ML20205N556
| ML20205N556 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 04/21/1986 |
| From: | Gagliardo J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Pilant J NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8605020185 | |
| Download: ML20205N556 (2) | |
Text
_
APR 2 l 1986 In Reply Refer To:
Docket: 50-298 Nebraska Public Power District ATTN: J. M. Pilant, Manager, Technical Staff-Nuclear Power Group P. O. Box 499 Columbus, Nebraska 68601 Gentlemen:
Attached is a copy of the exercise report of the October 16, 1985, joint
. exercise of the offsite radiological emergency exercise for the Cooper Nuclear Station. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) identified six deficiencie.; and several inadequacies as requiring corrective action. Five of the deficiencies have been corrected, and it is requested that representatives from Cooper Nuclear Station and the appropriate state agencies coordinate to complete the necessary corrective action for the remaining deficiency and the inadequacies in a timely manner.
If you have' ac/ further questions, please contact this of fice.
Sincerely, M hipedk
J. E. Gagliardo, Chief Reactor Projects Branch cc w/o report:
Richard W. Krimm, As,istant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Program Federal Em+ rgency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 cc w/ report:
Guy Horn, Division Manager of Nuclear Operaticns Cooper. Nuclear Station P. O. Box 98 Brownvi'le, Nebraska 68321 Kansas Radiation Control Program Director Nebraska Radiation Control Program Director bec: (see next page)
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91, Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 NAR IT ses MEMORANDlM FOR: Rimrd L. Jordan Director Division of DerT;ency Preparedness and Engineering Ibsponse U.S. Nuclear 14x;ulatory Conmission F10M: -
L Assistant Associate Director Of fice of Natural and Technological llazards Program SUSJECr: Exercise Report of the October 16, 1985, Exercise of the Of fsite Radiological Onergency Preparedness
, Plans for the Cooper Nuclear Station Attached is a copy of the Exercise Peport of the October 16, 1985, joint exercise of the offsite radiological emrgency preparedness plans for the Coq >er Nuclear Station at Brownville, Nebraska. The joint exercise was full participation for the State of Nebraska anci the Counties of Nanaha and Otoe; and, the State of Mia>uri and the Counties of Atchison and Nodt.way.
The report dated D2cember 20, 1985, was prepared by Faleral Drettlency Management Agency (FENA) Peqion VII.
FEMA Ibgion VII identified four deficiencies in Nebraska. Two concerned field monitorirr; and decontamination by the State. TW concerned Neuha County's alert & notification ( A&N) of Indian Cave State Park and access control throughout the jurisdiction. In addition, two deficiencies were identified in Missouri. These concerned the inability to successfully dononstrate the 15-tninute A&N function by the Atchison County Dnertjency Operations Center (ET) and the lack of provisions in both the Missouri and Atchison County plans for A&N in the Brickyard flill State Wildlife Area.
On November 26, 1985, the deticiency in 15 minute A&N of the public by the Atchison County EOC was corrected in a remedial exercise. All but one of the other d?ficiencies have been correctal by training, plan revisions, arx1 letters of agreement. The remaining deficiency is concerned with Brickyard fiill arvi is scheduled for correction by June 15, 1986. This correction will include not only plan revisions and letters of agreerent but a remedial exercise.
On Septenber 24, 1986, another full-participation joint exercise of offsite plans arri preparedness is scheduled to be held in support of the Cooper Nuclear Station. Were appropriate, all of the trainirvi, plan revisions and letters of agreerent will be tested at this exercise.
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In the October 16, 1985, exercise there were other inadequacies identified as requiring corrective actions. The States of Nebraska and Missouri have re-ceived a copy of the exercise report and are preparinq schedules of corrective actions. When they are received and analyzed, we will send you copies.
Although there were deficiencies observed at the exercise, the States of Nebraska and Missouri have nado substantial procress in correcting them; the only reminirq deficiency is scheduled for ccrnpletion by June 15, 1986.
Based on this progress in the correction of deficiencies, there is reasonable assurance that the public health and safety can be protected in the event of an accident at the Cooper Nuclear Station.- Therefore, the November 30, 1983, approval under FL%\ Rule 44 CFR 350 will remin in offect.
.If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Ibtert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division at 646-2861.
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EXERCISE EVAIDATION OF THE IMPIJMENTATION OF STATE AND IDCAL RADIOIDGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PIANS EKERCISE CONDUCTED OCTOBER 16, 1985 RDEDIAL DRILL CONDUCTED NOV)MBER 26, 1985 for the COOPER NUCLEAR STATION Brownville, Nemaha County, Nebraska Nebraska Public Power District PARTICIPANTS:
State of Nebraska State of Missouri County of Nemaha County of Atchison County of Otoe County of Nodaway (All affected jurisdictions participated) prepared by Federal Bnergency Management Agency Region VII Kansas City, M0 DECEMBER 20, 1985
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CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRORYE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv EYRRCISE
SUMMARY
................................................... vi I
1 INTRODUCTION....................................................
Exercise Background........................................ 1 1.1 1.2 Exercise Evaluators........................................ 1 1.3 Evaluation Critdria........................................ 2 1.h Exercise Findings Classification........................... 3 1.5 Exercise objectives........................................ 3 1.6 Exercise Scenario......................................... 22 1.7 State and Local Resources................................. 22 2 Exercise Evaluation............................................ 2h
. 2.1 Joint Operations.......................................... 2h 2.1.1 Drergency Operations Facility / Nebraska FCP. . . . . . . . . . 2h 2.1.2 Information Authentication Cer.ter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 2.1.3 Media Release Center................................ 27 2.2 Nebraska operations....................................... 30 2.2.1 State Energency Operations Center (SE0C ) . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 2.2.2 Radiological Assess =ent/ Field Team Coordination..... 31 2.2.3 Field Monitoring Tea =s.............................. 32 2.2. h State Radiological Laboratory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
- 2. 2. 5 Deconta=ination Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 23 County operations......................................... 38 2.3.1 Ne=aha County E0C................................... 38 2.3.2 Ne=aha County A=bulance............................. 39 2.3.3 Otce County EOC and Reception Center................. LO 2.h Missouri State Operations.................................. kl
) 2. k.1 State Emergency Operations Center. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . kl
- 2. k . 2 Fo rwa rd Co==and Po s t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L1 2.k.3 Field Team Coordination / Dose Assessment.............. L3 2.k.h Field Monitoring..................................... kk 2.5 County Operations.......................................... h6
- 2. 5 .1 Atchi son County E0C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h 6 2 5.2 Atchisen County Decontamination Facility............. k8 2.5.3 Relocation Center, Maryville, Missouri............... k8 2 5.h Decenta=ination Facility, Maryville, Missouri........ k9 2.5.5 Atchison County Medical Support...................... k9 3 ACTIONS TO RDEDY DEFICIENCIM3 PREVIOUSLY CITED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 3.1 Nebraska Deficiencies..................................... 51 3.1.1 Field Monitoring.................................... 51 3 1.2 Nebraska City Deconta=ination Facility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 3.1.3 Ne=aha County Access Control........................ 52 3.1.h Alert & Notification - Indian Cave State Park....... 53 3.2 Mi s s ouri De fi ci enci e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3
- 3. 2.1 Atchi son Coun ty E0C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3 3 2.2 Brickyard Hill State Wildlife Area................... Sk k SUttlARY OF AREAS REQlJIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION................... 56 5 SUpttARY OF RECOf9ENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
! )
iv ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYKI ACEOC Atchisen County (MO) E=ergency Operations Center AEOF Alternate E=ergency Operations Facility ANL Argonne National Laboratory ARC American Red Cross BLUEBIRD Nebraska State Patrol Mobile E=ergency Co==unications Center BRM Misscuri Division of Health, Bureau of Radiological Health CD Civil Defense CNS Cocper Nuclear Statien CRUSH Nebraska Civil Defense Portable Operations Center / Field Cctrand Pcst DCE Department of Energy
)
EES Etergency Broadcast Syste=
EPA Envirctmental Protection Agency EOC Emergency Operations Center ECF Emergency Operations Facility EFZ Energency Planning Zone FCP For ard Co==and Post FEMA Federal Energency Management Agency IAC Information Authentication Center INEL Idaho National Engineering laboratory KI Potassium Iodide
- MBC Media Release Center h -
v '
NCEOC Ne:aha County (NE) Emergency Operations Center NPPD Nebraska Public Power District NUREG-065h Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological E=ergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (.WREG-065h/FDiA-REP-1, Rev. 1)
OPPD Omaha Public Power District PAR Protective Action Recc==endation PHS Public Health Services PIO Public Infor=ation Officer ,
RAC Regional Assistance Cct:ittee RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan s
SCDA Nebraska State Civil Defense Agency S D *.A Missouri repartment of Public Safety, State Ihergency I'.anagement Agency SCP Standard Operating Procedure T' D '~her .clu=inescent Dosimeter USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture JL
vi I2ERCISE SUBSIARY The purpose of an , exercise is to determine the ability of appropriate off-site agencies to respond to an emergency covered by State and local Radiological Emergency Response Plans. The evaluation of such an effort will, of necessity, tend to focus on the negative aspects of the exercise, on inadequacies in planning, preparedness and performance.
This focus of attention on the negative should not be taken to mean
- that there vere not a great many positive acco=plish=ents as well. Indeed, there were, however, in the interest of brevity, only inadequacies vill herein be su -arized.
JOINT OPERATIONS Ehergency Operations Facility (EOF)/ Nebraska FCP The only objective not demonstrated fully was Number 3 for Nebraska.
There vere two areas requiring corrective action. The first relates to a clarification of the Nebraska State Plan regarding certain aspects of alert and notification. The second concerns backup co==unications to the Atchison County EOC.
There vere four reco=nendations for cperational improvement. Details are fcund in Section 2.1.1.
Information Authentication Center All ob,iectives were achieved by both States. There is one area of required corrective action relating to Nebraska coordinating with Missouri prior to release of EBS cessages not accompanied by sirens. Details are in Section 2.1.2.
kdia Release Center
. Nebraska failed to demonstrate Objective Number 26, as it requires a telephona hotline for rumor control. There were also three required corrective actions. Two related to the canner in which press briefings are conducted, and the third relates to Nebraska's responsibility for rumor control. Details are in Section 2.1.3. .
NEBRASKA OPERATIONS State lhergency Operations Center (SEOC)
All objectives were demonstrated.
Radiological Assessment and Field Team Coordination
) Only Objective Number 6 was not fully demonstrated. There was also a single reco==endation for operational improvement. Details are in Section 2.2.2.
~
ii -
vii .
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l Field Monitoring Teams
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l Only two of five objectives were fully de=onstrated. There vere two deficiencies relating to: (a) inadequate radiation detection equipment, and (b) operational procedures of one of the field teams. Details of the deficiencies are is Section 2.2.3. Remedial Actions are in Section 3.
Details of corrective actions are contained in Section 3.1.1.
State Radiological Iaboratory The single objective for this facility was not fully demonstrated.
This resulted in a required corrective action relating to the staff use of TLDs. Details are in Section 2.2.L.
Objective Number 29 was not fully demonstrated. This resulted in a deficiency due to the failure to de=enstrate personnel decontamination.
j Details are in Section 2.2.5, with re=edial action in Section 3.
Decontamination Facilities - Auburn, Nebraska Objectives demenstrated; no prcblems observed.
Nemaha County EOC
)
Objectives not demo.istrated were 13, 17, and 35 Failure to de=enstrate 13 and 17 resulted in deficiencies. One deficiency related to timely alert and notification to Indian Cave State Park; the other l related to the titely establish =ent of access control to evacuated areas.
Details of the exercise are in Section 2.3.1.; details of the remedial actions are in Section 3.1.3 Nemaha County Ambulance Unit All objectives were satisfactorily de=onstrated.
Otoe County EOC and Reception Center All objectives were demonstrated with no inadequacies observed.
MISSOURI OPERATIONS State Baergency Operationn Center (SHOC)
Objective Number h was not demonstrated due to the unavailability of adequate maps and displays. Details of recom=endations are in Section 2.k.1.
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.' viii Forward C - nd Post (FCP)
Objectives Nu=ber 13 and lb (alert and notification) were not demonstrated due to the fact that the General E=ergency occurred before the FCP became operational. One inadequacy was observed. Details are in Section 2.k.2.
- Field Team Coordination / Dose Assessment Objectives Nu=ber k and 5 were not fully demonstrated. There was one area requiring corrective action. This related to the use of a single map for radiological =onitoring. Details are in Section 2.k.3 Field Monitoring Two objectives were not fully demonstrated: One related to clarity of radio ec==unications afte- the EOF relocated; the other related to the transport of field sampler.
There was a required corrective action relating to the use of a single equip =ent checklist. Details are in Section 2.L.L.
Atchison County EOC Objectives not de=enstrated: 1, 5, 13, IL, 18, and 20. Several of these contributed to two deficiencies. The first related to the failure y to provide timely alert end notification to the residents in general; the second relates to failure of the State and local Plans to provide for ti=ely alert and notification of transients within the Brickyard Hill State 'a'ildlife Area.
In addition, there were areas requiring corrective action related to backup co==unication with the EOF, special needs of =obility impaired, and sheltering infor=ation for transients. Details are in Section 2.5.1.
Atchison County Decontamination Facility Objective Number 29 vas only partially de=enstrated. There was no personnel decontamination. Details are in Section 2.5.2.
Relocation Center, kryville, Missouri Objective Nu=ber 27 was only partially demenstrated. They vill be required to use proper registration procedures at the next exercise.
Details are in Section 2.5.3 Decontamination Facility, Maryville, Missouri Objectives vere de=onstrated; no inadequacies were observed.
ix ,
Atchison County Medical Support Due to the fact that ambulance and hospital staff lacked TLDs, Objective Nunter 20 was not fully de=enstrated. Thic calls for required corrective actien. Details are in Section 2.5.5
l 1 IFFRODUCTION i
1.1 EIERCISE BACIGROUND l Radiological emergency response plans for the Cooper Nuclear Station l (CNS) for the States of Nebraska .and Missouri and affected local l
jurisdications were conditionally approved by FD!A on July 2,198h.
! The plans of. both States - were evaluated in joint exercises annually
( since 1982. This report concerns the results of the joint exercise of October
.16, 1985 It vas classified as " full scale" for Missouri and "small scale" for Nebraska. The exercise was condreted between the hours of 0800 and l
1630.
1.2 EXERCISE EVAIEA1DRS i
Seventeen Federal Agency personnel and seven FDM Contractors evaluated the off-site emergency response functions:
OBSERVER AGENCY ASSIGNMEIT Wolf Biedenfeld FHS NE & MO Medic Bob Bissell FDM Nemaha Co. (NE) EOC Ja=es Bcgard DOE MO Rad Tean/Atchisen Co. Decon Bill Brinck EFA FT Coord./ Dose Assessment (MO)
Marlee Carroll FDM EOF /FCP (NE)
Nate Chip =an~ INEL NE Rad Team #2 John Coleman FD!A Regional Office Coordination Caroline Herzenberg ANL Nebraska City & Auburn Decon Ten Hogan FDM MO FCP/Atchison Co. E00 Rochelle Honkus INEL NE FT Coord./ Dose Assessment Chuck Huyett FDM Regional Office Coordination Eric Jenkins FDM NE State EOC Rich Lecnard FDM Ovetview Jamie Majors FDM Regional Office Coordination Gary McClure FEM MO State EOC Dorothy Nevitt USDA MO FCP Eileen O' Hare ARC Nodaway Co. Decen Facility /
Maryville Relocation Center Jim Opelka AfiL NE Rad Lab Gary Sanborn NRC IAC Chris Saricks ANL Nemaha Co. (NE) EOC Lyle Slagle INEL NE Rad Team #1 Tim Seidel FDM MRC Dick Sumpter FDM Oservicu Dianne Wilson FDM Nebraska City Relocation Center /
Otoe Co. EOC
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1.3 EVAIDATION CRITERIA The evaluation criteria for this exercise vere:
- 1. ?VREG-C65h/FD'A-REP-1, Rev. 1 (All applicable requirements).
- 2. The 35 Objectives used by FD!A vill serve as a corposite of exercise de=enstratable elements contained in NUREG-065h. A copy of these objectives is contained in Section 1.h of this evaluation. These objectives vill be referenced by number throughout the report.
3 Nebraska Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plant Incidents (RERP). April 15, 1983, (with all current changes snd amendments thereto).
L. Radiolegical Emergency Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plant Incidents, Ne=aha County, Nebraska, April, 1983.
- 5. Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Otce County, Nebraska, April, 1983.
- 6. Missouri Nuclear Accident Plan, Cooper Nuclear Station.
- 7. Atchison County, Misscuri Radiologicsl Etcrrency Pesponse Plan. ?
i
1.4 EDmCISE FINDINGS CIASSIFICATION l FEMA classifies exercise inadequacies as deficiencies or areas requiring corrective action.
Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedress was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be-taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in tue event of a radiological emergency.
Areas requiring corrective actions are demonstrated and observed inadequacies of State and local government performance, and although their correction is required, they are not considered by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety.
. In addition, FD'.A identifies areas reco== ended for improvement, which are probles areas observed during an exercice that are not considered to adversely i= pact public health and safety. While not required, correction of these vould enhance an organization's level of preparedness.
1.5 EDBCISE OIUECTIVES
.On August h, 1985, the State of Nebraska Civil Defense Agency submitted final off-site objectives for the exeriese.
On August 5, 1985, the off-site objectives from the Missouri State y
Emergency Management Agency were received.
Objectives - Nebraska State Support Capabilities (Verbatim, as submitted)
- 1. Activation of staff with subsequent deployment and operation of the State Field Com=and Post to include local and long-range coe=unications. If plant scenario pemits, test- relocation of State Field Co==and Post. Participation of Nebraska State Patrol BLUEBIRD vill be si=ulated.
- 2. Notification and follow-up contacts with State, Federal, and private agencies having responsibilities described in the Nebraska Plan.
3 Operational status and functioning of State EOC as well as coordination with agencies and field elements. Includes State EOC interstate coordination. With the exception of the Health Department, Agency representation at the State EOC will be simulated. State EOC vill implement appropriate protective actions as approved by the Governor and/or the Governor's Authorized Representative.
- h. State field radiological monitoring activities, off-site dose assessment, and coordination of protective action recommendations with Governor's Authorized Representative and State EOC.
Coordination vill also be effected with the utility and Missouri.
This vill include timely mobilization, deployment and operation
_L_ ,
of State field radiolegical =onitoring tears, as well as canagement of team activities, appropriate briefings and informatien flow.
Field =enitoring team equip =ent and ce==unications capabilities vill also be de=cnstrated. State aerial radiological =onitoring
=1ssions to roughly track and define the parameters of the airborne plume, as veJ1 as transport samples to the State Lab will be simulated.
- 5. Decisien-=aking provisions for the use and distribution of radieprotective drugs for e=ergency workers.
- 6. The collection and transport of samples to the State Laboratory in Lincoln cay be si=ulated. Timely processing of camples and other techniques at the State Laboratory vill be demonstrated.
- 7. State EOC coordination of si=ulated Federal technical and ncn-technical support under the Federal Radiological E=ergency Freparedness Plan (FRERP), including message flow and siculated support by such agencies as NBC, COE and 7D*.A.
E. State CD support of the jointly operated Infor=atien Authentication Center (IAC) and Media Relase Center (!GC ) . Pe=enstrate IAC coordinated dissemination of infor=ation siculated through the EBS. Operations at the !GC vill include news media briefings, as well as the apprcpriate une of zone designaters/lccal terms in briefing media and the State of !;ebrash 1se of visual displays Tcr briefing and creraticns. The transmission of selected c=ergency informatien by mesns of portable data terminals vill also be demonctrtated. Fu=cr control functions at the IAC and !GC vill te tested.
9 Support for and supervision of two decentaminaticn stations; one at Auburn for emergency workers and the other at Nebracks City for evacuees.
- 10. State and local co==unicaticns inclutinr, p ri =a ry and supporting capabilities.
'. l . Decision-making and coordination for reentry an I recovery.
- 12. State's capability to provide and dintribute cufficient desimetry to include self-reading and permanent record devices (TLDs) for the initial distributien to e=ergency workers operating i- radiation areas. Most TLDs use! durine the exercise vill be 'mulnted.
Actual TLLc vill Le available for inspection at the State FL '
Objectiven - Nebranka local Support Capabilitten
- 1. Initial notification receipt and alerting of key people.
- 2. Cc==unications and coordination with all involved agencien.
- 3. Activation and staffing of loen1 therrency (Terating Centern (EOC) and appropriate une of F=crgency Clat.31ricationc.
I
_5
- h. Coordinated access control and security decision-caking by selected law enforcecent agencies.
5 Increased readiness measures for potential operations at Nebraska City /0 toe County relocation center. This facility vill be operated on a training 6 asis, but vill be subject to observation.
- 6. Decontamination station operstions at Auburn to support emergency workers vill be demonstrated.
- 7. De=onstrate capability to activate public alerting syste= and provide an informational message to the public within 15 minutes.
Actual activation of alerting system and EBS will be siculated.
However, preparation and handling of public notification r:essages vill be de=onstrated. (The public alert and notification procedures vill be accomplished during the FDG-L3 test, to be conducted on October 17, 19B'). )
- 6. Coordination with IAC/PRC vhere appropriate concerning local public infor=ation activites. Demonstrate capability to define hszard area by referencing local land = arks.
9 Provisien of fire and rescue support as required by plant.
Transport and reception of simulated radiation casualty to the Ne=aha County Hospital by a local Rescue Squad.
- 10. Decision-making and coordination planning for recovery and reentry.
- 11. The Nebraska City /Otoe County reception registration and decontamination activities in support of Ne=nha County evacuees vill be operated on a training basis, but vill be subject to observation.
- 12. Demonstrate effective system for distribution and record keeping of desitetry - to include permanent record devices (TLDa').
- 13. Deconstrate timely ecc=unication and coordination with coc= unity facilities for nobility impaired, disabled, etc. that =ay require special actions; such as, early notification or other support -
functions as identified.
- 11. . Decision-making vill be demonstrated to simulate end control allocation of local resources, and determine need for State support, as necessary.
15 Decision-making vill be de=enstrated to simulate allocation cf appropriate support for the evacuation of the public vith special needs, if required.
Since Missouri submitted its objectives in a forent utilizing the 35 FEM Objectives, they are reproduced in full.
)
MISSOURI ,
STATE OBJECTIVES 1985 - COOPER
_______________________________MC IEOC IFCP IIAC IDose Assm IF iMRC lNedicall t ! I l____I_____I_____l__________l I ! !
I t i I I Demonstrate ability to i I I t ! I !
1.
mobilize staff and IYES t YES IYES I YES :YES tYES I N/A I activate f acilities f f f I t i ! I promptly. t____ _____!_____!__________!____!______!_______t t i I i ! ! I I i ! I I I
- 2. Demonstrate ability to 1 I :
fully staff facilities tYES : YES YES YES !YES :YES ! N/A i and maintian staffing i i I t ! I I i around the clock. l____I_____!_____!__________!____!______!_______l!
t i I I ! ! !
Demonstrate ability to I i ! : : I : I 3.
make decisions and to I YES I YES lN/A t YES tYES tYES I N/A I
! ! ! I t coordinate emergency : I I Cctivities. !____!_____t ! I I
! ! t l 8 I I Demonstrate adequacy I t : ! ! ! I !
O.
cf facilities and I YES ! YES tYES I N/A !YES :YES : N/A t Cisplays to support I ! ! : : I ! I emergency operations. l____I_____!_____!__________!____l______!_______l!
! I I 1 I i Demonstrate abili ty to I ! ! ! ! ! : ,
5.
communicate with all 1 YES I YES IYES i YES :YES iYES t YES I
! ! I I : I !
appr opriate locations, !
organizations, and ! ! ! : : I i !
field personnel. l____I_____!_____ __________!____l _____!_______
I l ! ! I i i I Demonstrate ability to ! ! I : : ! I 6.
mobilize and deploy i N/A t N/A !N/A YES IYES :N/A I N/A I field monitoring teams t ! ! I I t ! !
in a timely f ashion. !____!_____!_____!__________!____l ______I_______l !
1 I I ! ! !
t : ! : ! !
- 7. Demonstrate appropri- t I cte equipment and ! N/A I N/A !N/A YDS !N/A IN/A ! N/A !
t ! ! : I : : I procedures f or deter-cining ambient radt- 1 I !
ction levels. l____I_____!_____!__________I____!______!_______t!
i l i i : I !
Demonstrate appropri- t I i : ! : I t 8.
cte equipment and i N/A t N/A IN/A I YES !N/A IN/A N/A I I I I ! l ! I procedures f or measur- 1 ment of airborne ! I I I t ! ! I I i ! ! I I I rcdiciodine concentra- 1
! ! ! I !
tions as low as ! I !
i ! i : I l i I 10-7 uCi/CC i ! ! ! ! I presence of noble t I g ses. l____l_____!_____!__________I____l _____!_______I
(,
. TE6E TEEE- TiEE- TB5sE EisA TERE iARE-- TRE5iEAEt1
____I_____ _____i__________ i ____ i______:! I Demonstrate appropri- t I : I
- 9. I t ! I cte equipment and i I I I procedures f or coll ec- N/A : N/A N/A : YES tN/A 1N/A 1 N/A I
! ! : I : I tion, transport and ( 1 I
i ! ! I : : !
analysts of samples !
i ! ! : i I of soil, vegetation. I enow, water and milk. !____!_____I_____!__________!____!______I_______! : : 1 i
- I !
- i i ! I i !
- 10. Demonstrate ability 8 to project dosage i N/A t YES I N/A t YES tYES :N/A : N/A I
- I 1 i t to the public via ! :
! ! ! I plume exposure, based I I ! !
- I i 1 on plant and field ! ! I t
! ! I t I C ta, and to determine i ! !
- : : ! ! ! I appropriate protective ! * !
measures, based on !
- I I : : : I PAG's, avail abl e :
I ! ! l ! I chelter, evacuation i I time estimates, and I ! ! : : I i
! ! ! ! t 1 !
other appropriate I I
factors. I____!_____!_____I__________;____1______:
! I : ! ! : I
- I f I : !
- 11. Demonstra t e ability i I I : ! ! I to project dosage : !
IN/A IN/A IN/A I to the public via :N/A I YES IN/A t YES
! ! ! ! ! ! I ingestion pathway I I
i : ! ! I cxposure, based on I !
i I : ! ! :
field data, and to I I I t ! ! !
determine appropriate ! I
- : I !
protective measures ! : I
- I t !
Dased on PAG
- s and ! I t :
I : ! ! ! I f cn other relevant !
factors (NUREG-0654, I : :
I.10, J.11). l____I_____I_____ __________ ____i______:_______t
! I i : I I I i I i : :
- 12. Demonstrate abiity to ! I I !
- I implement protective i t i ! ! 1 I
cction f or ingestion IN/A 1 YES IN/A : YES IN/A IN/A 3N/A
! I I I I I I pathway hazards t I i 1 I I (NUREG-0654, J.9, 1 I J.11). l____!_____I_____I__________I____I______I_______t I I I
! I I ! !
i I ! I
- 13. Demonstrate abil t y to i I I t lN/A ;N/A IN/A :
clert the public with_ IN/A I YES IN/A I N/A f I I !
in the 10-mile EPZ, I i ! I
! ! I I I I I disseminate an initial i I i instructional message i I I I I I within 15 minutes l____f_____1_____!__________I____l ______I_______!
)
_g_
iEbb~ikbP~~likb~~ibb5E~db5b~iEbb~ibRU~~~ib5bibdLi l____!_____I_____l__________!____I______!_______I!
I I I I ! ! !
- 10. Demonstrate ability to I ! ! ! I I I I formulate and distri- lN/A ! YES IN/A N/A IN/A IN/A IN/A bute apprpriate in- 1 I ! ! ! ! I !
ctructions to the j ! ! I I I I i i I ! ! I I I I public in a timely fCshion. l____I_____I_____l__________I____!______!_______!
! ! I ! ! ! I I
- 15. Demonstrate the organi-: ! I I I I I I zctional ability and iN/A I N/A IN/A I N/A IN/A lN/A : N/A I resources necessary to : I I I I i i I manage an orderly I l I ! ! ! ! I
! I I I ! ! I :
cvacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ l ! ! ! I i : 1 (NUREG-0654, J.9, I : l : I l i I J.10.g). !____!_____!_____i__________!____I______!_______t i i ! ! I I ! !
- 16. Demonstrate the organi-l ! ! I ! ! !
zational ability and IN/A i 10 IN/A I N/A IN/A IN/A IN/A :
resources necessary to I I 1 ! ! 1
! ! : 1 I Coal with impediments ! ! !
to evacuati on, as : : I ! ! ! I I i l i : ! I I I inclement weather or
! : I : ! I I I traffic obstructions.
(NUREG-0654, J.10.k). !____!_____l ____!__________!____!______I_______ti I ! I i ! I I
- 17. Demonstate the organi- ! I I I ! ! ! 3 zational ability and IN/A I N3 IN/A I N/A IN/A IN/A I N/A 8 resources necessary to ! I ! ! ! ! I :
i i : ! I I :
control access to an I
! l cvacuated area (NUREG- 1 I ! l ! !
0654, J.10.j). !____!_____!_____l ________,_i____I______:,______I!
I i 1 1 1 1
- 10. Demonstrate the organi-l ! l ! i ! ! !
zational ability and !N/A I N/A IN/A I N/A IN/A IN/A IN/A !
i I I ! I resources neccessary I I :
to ef f ect an orderly i I I ! ! I ! I cvacuation of mobility-l ! I : I I i :
impaired individuals ! I I i l I i !
within the plume EPZ ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
(NUREG-0654, J.10.d). l____!_____!_____!__________!____!______I_______!
h
- i 9_
1 l
____ l
_____________________________________________ICAll IEDC IFCP !!AC IDOSE ASSM IFMC INRC IMED l l____I_____!_____!__________!____I______I_______!
1 I I I I I I I )
- 19. Demonstrate the organi-l i I I ! ! I I l actional ability and iN/A I N/A I N/A I N/A IN/A IN/A I N/A I l resources necessary to ! I ! l I I I I I Cffect an orderly 1 i ! ! I I I I cvacuation of schools i I I I I I ! !
within the plume EPZ l I l l 1 I I I (NUREG-0654, J.9, ! ! I I I I I I J.10.g). l____I_____I_____I__________!____I______!_______I I I I ! ! ! ! 1 20 Demonstrate the abilityi ! ! I I I I I to continously monitor i N/A I YES IYES I YES IYES IN/A I N/A I and control emegency I I I I I I ! I worker exposure. l____I_____I_____!__________!____I______I_______I I I ! ! I I ! !
- 21. Demonstrate the abilityl ! ! ! ! I I I to make the decision, 8N/A I YES IN/A I YES IN/A IN/A I N/A 1 b sed on predetermined ! I I ! ! I ! I criteria, whether to I l ! ! ! ! I I icsue K! to emergency i I I I I i ! I workers and/or the I ! ! ! I I ! !
general population. !____! ____I_____!__________!____!______!_______I I I I I I I I I
- 22. Demonstrate the abilityl i ! I I ! ! I to supply and adminster! N/A I YES IN/A I N/A IN/A IN/A I N/A I KI, once the decision ! I I I I I ! I his been made to do so.!____I_____!_____I__________I____l______f.______t I ! ! I I I 1
- 23. Demonstrate the ability! ! I I I I ! I to effect an orderly i N/A I N/A IN/A 1 N/A IN/A I N/A 1 N/A I cvacuation of onsite I ! I I I I I !
personnel (NUREG-0654, ! ! ! I i i i !
Ja2). l____I_____I_____I__________!____I ! !
! ! l I I I ! !
- 20. Demonstrate ability to ! ! ! I I I I I brief the media in a i N/A ! to IN/A 8 N/A IN/A LYES I N/A !
clear, accurate and i I ! ! ! ! I I timely manner. !____I_____!_____!__________I____I______I_______!
)
- TEEE iFEF- TiAE- TB5si EsiA IFAE~iARE-- TA;3ic;i:
____I_____ _____I__________I____I______I_______t i I I I I ! ! l
- 25. Demonstrate ability to I t I I I t ,I i I I I I I I I I provide advance co- N/A YES YES N/A N/A ! YES N/A ordanation of inform- I i l i !
ction released. !____I_____I_____I__________I____!______I_______
J l ! ! i I :
- 23. Demonstrate ability to ! I i ! ! I l !
establish and operate i I I I I I '
N/A m I N/A N/A I N/A I N/A I N/A I rumor control in a co- ! I I I orinated fashion. !____I_____!_____!__________f____t______!_______tI
! I i : I I
- 27. Demonstrate adequacy I : I ! ! ! ! !
Cf procedures f or reg- I t t t i N/A ! N/A .N/A !
N/A I N/A 'N/A I I' N/A I satration and radio-l ogi cal monitoring i : 1 I I I I I
! I !
cf evacuees (NUREG- I ! ! ! !
0654, J.12). I____!_____t_____!__________!____ ______I_______i i ! : ! ! ! ! I 2J. Demonstrate adequacy : I I : I I i !
Cf f acility f or mass tN/A : N/A tN/A I N/A IN/A I N/A I N/A I
! ! ! I : ! ! !
care of evacuees (NUREG-0654, J.10.h) l____i_____I_____!__________I____I______!_______tI i ! : 1 I I I
- 29. Demonstrate adequate ! ! 1 ! ! ! ! 1 equipment and pro- !N/A ! N/A IN/A : YES IN/A IN/A ! N/A : I cedures for decon- i i ! ! ! I I ! ! : I ! I tamination of emer- 1 3 i ! ! ! ! ! !
gency workers, equip- :
! I : ! I t I ment and vehicles I (NUREG-0654, K.5.a,b) !____I_____l _____!__________l____t i 1
! I I : 1 1 ! !
- 30. Demonstrate adequacy i I ! ! I I I I of ambulance f acilita es! N/A I N/A 1N/A I N/A IN/A IN/A IYES I
- .nd procedures for ! ! ! ! ! ! ! I nandling contaminated I i ! l I I I !
individuals. l____I_____!_____f _________I____!______!_______f !
I I I 1 : 1 I
! I I I ! !
- 31. Demonstrate adequacy I !
cf hospital facilities iN/A i N/A :N/A : N/A IN/A lN/A !YES !
i ! ! I I I I cnd procedures f or I t I ! ! !
handling contaminated ! ! I individuals. !____!_____I_____!__________!____I______I_______I
{ L
iEdE'lEEi)~~iiEE~~l66EE~E555~iEEE~lbitE~~ibEbiEEii~
l____l_____I_____!__________I____I______!______I
! I !
I I I I !
3i. Demonstrate ability to I ! I t ! i ! I identify need for, !YES I YES IN/A N/A IN/A IN/A tN/A
! ! ! I I I i t.
request, and obtain Federal assistance. t____!_____t_____t__________I____!______t_______t
! i i I I I I I i ! ! ! ! !
- 33. Demonstrate ability to 1 !
rClocate to and operate! N/A NO !N/A ! N/A IN/A IN/A IN/A i ! ! I the alternate EDF/EOC I I I I (NUREG-0654 H.2, H.3).!____t_____t_____t__________t____t______l_______t
! I t I ! ! ! I
! ! ! I I I
- 30. Demonstrate ability to I !
estimate total pop- !N/A I N/A IN/A t 10 IN/A IN/A ?N/A I ulalon exposure ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
(NUREG-0654, M.4) I____l_____t_____t__________t____!______!_______!
! I t I t i 1 !
I I ! I t I
- 35. Demonstrate ability to i I determine and imple- IN/A I YES IN/A ! N/A IN/A IN/A !N/A !
ment appropriate i ! I t ! ! I i measures for contro11ed! ! I I i i ! I recovery and reentry. t____!_____t_____!__________!____!______I,,,,,__t
)
LOCAL OBJECTIVES 1995 CDOPER
~ ~
I Y~C5iS05~~ l UODI5IS~~~~
. l__________l ___________I I I i
- 1. Demonstrate ability to i I I mobilize s'.aff and acti- t YES I N/A I vote facilities promptly l__________I____________I I I I
- 2. Demonstrate ability to i I I fully staff facilities I YES I N/A I and maintain staffing l__________I____________t around the clock. I I I I I I
- 3. Demonstrate ability to i I I make decisions and to I YES I N/A I coordinate emergency i I I activities. l__________I____________f I I I
- 4. Demonstrate adequacy of I I I facilities and displays I YES 1 N/A I to support emergency i I I operati ons. l__________l____________I I I I
- 5. Demonstrate ability to I I i communicate with all ! YES i N/A I appropriate locations, I I I organizations, and field i I i personnel, l__________l____________I I I I
- o. Demonstrate ability to i I I mobilize and deploy field t N/A I N/A 1 monitoring teams in a i l i timely fashion. l__________1____________I l i I
- 7. Demonstrate appropriate i I I equipment and procedures i N/A I N/A I for determining ambient i i i radiation levels. l__________I____________I I I I O. Demonstrate appropriate I I I equipment and procedures i N/A I N/A I for measurement of air- 1 I I borne radiciodine con- 1 I I contrations as low as i I i 10-' uCi/CC in i I I the presense of noble l__________l____________I gases.
I
~
I YE55800~~i~hb~D E E 7 l_________I____________II I I Demonstrate approprate i I I O. I equipment and procedues i I for collection, trans- I I I N/A N/A I port and analysis of I I I I samples of soil, vege- 1 tation, snow, seater and i I I milk. l__________I____________I I I i
- 10. Demonstrate ability to i I I project dosage to the i I I N/A N/A public via plume exposure! I I I
based on plant and field I I data, and to determine i I I appropriate protective i I I measures, based on PAG's,I I I available shelter, evacu-l i I ation time estimates, 1 I I and all other appropri- 1 I I ate factors. l__________I________,____I I I i .
- 11. Demonstrate ability to i I I
"!^ "I^ l project dosage to the i l public via ingestion i I I pathway exposure, based i I I on field data, and to i I I determine appropriate i I I protective measures, I I I based on PAG *e and other I i i I I I relevant factors.
(NUREG-0654, I.10, J.11).I__________l____________l i I i
- 12. Demonstrate ability to I i l implement protective i I I N/A actions f or ingestion i N/A I I pathway hazards. (NURE.G- 1 I I 0654, J.9, J.11). l__________I____________I I I i
- 13. Demonstrate ability to i I I alert the public within I i I g gjg I the 10-m11e EPZ, and i I disseminate and initial i I I instructional message i I I within 15 minutes. l__________I____________I 4
~
i I NODAWAY I IATCHISON I__________I__________-_II i I
- 10. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute I yr3 i N/A I :
I appropriate instructions i I I i to the public in a tieely!
fashion.
l__________I___..________II I I I I
- 15. Demonstrate the organi- 1 i I rational ability and I g N/n I resources necessary to i I I I manage an orderly evacu- 1 I I ation of all or part of I I I plume EPZ (NUREG-0654, 1 J.9, J.10.g). l__________I____________Ii I I I I
- 16. Demonstrate the organi- 1 i I rational ability and I g N/A l resources necessary to I i 1 deal with impediments to i i 1 1 1 evacuation, as incle- 1 I
I ment weather or traffic I I f obstructions (NUREG-0654,I J.10.k). l__________I___ ________fi I I I
- 17. Demonstrate the organi- 1 I i I rational ability and I g gjg !
resources necessary to I i i I I control access to an I I
i evacuated area. (NUREG- 1 l______,____1____________I 0654, J.10.j) i I I I
- 10. Demonstrate the organi- 1 I I
rational ability and re- i yp3 i N/A !
sources necessary to I i I i effect an orderly evacu- 1 I ation of mobility-impair-i i i I ed individuals within thelI I I plume EPZ (NUREG-0654, J.10.d). l__________I____________I i
- - _15 I'hi6E43~865~ l ~66 N Eki~~~ l l__ ______I___________Il
- 10. Demonstrate the organi- 1 I i '
national ability and re- I g N/A i I I sources necessary to I !
offact an orderly evacu- 1 I i ation of schools within I I I the plume EPZ (NUREG- 1 M54, J . 9, J.10.g). l_________I_______ ___I I I I i I i
- 20. Demonstrate the ability I to continously monitor 1 YES I N/A I ! I and control emergency worker exposure. !__________I____________II I I I I I
- 21. Demonstrate the ability I to make the decision, 1 N/A I N/A i
based on predetermined I I I
1 I crieteria whether to I issue K! to emergency i I i I I workers and/or the general population. l _________I____________II I I i I I
- 22. Demonstrate the ability I I to administer KI, once i YES N/A I i the decison has been madel
- to do so. l__________I____________I I I I i I I
- 23. Demonstrate the ability I
to effect an orderly i N/A I N/A I
evacuation of onsite per-l l sonne 11 (NUREG-M54, J.2)l__________f.___________f i I I i I I
- 24. Demonstrate ability to i I brief the media in a I to N/A i I I clear, accurate and timely manner. l__________I____________l I i I I I I
- 25. Demonstrate the ability I
to provide advance co- I YES I N/A I I ordination of informa- 1 tion releases. l__________l____________I
)
I ATCHISON I NODAWAY I
!___ ___I____________I I I I
- 23. Demonstrate ability to i I I establish and operate i NO I N/A I I I rumor control in a co- 1 ordinated fashion. l__________I____________I I I I
- 27. Demonstrate adequacy'of I I I procedures f or regis- I N/A l YES I traion and radiological i I I monitoring of evacuees. I I I (NUREG-0654, J.12). I ,, ____I____________I I I I
- 28. Demonstrate adequacy of I I I facility mass care of I N/A I N/A I ev&cuees (NUREG-0654, I I I J.10.h). l__________I____________I I I 1
- 29. Demonstrate adequate I I I i
equipment and procedures i N/A I N/A l for decontamination of I I I
, emergency workers, equip-l ,
I I ment and vehicles. I I I l
l (NUREG-0654, K.5. a,b). l__________l____________t
' I I I
- 30. Demonstrate adequacy i I I l
l of ambulance facilities i N/A I N/A I and procedures f or hand- 1 I I l
ling contaminated indi- 1 I I viduals. !__________I____________I I I I
- 31. Demonstrate adequacy i I I of hospital facilities i N/A I N/A I and procedures f or hand- 1 I I ling contaminated indi- 1 I I viduals. l__________I____________t i I l
- 32. Demonstrate ability to I i l identify need for, 8 N/A I N/A 8 request, and obtain i I i l
Federal assistance. l__________I____________t l
l l
1 I
I I ATCHIBON I NODAWAY
- I I-------
I I i
- 33. Demonstrate ability to 1 I I relocate to and operate i NO I N/A i the alternate EOF /EOC i i I (NUREG-0654, H.2, H.3) l_ ______I_____ l i I I
- 34. Demonstrate ability to i I i estimate total popula- I N/A I N/A !
tion exposure (NUREG- 1 I I M54, M. 4) . l__________I____________t i I I
- 35. Demonstrate ability to i I I determine and implement i I I appropriate measures for i YES I N/A I controlled recovery and i I I reentry. l__________I_______ __I I
i i
)
l .
i FEMA OBJECTIVES Cot 11SFoltDING OEJECTIVE FA11(5) 0F FORM IBUEEC-0634
- 1. Demonstrate ability to achill:e 10C 5ec. I E.1, E.1 staf f and activate' facilities W Sec. I promptly. %IASec.I RELOC Sec. I E c. I
- 2. Demonstrate ability to fully EOC Sec. I A.2.a.
staf f facilities and maintain W Sec. I A.4 staf fing around the clock. MEDIA Sec. I RELOC Sec. I
- 3. Demonstrate ability to make EOC Sec. II A.1.d.
decisions and to coordinate A.2.s emergency activities.
4 Demonstrate adequacy of f acilities EOC Sec. III c.3.a.
and displays to support emergency EOF Sec. II B.2, ope ra tions . MEDIA Sec. II H.3
- 5. Damonstrate ability to con =unicate EOC Sec. IV F with all appropriate locations. I6T Sec. III organizations , and field pe rsonnel. MEDIA Sec. III RELOC Sec. III F_A,Sec. I, 11 3 Sec. IV
- 6. Demonstrate ability to mobilize 3 Sec. I E.2, 1.8 and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely fashion.
- 7. Demons trate appropriate equipment E Sec. II. III 1.8, 1.11 and procedures for determining ambient radiation Invels.
- 8. Demonstrate appropriate equipment 3RADLAB Sec.Sec.
- 11. I,III 11 1.9 ,
and procedures for measurement of airborne as low asrad 191odine 10~ uC1/CC concentracions in the ,
presence of noble gases.
- 9. Demonstrate appropriate equipment 3 Sec. II, III 1.8 and procedures for collection, RADLAB Sec. I, 11 transport and analysis of samples of soil, vegetation, snow, water, I
and milk. l l
i 1
, CORRESPOND 13C outcrIvt FAar(s) or roan scazca634
- 10. Demonstrate shility to project EOC Sec. Y 1.10. J.10.a dosage to tbs public via plume 10I sec.11 exposure, bened es plant and field data, and to' detetuina appropriata protective asasures, based on FAG's, availabla obsiter, evacuation tima estimates, and all other appropriate factors.
- 11. Demonstrate ability to project EOC Sec. Y I.10. J.11 dosage to the public via ingestien EOF sec. VI partmany exposure, based on field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures , based on FAGe and other relevant factors.
- 12. Demonstrate ability to implacent EOC Se c . VII.C J.9, J.11 protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards.
- 13. Demonstrate ability to alert the EOC Sec. VI E.6 public within the 10 mi.la IP2. and g Sec. III disseminate an initial ins tructional message , within 15 minutes.
l 14 Demonstrate ability to for=ulate EOC Se c. VI E.5
(
i and distribute appropriate ins tructions to the public, in a timely fashion.
- 15. Demonstrate the organizational EOC Se c . VII . A J.9, J.10.g ability and resources necessary H Sec. I to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the pluma EPZ.
- l to deal with impediments to l evacuation, as inclement weather
~
l or traf fic obetructions.
l Demonstrate the organisational EOC Se c. VII. A J.10.j 17.
ability and resources necessary E Sec. I to control access to an evacuated area.
1
\ . .
6
CORRESPONDI)C C'lJECTIVE PART($) 0F FORM NUREC 0654
- 18. Demonstrate the organisational EOC Sec. VII.B J.10.d ability and resources necessary FA,Sec. 11.5 to of feet an orderly evacuation of mobility-impaired individuals within the plume EFZ.
l 19. Demonstrate the organisational EOC Sec. VII.3 J.9 J.10 3 l
l ability and resources necessary co effact an orderly evacuation
{Sec.II.A of schools within the plume EPZ.
- 20. Demons trate ability to continuously EOC Sec. Vill K. 3. a . b monitor and control energency {Sec.IV l
worker exposure. g Sec. V
- 21. Demonstrate the abilty to c.ake the EOC Sec. V J.10.f decision. based on predetermined EOF Sec. VI criteria whether to issue KI to ecergency workers and/or the general population.
- 22. Deconstrate the ability to supply EOC Sec. VIII J.10.e and ad=inister KI. once the decision M Sec. IV has been made to do so. 3 Sec. V 1 l 23. Demonstrate ability to ef feet an EOC Sec. VII.B J.2 l orde rly evacuation of onsite pe rs onne l.
24 Deconstrate ability to brief the EOC Se c . IX C.3.a l media in a clear. accurate and MEDIA Sec. IV C.4.a timely manner. EOF Sec. IV l
- 25. Demonstrate ability to provide EOC Sec. IX C.4.b advance coordination of information MEDIA Sec. IV released.
- 26. Demonstrate ability to establish EOF Se c . .H Tl C.A.c and operate rumor control in a MEDIA Sec. VI coordinated f ashion.
- 27. Demonstrate adequacy of procedures RELOC Sec. 11 J.12 for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees
- 28. Demonstrate adequacy of fac.111 ties RELOC Se c. 111 J.10. h for mass care of evacuees.
I
C0322SP0bODC CaJECTIVE PAXI(5) 0F FORM unazG-4654 1
- 19. Dessastrate adequate equipesat DECON all K.5.a. b and preesdures for decontamination of emergesey workara, equipment and whieles. .
- 30. Demonstrate adequacy of ambulance MEDIC sec.111 L.4 facilities and procedures for handling contaminated ipdividuals.
- 31. Demonstrate adequacy of hospital MEDIC Sec. II L.1 facilities and procedures for handling contaminated indinduals.
- 32. Demonstrate ability to identify need (to be de velope d ) C.l.a. b for, request , and obtain Fede ral assistance.
- 33. Denens tra te ability to relocate to (t o be de velope d ) H.2, H3 and operate the alternate EOF /EOC.
- 34. Demonstrate ability to estimate EOC Se c . V M.4 total population exposure. EU7 Se c. T 1
- 35. Denonstrate ability to determine EOC Se c . I M.1 and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.
.-.- __._.._.___-_._-__-,.,.,..,..._._m_
1.6 EXERCISE SCENARIO This exercise scenario was initiated by a plant worker injury with contamination. This triggers the Unusual Event.
The Alert was declared when a dropped radiation filter cartridge spread contamination within the, plant.
Pu=p damage and control rod insertion problems lead to a Site Area E=ergency. The condition escalates to a General E=ergency when a containment spray valve fa.ls, as well as failure of two of the three fission product barriers.
Power failure due to an electrical stor= also forces relocatien to an alternate EOF.
Before Recovery is achieved, a radioactive release occurs and lasts approximately two hours.
Planned + Actual Tire -
Event Time 0735 Unusual Event 0738 0800 Alert 0812 1030 Site Area E=ergency 1030 1115 General Energency 1105 1200 EOF Power Loss 1150 1300 Relocate to Alternate EOF 1227 1300 Radioactive Release 1303 ILL5 Release Terninated 1500 1630 Exercise Terninated 1605 1.7 STATE AND LOCAL REGOURCES State of Nebraska
- 1. Civil Eefense Agency
- 2. Dept. of Health, Divisicn of Rad Health and State Radiological Laboratory Local Resources
- 1. Ne aha County ',
(a) Civil Defense (b) Sheriff (c) Ccunty Board (d) RADEF Officer (e) County Health Director (f) Copnty 'n'elfare Director (g) PI;J 6
. _ . I
') 2. Otoe County-(a) Civil Defense (b) Sheriff (c) County Co==ission.
(d) PIO ,
(e) Social Services 3 City of Auburn (a) Mayor (b) Fire Depart =ent/ Rescue Squad
- h. Nebraska City (a) Mayor (b) Police Chief
. (c) Fire Chief Volunteer Agencies
- 1. A=erican Red Cross - Ne=aha and Otoe County Chapters Nu=erous other . volunteers not affiliated with for=al organizations, but recruited by the Civil Defense Directors were active participants. Their contributions are acknowledged and appreciated.
State of Missouri
- 1. Department of Public Safety, State E=ergency Manage =ent Agency
- 2. Division of Health, Bureau of Radiological Health 3 Department of Public Safety, Missouri State Highway Patrol
- h. Depart =ent of Public Safety, Headquarters Missouri National Guard 5 Northwest Missouri State University Local
- Resources
- 1. Atchison County
-(a) County Co==issioners (b) County Highway Department (c) Sheriff's Department (d) Atchison County A=bulance
-(e) Fairfax Co== unity Hospital
- 2. Nodaway County (a) Sheriff's Depart =ent Volunteer Agencies American Red Cross - Atchison and Nodaway County Chapters Numerous other volunteers not affiliated with for=al organizations, but recruited by the local Civil Defense Director vere active
) participants. Their contributions are acknowledged and appreciated.
The extensive use of teenage volunteers at the Atchison County EOC vas especially noteworthy.
-2h-2 FDRCISE EVA111ATION 2.1 JOINT OPERATIONS 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)/ Nebraska W P This facility is located at the plant and was staffed by personnel representing the utility, Nebraska and Missouri. It was primarily a Nebraska cperation, due to the fact that it was also their FCP. Missouri participation was minical, due to the fact that their FCP was located at the Atchison County EOC in Rock Pert.
Even though the Field Tean Coordination function for both States was physically located in the EOF, each vill te evaluated under its respective State Operations sectien.
Objectives to be demonstrated by Nebraska: 1, 2, 3, L, 5, 20, 21, 22, 23, 33, and 35 Objectives to be de=enstrated by Missouri: 1, 2, 3. L, 5, 10, 11, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 33.
Full staffing of the FCP for Nebraska was acec=plished according to plan by C932. First and second shift rosters were presented to account for 2h hour capability. A representative fro Atchison County, Missouri arrived shortly after 0900, with other staff arciving frc= Jeffersen City about 1125. But the utility did not provide any briefing and the Missouri )
team vent frc= person to persen gathering information. Objectives 1 and 2 were fully derenstrated.
Coordinated decision-caking and energency activities were de=enstrated.
This included the coordination of protective action recorrendations between Nebraska and Missouri, rectifying an inadequacy from 198L.
However, the evaluator noted the possibility for time inaccuracy and confusion in message handling. On some occassions a single cessage fora recorded more than one ressage, but shoved only one " start" and no "end" ti=e, i= plying that the cessages were done simultaneously. It is recorrended that Nebraska change procedures and/or forms to record each cessage on its own for=, or provide " start" and "end" times for each of the cultiple messages on a single for=.
Objective Number 3 was only partially deconstrated, due to the lack of briefing for Missouri staff.
Status boards and displays were adequate, satisfying an inadequacy from 198k. However, space was ;ight. When Missouri people arrived at about 1130, there was virtually no space available. Nebraska Operation and Rad Health had expanded to fill virtually all usable space. Though Objective Number L was fully demonstrated, it is reco== ended that: 1) Some arrangement be cade to reserve adequate space for Missouri; and 2) Nebraska and Missouri radio operations should utilize headsets to reduce noise levels.
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-25
[ Pri=ary- and secondary co==unications links were all eventually de=onstrated, satisfying Objective Number 5. It is noted that the Missouri radio should be in place before the arrival of the BRH representative to ensure backup co==unication from the EOF to the Atchison County EOC.
According to the ifebraska State Plan, and local portions site specific to Cooper Nuclear Station, there are =ultiple alternative means for acco=plishing .the administrative and physical functions of alert _ and notification.' However, no preferred or pricary method could be determined.
During this exercise the procedure used was notification by the licensee to the Nebraska FCP and the Atchison County, Missouri PIO. The FCP notified the local Nebraska EOCs. When the utility was unable to contact the Missouri SEOC the utility instructed the Missouri representative at the EOF to notify the Atchison County EOC.
If this ,is to be the pri=ary or preferred means of alerting the various Missouri and Nebraska off-site authorities, it should be clearly set .forth in the Plans, with secondary and tertiary =ethods so identified. These Plan clarifications vill be shown as " required corrective action" for Nebraska. Missouri has since corrected their Atchison County Plan to correspond with both the State and the utility notification sequences.
For both States the type and nu=ber of dosimeter vere . adequate, as was the use of TLDs, thus, demonstrating Objective Nu=ber 20, and eliminating a Nebraska inadequacy fro = the 198k exercise. However, the ' evaluator reco== ends the' development of a dose record to be issued with the self-reading-dositeters to assist staff in correctly recording their readings at the appropriate intervals. Reco== ended dose limits and reading intervals should be provided as a reminder.
At approxi=ately 1155 there was a si=ulated power failure in the EOF.
E=ergeacy lights ca=e on, but the decision was made to relocate to the alternate EOF in the ar=ory at Auburn as a precaution.
Evacuation of the EOF began around 1200. Staff arrived at the alternate EOF at 1227. No preparations had been =ade, but tables, phones, status boards are per=anently stored on site and by 1235 Nebraska operations were set up and they received the first plant update at 1240. During the relocation process the SEOC assumed co==and of the Nebraksa operations with CRUSH handling =uch of the ec==unications.
This activity provided a full demonstration of Objectives 23 and 33, for both States.
A sufficient supply of KI was available, and appropriate personnel from both States engaged in a lengthy discussion of the advisability of administering the drug and also the methodology.
)
It was finally decided that the situation did not warrant ad=inistration of KI. However, it was adequately de=cnstrated that distribution could and would have been cade, if circu= stances warranted it.
Objectives 21 and 22 were adequately de=onstrated, for both States.
Nebraska Operations staff returned to the EOF and participated in discussion of relevant recovery and reentry issues, de=enstrating Objective 35 Su mnry: Objective not fully de=enstrated by Nebraska: Nu=ter 3.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action
- 1. The Nebraska Plan for the Cooper Nuclear Station does not stipulate the pri=ary =eans of carrying out alert and notification at each emergency action level. k'hile it provides several alternatives, it does not prioritize among them. The Plan must be a= ended to acco=plish this.
- 2. Eackup cc==unication between the EOF and Atchisen County EOC =ust exist prior to the arrival of SEMA staff at both locations.
Recoc:mendations
- 1. Nebraska should consider changing procedures and/or forms to record e each message on its own separate for=; or provide " start" and "end" times for each =ultiple message on a single for=.
=
- 2. Scme arrangement should be cade to reserve adequate space for Missouri.
3 Nebraska and Missouri radio cperaticns should utilize headsets to reduce noise levels.
L. Nebraska should develop a dose record to be issued with self-reading dosimeters to assist in getting staff to record readings at proper intervals.
2.1.2 Information Authentication Center (IAC)
Objectives to be ~de=cnstrated by Nebraska: 1, 2, L, 5, 13, lb, 20, and 25 Objectives to be de=onstrated by Missouri: 1, 2, L, 5, 20, and 25 This facility, located at the EOF, is s taffed by representatives of the utility and both States.
Activation and staffing of this facility proceeded according to the Plan with two PIO's arriving fro Lincoln at 1020. Utilization of a verified roster provided for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> staffing, as Objectives Number 1 and 2 vere fully demonstrated. It was discovered that prior to departure fro: Lincoln, a precautienary EBS announce=ents was made, without benefit of siren sounding.
There were also other precautionary EBS announcements cade prior to the k
-2T-General E=ergency. In an area were there are 2 States, 2 EBS stations,
) 2 points of contact, and 2 points of siren activation, this could lead to a great deal of confusion and the need for an early activation of all rumor control systems.
The facility is rather s=all for the number of people and amount of equip =ent it would house in a real emergency. However, this situation did not . deter the staff frc= carrying out their tasks. Pri=ary and . back-up co=unications to all required sites was demonstrated fully accounting for Objectives Number h and 5 At the General E=ergency, alerting the public through sounding the sirens is the responsibility of local governments. In Nebraska the IAC is responsible for coordinating and releasing to the EBS subsequent messages regarding plant coordination and reco== ended protective actions. In Missouri,
. EBS is notified by the FCP or the County.
To the extent called for, these portions of Objectives 13 and lL vere de=onstrated.
However, it should be noted that the Nebraksa State and local Plans are .very a=biguous in describing the steps required and the specific parties respcnsible.
In the Nebraska State Plan, page 52, paragraph b. , and pages B-5 and B-6 per=it the activation of public alert and notification through several channels. They- fail to prescribe a pri=ary or preferred methodology; neither do they identify which teans are to be used under which conditions. While this =ultiple option approach permits a great deal of flexiblity, it also pro =otes uncertainty.
. Clarification of precise alert and notification terminology and
=ethodology will be required. (Detailed under EOF Section.)
Throughout the exercise the staff =onitored and recorded exposure values, fully de=onstrating Objective Number 20.
There was constant coordination between both States, local and the licensee PIOS once the IAC was staffed, fully de=enstrating Objective Number 25 Su==ary: All objectives planned for this facility were demonstrated.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action
- 3. When Nebraska releases EBS =essages prior to the sounding of sirens, they =ust notify Missouri of their intention to do so.
2.1.3 Media Release Center (MRC)
This facility is located in the Douglas County EOC in 0=aha, Nebraska, and is staffed by representatives of the utility and both States.
Objectives to be demonstrated for both States were: 1, 2, h, 5, 25, and 26 (for Nebraska).
The Nebraska and Missouri contingents of the staff of this facility acco=plished activation and staffing in a titely canner and by roster de=enstrated 2h hour staffing, acco=plishing Objectives Nu=ber 1 and 2.
Facilities and equiptent were adequate, as were all co==unication equipment, demonstrating Objectives Nu=ber k and 5.
During the exercise, four briefings for media were held at 1150, 1305, lh25, and 1515. NPPD, Missouri, and Nebraska all cade presentations and fielded questions. NPPD failed to provide any usable visual aids for the media, causing briefings to be confusing and of poor quailty. A plant sche =atic of sufficient size and quality to allow reproduction by video or still photograpy should be available.
The same applies to displays of the geographical area, which should include easily recognizable land = arks. An enlargement of the map in the brochure vould be very helpful.
During press briefings the participants each individually addressed the redia and then retired to the side. This put each presenter in the position of being open to a full range of redia questions, some of which
=ay have been cutside their area of expertise. The briefings became very lcng and ccnfusing.
A censistent, cocrdinated briefing protocol should be established prior {
to briefing. It shculd include screone to act as moderator and introduce the others. After chort individual presentations they could field media ,
questions as a panel. Also, arrangements should be made to provide su.m ries of prior briefings to reporters via video, audio tapes or hard copy. This is particularily important to reporterc arriving between briefings.
Nebraska and Misscuri tinimally accc. plished Cbjective Number 2h.
There was a failure to establish a Nebraska ru=or control line at the
!GC , due to confusion about whether NPPD or the NSCDA had the primary respcnsibility. Each clained it was the other's responsibility. NSCDA staff believed that the procedure was the same as that for Fort Calhoun, where the utility is responsible for the function. If this line was established at a location other than the !GC, the nu=ber was never publicized through the I'EC.
In any case, the portion of Objective Nu=ber 26, which calls for a telephone hotline was not de=onstrated.
Su-m ry: Objective not de=onstrated: Nu=ber 26 for Nebraska (N/A for Missouri).
Areas Requiring Corrective Action L. The fort and content of press briefings should be i= proved as detailed in the body of the report. (NURFD-065h, 6.3.a., 6.h.a.)
-_ _R
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..I 5 N 'FD should provide plant schematics and not rely on gestures and va gue verbal descriptions given by the PIO. (NURE-065h , 6.3.a.,
6.i.a.)
- 6. The Nebraska Plan should be clarified to delineate lead responsibility" for the rumor control hotlines, and an agreement reached between NPPD and NSCDA. (NURE -065h. G.h.c.)
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I 2.2 NEBRASKA OPERATIONS 2.2.1 State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)
The following objectives were to be de=onstrated at this facility:
! 1, 3, 4, 5, lo, 17, 25, 32, and 35.
l l
At OTh0 the SEOC was notified of an Unusual Event at 0738 at the Cooper i- Nuclear Station. At 0812 the State Patrol notified the SEOC that the i
_ condition had escalated to the Alert level.
h At this ti=e, activation and staffing was begun, with all calls being completed at 08h8, fully de=onstrating Objective Nu=ber 1. Since they did !
not intend to de=enstrate Objective Number 2, other Adency sthff attendance was simulated.
At 1028 the SEOC vas notified that a Site Area E=ergency had been l declared. Placing cattle on stored feed was announced at 10h8. They also l- coordinated with the U.S. Coast Guard and the FAA for the purpose of controlling access to the Missouri River and affected air space, de=onstrating Objective Nu=ter 17 At 1105 the General Energency was declared. The SEOC i==ediately r coordinated with the Governor's representative to release appropriate {
protective action.recc==endations. f Due to a si=ulated loss of electrical power at the EOF /FCP, the staff l vas forced to relocate to an alternate facility. This evacuation began at 1205, at which time the EOC assumed control of the- FCP functions. This operation proceeded very s=oothly and continued _until the alternate EOF /FCP was established at the Ar=ory at Auburn, Nebraska at 12h0.
! Decision-=aking, co==unications, coordination, and facilities at the 3
SEOC vere all adequate, as well as advance coordination of infor=ation fully L de=enstrating Objective Nu=ber 3, h, 5, and 25 l
t ns mentioned above, appropriate protective action recc==endation were issued at the proper time, de=onstrating that portion of Objective Nu=ber j 10 for which the SEOC is responsible.
Objective Nu=ber 32, regarding identifying the need of and request for - Federal technical assistance was shown by the State as an objective for de=onstration. However, the scenario did not realistically require
! additional resources, and the co-m11 cation was only informational in nature.
Discussion of recovery and reentry issues as prepared on preprinted for=s covered required points demonstrating Objective Number 35 Su==ary: All objectives set forth for this exercise were fully demonstrated.
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'l - 2.2.2 Radiological Assessment and Field Team Coordination Objectives to be demonstrated 1, 2, 3, h, 5, 6, 20, 21, 22. and 35 i
The call initiating activation of the radiological group was received at 0757. All required staff =e=bers were in place at the EOF by 0957, fully demonstrating Objective Number 1. Objective Nu=ber 2 was demonstrated insofar l as the facility was fully staffed. They did not intend to demonstrate 2h hour capability at this exercise.
The Radiological Heelth Coordinator worked very effectively with the Governor's representative to carry out all required decision making, fully '
demonstrating Objective Nr.ber 3.
. The facility did net afford adequate space or furniture for the functions that needed to be pertormed within the EOF. Noise was also a problem, but -
was controlled. It is recoc= ended that headsets be used to reduce noise levels. However, tea =s worked around these difficulties to carry out their tasks.
4 As centioned above, due to a simulated power failure it was necessary to relocate to an alternate facility in the =1ddle of the exeresie. Before, during and after this event, co==unication systems functioned without any proble=s, fully de=onstrating Objective Nu=ber 5.
- Field tea = deployment from the EOF vas delayed due to problems with
- the equip =ent belonging to OPPD. (This proble
- vill be examined in more ;
I detail under Section 2.2.3, " Field Monitoring".) This delay of nearly 30 minutes kept them from demonstrating Objective Nu=ber 6.
The Dose Assess =ent tea = vas well trained. Calculations were cade via primary and back-up co=puters. Projections vere verified with the utility and the State of Missouri and shoved high correlation. PAR's were made in a timely canner and coordinated with both the utility and Missouri.
j The plu=e was defined via field data; iodine calculations were checked.
However, it is reco== ended that data sheets should be i= proved to allow verification of field data. Currently, they use two separate forms which do not permit all relevant data to be arrayed in a single format. This
=akes verification difficult.
The staff was equipped with dositetry adequate to monitor and control exposure, de=onstrating Objective Number 20.
^
However, it is reco== ended that record keeping forms for self reading dosimeters be developed and readings taken on a more regular basis.
The decision regarding use of KI was made according to the State Plan. i Though it was not ad=inistered, its availability and the capability to ad=inister vere shown, thus de=onstrating Objectives Number 21 and 22.
1
-) At the appropriate time a table top discussion was held to cover the i issues related to recovery and reentry. Field samples of vegetation and j water vere taken and screened using the ND-6700 multi channel analyser.
It should be noted that Nebraska was provided a separate Radiological scenario to test this aspect of their preparedness. This was necessitated by the fact that the plume vent into Missouri. The method worked quite vcIl and was handled without confusion.
Su.-ary: Objective Nu=ber 6 was not fully demonstrated at this exercise.
Recommendation 5 Record keeping forms should be developed for self reading dosimeters, including an indicatier. of frequency of readings.
2.2.3 Field Monitoring Teams NOTE: Two =cnitoring teams are called for in the plan. In prior years one team was cceprised of two employees from the State Bureau of Radiological Health, and the second team was cc prised of two e ployees of the Oraha Public Pcver District (CPPD) cent frc= the Fcrt Calhoun Nuclear Station.
In evaluating their perfor ance they were referred to as the " State" team and the " Utility" team.
For this exercise the tears were mixed, each being cceprised of one State and cne utility persen.
Objectives to be denenstrated vere: 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 20, and 22.
Field Team Number 1 The Nebraska State Civil Defense Agency (ECDA) nade the call to mobilize field team persennel at 0755. The CFPD team renber arrived at the EOF at 09k5 and the Nebraska ERH tember arrived at 0957.
'a~hile ecbilization was accerplished in a titely =anner, deployment from the EOF vas delayed by about 30 minutes. This delay was due in large After part to the fact that team nurber 2 did not have a verking GM probe.
unsuccessfully atterpting to repair it, the field team coordinator ordered team number 1 to give their prebe to team 2. No tack-up survey instruments were provided in the kits or at the deploynent points.
Even with this delay (deploynent occurred at 1032), the team was not briefed on meteorological conditions, exposure centrol procedures, or clarification of work roles between utility and State personnel.
Objective Number 6 was not fully The " Deploy =ent" portien of demonstrated.
The vehicle for the team was excellent and provided primary and back-up
'o=ranication, satisfying a deficiency from 198L.
Due to the fact that they loaned their GM probe to tean 2, they did not have a sodium iodide scintillation counter.
The air sampler did not shov a date for calibration of flow rate, continuing an inadequacy noted in 198h. Also, there were no silver zeolite cartridges in the kit.
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) Since both tea: =e=bers were totally unfamiliar with the =nps used, the terrain, or the predetermined =onitoring points, there were unacceptable delays in finding =enitoring locations requested by the EOF. About an hour was spent within the plume while trying to deter =ine where they were before any sa=pling was done., Also, there was no consistency in surveying for a=bient radiation. k' hen survey was perfomed , they used the high range (ionization chamber) instrument instead of the low range instrument, and thus, they were unable to obtain an accurate reading. This was noted as a deficiency in the 198L exercise, tio =onitoring was done outside the vehicle. Iio ground level and 3' (above ground) readings were taken, k' hen asked by the EOF to locate the "1 R/hr level" of the plume and take an air sa=ple, the tea = vas not sure how to proceed.
Also, they were not adequately versed in use of the for=ula provided for calculating radioiodine concentration. After the sample was counted, three atte= pts were made before correct values were derived. Although they vere aware of the necessity to proceed out of the plume to count the air sample, they did not =onitor to assure that radiation levels outside the plu=e vere background before counting the cecend air sa=ple.
They did demonstrate proper techniques for collecting soil, vegetation and water se=ples, but did not package er transport them.
Objectives Iiu=be r 7 and 6 vere not detenstrated; Objective tiu=ter 9 vas partially demcnstrated.
Tea: =etbers failed to read their dosi=eters on any scheduled or predetermined basis. The ERH member had tid and high range pocket dositeters (20R and 100R) tnd the OPFD te=ber had 2 low range instruments (200 =R and 500 =R) . :leither of them were aware of any maximum dose allowed without further authorization, or any " turn around" levels. Both =e=bers had per=anent record dosimeters, as required (Simulated TLD).
k' hen the team =e=bers did remember to take readings in the vicinity of the plu=e, they used the high range instruments instead of the reco== ended low range. The centroller calculated that they accu =ulated an estimated dose of 1500 =R before they first exa=ined their dositeters. It is questionable whether this would have been detectable on the high range instruments, and would have far exceeded the scales of the low range dosimeters. For these reasons, the reco==endation made under field team coordination for maintenance of field tea = dose records applies here as well.
They did have a supply of KI and were aware of procedures for its use.
They failed to demonstrate Objective fiumber 20, but did demonstrate Objectives Iiu=ber 21 and 22.
Co==unication throughout was excellent, fully de=cnstrating Objective
) Ilumber 5
-3h-Field Team Number 2 As stated above for team 1, cobilization was timely, deployment was nct. Objective Number 6 was not fully demonstrated.
Continuing an inadequacy from last year, no check source was available.
All equipment had stickers indicating calibration within the last year.
Hevever, the digital icn chamber gave erroneously high background readinCS, rendering them inaccurate in the dose rate mode. It did appear to operate correctly in the integrated dose mode.
Tne sodium iodide scintillation counter (SAM II) gave background readings (counts per unit of time) which varied significantly, depending on whether the engine was used as power source or the battery. While this piece of equipment is adequate (when operating prcperly), the plan needs to be revised te reflect its use, since an NDG is currently called for.
Objectives 7 and 8 vere rot adequately demonstrated.
They did, however, de=cnstrate proper techniques in determining radiatien levels and in taking air, soil, and vegetation sa=ples, de=onstrating Cbjective Number 9 C: =unications with the EOF vere maintained throughout the exercise.
Hevever, slight break-up was exterienced after relocation to the AEOF.
Cbjective Number 5 was fully demonstrated.
TLDs and pocket dositeters were used, dencnstrating Objective Number 20.
KI was available, and its administration fully understood. Objectives 21 and 22 vere derenstrated.
Surrary (bath tears): Objectives underonstrated for this exercise:
6, 7, 8, 9, and 20.
Deficiencies That Would Lead to Negative Finding l
- 1. There was not sufficient operational radiatien detection equipment available to place two fully equipped monitoring teams in the field or a Letter of Agreement (LOA) between the State and botn utilitics to provide for same. (NUREU-065h, A. 3, I. 7, 8, 9, 10.)
- 2. Field team cperation was deficient to the extent that:
- a. One team was unable to locate predetermined monitoring points.
1 See Supplemental Report, Section 3, detailing correction of these deficiencies.
I
- b. Re=aining within the plu=e for over an hour, they failed to
)
survey for ambient radiation on any consistent basis,
- c. When surveying was done, they erroneously used high range instruments.
O
- d. No conitoring was done outside the vehicle.
- e. Calculation of radiciodine concentration required three atte= pts to obtain correct values.
- f. Background readings were not verified before counting air sa=ples,
- g. The team exhibited an overall lack o." training.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action
- 7. Team was unaware of =axi=um dose allowed, or turn around levels.
Recc==end that individual dose rate record cards be developed showing above data.
5 J 2.2.14 State Radiological Imboratory The only objective stated for demonstration was Number 9 And only j that portion referring to the demonstration of appropriate equipment and procedures for sample analysis would be applicable.
The evaluator noted that staffing was adequate for a single shift. i Although, it was not a. planned objective, there was no back-up to the radiological chemist. .In addition, it was the evaluator's judgement that i the procedures for use of the ND 6700 were sufficiently . co= plicated that a regular lab chemist could probably not be expected to step in for the radiological chemist if the situation required it.
As part of the exercise the staff adequately demonstrated procedures for analysis of soil sa=ples which had been laced with Cesium 137. l Field sa=ples were logged in using a methodology which worked s=oothly, was thorough and well understoed by the staff. Additionally, they had developed analytical protocols for each operation at the RAD LAB, and had a written agree =ent with the Department of Radiological Health for pick-up and disposal of radioactive caterials. These additions satisfy inadequacies noted at the Fort Calhoun Exercise of July 25, 1985 !
The evaluator noted that not all of the staff who handled the radioactive sa=ples had ~ TLDs, and none of the staff had pocket dosi=eters. Insofar as this would appear to be an integral part of " appropriate procedures for
-analysis of sa=ples", Objective Number 9 is judged not to have been fully demonstrated. .
Areas Requiring Corrective Actions
- 8. All s tart' handling radicactive sa=ples should wear TLDs. This f should be demonstrated the next time the RAD LAB is exercised.
2.2.5 Decontamination Facilities NEBRASKA CITY, NEBRASKA A decontamination facility for evacuees was exercised at the National Guard Ar=ory at Nebraska City. Since this was the first time for this facility, it was considered to be a semi-training exercise..
Objective 29, as applied to this site, calls for a demonstration of equipment and ~ procedures used in decontamination of personnel. The plan calls for local radiological monitoring and decontamination capabilities to function under the direction of State staff.
During the exercise, vehicular and personnel monitoring was demonstrated.
Vehicles needing decontamination were segregated for later re= oval to a local car wash.
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) The Nebraska City Decontamination facility failed to demonstrate the capability to perfom personnel decontamination. Specifically, there were no shower facilities available. Persons staffing the facility reported that a portable shever would be used in a real e=ergency. However, they had not locked into thg particulars of how and where it vould be obtained and installed. Also, the segregation of clean and contaminated areas vould be by =asking tape on the floor. Due to the restricted space, the likelihood of recontaminatin6 persons who had been decontaminated was high.
Su==ary: Objective Number 29 was not fully demonst. rated. ,
Deficency That Would Lead To A Negative Findingl ,
4 3 The Nebraska City Decontamination Facility failed to demonstrate
. the capability to perfor= personnel decontamination.
AUHJRN, NEBRASKA A facility for deconta=ination of emergency workers vas set up at the fire station in Auburn. i A well trained staff de=onstrated the equip =ent and procedures for j onitoring people and vehicles. !
Facilities for personnel decontamination were limited in that they
, had only one shower. Vehicular decontamination was fully explained with excellent facilities. The procedures for handling radioactive vaste were vell thcught out and suitable.
Su==ary: Objective Number 29 was de=enstrated.
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) 1 See supplemental report, Section 3, detailing correction of these deficiencies.
2.3 couirrY OPERATIONS 2.3.1 B-mha County EOC Objectives to be demonstrated: 1, 2, 3, h, 5, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 25, 35 ,
The . Sheriff received notification of- Alert status at 0828 and mobilization -and activation occurred promptly thereafter, staffing being co=pleted at 0920.
Use of a verified roster and double staffing at some positions de=onstrated 2h hour capability.
Objectives Number 1 and 2 were fully demonstrated.
Cecision-caking, coordination, and all necessary co==unication was de=enstrated, fully satisfying Objectives Number 3, k, and 5, and satisfying inadequacies in these areas which vere noted at the 196h exercise.
inten notification of the General E=ergency was received at 1106, the Sheriff was notified and sounding of sirens was si=ulated at 1111. The IAC vas called at 1113- with the EBS message. However, there was a failure to notify the authoritics at Indian Cave State Park that- a General Emergency had been declared. The last record of co==unication with the park was at 09k5 Neither the State Plan nor the Ne=aha County Plan is very explicit about this responsibility and the canner in which it is to be carried out. ,
Since the park relies on route alerting, which was determined in the
.198L exercise to take L5 minutes, it vould be advisable for them to begin notification for evacuation at the Site' Area Emergency to acco=plish A&N vithin the alleved h5 minutes.
The evaluator observed that the PIO vas not fully- fe=iliar with EBS tessage procedures. He appeared unsure of who is to. prepare and who is to authorize EBS messages. inten the reco==endation to evacuate to two miles was received, the PIO tried to call the IAC to authorize the message. .Since the IAC was being relocated to another site, he could not make contact.
He then called the PRC. The situation vould indicate the need for clarification regarding who can authorize messages, and additional training for the PIO.
Objective Nu=ber 13 was not fully demonstrated; 1h vas.
At 1210 the Sheriff received notice to evacuate to two miles. Evacuation of all residents was confir=ed at 1315 However, no one authorized road blocks to provide access control until 13h3. Then it only resulted because the . EOF called at 13L0 to request the location of the road blocks. Once activated, resources and organizational ability were well demonstrated.
Objective Number 17 was partially demonstrated.
{
Sufficient resources were available to deal with any impediments to I evacuation, fully demonstrating Objectives Number 15 and 16.
The Sheriff also dealt with mobility impaired during the exercise, accounting for a demonstration of Objective Number 18.
Appropriate dosimetry equipment and procedures were shown, fully denonstrating Objective Number 20.
As cetioned above, the PIO vas unsure of EBS procedures, however, he did coordinate with the IAC in a demonstration of Objective Nu=ber 25 At 1538, a =essage from the IAC advised of status deescalation to site Area E=ergency. It also reminded farmers that reentry was still on hold until State Health Officials could check the area. The message further advised: "No action required by you." This effectively terminated Recovery and Reentry activities without per=itting de=onstration of Objective Number 35 Su==ary: Objectives not fully demonstrated: 13, 17, and 35 Deficiencies That Would lead To A Negative Finding l L. Failure to notify Indian Cave State Park in sufficient time to permit alert and notificatio., of transients in the 5 to 10 mile area within L5 minutes.
5 Failure to establish access control road blocks to evacuated area in a timely canner.
Area Requiring Corrective Action 9 The State should provide the needed training regarding proper PIO procedures.
2.3.2 Nemaha County Ambulance Unit Objectives to be demonstrated were: 5, 20, and 30.
The ambulance responded to a plant request to transport a contaminated, injured patient to the hospital. The vehicle was equipped with all appropriate co==unication equipment satisfying an inadequacy from the 198h exercise.
However, messages are relayed through the radio at the Law Enforcement Center. The operation failed to relay the message totally and accurately.
He failed to say that the patient was contaminated.
1 See supplemental report, Section 3, detailirs response to these
) deficiencies.
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-LO-It is reco== ended that the radio relay staff be instructed in the necessity for verbati= transmission in medical emergencies.
The crev was equipped with high and low range dosimeters, chargers and record cards. The health physicist fro = the plant also accoc:panied them to the hospital yith the patient, and assisted with conta=ination containment enroute. He also provided the crev vith TLDs upon arrival at the plant.
All procedures were properly followed in receiving and transporting the patient, fully demonstrating Objectives ? lumber 5, 20, and 30.
2.3.3 Otoe County EOC and Reception Center
!iOTE: The main mission of the County EOC is to activate and support the Reception Centere at Tiebraska City.
To accc=plish this, the EOC vould need to de=cnstrate Objectives tiu=ber 1, 2, 3, L, and 5 After receiving a call frem the !iebraska Highway Patrol at 0815, the ECC was activated and staffed by 1000. Thcugh they did not de=cnstrate 2h hour capability, the presence of a large number of elected and appointed officials was gratifying.
The persen in charge exhibited gcod ccordina.ive and decision-making skills.
For the limited purposes of this EOC, the facilities and co==unication equipment vere adequate.
All objectives were de=enstrated.
Objectives to be de=cnstrated at the reception Center were: 1, 2, 3, 5, 27, and 28.
- alled for, activatien of the ?ieb raska City Vnen evacuation was Pelocaticn Center was requested. The activation and staffing began i==ediately, as they prepared for registration, cenrregate care, and decontamination.
Ynile registration and decentamination were handled at the fiational Guard Ar=ory, the majority of the care facilities were scattered around town at 15 sites providing accomodations for 2,L67 people. The armory itself could acco=odate about 350 people.
Throughout the exercise the staff de=enstrated coordination and carried out their duties according to plan. Direction and control vere evident; facilities and co==unicaticn vere adequate. All objectives were de=onstrated and no inadequacies were observed.
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) 2.4 MISSOURI STATE OPFRATIONS At the " Unusual Event" staff are dispatched from the SEOC to the Atchison County ECC to establish a Forward Co==and Post (FCP). k' hen this has been acco=plished, most decigion-=aking vill occur at the FCP. Until this time, the SEOC is the control center, and will co==unicate with the team while enroute.
2.k.1 State lhergency Operations Center (SEOC)
Objectives to be demonstrated: 1, 2, 3, h, 5, and 32.
Activation of the SEOC began at 0815 vith receipt of the call announcing the " Alert" status. Only members of the State E=ergency Management Agency were called upon to staff the office for this exercise. These positions were double staffed and engaged in a shift change.
To this extent Objectives Nu=ber 1, 2, and 3 vere de=onstrated.
k'hile the building facilities and co==unications are adequate, it was noted that they do not have a large scale =np of the Cooper area showing the EP2, the sector designations or population by area. If evacuation or other protective actions are called for prior to the establishment of the FCP, these visual aids vould be required for informed decision-=aking by the SEOC staff. These sa=e inadequacies re=ain from the last two Cooper exercises.
Therefcre, Objective Number k was not fully demonstrated; Objective Number 5 was.
At 1122 the FCP announced they were operaticnal and co==and was transfered to the FCP.
Through the rest of the exercise the SEOC vas kept posted on all developments.
At 151h, after conferring with the FCP, the SEOC contacted FE".A to coordinate a request for Federal Assistance, de=enstrating Objective Number 32.
Su==ary: Objective not de=onstrated: Number k.
Recommendation
- 6. Use of large scale =ap for Cooper area showing EPZ and population figures. This is not required, due to the reduced role of the SEOC resulting from delegation of control to the FCP.
2.k.2 Forward C - nd Post (PCP)
The Missouri State FCP was located at the Atchison County EOC.
Objectives to be de=onstrated vere: 1, 2, 3, h, 5, 12, 13, lb, 20, 21, 22, 25, 32, and 35.
-h2-.
The SD!A staff simulated travel from Jefferson City and arrived at-the FCP. at 1120. . They . vere briefed by the Atchison County CD Director regarding actions taken to'date.
Objectives Nu=ber 1, 2, and 3 vere demonstrated.
Facilities were somewhat improved over last year since the Field Team Coordination had been moved . to the EOF. Co==unication capabilities to all appropriate units vere demonstrated. Objectives Number- k and 5 were accomplished.
Since the General Emergency was declared prior to the activation of the FCP, Objective Nu=ber 13 became the responsibility of the.Atchison County EOC. Due to a failure to issue proper subsequent messages to transients, Objective lh was not demonstrated.
The Bureau of Radiological Health (BRH) delivered 30 TLDs to the FCP/EOC.
Their use rectified an inadequacy from the past. All other dosimeters were distributed and properly used. BRH distributed KI to all workers who might be exposed to a thyroid dose in excess of 25 re=. They were all aware of the procedures for its use.
. Objectives Number 20, 21, and 22 vere demonstrated.-
Throughout the exercise, the Atchison County FIO liaison, who had been dispatched to the EOF continued to verify and coordinate infor=ation. To this extent Objective Number 25 was de=onstrated. )
At 1620 the FCP asked that the SEOC request Federal Assistance in the form of additional support for field monitoring activities, demonstrating Objective Number 32.
A special demonstration occurred after the exercise was netually zerminated.
A team was dispatched to the field to take samples and survey in the ingestion pathway. The results were then analyzed and reviewed to generate appropriate protective action reco==endations. Objective 12 was fully demonstrated.
FCP and County EOC staff joined in discussion of recovery and reentry issues. They covered securing evacuated areas, reentry for essential services and safety precautions. Objective Nu=ber 35 was demonstrated.
Summary: Objectives Number 13 and 1h were not demonatrated.
Area Requiring Corrective Action
- 10. The FCP staff did not issue subsequent proper messages to alert transients regarding appropriate protective actions.
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') 2.k.3 Field Team Coordination / Dose Assessment l Objectives to be demonstrated: 1, 2, 3, h, 5, 10, 11, 20, 21, 22, and 35 l-The team from the' Bureau of Radiological Health was prepositioned at Rock Port and arrived at the EOF at 1120. Staffing was completed at 1125 Double staffing was used to demonstrate 2h hour capability.
Objectives Nu=ber 1 and 2 were fully demonstrated.
. Dose assessment and radio logs were kept and coordination of tea =s with the utility was very well done. Coordination with Nebraska or protective actions was also excellent.
I' .
l Upon arrival, they received no briefing by the utility to bring them up to date on the situation. Instead, they vandered frc= person to person trying to gather infor=ation as best they could.
i Objective Nu=ber 3 was partially de=onstrated.
'a'he n the Missouri tea = arrived at the EOF at 1120 there was virtually no space to accomodate them. Not enough chairs or desks were available and the noise level was rather high though controlled. (It should be noted
! 'that these condition impreved when they relocated to the alternate EOF about y- 1230.)
The rad monitoring caps for the States and the utility were all different and quite confusing in coordinating field team movements.
I For ' these reasons, there was not an adequate demonstration of Objective l Number L.
l All co =unication equipment worked well before and during the relocation of the EOF. However, after relocation of the EOF, makeshift antenna placement caused co==unication dead spots for Missouri. Objective Nu=ber 5 was fully de=onstrated.
Dose projection utilized both plant and field data. Calculations by hand vere demonstrated promptly, and the team was directed effectively in defining the plume.
l A two day time jump in the scenario allowed vegetation sa=ples to be taken and dosage in the ingestion pathway to be projected. As ' mentioned i above, coordination with Nebraska was good.
Objectives Nu=ber 10 and 11 vere fully demonstrated.
Staff were all equipped with high and low range dosimeters and TLDs, as well as appropriate record cards. KI was available and all vere aware of the proper procedures concerning its use.
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- i Objectives Nu=ber 20, 21, ard 22 were
- fully demonstrated.
The BRH staff followed tl. rough gith sampling ,measu e=ent, use of analytical results, cnd prep 9 red actiorg ' lid ts to det.ermi.ie the levels for reentry. The SDIA representx.tive discussed, inclementat ton, press releases, public no'.ification and ti=*ng.
Objecti'p #u=ber 35 was demon'strated; Su-nri-: bbje'tives not fully dc, aonstra yd: 3, h d-td 5 i
Areas Requiring Corrective Action ,
- 11. Coordinatier. oG field t aa.ns was co= plicated ty the use of three different =aps.' A sirigle cap indicating predesignated radiological J monitoring points should be adopted and provited for use by both States and the licensee. ,ISvever, the one ;urrently in use by the -Licensee is not recc=Nnded.
> , '4 '
2.h.k Field Monitoring Objectives do be der.E,trated: n 6, 7, 8, 9, 20.lund 22.
Fiild tean was r.e-Y:citic2e4 at Rock Port and simulated travel from Jeffersei City, arrivir4 at the~ State FCP about 1125 After a situation briefing (they depl^yed -irt.o the field under the direction of the field tea =
coordinator located at 1.he EOF. (ejective 6 was de=enstrated. )
I t While the teac nad sufff cient L radiation monitoring equip =ent to perfor=
their assigned "duJies, the ! ;irecise type of equipment did not agree totally with the inventory list in the plan. ;
As ten".i ot ect in p evicus, exercises, the vehicle (with over 100,000 miles) veuld not paffice ir ret 2gh terrain andfer be.t ve2ther and could place their staff' in dar'.ger. f SE'Ut assures that in case of neensity the National Gtard vill provide a vehicl' e.
, gajective Number T was demonstrated.
- [fne team and driver de=onstrated an excellent ab111ty to locat.e proper check points and demonstrated full familiarity with eqt.ipment and procedures necessary for measurement of airborne radiciodine. They a tsa collected soil,, vegetation and water samples.
However, there was no de=costration of the transport of these sa ples, o? wtsequent analysis at a rad lab.
Objectivh Number 8 was fully demonstrated; Objective Number 9 was partially de=onstrated.
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.y- When the EOF relocated to Auburn, the radio com=unication was not always It was subsequently deter =ined that the antenna arrangement at audible.
the alternate EOF was inadequate.
~To.this extent, Objective Nu=ber 5 was not fully demonstrated. .
The tea = possessed sufficient equipment and de=onstrated the proper procedures to =onitor and control exposure. However, the evaluator noted j that a mid-range dosi=eter should be included in their equipment. This ,
- vould give greater assurance that the 3 re= dose li=it not be exceeded.
1 i
, The availability and policies governing the use of KI vere de=onstrated, thus accounting for Objectives Nu=ber 20 and 22.
, Su-ary: Objectives not fully demonstrated: 5 and 9 P
Area Requiring Corrective Action i
- 12. There were two different equipment checklists with the equip =ent, as well as third version in the plan. More equip =ent is carried than listed. Lack of single comprehensive checklist can result ,
in failure to include all necessary equip =ent before dispatch.
(NUREG-065L, H.11.).
Recosamendation T. Soil and vegetation sa=ples vould be better protected if double-bagged. Also, vater samples collected by syringe, rather * '
than i==ersion of containers would be less likely to_ have surface conta=ination. Standard Operating Procedures for all sa=pling equip =ent (not just air sa=pler ~ and radioiodine sa=ple analyzer) should be co= piled in a reference manual, 9
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2.5 COUN'IT OPERATIONS
.2.5.1 Atchison County EOC Objectives to<be de=onstrated: 1, 2, 3, h, 5, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18,
- 19, 20, 22, 25, and 35. -
The call . initiating activation was received from SDM in Jefferson City at 0829 Mobilization of . staff began i= mediately and appeared to be -
co=pleted by 0900. ; However it was difficult to determine what constituted full staffing, as this information is not clearly listed in the County Plan.
This has not been. corrected in the new Plan submission.
.One person whose absence was easily detectable. was the County Health Officer. It was his responsibility to issue personal dosimetry to persons in the ECC. While a Deputy Sheriff did a good job of filling in, he was assisted by a prepositioned SD% staff person (who technically would not yet have arrived fro Jefferson City).
The SD% person's activity prior to his. actual arrival time cade it difficult to render a fair assessment of several activities to be perfor=ed by County staff. In future - exercises State staff should not appear at the County EOC until their si=ulated arrival time.
I Nevertheless, the County staff adequately de=onstrated Objective Nu=ber 2; Objective Number 1 was partially deconstrated.
Accurate and co=plete cessage logs were =aintained throughout. The
" Operation Secure" radio linking Atchison County EOC, S tate EOC and the
!GC made a high level of coordination possible. However, there was no backup ce==unication to the EOF until the FCP vas' established.
Objectives Nu=ber 3 and k were fully demonstrated; Objective Nu=ber 5 was not.
At 110h~ the General E=ergency was declared. The -licensee attempted, according to the State Plan, to notify SD% at the State EOC. The 'line was busy, and after two failed atte= pts, the utility liaison gave notification instead to the Atchison County PIO Liaison at the EOF. The County PIO, in turn, called the County EOC at 1112 and notified the=, Sirens were activated (simulated) at 1125 and the EBS station was called at 1127 This notification sequence was not in accordance with the Plan. Proper routing would be from the utility to the SEOC to the County. This vould have added time to the process, resulting in more than 15 minutes for alert and notification.
It was also noted that a later EBS message recoc=ending sheltering did not include instructions for transients without shelter, (e.g., ca=pers, hunters, etc.).
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) Neither the State nor County Plan address the issue of alert and notification of transients in the Brickyard Hill State Wildlife area. Alert and notification of persons in this area must be carri-d out in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-065h and REP-10 (formerly FD#.A-h3).
Objectives Number l3 and 1h were not demonstrated.
At proper times traffic control was ordered, and evidence was given of sufficient resources to handle evacuation, if required.
. Objectives Number 15 and 17 vere demonstrated.
However, the organizational ability to evacuate mobility impaired persons was not de=enstrated. The failure was due to the absence of sufficient Written infor=ation to give reasonable assurance that all mobility impaired could be accounted for.
There was no written list of those needing assistance.
Objective Number 18 was not demonstrated.
The resources to effect school evacuation vere successfully demonstrated, acec=plishing Objective Number 19 As centioned above, the State representative assisted in the distribution of dosimeters before he actually would have arrived.
)
His involve =ent plus the absence of the County Health Officer who is charged with distribution of dosimetry made it impossible to assess the County staff capability to achieve that portion of Objective Nu=ber 20.
Also, TLDs were delivered by BRH and did not arrive until about 1130.
TLDs need to be stored and available at the County EOC.
Objective Number 20 was not fully demonstrated.
The ability to supply and administer KI was demonstrated, acco=plishing Objective Nu=ber 22.
The PIO for the County provided one formal press briefing, and the Civil Defense Director gave several status briefings throughout the exercise.
Objective Number 25 was de=onstrated.
As the status at the plant deescalated, the County staff discussed recovery and reentry.
They arranged to secure evacuated areas, provided for reentry for essential services, described safety precautions and communicated their conclusions to all response organizations.
) Objective Number 35 was demonstrated.
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Deficiences That Would Icad To A Negative Finding
- 6. Atchison County EOC failed to provide both an alert and an instructional =essage to those citizens within the EPZ vithin 15 minutes, as prescribed. (NUREG-065h, Appendix 3.B.).
- 7. Neither the State nor Atchison County Plan provide for alert and notification of the transients within the Brickyard Hill State Wildlife ~ area. Plans must be revised to reflect the applicable provisions of NUREG-065h and REP-10 (for=erly FEMA-h3).
Areas Requiring Corrective Action
- 13. Backup co==unication with the EOF prior to arrival of S124A staff is required.
Ih. People requiring transportation assistance =ust be listed by na=e and address, with special needs of =obility i= paired being clearly This list =ust be updated at least annually.
indicated.
(NUREG-065h, J.10.d.).
15 E3S =essage should contain sheltering infor=ation for transients.
Recomunendation
- 8. The PIO should not let =edia briefings take priority over the responsibility of issuing formal EBS notification in a timely =anner. )
2.5.2 Atchison County Decontastination Facility Objectives to be de=onstrated: 29 A facility for the decontamination of emergency workers and vehicles was established at the Tri-County Landfill.
During the exercise they de=cnstrated proper procedures and adequate facilities for surveying and deconta=inating vehicles.
There was no de=onstration of decontamination of personnel or equipment.
Objective Number 29 was only partially demonstrated.
2.5.3 Relocation Center, kryville, Missouri
-Objectives to be de=onstrated: 1, 2, and 27 Upon notification, the facility at Northwest Missouri State University was mobilized and staffed in a ti=ely fashion demonstrating Objectives Number 1 and 2.
While evacuees were =onitored for radiological contamination, there was no demonstration of proper registration of evacuees through issuance of decontamination forms. This was an inadequacy from the prior exercise and is still unresolved.
Il.
-h9-Su==ary: Objective undemonstrated: 27.
) .
Area Requiring Corrective Action
- 16. . Proper use of registration S"a to -:parate contaminated and decontaminated evacuees will be required at the next exercise.
2.5.h Decontamination Facility, k ryville, Missouri If monitoriong at the Maryville Relocation Center indicated the need to decontaminate evacuees, they were directed to the decontamination site which was staffed by personnel from St. Francis Hospital, Maryville. Surface decontamination would be handled here; internal decontamination would be done at the hospital.
While there was no actual de=enstration of decontamination of personnel.
Procedures were described and facilities were displayed and explained.
Objective Number 29 was de=enstrated.
2.5 5 Atchison County Medical Support Objectives to be de=enstrated: 5, 20, 30, and 31.
Medical support capabilities included both the a=ublance service and the Fairfax Co== unity Hospital.
Proper - co==unication capability were exhibited by both the a=bulance dispatch, the ambulance itself, and the hospital.
Objective Number 5 was de=onstrated.
The ambulance crew su==oned to the vehicle accident correctly used survey meters and took proper precautions to prevent conta=ination of the a=bulance.
1 However, Deputy Sheriffs at the scene who did not have dosimetry, respirators, or protective clothing, assisted in loading the contaminated patient.
i The ambulance proceeded to deliver the patient to the Fairfax Co== unity Hosiptal where the e=ergency room was prepared to handle the contaminated individual. All proper procedures were observed for decontamination and vaste disposal.
The use of a radioactive source made the procedures quite realistic, i and provided an opportunity to deal with cross-contamination.
Objectives 30 and 31 were demonstrated.
i However, the evaluator noted that both the ambulance and hospital staff
) lacked TLDs. Ambulance staff also seemed to lack an awareness of the fact that the use of'KI could be initiated at their own discretion when the li=its are projected to be reached, and need not wait for a specific authorization.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - . _ .n.
For these reasons, Objective Nu=ber 20 was not fully de=onstrated by the ambulance crew.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action
- 17. TLDs should be available for both the ambulance crew and the hospital staff when handling a contaminated patient.
- 18. A=bulance crews need to be better trained in the use of KI.
Recommendation 9 Since the hospital does not have a health physicist on staff, the utility should provide one when the hosptial expects to receive a conta=inated patient. The utility should also reimburse the hospital at least for its use of supplies, equipeent and conse--ables used during an exercise.
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] 3 ACTIONS '!O RIINEDY DEFICIENCIES PREVIOUSLY CITE A- preliminary review of the exercise findings revealed deficiencies attributable to both Nebraska and Missouri. Details of these deficiencies were sent to both Sta"tes, FD(A Headquarters, and the Regional Assistance Coccittee on October 31, 1985 The nature of the Nebraska deficiencies was such that they were correctable by training, plan revisions, and letters of agree =ent.
One of the Missouri deficiencies required demonstrated capability through a re=edial drill. It was successfully conducted on November 26, 1985.
Details regarding the remedial actions of both States are contained in this supple =ent to the Evaluation Report.
3.1 NEBRASKA DEFICI2NCIES 3.1.1 Field Monitoring The following deficiencies were assessed against the Field Monitoring activity:
- 1. There was not sufficient operational radiation detection equipment available to place two fully equipped monitoring teams in the field, ner was there a Letter of Agreement (LOA) between the State and both utilities to provide the means for such. (NUREG-065h, A.3, I. T-10.)
- 2. Field tea = operation was deficient to the extent that:
- a. One team was unable to locate predetermined monitoring pointe,.
- b. Remaining within the plume for over an hour, they failed to survey for ambient radiation on any consistent basis,
- c. When surveying was done, they erroneously used high range instru= ente,
- d. No monitoring was done outside the vehicle.
- e. Calculation of radioiodine concentration required three attempts and an unacceptable length of time to obtain correct values.
- f. Background readings were not verified before counting air samples.
- g. The team exhibited an overall lack of training.
The State was notified of these deficiencies October 31, 1985. On Nove=ber 29, 1985, the FD4A Regional Office received a letter detailing the following accomplished and intended remedial actions.
On November 8, 1985, there was a joint meeting involv:ng the State Division of Radiological Health, the State Civil Defense Agency, Omaha Public Power District and Nebraska Public Power District. The purpose was to reviev
) the details of the deficiencies cited above, and discuss a LOA covering the critical points.
All parties agreed on the necessity for such letters and indicated that the following stipulations vould be acceptable, ru
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[ Each utility vould provide to the State as support for the other's facility, sufficient trained - personnel and equipment to permit the State
. ~ to field tvo fully equipped radiological monitoring teams (and back-up to pemit 2k-hour operation).
These utility employees, available for an emergency, will also participate in training, drills and exercises to the extent deemed necessary
- by the State Director.of Radiological Health.
Necessary radiological conitoring equipment, vehicles and cc:u::unications equipment sufficient to comply with NUREG-065h vill also be provided by '
the utilities.-
P While all parties agree to this in principle, the necessary legal i procedures are still in process. Signed documents vill be available by
- February lb, 1986.
j When these documents have been received and approved by FD!A, Region
.VII, this deficiency vill be closed. Pending a de=onstration by both teams at the next exercise.
3.1.2 Nebraska City Decontamination Facility The Nebraska City Decontamination facility failed to de=enstrate the capability to perform personnel deconta=ination. Specifically, there vere no shover facilities available. Persons staffing the facility reported that a portable shower vould be used in a real e=ergency. However, they )
did not specifically know what this would mean or where it would be obtained.
Also, the segregation of clean and contaminated areas was by tasking tape on the floor. Due to the restricted space, the likelihood of recentaminating persons who had been decontaminated vas high. (f.1TREG-065h, K.S.b. )
i I As a re=edy, the facility, a National Guard Arnory, was inspected by .
the State Director of Radiological Health, the Otoe County Civil Defense i Director, and a member of the SCDA staff on November 12, 1985.
1 After inspecting the facilities, a report was prepared describing the
- l. proposed structure modifications. The report has been reviewed by the appropriate Region VII RAC member and is judged to adequately address the issue of facility lay-out.
i Additionally, arrangements have been made to provide necessary showering facilities on a te=porary basis.
1- When the State and local plans are properly amended to reflect the h changes proposed in the report, this deficiency will be closed, pending a demonstration at the next exercise.
L 3.1.3 Nemaha County Access Control i'
Evacuation of certain portions of Nemaha County were called for during i the exercise. At 1315 the County Director reported that evacuation had y I
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) ' been completed. At ~13h0 the EOF called to ask about the location of the access control roadblocks. It became apparent that roadblocks had not been established. They were oredered to be set up at 13h3. Failure to establish access control in a timely manner was a deficiency.
On November 29,19D5, the State submitted changes to the Nemaha County Plan clarifying responsibilities related to access control. A training session for County Directors : with REP responsibilities has been scheduled for January, 1986. Access control vill be a point of emphasis.
This deficiency will be closed, pending a demonstration at the next
. exercise.
3.1.4 Alert and Notification - Indian Cave State Park Indian Cave State Park was not notified by the Ne=aha County EOC in.
sufficient ti=e to conduct route alerting, thus providing alert and notification to park users within h5 minutes from tl.e time off-site authorities are notified, as required by NUREG-065h.
On Nove=ber 18, 1985, a meeting was held with Nebraska Ga=e and Parks officials, the Superintendent of Indian Caves State Park, the Director of Radiological Health and the Assistant Director of State Civil Defense.
The resultant decision was that all State owned parks, recreational and vildlife areas within 10 miles of a nuclear power plant would begin I evacuation procedures no later than the announcement of a Site Area E=ergency.
Also, State and local Plans have been amended to specify both the persons responsible and the times for notification to t.ssure that parks and recreation areas can comply.
This deficiency vill be closed pending a demonstration of the capability of the County to notify Indian Caves State Park, and the Park to alert and notify transients in the park within the alotted time at the next exercise.
3.2 MISSOURI DEFICIl!NCIMI 3.2.1 Atchison-County BOC The first is the failure of the Atchison County EOC to provide both an alert and an instructional message to those citizens of Atchison County within the 10 mile EPZ vithin 15 minutes as prescribed by NUREG-065h, Appendix 3.B.
The 15 minutes' begins when the plant notifies the off-site authority of the emergency.
At 110h the General Emergency was declared. .The licensee atte=pted, according to the State Plan, to notify SEMA at the State EOC. The line was busy, and after two failed attempts, the utility liaison gave notification instead to the Atchison County PIO Liaison at the EOF. The County PIO,
) in turn, called the County EOC at 1112 and notified them. Sirens were activated (simulated) at 1125 and the EBS station was called at 1127.
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l'his notification sequence was not in accordance with the Plan. Proper routing would be frca the utility to the SECC to the County. This would have added time to the process, resulting in more than 15 minutes for alert and notification.
To recedy this deficiency a remedial drill was held on November 26, 1985 FEMA staff were present as evaluators. At 1541 a General Emergency was declared at the Cooper Nuclear Station. The licensee immediately contacted the Missouri State EOC in Jefferson City. The message was completed by 15hk. At 15h6 the State EOC called back to verify. They then notified the Atchison County EOC of the General Emergency. By this time it was 15L9 At 1550 the Atchison County EOC contacted the EBS station and dictated the notification tessage, with instructions that it be repeated every 10 minutes.
Sirens were also sounded at this time (1550). These actions successfully demonstrated the ability of Atchison County to accomplish alert and notificaticn within 15 minutes. This deficiency is closed.
3.2.2 Brickyard Hil1 State wildlife Area As a result of the pre and post exercise review it was discovered that neither the Missouri Radiolegical Emergency Response Plan nor the Atchison County Plan rake any provisien for the alert and notification within h5 minutes of transients at the Brickyard Hill State Wildlife Area.
The ? tate was informed of this deficiency en October 31, 1985 and vere told that re=edial actions vill include a revision of State and local plans to provide for the alert and notification (within L5 ninutes) to the transient population of the Erickyard Hill State Wildlife Area. These revisions shall fully comply with all applicable provisions of NUREG-065k, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.
1, and FD'A-L 3 (nov REP-10 ) .
On novetter L, 1985, the State of Missouri submitted changes to the State Plan.
Upcn review, the response was judged inadequate. On November ik, 1985, the folleving was sent to the State Emergency Management Agency:
"Regarding deficiency number 2, you propose a change to the Missouri Plan. It states that the Department of Conservation 'will provide prompt notification (alert and notification) of the public in the conservation areas within the ten mile EPZ at the Alert Classification. This notification vill be accccplished within L5 minutes of notification of a Site Area Emegency Declaration'.
There are five problems with this change.
- 1. You cannot know the time interval between the Alert and the Site Area Emergency, and therefore cannot say with absolute certainty that the notification vill be accomplished within h5 minutes of a Site Area Energency.
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- 2. Since no specific conservation area is mentioned, it must be assumed that this change applies to all. conservation areas. Those within 5 miles . of a plant (Callaway) only have 15 minutes for alert and
' notification. Response for each contingency must be addressed individually. ,
- 3. There is no description of how prompt alert and notification vill be performed. As - stated in my memo of October 31, 1985, 'These-revisions shall fully comply with all applicable provisions of NURE-065h, FMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, and FDM-h3 (Reissued in November, 1985 as FEMA-REP-10).' Compliance with these documents would require
, that any mobile siren system be subjected to the same tests and require =ents as fixed sirens.
- k. At a minimu=, the signs that are proposed must be at all points of ingress / egress as well as at all parking areas. They must also include reference to the EBS Station, including location on the dial, plus evacuation routes to lead them away from the nuclear Tower plant. Reference, FD(A REP 11 ' A Guide to Preparing Emergency Public Infor=ation Materials'.
- 5. You =ust indicate hev you will deal with rumors which may be generated from an early evacuation not followed by an immediate EBS message."
On the date of this report no response from the State had been received.
The deficiency still exists.
As advised on November ik,1985, the State of Missouri vill have until February lk, 1986, to acco=plish the remedial actions cited above.
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h SUM 4ARY OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS JOINT OPERATIONS Emergency Operations Facility (PDF)/ Nebraska FEP
- 1. The Nebraska Plan for the Cooper Nuclear Station does not stipulate the primary means of carrying out alert and notification at each emergency action level. b'hile it provides several alternatives, it does not prioritize among them. The Plan cust be amended to accomplish this.
- 2. Backup co==unication between the EOF and Atchison County EOC cust exist prior to the arrival of SDtA staff at both locations.
Information Authentication Center (IAC) 3 k' hen Nebraska releases 5BS messages prior to the sounding of sirens, they cust notify Missouri of their intention to do so.
p dia Release Center (MRC)
L. The form and content of press briefings should be i= proved as detailed in the body cf the report. ( !."JR EG-06 5 L , 6. 3. a . , 6. L . a . )
- 5. NPPD should provide plant scheratics and not rely on gestures ;
and vague verbal descriptions given by the PIO. (NUREG-065L, 6.3.a., 6.L.a.)
- 6. The Nebraska Plan should be clarified to delineate lead responsibility for the rumor control hotlines, and an agreement reached between NPPD and NSCDA. (I."JREG-065 L , G . L . c . )
NEBRASKA OPERATIONS Field Monitoring Teams Field Team Number 2
- 7. Tea = vas unaware of =axicum dose allowed, or turn around levels.
Reco==end that individual dose rate record cards be developed showing above data.
State Radiological Inboratory
- 8. All staff handling radioactive samples should wear TLDs. Thi; should be demonstrated the next time the RAD LAB is exercised.
COUNTY OPERATIONS Nemaha County FDC 9 The State should provide the needed training regarding proper PIO procedures.
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MISSOURI STATE OPERATIONS 3
Forward Cn- and Post (FCP)
- 10. The FCP staff did not issue subsequent proper messages to alert transients regarding appropriate protecti/e actions.
Field Team Coordination / Dose Assessment
- 11. Coordination of field teams was complicated by the use of three different maps. A single map indicating predesignated radiological monitoring points should be adopted and provided for use by both States and the licensee. However, the one currently in use by the licensee is not reco== ended.
Field Monitoring
- 12. There vere two different equip =ent checklists with the equipment, as well as a third version in the plan. More equipnent is carried than listed. Lack of a single co=prehensive checklist can result in failure to include all necessary equipment before dispatch.
(NUFM-065h, H.11. )
COUNTY OPERATIONS Atchison County EOC
- 13. Backup co==unication with the EOF prior to arrival of SEMA staff is required.
I ik. People requiring transportation assistance must be listed by name and address, with special needs of mobility i= paired being clearly indicated. This list must be updated at least annually.
(NUREG-065h, J.10.d.)
15 EBS messages on sheltering should centain sheltering infor=ation for transients.
1 Relocation Center, Dhryville, Missouri
- 16. Proper use of registration for=s to separate contaminated and decontaminated evacuees vill be required at the next exercise.
Atchison County Medical Support
- 17. TLDs should be available for both the ambulance crew and the hospital staff when handling a contaminated patient.
- 18. Ambulance crews need to be better trained in the use of KI.
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SUMMARY
OF RFX'OMATIONS JOINT OPEHATIONS Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)/ Nebraska FCP
- 1. Nebraska should censider changing procedures and/or for=s to record each =essage on its own separate form; or provide "s tart" and "end" times for each multiple message en a single form.
- 2. Scre arrangement should be made to reserve adequate space for Missouri SDIA staff.
3 Isebraska and Missouri radio operations should utilize headsets to reduce noise levels.
L. .'iebraska should develop a dose record to be issued with self-reading desiteters to assist in getting staff to record readings at prcper intervals.
NEBRASKA OPERATIONS Radiological Assessment and Field Team Coordination
- 5. Feccrd keeping forms should be developed for self-reading dosimeters, including an indication of frequency of readings.
MISSOURI STATE OPERATIONS State Emergency Operations Center (SFDC)
- 6. Use of large scale map for Cooper area showing EPZ and population figures. This is not reautred, due to the reduced role of the SEOC resu.'. ting from delegation of control to the FCP.
Field Monitoring
- 7. Soil and vegetation sa=ples would be better protected if double-bagged. Also, vnter samples collected by syrigne, rather than i=cersion of containers would be less likely to have surface contamination. Standard Operating Procedures for all sampling equipment (not just air sampler and radiciodine sa=ple analyzer) should be compiled in a reference manual.
COUNTY OPERATIONS Atchison County FX)C
- 8. The PIO should not let media briefings take priority over the responsibility of issuing formal EBS notification in a timely manner.
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Atchison County Medien1 Support
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9 Since the hospital does not have a health physicist on staff, the utility should provide one when the hospital expects to receive a contaminated patient. The utility should also reimburse the hospital at le4st for its use of supplies, equipment and consu== ables used during an exercise.
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