05000272/LER-1982-088, Forwards LER 82-088/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-088/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20070C134
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	11/24/1982
From:	Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20070C138	List: 05000272/LER-1982-088, Forwards LER 82-088/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8212140053
Download: ML20070C134 (3)

LER-2082-088, Forwards LER 82-088/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2722082088R00 - NRC Website

text

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O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Cornpany P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station November 24, 1982 Mr. R. C.'Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-088/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-088/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, l , $b'"

i H.J. Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations

, RF:ks //

CC: Distribution 0212140053 821124 DR ADOCK 05000272 PDR [' O' The Energy People

% 215) QCV) 1181

Report Number:- 82-888/03L Report Date: 11-24-82 Occurrence Date: 11-09-82 Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Fire Detection Instrumentation - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-429.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 6 - RX Power 0 % - Unit Load 9 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1555 hours0.018 days <br />0.432 hours <br />0.00257 weeks <br />5.916775e-4 months <br />, November 9, 1982, during surveillance testing of the turbine generator exciter fire detectors, an operator observed sparks and smoke emanating from Panel 1FP3. Power to the panel was immediately isolated, and the fire was extinguished. As a result of de-energizing the panel, Fire Detection Zones 81 through 96 were rendered inoperable. The fire detection instruments affected included 1

the Switch Gear Rooms, Battery Room el 64, Diesel Generator Area, and Diesel Fuel Storage Area detectors. Due to the inoperability of the instruments, Action Statement 3.3.3.6a was entered.

Fire watch patrols were immediately established for the areas involved. Investigation revealed that the problem was due to a failed I

relay for Panel 1FP3 alarm buzzer and that no futher damage was involved. The relay was replaced and power was restored to the panel.

Zones 81 through 96 were satisfactorily tested; the fire detection instrumentation was declared operable, and at 2030 hours0.0235 days <br />0.564 hours <br />0.00336 weeks <br />7.72415e-4 months <br />, November 9, 1982, Action Statement 3.3.3.6a was terminated.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURREHCE

As noted, the cause of the occurrence was the failure of Panel 1FP3 alarm buzzer relay. The alarm had been actuated a number of times during the testing of the detectors monitored by the panel. No previous failures of this type were noted and the problem was assumed to be of an isolated nature.

i ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Operability of the fire detection instrumentation insures that adequate. warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires. This capability is required in order to locate fires in their

early stages. Prompt detection of fires reduces the potential for damage to safety related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.

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LER 82-088/03L ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

Action Statement 3.3.3.6a requires:

With the number of operable fire detection instruments less than the minimum number operable required by the Technical Specifications:

a. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the zone (s) of the inoperable instrument (s) at least once per hour, and

b. Restore- the inoperable instrument (s) to operable status within 14 days or, in lieu of any other report required

by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrument (s) to operable status.

Establishing the fire watch patrols and compliance with the 14 day time interval in the action statement mitigate the additiona] risk resulting from inoperable detectors. Since, as noted, these actions were taken, the event involves no risk to the health and safety of the public.

The occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

As mentioned, the failed relay was replaced, the fire detection instrumentation was satisfactorily tested and returned to service.

No further action was deemed necessary in view of the nature of the problem.

FAILURE D&I&:

Pyrotronics Fire Alarm Panel Alarm Relay 4

Prepared By R. Frahm It 4 bM /td/

'Genefal Nanager -

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No. _E2-106 I

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