ML20206E427
| ML20206E427 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 04/03/1987 |
| From: | Livermore H, Rogge J, Schepens R, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206E344 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-87-12, 50-425-87-08, 50-425-87-8, NUDOCS 8704130609 | |
| Download: ML20206E427 (46) | |
See also: IR 05000424/1987012
Text
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p2 H!v UNITED STATES
'
-f ,
/ 'b NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.p #
p REGloN ll
.g j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
- t ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.: 50-424/87-12 and 50-425/87-08
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
P. O. Box 4545
Atlanta, GA 30302 ,
_
Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nss.: NPF-61 and CPPR-109
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Facility N"ame: -Vogtle 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: January 24 - March 9,1987
Inspectors: f.8 b b d
H. H. Livermore, Senior Residen~t Inspector
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3 87
Date'Sfgned
Ng Construction
3 5 67
J. F. Rogge, Senior Rosident Inspector Datg' Signed
M Operations
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DaterSilgned
07
R. J. Schepens, Resident Inspector, Operations
Accompanying Personnel: G.M. Nejfelt, Resident Inspector, Hatch
E. ,Christnot, Project Engineer
Approved by: - 0 Lio Y 3 67
M. V! Sinkule, Section Chief Dats sign #d
Division of Reactor Projects
S'JMMARY
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Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed Resident Inspection in
the following areas: plant operations, radiological controls, maintenance,
surveillance, fire protection, emergency preparedness, ' security, outages
activities, containment and safety related structures, piping systems and
supports, safety related components, auxiliary systems, electrical equipment
and cables, instrumentation, startup, ' quality programs and administrative
controls affecting quality, employee concerns / allegations, and follow-up on
previous inspection identified items.
Results: Two violations were identified in the area of plant operation.
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Failure to adequately control locked valves and failure to' establish an
l adequate program to collect and evaluate transient and operational cycles.
8704130609 870403
PDR ADOCK 05000424;
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REPORT DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
R. E. Conway, Senior Vice-President, Vogtle Project Director
- P. D. Rice, Vice-President, Project. Engineering
R. H..Pinson, Vice-President, Project-Construction
- C. W. Whitney, General Manager, Project Support
W. W. Mintz, Project Completion Manager
- R. W. McManus, Readiness Review
- G. Bockhold, Jr., General Manager Nuclear Operations
E. M. Dannemiller, Technical Assistant to General Manager
T. V. Greene, Plant Manager
- R. M. Bellamy, Plant Support Manager
C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance Manager
- C. E. Belflower, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Operations
- E. D. Groover, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Construction
W. E. Mundy, Quality Assurance Audit Supervisor
D. M. Fiquett, Project Construction Manager - Unit 2
8. C. Harbin, Manager Quality Control
- G. A. McCarley, Project Compliance Coordinator
W. C. Gabbard, Regulatory Specialist
G. S. Lee, Operations Superintendent
R. M. Odom, Plant Engineering Supervisor
C. L. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent (Startup)
M. A. Griffis, Maintenance Superintendent
G. R. Frederick, Quality Assurance Engineer / Support Supervisor
R. E. Spinnatu, ISEG Supervisor
- J. F. D'Amico, Nuclear Safety & Compliance Manager
W. F. Kitchens, Manager Operations
V. J. Agro, Superintendent Administration
- A. L. Mosbaugh, Assistant Plant Support Manager
M. P. Craven, Nuclear Security Manager
Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen, technicians,
supervisors, engineers, operators, maintenance, chemistry inspectors, and
office personnel.
Other Organizations
H. M. Handfinger, Assistant Plant Support Manager - Bechtel
D. L. Kinnsch, Project Engineering - Bechtel
F. B. Marsh, Project Engineering Manager - Bechtel
- Attended exit interview.
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'2. Exit Interviews - Units 1 & 2 (30703'& 30703C)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 9,1987, with
those persons indicatid in paragraph 1'above.- The inspector described the
!- . areas inspected and discussed in detail . -the inspection results. .No
dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did~not
identify as proprietary any of the materials' provided to or reviewed by
the inspector during .this inspection. Region based NRC exit interviews
4 were attended during the inspection period by a resident inspector. This
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inspection closed one unresolved . item,. three Inspector Followup Items-
. (IFI), and six.-.10 CFR Part 21 reports. The~ items identified during this
4
inspection were:
a. Violation 50-424/87-12-01, " Failure - to Maintain Control ; of Locked
'
Valves" - Paragraph 4.a
I b. Violation 50-424/87-12-02, " Failure to Establish an Adequate Program
for the Collection and Evaluation of Transient'or Operating Cycles" -
- Paragraph 18.d
, c. IFI 50-424/87-12-03, " Review' Revised Surveillance Procedure 14928-1"
l - Paragraph 4.b.(6)
I
d. IFI 50-424/87-12-04, " Review Completed Walkdown . Verification.
j Regarding Communication Cables in Safety Related Equipment" -
Paragraph 20.m
- e. IFI 50-424/87-12-05, " Review Corrective' Action Due to Use of-
t Inadequate Procedure No. 22220-C" - Paragraph 20.h-
f. IFI 50-424/87-12-06, " Review Followup Interview Regarding QCP File
87V0044" - Paragraph 20.n
g. IFI 50-424/87-12-07, " Review Licensee's Investigation- of Containment
4
Ventilation Isolation Reset Capability for . Containment Post-LOCA
Purge Isolation Valves" - Paragraph 4.b.(12)
!'
h. IFI 50-425/87-08-01, " Review Implementation of FECO to Change ITE 27B- "
i Relay to New Model Under MWO 2-87-0034 and MWO 2-87-0035" -
,
Paragraph 19.h
- 3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters - Units 1 & 2 (92702)~
I Not inspected.
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4. Operational Safety Verification - Unit 1(71707,93702,90712,92700)
4
The plant began this inspection period in refueling (Mode'6) with initial
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fuel loading in progress and subsequently completed on January 28. . Cold
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Shutdown -(Mode 5) was entered on February 1, followed by - Hot Shutdown
(Mode 4) on February 20, and Hot Standby (Mode 3) on February 23. -Due to
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High Vibration on the Number ~2. Reactor Coolant Pump the unit oroceeded_to
Mode-5 on February 26 to perform. repairs and returned to Mode 3 on -
March 1. .On March 9, Startup (Mode 2) commenced : and initial reactor
criticality. achieved 'at 8:37 a.m. , EST. ' Thirteen operational type events
were reported and received inspector ~ followup. Of the thirteen events,
eight were ESF type actuations, two related to failed equipment or
material . problems, one. involved Environmental Qualification of the Main
Steam Isolation Valves, and two were other type events. Within the .ESF
actuation category five were related to spurious containment, containment-
ventilation or control room isolations, and three were actuations of the
auxiliary feedwater system due to personnel errors,
a. Control Room Activities
Control . Room tours and observations were performed to verify that
facility operations were .being safely conducted within regulatory
requirements. These inspections consisted ofl one or .more of - the
following attributes as appropriate at the time of the inspection.
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Proper Control Room staffing
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Control Room access and operator behavior
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Adherence to approved procedures for activities in progress
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Adherence to Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Conditions
forOperations(LCO)
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Observance of instruments and recorder traces of safety related
and important to safety systems for abnormalities
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Review of annunciators alarmed and action in progress to correct
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Control Board walkdowns
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Observe the operabi',ity' of the safety parameter display and the
plant safety monitoring system
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Discussion and interview with the On-Shift Operations
Supervisor, Shift Supervisor, and Reactor Operators and the
Shift Technical Advisor to determine the plant status, plans and-
assess operator knowledge ;
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Review of the operator logs, unit log and shift turnover sheets
'
During review of the shift supervisor log on 2/19/87, the inspector
noted that diesel generator-(DG) 1A main ' fuel oil valve
(1-2403-U4-031) had been logged in as being found in ~the
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incorrect position (i.e., locked closed in lieu of locked open)
during the performance of the DG operability surveillance test
procedure no. 14980-1. The Inspector reviewed the following
clearances which had been taken out on the Train "A" diesel
generator during the diesel outage:
1-87-446 DG Train "A" Outage
1-87-0579 DG Train "A" Left Bank Intercooler
1-87-0235 DG Train "A" Fuel Oil Pump
The inspector also reviewed the latest diesel generator Train "A"
valve lineup procedure on file which was performed on 1/31/87 per
Operations Procedure No. 11145-1 and determined that another valve
lineup was not performed after the outage on the Train A diesel
generator. Discussions with shift personnel confirmed that once the
above valve was found mispositioned a complete valve lineup per
procedure No.1114-1 was performed on 2/18/87 on DG-1A prior to
re performing the DG operability surveillance per procedure
No. 14980-1.
From this review, the inspector determined that the latest
documentation which positioned the main fuel oil valve
(1-2403-U4-031) was clearance no. 1-87-446 which was installed on
2/7/87 and removed on 2/13/87. This clearance required the main fuel
valve (1-2403-U4-031) to be restored to the locked open position and
was signed off as being positioned correctly along with independent
verification. In addition, the inspector went to conduct a review of
the locked valve manipulation log per procedure 11888-1 to determine
if the position had been altered by this method of control. However,
the locked valve manipulation log had not been put into place as of
2/23/87. The inspector informed the licensee of this matter and the
locked valve manipulation was verified by the inspector to be in
place on 2/24/87.
Per operations procedure 10019-C, status changes in the positions of
locked valves shall be documented by one of the following means:
a) use of applicable alignment procedure; b) use of an approved
equipment clearance; or c) use of 11888-1, " Locked Valve Manipulation
Log". Contrary to this, the diesel generator Train A main fuel oil
valve was found on 2/18/87 to be in its other than required position
(i.e., locked closed in lieu of locked open).
The foregoing is considered to be in violation of Technical
Specification 6.7.la and will be identified as Violation
50-424/87-12-01, " Failure to maintain control of locked valves".
Additional underlying problems noted by the inspector are as follows.
The diesel generator was taken out of service for an outage on
2/7/87 and was being restored to service on 2/18/87. The DG valve
lineup per procedure 11145-1 was not performed prior to attempting to
perform the DG operability surveillance per procedure 14980-1. In
tfie precautions and Timitations section of surveillance procedure
M980-1, there is a statement to ensure that a current copy of
11145-1 was on file. Due to the extent of the outage on the diesel,
it would have been preferred that this valve lineup be performed
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prior to attempting to perform the surveillance. Discussions were
held with operations management on this matter and they acknowledged
that due to the extent of the outage, the vals e lineup should have
been performed after the outage. 0perations management also informed
the inspector that shift personnel were counseled regarding this
matter. Another discrepancy noted by the inspector during this
review was that procedure'10019-C requires a Deficiency Report (DR)
be initiated upon discovery of a valve locked in any position other
than that required. The inspector deemed it necessary to inform the
licensee of this requirement several times during the investigation
and noted that by the time of the exit interview the licensee still
had not informed the inspector if a DR had bcen written or not.
Finally, procedure 10019-C, " Control of Safety Related Locked Valves"
contains tables of locked valves which are incomplete. Discussions
with the responsible procedure writers confirmed their awareness of
the situation and that they were actively working on updating the
procedure to have an accurate and complete listing of all locked
valves. This matter should be given additional resources as
necessary to expedite the issuance of the revised procedure.
Subsequently, on 2/26/87, during an NRC inspection of the Auxiliary
Feedwater (AFW) system valve lineup, the steam generator No. 2 main
steam supply valve (1-1301-04-007) to the turbine driven auxiliary
feedwater pump was found to be in the locked closed position in lieu
of the required locked open position. The inspector reviewed the
following documentation to determine the latest valve manipulation.
Review of the AFW system alignment for startup and normal operation
procedure 11610-1 completed on 2/24/87 documented the valve to be
positioned and independently verified as being correctly positioned
(i.e., locked open). Review of clearances and lock valve manipu-
lation log did not reveal any documentation of valve repositioning.
Finally, review of the working copy of startup test procedure
1-5AL-01, "AFW System Test" did not document any repositioning of the
subject valve required or performed during the test. This is another
example of the above noted violation " Failure to maintain control of
locked valves" (50-424/87-12-01).
b. Facility Activities
Facility tours and observations were performed to assess the
effectiveness of the administrative controls established by direct
observation of plant activities, interviews and discussions with .
licensee personnel, independent verification of safety systems status j
and LCOs, licensee meetings and facility records. During these
inspections the following objectives are achieved:
(1) Safety System Status (71710) - Confirmation of system ,
operability was obtained by verification that flowpath valve !
alignment, control and power supply alignments, component
conditions, and support systems for the accessible portions of
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the ESF trains were proper. The inaccessible portions are
confirmed as availability permi ts '. _ Additional indepth
inspection of theT Residual Heat' Removal . (RHR) System was '
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performed to review the' system lineup procedure with the plant
drawings and as-built configurations, compare valve ' remote and -
local indications,:walkdowns were expanded.to include hangers
and supports,. and electrical equipment interiors. The: inspector
verify that the lineup was in. accordance with license
requirements for system operability. -
(2) Plant. Housekeeping _ Conditions - Storage of - material and
components- ard cleanliness conditions of ~various- areas
throughout the facility were observed to ' determine - whether
safety and/or. fire hazards existed.
(3) Fire Protection - Fire protection -activities, staffing and
equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was
appropriate and that fire' alarms, extinguishing equipment,.
actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, ' emergency
equipment, and fire-barriers were operable.
(4) Radiation Protection - Radiation . Control Areas . (RCAs) were
observed to verify proper identification and implementation.
(5) Security - Security controls were observed -to verify that
security barriers were intact, guard forces were on duty, and
access to the Protected Area (PA) was controlled in accordance
with the facility security plan. Personnel within the PA were
observed to verify proper display 'of badges and that personnel
requiring escort were properly escorted. Personnel ~within vital-
areas were observed to ensure. proper authorization for the area.
'
(6) Surveillance (61726, 61700) - Surveillance tests were observed
to verify that approved procedures' were being used; qualified
personnel were conducting the ' tests;' tests ' were adequate to
verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized;
and TG requirements were followed. The inspectors observed
portions of the following surveillances and reviewed completed'
data against acceptance criteria:
14210-1 Containment Building Penetrations Verification -
Refueling
24760-101 Steam Generator (Narrow Range) Level Transmitter
ILT-537 Calibration
14710-101 Remote Shutdown Panel Transfer Switch and Control
Circuit 18 Month Surveillance Test. l
43690-C Calibration of Containment Area Radiation (High '
Range) Monitors 1 RE-0005'and 1_RE-0006-
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The_. inspectors reviewed the following completed / approved
surveillances to verify test data was accurate and complete;
' test documentation was reviewed and test discrepancies were
rectified; and that test results met technical specification
requirements.
24587-102 Containment Pressure ' Protection Channel II
1 P-936 Analog Channel Operational Test
24588-102 Containmei.t Pressure Protection Channel III
1 P-935 Analog Channel Operational Test
24589-102 Containment Pressure Protection Channel IV
1 P-934 Analog Channel Operational Test
24624-101 Containment High Range (1 RE-0005) Area Monitor
1 RX-0005 Channel Calibration
24625-101 Containment High Range (1-RE-0006) Area Monitor
1 RX-0006 Channel Calibration
24625-102 Channel Calibration and Analog Channel
Operational Test
14420-101 Solid State Protection System Train A(B)
Operability Test
During the inspection period a review of Surveillance Procedures
14210-1, " Containment Building Penetrations Verification -
Refueling" and 14928-1, " Containment _ Ventilation Isolation -
Refueling" was performed to verify that the requirements of
Technical Specification Surveillances 4.9.4 and 4.9.9 were met.
The inspector noted the following:
(a) Procedure 14210-1 did not require that all containment
building penetrations be reviewed to determine the
potential of a direct access path as a result of
maintenance activities, and
(b) Procedure 14928-1 was inadequate in the following-areas:
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It did not verify that the containment normal and mini
purge isolation valves closed as a result of a high
radiation signal on the process containment vent
effluent monitor 1 RE-2565,
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It did not verify that the containment post LOCA ,arge
isolation valves 1 HV-2624 A&B closed on a containment
ventilation isolation (CVI) signal,
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It did not - verify that the containment radiation-
monitor 1 RE 2562 isolation valves 1 HV 12975,12976,
12977, and 12978 closed on a containment ventilation
isolation signal, and
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It did not properly restore the containment radiation
monitor 1 RE-2562 isolation valves 1 HV 12975,12976,
12977, and 12978 to their normal system alignment
position (open).
The above comments were discussed with the licensee and a
commitment was. made to revise the subject procedures.
Subsequently, Procedure 14210-1 was revised and issued on
2/21/87. The revised procedure adequately addressed the above
comment relative to Procedure 14210-1. Pending review of the
revised Procedure 14928-1 to address the above noted comments
this item will be identified as IFI 50-424/87-12-03, " Review
Revised Surveillance Procedure 14928-1".
During initial core load CVI was -inoperable; therefore, the
licensee complied with Technical Specifications LCO 3.9.4 and
3.9.9 by administrative 1y requiring that all isolat. ion valves
which receive a CVI signal be closed. This was verified to be
accomplished v'a Clearance No. 1-87-0256.
(7) Maintenance Activities (62703) - The inspector observed
maintenance activities to veri fy that correct equipment
clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention
work permits, as required, were issued and being followed;
quality control personnel were available for inspect 1"n
activities as required; retesting and return - of systems to
service was prompt and correct; and TS requirements were being
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followed. Maintenance backlog was reviewed. Maintenance was
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observed and work packages were reviewed for the following
maintenance activities:
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Reactor Assembly Including the Integrated Head Package Lift
and 0-Ring Installation
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Diesel Generator Train "A" Turbocharger Intercooler Inlet
Adapter Crack In Weld At Inlet Flange to Adapter Repair,
DR #1-87-0172
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Penetration No. 1040D Containment Spray Suction Line-
Removal of Incorrect Sealant Material, Maintenance Work
Order (MWO) #18702408
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Penetration No. 1752 Auxiliary Component Cooling Water
Supply to Containment-Removal of Incorrect Sealant
Material, MWO #18702408
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Diesel Generator 1A Dutage MW0s and Clearances. MWO
Nos. 18624489, 18702068, 18702107, 18701520, 18701851,
1871826, 18701825, 18702556, 18701681, 18701166, 18700990,
18702575, 18702435, 18701188, 18700829, and 1862597.
Clearance Nos. 187446, 1870579 and 1870235
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MSIV Testing, Trouble Shooting and -Stroking Per MWO
No. 18702863
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Repacking of PORV Block Valves 1 HV 8000 A&B Per MWO
18702953
(8) Cold Weather Preparations (71714) - The inspector reviewed
implementation of the cold weather preparation program.
Maintenance and engineering activities were reviewed to ensure
that proper equipment and sensitive systems had been identified.
Operational activities implemented when cold weather is pending
(temperatures less than 40 degrees F) were reviewed. The Safety
Evaluation Report, Section 7.5.2.6 and FSAR Question 420.11 were
reviewed as they pertain to area of freeze protection.
Operations Procedure N877-1, Cold Weather Checklist, Rev 0 was
reviewed. During interviews the inspector determined that OP 11877-1 had received no input from engineering. Engineering
stated that the procedure would be reviewed. This item will
receive future routine inspection next winter and no IFIs are
identified to track engineering's review.
(9) Plant Startup from Refueling (71711) - The inspector observed
the preparations for initial unit startup. Initial Reactor
Criticality was witnessed. The inspector noted that the startup
was conducted in a professional manner.
(10) Initial Fuel Loading Witnessing Units 1 (77574) - The inspector
conducted periodic inspections throughout the inspection period
of the initial core loading process. The inspection consisted
of, but was not limited to, the observation of work activities
to verify the following:
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Licensee was conforming with all technical specification
requirements and license conditions applicable during
initial fuel loading.
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Nuclear instruments were properly calibrated and were
operating with a . measurable count rate.
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Operation staffing for licensed operators were in
accordance with the requirements of technical
specifications.
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Inverse multiplication plots were being maintained in
accordance with procedural requirements.
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Boron concentration was being . verified by proper sampling
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and analysis at'the ' required frequency.
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' Refueling status boards in .the control room- and on the -
' refueling floor were maintained properly.
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Shift work schedules were within maximum' work time limits. +
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-Initial . fuel loading experienced .~ delays which were mainly
1'- attributable to problems with the sigma refueling machine and-
i nuclear instrumentation. ' As problems occurred,- the licensee was - -
observed taking' the conservative- approach' to- ensure
j- identification of the root cause, thereby achieving the proper
corrective action prior to. resuming with initial- fuel loading.
l Once problems -were corrected 'and operations personnel became '
more familiar with the equipment, fuel loading was observed. by
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the inspector to progress in an efficient and safe-manner as
j covered.by applicable procedures.
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) (11) Problem Identification System' Review-- The inspector conducted a
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review of the licensee's' Deficiency Reporting (DR) and Recording
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of Limiting Conditions for Operations'(LCOs) to verify
- implementation per the following procedures
j 00150-C Deficiency Reports
- 10008-C Recording LCOs
i 11875-C LC0 Status Sheet
11876-C LCO Status Log
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The inspector selected and' reviewed the following DRs to verify
j t. roper completion and evaluation for LCO reqairements.
Deficiency Report LCO (If' Applicable)
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[ 1-87~0521
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1-87-0522
j'- 1-87-0523
1-87-0524
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! 1-87-0525 1-87-218I ,
! 1-87-0526
i 1-87-0527 -
1-87-0528
1 1-87-0529 1-87-221I
!- 1-87-0530 1-87-217I
- 1-87-0531' '1-87-222I
j~ 1-87-0532 1-87-2251
1- 1-87-0533 1-87-220I I
i 1-87-0534 1-87-35 l
j 1-87-0535 '
i 1-87-0536 1-87-224I l
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1-87-0537 1-87-223I
1-87-0538 1-87-227I
1-87-0539
1-87-0540 1-87-2281
1-87-0541
1-87-0542
1-87-0543
1-87-0544
1-87-0545
1-87-0546
1-87-0547
1-87-0548
1-87-0549
1-87-0550
1-87-0551 1-87-236I
' 1-87-0552
- 1-87-0553
i 1-87-0554
1-87-0555
1-87-0556 1-87-209
1-87-0557 1-87-210
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1-87-0558 1-87-2371
1-87-0559
1-87-0560
1-87-0561
1-87-0562
During the above review, the inspector noted inconsistencies in
the method of completing the technical specification LCO
required action section of the DR. This matter was discussed
with the licensee and a night order was written to clarify to -
operations personnel the proper method for completing this
section of the DR. Another matter identified to the licensee as
a result of this review was the backlog of open DRs. At the
time of the inspection, there existed approximately 760 DRs of
which only 10-12 were closed. The licensee informed the i
inspector that additional resources would be applied in this
area to reduce the backlog. The licensee also informed the
inspector of a major change which was being implemented to the
Deficiency Report procedure. Discussions were held with the
procedure writer to review these changes. The new deficiency
report procedure will be reviewed in depth during subsequent
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inspections to verify implementation.
(12) Post-LOCA Containment Hydrogen Purge System Design and
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Operational Review - The inspector conducted a review of- the
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following documents to verify that. the post-LOCA containment
hydrogen purge system will function as designed and in
accordance with existing plant procedures.
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Document Title
FSAR 6.2.5 CombustibleGaspontrolinContainment
OP 19000-1 E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
OP'19200-1 F-0 Critical Safety Function Status
1 Tree
OP 19251-1 FR-2.1 Response to High Containment
Pressure
OP 13130-1 Post-Accident Hydrogen Control
P&ID 1X408213-1 Purifica. tion and Cleanup System
P&ID 1X6AA02-232-12 Functional Diagram Safeguard Actuation
System
P&ID IX6A-X01-409 -Solid State Protection System
Elementary
P&ID 1X3D-86-804A & Post-LOCA Purge Isolation Valves
P&ID 1X3D-86-B04B 1HV-2624A & B Elementary
The post-LOCA containment hydrogen purge system is provided as a
backup means of controlling hydrogen inside containment. It
provides a means of purging the hydrogen from the containment
and is intended as a backup to the hydrogen recombiner system.
The inspection consisted of a review of the post-LOCA purge
isolation valve elementary diagrams, . the safeguard activation
system logic and the SSPS elementary diagrams to verify that
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these valves could be opened when the procedure directed the
operator to open them. The inspector noted that procedure
13130-1 directs the operator to reset Containment Ventilation
Isolation (CVI) and then to open the post-LOCA purge isolation
!. valves if containment hydrogen concentration can not be
maintained below 4% by other means. Review of the safeguard
actuation system logic diagram details indicate that the CVI
reset logic as consisting of a retentive memory with actuation
block (i.e., CVI can be reset with a high radiation signal still
present). However, review of the Solid State Protective System
(S.iPS) logic per the elementary diagram shows that the high-
radiation signal must be cleared before a reset could occur.
Discussion with operations personnel revealed that they were
instructed and trained that CVI could be reset with a high l
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radiation signal still present. Discussions with engineering
and preoperational test personnel including Westinghouse confirm
that CVI can not be reset with a high radiation signal still
present. CVI is initiated by containment radiation area low
range monitors (RE-0002 and RE-0003) and containment ventilation
monitors (RE-2565 A, B and C).
During an accident condition, CVI will be initiated. Therefore,
in order to open the post-LOCA purge isolation valves during an
accident condition, CVI will have to be reset with a high
radiation signal still present. Pending the licensee's
engineering department review of this matter, this item will
remain open and will be identified as Inspector Followup Item
50-424/87-12-07, " Review licensee's investigation results of CVI
reset capability for containment post-LOCA purge isolation
valves."
5. General Construction Inspection - Unit 2 (92706)
Periodic random surveillance inspections were made throughout this
reporting period in the form of general type inspections in different
areas of both facilities. The areas were selected on the basis of the
scheduled activities and were varied to provide wide coverage.
Observations were made of activities in progress to note defective items
or items in noncompliance with the required codes and regulatory
requirements. On these inspections, particular note was made of the
presence of quality control inspectors, supervisors, and Quality Control
evidence in the form of available process sheets, drawings, material
identification, material protection, performance of tests, and
housekeeping. Interviews were conducted with craft personnel,
supervisors, coordinators, quality control inspectors, and others as they
were available in the work areas. The inspector reviewed numerous
construction deviation reports to determine if requirements were met in
the areas of documentation, action to resolve, justification, and approval
signatures in accordance with GPC Field Procedure No. GD-T-01.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6. Fire Prevention / Protection and Housekeeping Measures - Unit 2(42051C)
The inspector observed fire prevention / protection measures throughout the
inspection period. Welders were using welding permits with fire watches
and extinguishers. Fire f'ghting equipment was in its designated areas
throughout the plant.
The inspector reviewed and examined portions of procedures pertaining to
the fire prevention / protection measures and housekeeping measures to
determine whether they comply with applicable codes, standards, NRC
Regulatory Guides and licensee commitments.
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The inspector observed fire prevention / protection measures in work areas
containing safety related equipment during the inspection period to verify
the following:
-
Combustible waste material and rubbish was removed from the work
areas as rapidly as practicable to avoid unnecessary accumulation of
combustibles.
-
Flammable liquids were stored in appropriate containers and in
designated areas throughout the plant.
-
Cutting and welding operations in progress have been authorized by an
appropriate permit, combustibles have been moved away or safely
covered, and a fire watch with extinguisher was posted as required.
-
Fire protection / suppression equipment was provided and controlled in
accordance with applicable requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7. Structural Concrete - Unit 2 (47053C)
a. Procedure and Document Review
The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the - following
procedures pertaining to the placement of concrete to dete mine
whether they comply with applicable codes, standards, NRC r.ogelatory
Guides and licensee commitments.
-
CD-T-02, " Concrete Quality Control"
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CD-T-06, "Rebar and Cadweld Quality Control"
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CD-T-07, " Embed Installation and Inspection"
b. Installation Activities
The inspector witnessed portions of the concrete placement indicated
below to verify tne following:
(1) Forms, Embedment, and Reinforcing Steel Installation
-
Forms were properly placed, secure, leak tight and clean.
-
Rebar and other embedment installation was installed in
accordance with construction specifications and drawings,
secured, free of concrete and excessive rust, specified
distance from forms, proper on-site rebar bending (where
applicable) and clearances consistent with aggregate size.
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(2) Delivery, Placement and Curing
-
Preplacement inspection was completed and approved prior to
placement utilizing a Pour Card.
-
Construction joints were prepared as specified.
-
Proper mix was specified and delivered.
-
Temperature control cf the mix, mating surfaces, and
ambient were monitored.
-
Consolidation was performed correctly.
-
Testing at placement location was properly performed in
accordance with the acceptance criteria and recorded on a
Concrete Placement Pour Log.
-
Adequate crew, equipment and techniques were utilized.
-
Inspections during placements were conducted effectively by
a sufficient number of qualified personnel.
-
Curing methods and temperature was monitored.
(3) Rebar Splicing
The inspector witnessed cadwelding operations to ver'.fy the
following:
-
Inspections are performed during and after splicing by
qualified QC inspection personnel.
-
Each splice was defined by a unique number consisting of
the bar size, splice type, the position, the operator's
symbol, and a sequential number.
-
Process and crews are qualified.
-
The sequential number and the operator's symbol are marked
on all completed cadwelds.
The inspector also conducted random inspections of completed
cadwelds to verify the following:
-
Tap hole does not contain slag, blow ont, or porous metal.
-
Filler metal was visible at both ends of the splice sleeve
and at the tap hole in the center of the sleeve. No voids
were detected at the ends of the sleeves.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
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The sequential number and the operator's symbol are marked
on all completed cadwelds.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8. Containment (Steel Structures and Supports)-- Unit 2 (48053C)
Periodic inspections were conducted to observe containment steel and
support installation activities in progress, to verify the following:
-
Components were being properly. handled (included bending or
straightening).
-
Specified clearances were being maintained.
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Edge finishes and hole sizes were within tolerances.
-
Control, marking, protection and segregation were maintained during
storage.
-
Fit-up/ alignment meets the tolerances in the specifications and
drawings.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9. Safety-Related Structures (Structural Steel and Supports) -
Unit 2
(48063C)
Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities of
safety-related structures / equipment supports for major equipment outside
the containment to verify that:
-
Materials and components were being properly handled to prevent
damage.
-
Fit-up/ alignment were within tolerances in specifications and drawing
requirements.
-
Bolting was in accordance with specifications and procedures.
-
Specified clearances from adjacent components were being met.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping - Unit 2
(49053C,49063C,37301)
Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities of
the Reactor Coolant Boundary and other safety-related piping installations
inside and outside Containments. Verifications included but were not
,
limited to the following:
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Material and components were being properly handled and stored in
order to prevent damage.
-
Fit-ups and alignments were within tolerances per specifications and
drawings.
-
Specified clearances from pipe to pipe and adjacent components were
met.
-
Piping was installed and inspected in accordance with applicable
drawings, specifications, and procedures.
-
Those people engaged in the activity are qualified to perform the
applicable function.
-
Drawing and specification changes (revisions) are being handled and
used correctly.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping Welding -
Unit 2 (55073C, 55083C)
Periodic inspections were conducted during daily plant surveillances on
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safety-related pipe welding at various stages of weld completion. The
purpose of the inspection was to determine whether the requirements of
applicable specifications, codes, standards, work performance procedures
and QC procedures are being met as follows:
-
Work was conducted in accordance with a process sheet which
identifies the weld and its location by system, references procedures
or instructions, and provides for production and QC signoffs.
-
Welding procedures, detailed drawings and instructions, were readily
available in the immediate work area and technically adequate for the
welds being made.
'-
Wolding procedure specification (WPS) were in accordance with the
applicable Code requirements and that a Procedure Qualification
Record (PQR) is referenced and exists for the type of weld being
made.
-
Base metals, welding filler materials, fluxes, gases, and insert
materials were of the specified type and grade, have been properly
inspected, tested and were traceable to test reports or
certifications.
-
Purge and/or shielding gas flow and composition were as specified in
the welding procedure specification and that protection was provided
to shield the welding operation from adverse environmental
conditions.
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Weld joint geometry including pipe wall thickness was specified and
that surfaces to be welded have been prepared, cleaned and inspected
in accordance with applicable procedures or instructions.
-
A sufficient number of adequately qualified QA and QC inspection
personnel were present at the work site, commensurate with the work
in progress.
- The weld area cleanliness was maintained and that pipe alignment and
fit-up tolerances were within specified limits.
-
Weld filler material being used was in accordance with welding
specifications, unused- filler material was separated from other types
of material and was stored properly and that weld rod stubs were
properly removed from the work location.
-
There were no evident signs of cracks, excessive heat input,
sugaring, or excessive crown on welds.
-
Welders were qualified to the applicable process and thickness, and
that necessary controls and records were in place.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12. Reactor Vessel, Integrated Head Package, and Internals - Unit 2 (50053C
and 50063C)
The inspection consisted of examinations of the reactor vessel installed
in containment, the reactor vessel head with the installed control od
drive mechanisms that are located on the refueling floor, and the upper
internals in their designated laydown area. Inspections also determined
that proper storage protection practices were in place and that entry of
foreign objects and debris was prevented.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13. Safety Related Components - Unit 2 (50073C)
The inspection consisted of plant tours to observe storage, handling, and
protection; installation; and preventive maintenance after installation of
safety-related components to determine that work is being performed in
accordance with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee
commitments.
During the inspection the below listed areas were inspected at various
times during the inspection period to verify the following as applicable:
-
Storage, environment, and protection of components were in accordance
with manufacturer's instructions and/or established procedures.
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Implementation of special storage and maintenance requirements such
as: rotation of motors, pumps, lubrication, insulation testing
(electrical), cleanliness,etc.
-
Performance of licensee / contractor surveillance activities and
documentation thereof was being accomplished.
- Installation requirements were met such as: proper location,
placement, orientation, alignment, mounting (torquing of bolts and
expansion anchors), flow direction, tolerances, and expansion
clearance.
-
Appropriate stamps, tags, markings, etc. were in use to prevent
oversight of required inspections, completion of tests, acceptance,
and the prevention of inadvertent operation.
Safety-related piping, valves, pumps, heat exchangers, and instrumentation
were inspected in the following areas on a random sampling basis
throughout the inspection period:
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Residual Heat Removal Pump Rooms
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Diesel Generator Building
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Auxiliary Feedwater Pumphouse
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Containment Spray Pump Rooms
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Pressurizer Rooms
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Main Coolant Pump Areas
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Steam Generator Areas
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Safety Injection Pump Rooms
-
RHR and CS Containment Penetration Encapsulation Vessel Rooms
-
Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchangers, Surge Tanks & Pump
Rooms
-
Cable Spreading Rooms
-
Accumulator Tank Areas
-
Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Letdown Heat Exchanger Pump
Room
-
Battery & Charger Rooms
-
Nuclear Grade Piping, Valves & Fittings Storage Areas
_ _ _ - _ _ _
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Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Rooms
-
Pressurizer Relief Tank Area
-
CVCS Centrifugal Charging Pumps & Positive Displacement Pump Rooms
-
Bottom Mounted Instrumentation (BMI) Tunnel and Seal Table Area
-
BMI and Supports Under Reactor Vessel
-
NSCW Tower Pump Rooms and Pipe Tunnels
-
Containment, Auxiliary Building, Control Building, and Fuel Handling
_
Building auxiliary (secondary)' areas
No violations or deviations were identified.
14. Safety Related Pipe Support and Restraint Systems - Unit 2 (50090C)
Periodic random inspections were conducted during the inspection period to
observe construction activities during installation of safety-related pipe
supports to determine that the following work was performed in accordance
with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee commitments:
-
Spring hangers were provided with indicators to show the approximate
" hot" or " cold" position, as appropriate.
-
No deformation or forced bending was evident.
-
Where pipe clamps are used to support vertical lines, shear lugs were
welded to the pipe (if required by Installation Drawings) to prevent
slippage.
-
Sliding or rolling supports were provided with material and/or
lubricants suitable for the environment and compatible with sliding
contact surfaces.
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Supports are located and installed as specified.
-
The surface of welds meet applicable code requirements and are free
from unacceptable grooves, abrupt ridges, valleys, undercuts, cracks,
discontinuities, or other indications which can be observed on the
welded surface.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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15. Electrical and Instrumentation Components and Systems - Unit 2 (51053C,
52153C)
Periodic inspections were conducted during the inspection period to
observe safety-related electrical equipment in order to verify that the
storage, installation, and preventive maintenance was accomplished in
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accordance with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee
commitments.
During the inspection period inspections were performed on various pieces
-of electrical equipment during storage, installation, and cable
terminating phase in order to verify the following as applicable:
-
Location and alignment
-
Type and size of anchor bolts
~
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Identification
-
Segregation and identification of nonconforming items
-
Location, separation and redundancy requirements
-
Equipment space heating
-
Cable identification
.
-
Proper lugs used
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Condition of wire (not nicked, etc.), tightness of connection
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Bending radius not exceeded
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Cable entry to terminal point
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Separation
No violations or deviations were identified.
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16. Electrical and Instrumentation Cables and Terminations - Unit 2 (51063C,
52063C)
a. Raceway / Cable Installation
The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following
procedures pertaining to raceway / cable ins.allation to determine
whether they comply with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides and
licensee commitments.
-
ED-T-02, " Raceway Installation" l
-
ED-T-07, " Cable Installation" !
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Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction
activities of Safety Related Raceway / Cable Installation.
In reference to the raceway installation, the following areas were
inspected to verify compliance with the applicable requirements:
-
Identification
-
Alignment
-
Bushings (Conduit)
-
Grounding
-
Supports and Anchorages
In reference to the cable installation the following areas were
inspected to verify compliance with the applicable requirements:
-
Protection from adjacent construction activities (welding, etc.)
-
Coiled cable ends properly secured
-
Non-terminated cable ends taped
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Cable trays, junction boxes, etc., reasonably free of debris
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Conduit capped, if no cable installed
-
Cable supported
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Bend radius not exceeded
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Separation
b. Cable Terminations
The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following
procedures pertaining to cable termination to determine whether they
comply with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides and licensee
commitments.
-
ED-T-08, " Cable Termination"
In reference to cable terminations the following areas were inspected
to verify compliance with the applicable requirements.
-
Cable identification
-
Proper lugs used
-
Condition of wire (not nicked, etc.)
-
Tightness of connection j
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Bending radius not exceeded ;
-
Cable entry to terminal point l
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Separation l
No violations or deviations were identified. l
17. Containment and Safety Related Structural Steel Welding - Unit 2 (55053C, I
55063C)
Periodic inspections were conducted during daily plant surveillances on
safety-related steel welding at various stages of weld completion.
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The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether the requirements of
applicable specifications, codes, standards, work performance procedures
and QC procedures are being met as follows:
-
Work was conducted in accordance with a process sheet or drawing
which identifies the weld and its location by system, references,
procedures or instructions, and provides for production and/or QC
signoffs.
-
Welding procedures, detailed drawings and instructions, were readily
available in the immediate work area and technically adequate for the
welds being made.
-
Welding procedure specification (WPS) were in accordance with the
applicable Code requirements and that a Procedure Qualification
Record (PQR) is referenced and exists for the type of weld being
made.
-
Base metals and welding filler materials were of the specified type
and grade, were properly inspected, tested, and were traceable.
-
Protection was provided to shield the welding operation from adverse
environmental conditions.
-
Weld joint geometry including thickness was specified and that
surfaces to be welded were prepared, cleaned and inspected in
accordance with applicable procedures or instructions.
-
A sufficient number of adequately qualified QA and QC inspection
personnel commensurate with the work in progress were present at the
work site.
-
Weld area cleanliness was maintained and that alignment and fit-up
tolerances were within specified limits.
-
Weld filler material being used was in accordance with -welding
specifications, unused filler material was separated from other types
of material and was stored and controlled properly, and stubs were
properly removed from the work location.
-
There were no visual signs of cracks, excessive heat input, or
excessive crown on welds.
-
Welders were qualified to the particular process and thickness; and
that necessary controls and records were in place.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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18. Followup on Previous Inspection Items - Units 1 & 2 (92701)
a. (Closed) IFI 50-424/85-21-02, " Review Revision to Class IE Battery
Maintenance Procedures". The items identified in NRC Report
50-424/86-111 have been resolved.
b. (Closed) IFI 50-424/86-51-02, " Review Procedure 00301-C to Verify
Incorporation of Unfettered Access for NRC Resident Inspectors." The
inspector reviewed Revision 2, issued February 24, 1987, which
implements the final corrective action. The inspector also noted the
deletion in Step 3.1 that had previously clarified that Control Room
Access under emergency conditions would be limited, but included NRC
inspectors needed for emergencies. The inspector ascertained that
the new revision further clarifies who the inspectors would be and in
the event of an actual emergency additional personnel could be
readily authorized,
c. (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-424/86-111-01, " Review Inspection Results
of the Licensee's Inspection of Burn Damage on Limitorque Operator
Power Leads." This item was previously closed in NRC Report
50-424/86-136. Since that time the licensee has had an opportunity
to inspect the four operators contained within the encapsulation
vessels. The inspection results indicate that no burn damage to the
motor leads was identified. These results were reviewed by the
inspector.
d. (Closed) IFI 50-424/86-60-06, " Review the Establishment of a Plan to
Collect and Evaluate Transient or Operational Cycles". The inspector
reviewed Procedure 50040-C, Rev. O, January 10, 1987, " Component
Cyclic or Transient Limits". This procedure is intended to provide
the means to track the number of design transients which occur during
plant life. The procedure tracks these cycles which are identified
in the plant's Technical Specifications only. Since the procedure is
an engineering procedure it relies on other plant procedures for
notification that a cycle has occurred. The inspector reviewed the
record keeping and had discussions with the responsible engineer.
From this review the inspector determined that the established
program was not adequate in that:
(1) No full definition of what constitutes a cycle other than
presented in Technical Specification existed.
(2) The systems structures, or components of concern were not
identified to support a proper evaluation of when a cycle had
occurred.
(3) No method existed for partial cycle counting.
(4) Notification to engineering was not established within all
referenced procedures.
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25
(5) Cycle collection and evaluation on equipment that is not in the
Technical Specification had not been established.
(6) Not all cycles placed on the plant from Hot Functional Test to
present had been counted. ,
This issue was originally identified by the licensee during the
readiness review program for Module 7. At that time it was
identified as Finding #7-4 Data Collection. During NRC review of
Module 7 this IFI was identified because the project did not address
the subject of establishing a plan -or program to collect the data
<
(NRC Report 50-424/86-60 dated September 4, 1986). The Operations
,
Quality Assurance organization performed additional reviews, and had
,
closed the issue based on issuance of the program. It was noted that
QA had intentions of performing an audit in April after the program
had time to function. Based on the discussion above and Item (1)
a thru (6) the following violation is identified:
I
50-424/87-12-02, " Failure to Establish an Adequate Program for the
Collection and Evaluation of Transient or Operating Cycles".
e. (0 pen) 50-424/86-117-31 " Verification of Key Control and Access to
Plant Equipment By Operations Staff". This item consists of two (2)
commitments by the licensee pertaining to the control of Power Block
interior doors and the control of panel / cabinet keys. The inspector
conducted a review of the licensee's program to control panel keys
throughout the plant. The inspection consisted of: 1) Reviewing the
revised plant lock and key control procedure (00008-C, Rev. 5) which
establishes the method for controlling panel keys and the requirement
for auditing the program at least once per year, 2) Reviewing the
panel key index which categorizes the cabinet keys by building and
elevation, 3) Verifying that a representative ' sample of keys on the
panel key index did in fact open their respective panel or cabinet,
,
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and 4) Confirming that the program was understood and being
implemented with satisfactory results by interviews of operators.
Based on the above inspection the inspector has determined that the
licensee has satisfactorily addressed the control of panel / cabinet
keys. This item will, however, remain open pending the licensee's
completion and the inspector's review of the commitment pertaining to
the control of Power Block interior doors.
19. Followup of Reportable Items - Units 1 & 2 (92700)(36100)
This inspection was conducted to determine whether the items have been
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received by the licensee, evaluated and corrective action taken, where
appropriate. The inspector utilized discussions with cognizant personnel,
review of applicable documentation, and field verification as a basis for-
closure of each item.
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a. (Closed) 50-424/425 P2185-07 " Potential Valve Spring Failure In TDI
Diesel Engines." This item is identical to 50-424/425 CDR 86-94 and
is closed to eliminate dual tracking. It is noted that 50-424 CDR
86-94 was closed in NRC Report 50-424/86-103.
b. (Closed) 50-424/425 P2185-08, " Crack in Cast Iron Fan Hub". This
item is identical to 50-424/425 CDR 86-96 and is closed to eliminate
dual tracking. It is noted that CDR 86-96 was closed in NRC Reports
50-424/86-120 and 50-425/86-56.
c. (Closed) 50-424/425 P2186-02/P2186-05 "GE Type NGA15AG3 Relays
Incorrectly Wired." This item is identical to 50-424/425 CDR 86-123.
It is noted that 50-424 CDR 86-123 was closed in NRC Report
50-424/86-123.
d. (0 pen) 50-424/425 P2186-03, "BBC Brown Boveri K600/K800 Circuit
i
Breakers Wire Harness". This item as addressed in a Brown Boveri
letter to NRC dated June 30, 1986, concerns a defect where an
'
improperly secured wire harness could be cut by the racking gear.
The licensee informed the inspector that they have completed
l inspections and are currently assembling a complete package to assess
further reportability. The inspector will review the final package
when assembled.
i
e. (Closed) 50-424/425 P2186-04, "3050 Diaphragm Valves By Dresser".
This item is identical to 50-424/425 CDR 86-91. While verifying this
item the inspection noted that the CDR addressed 3/4" to 2" valves
where the P21 addressed 1/4" to 2". The licensee reaffirmed that the
CDR was correct by confirming that the site does not use 1/4" and
1/2" valves. It is noted that CDR 86-91 was closed in NRC Reports
50-424/87-05 and 50-425/87-05,
f. (0pened) 50-424/425 P2186-06, "Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (TDI) Time
Delay Relays". On October 1, 1986, Sacramento Municipal Utility
District reported deficiencies with Syracuse Electronic time delay
relays, Model TER-03803NL. Attachment 1 to the letter suggested that
Vogtle, as part of the TDI owner's group, may have these relays. The
licensee was provided a copy of the letter and was requested to
address the applicability of the letter for Vogtle.
g. (0pened) 50-424/425 P2186-07, " Insufficient Design Margin in Brown
Boveri Ground Detector Relays". On November 7, 1986, Brown Bovert
informed the NRC of a condition where the ITE 278 relays could fail
'
to detect a DC negative bus ground and upon receiving a positive bus
ground a short circuit of the batteries without an alarm signal could
result. This condition occurs with Catalog No. 239G0045 relays
(Note: see P21 86-08 below). The Bechtel evaluation concluded this
to not be reportable based on the fact that a single ground with
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27
relay failure would not fault the DC bus. The inspector informed the
licensee that this evaluation did not address the two grounded bus
configurations as a result of not detecting the first ground and what
failure would occur to the 125 VDC bus. The licensee clarified the
evaluation with the inspector. The interim corrective action by the
vendor is to set the sensitivity dial to the 10 o' clock position.
The evaluation indicates that at Vogtle this may be the normal
setting and no further modifications are necessary. Pending final
clarification by the licensee of modification planned and/or the
assurance that these relays are properly set in the future this item
will remain open.
h. (Closed) 50-424/425 P2186-08, "Overstressed Circuits in Brown Boveri
Ground Detector Relays". On January 5, 1984, and as an attachment to
a November 7,1986 letter, Brown Boveri informed the NRC of a
condition where ITE 27B relays could be placed in a condition where
two grounds could be indicated by the relays and depending on how
this output is utilized may affect the plant. A review of the
Bechtel evaluation in response to the November 7, 1986 letter
revealed that this deficiency pertained to Catalog No. 23900505
relays. The licensee has replaced this type relay on Unit I with
Catalog No. 239G0045 relays. Unit 2 relays will be installed under a
field equipment change order (FECO). The evaluation also states the
relays are utilized to only annunciate a grounded condition. Since
this is a fault where the presence of two grounds would be indicated
the failure is in the conservative direction. One IFI is identified
for Unit 2, IFI 50-425/87-08-01, " Review Implementation of FECO to
Change ITE 278 Relay to New Model Under MWO 2-87-0034, and MWO
2-87-0035".
20. Allegations - Units 1 & 2
a. Allegation, RII 86-A-0281, Concrete Voids in Aux. Bldg Wall.
Concern
During form removal from a "0" level Auxiliary Building wall,
concrete honeycombing was detected when the permanently installed
form bolts inadvertently pulled out of the wall.
Discussion
i
By letter dated December 8,1986, U.S. NRC Region II assigned the
subject allegation to Georgia Power Company for action and
disposition. A reply was received on December 30, 1986. The
inspector reviewed the reply and the related GPC Quality Concerns
File 86V0854 and notes that the licensee conducted an adequate
investigation into the subject allegation.
1
,
.
28
The alleger was concerned that the concrete voids (honeycombing) that
remained when the bolts were removed were not patched correctly. The
event took place in the time frame of 1980 - 1981 and the location
given was very general. A construction foreman and a QC Inspector
were located who seemed to remember the event. Both recalled that a
Deviation Report was written and the QC Inspector remembered that the
area was repaired correctly by pressure grouting (not dry-pack).
Construction Deficiency Report CD-1090 and CD-810 were located and
appear to address the situation correctly.
Conclusion
l
Based on the findings stated above and other details provided in
l Quality Concern 86V0854, this allegation is closed.
b. Allegation, RII 86-A-0315, Individuals Directed to Perform Work for
i
Which They Were Not Qualified.
Concern
l
Two electrical craftsmen stated that they were directed to perform
electrical instrumentation installation work for which they were not
qualified.
Discussion
By letter dated January 7, 1987, U.S. NRC Region II assigned the
subject allegation to Georgia Power Company for action and
disposition. A reply was received on January 21, 1987. The
inspector reviewed the reply, and the related GPC Quality Concern
File 86V0781, and determined that the licensee conducted an adequate
investigation into the subject allegation.
Two workers were instructed by their foreman to install some
instrumentation RTDs and associated straps. The workers notified
their foreman that they had not been trained and certified for that
particular type of work. There appears to have been some sort of
,
effort to have the workers perform the task under engineering
i
'
supervision. Fortunately the system corrected itself, the workers
did not perform the task, and were later sent to a training and
certification class. Verbal discussions were held with management
,
and it appears that this incident was an isolated case. Interviews j
l with other workers indicates that there are no other cases of workers l
l performing work for which they were not trained, i
l
Conclusion 1
The allegation is correct in that the men were initially instructed
to install instrumentation they were not certified to install. No
work was performed and the men were later sent through training and l
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certified. Corrective action to prevent recurrence appears adequate,
and there is no evidence of any workers performing tasks they were
not certified and trained to perform. This allegation is considered
closed.
c. Allegation, RII 86-A-0272, Cooldown of Weld by Application of Watered
Rags.
Concern
A craft foreman states that he was directed by Supervision to
cooldown a weld with watered rags. This practice is in violation of
procedures.
Discussion
The inspector reviewed GPC Quality Concern 86V5010 for additional
detail, and notes that Deviation Report PPP 15521 was issued
reporting the improper water cooldown of a structural weld. Location
was C Level, Containment 1, Imbed Plate 314 to Beam 33, a 1-1/4
structural A36 material weld. Procedure GWS-111/1, paragraph 5.4
states that welds of this material may not be cooled in this manner.
The DR was dispositioned "use-as-is" by virtue of rationale provided
in a letter from the PPP Welding Engineer, stating in summation, that
for this type and size of weld, plus circumstances of application,
there was no deleterious effect to the weld structure or material.
An NDE exam was then performed that produced acceptable results. The
inspector also notes that the accused Superintendent and General
Foreman deny they ever gave direction to cool the weld with water.
Corrective action was completed by reinstructing management and
workers that welds are not to be cooled down by water or wet rags.
Further investigation has determined that there are no other known
examples of welds being cooled down improperly.
Conclusica
The allegation that the weld was cooled down with watered rags is
correct. Whether the Foreman was specifically directed to do so is
unknown. Corrective action to prevent recurrence appears adequate
and the specific weld has been adequately dispositioned by Deviation
Report. The inspector considers this allegation closed.
d. Allegation, RII 86-A-0327, Electrical Separation Violations.
Concern
An anonymous alleger identified that a spacial separation violation
existed with high voltage cables in four specific Train-A cable trays
on Level A Hallway 58 wall penetration in the Control Building.
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Discussion
By letter dated January 1, 1987, U.S. NRC, Region II requested
Georgia Power act on the subject allegation. A reply was received on
January 12, 1987. The inspector reviewed Quality Concerns file
86V0774 and notes that the licensee conducted an adequate
investigation into the subject allegation. The review indicates that
Deviation Report (DR) 11054 identified three of the four problem
electrical cable trays in November 1985. A review revealed that the
DR did not address the concern directly and a misinterpretation
assumed that a "use-as-is" disposition applied to the cable
separation problem. In November 1986 an electrical walkdown
inspection was performed as a result of the allegation and an
on going scheduled Systems Completion program. DR ED15118 dated
11-17-86 was written detailing numerous electrical cable separation
problems including the four cable trays in the subject allegation.
Disposition was for physical correction of separation violations and
"use-as-is" dispositions where applicable. The inspector notes that
the corrective action appears to be adequate. Causal factors appear
to be human error, pulling cable over cable causing the lower layer
to move, and other craft physically working in the tray (penetration
sealers). Long term corrective action is: to be more aware and
careful during the Unit 2 installation phase, and for QC to report
the same problem more than once if necessary, and not wait for a
collective walkdown. The inspector notes that a major revision to
Procedure ED-T-02 has been issued that details very explicitly
electrical separation criteria for craft and inspection. The
inspector also notes that a recent Region II electrical inspection
did not disclose any electrical separation violations.
I
Conclusion
'
The allegation of specific electrical cable separation violations was
correct. GpC performed adequate immediate and long term corrective
action to prevent recurrence. The inspector considers this
allegation closed.
e. Allegation, RII-86-A-0235, Safety Violations in Regard to the Reactor
Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS) Testing.
Concerns
(1) The validity of a pressure test performed on June 13, 1986, was
questioned by the alleger due to its duration and the type of
M&TE used.
(2) Oil contaminated the system when a vacuum pump backed up. This
oil was noted on June 21, 1986, by a co worker of the alleger,
, (3) The alleger stated that a vacuum pump failed on September 16,
1986 and pulled oil into the RVLIS capillary tubes,
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Discussion
This allegation had been submitted to the Georgia Power Company (GPC)
! Quality Concern Program (QCP) as well as to the NRC. The QCP is
! tracking items (1) and (2), above, as File Number 86V0543 and item
! (3) as File Number 86V0826. The inspector reviewed in detail the
I
results of the investigation and action taken as described in the QCP
l files. The files indicate that the QCP response to item (3) involved
l
interviews with various personnel. As a result it was determined
- that no record exists which documents the failure of a vacuum pump,
l therefore this item was declared unsubstantiated by GPC. The
inspector could not locate any record of a vacuum pump being used on
the system in September of 1986.
Item (1) involved a pressure test run for forty-five (45) minutes
using a 0-5000 psig AMATEK gauge of one psi increments. It was
alleged that the amount of movement of the gauge needle would not be
enough to detect a pinhole leak. Item (2) involved several vacuum
pumps being used in the vacuum test portion of a Westinghouse
procedure. On several occasions these vacuum pumps were alternately
turned off and on inadvertently which permitted one vacuum pump to
,
possibly draw oil out of an idled pump. The files indicate that the
l pressure test was re performed and allowed to run for two hours, and
! that extensive flushing of the system, with chemical analysis was
performed. Personnel interviews verified that oil, or what appeared
to be oil, was discovered in parts of the system and that vacuum pump
operation was a problem. A DR was written and dispositioned properly
involving the oil in the system. The inspector reviewed Maintenance
Work Order (MWO) 18610118, which was used to facilitate filling and
venting of the RVLIS, and interviewed various GPC and Westinghouse
personnel. The MWO indicates that the filling and venting was
I performed in accordance with Westinghouse procedure SS-E-81-2,
l Revision 5 under the direction of Westinghouse engineers. Entries in
l the MWO starting from 6/27/86 to 7/4/86 document flushing part of the
RVLIS with toluene, acetone and demineralized water along with
chemical analysis to determine the amount of oil and total organic
Conclusions
Based on the inspector's review, the events involved in items (1) and
(2) did occur; however, effective corrective action was taken by the
licensee and the contractor in that:
(1) The pressure test was re performed and allowed to run for two
(2) hours which would have indicated pinhole leaks; and
(2) The section of RVLIS was chemically cleaned and flushed
satisfactorily.
The inspector considers these two items closed,
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(3) Based on the inspector's review, the events involved in Item 3
could not be confirmed or denied. No information was available.
Also involved in this concern was an allegation of wrongful
termination of a Westinghouse engineer, who was part of the fill and
vent team. The Department of Labor has this allegation under review.
l A determination of the circumstances of the dismissal was not made by
!
the inspector as part of this review.
f. Allegation, RII 85-A-0175-002, River Intake Structure Piping.
Concern
The alleger worked in the River Intake Structure and during this time
l observed the following:
(1) The QC Inspector assigned to the River Intake Structure Piping
Systems was not checking packing rings.
(2) While walking from the River Intake Structure to the plant he
noticed a large dent in a 48-inch Class III pipe located
approximately halfway between the plant and the structure. The
dent is near a section of pipe supported by a concrete saddle
block and a Dearman Alignment Joint Clamp.
Discussion
l The inspector toured the River Intake Structure both interior and
I exterior and at no time was any excessive water leakage observed. A
large pipe exits the south side of the structure and disappears
underground. The pipe is wrapped with a black type of material prior
to entering the ground and no large pipe was observed above ground
between the structure and the plant or the cooling towers. The
'
inspector reviewed Piping and Instrument Diagram (P&ID) AX4DB152-1
I " River Intake Structure" and noted that the system in question is
designated as #1402. The Vogtle Project designates all 1400 series
systems as Balance of Plant (BOP) non-safety related.
Conclusion
This allegation could not be confirmed or denied due to the fact that
all large pipe is buried and there are no large water leaks. It was
noted that the system is non-safety related. Based on this review
the inspector considers this item closed.
!
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g. Allegation, RII 86-A-0274, Fusible Links Improperly Sized or Not
! Installed.
!
Concern
Fusible links were not installed - or they were improperly sized in
j HVAC systems at Vogtle. A Deviation Report identified the problem
l
but was not acted upon (dispositioned),
1
Discussion
- On December 6,1985, QC Receiving Inspection identified that eight
HVAC fire dampers were received with incorrectly sized fusible links
! installed. Deviation Report (DR) CD8376 was initiated identifying
- the problem. Action was taken to obtain the 370-degree F. fusible !
! links from the vendor for installation in the Auxiliary Building ;
l dampers. Installation was completed on Unit I but not in Unit 2 *
! until September 1986, at which time the DR was closed. QC Inspection
I verified both unit installations and signed-off the Deviation Report
I as complete and acceptable on 9-11-86. The inspector verified that
an additional confirmation of installation was performed by
]
- engineering.
1
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Conclusion i
The allegation was correct in that incorrectly sized fusible links 3
1 were installed in HVAC dampers. The inspector notes that QC detected
i the problem and proper corrective action was taken. The inspector
! notes that the delayed corrective action for Unit 2 (approximately 9 1
l months) more than likely led the alleger to believe no action was
- taken on the Deviation Report. No improper hardware was installed in
l the plant as the licensee tock proper corrective action. Based on
- the findings stated above and other details provided in Quality
i Concern 86V0852, this allegation is closed.
I
- h. Allegation, RII-86-A-0275, Use of I&C Calibration Procedures, Testing
Procedures, Vendor Manuals and Drawings (Prints).
! Concern
l The concern was received by both GPC and Region II. The inspector
.
reviewed the allegation and placed the concerns in seven areas as
follows: ,
(1) Manuals for Fluid Components, Inc., Field Calibrator FC-81 and
Monitor Calibrator FM-71-0 were not controlled. :
- ;
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l (2) Post LOCA Purge Controller, Tag No.1-FC-2693, calibration was
j performed to an inadequate procedure.
) (3) Flow Valve FV-12777, no vendor manual available.
\
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34
(4) Vendor Drawings (Prints) X4AJ15-57 and X4AJ15-80 are the same
with the exception of additional information.
(5) Retest of the damper for Fan A-1535-N2-2001-No. I after
maintenance performed on damper.
.
(6) Lack of calibration procedure for Love Controllers Model 54.
1
i (7) The six items above are examples of the I&C shop not following
'
procedures as required by the NRC.
Discussion
l
The inspector reviewed procedures, interviewed personnel and reviewed
records. The following are the results of the review of the
'
allegation:
(1) The inspector requested .ind received from Document Control Items
l VM-1023 and VM-1024. Item VM-1023 is a Fluid Components, Inc.,
l instruction manual for Monitor Calibrator FM-71-D and Item
VM-1024 is an instruction manual for Field Calibrator FC-81 by
the same company.
(2) The inspector reviewed Procedure No. 22220-C, " Fisher Model 4150
l and 4160 Series Wizard II Controller and Transmitter
l Calibration" and reviewed Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 18619221.
!
This review indicated that the procedure was revised and the MWO
i was written to calibrate 1-FC-2693.
1
(3) The inspector received from Document Control and reviewed Vendor
Drawing X4AJ15-57-3 which is a three-way view of a valve with
information concerning the valve.
!
'
(4) The inspector received from Document Control and reviewed Vendor
Drawings (Prints) X4AJ15-57 and X4AJ15-80. Both are of the same
subject - a view of a valve.
(5) The inspector received from document control and reviewed MWO
A8602808 which indicated work performed on Fan A-1535-N7-001-000
(a possible misprint on the part of the alleger when he
,
indicated A-1535-N2-2001-No. I as the fan damper in question).
l
(6) The inspector located generic calibration procedure, 23830-C,
that successfully calibrated Love Controller Model 54 (e.g.,
ITIC-12678),
i
(7) The inspector observed work in the I&C shop, reviewed procedures i
and interviewed various personnel. l
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35
Conclusion
Based on the above activity the inspector found the following:
(1) The Vendor Instructions appear to be controlled and are
available from Document Control. Therefore, this part of the
allegation could not be confirmed as safety significant.
(2) The review of the calibration procedure and the MWO indicated
that the initial calibration procedure was inadequate.
Therefore, this part of the allegation is confirmed. The
inspector was informed that additional correctiu action is
required to document other areas where the inadequate procedure
was used. This item is identified as Inspector Followup Item
(IFI) 424/87-12-05, " Review Corrective Action Due to Use of
Inadequate Procedure No. 22220-C".
(3) The review of the Vendor Drawing indicated that it is a three-
way view of the valve and has adequate information. It is not
necessary that all vendor information be in the form of Manuals,
as long as the information supplied is sufficient to perform a
particular task. The Vendor Drawing provides the necessary
information. Therefore, this concern could not be confirmed as
- sfety significant.
(4) The review of the Vendor Drawings indicated that they are for
the same type of valve. In this particular case having two
drawings of the same subject is not safety significant. The
inspector was informed that drawing 4AJ15-57 was deleted.
(5) The review of the MWO indicated work was performed on the fan
involving the replacement of bearings. The MWO did not indicate
any retesting as being required. The removal and reinstallation
of the damper / fans during this work should not have affected the
test, provided the mechanical linkage was not disturbed. The
inspector found no evidence that this occurred. Therefore, this
part of the allegation could not be confirmed.
(6) A generic procedure is provided by procedure 23830-C to .
calibrate Love Controller Model 54. This portion of the
allegation is closed,
i
(7) The inspector concluded that although some of the items
discussed by the alleger may have occurred, collectively they do
not represent a breakdown in following procedures by personnel 1
involved in I&C work. ;
1
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I 1. Allegation, RII 86-A-0288, Termination for Reporting Concerns to ,
Quality Concerns Program. '
l
t
Concern
An alleger submitted the following concerns:
1
l (1) The wrong grease was used in the Turbine Building bridge crane
and magnatorque motors.
}
, (2) A management letter was issued deleting the requirement to
l
tighten screws on electrical terminations,
i
j (3) Maintenance of Unit 2 Containment Polar Crane is past due. ,
l (4) Termination was due to reporting concern to GPC Quality Concern
i group.
Discussion
! By letter dated December 8, 1986, U.S. NRC Region II requested
! Georgia Power to act on the subject allegations. A reply was
received on December 30, 1986. The inspector reviewed Quality
! Concerns files 86V0855, 86V0665, 86V00485, 86V0627, and 86V0705 and
< notes that the licensee conducted an adequate investigation into the
l
subject allegations.
! Inspector reviews indicate that the wrong grease was used on a small
number of motors and magnatorques in the Turbine Building. The i
problem was detected and isolated to one individual and proper
corrective action was taken. The motors were purged, correct
greasing occurred, and the electrician involved, as well as others, l
!
was counseled. Action was appropriate. !
'
The second allegation was also correct in that a memorandum was
issued from management directing that the regular maintenance
procedure requirement to check tightness of all termination screws on 1
the Unit 2 Polar Crane be deleted. The memo had well-meaning i
intentions but was incorrect. Corrective action was timely and ;
appropriate. The memo was rescinded, all personnel were counseled,
'
,
! and all the Polar Crane electrical terminations were tightened. [
There were no other examples of procedure deviations, past or
f present.
!
! The allegation of past due maintenance was not substantiated. Review 1
of records by GPC indicates that the only change in the maintenance
schedule was a change of shif ts in order that overtime would not be
4
expended for the maintenance effort. A review indicates that this
j allegation was passed on second-hand from a previous allegation ;
j closed out by Quality Concerns. No corrective action was required.
I i
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l
l
l
l The inspector reviewed all interviews, testimony and records in
l regard to the allegation of retaliation for submitting a Quality
l Concern. The inspector notes that the subject allegation was
, submitted anonymously and that there is no indication or proof that
l any of the associated personnel knew of the person's involvement with
the concern until after his dismissal. The reasons for the alleger's
dismissal was for a litany of work rule violations that are well
l documented. The allegation is unfounded.
l '
Conclusion
As previously discussed, action was appropriate on all subject
i
allegations. The basic allegation of retaliation was unfounded.
Based on the aforementioned discussions, the subject allegations are
considered closed.
J. Allegation, RII 85-A-0186 Concerning Improper Design Practicos.
Concern
An alleger stated the following concerns:
(1) Incorrect welding material and the wrong type of welds were used
on containment spray hangers.
(2) There is a lessening of verification / validation in the area of
analysis because independent review responsibilities have been
relinquished by Bechtel.
(3) In some instances where valves have "Q" rated piping on one side
and non "Q" on the other side, the anchors holding the valve
support may not be rated "Q" and the analysis may not have Deen
performed properly.
(4) Engineering associated with a specific hanger may be faulty.
(5) Small dimension anchors which should have been hot formed, were
actually cold formed and may not be suitable for their intended
engineering purpose.
(6) Bolting material may be a problem in that high Strength
structural bolts were used with improper engineering
application. Bergen-Patterson clamps are not intended to
restrain more than two degrees of freedom but have been used in
applications where they will have to restrain more than six
degrees of freedoin.
This allegation was officially transmitted to Georgia Power Company
(GPC) by the NRC for review and appropriate action in a letter dated
January 9, 1987. The GPC response to the allegation is documented in
!
!
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38
a letter to the NRC Region II, dated January 12, 1987. In their
response, GPC addresses each of the alleger's concerns and found five
to be unwarranted and the other identified only minor problems of
which no corrective action was required.
The following are the results of the inspector's review for each
concern: ,
(1) Engineering performed a preliminary review of the as-built
information for containment spray hangers in late 1985. That l
review determined that additional information was required
regarding weld configuration and clearances on the hangers.
This additional information was obtained in subsequent as-built
inspections. The existing information regarding as-built
containment spray hangers was then evaluated and reconciled
under the Final Design Verification program for safety-related
systems.
The weld material for the containment spray hangers was
determined to be in accordance with project requirements.
Quality Control inspects the welds, Quality Assurance audits the
welding process and Engineering provides as-built walkdowns.
The inspector was unable to find any open or unresolved
deviation reports or other issues regarding welding material or ,
containment spray hanger welds. ,
(2) The ANSI Standard (N45.2.11) and the standard industry practice 1
require that all safety-related design documents be authored by
a qualified individual and be verified by a second qualified i
individual independent of the author. Based on the inspector's
review, this requirement has been met continuously. In
addition, the change in arrangements between GPC and Bechtel and
between GPC and Westinghouse was identified to the NRC by
Amendment 18 (August 1985) to the FSAR Section 17A.1.8. ,
!
(3) Valves are frequently used to serve as the pressure retaining
boundary between "Q" and non "Q" piping and are supported by !
anchors / supports. The design criteria for both "Q" and non "Q" '
anchors / supports is identical for these cases. Bechtel Design "
.
Manual DC-1017, requires that "Non-Q" anchors meet the same
design stress allowables as required for "Q" anchors. .
1
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(4) This hanger / support was originally designed in the early 1980s,
was initially revised for installation on December 18, 1984, and
again on September 19, 1985, and was subsequently installed on
December 16, 1985. During each of these changes, the support !
calculations were independently verified in accordance with
project procedures and two additional independent reviews were >
conducted during the Final Design Verification program. '
However, when the most recent calculation of record was reviewed
on January 9,1987, by an independent engineering group, minor .
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39
dimensional errors were identified in the analysis model. The
engineering group lead engineer concluded by independent review
that the support is structurally sound and that the calculated
stresses are acceptable with respect to all project design
allowable stresses.
(5) From the description of the concern it was concluded that the
anchors in question are the part No. 51 anchor straps. The
anchor strap is a vendor fabricated pipe support component for
I
pipe sizes of 2 inches through 6 inches in diameter. Project
specification X4AQ01 defines that the contractor will fabricate
and supply components to the Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Power Plant
l
in accordance with the code. The applicable code of record for
l the project states that any process may be used to hot or cold
form or bend materials, provided impact material properties are
l
not reduced below minimum specified values. It is considered
l
the vendor's option as to the fabrication process used to form
! the anchor strap, provided compliance with applicable code
sections is maintained. Anchor straps are QC inspected at the
Vogtle site for rr.inimum thickness and fit-up gap between the
pipe and the strap. Inspections of some anchor straps noted
some excessive brake press indentations. The deficiencies were
documented at the time of inspection per project deviation
reports. The deviation reports were processed by the contractor
and forwarded to Engineering for evaluation. The deviation
reports were closed with "use as is", " repair" or " rework"
dispositions. A "use as is" or " repair" disposition has an
Engineering justification documented in the applicable pipe
support calculation.
(6) In order to obtain the required two or three directions of
support for small vent lines which branch off of larger process
piping, it is of ten necessary to support the small vent lines
directly fro'n the larger pipe to assure that both lines move
together thermally and that the vent line connection to the
process pipe is not overstressed. The structural attachment to
the process pipe must be capable of being a fixed point for
restraining all six degrees of freedom. To obtain this
capability, pipe clamps were bolted around the process pipe.
Unique calculations were performed for each clamp demonstrating
acceptability of the clamp for its intended design application
and no standard com>onent vendor capacity value was used for
these special applications. High strength bolts were
substituted for those supplied by the vendor to obtain the
required torque value and the clamp material was tested to
l
verify that the material would not yield at the required torque
l
values,
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Conclusion
Based on the inspectors detailed review of each aforementioned
concern interviews with the appropriate managers of the involved
organizations, review of applicable documents, and review of the GPC
response, this item is closed,
k. Allegation, RII 86-A-0285, Discrepant Conditions Not Identified on
Operations Discrepancy Report (00R).
Concern
Loose wire terminations were detected on Safety Related Vendor
supplied relay panels. Preliminary Maintenance Work Orders (MWO)
were written to rework the terminals. Conditions identified on MW0s
should have been identified on an ODR in order to address appropriate
root cause and corrective action to prevent recurrence.
Discussion
By letter dated January 2, 1987 U.S. NRC, Region II requested
Georgia Power to act on the subject allegation. A reply was received
on January 23, 1987. The inspector reviewed Quality concerns file
87V0003 and notes that the licensee conducted an adequate
investigation into the subject allegation.
The allegation was correct in that an ODR was not written in
accordance with procedures SUM 18 and 22. Paragraph 6.1.2 (SUM 18)
states, in part, that an ODR is required if there is a condition
adverse to quality. As a result of the allegation ODRs were written
and corrective action to prevent recurrence was taken. All Unit 1
and 2 Auxiliary panels from Reliance Corp. were inspected and the
loose wires tightened. Causal factors were reviewed and isolated.
Test engineers and supervisors were counseled verbally and by memo to
insure retightening of terminations during preop testing; and
reminded of the requirements to document deficiencies por procedure.
Conclusion
The allegation was correct. The loose terminations should have been
recorded on Operation Deficiency Reports. The discrepancy does not
appear to be widespread. No other examples were found. As a result
of the allegation, prompt and adequate corrective action was
accomplished by GPC Quality Concerns. Based on the foregoing, the
inspector considers this allegation closed,
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1. Allegation, RII 86-A-0216, Improper Installations of Pipe Insulation.
Concerns
An alleger submitted the following concerns having to do with pipe
insulation:
(1) Insulation was installed over unclean pipe.
(2) Insulation bands were installed incorrectly on main steam
piping.
(3) Insulation was installed using mastic rather than fiberglass
cloth.
(4) Tape was used in lieu of wire for insulation installation on
pipe elbows.
Discussion
The inspector reviewed GPC Quality Concerns files: 86V0283, 86V0284,
86V0299, 86V0316, 86V0360, 86V0369, 86V0413, 86V0429, 86V0430,
86V0480, and 86V0666. The subject allegations were addressed in
these files as were many other allegations. The inspector noted that
the licensee conducted adequate investigations into the allegations.
The inspector's review indicated that there were no areas of unclean
pipe detected. Specific areas pointed out by the alleger, as well as
nearby areas, were reinspected and swiped. No visible or chemical
unclean areas were present. A walkdown inspection was performed on
the questionable areas of the main steam piping. Insulation bands
were installed with the correct spacing (e.g., maximum of 12").
Collars and bridles were correctly installed on vt.1ves. In regards
to the use of mastic directly on pipe surfaces, the inspector noted
that specification X4AP01 requires mastic installation in open
joints.
Mastic is an approved insulator, and sir.ce no vapor barrier was
required'for the specific area involved, a fiberglass cloth
installation was not necessary. The inspector reviewed licensee
action on the allegation of tape being used in lieu of wire for
insulation installation. Specification allows the use of tape as an
installation aid, but not for permanent installation. Areas
designated by the alleger, as well as surrounding areas, were
inspected. Only those isolated areas pointed out by the alleger had
tape still installed. Investigation determined that material
compatibility was acceptable. The incident appeared to be isolated,
but widespread acceptable corrective action was taken.
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Conclusion
The inspector noted that proper carrective action was taken where ;
appropriate. Based on aforementioned discussion, this allegation i
(86-A-0216) is considered closed, i
m. Allegation, RII 87-A-0018, Miscellaneous Electrical and
Instrumentation Concerns. ;
Concern
An anonymous allegation made to NRC on January 23, 1987, was
transmitted to the licensee by NRC letter dated February 10, 1987.
The concerns were:
(1) 6" electrical separation criteria at the field cable and
internal wire junction of data module cabinet IRE 003 was not
satisfied.
,
(2) Non-safety communication equipment (e.g., pager phones) was [
installed in the Train "A" safety related wireways. Also some
non-safety fire protection wiring may have been added to the
Main Control Board (MCB). ;
(3) Hydrostatic test for a reactor vessel leak-off line used an
improperly calibrated gauge; and resulted in a failure to i
satisfy the hydro pressure requirements.
(4) Unit 1 Plant Effluent Radiation Monitoring System (PERMS) module
- ARE2532 that was located in Unit 2 was neither controlled nor -
protected. L
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Discussion
!
The Itcensee responded on March 2, 1987, to NRC letter dated
February 10, 1987, to address the subject allegations. The licensee ;
quality concerns file for these concerns was 87V0059. As of March 6, ;
1987, none of these concerns have been formally closed by the f
Itcensee, because of the final reviews required. The results of this -
allegation review were i
(1) The failure of satisfying a 6" electrical separation criteria at i
i
the field cable and internal wire junction of data module
cabinet 1RE003 was substantiated by the Itcensee and resulted in l
l Deficiency Card (DC) 1-87-743. The separation problem occurred t
when an incorrect knock-out was used for the routing of a l
non-safety related communication control room link through l
cabinet 1RE003. Eleven similar panels were reviewed by the l
Itcensee for electrical separation of wires inside cabinets and
no discrepancies were found. Based on the information reviewed. l
the inspector determined this was an isolated problem. ;
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l (2) The installation of non-safety communication equipment (e.g.,
pager phones) in the Train "A" safety related wireways was
substantiated by the licensee. Two bell type telephones were
found with communication lines routed in Train "A". DC 1-87-783
was written with the intent of correcting the problem. this
problem. In the licensee's response of March 2,1987, the
licensee committed to walk down the MCB and other switch boards
to verify that communication cable were routed correctly and
that temporary cables were removed. This verification was
completed on March 6, 1987. IFI 50-424/87-12-04, " Review
Completed Walkdown Verification Regarding Communication Cables
in Safety Related Equipment".
. Also, the incorrect wiring of non-safety related fire protection
( wiring to the MCB was not substantiated. The licensee verified
'
that non-safety fire protection wiring was correctly routed
outside the panels in question. However, during this
verification, one fire detection pull box was found by the
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licensee not to be torqued as required by procedure 29606 which
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and resulted in DC 1-87-783.
(3) The hydrostatic tost for a reactor vessel leak-off line (test
number 1-1201-35 completed on October 22, 1987) was found to
have used a test pressure gauge that was out of calibration.
This was because, the master test gauge, which was used for the
test gauge calibration, was out of calibration (e.g.,
approximately +150 psig with an actual condition of 3100 psig).
An engineering justification was performed to ensure compliance
with ASME Section III code requirements (i.e., to test a system
as a pressure not less than 1.25 times the system design
pressure).
Hydrostatic tests, which were performed using test pressure
gauges that were calibrated by the master pressure gauge in
question, were evaluated by the licensee with acceptable
results. The licensee's program to reverify testing performed
with test equipment that was later found to bo out of
calibration has been reviewed and accepted by the NRC in NRC
Report No. 50-424/86-20.
(4) The absence of control or protection of the Unit 1 Plant
Ef fluent Radiation Monitoring System (PERMS) module #ARL2532 in
Unit 2 was substantiated by the licensee. However, this
radiation equipment is not required by Unit 1 Technical
Specification Table 3.3.2 untti irradiated fuel is stored in the
Fuel Handling Duilding. To administrative control this
equipment during the Unit 2 construction, the licensee has
written maintenance work order (HWO) A8700648 to provide a
locked cabinet for this PERMS module.
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The other concern of Unit 1 electrical cables and equipment
located in Unit 2 has been addressed by IFI 50-424/86-31-05,
which has been previously closed.
I Conclusion
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Based on the inspector's detail review of each aforementioned concern
'
with licensee management and of documentation, this allegation
(86-A-0018) is closed,
n. Allegation RI! 87-A-0023, Termination for Identifying Safety Concerns
Concern
The following concerns were presented by the alleger:
(1) Termination of employment may have been caused by alleger's role
in Raychem electrical investigation.
, (2) Teflon tape may havo been improperly used on Conax cables in
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Containment.
(3) Heat shrink tubing may have been installed without adhesive.
Discussion
The inspector reviewed GpC files in regard to the termination of the
alleger. The files are complete, extensive, and contain meaningful
infortration. There is no evidence that suggests that the alleger was
laid of f because of an association or participation with the Raychem
electrical investigation. The alleger was one of many selected for a
Reduction in Force (RIF) and the selection process was in accordance
with GPC procedures.
l The inspector reviewed the files and reports for information in
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regard to the use of teflon tape in containment. The allegation is
one of second hand in nature, given to the alleger by a former
'
co worker. Investigation by QC and Quality Concerns indicates that
teflon tape may be used as splice material on Conax cables in
Containment. There are a few exceptions, but they are controlled by
specification and vendor instructions. Inspection instructions
address this issue. The Quality Concern File 87V0044 did not reveal
if a followup interview with the co-worker was initiated. Inspector
Followup Item (IFI) 50-424/87-12-06 " Review Followup Interview
Regarding QCP File 87V0044" is identified.
The inspector reviewed the QCP file and NRC Inspection Reports for
information on the use of adhesive on heat shrink tubing. During the
time of NRC Reports 50-424/86-95 and 50-424/87-06, the subject of
adhesive use was addressed. The allegation was true that an
inspector did write himself up for not insuring the use of adhesive
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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shimming for Raychem splices. The issue was known and corrected in
accordance with procedures. The NRC inspections noted above, and GPC
investigations found no other cases of omission of adhesive during
Raychem splicing.
Conclusion
The Quality Concern investigation was extensive, meaningful and ,
adequate. The inspector considers the allegations noted herein as
adequately addressed and therefore closed.
o. Allegation RII 87-A-0036, Failure to Follow the Smoking, Drinking and
Eating Procedure.
Concern
Plant Procedure 00253-C, " Smoking, Eating and Drinking Policy" was
not being implemented properly.
Discussion
On March 5, 1987, a Georgia Power Company employee concerned with
plant cleanliness informed the resident inspector office of the above
stated concern. This employee stated that the Auxiliary Building,
Health Physics Bathrooms, and the area directly outside the contain-
ment airlock routinely showed evidence of eating and smoking. He
also stated that he had not observed anyone violating the
cleanliness, but was unsure what to do if he did.
The inspector informed the employee of the proper reporting method,
that his observations have been already noted to management, that
management was planning additional action, and that these concerns
would be restressed at the next monthly resident exit.
The inspector interviewed the Plant Manager on March 6, 1987, to have
the individual's specific concerns relayed as well as ascertain what
actions were planned and the time table for implementation. The
Plant Manager had prepared a memo directed to All Personnel Working
in the Protected Area and the memo would soon be issued. The second
phase will be to become proactive in enforcement of the policy. On
March 9, 1987, upon entry into the protected area, the inspector
received a copy of the March 6,1987 letter. This letter clearly
establishes the individual as responsible for knowing the work rules
and reporting violations. The plant policy was attached which
included disciplinary action.
At the resident exit meeting on March 9, 1987, the issue was
restressed to upper management. The General Manager stated that
management was committed to a program to implement an effective i
policy.
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Conclusion
As previously discussed, plant management was aware of the problem
and was currently implementing a program to bring awareness and
enforcement. The basic allegation is substantiated, but based on
plant tours by the resident, the infractions are considered minor
with the appropriate action in progress by the licensee. This ,
allegation is closed. ,.
21. Management Meetings - Unit 1(30702)
This activity involves inspector participation and preparation in support
of the following meetings which presented site readiness.
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February 11, 1987 meeting with Chairman Zech and Technical
Assistants.
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March 3, 1987 meeting with Commissioner J. Asselstine and Special
Assistant.
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