IR 05000285/1999002

Insp Rept 50-285/99-02 on 990131-0313.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20205J284
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	04/02/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205J278	List: IR 05000285/1999002 ML20205J275
References
50-285-99-02, 50-285-99-2, NUDOCS 9904090262
Download: ML20205J284 (12)

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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.: 50-285 License No.: DPR-40 Report No.: 50-285/99-02 Licensee: Omaha Public Power District Facility: Fort Calhoun Station Location: Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Ad P.O. Box 399, Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun Fort Calhoun, Nebraska Dates: Jarauary 31 through March 13,1999 Inspectors: W. C. Walker, Senior Resident inspector )

V. G. Gaddy, Resident inspector Approved By: D. N. Graves, Chief, Project Branch B l

ATTAC' ? MENT: Supplemental Information 9904090262 990402 PDR

1. l G ADOCK 05000205

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EXECUTIVELSUMMAR_y Fort Calhoun Station NRC Inspection Report No. 50-285/99-02 I Operations

The inspectors observed power reduction activities in the control room on February 3, 1999. The power reduction was characterized by clear operator communications, attentive reactor engineering oversight, and effective control by shift supervisio Opere: ions personnel used appropriate piocedures and frequent briefings to ensure that activities were well planned and controlled. The inspectors concluded that the power reduction was performed effectively (Section 01.2). I

The licensee's revision to Surveillance Test Procedure IC-ST-lA-3009 introduced an J overly conservative test methodology for testing Instrument Air Accumulator Check Valve IA-YCV-1045-C, which caused a false negative test result and precipitated the initiation of an unplanned, Technical Specification required, plant shutdown on I February 3,1999. The root cause analysis, performed by the licensea following this event, was thorough and comprehensive (Section O2.1).

• A nonficensed epcrater conducted thorough checks of plant equipment with a good questioning attitude and attention to detail (Section 04.1).

• The licensee has instituted several different observation and training methods for increasing operations crew communications especially with operations crews which ]1 have recently been reconfigured. These methods, used in conjunction with s;mulator exercises, provided valuable training for the operations crew personnel (Section 05).

• The quality assurance department has begun a more proactive involvement in plant activities. More audits and surveillances of emergent plant activities were being performed. Quality assurance was identifying those programs and processes that would be used to determine if the station met the seven safety cornerstones outlined in the new NRC reactor inspection and oversight program. Quality assurance was developing schedules to audit these arens (Section 07).

Maintenance

• Maintenance and surveillance activities were performed in a thorough manner by knowledgeable technicians and with frequent obse;vation by supervision and system engineers (Sections M1.1 and M1.2).

• The inspectors concluded that the external material condition of equipment located in the auxiliary building, radwaste building, intake structure, and most areas of the turbine building, including the emergency diesel generators, was gcod. The inspectors also verified that the licensee was addressing identified deficiencies (Section M2.1).

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The inspectors concluded that the licensee performed a modification to the toxic gas monitoring system in a controlled manner and in accordance with procedures. The inspectors verified that postmodification testing was appropriate, completed, and l acceptable (Section E1.1).

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The licensee did an excellent job in planning and incorporating lessons learned from -

prior waste transfers when transferring a high integrity container of waste into a shipping cask for removal offsite (Section R1.2).

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t I Report Details Summary of Plant Status The Fort Calhoun Statior agan this report period at 100 percent power. On February 3,1999, a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated due to the inoperability of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Approimately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> into the required shutdown, the operability of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was restored and the power reduction was terminated. Reactor power was held at 60 percent to allow for cleanup of secondary water chemistry. On February 4,1999, the plant commenced a power ascension and, on February 5, 1999, attained 100 percent power and operated at that level throughout the remainder of the inspection perio I. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 Genural Comments (71707)

The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations war, professional and safety-conscious. Plant status, operating problems, and work plans were appropriately addressed during daily turnover and plan-of-the-day meetings. Plant testing and maintenance requiring control room coordination were properly controlled. The inspectors observed several shift turnovers and noted no problem .2 Reactor Power Reduction Observations The inspectors observed power reduction activities in the control room on February 3, 1999. The power reduction was characterized by clear opera' r communications, attentive reactor engineering oversight, and effective control b, Sift supervisio Operations personnel used appropriate procedures and freques iefings to ensure that activities were well planned and controlled. The inspectors conc,aded that the power reduction was performed effectivel Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O Initiation of Plant Shutdown Due to Failed Surveillance Test Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's root cause analysis report regarding the initiation of a plant shutdown due to a failed surveillance test on the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pum Observations and Findinos i On February 2,1999, the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was logged as inoperable for the performance of the quarterly Surveillance Test IC-ST-IA-3009, f

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" Operability Test of IA-YCV-1045-C and Close Stroke Test of YCV-1045," Revision The purpose of the surveil!ance was to test Instrument Air Accumulator Check Valve IA-YCV-1045-C to ensure that the accumulator, upon the loss of instrument air, would retain the ability to maintain Main Steam Stop Valve YCV-1045 closed as required by the system design basis document. During the performance of the curveillance test, Valve IA-YCV-1045-C failed to meet the acceptance criteria specified. The surveillance test required an accumulator pressure drop of less than or equal to 5.0 psig in a 30-minute period. The actualleakage rate was 5.5 psig in 30 minutes. Troubleshooting and retesting of Valve IA-YCV-1045-C was conducted throughout the evening and into the morning of February 3,1999, without succes On the morning of Februar/ 3,1999, engineering personnel detected an error in the test method specified in the t urveillance test. The error resulted in insufficient differential pressure being applied M properly seat Valve IA-YCV-1045-C. Revision 3 to IC-ST-IA-3009 was prepared to correct the test metho The 24-hour limiting condition for operation per Technical Specification 2.5 was to expire before the revised test could be p. :ormed. In anticipation of exceeding the limiting condition for operation, operations personnel began a plant shutdown at 12:02 p.m. on February 3,1999. Testing of Valve IA-YCV-1045-C using the revised test method was conducted in parallel with the plant shutdown. The revised test was successfully completed at 2:24 p.m. and the plant shutdown terminated with the plant power at 59 percen The licensee found the root cause of the event to be an inadequate understanding of the operation of 3-way Solenoid Valve YCV-1045-20-2, located in the instrument air valve lineup for Valve IA-YCV . 15-C. The original test did not allow for sufficient differential pressure across Valve YCV-1045-20-2 and resulted in a more conservative testing configuration. The differential pressure was less than 10 psid, which was the minimum differential pressure needed for Valve YCV-1045-20-2 to operate properl The licensee determined that the low differential pressure set up during the test was not valid. A revised test procedure was performed using the proper conditions (48 psid differential pressure) and Valve IA-YCV-1045-C tested satisfactoril Licensee investigation into this occurrence identified that the erroneous test methodology was introduced when the surveillance procedure was last revised l (Revision 2) as part of an auxiliary feedwater system modification effort. The licensee i determined that the results of two previous surveillance tests performed on l Valve IA-YCV-1045-C in June and November 1998, using Revision 2 of this surveillance i procedure, were still valid. The test was still able to demonstrate that Valve IA-YCV- l 1045-C would be able to perform its design function under accident condition I The inspectors verified that the surveillance test procedure for testing Valve IA-YCV-1045-C had been appropriately revised (Revision 3). The inspectors also reviewed additional licensee corrective action recommendations and enhancements and considered them to be appropriat l t

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-3- Qonclusion The licensee's revision to Surveillance Test Procedure IC-ST-lA-3009 introduced an overly conservative test methodology for testing Instrument Air Accumulator Check Valve IA-YCV-1045-C, which caused a false negative test result and precipitated the initiation of an unplanned, Technical Specification required, plant shutdown on February 3,1999. The root cause analysis, performed by the licersee following this event, was thorough and comprehensiv O2.2 Review of Eauioment Taaout (71707)

The inspectors walked down the following danger tagout:

• Circulating Water Pump CW-1 A The inspectors did not identify any discrepancies. The tagout was properly prepared and authorized. All tags were on the correct components and all components were in i the position prescribed by the danger tagout. The inspectors also performed a !

walkdown after the tags were removed. All components were in the proper position for l the required system lineu Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Auxiliary Ooerator Rounds Insoection Scoce (71707) l i

On March 2,1999, the inspectors accompanied the auxiliary building operator on a tour j of the auxiliary building, Observations and Findinos The tour performed by the nonficensed operator was thorough. Equipment checks were performed which consisted of verifying pump and motor housing temperatures, ensuring !

vibrations were normal, and verifying that no unusual noises were present. All readings that were required to be takan were recorded on the watch station log. The inspectors verified that the nonlicensed operator was familiar with his duties and responsibilities in emergency situations. The nonlicensed operator knew the location of emergency and abnormal procedures and knew which procedure to implement to mitigate accident The nonlicensed operator knew the location of prestaged emergency equipmen Conclusions A nonlicensed operator conducted thorough checks of plant equipment with a good questioning attitude and attention to detail.

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05 . Operator Training and Qualification a.' Insoection Scooe (71707)

The inspectors observed operations crew performance in the simulator during several training exercises. In addition, the inspectors attended the critique of the training

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exercises and discussed simulator fidelity with the operations training supervisor, b. ' Observations and Findings On February 24,1999, the licensee performed several simulator training scenarios. The inspectors observed that crew personnel were assigned various positions during the training exercises observed. During one exercise the shift manager performed the licensed senior operator functions and the licensed senior operator was the shift manager. The inspectors discussed this training method with the training instructor who stated that this reversal of roles has been helpful in increasing communication within operations crews. The training instructor stated that this method of training is especially -

valuable when operations crews have been recently reconfigured. During January of this year, most of the Fort Calhoun operating crews were reconfigured with some of the operations crews having been together for 3 or more year The inspectors also observed that orie of the operations personnel crew members was placed in an evaluator role for each of the scenarios. This was beneficialin that it a4 owed the evaluating operations person to see the whole crew's performance and j become sensitized to the challenges in performing the various crew responsibilitie Lastly, the inspectors observed that the operations training supervisor observed one of the scenarios and provided constructive feedback to the operations crew in the area o three-way communications and crew briefing The operations training supervisor position was created in January 1999. This position was created to provide an additional communication channel between operations end training personnel to enhance the qual.ity of the training provided to cperator Conclusions The licensee has instituted several different observation and training methods for increasing operations crew communications, especially with operations crews which have recently been reconfigured. These methods, used in conjunction with simulator exercises, provided valuable training for the operations crew personne i

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l 07- Quality Assurance in Operations J 07.1 ' Quality Assurance Activities insoection Scope (71707 and 62707) ~

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The inspecfors reviewed several surveillances which were performed by the quality assurance department. The inspectors also reviewed plans being made by the quality assurance department to independently assess programs and processes that would be -

used to determine if the licensee accomplished the seven safety cornerstones outlined in the'new NRC reactor inspection and oversight progra Observations and Findinos Dunng this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed eight surveillances which were performed by quality assurance personnel in January 1999. Maintenance activities were

' the focus of six of the surveillances. The remaining surveillances evaluated electrical equipment qualification and drawing verification. The inspectors noted that the scope of

. the surveillances was good and each identified areas for improvemen The inspectors noted that all the maintenance surveillances assessed emergent activities. Historically, quality assurance surveillances primarily enluated preplanned activities. However, the quality assurance manager informed the inspectors that the quality assurance department would be performing more surveillances of emergent activities. Emergent audits and surveillances were being performed to get quality .

assurance more involved in day-to-day plant activities. Plan-of-the-day items, ongoing plant issues, and other emerging activities were goint, to be utilized to select potential audit area With respect to the new NRC reacter inspection and oversight program, the quality assurance department identified programs and processes that would be usd to

. independently determine if the station met the seven safety cornerstonas. A schedule for evaluating these aciivities was under developmen Conclusions The quality assurance department has begun a more proactive involvement in plant ,

activitias. More audits and surveillances of emergent plant activities were being i performed. Quality assurance was identifying those programs and processes that would

- be'used to determine if the station inet the seven safety cornerstones outlined in the new NRC reactor irspection and oversight program. Quality assurance was developing schedules to audit these area l l

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-6-l ll. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments - Maintenance Inspection Scope (62707)

The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work activities:

• Cleaning Condensate Feedwater Pump FW-3,

• Troubleshooting of Radiation Monitor RM-057, and

• Numerous maintenance activities during circulating water cell outag Observations and Findinas The inspectors noted that the work performed under these activities was thorough, with no sub::tantive conce ns identified. All work observed was performed with the work packages present and in active use. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress. Quality control personnel were present i when require l Conclusions The maintenance activities observed were conducted in a contrclied and professional manne M1.2 Sjyveillance Tests Insoection Scoce (61726)

The inspectors observed or reswed all or portions cf the following test activities:

• Procedure OP-PM-AFW-0004, " Third Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability Verification," Revision 18;

• Procedure OP-ST-RW-3021, "AC-10C Raw Water Pump Quarterly inservice Test," Revision 20;

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• Procedure OP-ST-CH-3003, " Chemical and Volume Control System Pump / Check Valve Inservice Test," Revision 21; and

• Procedure EM-ST-EE-0009, " Monthly Surveillance Test fc- Station Battery Chargers," Revision 1 u

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! Observations and Findinas l The surveillance testing was conducted satisfactorily, in accordance with the licensee's l approved programs and the Technical Specification Conclusions i Surveillance activities wera generally completed in a thorough and professional manner.

M2' Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment ]

l M2.1 Review of Material Condition Durina Plant Tours Insoection Scoce (62707)

The inspectors performed routine plant tours to evaluate plant : 1aterial condition, Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed that the visible material condition and housekeeping of accescible areas of the auxiliary building, the radwaste building, the intake structure, and most areas of the turbine building were goo During a tour of the intake structure, external conditions of the diesel and electrical fire pumps were obsesved to be good with no leaks observed. Several deficiency tags were noted on the fire pumps, and the inspectors verified that mainienance work documents had been created and were active for the repair of the deficiencie During a tour of the auxiliary building, the inspectors noted that deficiency tags were in . I place identifying several valves and flanges with dry boric acid buildup. The inspectors i observed that all of the deficiency tags properly referenced a maintenance work request number to ensure that the deficiencies were repaired, Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the external material condition of equipment located in the auxiliary building, radwaste building, intake structure, and most areas of the turbine i building, including the emergency diesel generators, was good. The inspectors also verified that the licensee was addressing identified deficiencie l i

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-8-M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)

M8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-285/9716-0. - Inadequate postmaintenance testing of fire door lockset maintenanc The inspectors verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated October 14,1997, to be reasonable and complete. .No similar problems were identifie M8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-285/9718-02: Preventive maintenance order not completed by due dat The inspectors verified the corrective actions oescribed in the licensee's response lettor, dated December 31,1997, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were identifie j i

M8.3 (Closed) Violation 50-285/9811-01: Failure by operations personnel to initiate a work i package to document a deficient ball valve in the deluge syste The inspectors verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter l dated August 7,1998, to be reasonable and appropriate. The licensee has taken all 'i pertinent actions to address these commitment M8.4 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-285/9901-01: Shutdown Technical Specification entry due to auxiliary feedwater inoperabilit ,

This item was addressed in Section O2.1 of this repor Ill. Enaineerin_g E1 Conduct of Eng:neering E Review of Modification Packaae to Abandon a Portion of the Toxic Gas Monitorina System Insoection Scope (37551)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's modi.'ication package to abandon the chlorine and acid toxic gas monitor Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the modification to remove the toxic gas monitors for detecting chlorine, hydrazine, ethanloamine, and sulfuric acid. The monitors were originally

' installed to protect the operators against the worst postulated toxic chemical release accident. However, most of the toxic chemicals stored on-site have been remove Due to the current configuration at the Fort Calhoun Station, the hydrazine monitors will

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. be retained and modified to monitor / detect ammonia. This will ensure that ammonia is being monitored as required by the Fort Calhoun Station Technical Specifications and that,in the event of a toxic gas release accident, the outside dampers are closed and the control room ventilation is shutdown to preclude infiltration of toxic ammonia ga The inspectors discussed Modification 98-003 with the system engineering personnel specifically as it relates to the testing of the toxic gas monitors and the potential for inoperability cf the control room air conditioning units. The Technical Specification for the control room air conditioning units is 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to hot shutdown if both units are inoperable. During the testing phase for the toxic gas monitor system modification, one of the control room air conditioning unite will be inoperable. The inspectors, system engineering personnel, and operations personnel aiscussed the potential risk of causing both control room air conditioning units to become inoperable during the modificatio Technical Specifications would require the start of a plant shutdown with these condition System engineering personnel stated that a risk assessment had been considered for the mocification; however, no formal documentation of the assessment was noted, by the inspectors, in the modification package. The inspectors and system engineering personnel also discussed the scheduling of the modification and whether the modification could have been better performed during the refueling outage. The system engineer stated that the requirements for control room habitability were more limiting during the refueling outage, due to fuel movement. A determination was made to perform the modification on lin The inspectors observed portions of the modification and postmodification testing to the toxic gas monitoring system. The work and was performed in accordance with procedures and applicable Technical Specification Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee performed a modification to the toxic gas monitoring system in a controlled manner and in accordance with procedures. The inspectors verified that postmodification testing was appropriate, completed, and acceptabl !

IV. Plant Su_poort l

R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 General Comments (71750)

The inspectors observed health physics personnel, including supervisors, routinely ,

touring the radiciogically controlled areas. Licensee personnel working in radiologically l controlled areas exhibited good radiation worker practice i

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! l Contaminated areas and high radiation areas were properly posted. Area surveys posted outside rooms in the auxiliary building were current. The inspectors checked a sample of doors, required to be locked for the purpose of radiation protection, and identified no problem R1.2 As Low as Reasonab!v Achievable (ALARA) Brief for Hiah intearitv 00ntainer Shiofnent Inspection Scope (71750)

The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the prejob brief which was conducted prior 10 shipping a high integrity conta:ner of cadioactive waste offsit Observations and Findinas On March 2,1999, the inspectors attended a prejob brief for the transfer of a high l integrity container of waste resins from a storage location in the radioactive waste building to a shipping container for shipment offsite. The highest radiation reading on 1

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contact was 120 R/hr. The prejob brief discussed job responsibilities and ideraified contingencies that were to be implemented if a problem occurred. Effective communication was also stressed and ALARA personnel discussed the radiation work permits that were to be used by personnel involved with the transfe This was the fifth waste transfer in the last 14 months. The inspectors verified that the .

radiation protection pc'sonnel had incorporated lessons learned from previous waste shipments. The preplanning and incorporation of prior lessons learned was effective ]

because total dcao received for the entire evolution was 22 mre Conclusions The licensee did an excellent job in planning and incorporating lessons learned from prior waste transfers when transferring a high integrity container of waste into a shipping cask for removal offsit V. Manaaement Meetinas

X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at j

the exit meeting on March 15,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings as presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the

! inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION l FARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED -

L Licensee J. Chase, Division Manager, Nuclear Assessment l R. Clemens, Manager, Maintenance l D. Dryden, Station Licensing Engineer M. Frans, Manager, Nuclear Licensing B. Hansher, Supervisor, Station Licensing M. Puckett, Manager, Radiation Protection R. Ridenoure, Manager, Operations J. Solymossy, Plant Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED l

37551 Onsite Engineering l 61726 Surveillance Observations 62707 Maintenance Observations 71707 Plant Operations I

71750 Plant Support Activines 92902 Followup - Maintenance ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Ooened None Closed 9716-04 VIO Inadequate postmaintenance test of fire door lockset maintenance (Section M8.1).

9718-02 VIO Preventive maintenance order not completed by due date (Section M8.2).

9811 01 VIO Failure to initiate a work document (Section M8.3).

99-001-01 LER Shutdown Technical Specification Entry Due to Auxiliary Feedwater Inoperability (Section M8.4)

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Discussed None