ML20126M778

Handwritten Ltr Forwarding Draft SER on Dcrdr & Draft Evaluation of Dcrdr Summary Rept for Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station. Info to Be Discussed at Jul 1985 Meeting in Bethesda,Md

ML20126M778
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	06/12/1985
From:	Sears P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Whittier G Maine Yankee
Shared Package
ML20126M781	List: ML20126M778 ML20129A247
References
NUDOCS 8506200459
Download: ML20126M778 (9)

Text

F' l

y. -

l 2. Ju tde $s

~

[0- @0Q kOTE To: G, D. (AH t TTI EW

, M G 72' , d oc c.e a R ENG r MG.64 l AJG j L iceust tdG PI A iedc. %9ed KE.G A ro M t c. Pou)E.f2 C.o .

rei2 e M : RM. S E. AE S Peo de.c T H C, R , oTE 8

• 3, DL,81 RR 5 U BT: D ET~ A i t.E.D 0-0 NT 12o t.- 12o o M DEstGtd 9G WI G. u.)

l E MC.t oseD FOR YOiJ e IroFoe M AT oO

.15 Di2 A FT M ate.G2i A L To Be. Discd ss'aB 1 l

AT A M e E.Ti td C, ird Be.T H e.s D A To i

. B e. .s eT- . S o M e. TtME. .tM JU LY , / 9 EC.

w.%-

• ' '- ' * " ' wmn.-

e-  % ,y  % . .

~ hd:1) sic . 1 I I Rm.Sws e i

.fg;?ho/

. a y, .

oeae -

- 1 MRC FORY 386 U.S. NUCLE AR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION N m V A t t lN C. A D D R ESS / Request From/

( 5 -80 )

NRCY 0270

. 'N6kCb 4 2_. k F ACSIMILE Th AN'SMITTAL REQUEST r nE /uxN ew.mNau ro se Noe n 3H -.

\1)d t~. b ' [ vES I f NO MESSAGE TO NAME ats,' L F PtmNF -

n s's-)NuH 'NL Nf) INO ?F Pc G E 5 f/nclud,nq Trans-

"Z,,"c 3 (_. *Z Q ~ q ~, { mitta' instructions) f} t(( t bb- LO\p [q21 .* T 2_ C,

~

MESSAGE F ROM NAME F .-. E S I ". NE WI) r

. E H lF IC A T ION PHONE NC

z. .- H rgh -5 Deed 100 to 2 n' < I  : L O W-5DeeQ '4-O '"to I m,(_

(_; De /A BU I L D I N G I e 4 F IC f PH f '; N E NO ' 4 16. TPl F' A E C E D E N C E C'L d 0-Jht 2 Hou s m + ed ia t e

,_1oi< < ip, j 1 ] % 5 s3 9- L s '

4. .., - 3 %,

TIM E /D A T E HE CE IVE D l 'N>* 'ki C' I I-

. , 't

\$ 1 4

?g# o e r s i 4

r

. .C' '

ENCLOSURE 1 HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING BRANCH DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FOR MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER PLANT-POSITION Licensees and applicants for operating licenses shall conduct a Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR). The objective is to " improve the ability of nuclear power plant control room operators to prevent accidents or cope with accidents if they occur by improving the infomation provided to them" (NUREG-0660, Item I.D.). The need to conduct a DCRDR was confirmed in NUREG-0737 and Supplement I to NUREG-0737. DCRDR requirements in Supplement I to NUREG-0737 replaced those in earlier documents. Supplement I to NUREG-0737 requires each applicant or licensee to conduct a DCRDR on a schedule negotiated with the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC).

NUREG-0700 (Ref. 7) describes four phases of the DCRDR to be perfomed by the applicant and licensee. The phases are:

1. Planning

2. Review

3. Assessment and Implementation, and 4 Reporting.

' Criteria for evaluating each phase are contained in Section 18.1, Revision 0 and Appendix A-to Section 18.1, Revision 0 of the Standard Review Plan.

As a requirement of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, the applicants and licensees

~

are required to submit a program plan that describes how the following elements of the DCRDR will be accomplished:

1. Establishment of a qualified multidisciplinary review team

2. Function and task analyses to identify control room operator tasks and information and control requirements during emergency operations

3. A comparison of display and control requirements with a control room inventory

4. A control room survey to identify deviations from accepted human factors principles

5. Assessment of human engineering discrepancies (HEDs) to determine which HEDs are significant and should be corrected

6. Selection of design improvements

~

3 7.. Verification that selected design improvements will provide the necessary correction

8. Verificatior that improvements will not introduce new HEDs i

9. Coordination of control room improvements with changes from other

} programs 'such as- SPDS, operator training, Reg. Guide 1.97 instrumentation, and upgraded emergency operating procedures.

I The NRC requires each applicant and licensee to submit a sumary report at

, .the end of the DCRDR. The report should describe the proposed control room changes, implementation schedules, and provide justification for leaving j safety significant HEDs uncorrected or partially corrected. '

~The NRC will evaluate the organization, process, and results of each DCRDR. '

The evaluation of the applicant's and licensee's DCRDR efforts will consist of the following, as described in NUREG-0800 (Ref. 8).

i

1. An evaluation of the Program Plan report submitted by the licensee / applicant 1

2. A visit to some of the plant sites to audit the. progress of the-

.DCRDR programs 1

i

3. . An-evaluation of the licensee / applicant DCRDR summary report i 1 a

DRAFT SAIC assisted the staff in the evaluation and prepared the enclosed Technical Evaluation Report (TER). The NRC staff agrees with the technical positions and conclusions as presented in the TER.

The following is a summary of the staff's coments on MYAPCo's compliance "

with the DCRDR requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1:

1. Establishment of a Qualified Multidisciplinary Team - it is not clear whether the necessary expertise was available at appropriate levels of effort for each of the DCRDR tasks.

2. System Function and Task Analysis (SFTA) To Identify Control Room

, Operator Tasks and Information and Control Requirements During Emergency Operations - I't is not clear whether the staff's audit findings have been resolved; in addition, since MYAPCo plans to redo its E0P upgrade program, it appears that further task analysis and validation may be necessary.

3. Comparison Of Display and Control Requirements With a Control Room Inventory - The licensee has generated an acceptable control room inventory; however, since the acceptability of this. requirement is contingent on both the inventory and the task analysis results, and since the task analysis is in question (see above), this remains an open item. I I

i i

4 - A possible pre-icplerentation audit

5. - The preparation of a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) that will present the results of the NRC evaluation.

Significant HEDs shculd be corrected. Improvecents which can be accocplished l with an enhancerent progra:s should be done proeptly.

DISCUSSION The Maine Yankee Atomic Power Cocpany (MYAPCo) subcitted a Program Plan (Ref.1) for cceducting a DCRDR at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant to the l NRC on August 12, 1982. Staff coerents on the Progran Plan were issued on Octcber 4, .1983 (Ref. 2). MYAFCo submitted a Sumary Report on February 28, l 1985 (Ref. 4).

The staff conducted an on-site in-progress audit of the MYAPCo DCRDR cn February 13-17, 1984 with consultants from Science Applications Internaticnal Corporation (SAIC). The licensee's DCRDR has been evaluated based en information provided in the Program Plan, Sumary Report and during the in-progress audit.

The organization, cetheds and processes, and results of the Maine Yankee DCRDR were compared with the recuirements of Supplerent I to N'JREG-0737 and guidance contained in NUREG-0700 and Section 18.1, Revision 0 and Appendix A to Section 18.1, Revision 0 of the Standard Review Plan. Consultants free

l J

CONCLUSIONS The licensee has provided sufficient evidence for the staff to affim that one of the requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement I has been satisfied, that is the requirement for a control room survey. However, insufficient information was provided to allow complete evaluation of the other eight requirements. Therefore, the staff recommends that the licensee submit I

supplemental information, as follows:

1 i

1. discussion about the level of involvement of specific team members in various phases and tasks of the DCRDR especially the human factors specialist, training specialist, and nuclear systems engineer; i

2. further discussion to clarify how the NRC in-progress audit findings regnding the system function review and task analysis have been resolved;

.3. discussion regarding the possible impact of revising the emergency procedure program on the DCRDR, especially the task analysis and validation;

4. discussion addressing the concerns raised in the enclosed TER regarding task analysis;

4 Control Room Survey To Identify Deviations From Accepted Human Factors Principles - The control room survey has been conducted satisfactorily, using the guidance and criteria of NUREG-0700.

5. Assessment Of HEDs To Detemine Which Are Significant And Should Be Corrected - While the licensee has developed an acceptable assessment process, actual implementation of the process is

. unclear, i.e., MYAPCo should describe how cut-off levels were determined.

6. Selection Of Design Improvements That Will Correct Discrepancies -

The licensee did not provide a description of how this process was addressed.

7. Verification That Improvements Will Provide The Necessary Correction Without Introducing New HEDs - MYAPCo proposed an acceptable verification method during the in-progress audit. Staff could not detemine whether that method was actually isnplemented.

8. Coordination Of Control Room Improvements With Chances Resulting From Other Improvement Programs - Specific coordination mechanisms and processes were not described in the licensee's Sumary Report.

,