IR 05000285/1998020
| ML20198H749 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 10/05/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198H747 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-98-20, NUDOCS 9812300011 | |
| Download: ML20198H749 (15) | |
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ENCLOSURE-
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
REGION IV
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l Docket No.:
50-285 Licer.se No.:
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Report No.:
50-285/98-20 i
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Licensee:
Omaha Public Power District
Facility:
Fort Calhoun Station Location:
Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm.
j P.O. Box 399, Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun Fort Calhoun, Nebraska
. Dates:
August 16 through September 26,1998
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Inspector (s):
W. Walker, Senior Resident inspector
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l V. Gaddy, Resident inspector -
J. Russell, Resident inspector Approved By:
W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch B ATTACHMENT:
Supplemental Information l
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9812300011 981005 i
i PDR ADOCK 05000285 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Fort Calhoun Station NRC Inspection Report 50-285/98-20 Onerations A nonlicensed operator was not knowledgeable of a configuration change to the
Boric Acid Tank CH-11B totalizer bypass valve, which resulted in the operator failing to recognize that the valve was partially open and diverting flow around a flow element. The shift manager identified this as an area for enhanced training and requested training be provided to all nonlicensed operators conceming this configuration difference (Section 04.1).
The licensee failed to take a reactor coolant flow voltage reading once per shift as
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required by Technical Specification 3.1. The cause was inadequate self-checking by the control room operator and inadequate review of the logs by both the shift technical advisor and the shift manager. This nonrepetitive licensee identified and j
corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section V II.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (Section 08.3).
Maintenance The inspectors determined that the material condition of the waste holdup tanks was good. All ultrasonic test data on the waste holdup tanks was acceptable (Section M2.1).
Maintenance work instructions did not meet management's expectation regarding
level of detali and a nonlicensed operator failed to notify the control room prior to manipulating plant equipment. This resulted in an inadvertent start of the motor-driven fire pump (Section M4.1).
Enaineerina Tne inspectors identified an error in the Updated Safety Analysis Report regarding
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the routing and erecting of equipment in the cable spreading room. Based on the licensee's review, none of the equipment would have had an adverse safety impact on the cable spreading room (Section E.1.1).
The inspectors concluded that the auxiliary feedwater piping downstream of the
turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, by calculation, should remain intact given a turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump overspeed condition. Therefore, a single failure of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump speed controls would not cause damage to downstream piping and a complete loss of auxiliary feedwater. Since the single failure criteria for the auxiliary feedwater system was not violated either before or after installation of a turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump high discharge pressure trip, no further action is required (Section E8.1).
Plant Suocort
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The licensee did an excellent job of planning, controlling, and performing the transfer
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of a high integrity container of waste into a shipping cask for removal offsite (Section R1.1).
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Report Details
t Summarv of Plant Status i
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The plant operated at essentially 100 percent power during this inspection period.
1. Operations
Conduct of Operations
01.1 General Comments (71707)
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Using Inspection Procedure: 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional
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and. safety conscious. Operations management and supervisors were frequently
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observed in the control room providing oversight of operational activities. Operations personnel were attentive to plant indications. Communications among operations personnel were generally complete and specific. An equipment operator was l
observed performing routine rounds in a thorough and attentive manner.
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Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Risina Stem Valve Operation l
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Insoection Scope (71707)
The inspectors observed a routine surveillance test and noted an area where l
operator knowledge and operator training could be enhanced.
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Observation:; and Findinas On August 27,1998, the inspectors observed operations personnel perform Procedure OP-ST-CH-3003, " Chemical & Volume Control System Pump / Check Valve inservice Test." Specifically, the inspectors observed operations personnel perform Attachment 2 which verified the discharge flow and discharge pressure from Boric Acid Pump CH-4B. The procedure directed a nonficensed operator to unisolate Flow Element FE-200B by opening Boric Acid Tank CH-11B Totalizer Isolation Valves CH-464 and CH-466 and to close Boric Acid Tank CH-11B Totalizer Bypass Valve CH-462 and throttle Valve CH-124 until approximately 130 gallons per minute of flow was indicated through Flow Indicator F1-200B.
After performing these actions, the nonlicensed operator reported only 42 to 44 ga! Ions per minute of flow as indicated on Flow Indicator F1-200B. The control room initially thought there was a problem with Flow Indicator F1-200B and dispatched instrumentation and control technicians to troubleshoot the indicator.
Instrumentation and control technicians could not identify any apparent problem with the flow indicator. The control room dirccled the nonlicensed operator to reverify the positions of all valves called out in the surveillance procedure. The nonlicensed operator indicated that all valves were in their correct position. The control room then decided to back out of the surveillance procedure, declare the surveillance a failure, and initiate a maintenance work order to authorize more thorough
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-2-i troub!eshooting to determine the reason for the low flow, l
Immediately prior to backing out of the surveillance, the nonlicensed operator recognized that he had not fully closed Totalizer Bypass Valve CH-462. This resulted in flow being aiverted around Flow Element FE-200B. The nonlicensed operator indicated that this valve was not configured like the other valves which resulted in him not recognizing that the valve was not fully closed.
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During the performance of this surveillance, six valves were manipulated. All were rising stem valves. However, Totalizer Bypass Valve CH-462 had been modified in cuch a way that made it difficult to determine the position of the valve stem. The nonlicensed operator was unfamiliar with the configuration of the totalizer bypass valve, which resulted in the valve not being fully shut. As a result, the shift manager i
initiated a condition report requesting that a placard be placed on the valve to identify that it was configured differently and to request additional training for
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nonlicensed operators to ensure they are aware that some valves in the plant may j
be configured differently and require additional effort to ensure proper positioning.
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Conclusions A nonficensed operator was not knowledgeable of a configuration change to the Boric Acid Tank CH-11B totalizer bypass valve, which resulted in the operator failing to recognize that the valve was partially open and diverting flow around a flow
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element. The shift manager identified this as an area for enhanced training and requested training be provided to all nonlicensed operators concerning this l
configuration difference.
Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700)
08.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-285/97-08: improper shift staffing due to inadequate control of respirator spectacle kits. During a plant tour with an NRC inspector on May 6,1997, a station manager discovered that certain licensed operators did not have respiratory glasses available to be used in response to an emergency if self-contained breathing apparatus respirators were needed. At the time of discovery, 27 Fort Calhoun licensed operators were required by a condition on their license to wear glasses when operating plant equipnient.
This issue was addressed during the review and closure of Violation 50-285/9702-02. No further actions are required.
08.2 (Closed) Violation 50-285/9702-02: improper shift staffing due to inadequate control of respirator spectacle kits. The inspectors verified the corrective actions described in the licensee response letter dated July 3,1997, to be reasonable and complete.
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08.3 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-285/97-07: failure to satisfy a surveillance requirement for reactor coolant flow. On June 14,1997, at 6:58 a.m., OP-ST-SHIFT-0001, * Operations Technical Specification Required Shift Surveillance," readings for
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reactor coolant flow voltages, along with other parameters required by the surveillance test, were taken and recorded. OP-ST-SHIFT-0001 was next due at
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3 p.m... The control room operator recorded the next set of data but inadvertently left i
out the reactor coolant flow voltages. Although reviewed by the shift technical advisor and the shift manager, the missed readings were not discovered until approximately 6:50 p.m., by the relieving control room operator. Technical Specification 3.1 requires channel checks of reactor coolant flow on each shift.
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. Failure to perform this surveillance within the Technical Specification required time limit is a violation.
The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's closeout of Condition Report 199700708. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the j
NRC Enforcement Policy (50-285/9820-01).
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l 11. Maintenance o
M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments
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Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance activities:
Inspection of Circuit Boards on Battery Charger Number 3
Inspection and Repair of Charging Pump CH-1B Discharge Accumulator
Replacement of Hot Gas Bypass Valve on Control Room Air
Conditioner VA-46B lC-CP-01-3868, " Calibration of Raw Water to Component Cooling Water Heat
Exchanger Pressure Loop," Revision 4 b.
Observations and Findinas i
The inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be professional and thorough. All work observed was performed with the work package present and in active use. Maintenance technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. The inspectors frequently c5 served supervisors and system t -
engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control perscanel were present when l
required by procedure.
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Conclusions The maintenance activities observed were conducted in a controlled and professional
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manner.
t M1.2 Surveillance Tests a.
Inspection Scope (61726)
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l-4-i The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities:
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IC-ST-~RPS-0029, " Quarterly Functional Test Of Thermal Margin / Low Pressure Channel C," Revision 11;
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IC-ST-RM-6200, " Electronic and Secondary Calibration of Radiation Monitor,
RM062," Revision 10; SE-ST-AFW-3006, " Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10, Steam isolation Valve,
and Check Valve Tests," Revision 21; OP-ST-CEA-0004, " Secondary CEA Position Indication System Test,"
Re~ ision 11; and v
OP-ST-CH-3003, " Chemical and Volume Control System / Check Valve i
inservice Test," Revision 19.
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Observations and Findinos Surveillance activities were generally completed thoroughly and professionally. All surveillances observed were performed with the work package present and in active use. Technicians were knowledgeable and professional. The inspectors frequently
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observed system engineem monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present whenever required by procedure.
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Conclusions The surveillance activities observed by the inspectors were completed in a controlled manner in accordance with procedures.
pa2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Waste Holduo Tank Inspection a.
Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's activities with regard to the ultrasonic testing of the waste holdup tanks to determine whether any degradation of the tanks was occurring.
b.
Observations and Findinos On September 3,1998, the licensee conducted a prejob briefing in preparation for performance of ultrasonic testing on the first of three waste holdup tanks. The waste
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holdup tanks are constructed of carbon steel and have a 45,800 gallon capacity.
The three tanks are in closed rooms in the auxiliary building. The waste holdup tanks receive coolant wastes from the reactor coolant drain tank, neutralization tank, auxiliary building sump tank, and speat regenerant tanks. The waste holdup tanks provide waste storage prior to treatment.
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Equipment At Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1," the licensee determined that
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ultrasonic testing of the waste holdup tanks at the Fort Calhoun Station was prudent.
During the prejob briefing, the inspectors observed that system engineering and operations personnel were absent from the briefing. Several engineering and operations questions were asked during the brrafing which could not be answered by
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those in attendance. The briefing continued, although the briefing leader determined that additional information was needed prior to starting work on the tanks. The inspectors discussed the briefing performance with the radiation protection manager who informed the inspectors that some miscommunication had occurred within the radiation protection organization regarding the purpose of the initial briefing. The briefing was originally intended to be between radiation protection personnel and
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maintenance personnel in preparation for the prejob briefing. The radiation protection manager agreed that the prejob briefing as conducted was not adequate.
A subsequent briefing was conducted prior to the start of the waste holdup tank work j
with all necessi ry personnel present and well prepared to answer questions concerning performance of the waste holdup tank work.
The inspectors observed portions of the inspection of Waste Holdup Tanks A and B.
The work was controlled in an excellent manner with proper precautions observed for confined space entry and radiological conditions for entry into an area not routinely surveyed.
The licensee performed ultrasonic testing measurements at multiple locations on each tank to determine the wall thickness of the tanks. This work was performed in accordance with Maintenance Work Order 980882. The licensee chose to perform the testing on the bottom of the tanks where the worst degradation of the wall thickness would be expected. The results from the ultrasonic testing are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary of tank wall thicknesses Waste Nominal Bottom As Found UT As Found UT Holdup of Tank Bottom of Tank Bottom of Tank Tank Thickness Thickest Reading Thinnest Reading A
.500"
.598"
.509" B
.500"
.584"
.520" C
.500"
.592"
.544" c.
Conclusions The inspectors determined that the material condition of the waste holdup tanks was good. All ultrasonic test data on the waste holdup tanks was acceptable.
M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance l
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-6-M4.1 Inadvertent Start of the Motor-Driven Fire Pump a.
insoection Scope (62702 and 71707)
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t The inspectors followed up to determine the cause of the inadvertent start of the motor-driven fire pump.
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Observations and Findinas On September 9,1998, Maintenance Work Order 982795 was issued to troubleshoot l
the strainer for Motor-Driven Fire Pump FP-1 A.
During the performance of an earlier surveillance test, the strainer had failed to operate. The maintenance work l
order authorized maintenance personnel to troubleshoot the strainer's control circuitry at the motor control center and at the strainer's backwash control panel.
During troubleshooting, an electrical maintenance technician instructed a nonheensed operator to take the strainer's control switch from auto to manual. When the switch was taken to manual, it caused the solenoid operated backwash valve to time out and open, which caused a drop in fire main header pressure, which resulted in the j
motor-driven fire pump starting. The fire pump received an auto start signal on low fire main header pressure.
The inspectors determined that the troubleshooting instructions were not specific.
The troubleshooting instructions did not mention that taking the control switch from
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auto to manual would cause a start of the fire pump. Although Operating l
Instruction OI-FP-1 " Fire Protection System Water System," stated that placement of the strainer control switch in manual would start the fire pump, this document was not reviewed by maintenance planning personnel while planning the job. The j
maintenance manager indicated that the maintenance planner should have reviewed the operating instruction during the development of the troubleshooting instructions.
The inspectors determined that the nonlicensed operator should have contacted the control room prior to taking the control switch from auto to manual. This would have provided the licensed senior operator an opportunity to question the effect that manipulating the switch would have on plant equipment.
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Conclusions Maintenance work instructions did not meet management's expectation regarding level of detail, and a nonlicensed operator failed to notify the control room prior to
manipulating plant equipment. This resulted in an inadvertent start of the l
motor-driven fire pump.
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M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) Inspection Followuo item 50-285/98014-05: maintenance staff work hours.
This item had remained open pending the licensee's completion of an audit of the hours worked by maintenance personnel during the recent refueling outage. The l
audit, documented in Memorandum 98-QA/QC-115 dated September 15,1998,
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i l-7-reviewed the work hours of maintenance, radiation protection, and chemistry personnel. The audit concluded that no personnel exceeded the work hours requirement. Based on the actions performed by the licensee, this item is closed.
M8.2 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 50-285/97010-01: motor-driven fire pump failure to operate. This item had remained open to allow system engineering personnel to evaluate whether to recommend the use of the motor-driven fire pump's sparger.
Licensee personnel determined that use of the sparger was beneficial in preventing the sensing lines to the pressure switch from being clegged and also was beneficial in preventing the impeller of the pump from being locked by sand. The system engineering evaluation recommended the use of the sparger and the licensee placed the sparger in service in June 1997. Based on the actions performed by the licensee, this item is closed.
Ill. Enaineerin_g.
E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Eauipment in the Cable Spreadina Room a.
Inspection Scope (37551)
During a routine tour, the inspectors questioned whether the presence of certain equipment in the cable spreading room was acceptable.
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Observations and Findinas On August 31,1998, during a tour of the cable spreading room, the inspectors noticed a 1/2-inch copper instrument air line protruding through a fire barrier.
Because of 0 e configuration of the cable trays, the inspectors could not determine where the instrument air line terminated. The inspectors asked the licensee where the instrument air line terminated and also questioned if it was appropriate for instrument air lines to run through the cable spreading room.
The licensee informed the inspectors that the instrument air line terminated in the cable spreading room and was once used to supply air to a blowdown valve located in an adjacent room that has since been abandoned in place.
The inspectors reviewed the Updated Safety Analysis Report to determine if it addressed equipment in the cable spreading room. Updated Safety Analysis Report Section 8.5.1(e) stated that "the cable spreading room below the control room contains only electrical equipment necessary to route electrical wiring / cable, i.e.,
cable trays, junction boxes and conduits." Only cables that connect to the control boards or emergency response facility computer are routed in this room.
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in response to the inspectors' finding, the licensee performed a walkdown of the l
cable spreading room. The licensee identified additional equipment that was routed through or had been physically erected in the cable spreading room. Some of this equipment included fire detection panels, control room plumbing, control room air
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inspectors asked if this equipment had been analyzed to determine its impact on the cable spreading room. The licensee stated that some of the equipment had been in i
the cable spreading room since startup and some had been added by modifications
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during plant operation. The licensee performed a review of the equipment identified and determined that there were no adverse safety impacts to the cable spreading room.
l On September 16,1998, the inspector asked engineering personnel for an update l
on their efforts to determine whether any of the modifications in the cable spreading
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l room posed an adverse effect on the cable spreading room. Engineering personnel i;
stated that based on their review none of the equipment would have an adverse safety impact on the cable spreading room. This was documented in Corrective
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Action Report 199801743. The inspectors were informed that the issue was being treated as an error in the Updated Safety Analysis Report and the Updated Safety Analysis Report would be revised to allow this equipment to remain in the cable spreading room. The failure to revise the Updated Safety Analysis Report to reflect the addition of equipment to the cable spreading room, as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e), is considered a violation of minor safety concern and is not subject to
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formal enforcement action.
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The inspectors identified an error in the Updated Safety Analysis Report regarding i
the routing and erecting of equipment in the cable spreading room. Based on the l
licensee's review, none of the equipment had an adverse safety impact on the cable spreading room.
E8 Miscellar eous Engineering Issues (92903)
E8.1 (C.losed) Inspection Followuo item 50-285/98012-01: auxiliary feedwater system single failure validity. This item involved review of two licensee white papers,
" Answers to NRC Questions Regarding a Fort Caihoun Station Auxiliary Feedwater Over-Pressure issue," dated August 31,1998, and " White Paper on Peak Pressure
Associated with Overspeed of FW-10," dated July 8,1998. The inspectors also discussed the issue with members of the Fort Calhoun Station engineering staff.
l The reviews were conducted in order to assess the results of a single failure. The
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specific issue being reviewed was the potential for an overspeed event of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump to cause a failure of the auxiliary feedwater system.
t The licensee had recognized the possibility of the single failure described above, due
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to an actual overspeed of turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, and installed a high discharge pressure trip for the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. This
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i discharge pressure trip was installed to ensure that a single failure did not result in an overspeed of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, as described in NRC
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Inspection Report 50-285/98-12.
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The inspectors determined that the maximum calculated pressure resulting from a turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump overspeed occurrence would not exceed allowable downstream pipe stresses. The applicable design code for the auxiliary feedwater system is USAS B31.7-1968, Class 1.
The licensee calculated a maximum pump overspeed discharge pressure of 2815 psig. The most limiting downstream piping was limited by the design code to 2852 psig into.nal pressure. The design code limited upset stress is equivalent to the stress from intemal pressure and pipe weight (normal conditions) and the operational basis earthquake. The faulted stresses are equivalent to normal conditions and the safe shutdown earthquake and are specified in the Updated Safety Analysis Report in terms of bending stress. The limits for the auxiliary feedwater piping for these two cases were 30 ksi and 35.6 ksi, respectively.
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feedwater pump discharge flange to the auxiliary feedwater piping containment penetrations, and identified the most limiting stress locations. An intemal pressure of 2815 psig resulted in upset and faulted stresses of 25 ksi and 15 ksi, respectively, at i
the most limiting stress locations, which were below the code allowable.
i The inspectors concluded that the auxiliary feedwater piping downstream of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, by calculation, should remain intact given a turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump overspeed condition. Therefore, the single failure concem was not valid. Since no single failure criteria for the auxiliary feedwater system was violated either before or after installation of the turbine-driven i
i auxiliary feedwater pump high discharge pressure trip, no further action is required.
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IV. Plant Support i
l R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 Radwaste Shioment a.
inspection Scope (92904)
l The inspectors attended and evaluated the prejob briefing for a radioactive waste
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shipment.
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Observations and Findinas On September 16,1998, the inspectors attended a prejob briefing for the transfer of a high integrity container of waste resins from a storage location in the radioactive j
waste building to a shipping container for eventual shipment offsite. The purpose of
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the briefing was to discuss the waste transfer that was to occur later that day and to ensure that all contingencies of the waste transfer were addressed. The inspectors
noted that the p:ebriefing was comprehensive and all personnel involved in the
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waste transfer were in attendance.
The inspectors observed that the activities leading up to and during the waste
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-10-transfer were detailed with specific times supplied to all participants noting when l
.various phases of the waste transfer would occur. Radiation protection personnel L
were stationed at various locations both inside and outside the plant to properly monitor radiation dose rates.
The' inspectors determined that the licensee did an excellent job in preparing for the I-waste transfer and during the actual performance of the waste transfer. This was supported by the low total dose received during performance of the waste transfer.
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The licensee did an excellent job of planning, controlling, and performing the transfer l
of a high integrity container of waste into a shipping cask for removal offsite.
j V. Manaaement Meetinos l;
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
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The inspectors presented the inspection results to the members of licensee l
i management at the exit meeting on September 28,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary No proprietary information was identified.
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l ATTACHMENT
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
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PARTIAL LIST OF-PERSONS CONTACTEQ
- Licensee
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M. Bare, System Engineer
'D. Buell, System Engineer
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D. Dryden, Station Licensing Engineer-
' f'. Fritz, System Engineer l'
S. Gambhir, Divison Manager, Engineering and Operations Support
. R. Short, Assistant Plant Manager R. Jaworski, Manager, Design Engineering Nuclear J. McManus, Supervisor, Engineering Mechanics
- M. Puckett, Acting Manager, Radiation Protection D. Spires,- Manager, Quality Assurance and Quality Control
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2-INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering
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IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations
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IP 62707:
Maintenance Observations IP 71707:
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IP _71750:.
Plant Support Activities IP 92700:
Onsite LER Review
IP 92902:
Followup Maintenance
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IP 92903:
Followup Engineering IP 92904:
~ Followup Plant Support IP 92901:
llowup Operations
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ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED
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Closed
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50-285/97008 LER Improper Shift Staffing Due to inadequate Control of Respirator Spectacle Kits (Section 08.1)
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50-285/9702-02 VIO '
improper Shift Staffing Due to inadequate Control of Respirator Spectacle Kits (Section 08.2)
-50-285/97007 LER Failure to Satisfy a Surveillance Requirement for. Reactor Coolant Flow (Section 08.3)
50-285/9814-05 IFl Maintenance Staff Work Hours (Section M8.1)
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50-285/9810-01 IFl Motor-Driven Fire Pump Failure to Operate (Section M8.2)
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,50-285/9812-01 IFl Auxiliary Feedwater System Single Failure Validity (Section E8.1)
Opened and GQfdtd.
50-285/9820-01 NCV Failure to Satisfy a Surveillance Requirement for Reactor Coolant Flow (Section 08.3)
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