IR 05000409/2005031

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Forwards Notice of Violation Issued to Util Based on 850409-0531 Insp
ML20140H601
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse, La Crosse, 05000000
Issue date: 07/16/1985
From: Kammerer C
NRC OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS (OCA)
To: Glenn, Kaptur, Latta, Markey E, Metzenbaum, Simpson, Udall
HOUSE OF REP., HOUSE OF REP., ENERGY & COMMERCE, SENATE
Shared Package
ML20140C961 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-85-478 NUDOCS 8510230045
Download: ML20140H601 (1)
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' t UNITED STATES

! ~* .- 1, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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July 16, 1985

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'ho The Honorable Edward Markey, Chairman Subcomittee on Energy Conservation and Power

'Comittee on Energy and Commerce United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed please find a notice of violation issued to Toledo

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Edison Company for violations at the Davis Besse Nuclear Power

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Station.

Sincerely,

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An M arlto M er, Dir ctor Office of Congre al Affairs

Enclosure:

- As stated

REGION III==

Report Nc. 50-346/85018(ORP)

Docket hc. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company

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Edison Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, Ohio 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse 1 Inspection At: Oak Narbor, OH Inspection Conductec: April 9 through May 31, 1985 Enforcement Conference: May 24, 1985 ~

Inspectors: W. Rogers D. Kosloff ~

M. Ring

.d4 Tiett.L Approved By: . M . Jackiw, Chief Projects Section 2E t,[13/8i Date InspectionSummareg Inspection Areas Inspectec:on April 9 throuch May 31, 1985 (Report No. 50-346/85018(DRP))

events:

removal of the security and fire protection computer frorr without the shif t supervisor being informed; exceeding the thermal power for tne reactor coolant flow available and having one channel of the r reacto protection system set' lower than the allowable setpoint; and the discovery of a non-licenseo operator asleep while implementing a condition of the license.

Theults:

_Res inspection involved 27 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors Three items of nonennpliance were identified (failure to notify

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appropriate personnel that fire detection equipment was removed from service; failure to perform the action statements of Technical Specification 3 2 5 associated with reactor power and reactor protection system setpoints; and

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failure to properly implement a condition of the license associated with operation of the startup feedwater pump).

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OETAILS 1. Persons Contact'e'd T. Murray, Assistant Vice Presioent, Nuclear M1sslor S. Quennoz, Plant Manager W. O' Conner, Operations Superintendent L. Simon, Operations Supervisor J. Lingenfelter, Technical Superintendent The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C, training and health physics staff.

Enforcement Conference on May 24, 1985 Toledo Edisor. Personnel R. Crouse, Vice President, Nuclear Mission .

T. Murray, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Mission S. Quennoz, Plant Manager .

R. Peters, Nuclear Licensing Manager NRC Personnel J. Kepoler, Administrator, Region III C. Nerelius, Director, Division of Reactor Projects W. Shafer, Chief, Projects Branch 2 I. Jackiw, Chief, Prelects Section 2B W. Rogers Senior Resident Inspector D. Kosloff, Resident Inspector M. Ring, Reactor Inspector M. McCormick-Barger, Reactor Inspector E. Berson, Legal Counsel W. Senuitz, Enforcement Coordinator 2. Inocerable Fire Protection Comcuter While reviewing the unit log on April 9, 1985 the inspector noted that the security and fire protection computer had been shutdown for maintenance from 0915 to 1120 and the Snift Supervisor had no knowledge of the shutdown. The Toledo Edison Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual (NQAM) Section 14.0 requires that the plant manager establishes and maintains a program in which the operating status of equipment is known at all times. Section 14.1.1.1 of the NQAM furtner requires that the shift supervisor grant permission to release equipment or systems for maintenance or test. Failure to inform the shift supervisor of the equipment status at all times is considered a violation (346/85018-01).

A discussion of the occurrence with the shif t supervisor revealed that althougn he had'been informed that the security and fire protection computer was to be shutdown for maintenance that morning he was not notified at the time the computer was actually shutcown. He establishec

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fire watch patrols in accordance with existing plant procedures af'ter his independent discovery that the computer had been shutcown. During the enforcement conference the licensee stated that the areas in cuestion were being patrolled due to fire protection equipment other than the fire detectors being out,of service. Tne licensee further stated that the security supervisor has oeen designatec as the inc1vidual to inforir the shift supervisor wnen the computer is taken out of serv 1ce.

3. _ Inaccurate Reactor Power Measurements The limiting condition for operation of Technical Specif' cation 3.2.5

recuires reactor coolant flow to be equal to or greater than a specific

' val ue . Tne action statement associated with this limiting condition recuires that, within four hours, reactor power be reduced by 2% for every 1% that flow is less than the given value. From approximately 1720 on April 19, 1985 until approximately 0220 on April 20, 1985 thermal power was approximately 98%. At this time the limit for thermal power was between 96.42% and 95.8%. failure to maintain proper reactor power for the indicated reactor coolant flow is considered an item of noncompliance (346/85018_02). The events surrounding this condition are -

discussed in Inspection Report No. 85009. During the enforcement confer-ence the licensee confirmed that for approximately twelve hours one of the ,

four reactor power indicators was set less than actual reactor power by 2. 3 during the same time period in question. This indicator provides an input te the Reactor Protection System (RPS). These examples were the result of the licensee's failure to recognize that a feedwater flow indicator that had failed a week before provided an input to the computer heat balance calculation which is the standard Dy which the reactor power indicators are calibrated and which is the operators' primary indication of reactor thermal power.

4. Startuo Feedwater Pumo Pioina Monitoring While touring the startup feedwater pump / auxiliary feedwater pump (SUFP/AFWP) area on April 24, 1985 at approximately 1210 the inspector observed that the only other person in the room was a sleeping non-licensec operator. The plant was in hot standoy and tne SUFP was in operation. Paragraph 2.C.(3)(t) of the facility's operating license reautres that the licensee station an individual In the SUFP/AFWP area during operation of the SUFP to monitor the SUFP/ turbine plant cooling water (TPCW) piping status in the room. In the event of SUFP/TPCW pipe leakage the operator is to trip the SUFP locally or notify the control

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room to trip the SUFP, and isolate tne SUFP/TPCW piping. Failure te properly monitor the SUFP/TPCW piping status is considered an item of noncompliance (346/85018-03). Suosecuently, anotner licensee employee entered the room and awakened the operator in the presence of the inspector. Tne inspector notified the operator's supervisors of the occurrence. The lieensee took disciplinary action against the sleeping individua'..

5. Enforcement Conference An Enforcement Conference was held on May 24, 1995 in the NRC Region III office to discuss the circumstances surrounding the violations identified

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during the inspection that was initiated on April 9, 1985.

The meeting was opened by Mr. J. G. Keppler, Regional Administrator. He described in general terms the violations that were identified during the inspection. The licensee representatives were informed that individually the three violations were not cause for serious concern; however, more importantly there was an apparent overall breakdown in communication between site and corporate management as well as between corporate -

manage rs. The licensee representatives admitted they did not learn of the violations in a timely manner and were not directly involved in the -

corrective actions that were taken. The plant manager described corrective actions that had been taken to resolve each of the violations.

Tne NRC staff concluded that these actions addressed the specific problems but did not adequately deal with the root cause which was lack of manage-ment oversight ano communication. The licensee representatives expressed their concern, said they understood the problem and would take immediate steps to ensure that Davis-Besse management would become more involved in plant operation.

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