ML20198K219

Insp Repts 50-424/86-07 & 50-425/86-03 on 860210-14. Violation Noted:Failure to Protect Permanent Plant Equipment

ML20198K219
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	05/02/1986
From:	Blake J, Hallstrom G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198K211	List: ML20198K206 ML20198K216 ML20198K219
References
50-424-86-07, 50-424-86-7, 50-425-86-03, 50-425-86-3, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8606030367
Download: ML20198K219 (15)

See also: IR 05000424/1986007

Text

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UNITED STATES

/q.p* Hoog#'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON -

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y\- n REGION ll

y, ., j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

'g g ATL ANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-424/86-07 and 50-425/86-03

Licensee: Georgia Power Company

P. O. Box 4545

Atlanta, GA 30302

Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: CPPR-108 and CPPR-109

Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2

Inspection Condu d: February 10-14, 1986

Inspector: ev - i 86

G. A. HallMrom ' ' Dater Signed

Accompanying Personnel: L. G. Bruch, EG&G - Idaho, Inc.

K. Miller, EG&G - Idaho, Inc.

Approved by: .

J. lake, Section

(2 G f,

J Chief Date Signed

, n - eering Branch

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Di ision of Reactor Safety

, SUMMARY

Scope: This special, announced inspection entailed approximately 135 inspector-

hours on site in the areas of licensee action on previous enforcement matters

, (Units 1 and 2), housekeeping (Units 1 and 2), material control (Units 1 and 2),

safety-related steel components (Unit 1), and Readiness Review Module 8, Struc- ~

tural Steel (Unit 1).

, Results: One violation was identified - Failure to Protect Permanent Plant

Equipment - paragraph 6.

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8606030367 860516

PDR ADOCK 05000424

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REPORT DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted  ;

Licensee Employees

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• D. O. Foster, Vice President and Project Support Manager

• W. T. Nickerson, Assistant to Vogtle Project Director

• C. W. Hayes, Project Quality Assurance (QA) Manager i

*E. D. Groover, QA Site Manager - Construction '

• C. E. Belflower, QA Site Manager - Operations

• R. W. McManus, Readiness Review (RR) Assistant Project Manager

G. M. Creighton, RR Team Member

• G. A. McCarley, Project Compliance Coordinator

• L. N. Brooks, Civil Engineering Manager

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• B. C. Harbin, Manager of Quality Control (QC) - Construction ,

R. F. Dinsdale, RR Team Member '

J. E. Seagraves, RR Discipline Manager (Construction) ,

J. B. Stanley, RR Team Member

• G. E. Spell, Jr., QA Engineering Support Supervisor  !

• A. L. Mosbaugh, Inservice Testing Project Manager - Operations  :

• M. A. Griffis, Maintenance supervisor - Operations  :

• F. A. Smith, Maintenance Supervisor - Operations I

• E. M. Dannemiller, Senior QA Engineer - Operations

• W. C. Gabbard, Regulatory Specialist

• W. F. Burrett, QA Specialist i

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• H. P. Walker, Manager Unit Operations

• S. A. Bradley, Nuclear Operations

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, ,

engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, and office personnel. '

Other Organizations  !

• W. C. Ramsey, Southern Company Services (SCS), RR Project Manager

• G. F. Trudeau, Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC), RR Special Assistant

• J. H. Draggs, BPC, RR QA Representative  !

• M. R. Thaker, BPC, RR Civil-Structural Design Team Leader i

• W. M. Wright, SCS, RR Discipline Manager (Design) t

R. George, SCS, Manager of Nuclear Plant Support - Vogtle  !

• D. W. Strohman, BPC, Project QA Engineer

D. Niehoff, BPC, Deputy Engineering Group Supervisor "

• J. E. Miller, Pullman Power Products (PPP), General QA/QC Manager

• K. Wiess, PPP, Project Field Engineer

• B. L. Edwards, PPP, Resident Construction Manager

• K. M. Sinclair, PPP, Assistant Resident Construction Manager .

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NRC Resident Inspectors

• H. Livermore, Senior Resident Inspector (Construction)

• J. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector (Operations)

• Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 14, 1986, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the

areas inspected. Need for further Georgia Power Company responses to NRC

concerns on Polar Crane Design (Unresolved item 424/86-03-02,425/86-02-02)

and High Strength Bolted Connections (Unresolved item 424/86-03-03,

425/86-02-03) was discussed. No dissenting comments were received from the

licensee and the Vice President and Project Support Manager agreed that

further Georgia Power Company responses would be provided by March 17, 1986.

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(0 pen) Violation 424/86-07-02, Failure to Protect Permanent Plant Equipment

- paragraph 6.

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 424/86-07-01, Adequate Coverage of Module 8

Items Assigned to Other Modules - paragraph 7c.

The licensee did identify as proprietary some of the materials provided to

and reviewed by the inspector during this inspection; however, details from

those materials are not included in this report.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

a. (0 pen) Violation 424/85-40-04, Failure to Protect Permanent Plant

Equipment

Georgia power Company's (GPC) letter of response dated November 1,

1985, has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region II.

The inspector examined the corrective actions as stated in the letter

of response. The inspector concluded that corrective actions had been

insufficient to prevent a similar occurrence identified during this

inspection and further reported in paragraph 6. This item remains

open.

b. (0 pen) Unresolved Item 424/86-03-02, 425/86-02-02 - Polar Crane Design

This item concerns potentially inadequate design calculations for

seismic qualification of the VEGP Polar Crane. Apparent discrepancies

were identified during the NRC review of the Seismic design calculation

package (BPC log AXAL01-46-2) provided by the VEGP Polar Crane

Supplier. BPC specification X4AL01, Revision 1, dated December 14, <

1978, requires dynamic analyses for eight different loading conditions )

for both Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and Operational Basis Earth-

quake (0BE). Analyses for two of the required loading conditions l

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(trolley in center of span with full load in mid position and trolley

at end of span with full load in mid position) were not included. NRC

concern was also expressed due to the possibility that the worst case

for hook height may not have been included in the load conditions

originally specified for analysis.

Initial BPC response was provided during this inspection. The techni-

cal adequacy of the response was questioned on two points as follows:

The implication that crane girder seismic stresses are essentially

unaffected by the lifted load. Stated reasoning is that all

Z-component (vertical direction) earthquake stresses are absorbed

in the rope; i.e., that these stresses are never transmitted to

the Polar Crane Bridge Girder.

The contention that the up-position of lifted load is the worst

case for hook height. The stated basis for this contention is

that the natural structural frequency (about 2 hertz) for the

load / rope combination in the up position corresponds to the peak

acceleration of the vertical seismic response spectra. Further

support of an accurate coincidence of the frequencies is necessary

since lowering the load could increase the seismic acceleration if

the frequencies do not coincide.

Further GPC response on this issue is anticipated by March 17, 1986.

This item remains open.

c. (0 pen) Unresolved Item 424/86-03-03, 425/86-02-03 - High Strength

Bolted Connections

This item concerns the potential for overtensioning of ASTM A325 and

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A490 High Strength Steel bolts installed at Vogtle by the AISC

recognized " turn-of-nut" method. Discussions with QC inspectors and

other cognizant licensee personnel had identified potential overten-

sioning of bolts on mainplate girder #5 at elevation 240' in the

Control Building. The girder was installed in August 1982, and poten-

tial overtorquing was observed due to lack of conformance to " turn-of- ,

! nut" installation requirements within construction procedure CD-T-16.

Bolts in girder #5 were replaced.

However, followup discussions with cognizant licensee personnel during

this inspection established additional potential for overtensioning due '

to the following:

A common philosophy that bolt overtensioning would not present a

problem as long as the bolts did not break during installation.

This is not accepted as a technically supported interpretation of

the AISC bolting specification commentary since the commentary is ,

predicated on conformance to AISC approved installation procedures.

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Inability of the QC inspection program (past or present) to

identify overtensioning (overtorquing) to near failure limits. QC

inspection personnel uniformly stated that CD-T-16 specified only

that the minimum required torque be checked; i.e., no check for

potential overtorque is required or conducted and QA surveillance

of " snug tightening" or application of reference match marks is

not required.

Installation of high strength bolts by craftsmen who had not

received training on the " turn-of-nut" method. The turn-of-nut

method was initiated on Revision 3, dated July 23, 1982, of

CF-T-16. Initial training of construction craftsman was completed

on September 8, 1982.

Statements by cognizant licensee personnel that the minimum time

frame during which installation by turn-of-nut method is suspect

and overtorque a potential problem is from July 23 to September 8,

1982.

Further GPC response on this issue is anticipated by March 17, 1986.

This item remains open.

4. Unresolved Items

No unresolved items were identified during this inspection.

5. Independent Inspection Effort

Housekeeping (54834B), Material Identification and Control (42902B) and

Material Control 429408)

The inspector conducted a general inspection of Units 1 and 2 containments,

the control building and the reactor auxiliary building to observe activi-

ties such as housekeeping, material identification and control; material

control, and storage.

Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.

6. Safety-Related Components Observation of Work (50073)

The inspector examined the below listed safety-related components to deter-

mine whether:

Installation requirements were met such as: proper location, place-

ment, orientation, alignment, mounting (torquing of bolts and expansion

anchors), flow direction, tolerances, and expansion clearances.

Precautions were taken to prevent damage during placement / mounting.

Installation and inspection records were prepared and maintained.

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Maintenance inspection activities including scope and frenuency are

being performed according to instructions.

Protection is being provided in accordance with manufacturer's instruc-

tions and/or established procedures as required, including protection t

against adverse temperature, humidity, flooding, and foreign materials

such as dirt, dust, bottles, cans, and general debris.

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Lubrication, rotation, and electrical resistance checks are being

performed as required. l

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Records are being maintained as to the status of installed components.

Appropriate stamps, tags, markings etc. are in use to prevent oversight

of required inspections, completion of tests, acceptance, and the

prevention of inadvertent operation.

Components Inspected

Train A nuclear service cooling water (NSCW) pumps P4-001, P4-003, (

P4-005 and P4-008

Train A NSCW discharge limitorque motor operated valves (MOVs) I

1-HV-11600, 1-HV-11605 and 1-HV-11606

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Train B NSCW pumps P4-002, P4-004, P4-006 and P4-007

Train B NSCW discharge limitorque. M0Vs 1-HV-11607,1-HV-11612 and

1HV-11613

Reactor Coolant Pump P6-002

Reactor Coolant Pump P6-004  ;

During the above inspection, on February 13, 1986, the inspector observed /

that the heater for Train A NSCW M0V 1-HV-11600 was de-energized and motor

internals were at ambient temperature. De-energization had occurred due to

cutting and removal of the temporary power cable to 1-HV-11600. The inspec-

tor noted that the basis of previous violation 424/85-40-04 had been Train A

NSCW pump motor de-energization due to cutting the temporary power cable

involved.

Cognizant licensee personnel informed the inspector that electrical plant

maintenance activities for M0V 1-HV-11600 had been completed on February 6,

1986. The inspector reviewed maintenance work order No. 18600845 issued

January 16, 1986, for Train A NSCW M0Vs. The cut power lead and resultant

de-energization was not indicated. The electrical pre-operational main-  ;

tenance form involved did not require sign-offs for each step involved but '

only a final signature. Check off blocks for each maintenance step and '

clarifying notes had been entered before maintenance was initiated. Follow-

up discussions with the maintenance inspector who signed the form identified

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some uncertainty as to details regarding the maintenance steps and notes

involved.  ;

The inspector informed the licensee that the de-energization of MOV  !

1-HV-11600 was considered a lack of conformance to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,

Criterion XIII and would be identified as Violation 424/86-07-02, Failure to r

Protect Permanent Plant Equipment. This inspector also noted that the -

de-energization of M0V-1-HV-11600 was considered a repeat of Violation

424/85-40-04 for which corrective actions had been reported as completed by i

December 20, 1985. '

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7. Review of Readiness Review Module 8, Structural Steel  ;

a. General

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This inspection report documents Region II's concluding site inspec- ,

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tions relative to the evaluation of GPC's Readiness Review Module 8,

Structural Steel. The inspection was conducted to aid in determining

whether Module 8 provided an acceptable basis for its reported conclu-

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sion, concerning Unit 1 of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), ,

that the design and construction programs, and processes associated

with structural steel and welding, within the scope identified within

this module were in accordance with applicable licensing commitments. l

Readiness Review Module 8 is one portion (module) of a many part review

being conducted by GPC to aid in assuring that VEGP Unit I will be '

operationally ready in accordance with scheduled plans for obtaining an

operating license. The GPC Module 8 review activities, data and

results are summarized in the Module 8 report, which was submitted to

the NRC November 12, 1985. The module report consisted of eight

sections: 1.0, Introduction; 2.0, Organization and Division of ,

Responsibility; 3.0, Commitments; 4.0, Program Description, 5.0,

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Audits, 6.0, Program Verification, 7.0, Independent Design Review; and

8.0, Program Assessments / Conclusions.

Overview details of Region II's examination of Module 8 during this

inspection are included in this report. Final details of NRC evalua- l

tions and NRC conclusions regarding the GPC Readiness Review of Struc-

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tural Steel will be included in the NRC Review Report for Module 8 (NRC }

Report No. 50-424/86-18).  ;

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b. Clarification of the Module 8 Report

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Need for clarifications of the Module 8 report was identified during

earlier inspections. The specifics are documented in Report

Nos. 50-424/85-58 and 50-424/86-03. GPC responses for some of the ;

issues / questions were provided at the close of this inspection and

NRC's assessment is not yet complete. Initial assessment indicates

satisfactory GPC responses with exception of two issues. Those issues

are Polar Crane Design (unresolved item 424/86-03-02, 425/86-02-02) and

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High Strength Bolted Connections (unresolved item 424/86-03-03 425/86-02-03).

Continuing NRC concern regarding these issues is reported in para-

graphs 3.b. and 3.c.

c. Adequate Coverage of Module 8 Items Assigned to Other Modules

During the onsite inspections of Module 8, the inspector was informed

of several activities scheduled to be covered in other modules rather

than, or in addition to, Module 8. An overview summary of two such

items is as follows:

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Construction Verification of Pipewhip Restraints

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The Module 8 report notes that only design verification of pipe-

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whip restraints is included. Readiness review construction

verification of pipewhip restraints is purportedly to be covered

in Module 11 on pipe supports.

Commitment to IE Bulletin (IEB) 79-02

The Module 8 commitment matrix section 3.4 indicates that commit- #

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ment No. 1825 to IEB 79-02 on Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts is

assigned only to Module 8. The inspector questioned whether

commitment to IEB 79-02 was not also applicable to Module 11. GPC

initial response was that commitment 1825 was assigned to Module 8

rather then Module 11 since "the application of all expansion

anchors is through civil / structural calculations;" i.e., the type

of design calculations assessed in Module 8. This response was

later supplemented as follows

(a) Some aspects of commitment to IEB 79-02 are to be covered in

Module 11.

(b) The refererce number for the same commitment published in one

module will not necessarily agree with the reference number

for the commitment published in a later module.

(c) Commitments shown in a published module as applicable to

other modules will not necessarily appear in the later

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published modules.

The inspector concluded that the above GPC responses indicated need for

additional NRC emphasis and assessment of activities related to

structural steel to be covered in other modules. This further NRC

examination is identified as Inspector Followup Item 424/86-07-01 -

Adequate Coverage of Module 8 Items Assigned to Other Modules.

d. Section 1.0, Introduction

Section 1.0 of the report indicated that Module 8 covered design and

construction commitments and activities for Category 1 structural steel

used at Plant Vogtle. The structural steel stated to be within the

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scope of Module 8 included embeds, structural steel framing for contain- .

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ment . internals and other Category 1 structures, anchorage for i

structures and equipment, pipewhip restraints, cranes and supports,

liner plate systems and miscellaneous Category 1 structural and stain- i

less steel items. Readiness Review of the Welding Program at Plant  ;

Vogtle is also included in Module 8. j

The inspector completed the examination of Section 1.0. The objective

during this examination was the assurance of adequate coverage of  ;

Module 8 items (see paragraph 3.c).  ;

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{ e. Section 2.0 Organization and Division of Responsibility *

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j Section 2.0 provides details of the design organization and field i

construction organization at Plant Vogtle. This includes a brief  !

l description of the organization, responsibilities, and interface.  !

relationships between GPC, BPC, and SCS for design, procurement, and 1

construction activities related to structural steel. Field construc- i

tion organization details include those related to the three contrac-

I tors performing the work covered within Module 8. The contractors

involved are: Walsh Construction Company, the general civil contrac-

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tor; Ingalls Iron Works Company; the Structural Steel erection and  ;

j civil fabrication shop contractor;-and Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I),  ;

responsible for the containment building liner plate system, contain- l

ment locks and hatches, stainless steel liner plate for refueling l

canal, spent fuel pool liner, and steel liners for concrete tanks. ,

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! The inspector completed examination of Section 2.0. The objective  !

! during this examination was verification of general content and  !

, accuracy. No significant errors or omissions were identified. [

! f. Comitment Implementation

! Section 3.0 provides the commitments GPC identified for Module 8 and i

J the verification of their implementation. Subsections 3.1 through 3.3  !

! of Section 3.0 provided brief introductory information - including a  !

definition of a commitment, information regarding the sources of the i

commitments, and a listing of the typical documents that were deter- '

mined to implement comitments. l

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Subsection 3 3.4 and 3.5 of Section 3.0 presented, respectively, a  !

matrix listing : the commitments identified and a matrix listing the

documents considered to implement the comitments. In addition to i

providing a listing of the comitments identified, Subsection 3.4 - i

provides an identification of other Readiness Review modules to which t

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each Module 8 commitment was assigned and a determination as to whether  ;

implementation of the commitment was a design organization responsi- {

. bility, a construction organization responsibility or the responsi-  ;

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bility of both. The subsection 3.5 matrix includes, for each comit-  !

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ment, an identification of design and/or construction documents that i

were determined to implement the comitment. i

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The inspector completed review of the material presented in the

Module 8 Subsections 3.4 and 3.5 matrices to determine whether the

Readiness Review had satisfactorily identified commitments for the

module and if it had satisfactorily determined their inclusion in

implementing documents.

Details regarding insufficient readiness review background documenta-

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tion for verification of Table 6.1-2 commitments to second level design

documents and NRC subsequent re-verification is included in Inspection '

Report Nos. 50-424/86-03 and 50-425/86-02.

g. Program Description

Section 4.0 provides a summary description of VEGP program work

activities for design and construction of Category 1 Structural Steel.

Section 4.0 also includes details regarding the project welding pro-

gram. The inspector completed the examination of Section 4.0. The

objective during this examination was verification of general content

and accuracy. No significant errors or omissions were identified. '

Necessary additional examination of details regarding the project

welding program (Section 4.5 and 6.2) was completed during this inspec-

tion and is reported on paragraph 7.i.(2).

h. Audits

Section 5.0 describes a review of past audit findings (including NRC

inspection findings) that was conducted as part of the Module 8

Readiness Review. GPC performed the review to assess the adequacy of

the emphasis placed on resolution of audit findings related to the

scope of Module 8.

The inspector completed review of the data and rationale presented

(including material relative to NRC findings) to determine whether

proper emphasis had been placed on the resolution of audit findings.

Details regarding resolution of NRC concern relative to acceptance

criteria for structural welds and necessary further examination of the

STRIVE Load Tracking Program are included in inspection Report

Nos. 424/86-03 and 425/86-02.

i. Program Verification <

Section 6.0 describes GPC's verification to assure that the VEGP design

and construction programs adequately implement commitments. It con-

tains summary data supporting the review assessment, including

Readiness Review findings (violations of licensing commitments, project

procedures or engineering requirement identified by the reviewers) and

their resolution. The Readiness Review findings were classified into

levels of importance to plant safety. The following levels were used:

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Violation of licensing commitments, project procedures,

or engineering requirements with indication of safety

concerns.

II - Violation of licensing commitments or engineering

requirements with no safety concerns.

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III - Violation of project procedures with no safety concerns.

Section 6.0 is divided into two subsections, Subsection 6.1, which

describes design program verification, and Subsection 6.2 which

describes construction program verification.

(1) Subsection 6.1, Design Program Verification

As described in the Module 8 report, Readiness Review verification

of the design program was performed by a design RRT consisting of r

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five personnel experienced in power plant design engineering. The

verification was intended to ensure, through sampling, that the .

design processes for Category 1 Structural Steel had been adequ-

ately controlled and had resulted in proper implementation of

licensing commitments in design documents. The module report

describes the design program verification as having been performed

in two phases.

Phase I was the verification of commitments documented in the

Module 8 report Section 3.5 implementation matrix plus further

review of selected commitments for their implementation on

. second-order design documents (Table 6.1-2).  :

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Phase II was the verification that design activities were conduct- ,

, ed in accordance with project procedures and QA requirements "

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(i.e., ANSI N45.2.11).

Overview details regarding the NRC examination of design program

verification are included in inspection Report Nos. 424/86-03 and

425/86-02. Continuing NRC concern regarding apparent discrepan-

cies in calculations for seismic qualification of the VEGP Polar

Crane is reported in paragraph 3.b.

(2) Subsection 6.2, Construction Program Verification

As described in the Module 8 report, the Readiness Review verifi- i

cation of construction was performed by a Construction RRT consist- ,

ing of six personnel experienced in nuclear construction. It was

intended to ensure, through sampling, that the construction 1

j, processes for Category 1 Structural Steel had been adequately ,

i controlled and had resulted in proper implementation of licensing

commi tments. The module report describes the construction verifi- i

cation as having been performed in three phases. Phase I was the

verification of implementation of all construction related commit-

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l ments. The NRC examination of commitment implementation included ,

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a sample of those commitments related to construction. Phase II '

included a technical review of construction records associated '

with Module 8 hardware scope and Phase III was field verification  ;

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of randomly selected completed structures.

} Initial details regarding the NRC examination of construction

program verification are included in inspection Report

Nos. 424/86-03 and 425/86-02. Continuing NRC concern regarding

high strength bolted connections is reported in paragraph 3.c.

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l The NRC examination of construction verification items during this l

inspection was concentrated on liner plate systems and the project '

i welding program. Further details and conclusions regarding the .

items examined, construction attributes assessed, Readiness Review l

checklists / assessment plans, and specifics of associated quality  !

documentation will be included in NRC review Report No. 424/86-18. l

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An overview sumary is as follows- [

Liner Plate Systems

I Readiness review construction verification of liner plate systems -

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was bounded by two significant management decisions. The two  :

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bounding conditions are as follows:

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No Field Examinations Were Conducted i

, The RR assessment was completed by review of CB&I procedures

j and the Quality Assurance manua? (QAM) together with an  ;

) in-depth review of quality documentation for several items i

j versus construction specification (X2AG06 and X2AG07) require- i

, ments.

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Rationale for omitting field examinations was that visual

inspection of the installed (and painted) liner plate would  !

provide no opportunity for further assessment of the welding ,

involved and that dimensional checks against drawings would p

be unproductive or impossible due to concrete placement and '

painted over survey markings. Also that additional con- l

fidence in the adequacy of CB&I welding on liner plates  ;

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existed due to earlier review of the radiographic film

j involved by CB&I, GPC and an independent consultant. .

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No Stainless Steel Liner Plate Was Assessed

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_ Readiness Review reasoning was that special controls relative .

j to stainless materials (halogen contamination, control of

delta ferrite, temperature limits, etc.) were imposed on a -

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project basis and were assessed in other modules or other  ;

areas of Module 8. Other aspects of CB&I programmatic  !

controls for liner plate construction / installation were the '

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same for stainless as for carbon steel liner plate. Conse-

quently, items for construction verification were chosen from

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the containment liner plate system due to ASME code pressure

bounda' r y consideratiohs and a wider variation of items

involved: 1.e., penetrations, dome plates, thickened plates,

base mat embeds, polar crane brackets, etc.

Readkness review completed an in-depth assessment of Quality

documentation fur 17 items as follows:

2 - Polar crane brackets

2 - Reactor cavity liner plates

2 - Base mat embeds

2 - Thicker.ed floor liner plates

2 - Cylinder wall liner plates

2 - Penetration assemblies

2 - Dome plates

' li- Equipment hatch piece

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1 - escape lock piece

The NRC! assessment of liner plate systems began with examina-

tion of the liner plate assessment plan and associated

checklists (Figure 6.2-2). CB&I procedures and the QAM as

well as Procurement Specifications X2AG06 and X2AG07 were

then reviewed. Completed construction assessment checklists

for, all 17 assessments were then reviewed for apparent

errors, omissions and inconsistencies. A random sample of

seven . assessments, approximately 42 percent of the total,

were chosen for NRC re-verification of supporting quality

documentation. Sample items / assessments were as follows:

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Assessment No. 5 - Thickened floor liner plate (column

plate at 180 due South) Assembly - piece mark 53-B-R

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Assessment No. 7 Base MAT embed (Type A Restraint -

eastern most' on south side) 1.e. NSSS Support Assembly -

'

piece mark 62-A

m

-

A'ssessment No. 9.- Polar Crane Bracket Assembly at 210

- piece mark 283-A-7

-

Assessment No. 11 - Dome Plate Assembly ; bottom piece at

90 ) - piece mark 462-A

-

Assessment No.12 - Penetration Assembly No. 50 at

Elevation 202' 6" - piece mark 312-A

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< Assessment No.13 - Southern Main Steam Penetration

Assembly - piece mark 330A

-

s

M

~

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13

During the re-verification of assessment No. 13 the Inspector-

noted that the CB&I shop checklist for assembly 300-B-2, a

subassembly of 330A, incorporated the penetration sleve

(piece mark 302-3-1) which had been fabricated from SA 516 GP,

70 plate. The shop check list did not include the necessary

quality documentation related to welding and examination of

piece mark 302-3-1. Readiness Review background documenta-

tion was inadequate to show verification of the quality data

involved. The inspector noted that several other examples of

inadequate RR background documentation had been identified

during previous onsite examinations of Module 8. This was

considered further indication of an apparent deficiency _ of

the Readiness Review of Module 8 due to inadequate background

documentation. Subsequently the inspector examined the CB&I

shop checklist for fabrication of penetration sleeve piece

mark 302-3-1 and no discrepancies were identified.

Project Welding Program

Readiness Review verification of the.Vogtle project welding

program was completed in three parts; receipt of weld filler

material, control of weld filler material and review of Weld

Procedure Specification (WPS) and Procedure Qualification

Record (PQR) development.

-

Readiness Review verification of the receipt of weld

filler material involved 12 assessments of Certified

Material Test Reports (CMTRs) associated with purchase

orders from February 5,1979, through August 17, 1984.

CMTR's were verified to conform to the ASME SFA' material

specification involved. the inspector selected a random

sample of three of the assessment for re-verification as

follows: ,

(a) PAV No. 2852 for E7018 electrodes

Size Heat / Lot No. j

1/8" 02-1-E9292T- i

1/8" 02-2-E9292T  !

l

(b) PAV No. 9123 for ER 309L Weld Rod i

Size Heat / Lot No.

1/16" X49264~ l

1

h

l

l

!

.

.. -. .- .. - - .

i

4 .

,

i

14

(c) PAY No.10071 for ER NiCr Mo-3 Weld Rod

i Size Heat / Lot No.

1/16" HNX04E3AK

During the above examination the inspector noted that ,

Readiness Review supporting documentation was not >

} adequate to confirm verification of the CMTR - for

>

Lot 02-2-E9292T. This is another example of the

apparent deficiency reported above,

i

l

- Readiness Review completed verification.of weld filler

2 material control documentation from November 15, 1978. i

, through February 14, 1985. -This involved Review of a ,

l sample of 14 weld issue logs and subsequent review of -

.

the necessary certification / qualification for. the

j welders who drew weld mett I to that ' log. Readiness

l Review also completed field examinations for each weld ,

~

material distribution center (WMDC) as well as a random

'

sample of welders receiving materials versus documenta- i

tion requirements for the materials received. The ,

l inspector examined all Readiness ' Review supporting ,

j documentation and re-verified weld material issue logs .!

versus welder qualifications for the beginning and end .

of the period involved. ,j

'

! -

Readiness Review completed verification of WPS and PQR

development through examination of CB&I and PPP proce-

. dures. GPC and Pullman /Kenith Fortson (PK/F) welding i

j procedures which comply with AWS- requirements were not ,

3

reviewed due to a recent and extensive GPC QA Audit of i

'

{ AWS welding (GD08-84/87).

i

. The . inspector was aware of extensive NRC Review of

j Welding (including WPSs and. PQRs) at Plant Vogtle (

! (approximately 65 percent of all NRC audits examined in -

4

section 5.0 are related to welding) and did not re-

4 verify during this inspection the specific WPSs and PQRs i

i examined by Readiness Review (Similar WPSs and PQRs have

been examined by the inspector during previous inspec--

tions). However, the inspector did examine documenta- '

tion related to the 1984 GPC AWS welding audit .

!

GP08-87/87 and re-verified completion of adequate

corrective actions for findings 725-111, 728-111, and i

j 727-111. No significant deficiencies were identified. )

i 5

3

4

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5

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