page 4 of 8

3/2,4/1999 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Quad Cities Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP' , SALP Area =

• Maintenance * , Beginnirig Date = *12/21/1997* , Ending Date = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 27 3/31/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98004 Licensee Maintenance 28 All source range nuclear instruments on both units were rendered inoperable because of failure to perform Technical Specification required functional testing. Previous corrective actions were not sufficient to ensure surveillances were performed in a timely manner. This was considered a violation of surveillance testing (Section M1.4).

28 3/31/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98004 Licensee Maintenance 2B The licensee identified standby liquid control system temperature switches, used to satisfy a Technical Specification surveillance requirement, were set below the required minimum temperature. There were prior opportunities to identify this missed surveillance violation (Section M1.3).

29 3/31/1998 Positive IR 98004 Licensee Maintenance 3A An instrument technician found electronic controller modules which were impro; ny assembled by a contracted repair company. This condition was pi aerly reported to alert other facilities of a potential nonconforming conditian (Section M1.2).

30 3/31/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98004 Licensee Maintenance 3B A maintenance contractor operated valves with out-of-service (danger) tags attached. This issue was considered a violation of the licensee's administrative procedures, and demonstrated poor safety practices and ineffective control of contractor activities (Section M1.2).

31 3/31/1998 Negative IR 98004 Licensee Maintenance SC The licensee's corrective actions for previously identified testing deficiencies with the emergency diesel generator air start system were not technically adequate, and procedure reviews failed to identify the problems (Section M3.1).

32 2/13/1998 Strength IR 97022 NRC Maintenance 2B The maintenance training program was adequate to assure qualified maintenance technicians. The training facilities were very good and were considered a strength.

33 2/13/1998 Strength IR 97022 NRC Maintenance 2B Mr.ntenance activities were well controlled. The assignment of work week managers to coordinate activities was cccsidered a strength.

34 2/13/1998 Positive IR 97022 NRC Maintenance 2B 5A Licensee maintenance procedures were technically adequate, sufficient to perform the required maintenance and inspection tasks and had the necessary provisions to identify and evaluate deficiencies.

Page 5 of 8

3/24/1999 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX .

~

Quad Cities S arch Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP" ; SALP Area = " Maintenance * , Beginning Date = *12/21/1997* Ending Date = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 35 2/13/1998 Weakness IR 97022 NRC Maintenance 2B SA During walkdowns on the Unit 1 and 2 High Pressurf Coolant injection (HPCI) systems, minor problems with material condition were identified. i These minor problems did not affect the operability of either units' HPCI systems. Minor procedure errors were also identified with both the Unit 1 and 2 HPCI system checklists used to locally verify valve positions.

36 2/13/1998 LER LER 254/98010 Licensee Maintenance 3A TS surveillance interval for snubber visial inspections was exceeded due to personnel error when an incorrect surveillance credit date was entered into the electronic work control system predefine schedule as a result of a l change in frequency codes for conversion to the upgraded TSs_

37 2/13/1998 Positive IR 97022 NRC Maintenance 3A 3B The performance by an instrument technician during an observed surveillance was good. The technician precisely followed the procedure and demonstrated a good level of skillirme use of the test equipment involved.

38 2/6/1998 Weakness IR 97028 NRC Maintenance 2A 2B The licensee discovered that all three EDGs had out-of-tolerance time delay relay settings. The maintenance work history showed that preventive maintenance to calibrate the relays was not performed per the y established schedule, and relays in the past had exhibited a high failure rate.

39 2/6/1998 Negative IR 97028 NRC Maintenance 2B 3A The inspectors identified that weaknesses existed la documenting work history information previously provided by a vendor in addition, wiring errors resulted in a safety-related system being inoperable longer than scheduled.

40 2/6/1998 Negative IR 97028 NRC Maintenance 3A 2B During a surveillance test, the inspectors noted the procedure adherence policy was not followed. The inspectors also found problems with the use of independent verification methods.

41 2/6/1998 Negative IR 97028 NRC Maintenance 3A SC Lack of control of foreign material (electrical tape) resulted in a condition which could have adversely affected EDG p(rformance and may have contributed to the failure of the EDG to start. The licensee's investigation of this particular aspect of the event was initially lrionclusive and did not include recommended corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

Page 6 of 8

'*dSSS PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Quad Cities Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* , SALP Area = " Maintenance * , Beginning Data = *12/21/1997* ; Ending Date = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 42 2/6/1998 Weakness IR 97028 NRC Maintenance SA SC The quality control (QC) organization implemented overview inspections to replace non-mandatory hold points in maintenance activities. The Quad Cities Maintenance staff did not substitute the verification of hold point activities with maintenance supervisor verifications as initia!!y intended by management.

43 1/27/1998 LER LER 254/98008 Licensee Maintenance 2A Residual heat removal shutdown cooling common suction header was inoperable due to inadequate installation instructions resulting in mechanical failure of a mechanical shock arrestor (snubber).

44 1/3/1998 LER LER 254/98002 Licensee Maintenance 2B A required drywell high pressure instrument channel relay monthly surveillance interval was exceeded due to an inadequate test procedure that was caused by an inadequate procedure verification and revision during implementation of the TS upgrade program.

Page 7 of 8

3/R4/1999 GE.NERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLE LABELS . .

1. A counter number used for NRC internal e9iting.

The date of the event or significant isne. For those items that have a clear date of occurrence use the actual date. If the actual date is not known, use the date DATE the issue was identified. For issues that do not have an actual date or a date of identification. use the LER or inspection report date.

TYPE The categorization of the issue - see the TYPE ITEM CODE table.

SOURCE The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.

ID BY Identification of who discovered the issue - sae table.

SALP SALP Functional Area Codes - Engineering, Maintenance, Operations, Plant Support and A!!/Muttiple (i.e., more than one SALP area affected).

SMM CODES Senior Manager Meeting Codes - see table.

DESCRIPTION Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.

TYPE ITEM CODE NOTES SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING CODES DEV Deviation from NRC Requirements Eels are apparent violations of NRC 1 Operational Performance:

ED Escalated Discretion - No Civil Penalty requirements that are being considered for A - Normal eel

• Escalated Enforcement Issue - Waiting Final NRC Action escalated enforcement action in accordance B - During Transients with the " General Statement of Policy and C - Programs and Processes LER License Event Report to the NRC Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action Lic nting Licensing issue from NRR (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. 2 Material Condition:

Mirc Miscellaneous (Emergency Preparedness Finding. etc.) However, the NRC has not reached its final A - Equipment Condition NCV Non-Cited Violation enforcement decision on the issues B - Programs and Processes Negative Individual Poor Licensee Performance identified by the EEis and the PIM entries 3 Human i erformance:

Psitive Individual Good Licensee Performance may be modified when the final decisions A - Work Performance Str:ngth Overall Strong Licensee Performance are made. Before the NRC; makes its B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities enforcement decision, the Itcensee will be C - Work Environment URl** Unresolved Inspection item provided with an opportunity to either VIO/SL-1 Notice of Violation - Severity Level I (1) respond to the apparent violation or 4 Engineering / Design:

VIO/SL-Il Notice of Violation - Severity Level 11 (2) request a predecisional enforcement A - Design VIO/SL-Ill Notice of Violation - Severity Level 111 conference. B - Engineering Support

" URis are unresolved items about which C - Programs and Processes VIO/SL-IV Notice of Violation - Severity Level IV

• " 'd d " " "

Weakness Overall Weak Licensee Performance sue n ques on s a 5 Problem identification and Resolution:

h e acceptable item, a deviation, a A - Identification nonconformance, or a violation. However, B - Analysts ID BY C - Resolution the NRC has not reached its final Lic:nsee The licensed utility conclusions on the issues, and the PIM NRC The Nuclear Regulatory Commission entries may be modified when the final Self-Rivealed Identification by an event (e.g., equipment breakdown) conclusions are made.

Other Identification unknown Page 8 of 8

E.

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 3/24/199p Quad Cities Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP' , SALP Area =

• Engineering * , Beginning Date = *12/21/1997* , Ending Date = *10/1/1998*

DATE TYPE SOURCE l lD BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 1 9/1/1998 Positive IR 98013 NRC Engineering 4B The inspecters concluded that the licensee's troubleshooting efforts were thorough in determining the root cause of the Unit 2 high pressure coolant ;

injection turning gear failure (Section E1.3).

2 9/1/1998 Negative IR 98013 NRC Engineering 4C The inspectors determined that the licensee, in applying Regulatory Guide 1.9 " Selection, Design, Qualification, and Testing of Emergency Diesel Generator Units Used as Class 1E Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," in determining emergency diesel generator reliability, did not properly address emergency diesel generator start failures. Two additional examples of incorrectly classified starts were identified (Section E1.2).

3 7/24/1998 NCV LER 94013 NRC Engineering 4A The licensee identified that the relays that control the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) for the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) could be impacted by a single fire in a single zone of the turbine building.

This was an unanalyzed condition for safe shutdown during a fire.

However, this design problem had limited safety significance because the licensee had adequate time to take compensatory measures to cool the diesel generator rooms. The failure to assure that applicable design requirements were met is a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, i Appendix B, Criterion 111.

4 7/24h 998 Positive IR 98015 NRC Engineering 4B System engineering involvement in the corrective action process was t good for the eleven specific items.  !

5 7/24/1998 Positive IR 98015 NRC Engineering 4C For the eleven issues reviewed, the corrective actions and root cause analyses were acceptable.

6 7/16/1998 NCV IR 98012 Licensee Engineering 4C The licensee identified that during a shutdown of Unit 2 in February 1997, the primar. < 7ntainment function of pressure suppression wou.d have been bypassed for a short period during deinerting of the containment.

The procedures that allowed this alignment were subsequently changed.

This was a non-cited violation of Technical "

, Specification 3.7.K.3 (Section E8.20).

7 7/16/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98012 NRC Engineering 4C Oualification of commercial grade relays for use in a safety function as emergency diesel generator time delay relays failed to account for environmental concems such as vibration. This was considered a ,

violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 11 (Section E 8.18).  !

Page 1 of 11

/24/1999 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX .

Quad Cities Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP" , SALP Area = " Engineering" , Beginning Date = *12f21/1997* ; Ending Date = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 8 7/16/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98012 NRC Engineering 4C Engineers did not follow the process for changing safety-related setpoints in 1996 when the .second-level undervoltage setpoint was revised. As a result, no 10 CFR 50.59 review was conducted and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not updated. This was considered to be a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (Section E8.19).

9 7/16/1998 Negative iR 98012 NRC Engineering 4C The inspectors found that the level of review to justify important changes to the reactor protection system testing was insufficient. Later review and improved administrative controis were added to ensure that reactor protection system jumpers were not left in place after system testing (Section E1.2).

10 5/29/1998 Negative IR 98009 NRC Engineering 2A Equipment problems with emergency diesel generators continued this period. The Unit 1 emergency diesel generator failed to start on demand during survei!!ar.ce testing. The cause of the failure was a malfunctioning autostart logic relay. Other problems were identified by the licensee and corrected prior to their affecting diesel operability. The causes of these failures were still under review by the licensee (Section E1.3).

11 5/29/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98009 NRC Engineering 4B A design change to replace the defective humidifier for the computer room was canceled in May 1995. No safety evaluation for this non-conformance with the UFSAR was performed, in violation of 10 CFR 50.59 requirements (Section E8.6).

12 5/29/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98009 NRC Engineering 4B Issues involving the need to revise instrument calculations identified in 1991 and 1992 were not resolved prior to 1998. Some TS related setpoints were determined to have a non-conservative margin of error.

The Vulnerability Assessment Team report tracking item for this issue was closed without apparent justification. This was a violation of 10 CFR ,

Part 50, Appendix B requirements. Five instances of exceeding TS i required setpoints for the scram discharge volume were identified by the licensee (Section E1.2).

Page 2 of 11

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ,

3/24/1999 Quad Cities Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP" . SALP Area =

• Engineering" Beginning Date = *12/21/1997* , Ending Date = *10/1/1998"

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 13 5/22/1998 VIO/SL-il Letter dated NRC Engineering 4A in response to the safe shutdown issue, Comed changed its safe 9/11/98 shutdown procedures to permit the use of the station blackout diesel generator in lieu of the emergency diesel generators without first performing a safety evaluation to confirm that the departure from the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) did not constitute an unreviewed safety question. The required safety evaluation was performed after substantial intervention by the NRC staff. When performed, the NRC staff identified that the safety evaluation was deficient because it did not consider all necessary manual actions required to operate the station blackout diesel generator. EA 98-175 14 5/22/1998 Licensing IR 98011 NRC Engineering 4B Although the technical weaknesses associated with the post-fire safe shutdown methodology showed that the licensee had not strictly met all the conditions specified in the CAL, the inspection team concluded that the licensee's SSA and post-fire safe shutdown operating procedures did provide a minimally acceptable interim methodology which, when augmented with the compensatory measures, provided sufficient confidence to permit the restart of both units. The inspection team considered such compensatory measures to be acceptable only as short-term corrective actions with an objective of the licensee achieving full compliance with App 9ndix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

15 5/22/1998 VIO/SL-Il Letter dated NRC Engineering 4C The violations in the Notice represent inadequacies in Comed's capability 9/11/98 to shutdown the Quad Cities facility following a postutated design basis fire. These violations indicated a broad lack of understanding on the part of the Quad Cities' staff for the importance of having analyzed, proceduralized, and validated means for achieving and maintaining safe  ;

shutdown following a design basis fire. EA 98-175 16 5/22/1998 Licensing Letter dated NRC Engineering SC Based on the NRC inspection activities identified above, the 5/22/98 compensatory actions you have committed to put in place before startup of Unit 2, discussions between your staff and the NRC during the bi-weekly public meetings, and our review of your docketed correspondence, I have determined that your actions pursuant to CAL Rill-98-001 are adequate to close the CAL Page 3 of 11

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 344 sis Quad Cities Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascanding): Search Column = *SALP* , SALP Area = *Engineeri.ig" . Beginning Date = *12f21/199" , Ending Date = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 17 5/18/1998 Negative IR 98011 GRC Ergineering 4B On May 18,1998, the inspection team retumed to the site and reviewed the results of the licens'.e's reassessment of the TB-Il fire area. The inspection team identified a number of deficiencies which appeared to confirm the team's earlier assessment that the licensee had not identified i all areas where it was not in compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. When the team identified these deficiencies to the licensee, the licensee committed to implement compensatory measures and maintain them until an adequate resolution to the technical issues could be attained.

18 5/8/1998 Negative IR 98011 NRC Engineering 4B During the week of May 4 - 8,1998, NRC conducted a special startup inspection to review the licensee's revised SSA and procodures.

However, after three days onsite, the inspection team leaders and Region 111 management had identified sufficient weaknesses to conclude that the conditions of the CAL were not entirely satisfied. Specifically, the analysis methodology and post-fire safe shutdown capability were found to not satisfy the technical requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, i Sections lit.G.1 and Ill.G.3. Specific weaknesses included: (1) inadequate evaluation of, and level of protection providt .or,125Vdc control power to 4 kV Switchgear; (2) inadequate and non-conservative assumptions regarding the number of spurious equipment operations that could occur during a ' fire; and (3) deficiencies in operating procedures developed tu implement the po3t-fire safe shutdown capability. Because of tb :se deficiencies, the inspection team was unable to conclude that the SSA was adequately validated.

19 4/29/1998 Licensing IR 98011 Licensee Engineering 4B On April 29,1998, the licensee formally docketed its response to the Appendix R confirmatory action letter and concluded that all conditions necessary to restart the plant had been met.

20 4/17/1998 Positive IR 98008 NRC Engineering 2B System engineers were experienced and displayed a good knowledge of their assigned systems. The inspectors determined that the maintenance ,

rule stairs efforts to improve system engineers' knowledge and opinion of the maintenance rule program were effective.

21 4/15/1998 Negative IR 97023 NRC Engineering 1C The licensee did not take adequate actions to evaluate multiple precursors ident!'ied since 1987 that indicated potential deficiencies in the safe shutdewn analysis and its implementing procedures (Section F3.1).

Page 4 of 11

" SSS PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Quad Cities Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP' . SALP Area = *Engineenng' , Beginning Date = *12/21/1997* , Ending Date = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE  ! SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 22 4/15/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 97023 NRC Engineering SC Inadequacies were identified in the licensee's corrective actions to resolve post-fire safe shutdown issues (Section F3.3): ,A violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion 11, was identified for failure to properly train or qualify personnel to implement manual manipulation of safety related breakers as compensatory actions.

23 4/15/1998 Negative IR 97023 NRC Engineering SC Inadequacies were identified in the licensee's corrective actions to resolve post-fire safe shutdown issues (Section F3 3): ,The operability review performed for exiting the 67-day administrative limiting condition of operation (LCO) was not according to any approved procedure or process. Several calculations referenced in the operabihty review contained assumptions or conclusions not applicable to plant-specific conditions.

24 4/15/1998 Weakness IR 97023 NRC Engineering SC Inadequacies were identified in the licensee's corrective actions to resolve post-fire safe shutdown issues (Section F3.3): ,The review and approval process for the safe shutdown procedures was weak since the procedures did not receive the cross discipline review to ascertain the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown condition.

25 4/15/1998 eel IR 97023 NRC Engineering SC Inadequacies were identified in the licensee's corrective actions to resolve post-fire safe shutdown issues (Section F3.3): ,An apparent violation was identified for the failure to perform a safety evaluation for the use of the station blackout diesel generators (SBO DG) in lieu of the FSAR described emergency diesel generators (EDG) until prompted by the NRC. In addition, the initial safety evaluation for this change was inadequate since the licensee subsequently identified that this change involved an unreviewed safety question.

26 4/15/1998 eel IR 97023 NRC Engineering SC An apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.48 was identified for certain fire areas containing safe shutdown related equipment. The equipment would be so damaged that safe shutdown conditions would not be achieved and maintained if a postulated fire occurred in these fire areas (Section F3.2).

Page 5 of 11

PLANT !SSUES MATRIX '24TS Quad Cities Search Sorted by Dote (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* SALP Area =

• Engineering * . Beginning Date = *12/21/1997* , Ending Date = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION  !

27 3/31/1998 Negative IR 98004 NRC Engineering 4B Although licensee efforts to investigate emergency diesei anerator time delay relay failurc2 were good, significant reliability proble.as still existed.

Engineering jusM:.ation for dedicating the relays as safety-related parts did not address vulnerabilities of the relays to vibration. Engineering justification for exceeding Updated Final Safety Analysis Report limits for the relay settings was not thorough (Section E3.1).

28 3/31/1998 Positive IR 98004 NRC Engineering 4B There were more preparations (meetings, drawing reviews and subsequent walkdowns) by the examiners for the Unit 1 pressure test than other similar pressure tests. The examiners identified leakage which required repair prior to unit startup (Section E5.1).

29 3/31/1998 Nagative IR 19004 NRC Engineering SC The licensee was not successfulin determining the root cause of the Unit 1 emergency diesel generator failure to start in January 1998.

Nonetheless, operations declared the Unit 1 emergency diesel generator operable. No specific actions were recommended to improve airstart system performance which was a suspected contributor to the start failure. Similar failures had occurred in the past (Section E1.1).

30 3/31/1998 Positive IR 98004 NRC Engineering SC The prompt investigation team identified the cause of the Unit 1 emergency diesel generator failure to run on March 17,1998, to be a fuse block failure. The licensee took proper corrective actions to address the problem (Section E1.3).

31 3/26/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98005 NRC Engineering 4C Adequate controls were in place to ensure that at-risk work packages developed in parallel with the design package wobid assure components would not be declared operable until comp!etion of all design documentation. Use of the at-risk process was not routine and work completed appeared well-coordinated between the work analyst, design and construction staff. While generation of at-risk work packages was allowed by the Work Request initiation procedure, at-risk svork was contrary to the Plant Design Change Process procedure. This was considered a procedural adherence violation.

Page 6 of 11

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 3' " 99 Quad Cities Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP' SALP Area =

• Engineering * , Beginning Date = *12/21/1997* ; Ending Data = *10/1/1998*

I y# DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES!i  ! DESCRIPTION 32 3/26/1998 Positive IR 98005 NRC Engineering 4C Allowances, with precautions, for development of emergency and immediate modifications were adequately accounted for in the Quad Cities OA Program and in corporate and station procedures. Use of these types of modifications was not common and, when used, adequate controls existed to ensure minimum prerequisites, limitaGons, and operational restrictions were considered, including completion of 10 CFR 50.59 screenings or safety evaluations.

33 3/4/1998 Licensing Letter dtd 4/1/98 NRC Engineering 4C At Quad Cities the submittals from Comed have been generally good.

They usually provided sufficient information for the staff to provide an evaluation. Several Requests for AdditionalInformation (RAl) were required on complex issues such as seismic qualification of electrical and mechanical equipment (unresolved safety issue A-46), IPEEE, and pressure locking and pressure binding of power operated gate valves (GL

• 95-07). Two issues needing closer attention by Comed include a responso needed for a RAI issued 05/28/97 for GL 95-07 and closure of R.G.1.97 issues. Inadequate review of two submittals was also noted where the " Summary Report of Changes, Tests and Experiments Completed" dated October 31,1997, included two safety evaluation descripti-  ; it incorrectly stahd there was a reduction in the margin of safety a . . "O2C15 Core Operating Limits Report, Revision 1" dated Novembe 4,1997, included propriety ir.rormation that was not requested to be held in confidence.

34 2/13/1998 Negative IR 97022 NRC Engineering 4A 3A The HPCI system electrical calculations reviewed were generally acceptable, but numerous examples of inattention to detail and weaknesses in the design verification review process affected the quality of the analyses. Also, for some of the calculations reviewed, the tracking of assumptions and of results which may impact other calculations or procedures was weak.

35 /13/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 97022 NRC Engineering 4A 3A The sample of HPCI system modifications reviewed was acceptable; however, a violation of design control was identified. Other minor issues raised by the inspectors were satisfactorily addressed by the licensee.

36 2/13/1998 IR 97022 NRC Engineering 4B The .aspectors reviewed commitments from Comed's March 28,1997, response to the NRC's request for information pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f). The inspectors concluded that eighteen 10 CFR 50.54(f) commitments were closed.

Pags 7 of 11

3/24/1999 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Quad Cities Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP' SALP Area =

• Engineering

• Beginning Date = *12/21/1997 . Ending Date = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY ! SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 37 2/13/1998 Misc IR 97022 NRC Engineering 4B Overall, the inservice testing and Technical Specification (iS) surveillance testing specifically related to the HPCI system were i satisfactory. Based on a recent trend of TS surveillance noncompliance and potential programmatic testing inadequacies, the licensee had undertaken a root cause investigation to evaluate the trend and recommend corrective actions to prevent recurrence. The effectiveness of these actions could not yet be determined.

38 2/13/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 97022 NRC Engineering 48 3A Contrary to procedural requirements, the 50.59 screenings for two temporary alterations failed to evaluate the physicalinstallation of all instrumentation installed by the alteration.

39 2/13/1998 Negative IR 97022 NRC Engineering 4C While overall, the HPCI system mechanical calculations reviewed were found to be acceptable, weaknesses were noted with nonconservative assumptions in an initial " white paper" analysis and with not consistently accounting for instrument inaccuracies.

40 2/13/1998 Positive IR 97022 NRC Engineering 4C The inspectors concluded that the HPCI room cooler was being adequately cleaned and inspected pursuant to GL 89-13 commitments.

Flow and differential pressure were trended and monitored for degradation and cleaning was scheduled on a regular basis.

41 2/13/1998 VIO/SL-IV 1R 97022 NRC Engineering 4C While the 50.59 safety evaluations reviewed were adequate with supportable conclusior's, weaknesses were identified with the overall 50.59 program. These weaknesses included poorly written safety evaluations, incomplete summary report submittals to the NRC, difficult to retrieve screenings, and incomplete corrective actions to identified deficiencies. The incomplete summary report submittals were considered a violation of procedural requirements. The Off-Site review group, however, was providing good assessments and comments.

42 2/13/1998 Positive IR 97022 NRC Engineering 4C Inaccurate figures and text in the UFSAR were identified but the inspectors also noted ongoing leensee efforts to improve UFSAR accuracy such as line by line reviews of the UFSAR design information and an initiative to ensure all facility changes had been incorporated into the UFSAR.

43 2/13/1998 IR 97022 NRC Engineering 4C The inspectors reviewed the actions taken by Quad Cities staff for eight Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) topics and concluded that the actions taken were sufficient for closure of these items. NRC review of nine remaining SEP items was ongoing.

Page 8 of 11

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 3'VS9S Quad Cities Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Colurnn = *SALP" , SALP Area = *Engineenng" . Beginning Date = *12f21/1997" , Ending Date = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE 10 BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 44 2/13/1998 Weakness IR 97022 NRC Engineering 4C The inspectors noted that important calculations that form part of the Qucd Cities HPCI design basis were not easily retrievable, or did not exist. For example, at the inspection onset, the licensee lacked a calculation to ensure that the HPCI design basis flow of 5000 gpm could be delivered against reactor pressure to support the acceptance criteria in the Technical Specification surveillance procedure. The inspectors also noted that the design basis for various safety related systems was not clearly established. However, the licensee had initiated actions such as the Design Basis Initiative UFSAR review and was planning generation of approximately 15 missing analyses.

45 2/13/1998 Weakness IR 97022 NRC Engineering 4C Quad Cities design basis information weaknesses were also ex'libited with numerous errors identified with the HPCI system design basis document (DBD). However, the licensee was aware of the DBD shortcomings and had designated the DBDs as "information only" pending completion of a validation process.

46 2/10/1998 LER LER 254/98009 Licensee Engineering 4A Method of daily temperature verification of standby liquid control system pump suction heat tracing operablility using installed temperature switches did not account for calibration tolerance which allowed use of temperature switch settings that did not support the TS requirement resulting in inability to ensure suctions line temperature was above the minimum allowed value.

47 2/6/1998 Negative IR 97028 NRC Engineering 4B The inspectors concluded there were instances where engineering evaluations were not completed or were not of sufficient quality in areas such as snubber requirements, EDG ventilation, and electromatic relief valve vibration issues.

48 2/6/1998 Positive IR 97028 NRC Engineering 4B However, the inspectors noted instances where engineering support of maintenance activities for the radwaste system was good and some aspects of troubles!iooting for an electromatic relief valve failure were good.

49 2/6/1998 Negative IR 97028 NRC Engineering 4B 3A The inspectors were concerned with the quality of system engineering walkdowns which could result in conditions adverse to quality not being identified.

50 2/6/1998 Negative IR 97028 NRC Engineering 4B 4C The lack of follow-through on long-term EDG improvement plans was a weakness made more significant by recent EDG failures.

Page 9 of 11

/24/1999 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX .

Quad Cities Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP" ; SALP Area =

• Engineering" . Beginning Date = *12f21/1997* Ending Date = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 51 1/28/1998 LER LER 254/98006 Licensee Engineering - 4A Reactor building post loss of coolaat accident temperatures are higher than values used for the environmental qualification of electrical equipment due to unvalidated engineering judgment, the cause of which cannot be determined.

52 1/16/1998 Weakness IR 989011 NRC Engineering 4B To confirm the actions to be taken by the licensee to resolve Appendix R issues at Quad Cities, NRC issued a confirmatory action letter (CAL) to Comed en January 16,1998. As described in the CAL, the licensee committed to take several actions prior to restarting the plant, including:

1. Revision and Validation of the Safe Shutdown Analysis, 2.

Development of Safe Shutdown Procedures, and 3. Identification and Resolution of Appendix R Discrepancies 53 1/15/1998 LER LER 254/98007 Licensee Engineering 4A The design basis of the Quad Cities station reactor building superstructure is not in literal conformance with UFSAR description of class loading combinations. This is due to the fact that the FSAR, when originally written, lacked sufficient detail in description of class I loading combinations for addressing infrequent loading conditions (such as the crane) concurrent with a seismic event.

54 12/30/1997 LER LER 254/98005 Licensee Engineering 3B 3C Failure to complete periodic visual inspections for reactor coolant sources outside primary containment, es required by TS were due to a programmatic breakdown in scheduling and tracking of system inspections and ineffective program oversight.

Page 10 of 11

+

3/24/1999 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TA!LE LABELS - 's

1. A counter number used for NRC intemal editing.

The date of the event or significant issue. For those items that have a clear date of occurrence use the actual date. If the actual date is not known, use the date DATE the issue was identified. For issues that do not have an actual date or a date of identification, use the LER or inspection report date.

TYPE The categorization of the issue - see the TYPE ITEM CODE table.

SOURCE The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.

ID BY Identification of who discovered the issue - see table.

SALP SALP Functional Area Codes - Engineering, Maintenance Operations, Plant Support and All/ Multiple (i.e., more than one SALP area affected).

SMM CODES Senior Manager Meeting Codes - see table.

DESCRIPTION Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.

TYPE ITEM CODE NOTES SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING CODES DEV Deviation from NRC Requirements Eels are apparent violations of NRC 1 Operational Performance:

ED Escalated Discretion - No Civil Penalty requirements that are being considered for A - Normal eel' Escalated Enforcement issue - Waiting Final NFC Action escalated enforcement action in accordance B - During Transients with the " Genera! Statement of Policy and C - Programs and Processes LER- License Event Report to the NRC Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action Licin:Ing Licensing issue from NRR (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. 2 Material Condition:

Mire Miscellaneous (Emergency Preparedness Finding. etc.) However, the NRC has not reached its final A - Equipment Condition NCV Non-Cited Violation enforcement decision on the issues B - Programs and Processes Negative Individual Poor Licensee Performance identified by the Eels and the PIM entries 3 Human Performance:

P:sitive Individual Good Licensee Performance may be modified when the final decisions A - Work Performance am mah Mom h E makes its B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities Strrngth Overall Strong Licensee Performance enforcement decision, the l,censee i will be Unresolved Inspection item C - Work Environment URl" provided with an opportunity to either VIO/SL-1 Notice of Violation - Severity Level I (1) resp,.ad to the apparent violation or 4 Engineering / Design:

VIO/SL-il Notice of Violation - Severity Level II (2) request a predecisional enforcement A - Design VIO/SL-ill Notice of Violation - Severity Level lli conference. B - Engineering Support Notice of Violation - Severity Level IV " URIs are unresolved items about which C - Programs and Processes VIO/SL-IV W m.kness Overall Weak Licensee Performance wh e e q o sa 5 Problem entification and Resolution:

acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. However, B - AnalYsis ID BY C - Resolution the NRC has not reached its final Licnnsee The licensed utility conclusions on the issues, and the PIM NRC The Nuclear Regulatory Commission entries may be modified when the final Self-R .vealed Identification by an event (e.g., equipment breakdown) conclusions are made.

Other Identification unknown Page 11 of 11

/a4/1999 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ,

Quad Cities Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* , SALP Area = " Plant Support" Beginning Date = *12f21/1997* , Ending Date = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 1 8/28/1998 Strength IR 98014 NRC Plant 1C Overall performance during the 1998 Emergency Preparedness exercise Support was effective and demonstrated that your emergency plan implementation activities met regulatory requirements. The performance of the staffs in the Control Room Simulator, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility contributed to safety by taking appropriate actions to mitigate the simulated accident and protect the public. They met the exercise objectives in an acceptable manner while complying with emergency plan and regulatory requirements. Staff and management effectively completed self-critiques.

2 8/1 #1998 Positive IR 98016 NRC Plant 1C Air sampling was conducted consistent with NRC regulations and industry Support practice. Air samplers were well maintained and workers were observed correctly performing air sampling activities. However, there were several minor examples identiiied where procedural guidance needed additional clarification and where mistakes in air sampling records had not been identified through licensee supervisory reviews (Section R1.3).

3 8/14/1998 Positive IR 98016 NRC Plant 1C in-vitro and in-vivo analyses were being performed properly and were Support consistent with industry standards. However, the inspectors questioned whether a decrease in the frequency of quality control checks for the whole body counter would provide sufficient OC data to obtain an accurate indication of detector performance. This was being evaluated by the licensee (Section R1.2).

4 8/14/1998 Positive IR 98016 NRC Plant 1C The routine contamination and dose rate survey program was effectively Support implemented. Surveys were performed as required and appropriately documented. A technician observed during the inspection was knowledgeable of the procedure and the area to be surveyed, and demonstrated good servey techniques (Section R1.4).

5 8/14/1998 Positive IR 98016 NRC Plant 1C The inspectors concluded that the station was effectively p'anning and Support coordinating work to reduce source term and; therefore, overall station dose (Section R1.5).

6 8/14/1998 Positive IR 98016 NRC Plant 1C High and locked high radiation areas were well controlled and were Support maintained in good condition with only minor housekeeping probleas observed. Workers were familiar with access control requirements and RP staff was observed reinforcing these expectations in work areas (Section R2.1).

Page 1 of 7

3/24/1999 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX .

Quad Cities Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP* . SALP Area =

• Plant Support" Beginrung Date = *12/21/1997* . Ending Date = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION y 7 8/14/1998 Negative IR 98016 NRC Plant 1C Radiological postings and container labeling were well maintained, and Support appropriately informed workers of current plant radiological conditions.

Overall, housekeeping was good, except for the laiandry-tool decon building maintenance decontamination area. In addition, drain hoses from heat exhangers in the Unit 2 reactor building were not property secured and were inconsistently labeled. (Section R2.2).

8 8/14/1998 Positive IR 98016 NRC Plant 1C Radiological controls for the Units 1 and 2 spent fuel pool work were Support effective. The As-Low-As-is-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA) plan appropriately addressed past lessons-learned, potentially high radiological conditions and included reasonable contingency plans. The subsequent shipping of the material removed from the pool was also well conducted (Section R4.1).

9 8/14/1998 Positive IR 98016 NRC Piant 1C Radiological controls implemented for the demineralizer filter element Support replacement were effective. The radiation work permit appropriately addressed radiological concerns and included ALARA pre-job briefing notes. Radiation protection technicians and workers demonstrated good communication and radiation worker practices (Section R4.2).

10 8/14/1998 Positive IR 98016 NRC Plant 1C The licensee implemented good ALARA controls for the movement of IR 98016 Support highly activated components in the spent fuel pool and took prompt and effective actions after higher than expected dose rates were encountered during the job (Section R4.3).

11 8/14/1998 Strength IR 98016 NRC Plant 1C Overall, the external exposure control program was being effectively Support implemented in accordarme with station procedures and regulatory requirements. Radiation Protection (RP) staff were knowledgeable of procedures and processes. However, several minor defidencies regarding procedure adherence and record keeping were identified.

These deficiencies were being evaluated and corrected by RP management (Section R1.1).

12 7/16/1998 Negative IR 98012 NRC Plant 1C The inspectors identified numerous administrative problems associated Support with the fire protection compensatory actions but concluded that the regulatory commitments were satisfied. The inspectors were concemed with the quality of documentation supporting required fire watch tours and the quality of correspondence in the May 22,1998, letter to the NRC (Section F2.1).

Page 2 of 7

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX /2aiq9 Quad Cities S5 arch Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Searc5 Column = "SALP" , SALP Area = " Plant Support" , Beginning Date = *12/21/1997* , Ending Data = *10/1/1998"

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 13 5/29/1998 Positive IR 98009 NRC Plant 1C Good radiological controls were noted during the perfcrmance of Support traversing incore probe activities. These controls remained in place to provide persoanel protection from radiological hazards, even though the out-of-service program protections were not left in place (Section M1.4).

14 5/29/1998 Positive IR 98009 Licensee Plant 3B Chemistry and Radiation Protection personnel responded conservatively Support e . .iuickly to a release of radioactive xenon-133 in the chemistry laboratory. No adverse personnel or environmental hazards resulted from this release (Section R4.1).

15 4/17/1998 Positive IR 98010 NRC Plant 1C The 1996 and 1997 effluent reports were generated in accordance with Support the Offsite Do'se Calculation Manual, with the total activity released well below applicable regulatory limits. The reports also appropriately documented any abnormal releases (Section R1.4).

16 4/17/1998 Positive IR 98010 NRC Plant 1C The area radiation monitors (ARM) and continuous air monitors (CAM)

Support calibration, testing, and maintenance program was well implemented.

However, the ARM trending and component evaluation process, and radiation protection's oversight of changes to the ARM procedures was in need of improvement (Section R2.1).

17 4/17/1998 Strength IR 98010 NRC Plant 1C The liquid and gaseous effluent monitoring programs were effectively Support implemented. Effluent monitor operability was good, with calibrations and checks performed in accordance sith procedures and at the required frequencies. Effluent release data indicated that releases were well below regulatory limits (Section R1.3).

18 4/17/1998 Naitlve IR98010 NRC Plant 1C The as-low-as-is-reasonably-achievable (ALARA) plan for the Unit 1 Support bottom vessel drain line repair was detailed, and included evaluations of the additional dose as work progressed. The radiation work plan requirements incorporated ALARA plan contingencies and special instructions. The total dose for the bottom vessel drain line repair appropriately increased due to an expanded scope of work to include 5

expanding the length of time the freeze seat remained in place, and problems with installing and welding the replacement pipe section (Section R1.2).

Page 3 of 7

~ .

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX '3"288' Quad Cities Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* . SALP Area =

• Plant Support" . Beginning Date = *12f21/1997* ; Ending Date = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 19 4/17/1998 Positive IR 98010 NRC Plant 1C Radiological postings of equipment and facilities, and labeling of ,

Support containers were in accordance with procedures. Housekeeping was considered good. Minor inspector identified posting and housekeeping discrepancies were promptly corrected by radiation protection personnel (Section R2.3).

20 4/17/1998 Positive IR 98010 NRC Plant 2B Required surveillances and tests of the engineered safety feature filtration Support systems were well implemented and performed in accordance with procedures. The test results indicated that the Technical Specification acceptance criteria were met. The material condition of the filter systems was good (Section R2.2).

21 4/17/1998 NCV IR 98010 Licensee Plant 3B Radiation protection's response to an individual who ignored ED alarms Support was considered good and corrective actions were appropriate. One Non-Cited Violation of NRC requirements was identified (Section R1.1).

22 4/17/1998 Positive IR 98010 NRC Plant SA Audits of the chemistry and RP programs were sufficiently detailed to Support identify deficiencies and areas where improvements could be made.

Corrective actions for the chemistry audit had been effectively implemented. Radiation protection was developing a corrective action plan for the deficiencies identified in the recently completed RP audit '

(Section R7.1).

23 4/3/1998 Negative IR 98007 NRC Plant 1C Management controls were not effective on three occasions to ensure Support that licensee corrective actions were properly implemented. On two occasions maintenance management failed to recognize that corrective action was not implemented. On one occasion security management's corrective action was not totally effective in preventing a similar problem.

(Section S7) 24 4/3/1998 Positive IR 98007 NRC Plant 1C Security and plant personnel demonstrated an effective level of Support awareness and knowledge of security requirements. (Section S4) 25 4/3/1998 Positive IR 98007 NRC Plant 1C Security procedures and required documentation were well written and Support accurately described the required task or event. (Section S3) 26 4/3/1998 Positive IR 98007 NRC Plant 1C The vehicle barrier system and protected area detection aids were Support effective in meeting their designed functions. (Section S2)

Page 4 of 7

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 3/24fpk9 Quad Cities Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP* , SALP Area = "Piant Suppor*' , Beginning Data = *12/21/199T . Ending Date = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 27 4/3/1998 Positive IR 98007 NRC Plant 1C Security alarm station activities were conducted in an effective manner.

Support Access functions related to personnel and package control were conducted in accordance with regulatory requirements. (Section S1) 28 3/31/1998 Positive IR 98004 NRC Plant 1C Repair of the Unit 1 reactor water cleanup drain line and disassembly of Support the Unit 1 "A" residual heat removal pump were two maintenance activities performed in higher radiation areas. The use of as low as reasonably achievable initiatives were effective for the residual heat removal pump repairs (Section M1.2).

29 3/31/1998 Positive IR 98004 NRC Plant 2B The Unit 1 scram discharge he; ders were recently hydro!ased to reduce Support dose rates for hydraulic control unit work and to reduce dose rates in the general area (Section R1.2).

30 3/31/1998 Negative IR 98004 NRC Plant 2B The licensee was not aggressive in ensuring that radiation and Support contamination levels did not impact examiners and were kept as low as reasonably achievable in the Unit 1 drywell (Section Rt.1).

31 2/5/1998 Weakness IR 98002 NRC Plant 1C 01P01 outage ALARA plans and radiation work permits were Support comprehensive and observed radiation worker practices were good.

However, an inconsistency was identified in that ALARA initiatives were not always listed in RWPs.

32 2/5/1998 Positive IR 98002 NRC Plant 2A The licensee was taking good corrective actions to bring the radioactive Support waste systems back to their normal flow paths and to reduce the number of outstanding work requests.

33 2/5/1998 Positive IR 98002 NRC Plant 3A The radiological posting of facilities and equipment was good.

Support Radiological housekeeping was good, except in the Laundry-Tool Decon building maintenance shop. Labeling of containers was generally effective, with inspector identified deficiencies promptly corrected by radiation protection personnel.

34 2/5/1998 NCV IR 98002 NRC Plant 3A A Non-Cited Violation was identified for allowing materials outside the Support radiologically posted area (RPA) with direct radiation measurements above background levels. The Licensee initiated prompt and extensive corrective actions once the contaminated material was identified outside the RPA.

Page 5 of 7

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9 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 3*'PSS Quad Cities Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ay anding): Search Column = *SALP* : SALP Area = " Plant Support' Beginrung Date = *12/21/1997 . Erdng Date = *10/1/1998*

1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 35 2/5/1998 PositF e IR 98002 NRC Plant 3C Radiological controls for tools and equipment used in RPAs were Support generally effective.. Routine tool crib and storage area surveys performed by the licensee and independent surveys performed by the inspectors during the inspection confirmed the effectiveness of the radiological ce trols for tools and equipment. A bar coding system was being developed M improve the accountability and tracking of tools.

36 2/5/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98002 NRC Plant 3C One violation was identified for face shields in contaminated areas that Support were not issued by the radiation protection department. In addition, the face shields were left on the floor of contaminated areas, which could lead to the contamination of individuals using those face shields.

37 2/5/1998 Negative IR 98002 NRC Plant 5A The calibration and maintenance program for the portable instruments Support reviewed was sufficiently implemented. Several program weaknesses were identified by the inspectors, including poor response of some instruments at the lower end of their capability and the lack of a dedicated calibration crew.

Page 6 of 7

3/a4/1999 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLE LABELS e. '4 1 A counter number used for PGC intemal editing.

The date of the event or significant issue. For those items that have a clear date of occurrence use the actual date. If the actual date is not known, use the date DATE the issue was identified. For issues that do not have an actual date or a date of identification, use the LER or inspection report date.

TYPE The categorization of the issue - see the TYPE ITEM CODE table.

SOURCE The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.

l ID BY Identification of who discovered the issue - see table.

SALP SALP Functional Area Codes - Engineering, Maintenance, Operations, Plant Support and * " Multiple (i.e., more than one SALP area affected).

SMM CODES Senior Manager Meeting Codes - see tab!e.

DESCRIPTION Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.

TYPE ITEM CODE NOTES SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING CODES DEV Deviation from NRC Requirements Eels are apparent violations of NRC 1 Operational Performance:  ;

A - Normal ED Escalated Discretion - No Civil Penalty requirements that are being considered for Escalated Enforcement issue - Waiting Final NRC Action escalated enforcement action in accordance B - During Transients eel

• with the " General Statement of Policy arjd C - Programs and Processes LER License Event Report to the NRC Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action Lic;nt ing Licens.ing issue from NRR (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. 2 Material Condition:

Mire Miscellaneous (Emergency Preparedness Finding. etc.) However, the NRC has not reached its final A - Equipment Condition Non-Cited Violation enforcement decision on the issues B - Programs and Processes NCV Negative Individual Poor Licensee Performance identified by the Eels and the PIM entries 3 Human Performance:

may be modified when the final decisions A - Work Performance Pr:itive Individual Good Licensee Performance .

are made. Before the NRC makes its B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities l

Strength Overall Strong Licensee Performance enforcement decision, the licensee will be C - Work Environment URI, Unresolved Inspection item provided with an opportunity to either VIO/SL-1 Notice of Violation - Severity Level I (1) respond to the apparent violation or 4 Engineering / Design: ,

VIO/SL-Il Notice of Violation - Severity Level ll (2) request a predecisional enforcement A - Design Notice of Violation - Severity Level lit conference. B - Engineering Support VIO/SL-lil

• • URIs are unresolved items about which C - Programs and Processes VIO/SL-IV Notice of Violation - Severity Level IV

• 0 Inf ion i required i determine p Watkness Overail Weak Licensee Performance e acceptable item, a deviation, a A - Identification nonconformance, or a violation. However, B- Analysis ID BY C - Resolution the NRC has not reached its final Licensee The licensed utility conclusions on the issues, and the PIM NRC The Nuclear Regulatory Commission entries may be modified when the final ,

conclusions are made.

t Self-Rsvealed Identification by an event (e.g., equipment breakdown)

Other Identification unknown Page 7 of 7

o, a, o

QUAD CITIES INSPECTION / ACTIVITY PL_AN IP - Inspection Procedure Tl - Temporary instruction Core - Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory all plants)

Regional Initiative - Discretionary inspections NUMBER OF TYPE OF INSPECTION NRC INSPECTION /

/ TITLE / PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS / PLANNED DATES ACTIVITY-ACTIVITY INDIVIDUALS COMMENTS IP62700 Maintenance and Breakers 3 March 8 - 12,1999 Regional Initiative @

IP83750 Transportation, Radiation 1-2 March 8 - 12,1999 Core IP86750 Protection, Solid Radwaste Tl2515/139 Testing of Safety Related Logic 3 April 19 - 23,1999 Regional Initiative @

Circuits IP84750 Effluents, Radiation Monitors, 1-2 June 7 - 11,1999 Core Control Room Habitability IP71707 Configuration Management 2 June 28 - July 16,1999 Regional Initiative @@

IP81700 Security (SEC1) 1 July 12 - 16,1999 Core IP71001 Licensed Operator Requalification 2 July 19 - 23,1999 Core IP81110 Security OSRE 1 October, 18 -22,1999 Special Notes:

@ Followup on previously identified issues.

@ Followup for Generic Letter 96-01.

@ Combined inspection at Quad Cities, Byron, and Braidwood

. _ -___-________ _ _____ ___-____-__ __-. -__ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . __ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - - _ _