IR 05000285/1990025

Partially Withheld Insp Rept 50-285/90-25 on 900402-06 & 16- 19 (Ref 10CFR73.21).Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Physical Security Program,Including Previous Insp Findings, Security Plan,Testing & Maint,Locks,Keys & Combinations

ML20055C809
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	06/12/1990
From:	Caldwell R, Powers D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20055C806	List: IR 05000285/1990025 ML20055C805 ML20055C808
References
50-285-90-25, NUDOCS 9006250191
Download: ML20055C809 (2)

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APPENDIX B i

V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV  ;

r NRC Inspection Report: 50-285/90-25 Operating License: -OPR-40 Docket: 50-285 *

Licensee: Omaha Public Power District (OPPD)

444 South 16th Street Mall Mail Stop BE/EP4 Omaha, Nebraska 68102-2247 -

Facility Name:

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Fort Calhoun Station (FCS)

Inspection At: FCS, Blair, Nebraska '

. Inspection Conducted: April 2-6 and April 16-19, 1990 Inspectors: - "

b ~ /2" R.'A. Caldwell, Physical Security Specialist Date Security and Emergency Preparedness Section Accompanied-By: A. B. Earnest, Physical Secerity Specialist Security and Emergency Preparedness Section

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Approved:

Dr. D. A. Powers, Chief, Security and Emergency

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Date Preparedness Section Inspection Summary l- Inspection Conducted April 2-6 and April 16-19, 1990 (Report 50-285/90-25) l Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of the licensee's physical l security program. The areas inspected within the physical security program . included followup on previous inspection findings and licensee event reports; ,

physical security plan and implementing procedures; management effectiveness; security program audits; records and reports; testing and maintenance; locks, keys, and combinations; protected and vital area physical barriers; security system power supply; lighting; assessment aids; protected and vital area j-detection aids; alarm stations; and safeguards contingency plan implementatio DR ADock 0500 90061s ENCLOSURE CONTAINS -i Q 3

' SAFEGUARDS INFORMAil0N UPON SEPARATION THIS PACC p DCCONTROLLED

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Results: Within the program areas inspected, four apparent violations (inadequate assessment aids; detection aids; compensatory measures; and key control) were identifie During the past year, the licensee has been involved in a major upgrade of the entire security program. The licensee has redesigned the closed circuit television (CCTV) perimeter surveillance system, the protected area (PA) and vital area (VA) intrusion detect, ion systems (IDS), the computer support system (CSS) for both the CCTV surveillance system and the IDS system, and designed and implemented a new auxiliary access _ portal (AAP). The licensee has installed two new computers, IDS and CCTV systems, and the control station The licensee has also added new ingress and egress card readers and balanced magnetic switches on certain doors. The licensee's IDS system appears adequate. The redesign of the CCTV perimeter r ,)illance system fails to provide assessment capabilities for some of the , ironmental impacts of changing seasons and sunlight variations throughout the day. The licensee now uses compensatory measures during those period The CCTV system can be described as adequate when it is maintained at peak performance levels. More frequent testing by the licensee to detect reduced CCTV surveillance capabilities is needed to maintain a completely adequate CCTV surveillance syste Two of the four violations found this inspection period involve hardware h' redesign inadequacies not found by the licensee during system acceptance testing of the CCTV and IDS systems. The remaining two violations found during this inspection involved personnel-hardware interfaces affecting the control of VAs. One violation relates to keys required by the control room (CR) operators for response to emergencies that were placed in a key depository such that the key depository could be removed easily from the CR with little chance of detection. Another violation relates to compensatory personnel assigned to provide equivalent protection for IDS and personnel accountability functions to VAs when there is a total loss of the CSS syste The number of compensatory personnel assigned were insufficient to perform those task The ability of the licensee's personnel to use the new CSS system is limited by the experience level- of the central alarm station (CAS) and the secondary alarm station (SAS) operators. The enhanced features of the new CSS system and the inevitable software modifications that are attached to a new system have created training problems that the licensee is addressing. CAS/SAS operators need more time on these new equipment features and subsequent modifications to become comfortably proficien The licensee's security organization is undergoing a metamorphosis from a l combined proprietary and contractor organization to a proprietary organizatio Some marginal personnel performance has occurred because of the transition.

l Until the security organization stabilizes, more security management oversight is desirable for routine security activities than what has been provided to i~ dat Security management accessibility and frequent daily involvement with the security officers is needed to attend to the nuances of this transition period.

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ENCLOSURE CONTAINS UPON SEPARATION TlilS

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PACC IS DECONTROLLED