ML20211P344
| ML20211P344 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 09/07/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211P334 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-99-08, NUDOCS 9909130189 | |
| Download: ML20211P344 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000298/1999008
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ENCLOSURE
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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Docket No.:
50-285
License No.:
Report No.:
50-285/99-08
Licensee:
Omaha Public Power District
Facility:
Fort Calhoun Station
Location:
Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm.
P.O. Box 399, Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun
Fort Calhoun, Nebraska
Dates:
July 11 through August 21,1999
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inspectors:
W. Walker, Senior Resident inspector
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V. Gaddy, Resident inspector
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Approved By:
Charles S. Marschall, Chief, Project Branch C
ATTACHMENT:
Supplemental Information
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9909130189 990907
ADOCK 05000285
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Fort Calhoun Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-298/99-08 (DRP)
The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
No findings.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
No findings.
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Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
No findings.
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Report Details
Summarv of Plant Status
The Fort Calhoun Station began this inspection period at 100 percent power and maintained
that level throughout the inspection period.
1.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier integrity
1R03 Emeraent Work
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Diesel Generator
a.
Inspection Scope
inspectors observed emergent work associated with Diesel Generator 1.
b.
Observations and Findinas
On August 11,1999, Diesel Generator 1 was removed from service for monthly
surveillance testing. Prior to testing, a risk assessment was performed. This risk
assessment calculated the change in risk during diesel generator testing. During the
performance of the surveillance test, a metal temperature probe and its attached cable
were inadvertently inserted into the air intake fan that provided cooling to the electrical
generator windings portion of the diesel generator. The diesel generator was
immediately shut down and no abnormal indications were observed locally or in the
control room. The cable was found wrapped around the generator windings cooling fan
blades. The probe was destroyed and pieces were found at the bottom of the generator
windings. Maintenance personnel disassembled the housing around the generator
windings, performed a thorough inspection, and removed any loose parts from the
destruction of the metal temperature probe. Quality assurance personnel were present
during the inspection activities and verified that loose parts had been removed. A
surveillance test was performed on the diesel generator with no abnormal indications
observed and the diesel generator was declared operable.
The inspectors verified that the licensee had performed an additional risk assessment
associated with the repair activities and for other plant conditions. There were no
findings identified and documented during this inspection.
.2
Electrohydraulic Control Pumo Failure
a.
Inspection Scope
inspectors assessed the licensee control of risk associated with failure of
Electrohydraulic Control Pump EHC-38.
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Observations and Findinas -
On August 12,'1999, Electrohydraulic Control Pump EHC-3B failed. Pump EHC-3A
- auto-started as designed. The failed pump was removed from service and sent offsite
for repairs. The pump was returned to service on August 15,1999. The licensee
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performed maintenance on the failed pump as an emergent work activity, if the second
electrohydraulic control pump had failed, a turbine trip and a reactor trip would have
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occurred. The inspectors asked if a risk assessment had been performed to evaluate
the new plant configuration. Licensee personnel indicated that their risk model did not
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model turbine generator and auxiliaries because a turbine trip would not contribute
significantly to an increase in core damage frequency when considered in isolation.
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The inspectors also noted, however, that, during the time the electrohydraulic control
. pump was out of service, plant staff also took other components out of service for
planned testing. Specifically, on August 13,1999, quarterly inservice testing was
conducted on one train of emergency core cooling. The testing required that plant staff
individually render the low pressure spray injection, the high pressure spray injection,
and the containment spray pumps inoperable. These systems can be important, from a
risk perspective, in mitigating reactor transients. For example, in the event auxiliary
feedwater was lost during a transient, the emergency core cooling system would be
necessary to provide feed and bleed capability and high pressure recirculation to
mitigate a transient. By not performing a risk assessment for the planned activities and
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taking into consideration the increased likelihood of a reactor transient as a result of the
degraded electrohydraulic control system, the totality of risk was not considered.
When failure of the remaining electrohydraulic control pump would have initisted a
transient (turbine / reactor trip), the licensee did not perform a risk assessment to
consider the total risk prior to removing from service emergency core cooling systema
credited for mitigating a transient. The NRC considered the increased risk from a
postulated failure of the second electrohydraulic pump to be low, but noted that the lack
of a risk assessment that considered both planned and emergent activities by the
licensee was a weakness.
1R04 Eauipment Alianments
a.
Insoection Scoce
During this inspection period, the inspectors performed a partial walkdown to verify
containment integrity using Operating Instruction Ol-CO-5, " Containment Integrity."
b.-
Observations and Findinas
All containment isolation valves and electrical and mechanical penetrations were in the
position required by the procedure. The administrative procedure indicated that the
nitrogen pressure in certain penetrations should be greater than 15 psig. The inspector
noted three penetrations that were below this value. Two of the three had maintenance
requests written. The inspector informed the licensee of the remaining penetration and
a maintenance request was written. During discussions with the system engineer, the
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inspectors learned that the purpose of the nitrogen pressure was to keep air out of the
penetration, preventing the formation of corrosion. The nitrogen pressure was not
needed for operability. The inspector learned that all penetrations would be tested and
repaired during the upcoming outage. There were no findings identified and
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documented during this inspection.
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1R05 Fire Protection
a.
Inspection Scoce
The inspectors verified contingencies and compensatory measures during maintenance
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on fire protection equipment.
b.
Observations and Findinas
Throughout this inspection period, the licensee performed preventive and corrective
maintenance on fire protection deluge valves throughout the plant. The required various
parts of the fire protection system were to be removed from service. The inspectors
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verified that proper contingencies were in place and that fire watches had been
established. Additionally, combustibles were adequately controlled and fire protection
system testing was performed as required. There were no findings identified and
documented during this inspection.
1R09 Inservice Testina
a.
insoo.quw. Scope
On Ja 20,1999, the inspectors observed portions of Surveillance Test IC-ST-IA-3009,
" Operability Test of IA-YCV-1045-C and Close Stroke Test of YCV-1045."
b.
Observations and Findinas
Testing was adequate to verify compliance with code requirements. All components
met the acceptance criteria. There were no findings identified and documented during
this inspection.
1R12 Maintenance Rule imolementation
a.
inspection Scope
The inspectors verified proper implementation of the maintenance rule for diesel
generator maintenance,
b.
Observations and Findinas
On August 12,1999, prior to completion of the monthly diesel generator testing, Diesel
Generator 1 was shut down when a temperature probe was inserted in the generator
cooling fan. Diesel Generator 1 remained inoperable. The inspectors used the
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maintenance rule field flow chart and determined that the licensee properly dispositioned
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the failures. There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
1R15' Operability Evaluations
a.
Inspection Scope
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The inspectors reviewed the operability evaluations associated with the following
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condition reports:
CR 19901103, " Ventilation Requirements for Safety injection Pump Rooms not
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in Compliance with Current Basis for Safety injection Room Heating Ventilation
and Air Conditioning Flow Rates and Heat Load," and
CR 199901340, "PORV/ Safety Valve Tailpipe Temperature Circuitry Check."
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b.
Observations and Findinas
There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
1R19 Postmaintenance Testina
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a.
Inspection Scope
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The inspectors observed postmaintenance testing on Diesel Generator 1 and Raw
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Water Pump AC-100.
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b.
Observations and Findinas
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The tests were performed correctly and demonstrated that the equipment was functional
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and operable. There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
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1R22 Surveillance Testina
a.
Inspection Scope
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The inspectors observed performance of the following surveillance tests:
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Surveillance Test Procedure IC-ST-VA-0028, " Verification of Safety injection
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Pump Room Filter Unit Flow," Revision 2,
Surveillance Test Procedure IC-ST-IA-3009, " Operability Test of IA-YCV-1045C
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and Close Stroke Test of YCV-1045," and
OP-ST-DG-0002, " Diesel Generator 2 Check."
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b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors noted that surveillance tests ensured equipment operability and
demonstrated compliance with Technical Specification requirements. Operations,
engineering, and maintenance personnel were all involved in prejob briefs and testing.
Equipment used was properly calibrated and testing components were returned to their.
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required position to maintain operability. There were no findings identified and
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- documented during this inspection.
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4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
40A5 Exit Meetina Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at
the conclusion of the inspection of August 20,1999. The licensee acknowledged the
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findings presented. The licensee did not consider any material examined during the
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inspection proprietary.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
R. Clemens, Maintenance Manager
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M. Core, Manager, System Engineering
S. Gambhir, Division Manager, Nuclear Operations
J. Gasper, Manager, Nuclear Projects
B. Hansher, Supervisor, Station Licensing
R. Short, Assistant Plant Manager -
J. Solymossy, Manager, Fort Calhoun Station
J. Spilker, Manager, Corrective Action Group
D. Spires, Manager, Quality Assurance, Quality Control
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LIST OF BASELINE INSPECTIONS PERFORMED
The following inspectable-area procedures were used to perform inspections during the report
period. Documented findings are contained in the body of the report.
Inspection Procedure
Number
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Reoort Section
71111-03
Emergency Work
1R03
71111-04
Equipment Alignment
1R04
71111-05
Fire Protection
1R05
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71111-09
Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves
1R09
71111-12
Maintenance Rule implementation
1R12
71111-15
Operability Evaluations
1R15
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71111-22
Surveillance Testing
1R22
(none)
. Management Meetings
40A5
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