ML20206H883

Forwards Evaluation Rept Re Onsite Review of Licensee Simulation Facility Conducted During Wk of 880829.Simulation Facility Found to Be in Full Compliance W/Regulations

ML20206H883
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	11/17/1988
From:	Sears P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Randazza J Maine Yankee
References
TAC-67477, NUDOCS 8811230421
Download: ML20206H883 (11)

Text

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g g-November 17, 1988 Docket No. 50-309

.I Mr.~ J. B.-Randazza- >

President.

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company I 83 Edison Drive Augusta, Maine 04336

SUBJECT:

SIMULATION FACILITY INSPECTION REPORT (TAC NO. 67477)

Dear Mr. Randazza:

During the week of August 29. 1988, the NRC conducted an on-sito review of your company's simulation facility which had been certified by you on April 10, 1987 to be in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 55.45 of the Commission's regislations. As a result of our evaluation, the simulation facility was found to be in full compliance with these regulations.

The enclosed Evaluation Report provides the details of the evaluation that was conducted. Prior to arriving on-site to conduct the evaluation, the. staff reviewed the materials which were submitted with your certification, and evaluated information which your company provided in response to staff questions raised as a result of your initial submission.

Should you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me.

Sincerely, Original Signed by; Patrick M. Sears, Project Manager Project Directorate I-3 Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

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John B. Randazza, President Mr. P. L. Anderson, Project Manager Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Yankee Atomic Electric Company 83 Edison Drive 1671 Worchester Road Augusta, Maine 04336 Framingham, Massachusetts 07101 Mr. Charles B. Brinkman Mr. G. D. Whittier, Manager Manager - Washington Nuclear Nuclear Engineering and Licensing Operations Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Combustion Engineering, Inc. 83 Edison Drive 7910 Woodmont Avenue Augusta, Maine 04336 Bethesda, Maryland 20814 John A. Ritsher Esquire Ropes & Gray 225 Franklin Street Boston, Massachusetts 02110 State Planning Officer Executive Department 189 State Street Augusta, Maine 04330 Dr. E. T. Boulette, Plant Manager Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company P. O. Box 408 Wiscasset, Maine 04578 Regional Administrator, Region i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 First Selectman of Wiscasset Municipal Building U.S. Route 1 Wiscasset, Maine 04578 Mr. Cornelius F. Holden Resident Inspector c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission P. O. Box E Wiscasset, Maine 04578

gyg EVALUATION REPORT I. Review Team J. Wachtel, NRC Team Leader '

R. Eaton, NRC. License Examiner C. Plott, Micro Analysis and Design, Human Factors Specialist T. James, Southern California Edison, Peer Advisor, Operations Specialist L. Wiens, NRC, Observer II. Entrance Meeting Upon arrival at the simulation facility site, an entrance meeting was held to discuss the purpose of the evaluation, the time schedule, the personnel involved, and their roles. The following personnel attended this entrance meeting.

Facility Licensee Representatives M. Swartz, Supervisor. Simulator Group A. Shean, Director of Training M. Evringha:n, Head Operations Training R. Crosby, Licensing

8. Ball, Simulator Operations Coordinator K. Love, Simulator Technical Assistant NRC Representatives and Consultants J. Wachtel, Team Leader C. Plott, Consultant T. James. Peer Advisor Ill. Exit Meeting At the conclusion of the site visit, the NRC review team and consultants met with the facility licensee's training and simulation facility support staffs. The following personnel attended this exit meeting.

Facility Licensee Representatives M. Swartz, Simulator Supervisor B. Ball, Simulator Operations Coordinator M. Evringham, Head of Operations Training R. Emerick, 180 Technician K. Pei, Simulation Engineer (Consultant)

R. Crosby, Licensing Engineer A. Shean, Director of Training K. Love, Simulator Technical Assistant T. Suttner, Industrial Simulation Corporation (Consultant) 1 c

NRC Representatives J. Wachtel Team Leader R. Eaton, Licensing Examiner C. Plott, Human Factors Specialist (Consultant)

T. James, Peer Advisor and Operations Specialist (Consultant)

L. Wiens, Observer The following items were discussed during the exit meeting on September 1, 1988:

A. Appreciation was expressed to the entire Maine Yankee (MY) staff for their hospitality during the course of the visit. The NRC team had excellent working conditions, access to all needed personnel and technical materials, and imediate responses from the facility licensee's staff for all questions asked.

B. Because of the excellent support described above, and because of the obvious degree of preparation undertakan by the utility, the NRC was able to complete its task in a full day less than had been planned.

J. With the minor exception of the items discussed in Section 5 of this report, "Findings," the NRC found the simulation facility to be fully acceptable for the conduct of operating tests in accordance with 10 CFR 55 of the comission's regulations.

D. The guidance published in NUREG-1258, was used to conduct this inspection, and proved to be an excellent tool Certain lessons were learned, and these will be employed in future evaluations.

E. An i custry-based peer advisor was employed as a consultant to the NRC review team, with the prior permission of the facility licensee. The peer advisor proved to be an integral and highly successful component of the evaluation, and the NRC expects to continue to utilize the services of such individuals on future evaluations.

IV. Evaluation Sumary The evaluation, conducted in accordance with the guidance in NUREG-1258, contisted of four major areas, as identified below.

A. Perfonnance Testing Eleven performance tests were selected to be run on the simulation facility. As ditcussed in NUREG-1258, these tests were chosen to represent a balance of normal, abnormal, and emergency events in approximately the same proportions as such events might be used in the conduct of an operator licensing examinatica. Tests were selected to be operationally oriented to the greatest extent possible. Abnormal and emergency events were chosen to reflect actual operating experience at the plant wherever possible.

Documented events which have occurred at similar plants, and events 2

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with broad industry implications were also used, as applicable. The tests conducted at MY consisted of the following categories and events. The note in parenthesis after a test, where shown, identifies the source for the test, or the reason why it was chosen. More detailed descriptions of the purpose for, and basis of, each performance test, are provided as the Attachment to this Enclosure.

1. Normal Operating Events a) Main turbine latching and roll-up to 1800 RPM, phasing generator, synchronization to the grid, and matching reactor power, b) Power change using direct boron addition.

2. Abnonnal Events a) Dropped CEA (Maine Yankee Unusual Occurrence Report No.

29-88).

b) Turbine Valve Control Malfunction (Maine Yankee LER No.

85-19).

c) Heater Drain Pump Trip (Maine Yankee LER No.88-001).

d) Excess Flow Check Valve Closure (Maine Yankee LER No.86-003).

e) Reactor Coolant Pump Trip (Maine Yankee aart-Up Test Data) f) Loss of Control Air (Shearon Harris LER No.87-041).

3. Emergency Events a) Steam Generator Tube Rupture (North Anna LER No.87-017).

b) Loss of Off-Site Power with Natural Circulation (Maine Yankee LER No.88-006).

One additional test was performed to evaluate the limitations of the simulation facility to fully model an event resulting in the formation of a head bubble. This test was based on a natural circulation cooldown event with upper head voids event which occurred at the St. Lucie facility on June 11, 1980.

That event led to a multi-plant action (MPA-B-66) affecting all PWR's.

Data was gathered for all tests using the installed simulation facility strip chart recorders for continuous data, and the simulat'on facility corrputer to record various identified variables, witn data collected at predetermined discrete intervals. Data was compared against the source data available from LERs, other plant and industry rt 'Ited events, and startup test data, as applicable. Data was e.nalyzed for the similarity of trends of like parameters, or for expected trends, if comparative data was not available. In all cases, the criteria for data analysis was as set forth in ANSI /ANS 3.5, 1985.

B. Physical Fidelity Evaluation The segment of the inspection concerned with physical fidelity was performed in four parts: a general human factors assessment of the simulation facility in accordance with the guidance given in ANSI /ANS 3.5, 1985 and in NUREG-1258; a review and assessment of those differences between the plant and the simulation facility which had been identified by the facility licensee in its certification; a review of a representative sample of simulation facility control board components to determine the degree of fidelity to the corresponding' control room components; and interviews with MY operators for the purpose of understanding how their concerns for physical and functional fidelity prc' tems were dealt with by the facility licensee.

The general review included an evaluation of the ambient environment; coding schemes; communications systems; and computer system. Certain differences in lighting and in ambient noise between the simulation facility and the reference plant's control room had previously been identified by the facility licensee. These differences had either been justified for acceptance through the facility licensee's configuration management system, or were currently in the review process.

A review of the differences between the simulation facility aad the plant's control room which had been identified by the facility licensee found that satisfactory justification existed for maintaining these differences.

In accordance with the guidance in NUREG-1258, the review team evaluated a sample of approximately 100 components, which were selected from those control boards, displays and controls which were to be used in the conduct of the performance tests. The following components were reviewed:

Condensate pressure and main steam pressure indications.

EHC indication and control.

Feedwater control system indication and control.

Steam generator recorders.

Pressurizer pressure indication and control.

Boration indication and control.

THot and TCold indication and control.

Nuclear power indication.

Safety injection indication and control.

First-out annunciator panel.

Pressurizer annunciator panel.

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The facility licensee had previously conducted a survey of its operators to obtain feedback on simulation facility fidelity discrepancies from this perspective. Although not a requirement of the evaluation, the facility licensee voluntarily provided this survey and its results to the review team. This document was reviewed, and a cross-section of individual items was verified. At the request of the review team, the facility licensee made available four licensed operators for interviews. The operators were very positive about the capabilities of the simulation facility, and of management's responsiveness to their requests and suggestions for improvement. The operators reported that all instances of differences between the simulation facility and the reference plant that they had pointed out in this survey had either been satisfactorily resolved, had been rejected for valid reasons with an explanation provided, or were currently undergoing evaluation. The most significant concern expressed by the operators interviewed related to the lack of certain audible cues in the simulation facility which were present in the plant's control room.

Discussions with the facility licensee indicated that these concerns are presently being reviewed.

C. Control Capabilities The capability of the simulation facility to freeze the simulation, and to alert the instructor when the simulation progresses outside the known modeling limits, was verified to function as required.

D. Configuration Management This phase of the evaluation consisted of a review of the facility licensee's configuration management system, with a spot check of the status of specific items. In addition, items identified in examiners' simulation facility fidelity reports were verified to have been included in the system. Facility documents were reviewed to verify that changes in the plant, or discrepancies identified in the simulation facility, were assessed and dispositioned within the required time as specified in ANSI /ANS 3.5, 1985, as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.149. One item, a change to the RCP heat-up rate, was found to be out of compliance with the guidance in the standard, in that it had been carried in the tracking system as an open item for a longer time than permitted. The facility licensee stated that it was investigating an upc 2de to the entire RCS system model which would include a resolution of this isue. The review team determined that this differences would have little or no impact on the ability to conduct a licensing examination, and it therefore found the facility licensee's actions to be acceptable.

Several items which had been identified in examiner simulation facility fidelity reports were reviewed against the configuration management system. All such items had been identified by the facility licensee, and all had been corrected.

V. Findings The Maine Yankee simulation facility was found to be acceptable for use in the conduct of operator licensing examinations, and to meet the reouirements for certification set forth in 10 CFR 55.45(b) of the Commission's regulations. Justification for exceptions to ANSI /ANS 3.5, 1985 were found to be acceptable.

As a result of the physical fidelity review, one ite'n was found discrepant. This was a missing label on the sixth heat sensor point on the condenser mimic. Additionally, this item was shown in the facility licensee's tracking system as a discrepancy that had been resolved and closed. As a result of this finding, the facility licensee has reopened this item in its configuration management system.

A change to the RCP heat-up rate had been in an open status in the facility licensee's configuration management system for a longer period of time than permitted by the standard. It was determined that this open item had little or no impact on an examiner's ability to conduct a licensing examination. This item was therefore resolved.

As a result of perfomance testing, it was detemined that the simulation facility was unable to model a reactor head steam void during natural circulation / low pressure conditions. This modeling limitation was detemined to be neither a hindrance to the use of the applicable emergency operating procedures (EOPs), nor a constraint to the conduct of operator licensing examinations. Further, it was confimed that there is a provision to alert the simulation freility operator / instructor when a testing or training scenario has progressed beyond the model limits of acceptability Therefore, this item was resolved with no action by the facility licensee required. An analysis of the training value resulting from improving the simulation facility's ability to model this event, would be at the discretion of the facility licensee.

VI. Conclusions There are no follow-up actions required by Ragion I, Headquarters or the Licensee.

o . .

ATJmER

. SELECTION OF PERFORNANCE TEST 3 AT MAINE YANKEE The following is a list of performance tests cor, ducted during the Maine Yankee Simulation Facility Evaluation. Several factors were used to select the performance tests. Listed below are the performance tests and the reasons the tests were selected.

1. Turbine roll, generator phasing, and matching reactor power.

This test used Normal Operating Procedure 1-3.

a. This test demonstrated the ability to utilize nnraal plant operating procedures on the simulator,

b. The turbine, reactor control systems, steam dumo and main generator models were tested,

c. This test provided an indication of the simulator stability at low power levels,

d. The plant procedures provided a data base for the expected response.

2. Steam generator tube rupture: North Anna Event

a. This event has occurred at several operating plants and is one of the few emergency events for which actual plant data is available,

b. Data from the North Anna event was available and the response of the two plants to the event would be similar.

c. The event provides a good test of the RCS thermal-hydraulics and also test the following models: Reactor Coolant System, Steam Generator, Pressurizer, Radiation Monitoring System and Em6rgency Core Cooling System.

3. Loss of Control Air: Shearon Harris LER 87-41

a. This event occurred at a similar plant and in most cases the response would be different even for similar plants. The failuro mode of equipment at Maine Yankee was veriflod to be the same for the equipment listed in the Shearon Harris LER Therefore the LER provided good data for the performance test.

.. Perforcanco Test (2)

b. The event tested individual component response to control air system failure in vt.rious systems. It also tested the failure mode and the dynamic system response to these failures.

4. Loss of Off-Site Power / Natural Circulation

a. This event occurred at Maine Yankee just several weeks prior to the audit and provided very good data.

This test was originally identified from Arkansas Nuclear 2 LER 1980-042, but the Maine Yankee event provided plant spesific data.

b. The event tested the power supplies to various equipment and the response of tlie emergency diesels,

c. The -bility to use the plant emergency procedure for Loss of Off-Site Power was verified.

d. The RCS and Steam Generator models were tested in their ability to indicate the effects of loss of RCS forced circulation and establishing natural circulation.

5. Heater Drain Pump Trip, Reactor Trip

a. This event occurred at Maine Yankee and was just one of several LERs generated because of feedwater pump NPSH problems. The number of LERs indicated a high probability of this type of event occurrino in the referenco plant.

b. This event tested the dynamic response of the condensate and feedwater system.

c. The test verified the incorporation of plant modifications into the simulator, the NPSH trip had been modified to include a time delay.

6. Power Change using Boron Addition

a. This test verified the ability to use plant procedures tested CVCS system logic and dynamics for adding boric acid, and verified reactor core physics.

7. Turbine Valve Control Malfunction a, The test verified the response to an excess steam demand event and its offects on the RCS, Steam Generator and Reactor Protection Systems.

. Perforcance Test (3)

8. Oropped CEA

a. The Reactor Core, RCS and Nuclear Instrumentation model response to the dropped CEA were verified.

9. Excess Flow Valve Closure

a. Tested the steam generator level shrink and 2well effects and verified the response of the RCS and l Reactor F?vtection models.

10. Reactor Coolant Pump Trip ,

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a. The response of the reactor protection system to a l trip of a reactor coolant pump was tested.

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