ML20203L235
| ML20203L235 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 04/17/1986 |
| From: | Harpster T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Tiernan J BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8605010190 | |
| Download: ML20203L235 (2) | |
Text
-
y n~
4 APR 17 gggg Docket Nos. 50-317 50-318 Baltimore Gas and Electric Company ATTN: Mr. J. A. Tiernan Vice President Nuclear Energy P. O. Box 1475 Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Gentlemen:
Enclosed is a copy of the FEMA III staff report on the September 10, 1985 full-participation emergency exercise at Calvert Cliffs. No deficiencies were identified during this exercise. However, there are several areas requiring corrective actions as well as several areas recummended for improvement. We ask that you continue to work with State and local governments in addressing these concerns.
If you have questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. David Vito of
.my staff at 215-337-5142.
Sincerely,
'Origic51 SIM5 ht Terry L. Harpster, Chief Emergency Preparedness Section Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ encl:
' M. Bowman, General Supervisor, Technical Services Engineering Thomas Magette, Administrator, Nuclear Evaluations
- Public Document Room (PDR)
- Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (HSIC) i NRC Resident Inspector State of Maryland (2) i 8605010190 860417 DR ADOCK O 3}7 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY
- r hD 1
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company 2 bec w/ encl:
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
DRP Section Chief M. McBride, RI, Pilgrim T. Kenny, SRI, Salem D. Jaffe, LPM, NRR RI:DR Vito H ster 4//7/86 4/11/86 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY
. e 'o
~g UNITED STATES 8 o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
$ WASHINGTON, D. C. 20565 C
% April 4, 1986 MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas T. Martin, Director Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Region I FROM: David B. Matthews, Chief Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement
SUBJECT:
FEMA REPORT OF THE SEPTEMBER 10, 1985 CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER STATION EXERCISE The subject report, forwarded by memorandum dated March 19, 1986, is enclosed.
An advance copy was forwarded to your staff on March 31, 1986. There were no deficiencies observed during the exercise and the 44 CFR 350 approval, granted August 8, 1985 will remain in effect.
There were other inadequacies requiring corrective actions and the state-prepared schedule of these corrective actions will be forwarded to you when we receive it from FEMA.
60 v y David B. Matthews, Chief Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response '
Office of Inspection and Enforcement Enclosure FEMA Memo dtd. 3/19/86 with FEMA Rpt. dtd. 12/18/85 CONTACT: Gerald E. Simonds, IE 492-4870 e,f r/ s s .- /
m /" s \, N QIh Q .
~
~ Washington, D.C. 20472 W I 91986 MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward L. Jordan Director, Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcenent U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission FROM: r . ri Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards
SUBJECT:
Exercise Report for the September 10, 1985, Exercise of Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans for Calvert Cliff s Nuclear Power Plant Attached is a copy of the exercise report for the September 10, 1985, full-participation exercise of the offsite radiological emergency pre- (
paredness plans for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. The exercise
! report dated December 12, 1985, was prepared by the Region III staff of the Federal Energency Management Agency (FEMA).
l There were no deficiencies identified during this exercise. However, i there are Several arcas requiring corrective actions as well as several j areas recomended for improvement. In addition, several Category B i deficiencies remaining from the September 14, 1983, exercise v:ill now be l identified as areas requiring corrective actions. This report has been l sent to the State of Maryland and a schedule of corrective actions has been requested. Based on the results of this exercise, FEMA considers that offsite radiological emergency preparedness is adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken off site to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, the 44 CFR 350 approval granted August 8,1985, will remain in effect.
If you should have any questions, please contact Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2860.
Attachment j,, ef ~- Q
&,a -
aWTf [] .--- Y
s
. a \
. . ~,,
/ Federal Emergency Management Agency
'( -
8 Region lit 105 South 7th Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106 s.. 3 s
.>EC 181985 Mr. Edward Murray, Director Maryland Emergency Management and Civil Defense Agency Reisterstown Road and Sudbrook Lane Pikesville, Maryland 21208
Dear Mr. Murray:
Enclosed are two copies of the final report on the September 10, 1985 Calvert Cliffs exercise. This version of the report is modified somewhat from the draft distributed on October 10. Modifications were made following review of the draft by the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) and following receipt of your November 7,1985 response to the draft.
Recommended Improvement Item 12 (as numbered in the draft) has been dropped in response to your November 7 comments. Required Improvement Item 12 (as numbered in the draft) has been modified in order to avoid the inference that assembly area and mass care centers should be provided detailed infomation about plant conditions. The RAC does believe, however, that it is important that all response personnel be kept apprised of the general status of an accident. As to whether the mass care and assembly center staffs received appropriate information concerning county response actions in a timely manner we must stand by the report of the observer who was onsite at the assembly area and mass care center.
We appreciate the difficulties involved in proposing corrective actions within the short time between your receipt of the draft report and the date of your response. Accordingly, we request a more detailed presentation of proposed corrective actions based on the enclosed final report. We ask that January 31, 1986 be set as a target date for submission of the proposed corrective measures.
If you have any questions concerning this matter please contact James Asher or Joseph Gavin at ( Area Code 215) 597-8664.
Sincerelyj . O (nJ~
Paul P. Gior ano
[8'l Region'al Director Enclosures
f' ._ l , f{. )
OTaf t oF M AGYLt.ND -[j',/I'*g t
- m ,
f i A 'e f . h'S
- DEPARTMENT OF L I 2 i985
[
.,,%..' PUBLIC S AFETY AND CORRECTION AL SERVICES
- sx wammy MUGMES MARYLAND CALVIN a LeGHYFoof
- '**** EMERGENCY M AN AGEMENT ANO (([,',' ,',',',*,',',*[ '
FRaNR a MALL CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY c o.an c e.o= . s a evic e .
.o;0#.Z".'.:.~.I.. Su o = = == 'a ~ r a a c '*' < "'o* ~ aoa o Pi.EsviLLE ManvtaNo airos
. . . . . . . .**".4,"."."
l j aura coot soi see-44aa November 7, 1985 Mr. Paul P. Giordano Regional Director Federal Emergency Management Agency '
Region III 105 South Seventh Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106 ATTENTION: Mr. James R. Asher
Dear Mr.Giordano:
This correspondence represents the State of Maryland's re-sponse to the evaluation report for the radiological emergency re-sponse exercise with Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant on Septem-ber 10, 1985. Included with this response are some general com-ments on the methods used to evaluate exercise performance. Any proposed corrective actions must be considered tentative due to our inability to fully investigate and evaluate such actions in the time frame provided.
We feel the need to state our displeasure with the exercise evaluation process as it progreyses towcard a very one-sideo
- judgement. The State and counti,es must have more opportunity to explain their methods which may have been misinterpreted by obser-vors. 'It is obvious from the evaluation report that certain ob-cervors were not familiar with.the applicable plans and proced-ures. As a result, inaccurate statements are indisputably included in your report to FEMA Headquarters. Additionally, the report ap-pears to include more deficient items than were expressed at the post-exercise debriefing.
The response has been summarized to address several items si-multaneously due to the similarity of corrective measures. Four (4) categories are used in the response and corrective actions are keyed to the summary of " Areas requiring improvement" and " Areas recommended for improvement" provided in the FEMA report.
l
[- .
l 1 TTY FoR DEAF - 484 4083
O EQUIPMENT (required improvement items 1,4,8,15,16 and 21)
(recommended improvement items 3,5,6,7, and 20)
Communication system failures have been corrected or are in the process of being improved / corrected. Resource constraints in an exercise preclude demonstration of additional redundancy in com-munications capability, such as use of Maryland State Police, radio as backup for field monitoring teams and Radiation Control / Acci-dent Assessment Center.
A phone link or intercom will be established between the Mary-land Accident Assessment Center and the utility's Dose Assessment office.
Calvert County is installing radios in their Health Depart-ment vehicles, thus providing radio communications with all vehi-cles used for field monitoring. Calvert County also plans to build a new EOC, with new status boards capable of listing sequential events, to be completed in perhaps 18 months.
St. Mary's County will investigate the availability of 0-20 R dosimeters, but cannot justify purchase of these dosimeters.
PLANS / PROCEDURES (required improvement items 22 and 23)
(recommended improvement item 15)
St. Mary's County Civil Defense has a list of mobility and hearing impaired individuals. based on response from mail back cards distributed with annual Public Information brochures. The County Civil Defense augments their list with information from the Board of Education, Social Services, and the Commission on the Aging.
Thus the County has the capability and resources to notify and evacuate mobility and hearing impaired individuals. As the numbers are not gr, eat in this relatively small portion of the 10-mile EPZ, the County will go so far as to provide special evacuation for the elderly also.
The Standard Operating Procedures for St. Mary's County will be revised to reflect the correct. '
dosimetry that is available at the county. 6 Dorchester County has a plan in effect, formulated by the Board of Education, with instructions to the schools and trans-portation personnel to adequately handle school evacuation.
TRAINING (required improvement items 2,3,4,5,6,8,11,13,14,15, 17,18,20, and 24).
(recommended improvement items 1,4,9,10,12,13,17, and 18)
Tasks ci.ted in the referenced improvement items will be given emphasis during annual training. Training is projected to occur throughout 1986 in the form of classroom instruction or practice during drills and/or real emergencies.
2
^-
Subsequent to the September 10 exercise the State and counties have had to respond to two real emergencies (Hurricane Gloria and flooding of November 3-7). In each emergencyj evacuation and mass care were demonstrated adequately, thus providing opportunities to increase the knowledge and skill of emergency personnel.
EXERCISE PP.{TICIPATION/ CONDUCT (required improvement items 7, 9,10, and 19)
(recommended improvement items 2,8, 11,14, 16 and 19)
The referenced improvement items in this category are the re-sult of scenario deficiencies and player deviation from exercise participation guidance published in the State of Maryland exercise directive. This directive is distributed to all players prior to each REP exercise .
In the future, scenarios will be expanded to provide data for county field monitoring, include more messages to inject play for State and county agencies, and provide for more ingestion zone re-sponse. The exercise directive will emphasize full participation, to include expeditious response to assignments, during future full scale exercises.
Finally, we must challenge the accuracy and validity of re-quired improvement item 12 and recommended improvement item 12.
Required improvement item 12, indicates lack of knowledge of the Calvert County plan and perhaps observational error. County offi-cials believe they provided updates to the assembly area and mass care center either directly or through EBS. The county will not provide plant status updates to these centers, as the staff in these centers will not understand plant status. County response actions will be included in updates to assembly areas and mass care centers.
Recommended improvement item'12 resulted from the observor's failure to see all actions. The Assistant Radiological Defense Officer for Dorchester County, who issued dosimetry in the field, did conduct oral briefings as well as distributing written instruc-tions for dosimetry use. This must have occurred before the obser-vor arrived at the scene.
Should there be any questions regarding our response or comments, please contact my Assiste.nt Director for Operations, Mr.
Edwin O. Tremper, at (301) 486-4422.
i
, 3 L
7F Sincerely, EDWARD MURRAY Director EM:CR:lw INFORMATION ADDRESSEES: Mr . Vernon D. Horsmon, Director Calvert County Emergency Management and Civil Defense Agency Mr. Otto B. Cheesman, Jr . , Director Dorchester County Civil Defense and Disaster Preparedness Agency Mr. Thomas L. Oliver, Director St. Mary's County Civil Defense and Disaster Preparedness Agency Department of Health and Mental Hygiene Attention: Mr. David Resh, Jr.
State Public Information Officer Attention: Mr. Chuck Jackson Baltimore Gas & Electric Company Attention: Mr. Thomas E. Forgette
' 4 3
)
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION III EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT FACILITY: CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Town of Lusby, Calvert County, Maryland LICENSEE: BALTIM0RE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
)
EXERCISE DATE: September 10, 1985 REPORT DATE: December 12, 1985 PARTICIPATING JURISDICTIONS: State of Maryland, Counties of Calvert Dorchester and St. Mary's
)
c, gi
</ men dSG_
egq.(;()-
o TABLE OF CONTENIS PAGE(s)
EXERCISE SlNMARY i-ii IMTRODUCTION .
Background ill Exercise Participants iv Observer Assigrinents v Evaluation Criteria vi Exercise Objectives vii-x Scenario Suninary xi Demonstration of Resources xii Previous Deficiencies xiii-xv Objectives Yet to be Achieved xvi EXERCISE REPORIS State-level Activities State EOC 1-7 EOC(Accident Assessment) 8-10 ECC/IFCC 11-13 Sg Red Cross Field Office 14
', Field Monitoring Teams 15-16 Agricultural Sampling Teams 17-18 News Media Center 19-20 Cormunications or EBS 21 Traffic Control 22 Risk County Activities Calvert County EOC 23-33 Ibrchester County EOC 34-44 St. Mary's County ECC 45-53 SINMARY T ItMDMCIES/REQJMN:ND4TIONS Explanation of Categories 54 Areas Requiring Corrective Action 55-65 Areas Pecernended for Inprovement 66-69
EXERCISE SupMARY
)
Adequate capability was demonstrated for mobilizing staff and maintaining round-the-clock operation at the State E0C, the Calvert Cliffs Emergency Offsite Facility (E0F), the Department of Health's Emergency Command Center (ECC), field monitoring
- teams, the News Media Center and the emergency operations centers of Dorchester, St. Mary's and Calvert Counties.
Emergency operations management at all exercise locations ranged from satisfactory to excellent. Coordination between the State E0C and the counties was weak with the State not always up-to-date on the counties' response activities. Some improvement in external communications procedures are indicated.
All facilities involved in the exercise were generally adequate although there is a wide variation in their size and equipment. Calvert County's E0C does not provide sufficient table and working space; an expansion of the operations room is planned. Dorchester County's E0C is small and cramped, but this handicap was overcome through good coordination.
The State of Maryland E0C and the County E0Cs are equipped with an array of communications systems; there was, however, a breakdown in communications with the utility leading to a delay in notification of General Emergency.
Dorchester County also experienced some difficulties with the dedicated phone line connecting it to the utility and State, and with its communications with the Taylor's Island Fire Company. Tone alert radios at I three of the four schools within the 10-mile EPZ in St. Mary's County failed to operate.
The State's accident assessment operations, which were conducted at the E0F by Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH) personnel and at the DHMH Command Center in Baltimore, were satisfactory. Protective action recommendations arrived at led to a 360 degree evacuation out to ten miles and sheltering for residents in sectors P and Q (Calvert County) between 10 and 15 miles.
Maryland's dose assessment and protective action recommendations were adequate to protect the public and consistent with the EPA PAGs. A decision was made to utilize the more conservative hand calculations over the MIDAS System, which resulted in protective actions beyond 10 miles, but the decision was based on valid reasoning. It is commendable that the State recognized core status as a valid basis for protective actions Activation of the siren system and the emergency broadcast system was adequately achieved although there was some variation from the methods specified in the various REPS for activation of EBS. Sirens were sounded by counties without any. prior notification or immediate follow-up to the State EOC.
)
i
) Calvert County was lacking in the amount of detail included in its instructions to the public regarding protective actions. As noted above, Dorchester County experienced malfunctions with sirens in the EPZ but promptly instituted backup communications procedures.
Access and traffic contr,ol points were promptly activated throughout the three counties by State Police and county sheriffs. Decontamination and reception centers were established in a timely fashion. Provisions were made for handicapped individuals. Although St. Mary's County has implemented a sophisticated telephone-teletype system for notification of hearing-impaired residents, no coordinated list of all EPZ residents with special problems has been compiled.
Although the scenario called for ingestion pathway play, very little was observed. An agricultural field team was recalled because of termination of the exercise before it had collected any samples other than water.
State and county radiological health personnel were knowledgeable regarding exposure control and the use of potassium iodide. However, mid-range dosimetry is not available at all locations.
The State's public information operation was less than satisfactory. Long delays were noted between announcerients by the State E0C operations staff and their transmission to the media center at the Prince Frederick Fairgrounds. These delays adversely affected the performance of the PIO staff at the fairgrounds. No rumor control number was activated at the State EOC as called for by the REP.
The scenario provided suf ficient stimulus to test the major portions of the components of the State and county plans; there were several exceptions:
termination of the exercise signaled the recall of the agricultural sampling team before it had completed gathering samples. The scenario moved too quickly to provide for adequate testing of the media center operations.
A large number of " canned" messages were included in the scenario. However, very few of these were actually inserted into the exercise. Insertion of a lprger number would have had beneficial effects on the level of interaction among the participating jurisdictions and with the public.
)
11
O
) BACKGROUND Federal requirements dictate that periodic Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness exercises be conducted in support of nuclear power plants to evaluate major portions pf emergency response capabilities. The exercises test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within emergency preparedness plans and organizations. The exercises simulate a coordinated response by State and local authorities, along with the utility, to include mobilization of personnel and resources adequate to verify the capability to deal with an accident scenario '
requiring responses up'to, and including, evacuation. The last full-participation exercise for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, the State of Maryland and the three plume zone counties of Calvert, Dorchester and St.
Mary's was held on October 13, 1983.
The purpose of this report is to record the capabilities of the State and local governments to respond to an accident at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant based upon the actual demonstration or simulation of implementaion of radiological emergency plans during the September 10, 1985 exercise. Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Improvement will be identified from this exercise and corrective actions will be recommended which would help to improve preparedness and response capabilities.
The exercise was observed by a team of twenty-four observers from FEMA Region III, the Regional Assistance Committee' and Argonne National Laboratory.
)
lii
4
-) EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS State t
Maryland Emergency Management and Civil Defense Agency and 12 other State agencies and organizations.
l Plume EPZ Jurisdictions I
i Calvert County Dorchester County St. Mary's County Other Participants 4
l American Red Cross T
1 l
c i
s f I
J l
i l
i I
i l
I I
I
.1 v 7 l T
I
- - - - _ _ =- .- -- . -. .
l ) OBSERVER ASSIGNMENTS 4
Observers-at-Large James R. Asher, RAC Chairman
. Joesph Gavin, Project Leader State E0C Richard Kinard, FEMA, Team Leader Francesca DiCosmo, FEMA Tony Foltman, ANL Calvert County E0C Steve Hopkins, FEMA, Team Leader John Benn, FEMA .
Ed Tanzman, ANL Dorchester County E0C Karen Larson, FEMA, Team Leader '
- Bob Linck, FEMA Bill Gasper, ANL St. Mary's County E0C Janet Lamb, FEMA. Team Leader Mike Freeman, FEMA Carol Hertzenburg, ANL 1
Calvert Cliffs E0F Charles Amato, NRC Accident Assessment (at E0F) William Belanger, EPA
) Department of Health and Mental John Wells, HHS Hygiene Emergency Command Center Art Lawrence, HHS s
i Communications John Sullivan, FEMA Traffic Control Chuck Kolsky, DOT Field Monitoring Teams Jerry Coombs, DOE Hank Mitskas, FDA f Agricultural Sampling Team Robert Conley,ilSDA News Media Center Hugh Laine, FEMA Observer Operations Support Judy Jones, FEMA i
i i
)
I y l ,
i
,,..,-,.e -
- , - . - , --.-..-,c,., --,,,-, n.,-- , - - - , - - . - - - - - - -,,m.nn-.----,-, . , , - .---,.,.---,----,--n-,--
0-
) EVALUATION CRITERIA Evaluation criteria for this exercise consisted of the planning standards contained in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1; the Radiological Emergency Plan for Fixed Nuclear Facili. ties, Annex Q of the Maryland Disaster Assistance Plan; Appendix 1 of Annex Q, site-specific to Calvert Cliffs; Standard Operating Procedures for Radiological Emergencies for Calvert, Dorchester and St. Mary's counties.
vi t
) EXERCISE OBJECTIVES NUREG 0654 Planning Standard
- 1. Radiological Emergen*cy Plans Demonstrate the adequacy of and capability to implement State, Plume and Ingestion Zone County radiological emergency response plans. N.1
- 2. Accident' Assessment
- a. Demonstrate the effectiveness of the State accident assessment system, including adequacy of equipment, personnel staffing and competency skills, field measurement, actions for coordina-tion, communication and decision (s) for re-commended protective actions. H.4, H.7, H.12, I
- b. Demonstrate the activation, staffing and functions of the Ingestion Pathway Coor- H.4, H.7, H.12, I, dinating Center (IPCC).
- 3. Notification and Communications
- a. Test and demonstrate the adequacy of the CCNPP notification and alert procedures in the following areas: E.1, E.2, F.1
- 1) Notification by CCNPP to State and County governments.
- 2) Notification by the Maryland Emergency Management & Civil Defense Agency (MEM&CDA) to the Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, Division of Radiation Control (DRC), plume zone and ingestion zone county Emergency Operations Centers (E0C), selected State Departments / Agencies, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), contiguous States and the American Red Cross.
- 3) Notification by Plume Zone and Ingestion Zone Counties and State Departments / Agencies of emergency response staff personnel.
)
vii
) NUREG-0654 Objectives and Evaluation Criteria Planning Standard
- b. Test and demonstrate the ability of key emergency response personael in implementing notification procedures in the event of an accident at CCNPP, to include continuing notification and coordination E.1. E.2 E.4
- c. Demonstrate the ability of State and County authorities to alert and notify the public within the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone for the CCNPP. To include operability of prompt notification system sirens. E.5, E.6
- d. Demonstrate the ability of State and County authorities to provide the public within the CCNPP plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone with periodic updates of emergency status. E.5
- e. Test and demonstrate the adequacy of external communication systems from CCNPP, State and County Emergency Operations Centers and field locations. Federal agencies and contiguous States system will also be checked. F.1
) f. Demonstrate timely feedback to the Accident Assessment Center, Emergency Control Center, and Emergency Operations Facility from the counties and the State Emergency Operations Center on the status of protective action implementation and of other situations affect-ing County operations. F.1
- 4. Command and Coordination
- a. Demonstrate the ability of key (State, County) emergency response personnel to initiate and coordinate timely and effective decisions with respect to an accident at CCNPP. A.1
- b. Demonstrate the capability of Federal, State, and County emergency response agencies to iden-tify and provide resource requirements. C
- c. Demonstrate the capability of State and County governments in coordinating (internally /exter-nally) actions, needs, and status of situations between organizations for the purpose of acquiring support and evoking appropriate decisions. C
)
viii
.o
i
- ') NUR EG-0654 Objectives and Evaluation Criteria Planning Stan.iard
- 4. d. Demonstrate the level of support and 4 participation provided by the responsible ,
elected / appointed officials. A.I. A.2.a '
- 5. Protective Actions
- a. Demonstrate the capability of the State, i County, and State Departments / Agencies emer-gency response systems to make decisions and J.8, J.10, J.11, to implement the following protective actions: J.12
- 1) Take shelter (limited) .
l
- 2) Evacuation (limited) [
- 3) Access Control (limited)
I 4) Food, water, milk, and livestock feed control (limited) t The ingestion zone counties (except Montgomery and Worchester) will demon- ,
strate ingestion zone operations in sup- ;
t port of Department of Health & Mental ,
) Hygiene (DHMH), and provide information ;
to the public as necessary. ';
> 6. Parallel Actions Demonstrate the capability of the State, County
- g and State Departments / Agencies emergency response r systems to make decisions and to implement the following parallel actions: '
, a. Emergency Medical Services: (not to be exer- I
! cised, but demonstrated during the CCNPP ,
l annual medical drill). L -
j b. Radiation Exposure Control
- 1) Demosntrate methods and resources for f distribution, issuance, and administering i of potassium Iodide (KI) to emergency ;
l workers. J.10.e and f ;
Y i 2) Demonstrate methods and resources for
- distribution of dosimetry to emergency i
! workers. K.3.a l
' ) 3) Demonstrate personnel monitoring, equip-ment monitoring, and decontamination pro-i l
cedures. J.12 K.5.a and b !
! , ix [
. . . _ , _ - _ _ _ - - . . , _ , _ . _ . -..,-,_,_.._.-__,.-.-.--._.-___m-----
i o
's NUREG-0654 Objectives and Evaluation Criteria Planning Standard
- 6. b. 4) Demonstrate the method and capability of State, County, and local emergency personnel fo,r keeping radiation ex-posure records. K.3.b
- c. Law Enforcement and Crime Prevention (not to be exercised).
- d. Mass Care (limited) J.10.h, J.12
, 1) Demonstrate the capability of the State and County emergency response system to provide food, clothing and shelter for evacuees to include evacuation center operations.
- e. Reentry and Recovery (not to be exercised). M
- 7. Public Information Demonstrate the State and County Public Information Program and the adequacy of the interface of State, 1 County, and CCNPP public information systems with -
i the news media. G.3, G.4 6
- 8. Emergency Operations Center
- a. Test and demonstrate the adequacy of the Emergency Operations Center with respect to space, comfort, and function for managing a fixed nuclear facility incident.
i
- b. Test and demonstrate the adequacy, appropriateness and effectiveness of the internal communications 1
systems within the Emergency Operations Center, to include maps and displays.
- c. Demonstrate the adequacy of staffing and competency
- of staff.
- d. Test and demonstrate the adequacy of access control and security means for Emergency Operations Center, i
1 1
x
i SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Proj ected Actual Time Evept Time 0530 UNUSUAL EVENT (Leakage in reactor coolant system) 0530 0745 ALERT (Radioactive release associated with continuing leak) 0727 None SITE EMERGENCY (Escalation directly to GENERAL EMERGENCY None 0835 GENERAL EMERGENCY (continued and worsened loss of coolant) 0844
)
x1 3
) DEMONSTRATION OF RESOURCES
- State and county EOCs
- Communications systems and equipment '
- Staffing of facilities
- Prompt notification system, including siren system and EBS
- Joint Media Center, including rumor control
- Field sampling teams (air, water, agriculture) and equipment
- Designated reception and mass care centers
- Designated emergency worker decontamination stations
- Designated access control and traffic control points
- Self-reading dosimeters, dose records, and simulated TLDs and KI for emergency workers i
xil
/'
PP.EVIOUS DEFICIENCIES
)
The following deficiencies were identified at the last joint Calvert ' Cliffs exercise conducted September 14, 1983. They were all classified as Category "B" deficiencies at that time, i.e., "not indicative of a level of preparedness sufficient to provide the assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of" the plant. Under the present categorization scheme these deficiencies would be classified as areas requiring corrective actions.
State of Maryland
- 1. The State remains in need of enhanced accident assessment capabilities. Although the accident assessment functions was-adequately demonstrated in this exercise, it was not so demons,trated without assistance from the Cormionwealth of Pennsylvania, nor was it demonstrated entirely satisfactorily even with the assistance of Pennsylvania. This function would have benefitted from additional personnel at the Health Department Center in Baltimore. Dose projections were not independently derived from the plant release data. Maryland, by itself, does not have sufficient qualified personnel to conduct a prolonged 24-hour accident assessment. If
}
Pennsylvania is to be relied on to provide accident assessment assistance in the event of an emergency at Calvert Cliffs, a detailed '
fomal agreement between the states is necessary. This agreement should stipulate conditions for the triggering of assistance, the duration of assistance, and the number and training of persons detailed by Pennsylvania to assist Maryland.
Status:
This deficiency has been addressed. Maryland has enlarged its accident assessment staff and has modified its assessment operations during the two years since the last exercise. The elimination of this planning deficiency has been confirmed by the staff's perfomance in this exercise.
- 2. Space allotted to State and local government functions within the EOF is insuf ficient.
Status:
Space allotted to State and local government functions within the new EOF is sufficient. -
- 3. Incorrect information concerning the utility's protective action recommendation was provided to the MEM & CDA by its liaison at the E0F.
Status:
(
) This problem was not repeated in this exercise.
xiii
)
- 4. Press releases from the Joint Media Center concerning evacuation orders were, in one case, very late in coming, or in another, not issued.
- Status
J.
The same type of shortcomings were evident in this exercise. Delays in
- press releases wer~e apparently Jue to difficulty in coordination between the State E0C and the Juint Media Center.
Dorchester County
- 5. Some lack of understanding of the correct use of dosimetry and correct dose recordkeeping was evidence by Dorchester County personnel and State emergency workers supporting the County response (see recommendations No. 13 and No. 14). (NUREG-0654: K.3.a. and b.) '
Status:
This deficiency was repeated in this exercise.
I St. Mary's County !
- 6. Staff at the St. Mary's County evacuation shelter, including l decontamination workers, did not possess a thorough knowledge of their j overall responsibilities nor adequate knowledge of essential procedures.
l Status:
. As evidenced by this exercise the evacuation shelter staff remains in
- need of further knowledge of its responsibilities and procedures.
- 7. Sheriff's personnel involved in field activities in St. Mary's County were not provided with dosimetry and State Police personnel were not i issued dose record fonns. More thorough, advance instructions are also l needed.
Status:
! All field activity workers were provided with appropriate dosimetry, record forms and instructions. .
- 8. At St. Mary's County, independent decisions were made and response l activities initiated without sufficient coordination and infonnation-sharing with the State and other counties.
Status:
I Coordination and infonnation-sharing with the other risk counties was l excellent, however, coordination and communication between the State
- l. E0C and the county left room for improvement.
l .
I i ) i j vix i
e
.,~w,.._,e--.,,_g--w .y_, -3g
,, , , , , gpg-_%%,9 ,3 . - _ %,, __, _..m .., .ypy,,yy_ , yem__ % y,,. y w- ,.7-9,,.-_ ,
1 .
) 9. St. Mary's County failed to provide adequate information to the public in its press release concerning school evacuation.
Status:
Appropriate information on protective actions were included in the county's news releases.
i 10. The county has no information regarding the location of mobility-l impaired persons.
1 7
Status:
! Although the county has several methods for notifying and transporting mobility and hearing-impaired people, including a sophisticated I
telephone-teletype system, it still does not maintain a coordinated listing of the names and locations of these people.
- 11. Radiological monitoring teams were directed to return to the E0C for j personal monitoring even though no decontamination capability exists at
, the E0C.
Status:
i Instructions to monitoring teams in this exercise were clear and j correct.
t Calvert County j 12. The county neglected to implement the evacuation of handicapped individuals. This failure is construed as evidence that the County CD 3 Director is personally responsible for too many specific emergency procedures, j Status:
6 i No similar omissions were observed in this exercise. More l responsibilities were appropriately delegated by the CD Director.
- 13. The county field monitoring team was without essential information
- concerning plant conditions, meteorology, exposure limits, etc. The l team (s) are in need of training that would make them aware of the necessity of such information.
Status:
t Resolved, i
xv i
) OBJECTIVES YET TO BE ACHIEVED OR FULLY ACHIEVED The following objectives were not fully achieved:
- Effective field measurement of airborne radioactive releases.
- Radiological monitoring to include collection and analysis of water, soil and milk.
- Continuing notification by Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant to State government of all stages of the emergency.
- Demonstration of the adequacy of external communications systems and procedures between the EOF, the State E0C and the Department of Health's Emergency Command Center and between the State and the plume zone counties.
- Demonstration of the adequacy of the State public information systems with the news media and the existence and adequacy of State rumor control.
- Demonstration of methods and resources for distribution, issuance, and administering of potassium iodide to emergency workers.
4
, xvi
j Maryland State E0C
)
- 1. Activation and Staffing The call activating the Maryland State E0C came from the utility, Baltimore Gas and Electric, at 0742 over commercial telephone. The call was verified by a telephone call back to the utility as called for in E0C procedures.
Fan-out notifications were performed by six individuals and were completed by 0814 Complete staffing of the E0C occurred by 1245, although all but two agencies were represented by 1100 Fifty-seven staff and visitors were present for all or part of the day.
The agencies represented at the E0C were:
Agriculture Coast Guard Economic Community Development Education Fire Marshal Human Resources Health & Mental Hygiene Institute of Emergency Medical Services National Guard Natural Resources Red Cross i State Police Transportation The staff of the E0C appeared to be well-trained and knowledgeable in their tasks.
Twenty-four hour staffing was demonstrated by double staffing so as to allow the exercise to serve as a training vehicle.
II. Emergency Operations Management The operations at the State EOC were under the direction of various officials, depending on who was.at the E0C at any given time. The Director of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, his deputy, and the Director of the Maryland Emergency Management and Civil Defense Agency (MEM & CDA) were on hand during the day to oversee the State's response, with the minute-by-minute response being coordinated by the operations group of the MEM A CDA.
Periodic briefings were held for the staff throughout the exercise via a public address system. This afforded individuals the opportunity to be kept informed of the status of the exercise wherever they might be located in the E0C. There was no request for the State agencies to give periodic feedback to the EOC
)
1
) operations group so that the entire E0C staff could be made aware of the overall State response, t.ittle technical information on plant status was available to the E0C until a conference call took place at 1100. Additional technical information was given on follow-up calls and the utility representatives briefed the staff at the E0C at 1247.
Copies of the plah and checklists were available in the E0C and were utilized by the staff when appropriate. The message handling system was very efficient. All incoming and outgoing messages were funneled through the message center, logged, and forwarded to the appropriate location. In addition, direct contact between State agency representatives and their headquarters was also being logged by the individuals in the E0C.
Access to the E0C was controlled by an individual posted at the entrance. All people entering the E0C were required to sign in and were given proper identification which was displayed throughout the exercise.
MEM & CDA received the notification of Alert from Baltimore Gas &
Electric (BG & E), via commercial telephone at 0742 (it having been declared by the utility at 0727). As called for in MEM & CDM's procedures, verification took place by a call back to the utility.
The State EOC never received direct notification from BG & E of the General Emergency which was delcared at 0844 (most likely due to the fact that the red phone was not operational until 0941). It was only due to the fact that the State Police made a routine call to their communications office at 0920 that the State became aware of the General Emergency. Attempts to contact the utility through alternative means of communication (radio, conenercial telephone) proved fruitless. Indirect confirmation finally took place at 0930 through contacting Calvert County, with direct confirmation from the utility finally occurring at 0949 after the red line came back into operation.
Calvert Cliffs made its original recommendation for protective actions (both sheltering and evacuation in specific sectors of the plume EPZ) at approximately 1005 with the various offsite authorities (DHMH, MEM & CDA, Acting Governor) concurring by 1011. In some instances the counties took the initiative to commence a precautionary evacuatiore. At 1330, it was determined that sheltering in the area 10-15 miles downwind of the plant should be initiated.
After discussion by the concerned offsite officials, this took place
- at about 1400.
i Coordination between the State EOC and the counties was weak. It is l realized that the counties have the primary responsibility for
- responding to an accident at Calvert Cliffs. However, the State i should take a more active role in keeping up-to-date on the counties' response activities. As an example, it was not until the Federal
- )
l l
l L
) observer (at 1045) questioned the operations staff as to whether the counties had sounded their sirens and activated EBS that the counties were contacted concerning that issue. This was almost 35 minutes after protective actions had been initiated and 1-1/2 hours after St.
Mary's County had accomplished the task. Early on in the exercise it seemed that the utility would take the initiative for staus updates through their conference calls. MEM & CDA was more persistent in keeping informed of the counties' status as the exercise proceeded.
The Lieutenant Governor, serving in the role of Acting Governor, was actively involved in decision making throughout the exercise. He was briefed on operations at the State E0C and, along with other officials, toured the affected area.
III. Facilities The Maryland State E0C is a well-designed facility. There is sufficient space, furniture, telephones and lighting to support its function. It is capable of extended operations and is easily secured.
All status boards and maps were easily visible thrnughout the room.
Large-scale maps of the area showing the plume EPZ, evacuation routes, E0Cs, relocation centers.and access control points were posted. Additional information concerning evacuation time estimates for normal and adverse weather, population and vehicle demand by emergency action sub-area, and a flow diagram of the plant were also available.
Status boards were generally kept up-to-date on significant events except for wind speed. An erroneous wind speed was posted early in the day and was corrected only about 1345. The error arose due to conversion from meters per second to miles per hour. The wind direction was updated frequently.
IV. Communications The State of Maryland E0C demonstra.ted the use of various communications systems as follows:
County E0Cs - radio (MCD/ NET), teletype, dedicated (red) phone, commercial phone, NAWAS and WAWAS State Agencies - phone, radio FEMA - FNAVS, FNATS, FNARS, NAWAS EOF - dedicated phones, phone telefax, radio EBS Station - Remote pick-up unit-radio (RPU), phone Media Center - phone, telefax, radio Support Hospitals - phone, radio 1
t
.s 3
) Conferencing was available on the dedicated phone lire between the State E0C, county E0Cs, E0F, State Police and Dept. of Health.
Hard copy, via teletype, was available to and from the media center.
The teletype devices worked well and were reliable and fast.
The message cente*r and communications center worked very well together. Although the State displayed and used a sufficient variety of communications networks, the utility did not take full advantage of them. This was illustrated when the dedicated phone line went dead. The utility could have used an alternative means of communication to relay the message of General Emergency to the State EOC.
V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations Protective action decisions were reached to initially evacuate certain areas while calling for sheltering in others. Eventually, evacuation of the entire plume EPZ took place, as well as an area 10-15 miles downwind from the plant. These decisions were as a result of plant conditions, not due to EPA exposure guidelines.
Weather, especially windspeed and direction, was also a consideration in establishing protective actions. Based upon the information available to the decision-makers, protective action recommendations were reviewed and updated, as necessary.
VI. Public Alerting and Instruction Other than activating the State EBS system at 0925, the State EOC had no role in public alerting and instruction. As called for in the Maryland REP, the counties have the authority to activate their sirens and initiate EBS broadcasts. This was done by the three plume zone counties, as noted earlier, without any type of prior notification, or inmediate follow-up, to the State E0C.
VII. Protective Action A. Evac ation and Access Control The activation of access and traffic control points were promptly ordered by the Maryland State Police in conjunction with the county Sheriffs. Estimates of expected traffic volume and the estimated time that it would take to evacuate the plume exposure EPZ were discussed.
Besides blocking roads into the plume EPZ, State officials also contacted the air traffic control center at Leesburg, Virginia and arranged to have the airspace surrounding the facility
)
4
.I restricted. The State also worked with the U.S. Coast Guard to notify boaters of the emergency at Calvert Cliffs and to bar traffic from designated areas of the Chesapeake Bay and Patuxent River.
B. Special Evacuation Problems Dealing with the special needs of mobility-impaired individuals and school children is the direct responsibility of the risk counties.
C. Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Protective Actions Although as part of the exercise there was no need to implement protective actions for the ingestion zone pathway, it is evident that current information is available on f arms (including dairy farms), food processing plants, wholesale and retail food outlets, and water supply intake points.
In the event it would be necessary to implement protective actions, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene will. work with the Department of Agriculture, the State Highway Administration and the Tidal Fisheries Division to ensure that contaminated milk and food supplies are kept from the public and that contaminated water supplies are dealt with in an appropriate manner.
VIII. Radiological Exposure Control The Maryland E0C is not located in the plume EPZ of Calvert Cliffs.
Moreover, very few staff of the E0C would be dispatched to the EPZ in the event of an emergency at CCNPP; any that would be dispatched would be issued personal dosimetry at appropriate local sites.
However, some dosimetry (including mid-range, self-reading dosimeters, TLDs, a supply of KI and adequate instructions for their use) is available at the E0C in case of unforeseen situations.
IX. Media Relations The organizations represented at the State E0C included Public Information Officers from the State Fire Marshall's Office and the State Department of Public Safety. The PIO and staff arrived and activated the office between 0835 amd 0855. Although mobilization was not demonstrated, there are written SOPS for activation via phone. In addition, the PIDs have personal paging devices by which the State Police could contact them. A full complement of staff was present.
]
5
I The PIO displayed adequate training and knowledge and had participated in several previous exercises. Twenty-four hour staffing was not demonstrated. (There is no double staffing.) The PI0s written S0P did not indicate any double-shift capability.
Adequate clerical help was available for message handling, duplicating and other support activities.
The PIO had adequate space, furniture, lighting, typewriters and access to a copier. No space or furniture was dedicated to media representatives since all media personnel are directed to the joint media center. Maps and displays were available to the PIO.
Communications for the PIO at the State E0C are commercial telephone and teletype. As a last resort, radio communications via the communications center could be used. Information is received from the operations area and, if appropriate, formulated into a message.
The message is given to the message center for telecopier transmission to the media relations center, plume pathway counties and ingestion pathway counties. Conferencing was not available.
It was observed that the PIO at the State E0C was somewhat slow in preparing and transmitting messages to the media relations center.
For example, the E0C operations center announced an Alert condition at 0727; however, the PI0s message to the message center was issued at 0905. This time delay was typical for most of the six messages transmitted to the media center. The delay seems to be caused by the process by which the PIO formulates these messages. A ~ staff person
) sits in the operations center and writes down information as it is received. Then the staff person checks the information for accuracy and brings it to the PIO who formulates the message. The PIO dictates the message to a secretary who then types it. The message is taken to the message center for telefax transmission.
The PIO at the media center and the PIO at the State E0C kept in touch and up-to-date via the telephone. It appeared that they tried to coordinate information.
Although the PIO at the State E0C was designated the rumor control person, a rumor control number was not activated. The PIDs 50P does not provide much information relative to rumor control activities.
However, the PIO was asked by someone in the operations area about a rumor whereupon the PIO responded with factual information. This information was given to the person in the operations area who transmitted it to the proper person. However, there were no formal rumor control activities.
X. Recovery and Reentry This was not an exercise objective.
)
6 l
XI. Scenario
)
The scenario was an adequate test of the various State agencies' capabilities to respond to an accident at Calvert Cliffs. However, it is suggested that in order to test additional capabilities of these agencies, more canned messages be included in exercise play to produce a higher level of interaction with the counties and/or the public.
Maryland State E0C Deficiencies / Required Improvements / Recommendations
- 1. The State EOC never received direct notification from the utility of the General Emergency. It was not until 0920 that the State was made aware of the General Emergency through the State Police contacting their communications center. Attempts by the E0C to communicate with the plant by radio and commercial telephone received no response from the utility. Confirmation from Calvert County did not occur until 0930.
Communication equipment redundancy is excellent. However, a workable policy should be developed between the parties regarding notification procedures when the red phone is not operational.
- 2. Coordination between the counties and State E0C needs to be improved . It is realized that the counties are the primary responders but the State needs to be kept informed of all critical actions. It was not until well after the fact that the State was aware that the counties had activated their sirens.
- 3. PIO operations at the State E0C need to be improved. Messages are slow in being prepared for dispatch to the media center and to the counties. The PIO staff was not aware of 24-hour staffing capability and arrangements for rumor control were very sketchy.
- 4. The demonstrated procedure for activation of Calvert County's EBS station was not the method specified in the plans. In future exercises the State should allow County demonstration of their ability to activate the local EBS station, and prepare appropriate messages for broadcast.
- 5. The E0C management kept all staf f well briefed on ongoing activities. However, it is suggested that the State agencies periodically give feed back to the E0C management so that the entire group will be made aware of the overall State response.
- 6. Additional play should be included in future scenarios to provide a higher level of play for State agencies.
)
7 F
) Calvert Cliffs Emergency Operations Facility I. Activation and Staffing Six Maryland State personnel manned the Maryland State operations 4
room at the Calvert Cliffs EOF. There was no pre-positioning and Maryland RERP mobilization procedures were followed. Dosimetry was largely effected by hand calculations. The MIDAS computer system was accessed, but no data input by Maryland was observed. Field team control and field data receipt was effected using a radio net.
Maryland staff attended PAR decision forming conferences. Shi ft change was demonstrated by double staffing one person.
Staff displayed competency, knowledge and training. Staff consisted of a nuclear engineer, dosimetrists, manager, radio net controller and civil defense personnel. Personnel interpreted status board data correctly and recognized, albeit belatedly as did BG & E, dosimetry input discrepancies and problems associated with what appeared to be a mixed mode release. This was an exceptionally good performance given the unusual conditions and their implications.
II. Facilities The Calvert Cliffs E0F is a new all-weather facility with internal glass walls permitting viewing of status boards from the Maryland operations room where the Maryland ACC is located. This room g contains six desks and chairs, six phones, the MIDAS computer
> terminal and the field team radio, plus two wall maps with overlays.
Space and facilities are adequate and match or exceed the description in the plan. A loudspeaker in the room assured notification of all situation reports. The Maryland operations room is located directly above the BG & E Dose Assessment Center. One desk in the center is provided for Maryland use. There is no electronic phone line between the two; such a phone would be very helpful to the State staff.
III. Communications Communications were effected using mainly commercial phone lines.
Conference call capability by BG & E to the State and county E0Cs was demonstrated. The State CD personnel brought a portable facsimile, transmitter and used it. Another telecopier is available in the BG & E support room. Its use was not observed nor was use of backup communications observed. The MIDAS terminal functioned and the system was accessed.
IV. Informational Functions The observer did see clearance of public information by daryland State representatives at the E0F. This is in keeping with the MDRERP. Such notices ~ are received at the Public Information Center.
The BG & E Site Emergency Director did receive and review all such releases.
)
8
- - - . - ,,.r- ----, , . , , . . . ~ , , - - , . , , , - - - - - , . . . - . - , . .
s 4-
) V. Rumor Control Not observed.
VI. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Expected doses were derived primarily from plant release data, though field readings were obtained ar.d an attempt was made to correlate these readings with calculated concentrations. Calculations were demonstrated using hand calculations and using the MIDAS computerized dose projection system. In both cases calculations were made properly, though they did not agree. This will be explained in detail later. Calculations were checked by comparing State results with the independently-calculated Licensee results. There was agreement in the hand calculations by both organizations.
Monitored data was not plotted on a posted map by the State. It was used primarily as a check on calculated concentrations, which were plotted by the use of an overlay. Monitoring teams were directed to locations where the plume was expected to be. The plume was correctly defined by the combined use of field data and calculations. No attempt was made to define the plume by the sole use of field monitoring data. In spite of some radio problems, field data was received in a timely manner by the State. An estimate was made of total population dose.
Protective actions were simulated for plume pathway hazards.
Ingestion pathway hazards were not addressed within the time-frame of the exercise, though agricultural sampling was initiated during the exercise. This would have led to protective actions for the ingestion pathway. Protective actions were based on the EPA exposure guides for distances beyond 10 miles. Factors such as plant status, evacuation time estimates and weather were considered. In fact, the initial decision to evacuate was based on plant status. Protective action recommendations were driven by known or probable core damage plus failure of multiple barriers to fission product mobility. PARS were formed on this basis; dosimetry was secondary. This scenario and response is in keeping with NRC IE IN 83-28.
Use of KI was simulated by field monitoring teams upon departure for the pl ume area. According to the State, this pre-authorization is consistent with the plan. It was based on the fact that a radioactive release was expected, though the quantity of the release was not determined at the time.
Protective action recommendations were reviewed and updated as the situation developed and as conditions changed. Only the State of Maryland was involved so there was no need for coordination between states.
Problems in dose assessment were intimately linked to the scenario and so will be discussed as a unit. The scenario was defined and
) field monitoring data was obtained using the MIDAS System. This was 9
, - - , - - - - s
3 the basis for keeping the evacuation-causing doses within the 10-mile zone. Presumably, if the MIDAS System were used to do dose assessment during execution of the exercise, everything would agree and the high concentrations would remain within the 10 mile zone.
However, during execution of the scenario, hand calculations used by both the utility and the State showed levels as much as a factor of 10 higher than the MIDAS System. This discrepancy was resolved by choosing the highet of the two estimates in order to assure protection of the public. This is a valid and reasonable decision to make.
However, the discrepancy between the hand calculations and the MIDAS System were not resolved during the exercise. This might have been done if field monitoring data were used to choose between the two dose projection calculations; but the issue was not focused upon once it was decided to rely on hand calculations The recommendation to follow is in no way a deficiency, sincce emergency response actions are frequently based solely on hand calculations alone. The MIDAS System adds a greater degree of sophistication to the decision making process. Due to recent personnel changes, the State now has the meteorological expertise to allow it to understand the reasons why MIDAS differed from the hand calculations. If there had been an intimate familiarity with the basis for the MIDAS System, the reason for the discrepancy would be obvious and the decision between the two results may have been made differently. It is suggested that the State review the MIDAS System and become familiar with its workings. This would facilitate protective action decisions which are more consistent with the expected plume. The discrepancy and the resulting over-estimation of concentrations is the factor which caused protective actions to be recommended beyond 10 miles.
The familiarization suggested here is beyond the meteorological sophistication typical of most State radiation offices but is possible due to the presence of a person with meteorological background on the Maryland staff.
~
Calvert Cliffs EOF Deficiencies / Required Improvements / Recommendations
- 1. A phone link should be established between the BG & E Dose Assessment Center and the MDACC located in the Maryland operations room.
- 2. State accident assessment personnel should review the MIDAS system employed by Baltimore Gas and Electric.
)
10 9
) Department of Health and Mental Hygiene Emergency Command Center I. Activation and Staffing The activations of the Maryland ECC is guided by the S0P for the department. The. Director of Radiation Health was notified of an Unusual Event at 0630 at his home. He proceeded to the office; the operation is maintained in Radiation Health at unusual event. At 0805 the Alert message was received and the ECC was put into operation. The staff were arriving for work at this time; therefore, no call-up was demonstrated. The monitoring staff was briefed and dispatched to the field. Operations of the Health Department emergency response was maintained in Rad. Health until the ECC became operational.
The ECC was set up and phones tested by 0825. It was fully staffed by 0910. The staff reported to their assigned places and began to function. The S0Ps, room design and staff are appropriate.
II. Emergency Operations Management The ECC was under the command of the Assistant Secretary for Administration; he serves as the Department Coordinator for emergency actions. He briefed the staff periodically as to the status of the emergency. The status board was maintained and message logs were monitored by the various jurisdictional components (Rad. Health, PIO, Administration).
The commander was in active communication with his staff and consultants. The State supplements its staff with consultants in radiology and health physics from John Hopkins. There were consultations made at each report from the EOF for protective actions and each was concurred on; action messages were issued to EOC. The Secretary was also briefed.
Brookhaven Lab was notified of the situation and the possibility that assistance might be requested.
III. Facilities The operational facilities are adequate for doing the assigned tasks. The State plans to use a third shift to allow for full staffing in the 24-hour period. Double staffing was used for training the staff. Maps, status boards, etc. were present and updated.
IV. Communications The ECC is not equipped with radio facilities and relies on landline communciations. The landline system has no backup, potentially rendering the E0C communicationless.
)
11
1 The Radiation Control Department on the second floor of the building maintains dedicated lines to both Calvert Cliffs and to Peach Bottom, microwave communications to each; a low-band system transmitting from Baltimore on a field team coordinating frequency; and a repeater system which re-transmits on the low-band from a site in Calvert County. The low, band frequency is also used as base-to-car conmunications with coordinating and ECC officials who are not a part of monitoring field teams.
At 0815 several attempts were made to contact the Assistant Secretary to advise him of the Alert status. Contact was delayed because of the issuance of weather reports by another agency using the same frequency. The delay was not excessive; however, weather reports may be transmitted at an inopportune point during an actual emergency.
At 0945 the low-band repeating system at Calvert County was keyed by
- field teams in transit and by Rad. Control in Baltimore. It was discovered that transmission of messages via the repeater had failed. Although communications with field teams continued to be possible for the short period by utilizing the transmitter in
- Baltimore, as field teams moved South signals got weaker and eventually field units could not be contacted.
At 1045 all contact with field units 4404, 4405 and 4407 was lost.
In order to contact field units, Radiation Control had to contact E0F via microwave. E0F would then utilize a hard landline-to-repeater connection to transmit relayed communications to field units.
I However, because repeater receive capabilities in the Radiation Control remained intact, Radiation Control could monitor messages.
At 1120 the E0F advised Radiation Control that their landline connection with the repeating station had completely failed.
However, Radiation Control had re-established direct radio contact with Units 4404 and 4405 as they moved North to monitoring points.
E0F requested that Radiation Control relay monitoring messages from field units back to EOF via microwave. Carrying out this procedure called for the manning of the Radiation Control radio by four staff in order to be able to operate at minimal levels. Unit 4407 was still not contactable. Radio telephones were tried and did not function.
At 1135 the staff of the Radiation Control radio area became severely overloaded and nearly ceased to function. No allowances or plans had been made for such multiple communication failures. One staf f member took the lead and organized others into a system which could handle the radio traffic at a sub-optimal, but functional level.
At 1205 the repeater receive capabilities of Radiation Control were i
lost; several attempts were made to re-key the unit. All failed.
. The primary transmitter was used to contact 4405 in the field, at which time they were advised to use telephone landlines to contact the E0F with reports. At this point, with the exception of the
) primary transmitter in Baltimore, all radio communications were lost.
12
-- - . - x , .- - , _ _ . - . . . _ - - - _ , , , - - , -
3 At 1310, 4410 attempted to raise Radiation Control, but because of distance from the Baltimore transmitter was unsuccessful. 4410 was assigned to ingestion pathway control. In an actual emergency, given the radio problems, no information on essential ingestion flows would have been available to ECC Baltimore.
V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations The communications problems had implications for the ECC operators.
The commander would not have timely reports of readings from the monitoring sites by radio. He had to telephone the EOF to obtain information from the staff located there. The Rad. Health Director there was directing the taking of readings by the plume direction and the preassigned positions of monitoring teams. This left the ECC in the situation of not being able to monitor the team messages and provide timely direction and information.
Protective measures were ordered by the ECC Commander based on the information available. Evacuation was ordered for the area in the plume pathway and sheltering was also selectively ordered. KI was not ordered during this exercise.
~
04partrhsnf of' Health 1mergAncy Command Center Deficiencies / Required Improvements / Recommendations
- 1. The communications failure affected the ability of the ECC to be as effective and as timely as it could have been. The tasks were
) accomplished, but with a lot of effort to collect the data for the decisions required. There is a serious lack of redundancy in ECC/IPCC radio systems. Radiation Control staff used unacceptable radio procedures in initiating and responding to messages. As a result, several messages regarding monitoring readings and status ,
were incorrectly interpreted and passed along to the E0C. A standard method to record and review messages was not available. This led to multiple, needless transmissions to verify information which could not be copied quickly enough by Radiation Control operators. A paralleling lack of redundacy in systems at the EOF caused a nearly total failure in the radio communications system. A significant portion of messages were dependent on landlines which were not dedicated. In the event of an actual emergency, it is unlikely that commercial landlines would be readily available. Had this been an actual emergency it is likely that E0F-E0C-Radiation Control would have been deaf, dumb and blind given multi-system failures.
The State should re-evaluate the communications systems used to link the ECC, IPCC, E0F and field teams and should institute the improvements in equipment, procedures and training necessary to ensure effective communications.
- 2. It is recommended that the State recognize the capability of the county monitoring teams by providing, in future exercise scenarios, simulated readings for the teams to report. Some means of
) integration of S, tate and local teams should be considered.
13
American Red Cross Field Headquarters The ARC field headquarters was located at the Baltimore Area Headquarters on North Charles Street in Baltimore for this exercise and supported Red Cross efforts in Calvert, St. Mary's and Anne Arundel counties. Adequate space and personnel to support operations were available. Communications with all i
chapters supporting pos,sible evacuation, with all ARC State liaison personnel and with ARC operational headquarters (Alexandria, Virginia) was available as was communication with other volunteer agencies. Backup
. systems were also available.
i An ARC official was assigned to be in charge of support operations. A 4
written 50P was available and utilized.
The ARC's estimate of the total number of persons needing mass care is 10,000. Food would be obtained from various church and school pantry supplies, purchase orders with grocery retailers and wholesalers, and voluntary contributions. Cots and blankets, clothing, and medical supplies would be obtained through a distribution system arranged by the Arlington headquarters.
a 4
e
)
14
.) Field Monitoring Teams Field Team Mobilization Although mobilization of the field monitoring teams was not observed, it was learned that the monitoring teams were briefed in Baltimore on plant conditions; they were b'rought up to date on plant conditions and meteorological conditions when they arrived at the EOF. The teams were dispatched from the O'Connor Building in Baltimore at 0845 and arrived at the EOF at 1005. They departed the E0F at 1100.
Each team consisted of 2 individuals and a van. The members of the teams shared equally in the responsibilities. According to the monitoring team, there is a system in place for call-up of the teams on a 24-hour basis.
Since this would be accomplished in Baltimore, this activity was not observed.
Field Team Equipment The field monitoring teams had equipment capable of detecting alpha, beta and gamma radiation. This included SAM II's, PK 6A's, pancake probes, GM ionization and air samplers of a variety of manufacturers. They were also equipped with high/ low ra, , el f-reading pocket dosimeters and film badges.
Field Team Technical Operations The field teams had w.-itten S0Ps for operation of the equipment and demonstrated proper technique in operation of the equipment to obtain measurements. A detailed county map was used which showed almost every road in the area and had identified monitoring points on the map by both coordinates and number location.
Although proper sampling procedure was demonstrated, unnecessary exposure to possible beta radiation was allowed. After the sample was collected the team stayed in the plume and did their gross readings. Proper technique would be to leave the area of the plume before taking these measurements.
Because this scenario covered a rapidly developing accident and because of the slow response of the monitoring team, the main portion of the plume had passed the early monitoring points and.was never located. The composition and location of the main portion of the plume was never verified.
Field Team Communications All members of the field monitoring teams and individuals involved in receiving data or transmitting instructions to the field teams need additional training in good radio operations procedures to include the proper use of the phonetic alphabet when transmitting information.
Several dead spots exist in the EPZ in which neither transmission nor reception of information could be accomplished. The controller at the EOF was uncertain of what to do next.
15
4
) Field Team Exposure Control Field monitoring team designated as 4404 did not demonstrate procedures for personal exposure control. Records were kept, self-reading pocket dosimeters were never checked and the controller from the utility advised that he had exposure num)ers for the team. Team 4405 did not demonstrate much better procedures for personal monitoring.
The teams were aware of decontamination procedures and locations of decontamination centers. As part of equipment, water was available for at least a partial decontamination.
Field Monitoring ~ Teams Deficiencies / Required' Improvements / Recommendations
- 1. Poor personal monitoring and exposure control procedures were demonstrated. In some cases no personal monitoring procedures were demonstrated. The teams should review and refresh themselves on good personal monitoring procedures, e.g., reading dosimeter at regular intervals and being sure that they have received instructions.
- 2. Poor communication techniques were observed. The controller (at the E0F) did not respond very rapidly to incoming transmissions. The controller was slow in assigning the next monitoring station. A great deal of waiting time was observed. Team members and team controllers should review communications procedures and institute needed modifications in techniques and/or institute improvements in '
training.
)
16
,n-. , , - . .
i Agricultural Sampling Team The two team members who comprised the Agricultural Sampling Team were from the State Department of Health. They were notified of the incident at 0930 and prepared for deployment. The IPCC instructed them to deploy at 1145 and they left Baltimore immqdiately, arriving at the E0F at 1320.
They deployed with all necessary equipment including the following:
Dosimetry (2) CDV-742 (2) CDV-730 (2) TLDs (1) CDV-720 (1) COV-715 (1) CDV-700 All monitoring equipment was checked and calibrated prior to departure from Baltimore.
Sampling Equipment Gloves Plastic bags Coveralls Shovel s
) Buckets Labels Plastic containers Changing fluids for sampling equipment In addition they had complete maps of the area which included dairy farms, vegetable, fruit and grain areas and open water reservoirs clearly marked.
They also had a complete S0P manual .
Team members were very knowledgeable of exposure control procedures and the use of KI and decontamination. Recordkeeping of dosage was demonstrated on a half hour basis. Effective use of dosimetry equipment was also i demonst rated.
The team deployed from the E0F at 1345 and began sampling after receiving complete instructions from State Radiation Control representatives at the E0F.
, The team's vehicle was small but adequate and was equipped with a two-way l radio. Communications were maintained with the EOF.
l
)
17 l
l
) The team took samples of soy beans from a farm in Calvert County and demonstrated adequate sampling techniques. While enroute to St. Mary's County, to collect samples of milk, soil and fruit, they were notified by i
radio from the E0F, at 1442, that the exercise was terminated as of 1425.
They were instructed to return to the E0F with the samples they had taken.
Overall the team demonst' rated excellent knowledge of sampling techniques and were well trained and prepared for a radiological emergency. Their experience level was excellent.
1
- However, due to termination of the exercise, the team did not completely demonstrate the ability to perform radiological monitoring to include collection and analysis of all sample media, e.g., water vegetation, soil and milk. Only vegetation samples were collected.
Agric 0lt0ral~Ssmpling'T im'Deficiincy/ Required'imprbvement/ Recommendation
- 1. In future exercises the agricultural sampling team should be given l sufficient time to accomplish its mission by either an earlier activation or by extending its operations beyond the official '
- termination of the exercise.
f
-f 4
i I
1 I
I J
4 i
18
i l
E
- News Media Center I. Activation and Staffing The State PIO and an Assistant PIO were at the Media Center as was a spokesman for the county and a full PIO staff representing the utility.
There has been a substantial turnover in State PIO personnel. All the lead PI0s of previous exercises are no longer there. Training is needed.
A listing of the PI0s available for call-up from other agencies was shown. Some have assisted in previous exercises. These are sufficient for a 24-hour coverage. All need training.
Clerical help was available and was capable.
II. Facilities The mobile trailer used by the State was adequate in space, furniture, lighting, equipment, etc. However, it would be somewhat small if it were needed for longer periods of time. It was provided by the utility and the utility representative informed the PIO that that particular trailer may not be available next time. A less comfortable one may be necessary (lease or rental). Also, the PIO was informed that the FAX machine, which the utility supplied, would not be available next time. It appears that the State must take some action to assure that they have proper space and equipment for future tests or real emergencies.
The PI0s had a place for private conference.
The media representatives had adequate space, lighting and furniture. They must provide their own supplies and typewriters, and arrange with the telephone representative at the media center for their own phone, for which they will pay.
III. Communications The State had three commercial telephones for incoming and outgoing calls. There were backup radio communications available.
Reporters made arrangements with the telephone company representative for their own phone. Ample telephone jacks were available.
Utility PIO representatives at the Media Center were advised of the Alert and General Emergency status. The State PI0s arrived after the General Emergency and the Evacuation had been ordered. It was 1200 before the Evacuation message preapred at 1002 was received.
)
19
) IV. Informational Functions Three briefings were held and the State participated in one. The utility did a good job, but the State's participation was not adequate. The State PI0s are capable professionals, but due to delays in the communications at Pikesville, information was extremely late and there was poor coordination throughout.
Emergency instructions were not drafted in the Media Center. That was to be done at Pikesville EOC and at the local level. No emergency public instructions were contained in any release, except the message to evacuate.
V. Rumor Control The PIO at the Media Center said rumor control was operated by individual counties. The State Rumor Control was operated out of Pikesville, but the number was not available. There was no observed publicity given the State Rumor Control number.
VI. Scenario The scenario moved too quickly to provide for adequate testing of the Media Center operations. The State PIO would be activated at the Alert which was at 0745. The Media Center would be activated at the Site Emergency or General Emergency. It is a two hour drive from Baltimore to the Media Center. In this exercise the General
)
Evacuation was ordered before the State PIO arrived at the Media Center. This could happen in a real-life situation. But for an exercise, this scenario does not allow for full testing of capabilities.
1 News Media Center Deficiencies / Required Improvements / Recommendations
- 1. PIO coordination and communication between the State EOC and the media center was poor leading to inadequate performance. The State
' should review its communications equipment and procedures in order to determine what modifications are necessary.
- 2. Rumor control numbers should be publicized in future exercises, i
1 l
l l 20 1
= _ - , . . - - -_ , _ . ...
3 EBS Test - WBAL/WlYY At 0920 EDT the control room of WBAL received a call from the Maryland State EDC advising the station that an impending emergency announcement was to be made over the EBS network. At 0922 the Remote Pickup Unit (RPU) was activated by the EOC and,at 0923 a pre-recorded EBS test message was broadcast over WBAL-AM. Meanwhile, the text of the exercise message was being recorded on tape in the studio. The taped exercise message concluded at 0926. At 0928 the same pre-recorded EBS test message was broadcast over WBAL's FM sister station, WIYY.
4 21 L..
) Traffic Control Calvert County i
Transportation Coordinators (State Police Officers) at the Prince Frederick i E0C notified field officprs to man blockade areas at approximately 0950.
Three Calvert County Access Control Points were manned by Maryl,and State Police . Troopers. At two sites there were on hand personnel from the Maryland State Highway Administration with barricades to block off the road, if necessary. The third site could be adequately handled by a police cruiser. All were well prepared and knowledgeable. There was no equipment immediately available to clean the roadway, but all had names and numbers to -
call. The only fault found was that the officers manning the southern points who would turn cars back to the south, knew only of the i
decontamination and mass care centers to the north, which would not have been accessible in a real life emergency since routes to them were blocked off. They should have been told to reroute people to the St. Mary's
- facilities.
$t.' Mary's County
., At the first site visited the officer was very well-informed and knowledgeable. State Highway Administration maintenance personnel were on hand with barricades as needed, s Two other sites were visited at approximately 1120-1130 but no officers were
) found. The observer was informed by the Access Control _0fficer at the St.
Mary's E0C that the officers manning these sites were pulled to check on a possible helicopter crash. Tnis crash was found to have occurred much farther north, outside the limits of the local barracks. By the time the accident had been investigated the CALVEX 85 scenario had escalated and the control of access points had been pushed back to the 10 mile limit. These sites were visited at 1311 and found to be manned by officers as well prepared and knowledgeable as the one at the first site.
Over all the response by the State Police was excellent.
I i
o 22
) Calvert County E0C I. Activation and Staffing Activation and staffing were accomplished in the Calvert County E0C in a timely and ef ficient manner. The call from the utility notifying the county of the Unusual Event was received at 0544 in the county communications center via the hotline telephone dedicated to this purpose. The communications center is a 24-hour facility and is the communications nerve center for most county emergency and public safety services. Its dispatchers are equipped and trained to notify the entire E0C staff at any hour, if necessary. Because the exercise Alert notification was received at 0733, during normal working hours, the Civil Defense Director implemented the activation procedure, notification of the EOC staff occurred promptly arid as specified in the plan.
The staff performed their jobs well. The E0C Director activated the E0C officially at 0815. Organizations represented throughout the exercise included Civil Defense, Engineering, Radiological Defense, Schools, Health, State Police, County Sheriff's Office, Red Cross, Social Services and a quorum of the County Commissioners. Backup personnel are available for these functions. In general, the staff members were aware of their responsibilities and performed competently.
II. Emergency Operations Management The Calvert County Civil Defense Director, as specified in the plan, was effectively in charge of coordinating the county's emergency response activities. The Director performed periodic briefings of the EOC staff, as appropriate. Staff members were involved in decision making and other activities as necessary. Copies of plans, procedures and checklists were available and consulted. Message handling and routing, using a new message fonn for both incoming and outgoing messages, was efficient. Message logs were also maintained. Adequate E0C security was established during the Alert stage, enforced by police officers. E0C staff members were issued ID badges, and only visitors with legitimate reasons and valid ID were admitted.
Support and participation by elected officials was excellent. One County Commissioner served as the Public Information Officer, and at least two others visited the E0C periodically during the exercise.
The Commissioners were present in the courthouse throughout the exercise and, in consultation with the CD Director, made all major decisions regarding the emergency declaration and protective actions.
)
23 1
) The times for the occurrence of significant events at the E0C are as follows :
(Time Declared)
Receipt of Utility's Unusual Event Declaration 0556 (0544)
Receipt of Utility's Alert Declaration 0733 (0727)
Receipt of Utility's General Emergency Declaration 0855 (0844)
Alert & Notification System Activation 0912 ----
County Commissioners' Emergency Declaration and Precautionary 2-Mile Evacuation 0925 ----
County's Recommendation for Sheltering within 2 to 5 Mile Radius 1032 ----
Receipt of Governor's Protective Action Decision 1040 (1022)
Receipt of State / Utility Confirmation for Sheltering within 10 and 15 Miles Downwind 1355 Exercise Termination 1510 The Director and his staff, as well as the County Commissioners, performed commendably in responding to a fairly complicated and worsening situation. Wind direction throughout the exercise was such that Calvert was far more impacted by the plume than the other risk counties. As the schedule above shows, protective actions were implemented in four phases. The first phase occurred shortly after the county received the General Emergency notification. This was a I
precautionary 2-mile evacuation around the facility, which was announced by the County Commissioners after declaring a state of emergency. This was followed by the second phase, a recommendation for sheltering between 2 and 5 miles, resulting from deteriorating plant status. Both of these decisions were made by county authorities on their own initiative, and were appropriate for the exercise conditions. The third protection action phase was the Governor's decision to evacuate out to 5 miles in all sectors, and out to 10 miles in 5 designated downwind sectors. The final phase was again initiated by county officials, who recognized conflicts in dose rate measurements being reported by the State and the utility for various distances from the plant. One reported dose rate at ten miles was high enough to cause concern that additional protective actions were warranted beyond the EPZ. At 1250 the CD Director sought the advice of the State accident assessors who, in turn, consulted with their counterparts at the utility. It w.s not until over an hour later, at 1355, that the State E0C approved sheltering between 10 and 15 miles in two sectors. During the interim, E0C officials became' concerned about the delayed response, and the county was on the verge of unilaterally initiating the protective action irregardless of State concurrence. On the advice of his radiological staff, the Director had gone to confer with the Commissioners, and had just returned to the EOC with their approval for sheltering when the State's official recommendation was received via the hotline.
)
24
a & e 4--- -- -A*--
- - - - 1 + -
) Throughout these developments, county officials demonstrated capability and professionalism in choosing the appropriate course of action. A factor which aided their efforts at managing the response operations was the availability of status information, both onsite and offsite, of a fairly detailed nature. The county radiological staff demonstratep that they were well-qualified to make use of this
- info rmation.
Appropriate actions were taken by the E0C staff to coordinate emergency activities, as necessary. Activation of radiological monitoring teams, reception and mass care centers, and related response organizations were timely.
III. Facilities Located in the basement of the Calvert County Courthouse, the main operations room provided limited space to effectively accommodate the number of representatives / organizations and communication aides present. Although each organization had seating and adequate lighting and access to telephones, the table and working space were inadequate. The Red Cross, Social Services and PIO staffs were not located in the operations room, but were assigned to spaces nearby.
The county has plans to expand the operations room size and should make every effort to accomplish this construction as soon as possible.
The wall space was effectively utilized with an erasable grease-pencil status board as well as road maps, plume zone overlays with labeled sectors which identified evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control points and radiological monitoring points.
Population by sector was not posted but available. The status board i
was kept up-to-date with relevant information, but such information was subsequently erased which did not allow for establishing a sequence of events list. Wind changes occurred at least three times which would be valuable in a time sequence of events. It is recommended that a means be established to provide a list of sequential events, readily visible to the staff.
IV. Communications Initial notification was received over the Calvert Cliffs hotline from Baltimore Gas & Electric, followed within several minutes by an l announcement over NAWAS from the State warning point in Pikesville.
[ The County CD Director was notified at his residence over a special dedicated line connecting him with the county E0C. At 0912 (General Emergency) the county sounded the 21 sirens within their jurisdcition. This was done via radio control and at this time there were no known failures.
Contact with the State was maintained primarily over commercial telephone and the BG & E hotline for situation updates. The State radio teletype system was used extensively for hardcopy messages.
(
)
25 P
-me-- .--,..sw .-n,, _ _ - ,. ,n-. _ , - - - _ _ _ , . - . - - _n. - -
t T The backup radio link to BG & E was tested at the beginning of each shift but was not observed to have ever been actually used in lieu of this hotline which functioned well all day.
RACES - Two meter radio was used to communicate between the county E0C and the reception center at Calvert High School and the mass care center setup at the Northern Middle School. In addition, direct lines were in place to the EMS shock trauma teams at the P.G.
Hospital and the P.G. Shuck Trauma Cener.
Communication with monitoring teams was maintained via State Police radio. Sanpling teams, reporting to the Department of Health, kept in touch via REACT, which was monitored at the county E0C.
V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations Calvert County dispatched two field monitors to collect data for use in dose assessment. The field activities were capably directed from the county E0C by the Radiological Defense Officer (RD0) and Assistant RDO. The county has established fixed monitoring points (which are delineated on a large-scale map) at various locations throughout the plume zone. Based on meteorological and other information provided by the utility, the RDO staff promptly directed the monitors to new locations, as appropriate. Field readings (actual background measurements were reported) were received promptly, but only one monitor was equipped with a radio. It is recommended that the county obtain the use of a radio for each team,
) to preclude dependence upon commercial pay phones. According to the RDO, in an actual emergency, county field team readings would be forwarded to the accident assessment staffs at the State Health Department and the utility, where dose projections are calculated.
It should be noted that this activity was performed in accordance with the county plan, but the exercise scenario did not recognize this capability. County officials would like to see the capabilities of the field monitors recognized and included in future scenarios.
It is recommended that county monitors be provided with simulated readings to report. This would provide additional input, and more realism to the overall dose assessment effort.
l VI. Public Alerting and Instruction The capability for performing both primary and secondary public alerting was adequately demonstrated. The primary means for alerting the public was accomplished by activation of the siren system. This occurred in Calvert Cliffs at 0912, the time agreed upon by the three risk counties during a coordinating conference call. The sirens within the county's portion of the EPZ were activated from the Communications Center, in accordance with the Director's instructions.
J
)
26
3 The County Sheriff's Office and Maryland State Police representatives at the E0C demonstrated good coordination in simulating the dispatch of emergency vehicles to perform route alerting within the areas affected by each succeeding phase of the protective actions.
The demonstrated . procedure for activation of Calvert County's EBS station, WMJS, was not the method specified in the plans. According to the county PIO, such activation is normally the responsibility of the county. For the exercise, however, EBS activation was to occur from the State E0C. The PIO did notify the EBS station at the Alert stage, and again at 0904, prior to the siren sounding. However, these did not constitute formal activation, and no official EBS messages (test or otherwise) were provided. In future exercises, county officials should demonstrate their resonsibility for activating the local EBS station, and preparing appropriate messages for broadcast.
The county PIO made numerous informational calls to local print and broadcast media, and demonstrated good coordination with his counterparts at the other risk county and State E0Cs and, upon activation, the Joint Media Center. However, the capability for preparing comprehensive, detailed public instruction regarding protective actions was not demonstrated. Advising the public only that an evacuation of residents within two miles of the facility has been recommended is not adequate. Considerably more detailed public instructions regarding protective actions are necessary, and the capability to provide them, in the form of both news releases and EBS messages, should be demonstrated in future exercises. Evacuation instructions should include details on reception and mass care locations, means of transportation, routes, items that should and should not be taken to mass care centers, means of obtaining special assistance, etc. Sheltering instructions should be similarly detailed. In both instances, the instructions should include a description of the protective action area in terms that the public can identify, such as describing boundaries in terms of roads, bodies of water, or other landmarks.
VII. Protective Actions A. Evacuation and Access Control The State Police, with assistance from Sheriff's Deputies, fulfilled their responsibilities for maintaining public safety and access control during the evacuation. Traffic Control Points were established promptly at the first protective action, and subsequently were re-deployed as the affected area expanded. Although the police anticipate neither traffic jams (because of the small EPZ population) nor adverse weather (because of the mild climate), they did discuss these 1
27
) contingencies during the course of the exercise. While local resources would not be sufficient for all traffic control and access control functions simultaneously, the police were well-prepared to request and brief reinforcements from neighboring state police posts. Both the decontamination and reception centers wer,e activated in a timely fashion.
B. Special Evacuation Problems The Transportation Director took a count of the needs of the mobility-impaired during the exercise. He had a list of 17 people (along with their disabilities) who had responded to county publicity intended to solicit those who might need help to contact the CD office. In addition, he had access through the schools to a list of the residences of handicapped school children. He placed a lift bus on standby to provide transportation in case it was needed.
C. Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Protective Actions
~
The implementation of ingestion zone protective actions was not demonstrated in Calvert County; there was no indication to observers that such decisions were received from the State.
VIII. Radiological Exposure Control Sufficient quantities of low and high range dosimeters, TLD badges
) and rate meters were available and distributed. Mid-range (0-50R) dosimeters were not available. Dosimeters were properly zeroed prior to distribution. As each team / organization which required dosimetry picked up their equipment, the Assistant RD0 issued appropriate instructions, and presented an overview of the contents of the radiological information package. Potassium iodide pills and instructions were also explained in the Assistant RD0's presentation to teams. The county RAD staff were well versed in their responsibilities and exhibited an excellent command of the technical aspects of their positions. It was their evaluation of the dosage
' rate reported at 10 miles that led the county to request in-place shelter for those individuals residing between 10 and 15 miles in sectors P and Q.
IX. Media Relations Liaison with local news media was effectively acomplished by the County Administrator acting as the PIO. Call down lists were utilized to inform the local print and broadcast media of the initial alert and provide basic information verbally. Written news releases
, were also limited in information, and as noted in Section VI. above,
)
4 28
- y. ----_-y y,- y ---,---...py 3,_,m , , , _ , , - . - ,__m-. , - - , , . - - ~ - - - - . ~ . - - - . - . _ _ _ , - - - -
) detailed public ' instructions regarding protective actions were not prepared. No pre-fonnatted messages were utilized, nor are there any in the county plan. Information was relayed to the media center via telephone by the PIO.
X. Reentry & Recovery The demonstration of reentry and recovery capability was not an exercise objective.
t '. '
e 29
)
Calvert County Field Activities Field Monitoring' Teams Field team monitoring personnel were activated during the Alert phase by the Assistant Radiological Defense Of ficer (RD0) using a pre-prepared call-down list. As members arrived at the E0C, the Assistant RDO properly instructed
-them in their duties, went through operational checks and issued dosimetry and KI. All tear. members were briefed as to the situation, exposure controls and decontamination site. An off-duty state police officer. was dispatched to fixed site #1 where he was observed properly checking rate meters, logging information and calling in readings as required.
Informational packets issued to each team contained relevant information necessary to successfully accomplish his mission. The monitor exhibitied suitable technical competency in the use of radiological detection equipment. The officer reiterated his knowledge in terms of exposure control in sufficient detail to indicate he was excellently trained.
Mass'Cir I. Activation and Staffing Relocation functions in Calvert County are split between an assembly area, where registration and decontamination occurs, and mass care center, where evacuees needing medical treatment or shelter are sent. The assembly area, loctaed at Calvert Senior High School, had a staff of six social serices personnel, plus an amateur radio operator. The mass care center, located at Northern Middle School, was staffed by three Red Cross representatives, five Social Services representatives, one registered nurse from the Health Department, and one amateur radio operator. In addition, nine volunteers contributed their time to be mock evacuees. The staff was activated by the E0C in a timely fashion, and a suf ficient group is available on a 24-hour basis. The staf f members at the mass care center were well-prepared for their jobs and knew how to obtain additional staff or supplies if needed. However, the staff members at the assembly area were not sufficiently familiar with the details of their assignments; for example, they were unaware of the plan's provision for transporting evacuees whose cars were contaminated to the mass care centers.
The staffs at both the assembly area and mass care center did not receive adequate status updates to advise them of current plant conditions and county response actions. Calvert County should establish procedures whereby E0C personnel provide the mass care and assembly center staffs with appropriate information in a timely manner.
30
) II. Registration and Monitoring of Evacuees Evacuees were registered at Calvert Senior High School after being monitored for radiation and,1f necessary, decontaminated. Each evacuee completed a Red Cross Disaster Shelter Registration Form, with copies for the E0C, the assembly area, the evacuee, and the mass care center.
III. Congregate Care of Evacuees The Northern Middle School mass care center, located almost 10 miles beyond the plume exposure EPZ boundary, is an excellent facility for the 600 people it is planned to accommodate. As a school with 800 students, it has a cafeteria and all other necessities, although only 1 bathroom is equipped for the handicapped. Other mass care centers, including neighboring Northern High School, would handle additional evacuees if needed.
Communications with the E0C were provided by both commercial telephone and amateur radio, although the latter required a relay system because its new repeater station is not completed.
A registered nurse was present as part of the staff, and a health suite exists in the school for examinations. In addition, several doctors are on call to the school and the Prince Frederick Hospital is nearby.
-) Adequate coordination with the county E0C was not demonstrated at the mass care center. Shelter personnel did not know how many evacuees were to be sent to them nor were they advised as to the general status within the affected areas. There was confusion between the E0C and the center as to whether evacuees who had not registered at an assembly area were to be returned to the assembly area, or monitored and registered at the mass care center. The E0C did not provide personnel for decontamination at the mass care center, but the mass care staff thought that they were also to perform this function. Thorough coordination between the E0C and the mass care center should be demonstrated at future exercises.
IV. Decontamination The bus with mock evacuees arrived at the Calvert Senior High School at 1100, where it was stopped and promptly monitored for contamination. The staff of three trained people (two from the Health Department and one volunteer fireman) then monitored each evacuee and the bus driver, declared them free of contamination, and sent them in for evacuee registration. Their monitoring equipment consisted of two Eberline 520's with probes in plastic bags, I headphone, two other monitors with probes, and several CDV-700's without probes. Suf ficient dosimetry was available. Sel f-contained breathing apparatus was present.
)
31
g A number of problems were obser"ed. First, although the plan (figure 3-5) assigns primary responsibility to the CD Department, nobody was present from that organization, and it was clear that nobody was officially in charge. Second, nobody was present from the Department of Public Safety, although they are made responsible by the plan (figure 3-5) for,all monitoring. Third, the decontamination center was set up for men, but the staff forgot to plan contaminated and clean routes into and out of the ladies' shower room. Fourth, the equipment was insufficient insofar as a minimum of three instruments with headphones are needed at this facility (50P 4-8) and only one headphone was present. Fifth, the staff did not know the proper exposure levels for decontamination of people (0.05mR/hr), vehicles (1200 cpm), or emergency workers' thyroids (0.1mR/hr) as set out in pp. 4-9 to 4-11 of the 50Ps. Finally, it was very difficult to determine how many people could be processed per hour at this facility because many of the trained radiation monitoring staff also have other emergency assignments in this plan (e.g., state police, E0C staf f, and atmospheric sampling).
This function needs to be thoroughly reconsidered by county planners to supplement the plan, training and equipment.
~
Calvert County Dsficisncies/Requirsd'Improvsments/ Rec 6mmendations
- 1. The capability for preparing comprehensive, detailed public instruction regarding protective actions was not demonstrated. In future exercises, county officials should demonstrate their capability for providing detailed instructions in the form of both messages and news releases.
- 2. The staffs at both the assembly area and mass ca:'e center did not receive adequate status updates to advise them of current plant conditions and county response actions. Calvert County should establish procedures whereby E0C personnel provide the mass care and assembly center staffs with appropriate information in a timely manner.
- 3. The mass care center staff did not de*1onstrate adequate coordination with the county E0C. Thorough coordination with the county E0C should be demonstrated in future exercises.
- 4. Staff members at the assembly area were not sufficiently familiar with some aspects of their responsibilities. Additional training should be provided to familiarize personnel with the plans and procedures.
32
6 3
- 5. A number of problems involving staffing, training and equipment were l' observed among personnel responsible for evacuee monitoring at the assembly area. Staffing capability consistent with the plan should be established, additional training should be provided, and the specified equipment should be obtained.
" ~
- 6. Mid-range dosimetry (0-50R) as called for in the county 50P was not available thus making it impossible to start reporting dosimetry readings when the dosimeter registers 1R (neither the 0-200mR nor the 0-200R dosimetry is adequate for this purpose). The county should either obtain mid-range dosimetry or modify its reporting requirements to utilize the dosimetry actually available.
- 7. The county E0C provides very limited space, and all organization representatives could not be located in the operations room. The county's plan to expand the operations room should be implemented as soon as possible.
- 8. The status board did not provide enough space to accommodate a continuous list of sequential events. It is recommended that some means be established to provide the staff with a readily-accessible sequential listing of events.
- 9. One of the county's two radiological field monitors was not equipped with a radio for reporting field readings. It is recommended that radios be obtained for all field teams- dispatched, to avoid dependence on public telephones.
I 4
I i
i 33
r
)
Dorchester County E0C I. Activation and Staffing A direct communications link with the utility exists between both the County EOC and the County Central Warning point. Central Warning is manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,*and received the Alert classification notice from Baltimore Gas and Electric at 0739 (unobserved) and forwarded notification to the Director at his home. The Director and Assistant Director then proceeded to the E0C, arriving at 0800 to begin notification of staff. Notification was complete at approximately 0830 and staffing was completed at 0850, with the exception of the Dorchester County Red Cross representative, who arrived at 1035.
This position, however, was covered by a representative from Talbot County.
Representation at the E0C included the following organizations:
Civil Defense (Director, Assistant Director, Radio Communications, Support Staff), Health Department, Social Services, Schools, Engineering, State Police, Fire and Rescue, Sheriffs Department, Cambridge City Police, Natural Resources, Red Cross and the Board of County Commissioners. All representatives demonstrated committment to and knowledge of their respective authorities and responsibilities. Round-the-clock staffing was demonstrated via double staffing and roster presentation.
II. Emergency Operations Management The County Civil Defense Director effectively coordinated activities at the Emergency Operations Center. Periodic briefings were held often to update the staff. Elected officials of the county were intimately involved in decision making with three of the five -
Commissioners present during most of the exercise and all five present during parts of the exercise.
Access to the EOC was controlled and monitored by a guard posted at the door leading to the EOC. A sign was posted indicating that the operations area was limited to E0C staff. The guard required identification of all seeking entrance; without proper identification entrance was denied.
Message logs were kept, reproduced and distributed as needed.
Message handling was efficient.
The county was notified of Alert status at 0739 and of General Emergency status at 0902. There was no receipt of Site Area Emergency in accordance with the scenario. It was reported by the Director that the county received no initial notification of Unusual Event, although the State's Initial Incident Report for the Unusual Event indicates that Dorchester County was notified at 0630.
)
34 3
3 Calls were placed to activate a radiological monitor, the reception center and congregate care center at 1010. Fire and ambulance organizations were activated at 1010, traf fic control points at 1012 and a bus company at 1045.
The Director held a wrap-up critique of the exercise at the close of the exercise. Each participant was involved in discussing his/her role (s) in the exercise and a general overview of the response. This appeared to be very beneficial for the participants in identifying any problems which were encountered during the exercise.
III. Facilities Although the Dorchester County E0C is somewhat cramped, the operation was well coordinated so as to overcome this potential handicap.
Adequate furniture, lighting and telephones were available and a backup generator with a thirteen day fuel supply was available but not demonstrated.
A status board was available in the operations room, and was used by the RDO to convey basic radiological information to the staff. The status board was not used to post emergency classifications, but this did not appear to affect response performance as the Director maintained close and frequent conmunication with all staff. However, the briefing of second shift staff could be facilitated through the use of the board as a posting location- for significant events during the exercise.
A map was posted in the operations room which depicted the plume EPZ with sectors and zones, siren locations, monitoring points, evacuation routes, access control points, assembly areas, evacuation centers, hospitals, and media communications center. Information regarding EPZ population was available but not posted.
IV. Communications Commercial telephone was the primary means of communication demonstrated between the Dorchester E0C, the State E0C and other local E0Cs. Backup communication for the above was via radio, teletype and NAWAS. Telefax between the county and the State was demonstrated when written notification of the Emergency Proclamation and the initial evacuation directive, originally received verbally at 1122 and 1015 respectively, were received at 1345. Dedicated landlines were the primary communcition means between the E0C and the EOF. Radio phone was available as backup.
Commercial phone was the only means of communication with the EBS station, the media center, schools and radiological monitoring team.
l l
! )
l 35
A base station radio connects the E0C with ambulances.
)
Several communications problems were experienced at Dorchester County EOC during the course of the exercise. Initially, the " red phone," a dedicated line with conference capability, was not working properly, but was reported as being back in operation at 0915. Channel 1, used to contact the Ma*ryland State Police, was out of service during the exercise, and commercial telephones were used as backup. The Taylor's Island Volunteer Fire Company was finally contacted at 1100, but continued attempts at 1129, 1135 and 1145 via radio and phone proved futile. It is recommended that contact procedures with the fire company be reviewed and revised, if necessary, to improve communication capability with that location. The dedicated landline and Channel I communication systems should be reviewed to ensure operability during emergency response activation.
V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recomendations A. Dose Projection Although dose projection is not a designated county responsibility, a local radiological monitor was dispatched from the E0C at 0950 to take readings from a car, covering the length of Taylor's Island along the shore boundary. Thi s individual called back his readings to the EOC approximately every half hour. Also, at 0906, the RD0 indicated that the county would enlist the assistance of a retired volunteeer fire
) representative who resides along the shore on Taylor's Island.
This individual had use of a 70' tower, with wind speed and direction monitoring capability. This information was periodically called in to the county, and was used by county officials in their discussions regarding protective actions.
B. Protective Action Recommendation At 1015 a conference call with the county CD Director and Baltimore Gas and Electric was convened, during which Calvert Cliffs recommended expanded protective actions to include a 360 degree evacuation out to 5 miles, evacuation out to 10 miles in sectors M, N, P, Q and R (none of which are in Dorchester County), and sheltering out to 10 miles in all other sectors.
The President, Board of County Commissioners, signed the Proclamation of a State of Emergency in the area of Taylor's Island in Dorchester County at 1016. An EBS announcement at 1017 advised residents of Taylor's Island to prepare for evacuation. At 1025 the County Commissioners and CD Director discussed the current situation with the RDO to assess the potential impact on Dorchester County considering distance from the plant, wind speed and direction. At 1027 it was determined that sheltering.as a protective action was appropriate, and an
)
36
g EBS message was aired to that effect at that time. At 1035, a follow-up briefing with E0C staff forwarded information from another conference call indicating that serious core damage may occur at or around 1100, and that additional protective actions may be expected at that time. I
~
The CD Director and County Commissioners left the E0C to attend a press briefing at 1105 and placed the Assistant Director in charge of response operations. At 1122 the State called, forwarding information regarding the Lieutenant Governor's State of Emergency Proclamation, and at 1134 it was determined to proceed with a precautionary evacuation. An EBS announcement was transmitted at 1135 to order a precautionary evacuation of Taylor's Island.
Although no protective action recommendations were received from DHMH, one scenario-injected message related to ingestion pathway concerns, i.e., a fish catch from the bay. This message was responded to capably by the county, with no demonstrated coordination with the State.
XI was distributed to the established assembly center, which was also to serve as the distribution point for dosimetry to emergency workers. KI was~ distributed to emergency workers (simulated), and workers were advised to take KI as a precautionary measure, as authorized by the County Department of Health.
)
VI. Public Alerting and Instruction A call from the utility at 0902 advised Dorchester County of escalation to General Emergency with no protective actions recommended. A conference call was then conducted, with all plume EPZ counties reportedly participating, in order to coordinate activation of the sirens at 0912. However, dif ficulty was encountered during the first attempt to activate the sirens, reportedly due to the severe electrical storm which had occurred the prior night. Since it was not immediately apparent that the sirens did not sound, an EBS announcement was made by the Public Information Officer directly on the air from the E0C at 0918. The CD Director was notified at 0916 by the Communications Officer that the initial attempt to sound the sirens had failed. A second attempt to start up the. emergency sirens was Fade, but this too was reported as fa.iing to activate the sirens. The county then authorized activation of the fire siren at the Taylor's Island Volunteer Fire Station at 0930, with route alerting to follow. An EBS message was aired at 0931 to again disseminate information regarding the General Emergency and to
)
37
s explain in brief the need for manual activation of the siren at the fire station. A follow-up message at 0934 from Dorchester Fire Control indicated that the fire sirens had indeed sounded. A 0936 message from the Chief Deputy Sheriff's Department reflected that both the CD and fire sirens were working, and the request for use of vehicles with PA. systems to complete route alerting was cancelled.
Four additional EBS messages were aired. One at 1017 to advise residents to prepare for evacuation, one at 1027 to recommend residents to take shelter, another at 1135 to recommend a precautionary evacuation of Taylor's Island, and a final message at 1245 to close down EBS involvement. All of the EBS messages were informative and timely, and were constructed from prescripted messages.
The message to take shelter included guidance regarding the closing of doors and windows and the turning off of ventilation systems, but did not include instructions for transients. Two campgrounds are within the 10-mile EPZ on Taylor's Island. No active schools are located in the EPZ.
VII. Protective Action A. Evacuation and Access Control Two access control points were promptly ordered by E0C staff at 1012, one at the intersection of Smithville Road and Route 16, and another at Church Creek. These positions were manned until 1200 when the DHMH recommended movement of the ACPs to 10 miles out.
The Natural Resources representative ordered evacuation of Slaughter Creek, Little Choptank River and the Chesapeake Bay from James Point to Punch Island Creek at 0935. Tilghman Island and Oxford resources were placed on standby to assist if necessary with the evacuation.
Activation of the assembly center was initiated with a 0945 telephone call to the appropriate principal, cafeteria manager and support staff, advising them to stand by. The Shelter Director was notified at 1010 to set up the shelter. The shelter was reportedly fully manned at 1041.
B. Special Evacuation Problems According to the CD Director, only one individual is mobility-impaired within the 10-mile EPZ. Arrangements have been made with the volunteer fire canpany in order to provide transportation assistance to this individual. Written record 38 i
h' I
of this information was not demonstrated. No other handicapped persons are known to be in the 10-mile EPZ, as no other responses have been received as a result of the county's annual mailing and request for this information.
No schools
- are currently in use within the 10-mile EPZ in Dorchester County.
C. Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Protective Actions No ingestion pathway recommendations were received at the county E0C from the State. According to the Department of Health representative, the only known animal farms within the 10-mile EPZ are a number of chicken farms. In formation regarding these locations was not available at the E0C, but is reportedly available through the Department of Health's Environmental Health Division.
VIII. Radiological Exposure Control Supplies of low-range and high-range dosimeters, chargers, recordkeeping cards and TLDs were all available at the county E0C in more than adequate numbers when compared with listed needs in the county plan. Adequate supplies of KI were reportedly available but not observed. The present 50P calls for dispatching this equipment to the Church Creek Volunteer Fire Station for distribution to emergency workers.
Legal-sized sheets with detailed, typed instructions regarding dosimetry use were available for distribution to emergency workers.
However, in a rapidly escalating situation, emergency workers may not take the necessary time to read these instructions in toto. The county may wish to extend emergency worker instruction by ad ' tionally providing an oral briefing regarding self-protective a_.4ons.
Department of Health representatives were very knowledgeable with 3 regar ' to proper proceJures in the use of dosimetry and KI, and the procedures / location for monitoring and decontamination.
l IX. Media Relations A press briefing was given at 1110 in the county office building located across the street from the Emergency Operations Center. The briefing was conducted by the CD Director and the County Canmissioners. The briefing lasted for approximately fifteen minutes and provided the two' attending press representatives with a canplete and accurate presentation of emergency actions taken and the present situation. Segments pf the briefing were aired over the local radio 4
station at 1205.
)
w 39
) A rumor control line was established but not demonstrated during the exercise.
X. Recovery and Reentry Not demonstrated..
XI. Scenario The scenario was adequate to allow the county to demonstrate major response activities. However, following the precautionary evacuation and demonstration of field activities, the county experienced a long duration of time with very little to do. Exercise messages that were injected into response play were of a general nature which acted to restrict detailed response by the county. This could result in a loss of enthusiasm by players if repeatedly encountered during future exercises.
i i
i 40
)
Dorchester County Field Activities I. Traffic and Access Control Two traffic / access control points (TCPs) were established and manned during this exc.'c.ise, they were located at the intersections of Route 16 and 355 in Church Creek and at Route 16 and Smithville Road. Only one TCP (Routs 16 and Smithville Road) was visited by the observer due to time constraints imposed by the scenario.
County Highway Department personnel arrived at this location at 1040 (unobserved) in order to deliver and set-up road barricades and to man the TCP until Maryland State Police arrived. These emergency workers were instructed to redirect traf fic flow (simulated),
limiting access from Route 16 West and Smithville Road South, and to advise motorists regarding conditions at Calvert Cliffs. At 1115 a State Police patrolman arrived to relieve the Highway Deprtment personnel, with similar procedural instructions. ,
Ample resources are reportedly available to assist in the removal of any impediments to traf fic flow.
II. Special Evacuation Problems No schools are in currently within Dorchester County's 10-mile EPZ. According to county pe. , there is currently ~no plan of action in place with regr to school children who may be in
. / attendance at the Cambridge-Souto Dorchester High School during an emergency response (the decontamination / mass care center designated i in the plan). The county should review standard operating procedures to resolve this issue.
III. Route Alerting Not demonstrated during this exercise.
IV. Worker Exposure Control The County Highway Department representatives, who were dispatched to set up the barricades and to man one of the access control points
, until State Police arrived, were not issued any dosimetry equipment.
State Police representatives had dosimetry kits in their possession ,.
containing one CDV-138, two CDV-747s, a TLD, and recordkeeping cards. Although the State Police also had an information sheet describing appropriate use of the dosimetry and protective actions, these representatives were not adequately trained in their use.
Also, the representatives were not aware of decontamination procedures, the location of the decontamination facility and/or relocation center. No KI had been provided to these individuals, although according to County Health representatives at the county EDC, emergency workers had been instructed (simulated) to take KI as I )
i i 41
s a precuationary measure. Additional training should be provided to access and traffic control personnel with regard to appropriate protective actions and the use of dosimetry. (Note: this is a repeated deficiency from the last full-scale REP exercise.)
Dorchester County Reloca_ tion ~ Center The relocation center activated for the exercise is not the facility which would be used during a real event. The designated location is in the Cambridge-South Dorchester High School and Vo-Tech Center in Cambridge. It was determined that planned exercise activities would be disruptive to the school system; therefore, a backup facility at the Church Creek Volunteer Fire Department in Church Creek was used. Activities demonstrated there consisted of radiological monitoring of evacuees and vehicles, registration and limited congregate care (feeding only). There was a walk-through discussion and tour of the high school facility following the demonstration at Church Creek. All procedures demonstrated at the Church Creek facility would be conducted at the high school.
A. Activation and Staffing There was an adequate representation of emergency workers to perform all functions demonstrated at the relocation center. Staff members included the Director, Red Cross, County Board of Education and Church Creek Volunteer Fire Department personnel . All were sufficiently trained in their duties, with 24-hour staffing available through backup personnel. The relocation center was activated about 1010 and was fully manned at 1030. Activation procedures were conpleted (unobserved) following an initial standby notification to the Reception Center Director at 0945.
B. Registration and Monitoring Evacuees as well as emergency personnel could be processed through this center, although the plan calls only for emergency worker monitoring and decontamination. Seven evacuees were transported by bus from Taylor's Island Volunteer Fire Department, and upon arrival at 1137 they were initially monitored for contamination. Monitoring procedures were adequate and proficient. If contaminated, evacuees would proceed to the decontamination area at the center.
Uncontaminated individuals would be " marked" with an X on their wrist which would allow them free access throughout the congregate care facil ity. There were adequate numbers of trained monitors and appropriate equipment at the relocation center. Evacuees were then registered using a standard Red Cross form and entered into the congregate care.
)
! 42
_.._..._.._,_..-,,._,m ,_ ._
3 C. Congregate Care The high school complex has a capacity of 1,300 people, well above any expected volume of evacuees. Additional facilities are available if more room is needed to process and handle evacuees. A three day supply of food (planned menus) are stockpiled at the school with additional supplies reportedly available if needed. Provisions for the housing (cots, blankets, etc.) of evacuees would be provided by the Red Cross out of Easton, Maryland. Communication capabilities exist between the relocation center and the county E0C, State E0C (through the county) and medical facilities via comercial phones and police radio.
D. Decontamination Decontamination procedures were not demonstrated during the exercise, with the exception of monitoring of evacuees and vehicles at the alternate relocation center, as the actual location for decontamination (high school) was not activated. The facility used for decontamination and the procedures implemented were toured and discussed following the relocation center demonstration. Although activation of this activity was not demonstrated during this exercise, it appears that the facility is more than adequate and the procedures and equipment are suf ficient to do the required job.
~
Dorchist VCo0nty' DEficienci s/Rsquired Improvements / Recommendations
- 1. The emergency sirens, the dedicated " red phone" line and Channel I communications means should all be reviewed and repaired if necessary to ensure operations capability during an emergency response.
- 2. Emergency instructions to the public calling for sheltering as a protective action should include instructions for the transient population.
- 3. Adequate dosimetry was not provided to all emergency workers in the field, and all workers were not aware of proper dosimetry use, decontamination procedures, or the location of decontamination /
relocation centers. The county should take the necessary steps to ensure that all emergency workers detailed within the 10-mile EPZ are provided adequate dosimetry equipment and appropriate training with regard to protecti" actions.
- 4. Mid-range dosimetry (0-50R) as called for in the county S0P was not available thus making it impossible to start reporting dosimetry readings when the dosimeter registers 1R (neither the 0-200mR nor the 0-200R dosimetry is adequate for this purpose). The county should either obtain mid-range dosimetry or modify its reporting requirements to utilize the dosimetry actually available.
\
43
) 5. The county should review contact procedures with the Taylor's Island Volunteer Fire Company and revise current procedures if necessary in order to improve communication capability with that location.
- 6. The county should review its procedures for initial notification of an Unusual Event .at the Calvert Cliffs Power Plant to ensure that appropriate personnel are alerted to the situation.
- 7. Although a blackboard was available in the E0C, it was not used to post significantactivities and/or actions taken in response to the Calvert Cliffs REP exercise. The use of this board to post these activities should enhance the briefing of second-shift personnel should extended operations be required during a real emergency.
- 8. The PIO, in accordance with the county plan, should be responsible for delivering press briefings at the county level, thereby relieving the CD Director to maintain direction over the general emergency response.
9 Future exercises should provide for more detailed injected play messages in order to provide for more active county response.
- 10. The county should coordinate with the appropriate school officials in order to develop plans to care for school children who may be in attendance at the designated congregate care center (s) during an emergency, t
1 S
, 44
St. Mary's County EOC
)
I. Activation and Staffing At 0735 the Communications Center at Baltimore Gas and Electric notified St. Mary's County Communications Center that an Alert had been declared at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Station. The call was received over a direct dedicated phone link between St. Mary's County and the utility, therefore, no verification was necessary. The dedicated phone link is monitored 24-hours a day by personnel on duty in the communications center.
Staff mobilization procedures were initiated immediately via a written call-down list. All staff members were notified and verified receipt of notification by 0815. However, staffing in the E0C was not complete until 1050 when the Red Cross representative arrived.
The Red Cross representative said that he had not been notified by the county. The county communications operator could not contact the primary Red Cross representative; however, a backup was notified. He advised the county that he would keep trying to contact the primary Red Cross representative. Several other staff members took from 3/4 of an hour to 1-1/2 hours to arrive at the E0C. Staffing times became important because a General Emergency was declared at 0858 and a partial evacuation began at 1035. Emphasis should be placed on response times for all agencies that have a responsibility in an emergency situation since there is no way of knowing how quickly an emergency may escalate. The county plan calls for the Patuxent Naval Air Test Site to send a representative from the base to the St.
Mary's County E0C. The Naval Air Station Disaster Office verified receipt of the message at 0818. However, the representative never arrived at the E0C. A medical officer from the base hospital did arrive at the E0C at 0925. The hospital representative stated that he was a representative of the hospital only and could not speak for the Base Commander. He did pass information to the Base Disaster Office. It should be noted that there are base housing units on the air station located within the 10-mile EPZ. It is important that a representative from the Naval Air Station; who will be in a position to forward protective action recommendations to the appropriate officials on the Naval Air Station who will implement the emergency response plan, be available at the county E0C.
The following staff and organizations were represented in the E0C:
Deputy Civil Defense Director County Commissioners Communications staff Radiological Officer Public Information Officer Baltimore Gas & Electric Tech. Rep.
Board of Education Sheriff's Department State Police
) Department of Social Services Department of Health 45
- Fire Department Department of Public Works Rescue State Department of Highways County Department of Highways Red Cross .
Naval Air Station Hospital Rep.
All staff members displayed adequate training and knowledge to carry out their assigned responsibilities. Many positions in the E0C were double-staffed during this exercise. An actual shift change was demonstrated for the State Police, Sheriff's Department, Emergency Management Coordinator and Communications staff. Other positions which were not double-staffed or did not demonstrate a shift change, called the second shift personnel and informed them when to report to the E0C.
II. Emergency Operations Management The Civil Defense Director, and his 24-hour replacement (Deputy CD Director), both demonstrated the effective leadership and decision making capabilities required to respond to an emergency in St. Mary's
, County.
All staff were involved in discussions and decision making. Periodic briefings and updates were provided, both by the Director and by the Baltimore Gas & Electric Technical Representative on plant condition updates. In addition, the Director requested several updates from the organizations represented in the E0C on the status of actions for which each was responsible.
Messages (both incoming and outgoing) were written out in triplicate, given to the Director and then routed to the appropriate action officer. All messages from the EOF were numbered. However, other messages (incoming and outgoing) from responding organizations were not numbered and times were not noted in all cases. Additional training on message forms for these organizations would enhance the message handling system.
Coordination of information between St. Mary's County, the other risk counties and Charles County (support county) was excellent. However; additional updates should be provided to the State E0C. Public information coordination from the State E0C and the Joint Media Center State PIO to the St. Mary's County PIO was not observed. The county does not send a PIO to the Joint Media Center. The plan calls for coordination between the Calvert County PIO and the St. Mary's County PIO which was accomplished during the exercise. The county was not aware, prior to release, of the information being sent out either by the State or the Joint Media Center.
The County was notified of an unusual Event at 0544, an Alert at 0727 and General Emergency at 0858 by the utility.
)
46
) The State E0C notified St. Mary's County of an Unusual Event at 0628, an Alert at 0813 and the General Emergency at 0951.
III. Facilities The St. Mary's County E0C is located in a secure underground facility which is in use on a daily basis for county communications. There is adequate space, furniture, lighting and telephones. The facility could support extended operations, and has a 14 day water supply and emergency generator (backup poder was demonstrated during the exercise), as well as showers, kitchen facilities and mattresses. A status board was clearly visible in the main operations room, and this was kept up-to-date on significant events relevant to St. Mary's County. Many maps and charts with information useful in a radiological emergency were posted, including maps showing the plume EPZ, with sectors labeled; evacuation routes; relocation centers; access control points; and radiological monitoring points. Other information, including population by evacuation area, was available but not posted. Facilities at the St. Mary's County E0C are excellent.
IV. Communications The St. Mary's E0C incorporates the emergency communications faciltiies for the county which operate on a 24-hour a day basis (including Sheriffs Department, fire and rescue, 911 phone). In addition, there was National Emergency Warning System telephone, and dedicated telephone to Calvert Cliffs and radio to Calvert Cliffs.
Further, RACES / ARES amateur radio volunteers were present operating a radio teletype link to Pikesville and radio communication to the St.
Mary's County reception and congregate care center at the Leonardtown High School. Canmunication from the State E0C was demonstrated on the KAWAS telephone and commercial telephone. Contact with other local E0Cs was conducted on commercial telephone. Communications from Calvert Cliffs were received on the dedicated telephone line (use of the radio link was not observed during the exercise). The local EBS station was contacted by commercial telephone, and EBS announcement broadcast using the remote pickup unit located in the county E0C. The media center was contacted by commercial telephone.
Tone alert radios as well as commercial telephone were used to
-contact local schools. However, the tone alert radioes at 3 of the 4 schools within the 10-mile EPZ failed to operate properly (only one of four gave audible and visual warning when the sirens were sounded). The E0C contacted the support hospital by telephone; EMS radio was available for this also, but its use was not observed.
Ambulances were contacted by the representative in the E0C; radio connunications or personal pagers could be used for this purpose.
Contact with local radiological monitoring teams was made by State Police radio and citizens band was also available for this purpose.
Canmunications channel with hearing-impaired residents is available via a teletype unit attached to a telephone. There are 15 to 20
) units located in the county. However, there was no information on 47
) the location of the units or if all hearing-impaired in the county have a unit in their homes. This information should be included on a complete list of hearing and mobility impaired individuals which should be developed for the county E0C. In general, communications were very good at the St. Mary's County E0C. However, it is recommended that the malfunction of the tone alert radios at the school be analyzed and the problem corrected promptly.
V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations No State monitoring team data was received either from the State E0C or from the EOF. The county sent out two field monitoring teams who performed monitoring duties in pre-designated areas. Readings were provided back to the RDO throughout the exercise. Teams were redirected to various locations as appropriate. The capabilities of the county monitoring teams could be used to better advantage if some simulated dose information were provided. All readings reported to the county were zero.
Protective action decisions were based on recommendations from the facility on plant conditions. The State Department of Health did not advise the county to authorize the use of K1 nor were protective action recommendations given to the county for farm animals.
VI. Public Alerting and Instruction
,' St. Mary's County played a very active role in public alerting and instructions. After notification of a General Emergency from the E0F at 0858, the three risk counties coordinated sounding of the sirens.
Sirens were sounded at 0912, followed by the appropriate EBS message. An actual prescripted message was aired over WKIK in Leonardtown which was preceeded and followed by an explanation that this was an exercise. The EBS was activated again at 1030, for protective actions; at 1125, to inform the public that the county had declared a State of Emergency in conjunction with the Governor's declaration of a State of Emergency and at 1250 for updated protective actions. The State Police dispatched route alert teams to provide door-to-door notification and to use public address system in the area being evacuated. Calls were placed to four schools located in the first area to be evacuated and again at 1250 for the 10-mile evacuation. The Naval Air Station was also notified of each set of protective actions undertaken by the county.
Public instructions prepared by the county PIO were clear and appropriate. Areas where protective actions called for were described using familiar boundaries and landmarks. Evacuation announcements contained proper instructions for transient, residents and schools.
)
48 k
- Vll. Protective Actions A. Evacuation and Access Control Activation of traffic and access control points was initiated promptly. . Coordination of the evacuation in Calvert County was observed and State Police set up traffic control points to assist Calvert County residents evacuating into St. Mary's County. Expected traffic volumes and time needed to evacuate were discussed and updated as appropriate. Road barriers and other equipment resources were provided by County Department of Public Works.
B. Special Evacuation Problems The E0C staf f was aware of some mobility-impaired individuals.
The County Department of Health was aware of others. In addition, a communications channel to notify hearing-impaired individuals via a teletype unit attached to the telephone is available in the E0C with 15 to 20 units located at hearing-impaired individuals' homes. The county did not present a list of where the units were located or if all hearing-impaired in the county have the units in their homes.
A complete list of all residents who have special problems should be maintained in the county E0C. Specific problems should be listed for each individual (mobility-impaired, hearing-impaired,etc.). In addition, arrangements should be planned for the notification and evacuation of these residents. One organization should be given the responsibility for insuring the notification of hearing-impaired residents and one organization given the responsibility for evacuation of mobility-impaired residents.
Four schools in sectors M and N were notified to evacuate at 1030. The county owns enough buses to cover these schools. In addition, Charles County EOC was standing by to provide additional assistance. The County Board of Education is responsible for notification of schools, buses and drivers.
VIII. Radiological Exposure Control Radiological exposure control was demonstrated by St. Mary's County in a very professional manner. There are over 50 radiation detection kits stored in the St. Mary's County E0C. Each kit contains a high level survey meter-(CDV-715), a general purpose CM survey meter (CDV-700), 6 high range dosimeters (0-200R), a dosimeter charger and batteries. Forty low range dosimeters (0-200mR) and TLDs were also available, as well as recordkeeping sheets. A good briefing, plus clear and appropriate' written instructions were provided when f
49
3 radiation detection kits and dosimetry equipment were issued to local emergency workers. Staff members were aware of decontamination procedures including where the decontamination station and the evacuation center was located. A large supply of potassium iodide (KI) (1400 individual doses) was available and stored in the County Health Department building. The County Health Officer was available in the EOC and was well informed as to the proper procedures for the
.t use of KI.
The St. Mary's County plan states that the county has 0-200mR dosimeters and 0-50R dosimeters. In actuality, the county has 0-200mR dosimeters and 0-200R dosimeters. The plan calls for emergency workers to start reporting dosimetry readings at IR. However, 1R
, will not register on either dosimeter available. It is recommended that mid-range (0-20R) dosimeters be obtained and the St. Mary's
, County plans be updated to reflect the actual dosimetry available.
IX Media Relations An office in the county E0C was set aside for press briefings. An actual briefing was given by the Public Information Officer during the exercise. The briefing was complete and accurate and avoided the use of technical terms. The reporter was given a tour of the E0C.
4 Coordination of EBS messages being released in the county took place i between other risk county P10s. St. Mary's County did not have a representative at the Joint Media Center. However, Calvert County did and Calvert County PIO passed information to St. Mary's County PIO. No coordination of public information was conducted between the State PIO and St. Mary's County PIO.
?
The county news releases sent out over the local EBS station were well-written and informative. Appropriate irformation on protective actions, locations affected, where to go and what to take were included. Radio station WKIK actually aired EBS messages four times during the exercise. Messages were preceeded and followed by appropriate announcements and explanations that the announcements were exercise messages. Rumor control was adequately demonstrated by
- the PIO and rumor control telephone numbers broadcast over the radio ,
along with EBS announcements.
~
X. Recovery and Reentry This was not an exercise objective. I i
j XI. Scenario .
The scenario was sufficient to test the capabilities of St. Mary's County E0C. When the exercise jumped from Alert to a General Emergency situation, -it became obvious that more emphasis should be placed on getting the organizations needed to respond to an emergency into the E0C as rapidly as possible, i
i i >
l 50
_ _ _ . . __ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ . , , _ . _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ - _ _ _ _ , _ ~ . . , _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , . _ _ . - _
T
) St. Mary's County Evacuation Shelter I. Activation and Staffing The representative of the County Department of Social Services notified the relocation site manager of General Emergency at 0900.
He proceeded to the Leonardtown High School and opened it as a relocation center at approximately 0930. Other staff members were in place by 1000 except the Red Cross. Two Red Cross representatives arrived at 1100 and three more at 1120. Social Services had five staff members available, Depar nent of Health had eight, Communications had one and Roc Cross had a total of five. Most staff members displayed the training and knowledge necessary to respond to the emergency. However, Red Cross members were unorganized and did not appear sure of what their responsibilities were. Ability to man the relocation center for protracted periods was indicated, but no shift change was demonstrated.
II. Registration and Monitoring of Evacuees At 1040 a van arrived at the relocation center. Approximately 11 senior citizens were recruited as evacuees. Rul Cross representatives had not arrived at the Leonardtown High School with appropriate forms to register evacuees. However, the Social Services representatives had a copy of the registration form. It was reproduced and evacuees were registered in the proper manner.
Prior to entry into the building, all evacuees were monitored for any radiological contamination. If evacuees were found to be contaminated they were directed to the shower area. There were 1
separate entrances and exits so that decontaminated evacuees would not walk through a contaminated area. Separated showers were available for men and women evacuees. No clothes were available for decontaminated evacuees. None of the organizations were aware of procedures to obtain clothing. They did request assistance from the Department of Social Services in the county E0C. The county did obtain the required clothing from the Catholic Charities Association; however, the relocation center was never informed that the clothing would be supplied by this agency.
Although the procedures for disposing of contaminated clothing were known by the monitoring teams, none of the equipment needed, such as plastic bags and steel containers, were available and emergency workers did not request assistance in obtaining the equipment.
Emergency workers were also monitored at the Leonardtown High School decontamination station, i
51
III. Congregate Care of Evacuees The evacuation center (Leonardtown High School) is located 15 miles from the plant. There are two schools next to it that could handle some overflow. The high school holds 200 evacuees.
The central food
- distribution point for the schools would be used to obtain additional food supplies.
No cots or blankets were available and personnel were not aware of where to obtain them. They did not request assistance from the county E0C.
At 1230, four additional schools were opened to accommodate the additional evacuation of sectors J K and L. Calls were placed to ensure appropriate staff availability for the new evacuation centers. Activation of the additional centers was simulated.
~
St. Marp's'C66nt9'Dsficiincies/Rsquirsd'Improvsmsnts/RscommA6dations
- 1. Several organizations on the emergency operations staff took from 3/4 of an hour up to 1-1/2 hours to report to the E0C. The Red Cross did not arrive until 1050, after evacuation had begun, and evacuees had arrived at the evacuation center. Organizations must report to the E0C as quickly as possible in order to meet their responsibilities during an emergency.
- 2. The county should provide status updates to the State more frequently; EBS activations, evacuation updates, etc. were not always provided to the State in a timely manner.
- 3. When the siren system was activated in St. Mary's County, three of the four tone alert radios located in the schools did not function.
, This equipment should be checked and operability ensured as quickly i as possible.
, 4. Canplete lists of hearing-impaired and mobility-impaired individuals 4
with any special needs indicated should be maintained in the E0C in i accordance with Section 5.2 of the County REP. Arrangements for the notification and evacuation of these individuals should be planned 4
and demonstrated.
- 5. Mid-range dosimetry (0-50R) as called for in the county S0P was not available thus making it impossible to start reporting dosimetry
, read-ings when the dosimeter registers IR (neither the 0-200mR nor i the 0-200R dosimetry is adequate for this purpose). The county i
should either obtain mid-range dosimetry or modify its reporting requirements to utilize the dosimetry actually available.
)
i , 52
3'
- 6. The staff in the evacuation center was aware of the resources they would need for congregate care of evacuees. However, they were not sure of where to go or who to ask for assistance. Cots, blankets and containers for contaminated clothing were never included in the request to the county for clothing. The county did not notify the evacuation center of who would supply clothing to the center.
Procedures should be agreed upon within county organizations concerning acquisition of these resources.
- 7. Attempts should be made to ensure an appropriate representative of the Commander of the Patuxent Naval Air Station is dis-patched to the St. Mary's E0C to enable the Commander to respond appropriately to protect any personnel who live or work within the 10-mile EPZ of Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Generating Station.
- 8. More emphasis should be placed on the proper completion of messages.
Not all messages were numbered and times were not always noted on message forms.
- 9. Additional coordination prior to release of public information between State and county PI0s would ensure that all public information was consistent.
)
53
I SuriMARY OF INADEQUACIES Explanation of Categories The inadequacies listed for each evaluated location or activity have been summarized and classified according to the following three categories:
Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that cause a finding that off site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of Calvert Cliff s in the event of a radiological emergency. Because of the potential impact of deficiencies on emergency preparedness, they are required to be promptly corrected through appropriate remedial actions including remedial exercises, drills or other actions.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action are demonstrated and observed inadequacies of performance, and although their correction is required during the next scheduled biennial exercise, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact pulic health and safety.
Areas Recommended for Improvement are problem areas observed during an
, . . , exercise that are not considered to adversely impact public health and safety. While not required, correction of these would enhance an organization's level of emergency preparedness.
AREAS REfNIRING CORRECTIVE ACTICNS Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part !! Correction Date Date Maryland State E0C
- 1. The State EOC never received direct F.1.d.
notification from the utility of the .
General Emergency. It was not until 0920 that the State was made aware of the General Emergency through the State Police contacting their communications center. Attempts by the EOC to communicate with the plant by radio and commercial telephone received no response from the utility. Confinnation from Calvert County did not occur until 0930.
Communication equipment redundancy is excellent. However, a workable policy should be developed between the parties regarding notification procedures when the red phone is not operational.
- 2. Coordination between the counties and State E and F.
E0C needs to be improved. It is realized that the counties are the primary responders but the State needs to be kept informed of all critical actions. It was not until well ,
after the fact that the State was aware that the counties had activated their sirens.
55
- - . . _ _ _ _ . - ~ . _ - - - . - - _ - . - - _ _ _ . - . - - - . - _ . - . - - _ _ _ . _ - . ..
1 ,
i AREAS REQUIRING CORitLnVE ICTIONS Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual l Recommendation Part !! Correction Date Date !
1 3. PIO operations at the State E0C need to be G.4.b.
improved. Messages are slow in being pre- .
pared for dispatch to the media center and ,
to the counties. The PIO staff was not aware of 24-hour staffing capability and arrange-ments for rumor control were very sketchy. '
- 4. The demonstrated procedure for activation E.5.
! of Calvert County's EBS station was not the l method specified in the plans. In future l exercises the State should allow County demon-stration of their ability to activate the :
l local EBS station, and prepare appropriate '
messages for broadcast.
I Department of Health and Mental Hygiene ECC
- 5. The comunications failure affected the F.1.d -
ability of the ECC to be as effective and as timely as it could have been. The tasks were accomplished, but with a lot of effort to collect the data for the decisions required. i There is a serious lack of redundancy in ECC/ .,
l 56 l ._ _. . - -
e e AREAS P5JOUIRING Colo<1LnVE ACTICNS Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Reconnendation Part II Correction Date Date IPCC radio systems. Radiation Control staff used unacceptable radio procedures in initiating and responding to messages. As a result, several messages regarding monitoring ,
readings and status were incorrectly inter-preted and passed along to the EOC. A standard method to record and review messages was not available. This led to multiple, needless transmissions to verify infonnation which could not be copied quickly enough by Radiation Control operators. A paralleling lack of redundacy in systems at the EOF caused a nearly total failure _
in the radio communications system. A significant portion of messages were dependent on landlines which were not dedicated ~. In the event of an actual emergency, it is unlikely that commercial 1andlines would be readily available. Had this been an actual emergency it is likely that EOF-EOC-Radiation Control would have been deaf, dumb and blind given multi-system failures.
The State should re-evaluate the communications systems used to link the ECC, IPCC, E0F and '
field teams and should institute the improvements _
in equipment, procedures and training necessary to ensure effective communications.
57
AFfAS REQUIRING CORRdCTIVt ICTIQ4S Reference NUREG-0654 Proj ' d Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date Field Monitoring' Teams
- 6. Poor personal monitoring and exposure K.3.
control procedures were demonstrated. In
- some cases no personal monitoring procedures were demonstrated. The teams should review and refresh themselves on good personal monitoring procedures, e.g., reading dosimeter at regular intervals and being sure that they have received instructions.
- 7. Poor communication techniques were ob- F.1.d.
served. The controller (at the EOF) did
not respond very rapidly to incoming transmissions. The controller was slow in assigning the next monitoring station. A great deal of waiting time was observed.
Team members and team controllers should -
~
review communications procedures and institute -
needed modifications in techniques and/or institute improvements in training.
58
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE 1CI'IOtG Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date Agricultural Sampling' Team -
- 8. In future exercises the agricultural I.8.
sampling team should be given sufficient
- time to accomplish its mission by either an earlier activation or by extending its operations beyond the official termination of the exercise.
News Media Center I
- 9. PIO coordination and communication between
\ ^~
G.4 b.
the State E0C, the media center and the '
county E0Cs was poor leading to inadequate performance. The State should review its comnunications equipment and procedures in order to determine what modifications are necessary.
- 10. Rumor control numbers should be publicized G.4.c.
in future exercises.
59
( .-
AREAS RE2UIRIIKi COiceLnVE JCTICNS Reference NUREG-0654 P roj ' d Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date Calvert County
- 11. The capability for preparing comprehensive, E.7.
detailed public instruction regarding
- protective actions was not demonstrated.
In future exercises, county officials should demonstrate their capability for providing detailed instructions in the form of both messages and news releases.
- 12. The staffs at both the assembly area and E., F. A J.
mass care center did not receive adequate status updates to advise them of the accident status and county response actions.
Calvert County should establish procedures whereby E0C personnel provide the mass care and assembly center staffs with appropriate information in a timely manner.
- 13. The mass care center staff did not E. A.F.
demonstrate adequate coordination with the county E0C. Thorough coordination with the county E0C should be demonstrated in future exercises. ,
60
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part.II Correction Date Date 14 Staff members at the assembly area were not J.10.h.
sufficiently familiar with some aspects of their responsibilities. Additional training should be provided to familiarize personnel ,
with the plans and procedures.
- 15. A number of problems involving staffing, J.12.
training and equipment were observed among personnel responsible for evacuee monitoring at the assembly area. Staffing capability consistent with the plan should be established, additional training should be provided, and the specified equipment should be obtained. -
- 16. Mid-range dosimetry (0-50R) as called for in the county 50P was not available thus making it '
impossible to start reporting dosimetry read-ings when the dosimeter registers 1R (neither
- the 0-200mR nor the 0-200R dosimetry is adequate for this purpose). The county should either obtain mid-range dosimetry or ,
modify its reporting requirements to utilize the dosimetry actually available.
t i
61
AREAS REQUIPING CORPECTIVE ACTIONS Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date Dorchester County
- 17. The emergency sirens, the dedicated " red E.6. & F.1.e.
phone" line and Char.nel I communications
- means should all be reviewed and repaired if necessary to ensure operations capability during an emergency response.
18 Emergency instructions to the public calling E.7.
for sheltering as a protective action should include instructions for the transient population.
- 19. Adequate dosimetry was not provided to all emergency workers in the field, and all workers were not aware of proper dosimetry use, decontamination procedures, or the location of decontamination / relocation centers. The county should take the necessary steps to ensure that all emergency '
workers detailed within the 10-mile EPZ are provided adequate dosimetry equipment and appropriate training with regard to pro-tective actions. ,
62
. ~
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date
- 20. Mid-range dosimetry (0-50R) as called for in the county 50P was not available thus making it impossible to start reporting dosimetry read-ings when the dosimeter registers 1R (neither -
the 0-200mR nor the 0-200R dosimetry is adequate for this purpose). The county should either obtain mid-range dosimetry or modify its reporting requirements to utilize the dosimetry actually available.
- 21. The county should review contact procedures F.1.e.
with the Taylor's Island Volunteer Fire Company and revise current procedures if necessary in order to improve communication capability with that location.
St. Mary's County
- 22. Several organizations on the emergency E.2.
operations staff took from 3/4 of an hour up to 1-1/2 hours to report to the E0C.
The Red Cross did not arrive until 1050, 63
AREAS REQUIRING CORRDCTIVE ICTIONS Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date after evacuatiot had begun, and evacuees had arrived at the evacuation center.
Organizations must report to the EOC as quickly as possible in order to meet their -
responsibilities during an emergency.
- 23. The county should provide status updates to E.1.
the State more frequently; EBS activations; evacuation updates, etc. were not always provided to the State in a timely manner.
- 24. When the siren system was activated in St. E.5. & 6.
Mary's County, three of the four tone alert radics located in the schools did not function.
This equipment should be checked and operability ensured as quickly as possible.
- 25. Complete lists of hearing-impaired and J.10.d.
- mobility-impaired individuals with any -
special needs indicated should be maintained in the E0C in accordance with Section 5.2 of the County REP. Arrangements for the notification and evacuation of these individuals should be planned and demonstrated.
l 64
.~ - - - - . _ - . ~ .-
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTICNS 1
Reference NUREG-0654 P roj 'd Actual Rtcommendation Part II Correction Date Date j 26. Mid-range dosimetry (0-50R) as called for in the county S0P was not available thus making it impossible to start reporting dosimetry read-ings when the dosimeter registers 1R (neither
- the 0-200mR nor the 0-200R dosimetry is adequate for this purpose). The county should either obtain mid-range dosimetry or
- modify its reporting requirements to utilize j the dosimetry actually available, i
- 27. The staff in the evacuation center J.10.
was aware of the resources they would need for congregate care of evacuees. -
However, they were not sure of where to go or who to ask for assistance. Cots, blankets and containers for contaminated clothing were never included in the request to the county for clothing. The county did not notify the evacuation center of who would supply clothing to the center.
Procedures should be agreed upon within county organizations concerning acquisition of these resources.
l 65
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part 11 Correction Date Date Maryland ~ State E0C
- 1. The E0C management kept all staff well
- briefed on ongoing activities. However, it is suggested that the State agencies periodically give feed back to the E0C ,
management so that the entire group will be made aware of the overall State response.
- 2. Additional play should be included in future scenarios to provide a higher level of play for State agencies. ~
Emergency Operations Facility
- 3. A phone link should be established between F.1.d.
the BG & E Dose Assessment Center and the MDACC located in the Maryland operations room.
~
Maryland Department of Health & M4ntal' Hygiene
- 4. It is recommended that the State recognize the capability of the county monitoring teams by providing, in future exercise scenarios, simulated readings for the teams to report.
Some means of integration of State and local teams should be considered.
66
a s
~ ..
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Reference NUREG-0654 Proj ' d Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date
- 5. State accident assessment personnel I, should review the MIDAS system enployed by Baltimore Gas and Electric. ,
Calvert County
- 6. The county E0C provides very limited H.3.
space, and all organization represent-atives could not be located in the operations room. The county's plan to expand the operations room should be implemented as soon as possible.
7 The status board did not provide enough H.3.
space to accommodate a continuous list of sequential events. It is recommended that some means be established to provide the staff with a readily-accessible sequential ,
~
listing of events. -
- 8. One of the county's two radiological field F.1.d.
monitors was not equipped with a radio for reporting field readings. It is recamnended that radios be obtained for all field teams dispatched, to avoid dependence on public telephones, i 67
AREAS RECOMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
, Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date
. Dorchester County
- 9. The county should review its procedures E.1. & 2.
for initial notification of an unusual Event -
l at the Calvert Cliffs Power Plant to ensure that appropriate personnel are alerted to the situation.
- 10. Although a blackboard was available in the H.3.
EOC, it was not used to post significant activities and/or actions taken in response to the Calvert Cliffs REP exercise. The use ,
of this board to post these activities should enhance the briefing of second-shift personnel should extended operations be required during a real emergency.
- 11. The PIO, in accordance with the county plan, G.4.g.
should be responsible for delivering press briefings at the county level, thereby relieving the CD Director to maintain direction over the general emergency response.
- 12. Future exercises should provide for more detailed injected play messages in order to provide for more active county response.
68
. o
- s. c'
% +,
AREAS REC 0PMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date
- 13. The county should coordinate with the appropriate' school officials in order to develop plans to care for school children who may be in attendance at the designated congregate care center (s) during an emergency.
- St. Mary's County
- 14. Attempts should be made to ensure an A. & E.2.
appropriate representative of the Commander of the Patuxent Naval Air Station is dis-patched to the St. Mary's EOC to enable the Commander to respond appropriately to protect .
any personnel who live or work within the 10-mile EPZ of Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Generating Station.
- 15. More emphasis should be placed on the F.1.d.
proper completion of messages. Not all messages were numbered and times were not always noted on message forms.
- 16. Additional coordination prior to release G.4.b.
, of public information between State and
- l county PI0s would ensure that all public information was consistent.
69 m ,