IR 05000285/1997016
| ML20211F214 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 09/29/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211F177 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-97-16, NUDOCS 9709300379 | |
| Download: ML20211F214 (18) | |
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ENCLOSURE 2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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i Docket' No:
50-285 I
c License No:-- DPR 40.
Report No: _50 285/97 16 Licensee:
Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm.
P.O.- Box 399, Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun
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Fort Calhoun, Nebraska ~
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Facility:
Fort Calhoun Station Location:-
Blair, Nebraska Dates:
August 3 through September'13,1997
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inspectors: ' W. Walker, Senior Resident inspector t
V. Gaddy, Resident inspector T. Andrews, Radiation Specialist
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Approved:
W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Pranch B Attachment: Supplemental Information
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9709300379 970929 PDR. ADOCK 05000285
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Fort Calhoun Station NRC Inspection Report 50-285/97-16 This routine announced inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineenng, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
Operations In general, the conduct of opera: ions was professional and safety conscious, with j
one notable exception being the disabling of the containment spray valves during a i
surveillance activity (Section 01).
l Operations personnel followed Technical Specification requirements and procedures
during installation of a temporary modification on inverter A to allow repair of a broken inverter bypass switch (Section 02.1)
Operations personnel performed effectively during the power re&ction and
subsequent shutdown to repair a condenser tube leak (Sectior
.2).
Material condition of Diesel Generator 1 was good. Lighting in the diesel generator
room was improved, oil leaks had been reduced, and all valves were verified to be in the position required by the operating instruction (Section 02.3).
Maintenance In general, maintenance and surveillance activities were conducted in a controlled
and professional manner with good three-way communications noted between auxiliary operators and licensed operators during surveillance activities (Sections M1.1 and M1.2).
During the replacement of a mechanical seal on a containment spray pump,
maintenance mechanics demonstrated a good questioning attitude when they stopped work after obtaining an improper pump runout specification (Section M1.1).
Inadequate maintenance rule scoping resulted in the fire protection system piping
and the deluge valves not being considered within the scope of the maintenance rule (Section M3.1).
Maintenance errors and failure to perform postmaintenance testing resulted in two
normally locked doors within the radiologically controlled area which could not be opened using the lock keys (Section M8.1).
Enaineerina Engineering personnel took steps to ensure that conservative shape annealing
factors were installed in the reactor protection system (Section E1.2).
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The inspectors concluded that licensee personnel were knowledgeabla of the'
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effectively performed their functions (Section R1.2).
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-' The inspectors identified instances of inattention to detail in that an out of -
calibration electronic dosimeter remained available for use and a maintenance helper
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reached over a contaminated zone boundary (Sections R2.1 and R4.1).
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Security personnel identified that keys were left inside an unattended vehicle within
. the protected area (Section S2.1).
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Report Detailt-Summarv of Plant Status--
On August 12,'1997, power was reduced to 70 percent due to the inoperability of the axial power distribution trip units on two channels of the reactor protection. system.'
Repairs were completed and power was again at 100 percent on August 15,1997.
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Reactor power remained at 100 percent until August 26.when a shutdown was started due-
-to the failure of an inverter bypass switch on inverter A; Repairs to the switch were -
' completed on August 26, the shutdown was stopped at 22 percent power, and a power
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ascension toward 100 percent was begun. The reactor reached 100 percent power on August 28 and remained there until September 9,1997. At that time, reactor power was
. reduced to 56 percent to repair a malfunctioning condenser outlet valve.
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Following the power reduction, a condenser tube leak was discovered and the reactor was-shut down. On September 13, the reactor was made critical and a power ascension began. At the end of the inspection period, the power ascension was stillin progress.
l. Operationa
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Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
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Using inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations, in general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious. One notable exception was the disabling of the conte 5 ment spray header isolation valves by operations personnel during a surveillance ac
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control switches for the containment spray header isolation valves remained in OVERRIDE, rendering the containment spray system inoperable for mitigating an accident without operator action for approximately 12.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. Details of this event were discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/97 17.
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Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
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02.1 Power Reduction to Repair Inverter Bvoass Switch a.
Insoection Scooe (71707 and 62707)
The inspectors followed up on the circumstances surrounding the inoperable static inverter and the subsequent Technical Specification required power reduction.
.b.
Observations and Findinas On August 25,1997, electrical maintenance personnel attempted to perform Preventive Maintenance Order 9705602 on Static inverter EE-8H (Inverter A). The purpose of the maintenance-activity was to replace the inverter f an assembly. The,
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- work instructions directed electrical maintenance personnel to move the transfer switch of the inverter from the inverter position to the bypass position. After the transfer switch was placed in the bypass position, the " sync loss" light should have
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-2-illuminated. Since the " sync loss" light did not illuminate, maintenance personnel stopped the maintenance activity and began troubleshooting to determine why the light did not illuminate.
During troubleshooting, operations personnel were directed to move the transfer switch from the bypass position to the inverter position. While performing this action, the transfer switch broke, rendering the inverter inoperable. The licensee entered Technical Specification 2.7.(2).o at 1:42 p.m. This placed the plant in a 24-hour limiting condition for operation, if the inverter could not be returned to service within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the Technicol Specification allowed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to reach hot shutdown (Mode 3).
Af ter entry into the 24-hour limiting condition for operation, the licensee considered numerous options on the best way to approach the repair of the inverter. All repair options would havo resulted in the licensee exceeding the 24-hour limiting condition for operation. At 12:15 p.m., on August 26,1997, the licensee notified the NRC that they had begun a Technical Specification required shutdown. In the notification, the licensee indicated they planned to complete the shutdown, repair the defective switch, and return Inverter A to service.
Subsequent to the notification, at 6 p.m., the plant review committee met and approved Temporary Modification 97-019 and its 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. The purpose of the temporary modification was to install a temporary power source to Instrument Bus A to allow inverter A to be removed from service and repaired. This method allowed Inverter A to be repaired without deenergizing Instrument Bus A more than momentarily.
At 11:30 p.m., with the reactor at approximately 22 percent power, the licensee made a followup to the earter notification and informed the NRC that, at 9:34 p.m.,
they had voluntarily enteied Technical Specification 2.0.1. This required the plant to be in hot shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The Geensee entered Technical Specification 2.0.1 to install Temporary Modification 97-019. The temporary modification provided power to instrument Bus A from a 480 Vac power supply through a 480 Vac to 120 Vac transformer. The transformer was not safety-related equipment. This configuration required ; hat both Instrument Bus A and Inverter A be declared inoperable. Although the bus could not be considered operable, this configuration allowed instrument Bus A to remain energized during the repairs.
Deenergizing Instrument Bus A sent a start signal to all three charging pumps. To prevent the addition of excess inventory to the reactor coolant system, the licensee placed all three charging pumps in pull-to-lock. This also placed the licensee in Technical Specifications 2.2.2 and 2.2.4 which required that the plant be placed in hot shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
The plant review committee concluded that installatirn of the temporary modification was more desirable than deenergizing Instrument Bus A. After Inverter A was
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-3-removed from service, it was repaired in approximately 15 minutes. Following repair, the temporary modification was removed and the licensee began increasing power to 100 percent. The inspectors reviewed Temporary Modification 97-019 and the associated 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, c.
Conclusions Licensee actions to reduce power and repair Inverter A were appropriate. No problems were identified with the temporary modification or the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation.
02.2 Reactor Shutdown to Repair Condenser Tube Leak a-IDsoection Scope (93702, 70707, and 62707)
The inspectors observed a,:tivities related to a reactor power reduction to approximately 56 percent to repair a condenser outlet valve and a shutdown to repair a condenser tube leak.
b.
Observations and Findinas On September 8,1997, the licensee reduced reactor power to approximately 56 percent to repair Condenser Outlet Valve MOV-B-D4. The valve was normally open and was required to close in order to backwash the condenser. The valve would not fully close during backwashes and would bind at approximately 50 percent closed. To repair the valve, the licensee had to isolate and drain Condenser B to remove the valve, After removing the valve, maintenance personnel determined that the valve's bushing and internals were worn. No operational anomalies occurred during the power reduction.
On September 9,1997, chemistry personnel identified high levels of sulfate and
. sodium in the steam generators. The high levels of sulf ate and sodium in the steam generator blowdown sample required the licensee to enter Action Level 2 of Chemistry Procedure CH-AD-0003, Plant Systems Chemical Limits and Corrective Action." This procedure required that, with levels of sulf ate and sodium greater than 50 ppb power, it should be reduced to less than 30 percent within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
On September 10,1997, chemistry personnel obtained another sample of steam generator blowdown. This sample showed that the levels of sodium and sulfate had increased and were stillincreasing. TH :-1.um levels were 165 ppb in Steam Generator B and 158 ppb in Steam Generator A. Chemistry Procedure CH AD-0003 required that, if sodium or sulf ate levels exceeded 250 ppb, then power should be reduced to less than 5 percent within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The licensee suspected that the most
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4-likely source of the increases in sodium and sulfate was a leak in Condenser A.
Since the sodium levels were continuing to increase, the licensee made the conservative decision to shut down to Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) and repair the tube leak in the condenser.
Following the shutdown, the licensee completed the repairs on Condenser B and returned it to service, then drained Condenser A and performed helium testing to locate any tube leaks. Helium testing identified two tube leaks in Condenser A.
Maintenance personnel plugged the tubes and returned the condenser to service.
While inserting control rods during the plant shutdown, Control Rod 22 in Group 2 lagged behind the other seven control rods in the group. The licensee performed troubleshooting and replaced the cable from the patch panel inside containment to the control element drive mechanism package. After the cable was replaced, Control Rod 22 moved as designed.
c.
Conclusions Operations personnel performed effectively during the power reduction and subsequent shutdown to repair a condenser tube leak.
02.3 Enaineerina Safety Feature System Walkdown The inspectors used Procedure 71707 to walk down Emergency Diesel Generator 1.
The system was walked down using the following operating instruction and drawings:
Operating Instruction OI-DG-1, Diesen Generator 1
Drawing B120F07001, Air Start Scheraatic
Drawing B120F04002, Jacket Water Schematic
Drawing li120F04003, Lube Oil Schematic
The inspectors noted that the lighting in the diesel generator had improved, oil leaks had been reduced, and the material condition of the equipment was good. All valves were verified to be in the correct position as required by the operating instruction.
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11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments a.
Inspection Scone (627021 The inspectors observed all or portions of the following activities:
Caulking of fire seal between auxiliary building and radwaste building
Low pressure safety injection pump oil change
Mechanical seal replacement on containment spray pump
Repair of Condenser Backwash Valve MOV-B-86
Repair of Condenser Outlet Valve MOV B-D4
b.
Observations and Findinas On August 20,1997, the inspectors observed maintanance personnel replace the mechanical seal on Containment Spray Pump SI 38. The maintenance mechanics were using the appropriate maintenance procedure. The inspectors noted that the measurements for totalindicated runout for the pump were not within the tolerance limits of less than.002" as specified in the maintenance procedure. The maintenance mechanics stoppeo work and requested assistance from the system engineer to resolve the discrepancy. The system engineer contacted the vendor for the pump and determined that total indicated runout could be greater than the.002" specified in the procedure. The system engineer initiated the appropriate procedure change and the maintenance was completed satisf actorily.
c.
Conclusions The maintenance activities observed were conducted in a controlled and professional manner.
M1.2 Surveillance Activities a.
Insoection Scoce (61726)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following activities:
RE-ST-NI 0001, "incore/Excore Nuclear Instrumentation Offset Check,"
Revision 16
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-6-IC-ST-VA-0031, " Quarterly Channel Calibration of Post Accident Containment
Hydrogen Analyzer VA-81B," Revision 4 OI-ST SI-3008, " Safety injection and Containment Spray Pump inservice Test
and Valve Exercise Test," Revision 19 OP-ST-CEA-0006, " Refueling Control Element Assemble (CEA) Group indicating
Lights and Rod Drop Test," Revision 5 b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors noted that the surveillances were performed in accordance with procedures. The surveillance procedures were present and in use during the observations. Good three-legged communications were noted between operations personnel performing valve lineups prior to the start of surveillance testing and the control room operators.
c.
Conclusions The surveillance activities observed by the inspectors were completed in a controlled manner and in accordance with procedures.
M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation M3.1 Inadeauate Mtintenance Rule Sconina a.
Insoection Scoce (37551)
The inspectors followed up on the inadequate maintenance rule scoping that resulted in the fire protection system piping and deluge valves not being included within the scope of the maintenance rule, b.
Observations and Findinas On August 1,1997, engineering personnel determined that, in March 1996, the expert technical panel for the maintenance rule should have included the fire protection system piping and deluge valves within the scope of the maintenance rule.
The licensee had included the fire pumps within the scope of the maintenance rule, but not these components.
On August 1,1997, during an expert technical panel meeting, one of the members recalled a historical event in which a fire protection deluge valve inadvertently actuated and sprayed water on a pressure switch in the electrohydraulic control system. This caused a turbine trip and a subsequent reactor trip. The expert technical panel was not aware that the inadvertent actuation of the deluge valve
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caused the reactor trip because a root cause determination was not performed.
During the March 1996 scoping, the expert technical panel thought the reactor trip was caused by the electrohydraulic control system. Since the inadvertent actuation of the fire protection deluge valve caused a reactor trip, the expert technical panel determined that the fire protection system piping and deluge valves should be within the scope of the maintenance rule.
Failing to include the fire protection system piping and deluge valves within the original scope of the maintenance rule is a violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2)(iii), which requires nonsafety-related structures, systems, and components that could cause a reactor trip be included within the scope of the maintenance rule. Upon discovery, the fire protection system piping and deluge valves were added to the scope of the maintenance rule. Engineering personnel were reviewing additional f ailure history data to determine the most appropriate category of the maintenance rule in which to place the fire protection system piping and deluge valves. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50 285/9716-01),
c.
Conclusions Following the identification that the expert technical panel had improperly excluded the fire protection system piping and deluge valves from the scope of the maintenance rule, licensee corrective actions were appropriate.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues M8,1 [Closedj Unresolved item 50-285/9715-02: inadequate postmaintenance test for fire door lockset maintenance. On July 11,1997, the inspectors identified that the door to Room 15A (shutdown heat exchanger valve room) would not open with the door key. It took the licensee approximately 30 minutes to open the door after locating proper tools to dismantle the door lock, in addition, the licensee identified seven other doors which had improper maintenance performed on the locks. The only other door which was normally locked was to Room 29 (volume control tank room). This lock also had to be dismantled. The other six doors which were normally unlocked could be opened without any additional actions.
The inspectors reviewed Maintenance Procedure GM-RM-FP-AO1, Repetitive Maintenance, " Fire Door Lockset inspection and Repetitive Mainter,ance," Revision 5, and determined that the procedure was inadequate in that it did not specify instructions to ensure that the door could be opened following performance of maintenance. Failing to ensure that the lockset maintenance procedure contained adequate instructions is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (50 285/9716-04).
The inspectors reviewed the safety significance of not having immediate access to Rooms 15A and 29. Room 15A contains manual valves associated with the
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L shutdown cooling heat exchangers. Manual valve manipulations are required in Room 15A to establish normal shutdown cooling and postaccident shutdown cooling.
The inspectors reviewed Emergency Operations Procedure Attachments 4 (shutdown cooling without recirculation actuation signal) and Attachment 7_ (shutdown cooling with a recirculation actuation signal). The inspectors determined that the safety functions necessary to minimize the consequences of an accident would have been
. performed prior to the establishment of shutdown cooling.
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in the case of Room 29, the primary impact was the inability to access Volume Control Tank Outlet Valve LCV 218 2 if necessary for manual operation. Access to Room-29 and manual closure of the volume control tank outlet valve is desired in certain cases to achieve reactor coolant system boration via gravity feed from the boric acid storage tanks or the safety injection refueling water tank. The inspectors.
reviewed emergency operation procedures and abnormal operating procedures and determined that the inability to access Room 29 woula not have compromised the licensee's ability to safely shut down the plant.
Based on the inspectors' review, the potential safety significance of not being able to access Rooms 15A and 29 for approximately 30 minutes was considered to be low.
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Ill. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Shane Annealina Factor Effects on Reactor Protection System Instrumentation
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Inspection Scooe_(375511 The inspectors followed up on the effects of shape annealing factors on the proper functioning of reactor protection system instrumentation, b.
Observations and Findinas On August 12,1997, the design engineering group received verification from combustion engineering personnel that the shape annealing test performed at the beginning of Cycle 17 indicated that the shape annealing factors measured during startup were larger than the values the licensee currently had installed in the reactor protection system instrumentation. _ The shape annealing factors'are a ratio of the change in incore axial shape index to the change in excore _ axial shape index. Larger
. values of the shape annealing f actors indicate that a larger change in axial shape
.index will occur with a change in excore axial shape. Larger shape annealing f actor values would generally indicate a more conservative approach to monitoring core
~ behcvior. The licensee identified that the current shape annealing f actor setpoints instrlied in Channels A and D of the reactor protection system possibly were not
.cor.servative. The licensee declared the three trip units which are effected by the shape annealing factor in)perable and entered a limiting condition for operatinn
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requiring a shutdown in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> if the trip units were not returned to operable condition. The Cycle 8 shape annealing values were installed in Reactor Protection Systems A and D since these setpoints had been previously evaluated by-Combustion Engineering. The Technical Specification limiting condition for operation was then exited, c.
Conclusions.
The inspectors concluded that the actions taken by engineering personnel to ensure that conservative shape annealing foctors were installed in the reactor protection system were appropriate.
IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Contro!s RI.1 Entrance into the Radioloaical Controlled Area Without Proper Dosimetry a.
Insoection Scoce (71750)
The inspectors followed up on an entry into the radiologically controlled area without a self reading or electronic dosimeter, b.
Observations and Findinas On August 19,1997, a radiation protection technician discovered that a maintenance
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technician had entered the radiologically controlled area without an electronic dosimeter (ALNOR). While passing through the radiation protection dressout area, a radiation protection technician found an At.NOR lying on a bench, Radiation protection personnel located the maintenance technician who had checked out the ALNOR in Room 23 (Spent Regenerative Tank Room). The maintenance technician estimated he had been without the ALNOR for approximately 10 minutes.
The licensee determined that the maintenance technician had signed onto Radiation Work Permit 97-1023 to perform work in Room 23. The work to be performed required the' donning of protective clothing. While donning protective clothing, the maintenance technician left the ALNOR on the bench and entered tha radiologically
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controlled area. Entering the radiologically controlled area without a self-rcading or electronic dosimeter is a violation of the licensee's radiological protection procedure
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and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. The licentee counseled the maintenance technician on the requirement to be monitored when inside the radiologically controlled area, notified his supervisor, and assigned him a 3 mrem dose. This nonrepetitive," licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated
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as a noncited violation consistent with Section Vll.B,1 of the NRC Enforcement J
Pclicy (50-285/97016-02).
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Conclusions The actions by radiation' protection personnel following discovery of an electronic dosimeter in the dressout area were appropriate.-
R1.2-Tours of Radiolooically Controlled Areas a,
'Insoection Scope (71750)
J The inspectors performed routine tours of the radiologically controlled area and'
observed radiation work practices of plant personnel.
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Observations and Findinos Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors observed licensee personnel perform duties in the radiologically controlled area Workers were observed to be obeying all administrative and regulatory requirements. 'The inspectors also verified that al!. doors required to be_ locked for the purposes of protecting personnel from
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radiation exposure were locked.
The inspectors questioned certain licensee personnel regarding the requirements of their radiation work permits. All personnel were familiar with these requirements.
Radiation protection personnel were' observed to be performing their duties in a professional manner.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that licensee personnel were knowledgeable of the requirements'of their radiation work permits and that radiation protection personnel effectively performed their functions.
R2 Status of Radiological Protection and Chemistry Control Facilities and Equipment
R2.1 Uncalibrated Electronic Dosimeter
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Insoection Scope (7175Q1
The inspectors followad up on un uncalibrated electronic dosimeter that was not removed from service.
b.
Qbservations and Findinas LOn August 5,1997, the inspectors obtained an electronic dosimeter (ALNOR) from the issue ares prior to entry into the radiologically controlled area. The inspectors Lobserved that the calibration expiration date on the ALNOR was June 7,1997. The
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dosimeters were calibrated semiannually. The inspectors informed radiation
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protection personnel that the ALNOR was out of calibration and asked if it had been used by. radiation workers while in the radiologically controlled area to provide an indication of radiation dose and radiation dose rate information.
-The licensee performed an investigation and determined that the instrument had been
- used several times since its calibration expired. Radiation protection personnel performed a response time test on the uncalibrated dosimeter and verified that it was operable.- Radiation protection personnel also inspected the other electronic dosimeters and did not find other instruments out of calibration. The inspectors reviewed Radiation Procedure RP-401, " Issue, instrumentation," and noted that it required both access control personnel and the_ user to verify the calibration date prior to use. Step 7.4.5 stated that radiation protection personnel shall be responsible for removing from service and tagging out of service any radiation protection instrument suspected of malfunction or out of calibration. Failing to remove the out of calibration electronic dosimeter is a violation (50-285/97016 03).
c.
Conclusiorig _
'The inspectors identified that radiation protection personnel failed to remove an uncalibrated electronic dosimeter from service. This resulted in several radiation workers making entries into the radiologically controlled area with an uncalibrated
electronic dosimeter.
R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Radiation Protection and Chemistry R4.1 Reachino Across Contaminated Zone Boundarv a.
Insoection Scope (71750)
The inspectors performed a routine tour of the radiologically controlled area, b.
Observations and Findinos On August 21,1997, the inspectors observed two maintenance personnel working in the east safety injection pump toom. The maintenance helper was located outside the contamination area beundary in a clean area. The maintenance helper reached over the contaminated area boundary and picked up the gaitronics to call for additional parts. This example is contrary to the requirements set forth in Standing Order G-101, " Radiation Work Practices." The licensee's failure to follow procedures during an activity affecting quality is a violation of NRC requirements (50-285/9716 03),
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Conclusions The inspectors identified that maintenance _ personnel _ f ailed to follow appropriate radiological practices during conduct of maintenance by reaching across a -
contaminated barrier while inside the radiologically controlled area, P8 Miscellaneous Emergency Preparedness issues P8.1. (Closedl Unresolved item 50 285/9704-03: signatures on notification form. During the June 3,1997, exercise, the inspectors obse" sed that one of the notification forms prepared in the emergency operations fe%ty did not have an authorization signature, but the notification to offsite agencies had been made. Prior to release of the information, the inspectors observed the emergency director review the notification form, but the emergency director did not sign the form.
When the forms were reviewed after the exercise, all of the forms had been signed.
Upon closer review of the signatures, the inspectors noted that one of the signatures for the emergency director was significantly different from the others. This signature was en the form the inspectors originally observed as unsigned. When presented with the questionable signature, the emergency director stated that it was not his signature.
Following the inspection, the licensee conducted a thorough investigation regarding the signature. Strong disciplinary action was taken by the licensee against the individual who actually signed the form. Additional corrective actions included measures to prevent recurrence by other emergency response organization members.
Because the investigation conducted by the licensee was thorough, corrective actions taken by the licensee were considered to be comprehensive and appropriate, and there were no enforcement issues identified, this issue is closed.
-S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S2.1 Keys Left in Ignition Switch of Unattended Vehicle; a.
Insoection Scone (717521 The inspectors followed up on an occurrence-in which keys were left in the ignition
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switch of an unattended licensee vehicle.
b.
Observations and Findinos
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On August 26,1997, while making routine rounds i_n the protected area, a security officer identified that keys had been lef t in the ignition switch of an unattended L
licensee vehicle.
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The liceraee determined that a maintenance technician had obtained the keys to the vehicle from the keyissue area in order to transport trash from inside the protected area to the old warehouse. Upon returning into the protected area, the maintenan,e techniciar. lef t the keys in the ignition switch and lef t the vehicle unattended.
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A maintenance supervisor stated that the keys to this vehicle were controlled by the maintenance department. The individual who obtained the keys was responsible for maintainirig positive control of the keys. Leaving a vehicle unattended with the keys'
in the ignition switch is a violation of the Site Security Plan. A. corrective action,
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the keys were immediately removed from the vehicle by security personnel and the.
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individual involved was counseled.on the requirement for maintaining positive ' control over vehicle keys in the protected area. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with c
Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50 285/9716-05).
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Conclusions The licensee's response to finding.that keys had been left in the ignition switch of an unattended vehicle inside the protected area was appropriate.-
VI. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management on September 15,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings as presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R. Andrews, Division Manager, Nuclear Services G. Bishop, Assistant Plant Manager C. Brunnett, Manager, Quality Assurance and Quality Control G. Cavanaugh, Station Licensing Engineer J. Chase, Manager, Fort Calhoun Station O. Clayton, Manager Emergency Planning R. Connor, Manager, Training M. Core, Manager, System Engineering D. Dr / en, Station Licensing Engineer d
H. Faulhaber, Manager, Maintenance M. Ellis, Supervisor, Maintenance Support S. Gambhir, Division Manager, Production Engineering J. Gasper, Manager, Nuclear Projects W. Gates, Vice President, Nuclear S. Gebers, Manager, Radiation Protection B. Hansher, Supervisor, Station Licensing J. Herman, Manager, Outage Management T. Jamieson, Supervisor, Radiological Operations R. Jaworski, Manager, Design Engineering, Nuclear B. Kindred, Supervisor, Nuclear Security Operations L. Kusek, Acting Manager, Quality Assurance /Ouality Control D. Leiber, Supervisor, Security Support Services E. Lounsberry, Manager, Strategic Planning and Business T. Matthews, Acting Manager, Nuclear Licensing E. Matzke, Station Licensing Engineer R. Phelps, Manager, Station Engineering R. Ridenoure, Supervisor, Operations H. Sefick Manager, Security Services R. Short, Manager, Operations C. Simmons, Acting Manager, Nuclear Safety Review Group J. Skiles, Manager, Station Engineering-J. Spilker, Corrective Action Group D. Spires, Manager, Chemistry M. Tesar, Manager, Corrective Action Group J. Tesarek, Supervisor, Simulator Services J. Tills, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
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D. Trausch, Manager, Nuclear Safety Review Group l
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INSPECTION PPOCEDURES USED IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations IP 62707:
Maintenance Observations IP 71707:
Plant Operations IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities IP 92902:
Followup-Maintenance IP 92904:
Followup-Plant Support IP 93702:
Prompt Onsite Response to Event ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened i
50-285/97016-03 VIO failure to remove uncalibrated electronic dosimeter from service (Section R2.1) and reaching across contaminated area boundary (Section R4.1)
50-285/97016 04 VIO inadequate postmaintenance test for fire door lockset maintenance ' ' action M8.1)
Closed 50 285/97015 02 URI inadequate postmaintenance test for fire door lockset maintenance (Section M8.1)
50-285/97004-03 URI signatures on notification form (Section P8.1)
Ooened and Closed 50-285/97016-01 NCV inadequate maintenance rule scoping (Section M3.1)
50-285/97016-02 NCV entry into radiologically controlled area without dosimetry (Section R1.1)
50-285/97016-05 NCV key left in ignition of unattended licensee vehicle (Section S2.1)
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